IR 05000331/2002005
| ML021900635 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 07/09/2002 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB2 |
| To: | Peifer M Nuclear Management Co |
| References | |
| IR-02-005 | |
| Download: ML021900635 (32) | |
Text
July 9, 2002
SUBJECT:
DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-331/02-05(DRP)
Dear Mr. Peifer:
On June 29, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Duane Arnold Energy Center.
The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on June 27, 2002, with Mr. R. Anderson and other members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Specifically, this inspection focused on reactor, radiation and safeguards safety.
No findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Bruce L. Burgess, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-331 License No. DPR-49
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-331/02-05(DRP)
See Attached Distribution
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\duan\\ML021900635.wpd To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE RIII RIII NAME GWright/smb BBurgess DATE 07/09/02 07/09/02 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
REGION III==
Docket No:
50-331 License No:
DPR-49 Report No:
50-331/02-05(DRP)
Licensee:
Alliant, IES Utilities Inc.
Facility:
Duane Arnold Energy Center Location:
3277 DAEC Road Palo, Iowa 52324-9785 Dates:
March 31 through June 29, 2002 Inspectors:
P. Prescott, Senior Resident Inspector M. Kurth, Resident Inspector G. Pirtle, Physical Security Inspector R. Schmitt, Radiation Specialist Approved by:
Bruce L. Burgess, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000331-02-05(DRP), on 03/31-06/29/2002, IES Utilities, Inc., Duane Arnold Energy Center. Routine safety inspection.
This report covers a 6-week routine inspection. The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, a region-based radiation protection specialist, and a physical security specialist.
The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609 Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html. Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of the applicable violations.
A.
Inspector Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B.
Licensee Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Report Details Summary of Plant Status The plant was operated at essentially full power until May 18, 2002. At 11:39 p.m. on May 18, operators conducted a controlled shutdown to perform a planned repair of a main condenser tube leak. After opening the condenser waterboxes, isolation of a tube leak, and performance of preplanned maintenance, the reactor was taken critical May 22, at 7:59 p.m. and the main generator synchronized to the grid on May 23, at 8:04 a.m.
On May 24, from 12:15 a.m. to 1: 58 p.m., reactor power was lowered with recirculation flow from 83 to 63 percent to allow an unplanned weld repair to be performed on a control valve for the moisture separator reheater drain tank 1T-92A drain to feedwater heater 1E-6A (CV-1056).
Following the repair, full operating reactor power was achieved at 5:55 p.m., on May 25. For the remainder of the inspection the plant remained at or near full power.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating events, Mitigating Systems, and Emergency Preparedness 1R01 Adverse Weather (71111.01)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a walkdown of the licensees preparations for adverse weather, including conditions that could lead to loss of off-site power and conditions that could result from high temperatures or high winds. The licensees procedures and preparations for the impending tornado season were reviewed by the inspectors and were verified to be adequate. During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant specific design features and the licensees procedures used to mitigate or respond to adverse weather conditions. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and performance requirements for systems selected for inspection. Operator actions taken to prepare the plant for adverse weather were verified to be appropriate with plant specific procedures.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the following equipment trains to verify operability and proper equipment lineup. These systems were selected based upon risk
significance, plant configuration, system work or testing, or inoperable or degraded conditions.
- Main Switchyard;
A Core Spray system; and
B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system The inspectors also verified the position of critical redundant equipment and looked for any discrepancies between the existing equipment lineup and the lineup required by the Technical Specifications and plant procedures.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors walked down the following risk significant areas looking for any fire protection issues. The inspectors selected areas containing systems, structures, or components that the licensee identified as important to reactor safety.
- Area Fire Plan (AFP) 4, Reactor Building North Control Rod Drive (CRD)
Module Area, CRD Repair and CRD Cable Rooms;
AFP 5, Reactor Building South CRD Module Area and Offgas Recombiner Rooms and Railroad Airlock;
AFP 6, Reactor Building Residual Heat Removal Valve Room;
AFP 7, Reactor Building Laydown Area, Corridor and Waste Tank Area, and Spent Resin Tank Room;
AFP 8, Reactor Building Standby Gas Treatment System and Motor-Generator Set Rooms; and
AFP 9, Reactor Building Reactor Building Closed Looped Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Area, Equipment Hatch Area and Jungle Room The inspectors reviewed the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection equipment, manual suppression capabilities, passive suppression capabilities, automatic suppression capabilities, and barriers to fire propagation.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees flooding mitigation plans and supporting plant equipment to determine consistency with design requirements and the risk analysis assumptions related to seasonal external flooding. Walkdowns and reviews performed considered design measures, seals, drain systems, contingency equipment condition and availability of temporary equipment and barriers, performance of surveillance tests, procedural adequacy, and compensatory measures.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors observed licensed operator crew performance in mitigating the consequences of events during the May 15, 2002, site training full scale drill. The scenario included a seismic event; reactor core isolation cooling inlet steam valve failure; loss of reactor protection system power, inadvertent rapid insertion of a control rod ultimately leading to fuel failure; a break in reactor vessel piping; and site release of radioactive inventory based on the failure of secondary containment dampers. Areas observed by the inspectors included: clarity and formality of communications, timeliness of actions, prioritization of activities, procedural adequacy and implementation, control board manipulations, managerial oversight, emergency plan execution, and group dynamics.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed and observed emergent work, preventive maintenance, or planning for risk significant maintenance activities. The inspectors observed maintenance or planning for the following activities or risk significant systems undergoing scheduled or emergent maintenance.
- Weekly Scheduling and Planning Meetings; and
Outage Planning and Emergent Work Review Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the risk assessment of scheduled maintenance activities associated with work weeks 14, 17,18 and 21. Work week 14 included work
on the B core spray system and the 161 KV switchyard circuit breaker CB5950 and work week 17 involved work on 345 KV switchyard circuit breaker CB2820 and the reactor water cleanup system. Work week 18 involved work on the A control building chiller and divers inspecting the river water intake and work week 21 involved a plant shutdown to repair a main condenser tube leak.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's evaluation of plant risk, risk management, scheduling, and configuration control for these activities in coordination with other scheduled risk significant work. The inspectors verified that the licensee's control of activities considered assessment of baseline and cumulative risk, management of plant configuration, control of maintenance, and external impacts on risk. In-plant activities were reviewed to ensure that the risk assessment of maintenance or emergent work was complete and adequate, and that the assessment included an evaluation of external factors. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee entered the appropriate risk category for each planned and emergent maintenance activity.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the following operability evaluations to determine the impact on Technical Specifications (TS), the significance of the evaluations, and to ensure that adequate justifications for operability were supported in the requisite documentation.
- Action Request (AR) 30562, One (CV 4327F) of Seven Drywell to Torus Vacuum Breakers Exhibited Position Indication Problems During Performance of the Monthly Surveillance;
AR 30690, Low Sump Lube Oil for Emergency Diesel Generator 1G021 During Monthly Surveillance Run; and
AR 30785, Can the Residual Heat Removal Pump Seals (i.e., IP229A,B,C&D)
Operate Under Accident Conditions Without Seal Cooling Operability evaluations were selected based upon an understanding of the relationship between safety-related systems, structures, or components and risk.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Operator Workarounds (OWA) (71111.16)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed OWA AR 23397, EMAs A46577 & 78: AN4162A/B (Offgas Hydrogen Analyzers) Replacement. Also, OWA 30779, Provide Suppression to Eliminate Spurious Alarms Caused by Cycling MO2404 [RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Isolation], was evaluated. The inspectors review of the offgas hydrogen analyzers replacement included the workarounds potential to impact the operators ability to ensure that radioactive gases remain as low as reasonably achievable. The review of the workaround associated with MO2404 was ensure that operability of the valve was not impacted.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors selected the following post-maintenance activities for review. Activities were selected based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to impact risk.
- Preventive Work Order (PWO) 1118938, Overhaul Limitorque Operator for B Core Spray Outboard Isolation Injection Valve MO-2135-O;
Corrective Work Order (CWO) A53631, for 345 KV Breaker CB0710(T), Current Transformers are Leaking SF6 Gas. Overhaul Current Transformers.;
CWO A53320, for 1K4 standby liquid gas treatment (SBGT) instrument air compressor, Aftercooler on 1K004 is Bulged and has had a Braze Repair to the Shell. Replace Aftercooler with a New One.; and
CWO A57385, for the standby transformer feeder breaker 1A401, Refurbish Breaker and Install Breaker into 1A401" The inspectors verified by witnessing the test or reviewing the test data that post-maintenance testing activities were adequate for the above maintenance activities.
The inspectors reviews included, but were not limited to, integration of testing activities, applicability of acceptance criteria, test equipment calibration and control, procedural use and compliance, control of temporary modifications or jumpers required for test performance, documentation of test data, TS applicability, system restoration, and evaluation of test data. Also, the inspectors verified that maintenance and post-maintenance testing activities adequately ensured that the equipment met the licensing basis, TS, and USAR design requirements.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors selected the following surveillance test activities for review. Activities were selected based upon risk significance and the potential risk impact from an unidentified deficiency or performance degradation that a system, structure, or component could impose on the unit if the condition were left unresolved.
- NS 720202, Offgas Hydrogen Monitor Channel Calibration, Revision 9;
Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 3.3.5.1-09, Functional Test of Drywell Pressure - High Instrumentation, Revision 0;
STP 3.3.6.1-13, Reactor Water Cleanup High Differential Flow Channel Calibration, Revision 6;
STP 3.5.1-05, HPCI System Operability Test, Revision 15;
STP 3.7.4-03, Control Room Positive Pressure Test, Revision 5; and
STP 3.3.8.1-06, Essential Bus Degraded Voltage Relays Logic System Functional Test, Revision 0 The inspectors observed the performance of surveillance testing activities, including reviews for preconditioning, integration of testing activities, applicability of acceptance criteria, test equipment calibration and control, procedural use, control of temporary modifications or jumpers required for test performance, documentation of test data, TS applicability, impact of testing relative to performance indicator reporting, and evaluation of test data.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed temporary modification permit (TMP), Energize K2 Relay Inside 1LUPSB so that Normal Lighting may be Restored to the Control Room. Also, TMP 01-061, Bypass Voltage Monitoring Relay - The Relay is used to Ensure 250 VDC Circuit Breaker has not Tripped and is Available for MO1909 Power, was reviewed to ensure the relay was used to provide indication only and did not inhibit operation of an RHR shutdown cooling outboard isolation valve. The inspectors reviewed the safety screening, design documents, USAR, and applicable TS to determine that the temporary modification was consistent with modification documents, drawings and procedures. The inspectors also reviewed the post-installation test results to confirm that tests were satisfactory and the actual impact of the temporary modification on the permanent system and interfacing systems were adequately verified.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
a.
Inspection Scope A simulator-based emergency preparedness drill and training evolution was observed by the resident inspectors to evaluate drill conduct and the adequacy of the licensees critique of performance results in identifying weaknesses and deficiencies. The implementation of the emergency operating procedures, event classification and reporting actions were also observed. The May 15, 2002, training drill included a seismic event; reactor core isolation cooling inlet steam valve failure; loss of reactor protection system power; inadvertent rapid insertion of a control rod ultimately leading to fuel failure; a break in reactor vessel piping; and site release of radioactive inventory based on the failure of secondary containment dampers. This simulator scenario resulted in an unusual event, alert, site area emergency, and general emergency classifications. The inspectors verified that the drill evolution was of an appropriate scope and that no discrepancies existed between observed performance results and reported performance indicator statistics.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2.
RADIATION SAFETY Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety (OS)
2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)
.1 Plant Walkdowns, Radiological Boundary Verifications, and Radiation Work Permit Reviews a.
Inspection Scope The inspector conducted walkdowns of the radiologically protected area to verify the adequacy of radiological area boundaries and postings. Specifically, the inspector walked down radiologically significant work area boundaries (i.e., radiation, high and locked high radiation areas) in the Reactor Building, Radwaste Building, Spent Fuel Pool area, and the Turbine Building. The inspector performed confirmatory radiation surveys in selected portions of these areas to verify that they were properly posted and controlled in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20, licensee procedures, and Technical Specifications. The inspector also examined the radiological conditions of work areas within radiation and high radiation areas to assess contamination controls. Additionally, the inspector reviewed radiation work permits (RWPs) for general tours and access to
high radiation /locked high radiation areas (HRA/LHRAs), to verify that work instructions and controls had been adequately specified and that electronic dosimeter set points were in conformity with survey indications.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Reviews of Licensees Programmatic Controls for Highly Activated/Contaminated Materials a.
Inspection Scope The inspector performed walkdowns of the spent fuel pool and cask pool to verify adequate physical controls of highly activated or contaminated materials. The inspector reviewed procedure ACP 1407.2, Material Control in the Spent Fuel Pool and Cask Pool, to ensure the licensee was in compliance with procedural storage and control requirements. The inspectors also discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager the licensees programmatic controls over the highly activated or contaminated materials.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed licensee Action Requests (ARs), written since the last assessment (February 2001) to the date of the current assessment, which focused on access control to radiologically significant areas (i.e., problems concerning activities in HRAs, radiation protection technicians performance, and radiation worker practices).
The inspector reviewed these documents to verify the licensees ability to identify repetitive problems, contributing causes, the extent of conditions, and then implement other corrective actions in order to achieve lasting results.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2.
RADIATION SAFETY Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety (PS)
2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems (71122.01)
.1 Offsite Dose Assessment Manual (ODAM), Dose Calculations, and Changes to The ODAM a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed a selection of monthly, quarterly, and annual dose calculations from the 2001 ODAM (Revision 16) to ensure that the licensee had properly calculated the offsite dose from radiological effluent releases and to determine if any annual Technical Specifications or ODAM limits (i.e., Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 values)
were exceeded. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the ODAM for changes made by the licensee to the liquid or gaseous radioactive waste system design, procedures, or operation since the last inspection. For each ODAM revision that impacted effluent monitoring or release controls, the inspector reviewed the licensees technical justifications for the changes and determined if the changes were made in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Radioactive Effluent Release Data a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the calendar year (CY) 2000 Annual Radioactive Materials Release Report to verify that the radioactive effluent program was implemented as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and ODAM and to ensure that any anomalies in the release data were adequately understood by the licensee.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Gaseous and Liquid Releases a.
Inspection Scope There were no liquid releases or gaseous batch releases during the inspection period (i.e., only continuous releases of gaseous effluent). However, the inspector reviewed the staff assessments and analyses of the continuous gaseous release, including the projected doses to members of the public, to verify that appropriate treatment equipment was operational and that the radioactive gaseous effluents were processed and released in accordance with ODAM requirements.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Liquid and Gaseous Release Systems Walkdowns
a.
Inspection Scope
Prior to commencing walkdowns, the inspector interviewed members of the licensees chemistry staff responsible for implementing the liquid and gaseous radioactive waste effluent treatment and monitoring program and the system engineers responsible for maintaining the safety-related (and non-safety related) ventilation systems. The interviews were conducted to assess staff knowledge in their areas of responsibility and to obtain system performance information. The inspector performed walkdowns of the major components of the liquid effluent treatment and monitoring system (e.g., radiation and flow monitors, tanks, and pumps) to verify that the current system configuration was as described in the UFSAR and the ODAM. Specifically, the inspector reviewed the material condition of the point of discharge radiation monitors and the condition of equipment in the following areas:
the liquid radwaste discharge transfer valve;
turbine building waste sump pump discharge valve;
surge volume holding tanks;
chemical waste and detergent holding tank room;
chemical waste filter collector tank room;
waste collector tank room;
condensate phase separator room; and
clean-up phase separator room.
Additionally, the configurations of the liquid and gaseous radioactive waste collection and processing equipment and the filter housings for the control room emergency filtration/pressurization system and the plants ventilation system were inspected to verify conformance with the licensees UFSAR. The inspector also evaluated the material condition of the gaseous treatment and monitoring system to ensure that the equipment was as described in the UFSAR and ODAM. In particular, the following filtration and monitoring system components were inspected:
SBGT system ventilation, A and B trains;
control room standby filter unit (SFU) system ventilation, A and B trains;
technical support center SFU system ventilation;
low-level Radwaste processing and storage facility (LLRPSF) ventilation exhaust stack, normal range digital radiation monitoring system (DRMS);
turbine building ventilation exhaust with normal and accident range DRMS;
reactor building ventilation exhausts #1, #2, and #3, with normal and accident range DRMS; and
offgas stack with normal and accident range DRMS.
The inspector also observed ongoing activities, including observations of chemistry technicians performing weekly change-outs of the particulate filters and silver zeolite (i.e., iodine) cartridges on each of the plants monitoring systems from the Turbine Building Kaman #2 (K2) effluent monitor, the Reactor Building Kaman (K4, K6, and K8)
effluent monitors, and the Off-Gas stack Kaman (K10) effluent monitor to verify that the
samples had been collected in compliance with station procedures. Additionally, the inspector reviewed liquid effluent sampling procedures, analysis results from the most recent liquid effluent sample (i.e., shutdown service water), and conducted a tour of the plant areas where chemistry technicians would sample shutdown service water to verify plant personnel could properly collect samples and demonstrate adequate analytical practices to ensure that effluents were properly quantified.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Air Cleaning Systems a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the most recent results of the in-place filter testing of high efficiency particulate air filters and charcoal absorbers for the control room ventilation system SFU, the SBGT system, and technical support center SFU ventilation systems.
The inspector also reviewed the results of the laboratory tests performed on charcoal absorbers sampled from the control room ventilation system SFU, the SBGT system, and technical support center SFU ventilation system, as well as charcoal adsorber material in the warehouse stock system, to verify that the air cleaning systems were tested in compliance with Technical Specifications and that test results met acceptance criteria. The inspector also reviewed surveillance test results for the stack and vent flow rates to verify that the flow rates and periodicity of testing were consistent with the UFSAR.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.6 Liquid and Gaseous Effluent Monitor Calibrations a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed records of instrument calibrations or maintenance performed since the last inspection for selected point of discharge effluent radiation monitors (including the associated flow rate instrumentation) to verify that these instruments had been calibrated consistent with industry standards and in accordance with station procedures. Specifically, the inspector reviewed the calibration records for:
Main Steam Line radiation monitor (RM-4448A);
Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) radiation monitor (RM-1997);
Reactor Building Exhaust Shaft radiation monitor (RIM-7606A);
Off-Gas Vent Stack radiation monitor (RIM-4116A/B);
KAMAN Reactor Building Vent Shaft 2 normal range (1C330B); and
RHRSW/ESW Rupture Disk radiation monitor (RM-4268)
Additionally, the inspector reviewed recent modifications to effluent monitoring systems and the current effluent radiation monitor alarm set-point values for these monitors to assess compliance with ODAM requirements. The inspector also examined the licensees data for CY 2000 - 2002 for trending and tracking the reliability and maintenance of selected point of discharge effluent radiation monitors. The inspector performed this review to assess the adequacy of the licensees efforts to improve the overall effectiveness of the effluent and process radiation monitoring system.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.7 Analytical Instrumentation Quality Control (QC)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the quality control data and charts for the radio-chemistry instrumentation systems used to identify and quantify effluent release and environmental samples, to verify the equipment was properly maintained consistent with station procedures and to ensure that effluent concentrations were accurately calculated. This included a review of the licensees gamma spectroscopy/spectrometry systems, liquid scintillation instruments, and associated instrument control charts.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.8 Interlaboratory Comparison Program a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the results of the CY 2000 and First Quarter 2001 Inter-Laboratory Comparison Program in order to assess the quality of radioactive effluent sample analyses performed by the licensee. The inspector reviewed the licensee's quality control evaluation of the Inter-Laboratory Comparison Program and associated corrective actions for any deficiencies identified.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.9 Identification and Resolution of Problems a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed selected CY 2000 to 2002 licensee quality assurance audits, chemistry/radiation protection departments self-assessments, and an independent nuclear industry audit which were used to evaluate, identify, characterize and prioritize
problems with the radioactive waste effluent treatment and monitoring program. The reviews were conducted to verify that radiological effluent issues were adequately addressed.
The inspector also reviewed ARs that related to the liquid and gaseous radioactive waste effluent program, which were written during the last assessment period. The inspector reviewed these documents to assess the licensees ability to enter identified problems into their corrective action program, note repetitive problems, identify contributing causes, and assess the extent of conditions. The inspector also reviewed these documents to verify that deficiencies were appropriately resolved in a timely manner and that the licensees corrective action program would achieve long-lasting results.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
3.
SAFEGUARDS Cornerstone: Physical Protection 3PP1 Access Authorization (AA) Program (Behavior Observation Only) (71130.01)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspector interviewed five supervisors and five non-supervisors (both licensee and contractor employees) to determine their knowledge level and practice for implementing the licensees behavior observation program responsibilities. Selected procedures pertaining to the Behavior Observation Program and associated training activities were reviewed. Also, licensee fitness-for-duty semi-annual test results were reviewed. In addition, the inspector reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments and security logged events. The inspector also interviewed security managers to evaluate their knowledge and use of the licensees corrective action program.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
3PP2 Access Control (Identification, Authorization and Search of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles) ( 71130.02)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the licensees protected area access control equipment testing and maintenance procedures. The inspector observed licensee testing of all access control equipment to determine if testing and maintenance practices were performance based. On two occasions, during peak ingress periods, the inspector observed in-
processing search of personnel and packages to determine if search practices were conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements. Interviews were conducted and records were reviewed to verify that security staffing levels were consistently and appropriately implemented. Also, the inspector reviewed the licensees process for limiting access to the protected area and vital equipment to only authorized personnel.
The inspector reviewed the licensees program to control security keys and security related computer data.
The inspector reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments, maintenance request records, and security logged events for identification and resolution of problems. In addition, the inspector interviewed security managers to evaluate their knowledge and use of the licensees corrective action system.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
3PP4 Security Plan Changes (71130.04)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed Revision 44 (dated August 1, 2001) to the Duane Arnold Energy Center Physical Security Plan. The review was conducted to verify that the changes did not decrease the effectiveness of the security plan. The referenced revision was submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p).
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety, Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Physical Protection
.1 Radiological Effluent Technical Specification (RETS)/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrence Performance Indicator a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the licensees ARs for CYs 2000-2002 and offsite dose calculations (January 2001 through December 2001) to identify any occurrences that were not identified by the licensee and verify that the licensee had accurately reported the performance indicator for the public radiation safety cornerstone. The inspector discussed the RETS/ODCM performance indicator data collection and analysis process
with the data steward for this indicator, to verify that the program was implemented consistent with industry guidelines provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02 and licensee procedures.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors verified the accuracy and completeness of the Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal performance indicator data submitted by the licensee for the fourth quarter of 2001 (October through December of 2001). The inspectors reviewed data reported to the NRC since the last verification. The review was accomplished, in part, through evaluation of the TS requirements, plant records, procedural reviews, and reactor coolant sample data.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Safety System Unavailability a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors verified the accuracy and completeness of the Safety System Unavailability - Standby Diesel Generators performance indicator data submitted by the licensee for the fourth quarter of 2001 (October through December of 2001). The inspectors reviewed data reported to the NRC since the last verification. The review was accomplished, in part, through evaluation of the TS requirements, plant records, procedural reviews, and reactor coolant sample data.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Physical Protection Performance Indicators a.
Inspection Scope The inspector verified the data for the Physical Protection Performance Indicators (PI)
pertaining to Fitness-For-Duty Personnel Reliability, Personnel Screening Program, and Protected Area Security Equipment. Specifically, a sample of plant reports related to security events, security shift activity logs, fitness-for-duty reports, and other applicable security records were reviewed for the period between April 1, 2001, and March 31, 2002.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution Action Request 30860: D Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Pump Failed to Trip from the Control Room a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed circumstances involving the D RHRSW pump failing to trip from the control room. The pump was in operation during the performance of routine surveillance STP NS540002, Emergency Service Water Operability Test. The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective actions associated with the following attributes: complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner commensurate with its significance and ease of discovery; evaluations and disposition of performance issues associated with maintenance effectiveness; evaluation and disposition of operability/reportability issues; consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences; classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem commensurate with its safety significance; identification of root and contributing causes of the problem; identification of corrective actions which are appropriately focused to correct the problem; and completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.
b.
Findings The licensee determined that the breaker position switch was not fully engaged therefore, the electrical circuit was incomplete. The device is located at the rear of the breaker cubicle and is mechanically operated by the breaker racking mechanism. The breaker racking mechanism toggles the position switch into normal plant control scheme when the breaker is elevated to the racked-in position. During this occurrence the breaker position switch was not fully toggled resulting in a disconnect from normal plant control circuitry.
Corrective actions include removal of the breaker position switch and modifications to breaker control circuitry. The licensee plans to complete the corrective actions during the upcoming refueling outages when the electrical busses will be taken out of service for maintenance. The licensees review determined that the modification applies to all 4160 volt breakers in service at the plant.
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meeting Exit Meeting The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Anderson and other members of licensee management on June 27, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
An interim exit related to the public radiation safety, and radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent treatment and monitoring systems inspection was conducted on April 5, 2002 with Mr. R. Anderson. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
The results of the Safeguards inspection were presented to Mr. G. Van Middlesworth and other members of the licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 19, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered safeguards or proprietary information. No safeguards or proprietary information was identified.
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee R. Anderson, Plant Manager B. Bernier, System Engineer Supervisor J. Bjorseth, Manager, Engineering D. Brigl, Long Term Program Engineer R. Brown, Nuclear Oversight Manager E. Christopher, Program Engineer D. Curtland, Site Support Manager K. Dunlap, Emergency Preparedness Planner J. Ertman, Team Leader-Engineer T. Evans, Operations Manager S. Funk, Radiological Effluents Coordinator L. Gibney, Emergency Preparedness Planner H. Giorgio, Manager, Radiation Protection A. Johnson, Operations Training Supervisor R. Johnson, Emergency Preparedness Scenario Developer D. Johnson, Emergency Preparedness Specialist J. Karrick, Licensing B. Kindred, Security Manager L. Kriege, Chemistry Supervisor J. Lohman, Communications Manager S. McVay, System Engineer S. Nelson, Health Physics Supervisor J. Newman, Radiological Engineering Supervisor K. Putnam, Licensing Manager A. Roderick, Principal Mechanical Engineer B. Roland, Security Operations Supervisor W. Simmons, Maintenance Superintendent P. Sullivan, Emergency Planning Manager R. Titus, Emergency Preparedness Planner G. Van Middlesworth, Site Vice-President Nuclear C. Vogeler, Emergency Preparedness Specialist G. Whittier, RHR System Engineer K. Williams, Senior Emergency Planning Specialist NRC P. Prescott, Senior Resident Inspector B. Burgess, Chief, Branch 2, DRP
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None Closed None Discussed None
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ADAMS NRCs Document System AFP Area Fire Plan ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable AR Action Request CFR Code of Federal Regulations CRD Control Rod Drive CWO Corrective Work Order CY Calender Year DAEC Duane Arnold Energy Center DRMS Digital Radiation Monitoring System DRP Division of Reactor Projects DRS Division of Reactor Safety EMA Engineered Maintenance Action EP Emergency Preparedness HPCI High Pressure Coolant Injection HRA High Radiation Area K2 Kaman #2 LHRA Locked High Radiation Area LLRPSF Low Level Radwaste Processing and Storage Facility NEI Nuclear Energy Institute NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission ODAM Off-site Dose Assessment Manual ODCM Off-site Dose Calculation Manual OI Operating Instruction OS Occupational Radiation Safety OWA Operator Workaround P&IDs Piping and Instrumentation Drawings PARS Public Availability Records PI Performance Indicator PS Public Radiation Safety PWO Preventive Work Order RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RETS Radioactive Effluents Technical Specification RHRSW Residual Heat Removal Service Water RHRSW/ESW Residual Heat Removal Service Water/Essential Service Water ROP Reactor Oversight Process RP Radiation Protection RWP Radiation Work Permit SBGT Stand-by Gas Treatment SDP Significance Determination Process SFU Stand-by Filter Unit STP Surveillance Test Procedure TMP Temporary Modification Permit TS Technical Specification UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED The following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the inspection and to support any findings.
1R01 Adverse Weather IPOI 6, Attachment 2 Plant Return to Normal Operation Checklist Revision 21 Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE)
November 1995 1R04 Equipment Alignment P&ID DAEC Substation Revision 4 P&ID DAEC Switchyard Schematic Revision 3 Operating Instruction (OI)
151 Core Spray System Revision 35 P&ID M119 Residual Heat Removal System Revision 73 P&ID M120 Residual Heat Removal System Revision 57 OI 149 Residual Heat Removal System Revision 74 1R05 Fire Protection Area Fire Plan (AFP) 4 Reactor Building North Control Rod Drive (CRD)
Module Area, CRD Repair and CRD Cable Rooms Revision 23 AFP 5 Reactor Building South CRD Module Area and Offgas Recombiner Rooms and Railroad Airlock Revision 22 AFP 6 Reactor Building Residual Heat Removal Valve Room Revision 22 AFP 7 Reactor Building Laydown Area, Corridor and Waste Tank Area, and Spent Resin Tank Room Revision 22 AFP 8 Reactor Building Standby Gas Treatment System and Motor-Generator Set Rooms Revision 22 AFP 9 Reactor Building Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Area, Equipment Hatch Area and Jungle Room Revision 23 Fire Plan Volume II - Fire Brigade Organization Revision 32
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program 2002 Red Training Full Scale I Drill Revision 0 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Online Look-Ahead Agenda (Week 14)
March 28, 2002 Level A and Other Significant Activities Summary - Week 9214 February 12, 2002 Online Look-Ahead Agenda (Week 18)
April 18, 2002 Level A and Other Significant Activities Summary - Week 9218 March 19, 2002 Online Look-Ahead Agenda (Week 21)
May 16, 2002 Level A and Other Significant Activities Summary - Week 9221 April 9, 2002 1R15 Operability Evaluations AR 30562 One (CV 4327F) of Seven Drywell to Torus Vacuum Breakers Exhibited Position Indication Problems During Performance of the Monthly Surveillance April 11, 2002 AR 30690 Low Sump Lube Oil for Emergency Diesel Generator 1G021 During Monthly Surveillance Run April 22, 2002 AR 30785 Can the RHR Pump Seals (i.e., 1P229A,B,C&D)
Operate Under Accident Conditions Without Seal Cooling April 29, 2002 Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Letter Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Core Spray (CS) Pump Seals April 30, 2002 Evaluation of RHR/CS Pump Room Temperature Following a DBA LOCA Without Loss-of-Offsite Power May 16, 2002 1R16 Operator Workarounds AR 23397 EMAs A46577 & 78: AN4162A/B (Offgas Hydrogen Analyzers) Replacement December 11, 2000 CWO A46577 Replace Offgas Hydrogen Analyzer December 10, 2001 CWO A46578 Replace Offgas Hydrogen Analyzer April 8, 2002
AR 30779 Provide Suppression to Eliminate Spurious Alarms Caused by Cycling MO2404 April 29, 2002 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing PWO 1118938 Overhaul Limitorque Operator for B Core Spray Outboard Isolation Injection Valve MO-2135-O April 2, 2002 CWO A53631 Current Transformers are Leaking SF6 Gas.
Overhaul Current Transformers April 15, 2002 CWO A53320 The Aftercooler on 1K004 is Bulged and has had a Braze Repair to the Shell. Replace Aftercooler with a New One.
June 6, 2002 EMA A45562 During Replacement of 1F608B and the Installation of 3/4" inch OD Stainless Steel Tubing Evaluated Under Generic EMA A45562 in 1K4, an Undocumented Check Valve was Found on the Inlet Air Piping to the Aftercooler Revision 1 Memo Performance of the Revision to WO A53320 for 1K4 did not Proceed as Expected June 6, 2002 EMA A53319 EMA will Replace the Aftercoolers Located on the CB/SBGTS Instrument Air Compressor Skids February 4, 2002 CWO A57385 Refurbish Spare Breaker and Install Breaker into 1A401 June 4, 2002 CKTBKR-G080-07 Breaker Overhaul Revision 6 1R22 Surveillance Testing NS 720202 Offgas Hydrogen Monitor Channel Calibration Revision 9 STP 3.3.5.1-09 Functional Test of Drywell Pressure - High Instrumentation Revision 0 STP 3.3.6.1-13 Reactor Water Cleanup High Differential Flow Channel Calibration Revision 6 STP 3.5.1-05 HPCI System Operability Test Revision 15 STP 3.7.4-03 Control Room Positive Pressure Test Revision 5 AR 31169 STP 3.7.4-03 (Control Building Positive Pressure Test) Issues June 1, 2002 DAEC Technical Specifications STP 3.3.8.1-06 Essential Bus Degraded Voltage Relays Logic System Functional Test Revision 0
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications TMP 02-015 Energize K2 Relay Inside 1LUPSB so that Normal Lighting may be Restored to the Control Room March 25, 2002 CWO A57890 Positive Battery Position Cell A-3 & B-3 are Shearing on Cell B-3. There Appears to be a Crack on the Top Connection Plate Inside the Cell April 9, 2002 UFSAR 9.5.3.2.2 Appendix R Control Room Lighting TMP 01-061 Bypass Voltage Monitoring Relay. Relay is used to Ensure 250 VDC Circuit Breaker has not Tripped and is Available for MO1909 Power May 22, 2002 2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas Action Request Items AR 29962 Failure to Attend Pre-job Briefing for HRA Work, Prior to RCIC Run February 21, 2002 Procedures HPP 3110.27 Calibration Sheet for ED #176820, Failed Test Results April 3, 2002 ACP 1407.2 Material Control in the Spent Fuel Pool and Cask Pool Revision 9 Miscellaneous Data NG-130K Spent Fuel/Cask Pool Material Storage Log Routine NRC Tours and Surveillance Revision 1 Revision 12 RWP 32 DAEC Week 9213/9214, On-line Schedule Defective Dosimetry Report, ED #176820 Daily Focus, DAEC Plant Status Report Spent Fuel Pool and Cask Pool Storage Location Drawing March 29, 2002 April 3, 2002 April 4, 2002 2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems Action Request items AR 16125 Inconsistent Alarm Set-points Between Ops Procedures, EALs, and ODAM March 17, 2000 AR 26438 Marginal Particulate and Iodine Sampling at Reactor Building Vent Stacks July 13, 2001
AR 27728 KAMAN 4 Computer Locked-up September 24, 2001 AR 29099 Determine Criteria Necessary to Meet Time Requirements for Compensatory Sampling December 6, 2001 AR 29439 Alarm Malfunction on KAMAN 12 January 28, 2002 AR 29482 Failed RHRSW Radiation Monitor Calibration January 1, 2002 AR 30488 Under-identifying of Cs-134 in DAEC HPGe Isotopic Analysis System April 4, 2002 Procedures ODAM Offsite Dose Assessment Manual November 30, 2001 PCP 1.2 DAEC Chemistry Quality Assurance Program Revision 17 PCP 2.6 Offgas Pretreatment and Post-treatment Sampling Revision 10 PCP 2.7 Gram sampling of Offgas stack, Reactor, Turbine, and LLRPSF Vent Stacks Revision 11 PCP 2.8 Collection and Analysis of Particulate and Iodine Filters from the Gaseous Effluent Monitors Revision 11 PCP 8.2 KAMAN Effluent Monitoring System Operating Procedures Revision 12 PCP 8.3 Alarm Set-points and Background Determination for KAMAN Normal Range Monitors Revision 15 PCP 8.4 Alarm Set-points and Efficiency for GE Offgas Stack Radiation Monitor Revision 6 PCP 8.5 Alarm Set-points and Efficiency for OG Post-treatment Revision 7 PCP 8.6 Alarm Set-points and Efficiency for OG Pre-treatment Revision 13 PCP 8.7 Alarm Set-points and Efficiency for Liquid Radiation Monitors Revision 11 STP-NS 290201 TSC Standby Filter Unit HEPA and Charcoal Testing, W/ Test Results (12-11-01)
Revision 2
STP-NS 790201 Offgas Post-treatment Radiation Monitor Calibration, W/ Test Results (12-3-01)
Revision 4 STP-NS 790202 Pretreatment Offgas Sample Radiation Monitor Calibration, W/ Test Results (12-4-01)
Revision 2 STP-NS 790301 GSW Radiation Monitor Calibration Revision 4 STP-NS 790303 RHRSW/ESW Rupture Disc Radiation Monitor Calibration, W/ Test Results (10-23-2000)
Revision 4 STP-NS 790305 RHRSW Radiation Monitor Calibration, W/Test Results (1-9-02)
Revision 2 STP-NS 790601 Effluent P & I Sampling and Analysis Revision 4 STP-NS 790702 Continuous Service Water Release Sampling
& Analysis, W/ Test Results (4-1-02)
Revision 5 STP-NS 791009 K6 Calibration, W/ Test Results (10-18-00)
Revision 3 STP-NS 791011 K8 Calibration, W/ Test Results (9-17-01)
Revision 4 STP-NS 791013 K 10 Calibration, W/ Test Results (9-6-01)
Revision 3 STP-NS 791013 K 10 Calibration Revision 5 STP-NS 791016 KAMAN Monitor Inoperable, with Compensatory Sampling Data (7-11-01 and 9-9-01)
Revision 0 STP-3.3.6.1-23 Reactor Building Exhaust Shaft Radiation Monitor Channel Calibration, W/ Test Results (1-3-02)
Revision 3 STP-3.3.6.1-26 Offgas Vent Stack Radiation Monitor Channel Calibration, W/ Quarterly Test Results (Second Quarter, 2001 to First Quarter, 2002)
Revision 3 STP-3.3.6.1-36 Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor Channel Calibration, W/ Test Results (2-7-02)
Revision 4 STP-3.3.6.1-38 Radiation Monitor Sensor Checks, W/ Test Results (3-30-02)
Revision 7 STP-3.6.4.3-03 Standby Gas Treatment System HEPA &
CHARCOAL FILTER EFFICIENCY TESTS, W/
TEST RESULTS FOR A and B Units (12-10-01 and 12-13-01)
Revision 7
STP-3.6.4.3-03 Standby Gas Treatment System HEPA &
Charcoal Filter Efficiency Tests, W/Test Results for Warehouse Charcoal Supply (12-10-01)
Revision 7 STP 3.7.4-02 Main Control Room Ventilation Standby Filter Unit Test, W/ Test Results (12-11-01)
Revision 4 STP-3.7.6-01 Pretreatment Offgas Sample-Noble Gases Activity Determination Revision 0 Self -Assessments RP6i Effluents Controls Program: Spring 02 Focused Self-assessment March 28, 2002 Nuclear Oversight Audit, Offsite Dose Assessment Manual (ODAM) Technical Requirements and Implementing Procedures Second quarter, CY 2000 Nuclear Oversight Audit, Offsite Dose Assessment Manual (ODAM) Assessment May-June, 2000 Miscellaneous Data Calibration Response Charts, Offgas Stack Vent, Aand B Monitor January, 1993 to April, 2002 Control Charts for Chemistry Lab Detectors #1, 2, and 3 December, 2001 to April, 2002 DAEC 2000, Annual Radioactive Materials Release Report Daily Chemistry Lab Detector Background Readouts April 2, 2002 Listing of ODAM Monitor, P.A.M. Monitors, Tech. Spec. Monitors, and Charcoal Filtering Units Memorandum on Calibration Frequency, Counting Instrument Calibration January 2, 2000 Nuclear Insurers Inspection Report December, 2000 Particulate and Iodine Log Sheets for K2,K4,K6,K8, K10, K12, and 1C-132 Second Quarter, 2002 Printouts of Process Flow Trend Displays, Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Readouts April 2, 2002
Radio-chemistry Cross Check Program Results, Analytics 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quarters, CYs 2000 and 2001 3PP Plant Protection ACP 101.6 Fitness-For-Duty Revision 7 ACP 101.7 Continued Behavioral Observation Program Revision 2 ACP 101.8 Access Authorization Program Revision 0 ACP 1402.4 NRC Performance Indicator Collection and Reporting Revision 3 ACP 1413.4 Access Authorization and Site Visitor Requirements Revision 15 Action Report No.
2657 Continued Behavior Observation Program July 16, 2002 Card History Printouts for Eight Randomly Selected Personnel Between September 2001 through March 2002 DAEC Security Daily Shift Log and Surveillance Logs September 2001 through February 2002 Master Listing of Security Related Action Requests May 25, 2001 to March 1,2002 Monthly Security Status Reports September 2001 through February 2002 Performance Indicator Calculation, Review, and Approval Second Quarter 2001 through First Quarter 2002 SD-4 Explosive Detectors Revision 13 SD-5 Metal Detector Revision 10 SD-7 X-Ray Inspection System Revision 10 SD-9 Keycard/Security Access Badge Issuance Revision 13 SD-15 Security Preventive Maintenance Revision 21
Security Event Reports April 1, 2001 through March 30, 2002 Semi Annual FFD Reports January 1,2001 to December 31,2001 SP-4 Control of Personnel and Visitors Revision 39 SP-5 Vehicle Access and Control Revision 24 SP-9 Locks, Keys, and Cards Revision 21 Testing and Maintenance Requirements for Security Equipment September 2001 through March 2002 Vital and Protected Area Key and Core Inventory June 28, 2000 and June 27, 2001 40A1 Performance Indicator Verification Action Request Items AR 20761 Inadequate Procedure for KAMAN Calibration July 5, 2000 AR 26783 Filter Media Re-installed Improperly for KAMAN 2 September 13, 2001 AR 29683 Detector Failure on KAMAN 9, Off-gas Stack Accident Range January 28, 2002 AR 23280 Effluent Monitoring System History Process Stopped Unexpectedly November 30, 2000 Procedures ACP 1402.4 NRC Performance Indicator Collection and Reporting. Attachment 1, PI Data Calculation, Review and Approval. First, Second, Third and Fourth Quarters, 2001 Data.
Revision 0 Miscellaneous Memo DAEC 4th Quarter 2001 NRC PI Summary January 25, 2002