IR 05000331/1992021
| ML20126J390 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1992 |
| From: | Cox C, Markley A, Mccormickbarge, Ploski T, Simons H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126J385 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-331-92-21, NUDOCS 9301060135 | |
| Download: ML20126J390 (20) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ;
REGION !!! <
Report No. 50-331/9202)(DRSS) .
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Docket No. 50-331 License No. DPR-49
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Licensee: lowa Electric Light and Power Company IE Towers, P.O. Box 351 '
Cedar Rapids, IA 52406 facility Name: Duane Arnold Energy Center Inspection At: Duane Arnold Energy Center site, Palo, IA Corporate Office, Cedar Rapids. IA ,
inspection Conducted: December 14-17, 1992 Inspectors: / d th ' /% /p2, T PT5'sTi Date
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Y 00mDM) /2/22./9b II. Simons Date kj()kleylll$wh[i$o,y>f .ls/>3)q1 '_
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Accompanying Personnel: M. Parker -
C. Miller D. McNeil Approved By: j)] llNwvW-/ 0 P?
-Dife ) Y))'/ , W.-~ Cormick~Ifarger, I Tef ~
Emergency Preparedness and Non-Power Reactor Section-IDipaction Summar_v
. inspection on December 14-17. 1992 (Report No.'50-331/92021(DRSS)) ..
At.0as Insoected: Routine, announced inspection of the Duane Arnold Energy Center's emergency. preparedness exercise -involving review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302), observations by seven NRC representatives of key 9301060135921230 PDR ADOCK 05000'g1
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functions and locations during the exercise (IP 82301), and follow-up on licensee actions on previously identified items (IP.82301 and IP 82701).
Results: No violations or deviations were identifie The licensee's overall performance was excellent, particularly with respect to: the onsite medical response; prompt emergency declarations and offsite agency notifications; onsite and offsite protective action decisionmaking; and operation of the Operational Support Center. Thorough corrective actions were .<
demonstrated on both concerns identified during the 1991 exercis l Several improvement areas were recommende The operating shift supervisor should have declared a second Unusual Event rather than making timely courtesy notifications to offsite agencies when plant conditions satisfied a second set of Unusual Event classification criteria (Section 6.a). The emergency !
operations facility's engineering support group should have treated' assessment
. requests from the facility's senior manager as action items having response .
deadlines (Section 6 e).
Challenging aspects of the scenario included: assembling and accounting for '
all onsite personnel; an onsite medical response; a difficult to identify release path from containment; and use of a response cell of controllers to simulate remotely located NRC reactor safety and protective measures staff :
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DETAILS 1. IIRC Observers and Ateas observed C. Cox, Control Room Simulator (CRS), Technical Support Center (TSC)
D. McNeil, CRS TSC C. Miller, TSC H. Simons, Onsite Medical Response, Operational Support Center (OSC),
Inplant Teams A. Markley, Emergency Operations Facili+y (EOF)
M. Parker, EOF T. Ploski, EOF 2. Persons Contacted D. McGaughy, Vice President, Production J. Franz, Vice President, Nuclear P. Serra, Manager, Emergency Planning L. Henderson, Supervisor Emergency Planning The above and 15 other licensee staff attended the exit interview on December 16, 1992. The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous 1v identified items (IP 82301)
(Closed)- Insnestion Followun item No. 331/91010-01: During the 1991 exercise, there was inef ficient and untimely decision making regarding the dispatch of inplant repair team As indicated in inspection Report No. 50-331/92008 (DRSS), the licensee revised the responsibilities assigned to positions in the Technical Support Cen'.er (TSC) and Operational Support. Center (OSC) which would be involved ir the authorization, formation and briefing of inplant teams.- ,
During the 1992 exercise, inplant teams were authorized, formed and briefed in a timely manner. This item is close (Closed) Inspection followup Item No. 331/91010-021 During the 1991 exercise Emergency Operations facility (EOF) staff failed to properly complete several offsito agency notification form The licensee revised the format of the form used for state and county notifications. During the 1992 exercise E0F staff correctly completed the offsite agency notification forms. This item is close .(Closed) Inspection Followun item No. 331/92008-011 Three emergency plan implementing procedures (EPIPs) contained incorrect information regarding the NRC Incident Response Plan and the notification requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (a)(3) and (c)(3).
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These EPIPs were revised to include current information on the NRC Incident Response Plan and accurate information regarding NRC notification requirements. This item is close . Egngral (IP 82H21 An announced, daytime exercise of the licensee's emergency plan was conducted at the Duane Arnold Energy Center on December 15, 1992. This was also a full scale exercise for the State of Iowa and for Linn County and Benton County. The exercise tested the capabilities of licensee, state and local organizations to respond to an accident scenario resulting in a simulated release of radioactive offluen The performances of state and local response organizations were evaluated by representatives of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), who will document their evaluation in a separate report. NRC and FEMA representatives summarized their preliminary exercise findings at a Public Critique hosted by FEMA in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, on December 17, 199 Attachment I describes the scope and objectives of the exercis Attachment 2 summarizes the exercise scenari . General Obseryations (IP 82301)
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The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely. If events had been real, actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to mitigate the accident and allow state and local officials to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safet . Specific Observations (IP 82301) Control Room Simulator (CRS)
The A - Operating Shift Supervisor (A-0SS) quickly and correctly declared an Unusual Event for the onsite response to a simulated, contaminated injured w ker and an Alert for a reactor coolant system leak greater than 50 gallons per minute but within makeup capability. State, county and simulated NRC officials were initially notified of both emergency declarations in a very timely and detailed manne In contrast, the crew was slow to seek information about the status of the onsite medical emergency from onscene responder In between the aforementioned emergency declarations, an orderly reactor-shutdown was begun when the coolant leak was less than 50
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gallons per minute but above the limiting value in the plant's
- _ Technical Specifications. This condition warranted an Unusual
Event declaration per the plant's Emergency Action Levels (EAls).-
i However, since an Unusual Event had already been declared for the unrelated response to an onsite injury, the A-0SS made " courtesy" notifications to state, county and simulated NRC officials rather-
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than declare'a'second Unusual Event. These courtesy notifications were completed;in'a timely and detailed manner. The A-055 should-
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have declared a.second-Unusual Event-for the increased coolant
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leak and associated commencement of reactor: shutdow Overall communications among the crew were gook .As'the scenario progressed, inplant repair activities were tracked. LOperators made good use of control panel indicators to quickly' identify the: -
approximate location in the reactor building associated with the containment broach. However, the fact that the breach was a failed containment penetration could'not'be identified from CRS-readout No violations or deviations were identified, b, Onsite Medical Emeraency Response
Security and Health Physics (HP) technicinns quickly responded-to i the simulated, contaminated injured person. -The-lead security ,
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officer exhibited strong command and control at the accident scene
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and did an excellent job assessing the victim's injuries and 4 monitoring vital sign The HP technicians did an excellent-job of promptly surveying ~the: -[
accident scene for contamination to expedite the medical response
by the security officers. The victim was located in-a very.small-space which allowed only one person-to attend the victim at a >
time. Despite these cramped conditions,:the HP technician was thorough in. monitoring the victim for contaminatio .
Tha' security officers and HP technicians worked well-together to 4 provide a timely transfer of the victim to the ambulance crew. - A '
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noteworthy example of this teamwork occurred when a security -
officer forgot to don-gloves before helping:another officer--splint?
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the victim's contamini'ed broken leg.:(The- other officer quickly!
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r noted that his coworker wasinot. wearing gloves.and: instructed himl to have his hands monitored for contamination. .The HP technician- '
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surveyed the officer's bare hands Mnd found that one-hand was contaminated. The technician taped a surgical' glove on the-
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contaminated hand, allowing the of ficer to. continue: attending,to- c the victim, and properly decidedito decontaminate the' officer's 1 handiafter the victim had been transferred'to the ambulanc The lead security officer made.a detailed record of the victim's-injuries and contamination _ levels.1: He provided this. Written "
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information to the ambulance: crew along with a' thorough verbal-briefing before the,:. victim was transported offsite.' ' u No violations or deviations were -identifie .
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c. JEhuifdl_Sypport Center (15Q The TSC was activated following the Alert declaration. Incoming staff prepared to perform their duties in an efficient manner. An orderly transfer of connand and control of onsite response activities to the Emergency Coordinator (EC) occurred within one half of an hour of the Alert declaratio All onsite personnel were assembled and accounted for within 30 minutes following the Alert declaration, per procedures. The simulated evacuation of nonessential personnel was ordered after the Site Area Emergency declaration in accordance with procedure Since the scenario postulated the unavailability of the primary of f site reassembly point for these avacuees, the correct decision was made to simulate their going to a backup . :*embly poin Technical staff did an excellent job of adjuning priorities as the scenario progresse Internal briefings were good supplements to detailed information accurately maintained on status board Status boards were well utilized to display the current status of inplant teams and numerical values found in potentially relevant EAls, so the EC could make a timely reclassification decisio Radiation protection staff closely monitored inplant radiation level data and kept OSC supervision informed of adverse change When significant increases in a number of area radiation monitors'
readings were noted, TSC staff even paged several deployed inplant teams to better ensure that these teams were promptly notified of the adverse radiological changes that could affect their mission TSC staff maintained effective communications with CRS and EOF counterparts. For example, when some plant parameter data appeared questionable on Emergency Data System (EDS) displays following a brief stop and restart of the simulator, actions were soon initiated to verify the more critical plant parameters'
latest values using a CRS communicator, who periodically obtained the data from panel indicators. The updated data were then verbally relayed by TSC staf f to OSC and EOF counterparts, as appropriat A simulated liould post accident sample was requested in ora to obtain an initial estimate of core damage, A reactor engineer made a good evaluation of the sample analyses results provided in the scenario, which indicated somewhat different estimates of the extent of core damag Very good engineering solutions were pursued to identify the breach of containment integrity. Once the possibility of a leak from the reactor water cleanup system was eliminated, plant drawings were used to identify that nearby piping of one train of the core spray system was another possible leak path. TSC staff eventually recognized that a failed containment penetration was
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another possibility and that visual inspection of the portion of the reactor building having the highest radiation levels would be necessary to1 confirm the identity of the containment breach. As inplant-radiation levels generally trended down, a team was requested to perform this inspection.-
Copies of emergency operating procedure flowcharts were readily available in the TSC. However, these flowcharts were not used as a reference to better monitor and anticipate the actions of the-CRS crew until relatively late in the scenari No violations or deviations were identifie Operational Support Center (OSC) and Inolant Team The OSC was staffed in a timely and orderly manner following the Alert declaration. The OSC Supervisor exhibited strong command-and control in the 0SC. Excellent support was provided by the HP, instrumentation and controls, electrical maintenance and mechanical maintenance supervisors. Status boards were kept current with detailed information regarding plant conditions and the status of repair teams. Briefings by TSC staff on the public address system provided additional information to OSC personne Inplant teams were dispatched from the OSC in a timely manne When the TSC staff requested a team, appropriate _ personnel were promptly chosen and were given detailed briefings on thei missions and associated radiological conditions prior to dispatc One noteworthy instance of good team coordination occurred with respect to the high priority task of opening a core spray valv Two teams were simultaneously formed to accomplish this task. One team was comprised of electrical maintenance personnel, while the other consisted of mechanical maintenance technicians. HP technicians accompanied both team A good decision was made to dispatch'~the electrical _ maintenance-team first to attempt to open the valve electrically, since their - -
effort would take relatively little time. The mechanical-maintenance supervisor and HP supervisor then began briefing the mechanical maintenance team, which would manually open the valve, should the efforts to open the valve _ electrically fai The only negative aspect to-the efforts to open the valve was:that-an overly restrictive turn back dose rate of 50 milliroentgen,per -
hour (mR/hr) was given to the mechanical maintenance team. W hen-the electrica_1 maintenance team reported that-they could not open the. valve, the mechanical maintenance team was-immediately .~
' dispatched. The team's HP technician closely monitored dose rates
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along the route to the job site. When the valve could not be operated manually, the team left. to obtain additional--tools. On-the way to these tools,-they encountered dose rates exceeding
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their turn back dose rate. The HP technician called the OSC to get the turn back dose rate raised. The HP Supervisor only raised the turn back dose rate to 100 mR/hr, which proved to be insufficient when the team later encountered a higher radiation field. Meanwhile, the OSC Supervisor made the good. decision to dispatch another team to continue wor _k on this valv i No violations or deviations were identifie e. Emerc:ency Operations Facility (E0F)
The decision to activate the E0F following the Alert declaration was conservative. Facility activation was orderly and timel The E0F's Emergency Response and Recovery Director (ERRD) relieved _
the EC of lead responsibility for the licensee's emergency !
response within an hour of the Alert declaration. The ERRD assumed overall command only after he was well briefed on the situation and after his key aids had indicated their staffs'
readiness to begin performing their dutie The ERRD, the Corporate Management Representative and a member of the engineering support group closely monitored changing plant parameter data and potentially relevant emergency action level As torus radiation level values approached the value stated in th relevant EAL, the ERRD correctly declared a Site Area Emergenc The Radiological and E0F Manager assured that State, county and .
simulated NRC officials were initially notified of this declaration and the associated Protective Action Recommendation (PAR), that animals within two miles of the plant be placed on stored feed and water, in a very timely manne Shortly after-the Site Area Emergency dec_laration, the simulato briefly stopped. After its restart, EOF staff initiated. good
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efforts to verify data on the various EDS displays with the aid of CRS and TSC staffs. About 30 minutes ' elapsed before sufficient, verified data were available.to key. EOF staf While the reliability of various EDS data were being determined-with and without' the intervention of exercise controllers, the ERRD correctly directed engineering and protective measures staffs to focus on identifying any indications of.a -loss' of containment:
integrity and evaluating the possible offsite consequences of its-loss. State officials were informed that a loss of containment-
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integrity would necessitate an emergency reclassification and a revised PA Upon recognizing the first indication of a containment breach,-the-ERRD quickly verified the indication with his TSC-counterpart and correctly declared a General Fmergency. A procedurally correct PAR was. rapidly developed. State, county and NRC officials wer initially notified of this declaration, its bases, the initiation of an abnormal release to the environment and the PAR well within
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the required 15 minutes. A revised PAR was later transmitted in a timely manner, as containment radiation and release rate levels sharply increase The Radiological and EOF Manager's performance was excellent with >
respect to developing PARS, keeping the ERRD well informed of the-protective actions chosen by offsite officials and updating the ERRD of the progress of the simulated offsite evacuations. The manager also directed his staff to perform frequent offsite dose projections based on current plant conditions. An eight hour default release duration was utilized in these calculations, sinc engineering and operations staffs remained relatively unsure of the exact cause of the loss of containment integrity and could not, therefore, provide a better estimate of release duration.than ,
this fairly large default valu '
The ERRD and several key E0F staff gave frequent briefings to E0F staff on current plant status, inplant repair priories and their assessments of the onsite and offsite situations. Back screen projectors were an excellent method of displaying EDS outputs and the geographic areas affected by offsite PAR Engineering staff assured that critical plant parameters were trende Typically only one of the parameters being trended was displayed on a projection screen at a time. The parameter was selected either by the ERRD or by a member of the engineering support group. The display of only one trended parameter at a time along with the EDS displays did not adversely' affect key staff's ability to maintain a very good overall perspective of abnormal plant conditions for this scenari The ERRD approved all offsite agency notification message forms prior to their transmittal. These message forms contained accurate information. The ERRD also reviewed and approved draft press releases. A communicator kept a public affairs counterpart well informed on scenario events and major decision One member of the E0F's engineering support group provided excellent support to the ERRD by closely monitoring potentially
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relevant EAls and emergency operating procedures' flowcharts. In-
-contrast, when the ERRD requested the group to focus on assessing high priority concerns and to provide feedback, the group was generally not very results oriented. The ERRD's requests were not treated as action items having deadlines. Feedback was usually not provided until the ERRD asked for it. Although the group-listed high' priority items-on its status board, the group's-followup on these items typically was another brainstorming session rather than completed assessments or recommendations. The engineering support group should treat requests from the ERRD as action items having deadline . ..
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in response to a scenario control message late'in the exercise, TSC and EOF staffs focused their efforts on initial recovery-planning. Action item lists were developed by TSC and EOF staffs and were consolidated during a teleconference involving key staffs. Excellent use was made of procedural guidance in arriving at the correct conclusion that, if scenario events were real, it was very premature to enter a recovery phas The overall quality of _the action item list was very good. - The needs to interface with onscene NRC incident responders and incident investigators were recognized; however, the program needed to assess the environmental impacts of the release was not well understood. Key staff indicated that environmental sampling would be done using only licensee, State and contractor resource The major role of the Department of Energy in performing this assessment in cooperation with the State, licensee and a number of Federal agencies was not recognize No violations or deviations were identifie f. Offsite Monitorino Teams (0MTs)
Two OMTs were formed, well briefed and dispatched from the OSC-following the Alert declaration, per_ procedure Control of the teams was smoothly transferred from TSC to EOF staff when the ERRD
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assumed command of the licensee's response effort The_ teams were appropriately positioned at different distances-downwind from the plant prior to the release in order to detect a releas Before and after the simulated release began, the OMTs were in frequent contact with the E0F's Field Team Director, who maintained good records of their reports and directed their activities. The director kept both teams well advised of changing-plant conditions and simulated meteorological condition Based on communications between the teams and the Field' Team Director, the teams successfully located and tracked the simulated plume. The teams kept the director adequately . informed of their survey results and simulated exposure Proper concern.was demonstrated for minimizing =the teams' stay times in the plume. When the OMT closest to the plant reported reaching 50 percent of its exposure limit, a good decision was made to switch its future assignments with the second OMT rather than to seek an exposure extension. However,- neither .the Field Team Director nor the Radiological Assessment Coordinator were certain of the teams' exposure limit until they contacted TSC staff who had. earlier established that limi Personnel directing the activities of the State's OMTs were located in a room adjacent to their ' licensee counterparts. .The State's and licensee's OMTs typically remained within similar
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downwind distances from the plan Reports from the licensee's and State's teams were posted on status boards to facilitate information sharin At one point, the State's OMT were advised to simulate taking potassium iodide (KI) to reduce the effects of their exposure to radioiodines in the release. When one of the licensee's OMTs asked whether taking KI was advisable, TSC and EOF staffs considered the request for over 10 minutes before advising the team that taking K1 was not yet necessary. This decision was in accordance with procedural guidance; however, the licensee should reevaluate this apparent inconsistency with the State's criteria for taking Kl. Variable meteorological conditions may make an OMT's exposure to radiciodines less predictable than an inplant team's exposur No violations or deviations were identifie . Exercise Ob.iectives and Scenario Review flP 82302)
The exercise's scope and objectives and complete scenario manuals were submitted for NRC review within the proper timeframes. No significant concerns were identified during the revie Challenging aspects of the scenario included: assembly and accounting for all onsite personnel; an onsite medical emergency response; activation of a backup facility as a reassembly point for non-essential site evacuees; a difficult to identify release path from containment; deploym e t of two offsite survey teams; operation of the emergency news center arid the rumor control function; and use of a response cell of controllers to simulate NRC officials for the receipt of reactor safety and protective measures information from TSC and E0F communicator No violations or deviations were identifie . Exercise Control (IP 82301)
There were sufficient numbers of personnel to control the exercis Overall control of the exercise was very good. The only noteworthy instance of improper controller action occurred after a brief stoppage of the simulator. After the simulator was restarted, exercise participants began verifying plant parameters' current values' available
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on EDS displays in the TSC and EOF. It soon became apparent that some values were reasonable, while others remained suspect. Participants arranged to obtain the more relevant parameters' values using communicators. Meanwhile, several exercise controllers inappropriately advised TSC and EOF participants on the reliability of various data on the EDS display No violations or deviations were identifie i
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. Exercise Critiaues (IP 82301)
The licensee's controllers held initial critiques in each facility with participants following the exercise. The licensee provided a summary of its strengths and weaknesses, which were in very good agreement with the inspectors' findings, prior to the exit intervie . Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview on December 16, 1992, with those licensee representatives identified in Section 2 to present.and discuss the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee indicated that none of the matters discussed were proprietary in natur Attachments: Exercise Scope and Objectives Exercise Scenario Summary
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SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES BASIS Scope The 1992 Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) Emergency Preparedness Exercise, scheduled for December 15, 1992, will test and provide the opportunity to evaluate Iowa Electric-Light and Power Company, the State of Iowa, and Benton, Linn, and Marshall Counties'
emergency plans and procedure The Exercise will test each emergency response organization's ability to assess and respond to emergency conditions and coordinate efforts with other agencies for protection of the health and safety of the general publi Whenever practical, this Exercise will incorporate provisions for " Free Play" on the
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part of the participant The scenario, as driven by the DAEC Control Room Simulator, will depict a simulated sequence of events, resulting in a radiological release of sufficient magnitude to-warrant mobilization of State and local agencies to respond to the emergenc Ob.iectivei_
The DAEC 1992 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Program objectives are based on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements as delineated in 10 CFR 50.47, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, and Inspection Procedure 82302. Additional guidance provided in NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP-1 Revision 1, NUREG-0696, and NUREG-0737 Supplement I was utilized in developing these objective This Exercise will include participation from Benton, Linn, and Marshall Counties, as well as the State of Iowa. 'The offsite objectives are based upon the Federal Evaluation Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Exercise Manual and Exercise Methodology, FEMA-REP-14 and FEMA-REP-15 respectivel Please note that the warning system sirens for the-DAEC Emergency Planning Zone will
- not be sounded, and the area EBS Station (WMT AM/FM) will not be broadcasting during '
the Exercis The purpose of the Exercise is to evaluate the integrated capability of. a majo portion of the basic elements existing within the onsite and offsite emergency plans and emergency response organizations. The specific objectives of the Exercise to be demonstrated are listed within the following attachment .
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1992 DAEC EXERCISE ONSITE OBJECTIVES l
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CORE ELEMENTS (1) FREQUENCY (1) REGULATORY REFERENCE (3) COMMENTS ,
(a) Off-hours staffing (6 pm-4 am) as 5 years N. Will not be demonstrated as part of the t
- referenced in NUREG-0654. Revision 1 exercise in 1992. Propose demonstratior
' Supplement 1 - of this objective is through separate drill techniques
.. t (b) Activation of emergency news center 5 years G 3. G 4 Will be demonstrate ~
(Joint Information Center)
(c) Use of fire control teams 5 years N.2.b, 0. Will not be demonstrated as part of the 1992 exercis .
(d) Use of first aid and/o?. rescue teams 5 years K.1, K.2, K.3. K.4, K.5. L2. O 4.f Demonstration via in-plant medical emergency. injury with potential contamination
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(e) Use of medical support personnel 5 years N 2.c, L 1, L4, 0. Benton-Linn Ambulance will demonstrate contamination control and communications capabilitie with Mercy Medical Center (f) Use'of licensee's headquarters support . 5 years O4i As dictated by the scenario. Corporate -
- personnel . Support Services and engineering ;
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support will be utilized within the EO (g) Use of security persorinet to provide 5 year O. Will not be demonstrated in 1992.- Last , '
- prompt access for emergency equipment demonstrated in 199 and support
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(1) As delineated in NRC Inspection Manual-Procedure 82302 (3) Items refer to NUREG-0654, Part lif except for element (j). for which the
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reference is NUREG-0737,. Supplement 1
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1992 DAEC EXERCISE ONSITE OBJECTIVES -
- h CORE ELEMENTS (1). FREQUENCY (1) REGULATORY REFERENCE (3) COMMENTS
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(h) Use of backup communications 5 years Use of interfacility back-up will nc,1 be 4
demonstrated in 199 '
(i) Rumor control 5 years G Rumor control will be demonstrated in a parallel with activation of the Emergency News Cente (j) Use of emergency power (where not a .5 years 8 Will not be demonstrated during the 1992 part of plant safety systems.- exercise, Completion of this objective
. e.g..uTechnical Support Center may be ascertained by routine (TSC)) inspection of applicable test procedures
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(k) Evacuation of Emergency Response 9. years J.10 g Well be demonstrated in 199 '
Facilities (ERFs) and relocation'
to backup ERFs, where applicable ,
(I) Ingestion pathway exercise 5 years J.9. J.11 Will not be demonstrated in 1992. Last ,
demonstrated in 1990 with State of Iowa (m) Field monitoring, including soi years' l.7. l.8.1.11, N. Collection and analysis of sample media .
vegetation, and water sampling
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- (1) As delineated in NRC Inspection Manual-Procedure 82302- I (3) Items refer to NUREG-0654, Part 11, except for element (j), for which the
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'I 1992 DAEC EXERCISE ONSITE OBJECTIVES CORE ELEMENTS (1)- FREQUENCY. (1) REGULATORY REFERENCE COMMENTS
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(n) Capability for determining the 5 years l_3, ! 4. l.6,1.8. l 9,1.10 Wi!! demonstrate determination of total ,
magnitude and impact of the particular release and presence of radio-iodine i components of a release
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(o) Capability for post-accident coolan years Will not be demonstrated in 1992, sampling and analysis t
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(p) Use of Potassium lodid'e (KI) 5 years J Will not be demonstrated in 199 (q) Assembly and accountability 5 years Will be demonstrated (r) Recovery and Re-entry 5 years Will not be demonstrated in 199 (1) As' delineated in NRC Inspection Manual-Procedure 82302 ;
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o Narrative Summarv ~
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The scenario for this Exercise is based upon a series of postulated events that leads to a release of radiation off-site of sufficient magnitude to declare a i l-GENERAL EMERGENCY. The fuel failure occurs due to a combination of ,
Emergency Core Cooling system failures and a Loss of Coolant Accident, ,
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beyond the design basis. This coupled with a small failure in the primary containment boundary, leads to the release off-sit , ,
n i Initial conditions specify that the plant is at about 96% power, middle of cycle, with the current run at about 109 days. RCIC is out-of-service due to *
pump seal failure. The pump seals are being replaced. The turbine is .I uncoupled from the pump, the old seals have been removed, with the pump casing off of the pump. The new seals are due to arrive late this Wednesday, with installation to be completed by this coming Saturday. The 14 day LCO has been in effect for 6 days. The HPCI system has been verified operabl The "D" RHR pump is out of-service due to a short in the motor windings. The motor is being repaired and due back to the plant this Friday. The 30 day LCO '
l has been in effect for 20 days. All required systems for the LCO have been (
verified operable. The "A" CRD pump is OOS due to a failed motor bearin l The pump motor is scheduled to be pulled this Thursday for bearing i replacement. The "B" pump tripped last Wednesday on a faulty suction j pressure switch. The "A" pump ran until Monday morning, when its motor bearing failed. Ops shifted back to the repaired "B" pump. Drywell Floor Drain leakage is running around 1.0 gpm and the Equipment Sump leakage around p 0.7 gpm (holding steady for the last two months). A high level radwaste i shipment is scheduled to be moved frorn the refuel floor today. Plans are to !
ship the container out on Wednesday. This shipment is the last of a series and i has a very high Curie content. Several key events in the last few monthc, .
include: a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Hot Shutdown LCO, when both Diesel Generators were j ,
inop, due to a faulty auto start logic problem; a Limitorque concern from a
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recent NRC maintenance inspection, that required several small LCOs to be entered / exited to adjust some torque settings; and a partialloss of EHC, when ;f the "A" pump tripped, during turbine testing. Those problems have been ;
corrected and the systems restore [
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i 1992 Exercise 6.1-1 Rev.a 09/29/92
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i o F The drill starts with a worker deconning in the Hot Tool Crib area, Detting
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injured. He/she is highly contaminated, with injuries to the upper lef t shoulder h
and the lower lef t leg. Of f-site transportation is required, so an Unusual Event, I (A 26), " Transportation of contaminated injured individual to the hospital." is g declared. A small leak develops on the "B" Feedwater check valve, inside the l Drywell, (V-14-3). Ops will calculate the leak rate and may decide to start a plant shutdow Ops wil' monitor the leak rate closer and it will gradually increases to around 5 gpm. If not already started, a plant shutdown will commenc Reactor power is reduced to about 64% with Recirc and control rod insertion
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be0i ns. Af ter several rod insertions, the Reactor Manual Control system will '
fait and'the operators will be unable to select any control rods. Meanwhile, a
fire develops at the Palo School, the towa Electric "Off-Site Relocation and
Assembly Area" (ORAA), and will require the use of an alternate facility, when .
the ORAA is activate f The leak rate in the drywellincreases to around 60 gpm. A larger
increase in drywell air temperature and pressure start occurring. Ops may elected to lineup and vent the containment, to help control any drywell pressure increase. The EAL is upgraded to an ALERT, (B-1), " Reactor Coolant System leak rate greater than 50 gpm, but within makeup capacity: RPV level being maintained." Ops also may elect to insert a manual scram from this f power level. If they elect to scram, the ALERT may shift to B-11, " Failure of RPS to initiate and complete a reactor shutdown." The rod select problem is I
repaired and the insertion of control rods can resume. (if a manual scram was '
not inserted) Leak rate in the drywell increases, with drywell pressure approaching the 2 psig setpoint. Ops inserts a manual scram, but all control rods do not go in. 24 rods don't scram, of which about 14 are full out. The ;
ATWS EOP will be entered. Some initial cladding failure starts to show u Drywell pressuie finally exceeds 2 psig and the operable emergency systems auto start. The "A" Core Spray pump will start and trip, HPCI will "
start and Ops will secure it. The remaining control rods are inserted, by manually driving them in, or by venting the over piston area. The ATWS EOP is I exited and Ops Mart a cooldown of the reactor vesse Exercise 6.1-2 Rev.a 09/29/92
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The leak again increases in size. HPCI is re str.rted, but is injecting into i the broken feedwater line. The feedwater and condensate pumps run out of j
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makeup water and trip. The remaining RHR pumps and the "B" Core Spray pump are verified running and OPS Emergency Depressurizes, to allow low j pressure injection. The "B" Core Spray pump's outboard discharge valve, MO- }
l 2137, does not open. LPCI (RHR) injects, but Reactor Vessel level does not
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fully recover. Alternate means of makeup are looked at, and the EAL is upgraded to a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (C 1), "LOCA greater than makeup
capacity.", or a (C-25), " Torus radiation levels > 100 R/hr". Torus water -
temperature increases rapidly, along with drywell temperature and pressur The magnitude of the cladding failure increases, as indicated primarily by the I
drywell radiation monitor Penetration X16a fails in the plant. (2nd floor Rx Bldg, "A" Core Spray Drywell penetration) Radiation levels in the Reactor Building start increasing ;
and a release off-site starts. The "C" RHR pump trips on a faulty motor j
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overload relay and RPV level drops rapidly, The EAL is upgraded to a GENERAL EMERGENCY (D-1), "LOCA, with failure of ECCS to perform, leading to core degradation or melt in minutes or hours. Loss of containment integrity may be ;-
imminent.", or a (D-5), " Loss of 2 of 3 following fission product barriers with l potential loss of the third.", or (D 10), "High Radiological Indications: Offgas !
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monitor reading of > 1300 Ci/cc, or Drywell radiation levels > 3200 R/hr,",
Drywell radiation levels peak and slowly start to drop to a lower level. (peak is around 400,000 R/hr) The "C" RHR and "B" Core Spray pumps are recovered and Reactor vessel level is slowly restored Drywell radiation levels start decreasing at a faster rate and the release off-site diminishes. With plant conditions stable, Recovery /Re-entry discussions commence. Following the Recovery discussions, the Exercise is terminated.
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L 1992 Exercise 6.1-3 Rev.a 09/29/92 l i
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