IR 05000317/1986014

Emergency Preparedness Insp Repts 50-317/86-14 & 50-318/86-14 on 860908-10 & 1014-17.No Violations Identified.Deficiencies Noted in Areas of Accident Assessment & Info Flow (Communications)

ML20214V443
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	12/03/1986
From:	Hawxhurst J, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214V414	List: IR 05000317/1986014 ML20214V410
References
50-317-86-14, 50-318-86-14, NUDOCS 8612090687
Download: ML20214V443 (13)

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. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

50-317/86-14 Report N /86-14 50-317 Docket No. 50-318

'DPR-53 License No. OPR-69 Priority -

Category C Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company P. O. Box 1475 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Facility Name: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Pant, Units 1 & 2 Inspection At: Lusby, Maryland '

Iaspection Conducted: September 8 ,10 and 0ctober 14-17, 1986 Inspectors: /htM Jam (s'Hawxhurst, Emergency Preparedness

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'dite Specialist, USNRC, RI D. Trimble, USNRC, RI, Calvert Cliffs T. Foley, USNRC, SRI, Calvert Cliffs M. Solberg, USNRC, Emergency Planning, IE C. Gordon, USNRC, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, RI J. MacLellan, Battelle, PNL V. Ransdell, Battelle, PNL G. Weyman, Battelle, PNL Limr th, USNRC, Project Engineer Approved by: ,W' A di, W. @ aru M hief, Emergency Preparedness date Section, EPRPB/DRSS Inspection Summary: Emergency Preparedness Inspection on September 8-10, and October 14-17,1986 (Report Nos. 50-317/86-14 and 50-318/86-14)

Areas Inspected: Announced routine and follow-up inspection of emergency pre-paredness activities including observation of the partial-scale emergency pre-paredness exercise and remedial drill conducted on September 9, and October 16, respectively. The inspection included pre-exercise and drill briefing Results: No violations were identified. However, several deficiencies were identified that require additional licensee attention. A Confirmatory Action Letter was issued to the licensee on October 1,1986 identifying specific areas for corrective action. The specific deficiencies were in the areas of accident

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assessment, information flow (communications) and a significant delay in pro-i viding appropriate protective action recommendations to offsite authorities.

. A subsequent remedial drill was held successfully demonstrating these area However, the dose assessment area is still under review.

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted J. T. Carlson, Plant Health Physicist

• P. T. Crinigan, General Supervisor - Chemistry R. M. Douglass, Manager, QA&SS

• T. E. Forgette, Supervisor Emergency Planning J. R. Hill, Supervisor Operations Training

• S. E. Jones, Jr., General Supervisor - Nuclear Training

• J. R. Lemons, Manager - Nuclear Operations Department

• W. J. Lippold, Manager Nuclear Eng Services (Oct 17 only)

C. R. Mahon, Principal En J. A. Metzger, Media Relations Rep.

R. Olson, Principal En *T. N. Pritchett, General Supervisor Planning and Support

• G. C. Rudigier, Emergency Planning Analyst

• L. B. Russell, Manager - Nuclear Maintenance

• L. J. Smialek, Sr. Plant Health Physicist

• L. A. Sundquist, General Supervisor Quality Control and Support

• J. A. Tiernan, VP Nuclear Energy The persons above attended the exit meeting held on September 10, and those with an astericks (*) also attended the October 17, 1986 exit meetin The team also observed and interviewed several licensee emergency response personnel, controllers, and observers as they performed their assigned functions during the exercise.

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2.0 Emergency Exercise The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant partial scale exercise (limited off-site participation) was conducted on September 9, 198 Pre-Exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives had telephone discussions with licensee representatives and provided written comments on the scope and content of the objectives and scenari The exercise scenario included the following events:

(1) Security Emergency (UE);

(2) Loss of offsite power; (3) An automatic reactor trip; (4) Steam generator tube rupture (100-1000 gpm leak rate) (ALERT);

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. 3 (5) A stuck open steam generator safety valve on the affected steam generator; and, (6) An unmonitored release path directly to the atmosphere (GENERAL EMERGENCY).

The above events resulted in activation of the licensee's Emergency Plan and emergency response facilitie Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; activation of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:

(1) Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events; (2) Direction and coordination of the emergency response; (3) Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent information; (4) Communications /information flow, and record keeping; (5) Assessment and projection of radiological (dose) data and consideration of protective actions; (6) Provision for in plant radiation protection; (7) Performance of Post-Accident Sample System and Team; (8) Performance of technical support; (9) Performance of repair and corrective actions; (10) Activation and operation of E0F; and, (11) Dissemination of public informatio Exercise Observations The NRC team identified several significant deficiencies in the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and actions and use of the facilities in the areas of accident assessment, information flow (communications) and providing appropriate protective action recommendations and projected doses to offsite authoritie Specific i details are discussed below.

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Operators response to off-normal plant conditions were slow and leac to a delay in accident assessmen Control room briefings occurred only once to all personnel, no periodic updates or announcements of significant event An integrated offsite dose was not initially estimated, and protective actions were not initially based on plant condition Information transfer within the dose assessment area and betwaen the RAD and the RM and SEC was inefficient. The information presented to the RM and SEC by the RAD frequently did not seem to contain the information needed by the RM and SE Occasionally, the RAD appeared unprepared for briefings of the RM and SEC and presented background information rather than assessment Radiological Assessment Specialists did not demonstrate the ability to effectively use MIDAS for dose assessment. The Radiological Assessment Director (RAD) relied on hand calculated dose estimates, using " rule-of-thumb" type estimates, even though the MIDAS computer was availabl Source Term determination was slow, due in part to a delay in obtaining and analyzing a PASS sampl Dose assessment status boards were not all used. The Recovery Manager had to ask for the Environmental Status Board to be used and update No in plant radiation monitor data was poste The Recovery Manager's request for an evaluation of the cor-relation of off-site monitoring data, release rates calculated using MIDAS, and known coolant activity levels, was never satisfie Information (data) was not well documented and communications were ineffective at times between key managers. As a result, the Radiological Assessment Director disseminated too much extraneous data and some conflicting information. Consequently, the Site Emergency Coordinator could not determine an adequate protective action recommendation for offsite authorities from supportive data supplied by the RA Notwithstanding the above deficiencies, the following actions of the licensee's emergency response organization demonstrated well planned and implemented action OSC team briefings were very good. All activities were coordi-nated with the Radiation Protection Team Leader. Radiation protection precautions were provided to all teams dispatche .

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- The dosimetry station was well organized and operated efficiently during the exercis There was good information exchange between TSC members who actively pursued mitigation of worsening plant condition The E0F was staffed and operational in a timely manne Based on the identified deficiencies, a drill was conducted on October 16, 1986, to reevaluate the licensee's performance (See detail 3.0 below).

3.0 Remedial Drill A remedial drill was conducted on October 16, 1986 in response to the deficiencies noted in detail 2.0 above and in accordance with commitments identified in Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) dated October 1, 198 Pre-Drill Activities The licensee provided additional training, changed the location of the Chemistry Director to facilitate better communication and accident assessment and modified procedures. Specifically, a change was made to incorporate the guidance provided in Information Notice 83-2 Prior to the drill, NRC Region I representatives reviewed the scenario with licensee representatives and provided comments on the scope and content of the objectives and scenari The drill scenario included the following events:

(1) Briefing identifying pre-conditions for an Unusual Event (UE)

based on unidentified RCS leakage 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> prior to start of drill (6:00 AM)

(2) Radioactivity monitored for 15 minutes (8:00 AM) on RI-5425 (Access Control Vent) ALERT; (3) Loss of coolant accident (450 gpm);

(4) Reactor and Turbine automatic trip, and; (5) Loss of last High Pressure Safety Injection pump (General Emer1ency).

(6) Core uncovery and release to atmosphere through main plant ven _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ . _ - _ . _

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The above events resulted in the activation of the licensee's Emergency Plan and emergency response facilities necessary to demonstrate deficient areas previously identified in the annual exercise. Other areas were simulated by use of a controller providing the necessary informatio Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's drill, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization in the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility. The following activities were observed in these facilitie (1) Detection, classification and assessment of the scenario events; (2) Direction and coordination of the emergency response; (3) Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent information; (4) Comunications/information flow, and record keeping; (5) Performanceofaccidentassessment(technicalsupport)

(6) Assessment and projection of radiological (dose) data and consideration of protective actions; (7) Activation and operation of E0F; and, (8) Development of news release Drill Observations The NRC tm specifically observed areas that were identified as exercise eeficiencies in detail 2.0 abov The following actions of the licensee's emergency response organization were well planned and implemente Protective action recomendations (PARS) were both timely and conservative. Initial PARS were based on guidance given in Info. Notice 83-28 and plant conditions. Recommendations were updated and the state and counties were kept informe .

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Accident assessment was excellen Leak rates were promptly determined leading to accident projections on which a timely decision to declare a General Emergency was made. The turnovers between the GS0 (Control Room) and the Site Emergency Coordi-nator (SEC), and later turnover between SEC at TSC 8 E0F were thorough. The decision to turn over the SEC responsibilities to the E0F and then declare the General Emergency was carefully evaluate The release pathway (s) were determined and information promul-gated. Periodic briefings of TSC personnel conducted were effective in assuring that personnel were maintained current on plant conditions and projection Overall communications between key managers of emergency response facilities were goo The TSC and EOF were staffed in a timely manner and the transfer of authority and responsibility from the TSC/CR to the EOF was generally efficient and positive.

The E0F staff was kept informed of conditions and prognosis by the Recovery Manager (RM).

The following areas were identified which could have degraded the response and need to be further evaluated by the licensee for possible corrective action Transfer of the Radiological Assessment Director (RAD) from the CR to the EOF lagged behind transfer of other function Documentation of data transmitted and received at the TSC was minimally adequate. Approximately 50% of the Emergency Message Forms originated in the TSC were not signed by a Communicato It appears that a message at 10:20 am containing release rates from the main vent were never received at the E0F. The Emer-gency Message Form does not provide for positive evidence that a message was transmitted, time actually transmitted and the in-dividual actually receiving the messag Further training is required in dose assessment. In particular, training is needed in estimating potential doses from projected releases, and in estimating deposition and doses from deposited materia The RAD was overly involved in details within the dose assess-ment area, rather than concentrating on overall assessmen Dose computations performed in the TSC following E0F activation differed from EOF computations and appeared to contribute to confusion in dose assessmen . _ __ _ _ ._ ,

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Based on these observations, it was detennined that the concerns that resulted in the remedial drill were satisfactorily correcte The remaining issues will be evaluated in a subsequent routine inspectio The status of inspection findings from both the exercise and drill are sumarized in detail 4.0 belo .0 Status Sumary of Inspection Findings from the September 9,1986 Exercise, October 16, 1986 Remedial Drill, and previous exercises, September 9, 1986 Exercise and October 16, 1986 Drill Findings Control Room / Technical Support Center Detection and Classification (CLOSED)IFI(50-317/86-14-01;50-318/86-14-01)

Operator response to plant conditions, specifically a stuck open Safety Relief valve, was not timely. The stuck open safety was not identified until 20 minutes after it had lifte DRILL The senior shift supervisor evaluated plant conditions, reviewed the emergency procedures and promptly identified emergency action levels in conjunction with technical support personne Accident Assessment (CLOSED) UNR (50-317/86-14-02; 50-318/86-14-02)

Although operators recognized the steam generator tube rupture and the release through Condenser A's air ejector discharge, no attempt was made initially by the Shift Technical Advisor or later by TSC staff to specifically quantify the leak rate based upon empirical data. This resulted in inaccurate rough estimates of leak rate being used throughout the exercis Proper quantification of leak rate would have provided and facilitated more accurate and timely dose assessmen DRILL

- The GS0 and TSC staff promptly determined leak rates which lead to timely assessment of the accident and emergency classification leve .

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Data Transfer /Information Flow (OPEN) IFI (50-317/86-14-03; 50-318/86-14-03)

Control Room briefings occurred only once to all personnel, no periodic updates or announcement of significant events such as loss of two out of three fission product barriers. Also, empirical data used and assumptions made were not well documented, appeared unorganized and led to imprecise data being transferre DRILL Comunication of significant events was good between key managers. However, documentation of data transmitted and received between facilities had not been formalized and the Emergency Message Form used doesn't provide for positive evidence that a message was transmitte Notification (CLOSED)UNR(50-317/86-14-04;50-318/86-14-04)

Following declaration of the General Emergency (G.E.), no coincident protective action recomendations (PAR) were mad Information Notice IE 83-28 recommends immediate sheltering to two miles and five miles downwind upon declaring a general emergency. A PAR was belatedly made two hours after the was declared, based on dose projection and field measurement dat Initial notification and activation of the emergency organization was slow. The paging system was not operational in the New Engineering Facility; as a result, personnel in this building were late in respondin DRILL All offsite notifications were timely and protective action recommendations were coincident with the declaration of the General Emergency. Follow-up notification were made as necessar Communication (OPEN)IFI(50-317/86-14-05;50-318/86-14-05)

The Chemistry Director and Radiological Assessment Director (RAD)discussionswereinfrequent. Information on actual

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source term determination or total number of curies being

! released was not discussed or disseminated to offsite official . . . . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ .

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The field monitoring team in the helicopter was not able to communicate directly to the field team coordinato Information flow was slow and delayed important decisions, since the release was over the Chesapeake Ba The Security Team Leader relayed radiological data from the Radiation Protection Director which caused some confusio This is not a planned communication pathwa There was an inadequate flow of information from the CR to E0F between Alternate RAD and RA It was difficult for the RAD (CR) to find an outside line, no phone was available near the MIDAS terminal in the CR to communicate with E0F. As a result, dose assessment wasn't turned over to the EOF until two hours after the Alert was declared, and one hour after the EOF was manne DRILL The discussions between the Chemistry Director and Radiological Assessment Director were improved, however, information and discrepancies on grab sample analysis and dose calculations done in the TSC weren't handled in a timely manne Initial Dose Assessment (CR)

(OPEN)UNR(50-317/86-14-06;50-318/86-14-06)

Initial dose calculations and assessment of the radiological release were inaccurate and slow, due in part to inaccurate assumptions about the release rate and difficulty in effectively using the MIDAS computer system. The RAD didn't provide the interim Emergency Director with reasonable offsite dose projections for approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> after the release bega Message forms weren't effectively used and no continuous documentation in an official log was observe DRILL The ability to quickly and continually assess the impact of the release of radioactive materials offsite was not fully demonstrated. This will be evaluated in the next exercis Operational Support Center The following areas were identified which could have degraded the response to an actual emergency, and should be evaluated for corrective action. These areas were not required to be demonstrated during the remedial drill and will be observed in the next exercis ___ _ .- . _ _ -

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Post-Accident Sampling and Analysis _ ,

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(OPEN)(50-317/86-14-02;50-318/86-14-02). ~

The chemistry technician did not have the proper keys to open required valves to initiate taking of a post-accident sampl This delayed the PASS sample and analysi (RepeatFinding). .

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Suitable measurements / surveys for detecting concentratiion of ,

radioactive materials in air were not made. No breathing , cone .

air samples were taken, nor were there provisions for them .

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during accident situations when the primary coolant scmples *'d'

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were degassed and when the boron analysis was done. ERPIP .1.8.2 requires air sampling during sample degas. An' air sample was taken in the lab where the sample was degasse However, it was taken on the floor seven feet from the chemical fume hood and was not representative of radioactive cosen-

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trations in the breathing zone. This air sample was also never analyzed. No air sample was taken during baron analysis.,

The shielding' setup at the gama analysis station was inadequate in that the setup required the user to bend over the ,

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shield in order to see what they were working on and resulted, in unnecessary exposur ,j

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Analysis of post-accident samples were delayed because Ge-Li detectors were not available. Because of all the delays, the source term could not be adequately determine '

Medical Emergency (Contaminated / Injured Individual . <

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(OPEN)(50-317/86-14-07;50-318/86-14-07)

This area was not fully demonstrated. This was not a required action in the 1986 exercise. The licensee had successfully demonstrated their capability to handle a contaminated injured individual on August 15, 1986. This area will be redemon-strated during an upcoming routine drill or exercis EOF Dose Assessment /,

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(CLOSED) UNR (50-317/86-14-08; 50-318/86-14-08).

The RAD did not function effective as an advisor to the Site Emer-gency Coordinator and Recovery Manage The RAD did not direct and coordinate his staff effectivel Information flow from the Control Room to Radiological Assessment in the E0F was inadequate. The PASS sample results were never received in the E0F. Calculated doses were not provided to the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) until more than two hours after the start of the releas . . _ , , . - - - . - . - . - -

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On-site measured dose rates were passed to the EOF through Security,

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' bypass 3ng the Radiological Assessment Director (RAD). This caused C confusion in the EOF and did not allow the RAD to organize and 2 interpret available dose informatio y ,

fi ye DRILL, ThisareawabmuchimprovedandRADwasabletoprovideap-propriate information to SEC and R c Erevious Inspection Open Items A;>

? (CLOSED)'(50-317/85-25-06;50-318/85-22-06)

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g a. .-Emergency notification for the Alert and General Emergency were not" completed within the required 15 minute time period. The

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?- - licensee indicated that the emergency communicators (ECOM) were 7 ' . retrained in 1986 and the revised lesson plan included reference j f' to notification problem identified during the 1985 exercis y

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exercis6;

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' The initial notification form (Attachment 1) for the General s .

Erwrgency was not completed by ECOM and it is not clear if the

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J , ' notified by the licensee directl 'This area was successfully. demonstrated during the 1986 exercise.

After declaring the General Emergency there was a deviation

from NRC policy stated in IE Information Notice 83-2 Coincident Protective Actions Recommendations were not made.

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. The licensee has revised the approach to PARS in ERPIP 4. ~ . Rev. 10 to address coincident recommendations with declaration i s of a General Emergency.

[ ' S.0 Licens~ee Critiques

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"^ The licensee demonstrated the ability to self-critique and identify weak

V knd deficient areas that need correction. The licensee also promptly N . , corrected 'the most significant deficient areas identified during the

- ~ f annual emergency exercise, as evidenced by their performance during the

. -remedial drill.

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6.0 Exit Interviews Exercise The inspectors met with licensee representatives (see detail 1 for attendees) at the conclusion of the exercise to discuss the exercise findings as detailed in this report. The licensee acknowledged the findings and indicated that appropriate action would be taken to correct weak and deficient areas. In addition, the licensee indicated a willingness to better demonstrate their emergency response capabilities during a remedial drill, in the areas they were deficien Remedial Drill The inspectors met with licensee representatives (indicated in section 1.0) at the conclusion of the inspection to discuss the findings of the drill observation and resolution of deficient areas identified during the exercise. The licensee acknowledged the findings and indicated that appropriate corrective actions would be take At no time did the inspectors provide written material to the licensee.

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