IR 05000275/1984007
| ML20214T258 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 06/21/1984 |
| From: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20213E738 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-197 TAC-64792, NUDOCS 8706100180 | |
| Download: ML20214T258 (2) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:______-- - ___
- , ' , C- %L }
', E' o
' ,% -
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~
) 7 O&
E REGION V % ' ' ' * 5~
* /- 1450 MARIA LANE. SUITE 210 *
,
M WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596
%..... .
3 fp JUN 211984 bdk lit a hf L MEMORANDUM FOR: Harold R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear bb do Reactor Regulation FROM: J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator SUBJECT: SPECIAL INSPECTION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE OPERATING.
CREWS - DIABLO CANYON, UNIT 1.
(Reference: Staff Requirements Memorandum, S. J. Chilk to W. J. Dircks, dated March 29,1984) Enclosed is the report of the subject special inspection directed of the staff by the Coninission.
This inspection was conducted by a Special Inspection Team consisting of senior members of the Region V staff, Senior Resident and Resident Inspectors assigned to operating power reactors in Region V, and three consultants from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and EG&G Idaho, Inc.
The overall assessment of the Special Inspection Team was that the perfonnance of the operating crews at Diablo Canyon, Unit 1 was above average when compared to similar licensed facilities during initial startup and low power operation. The shift advisors were observed to be effectively integrated into shift activities and appeared to be well accepted by members of the operating crews.
This inspection provided an opportunity by the Special Inspection Team to assess the involvement of licensee management, both senior site management and corporate management, in the day-to-day operation of Diablo Canyon, Unit 1. In this regard, we found management involvement to be substantive and effective.
During the course of the inspection, concerns were identified by the Special Inspection Team where improvements in the perfonnance of operating activities appeared to be warranted. These concerns were brought to the attention of licensee management, and priority attention was given to the satisfactory resolution of each. In addition, the licensee has committed to goals for continued involvement by corporate and senior site management in the day-to-day operation of_the facility.
8706100180 070604 PDR FOIA : HOLMES 86-197 PDR i !
! ev
;
, . __ _ . _ _ _ . _ , . . .-. . - . , .
Harold R. Denton -2-Based upon the results of this inspection and licensee management comitments to continued involvement in operational activities, we feel there is reasonable assurance that Diablo Canyon, Unit 1 can be safety operated at power levels above 5 percent and up to full power.
/ Should you or your staff have question]regarding s this inspection or our-findings, please let me know. , ,/ , , fg/${{ib0+1 J. B. Martin Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 50-275/84-07
REGION V I'
{- ,I 8, . 1450 M arf A LANE,sulTE 210 .
_ %/ ,e,4 WALNUT CREE K. CALIFORNI A S4596 ,
' ....*
b b if b b . . Docket No. 50-275 Pacific Gas and Electric Company-77 Peale Street Room 1435 San Francisco, California 94106
'
Attention: Mr. J. O. Schuyler, Vice President Nuclear Power Generation Subject: NRC Inspection of Diablo Canyon Unit 1 This refers to the special team inspection conducted by Mr. J. and others of this office, on April 19 - May 23, 1984 and June 12, 1984, of activities authorized by NRC License No. DPR-76.
Areas examined during this inspection.are described in the enclosed inspection report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspectors.
No. items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified within the scope of this inspection.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of. this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room unless you notify this office, by-telephane, within ten days of the date of this letter and submit written application to withhold information contained therein within thirty days of the date of this letter. Such application must be consistent with the requirements of 2.790(b)(1).
. . h i s' . ie -- ^ gk -[ WP U
" ,. , / - _.
- . ~ - - = - -7- _ . , ,
_ .. --- ---=.-_ . - . - - - -
-
~
.
.
.
. .
.
Paci[ic Gas and Electric Company -2- 6
'
_.
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be glad to
,
discuss them with you.
Sincerely,
- l h r,.
,
T. . Bishop, Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects
- - -
Enclosure:
Inspection Report
No. 50-275/84-07
REGION V== Report No. 50-275/84-07 Docket No. 50-275 License No.
, DPR-76 Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company * 77 Beale Street San Francisco, California 94106 Facility Name: Diablo Canyon, Unit 1 Inspection at: Diablo Canyon Site Inspection conducted: April 19 - May 23, 1984 and June 12, 1984 Inspectors: r 'e 7 [M/[Y /J M-- J. L. Vress; c'ntor Reactor Engineer and
~
Dg"te signed Teas
[Leade -
1 Vf A.% . Johnson, E forcement Officer WW $~ D4te S(gn6d f
$ /$ ' ') l / f A. E/'Chlii' fee, Sen%r Resident Inspector, Dafe Signed San Onofre (Alb -
bl/5/f4 f J . f .', $1dia rdt , Tenior Resident Inspector, Date S'igned gadcho Seco fl'LL f dlfe/ S/ Allchards,14esident Inspector, Trojan Date signed
* *
, $ '
P. J, floxri 1, Reactor Inspector Date Signed
* . l)l W ' b / '
l h , M. f. /Phpov'an~, Residp' Inspector, Da'te S'igned ) DjabloManyon l l U*~
~
D. P. Haist', Reactor Inspettor
~
I Dite figned h!!_[ <'l?> > m ,. U ( Q ' ( [ D Q '(m /_ pr. -
~17 -
____." . _ .- -. _ _ _ - _ .
.- . . . , Other Accompanying Personnel:
L. R. Peterson, Consultant, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) R. L. S * , Consultant, EG&G Idaho, Inc. (EG&G) P. . Isak n, Consultant, EG&G Idaho, Inc. (EG&G) Approved By: _
-
/
J. B. Bartin, Regional Administrator Date Signed Summa ry: Inspection on April 19-May 23, 1984 a'd n June '12, 1984 (Report No. 50-275/84-07) Areas Inspected: Special Team Inspection of the operating crews during initial startup and low power testing. This inspection involved 657 inspection hours (including 300 hours devoted to routine inspection activities) by eight NRC personnel and 148 inspection hours by three NRC consultants.
Findings: No items of noncompliance resulted from this inspection. The NRC Resident Inspection staff is, however, continuing to examine the circumstances regarding the use of a special test device (optical isolator) in a non-safety related system without proper testing prior to use. Additional information is necessary to determine if such use was in violation of NRC requirements.
:
I I l _. _ _ _ .
__._ _ _ _. _ _ _
-- .
*.
*
, .
. \
. - 1
.. - l
'
. . - DETAILS ; _ 1. Persons Contacted
*G. A. Maneatis, Executive Vice President *J. O. Schuyler,.Vice President, Nuclear Power Generation *J. D. Shiffer, Manager, Nuclear Power Operations .
W. A. Raymond, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Power Operations
*R. C. Thornberry, Site Manager R. Patterson, Assistant Site Manager-Plant Superintendent J. D. Townsend, Assistant Plant Superintendent ,
J. M. Gisclon, Assistant Site Manager, Technical Services T. J. Martin, Training Manager J. A. Sexton, Manager of Operations R. L. Fisher, Sr. Power Production Engineer L. F. Womack, Manager, Engineering (Site) S. N. Banton, Sr. Nuclear Engineer B. W. Giffin, I&C Maintenance Manager S. R. Fridley, General Operating Foreman The inspectors also held discussions with and observed the performance of numerous other licensee employees and contractor / consultant personnel during the course of the inspection; these included Shift Foremen, Shift Advisors, Shift Technical Advisors,-Senior Control Room Operators, Control Room Operators, unlicensed operations personnel startup engineers, maintenance technicians and quality assurance personnel.
- Attended Management Meeting on June 12, 1984.
2. Operating Crew Performance ,
'
Background i By Staff Requirements Memorandum, dated March 29, 1984, the Commission - directed the NRC staff to "... conduct a special inspection of operating
, crews..." during low power operation at the Diablo Canyon Unit 1. The ; principal purpose of the current Special Team Inspection was to implement -
the special inspection directed by the Commission.
_
'
Special Inspection Team Composition and Pattern of Inspection The inspection was carried out by senior members of the Region V staff, Senior Resident and Resident.-Inspectors assigned to operating power reactors in Region V, and three NRC consultants from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and EG&G Idaho, Inc (EG&G). The latter consultants (two individuals) from EG&G currently provide contract assistance to the NRC staff in the conduct of operator license examinations for PWR (Westinghouse supplied) power reactor facilities.
The consultant from LLNL is an experienced reactor physicist, and has previously served as a consultant to the NRC staff in the area of human factors evaluation of control room layout and design.
To evaluate the performance of the operating crews, members of the Special Inspection Team were assigned to essentially around-the-clock-
. --.. - ,- - . - -n . , - -,--y -: . - - - -, .r
. -
_
, . . . . . _ . ._- -
_
= . ^
- * -
.
. .. . e coverage of shift operations commencing on April 19, 1984, when plant , heatup in preparation for initial criticality was' started. Except for the period April 22-24, 1984 during which_the approach to initial criticality was discontinued for replacement of a leaking 0-ring in'the ! No. 4 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal housing, this essentially around-the-clock coverage continued through initial criticality (at ' 0007 hours on April 29, 1984) and until May 4, 1984. During the balance of the inspection period through May 23, 1984, when low power testing was
completed, members of the.Special Inspection Team visited the plant at - random bours, unannounced, on May 7.-11, 14-18, and 21-23, 1984.
I The above pattern of inspection permitted members of the inspection team
-
to observe the performance of each of the five operating crews as well as the conduct of portions of' essentially all of the zero power physics and
- special low power tests.
t
,
Assessment of Operating Crew Performance Operating crew performance was assessed based upon the Special Team's observation of (1) the conduct of scheduled plant evolutions during zero
- power physics and low power tests and training demonstrations (including i natural circulation tests), (2) crew response to unplanned events
! (including one occasion on May 8, 1984 when reactor trip and' Safety Injection actuation occurred), and (3) through discussions with
. individual operating crew members. Particular emphasis was given to the extent to which Shift Advisors (individuals'under contract to the licensee to provide on-shift experience in the operation of similar licensed power reactor facilities) were integrated into the shift-operations.
The overall performance of the operating crews was judged by the Special- , j Inspection Team to be above average in plant knowledge and in the conduct 2 of operating duties (including the use of and adherence to operating i procedures) when compared to operators of power reactor facilities of similar type (Westinghouse, PWR) during the initial plant startup and early operating period.
> Prior to commencement of the current inspection, on April 13, 1984, the j leader of the Special Inspection Team questioned a senior licensed operator in the control room regarding the normal alignment (manual and.
, automatic valve positions) of the Safety _ Injection System. The operator's response was one of apparent uncertainty regarding the proper ' ! alignment (position) of such valves. This' observation, coupled with'a l recent event (on April 7,1984)'in which valves for the Boron Injection i Tank were found to be improperly aligned (electrical motor breakers.
- racked out) prompted a concern which was brought to the attention of
! licensee management. In response, prompt steps weref taken' by senior site management to direct special training for all licensed plant operators in the proper alignment of safety related systems of the plant and the Limiting Conditions for Operation associated with these systems. During l the course of the current inspection there was not a repeat of such a ! response by any of the plant operators.
i , . i'
- . - - - - . ..
y-5 y it t -- -- '-,-T- *-g-*-t " r- * y w-t'-- -'v V '-
@- *F r?- - '--'
'N TFe* F
a .. . .
--
1- ___ m
.. . , -
. - An instance of improper clearance and independent verification of the removal from service of a Boric Acid Transfer Pump by two non-licensed plant operators occurred during the_ current inspection, and is discussed.
, in paragraph 3 of this report. Although this occurrence did not have direct impact on nuclear safety, in this instance, it did reveal a , potential generic weakness in the licensee's procedures and practice with
- regard to the independent verification of operating activities by operations personnel.
. Shift Advisors were observed to participate extensively in the conduct of plant operations and the evaluation of plant performance. Seven qualified Shift Advisors are currently utilized at the plant. Five have been assigned to the operating shifts, and thus rotate with the crews to which they are assigned. Their knowledge and experience appears to have been integrated effectively into the operating staff. These individuals were observed to confer frequently with plant operators and shift supervision. Discussions with plant operators and supervision revealed , an apparent high degree of acceptance of the Shift Advisors by the i operating crews. In addition to the role of providing experienced- advice to the operating crew members, Shift Advisors have been assigned to special tasks for plant improvement. One such task is a special effort to reduce the number of _ unnecessary control room annunciator actuations y during normal plant operation.
The turnover of information during' shift change- was observed by the Special Inspection Team on a routine basis. Individual one-to-one turnover by Shift Foremen and the Control Operators is covered by formal checklists on which the status of plant systems and instrumentation is documented during a joint "walkdown" of the control room panels.
Following the one-to-one turnovers, a shift briefing is conducted by the i
'
oncoming Shift Foreman. These briefings were observed to be thorough, typically lasting approximately 20 to 30 minutes. Startup engineers were observed to participate extensively in the shift brieficg to discuss testing scheduled for the shift and the expected plant response. During these shift briefings plant operator comments, questions and recommendations were encouraged. Overall, the shift turnover and briefings were observed to be thorough and effective. Observations by
- the Special Inspection Team did, however, reveal the need for improvements in two areas of shift turnover. During the early part of the inspection period the number of' personnel-in the control room area
, during shift briefings was observed to be large, approaching 15 or more persons on some occasions. This led to an atmosphere of potential I distraction to the control operators. When this observation was brought to the attention of licensee management, shift. briefing were moved to the Unit 2 area of the control room, while two to three operators remained in the Unit I area and were subsequently briefed separately.
i - Another observation by the Special Inspection Team was that shift briefings did not include participation by maintenance representatives.
In response to this observation, licensee management included the regular participation by the on-shift Instrument and Control Maintenance Foreman in the shift briefings. The planned installation and use of special test equipment was a particular subject covered by these individuals.
J l l __ _ _ _ . _ . __
. ._. _ -,_ _ . _ ~ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ __, ._ _ _
L. ~.;_. nw
^
-
^ '
.L-- ': ~~
. -- -
-
.
'
.
. . ,
, . The licensee has established a " carpeted area" of the control room l wherein visual and audible surveillance of instrumentation, alarms, and , reactor controls is maintained by plant operators. Access to this area , 'was observed to be effectively .ontrolled. Rules have been established and implemented, whereby permission to enter ' the " carpeted area" must be
'
obtained from the Senior Control Operator or Control Operator. There-
. appeared to be a strong discipline in adherence to the access control rules.
Hours of work by operations personnel were examined and found to be well , within regulatory requirements. For the period April 1 through May 15, 1984, the average and maximum overtime for operations personnel regularly assigned to shift operations was as follows: Classification Average Overtime * Maximum Overtime *
,
Shift Foremen- 4 hours /wk 5 hours /wk Senior Control Operators 5 hours /wk- 7 hours /wk Control Operators 4 hours /wk 6 hours /wk Assistant Control Operators 4 hours /wk 7 hours /wk Auxiliary Operators 4 hours /wk :8 hours /wk l * Rounded to nearest hour The average overtime for Instrumentation and Control Technicians during a similar period, although within regulatory requirements, was somewhat higher than operations personnel, averaging approximately 14 hours per week during the period April 23 through May 19, 1984.
t Additional findings regarding operating crew performance are included in the reports of NRC consultants who participated in the inspection. These reports are included as Attachments 1 through 3 to this report. , i
'
3. Equipment Control Procedures and Practices The Special Inspection Team observed the implementation of procedures established by the licensee over the use of electrical jumpers (and lifted leads) and the removal / return to service of equipment and components important to safety.
The records of jumpers and lifted leads were examined frequently during the course of the inspection. Although administrative-discrepancies (essentially in all cases errors in the current index of the active jumper log) were identified on two occasions, no actual misuse or loss of effective control over the use of electrical jumpers' was identified.
Errors in the current index of active jumpers were resolved in each case when it was determined that either an " active" jumper in question had been removed and the record of its use thus removed from the log without the index being updated or the record of a specific jumper's use had been ( improperly placed in the jumper logbook.
l The Special Inspection Team observed the implementation of procedures for the . removal . from service and restoration of equipment on several I.
i j.
'_.-. . _ _ . - . . . _ . ,
, _ . ~7[_ ._i .
-
_ _ _ , _ , _ _ , , _ _ . . . __ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ -
. ..w = .. -_ = _
-
.
. .
. 5
..
. occasions, and except for the instance on May 15, 1984 discussed below .
observed no significant discrepancies. In particular, the removal of the Steam-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump from service for repair on April 27, 1984 was examined in detail. The removal of the pump from service was carried out in accordance with equipment clearance procedures, including tag-out. Entry into an Action Statement of the.
' governing technical specification was properly documented to assure - return of the pump to service within the time period required.
An occurrence on May 15, 1984, involving the improper removal from service of a Boric Acid Transfer Pump (PI-2), was examined in ' depth' by - the Special Inspection Team. This occurrence was brought to the < attention of the NRC inspectors who arrived at the site shortly following its discovery. Circumstances regarding the occurrence were as follows. _ A Clearance Request had been approved on May 14, 1984 to remove pump P1-2 from service to investigate reported motor vibration. In preparation for this work the pump was to be removed from service on the morning of May , 15, 1984. Two non-licensed Auxiliary Operators (AO) were assigned to ' remove the pump from service by racking-out the electrical breaker for the pump motor. In accordance with procedures for independent verification of the activity, one A0 was to rack-out the motor breaker and the second A0 was to verify that the motor breaker had been racked-out. Clearance records iudicated that this task had been.
' completed and clearance tags (Man On The Line-Caution tags) were attached to the motor breaker panel at approximately 0509 hours on May 15, 1984.
, At approximately 0730 hours on May 15, 1984, Control Operators, while walking down the control room panels during shift turnover, discovered- } that electrical power to the breaker for pump PI-2 was on, contrary to ! ' that indicated on an information tag attached to the pump switch and the Clearance Request form. Preliminary investigation by the plant operators at that time revealed that the breaker for pump PI-2 had not been racked out at 0509 hours as previously reported by the AO's involved.
, Discussions relating to this occurrence were held with licensee l representatives, including the two AO's involved, from which the following information was obtained. It has become routine practice at ' the Diablo Canyon plant when performing independent verification of i operating activities to have two persons go together when a task is ' performed - one performing the activity, and the other independently i verifying conduct of the activity. This practice is consistent with l current written procedures for independent verification, which require ' that independent verification be completed within 4 hours of the completion of the activity. l Consistent with the above practice two AO's went together to the motor ! . control center for pump PI-2 on May 15, 1984. When they arrived at the l motor control center the pump was observed to be running. Therefore, a I ' request was made, via plant telephone, for operators in the control room j to shut the pump off. During the course of their task the AO's related ' _ to NRC inspectors that they were engaged in conversation unrelated to their work task at the time. Upon observing that the pump had been shut off (audible and light indications were observed), the AO's proceeded to
*
hang Man On The Line Caution tags on the breaker panel for pump P1-2 and 1 eft the area. They failed to -realize that the breaker for pump P1-2 had-i l . sa
--,, - , - . _ , - - , ,. , , - ~ ,- - - . . , . . , . - - - --.. - - - - -
-
._
i _ ..
. -. 6
.
/
not been racked-out as required. When questioned by NRC inspectors, the LAO's stated that they were simply inattentive to the job at the time -- they had experienced "...a lapse in concentration." Both AO's have been employed in their current jobs at the plant for approximately _18 months.
Each stated that they had been' trained in the applicable equipment clearance procedures and their importance since initially being assigned to their jobs.
They also stated that they had performed equipment clearance tasks on many occasions in the past without error.
The licensee's clearance procedures require that in addition to the steps taken by operations personnel in removing equipment from service for maintenance the maintenance craftsman must also "walkdown the clearance" to assure himself the equipment is properly. removed from service. In this instance the assigned electrician had not yet walked down the.
clearance in preparation for work, nor had he commenced work on the pump motor.
In considering the circumstances of the above occurrence, NRC inspectors developed a generic concern regarding the current practice of the licensee in conducting independent verification of equipment status. The specific concern is that two persons essentially arm-in-arm can and often are employed to perform a check or other operating task and independently verify the check or completion' of the task at the same time. It appears that such a practice could, under circumstances similar to that which occurred on May 15, 1984, seriously compromise the " independence" of the independent verification. This concern was brought to the attention of licensee management, who acknowledged the validity of the NRC concern and coenitted to review and revise, as appropriate, the governing procedures and practices for independent verification. (See Paragraph 8, Management Interview).
4. Work Planning An entry in the Control Operators log on May 14, 1984 described an event wherein spurious cycling open and closed of the pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV's) had occurred. The plant operators responded plant to the operation event without difficulty, and no serious transient in resulted.
l
;
A review of facility records and discussions with licensee I representatives revealed the following infonnation relating to the event. ' The cause of the PORV cycling was attributed to the installation of.
defective special test equipment (an optical isolator) in the PORV control circuitry. The special test equipment, which was being installed to permit the recording of selected parameters in the pressurizer control circuitry, had not been tested for proper performance prior to installation. (The NRC resident inspection staff is continuing to examine the quality assurance program aspects of this occurrence, and will report separately their findings).
This occurrence, together with a previous observation by the Special Inspection Team relating to work by Instrumentation and Control (I&C) technicians on non-safety related systems, led to a closer examination of the work planning effort for I&C activities. The previous observation
wa. :.-~w.- -- "TJ_.._
^
.L L T': i _" ~ '
^ ~ ~
W
., . - -
_7
.
involved work on the recorder for the main steam system of the plant--a
'
non-safety related system. The Clearance and work order in this instance authorized calibration of the recorder while the reactor was operating.
Although, this work (calibration of the recorder) was not actually performed while the reactor was operating, it could have caused unexpected oscillation of the main steam system and unnecessary challenge to the reactor protection and engineered safety features. In both instances the lack of proper work planning was evident to fully assess - the effect work on non-safety related systems (particularly instrumentation and control systems) could have on safety related systems of the plant. Further discussion with licensee representatives revealed that two of four currently authorized positions in the I&C Work Planning group were unfilled. In addition, two proposed positions in this group had not yet been authorized.
NRC concerns in the work planning area were discussed with senior licensee site and corporate office management. On May 21, 1984, offers were approved for two individuals to fill vacant positions in the I&C Work Planning group. Priority attention by licensee management is currently being given to further staffing needs in the work planning area, including mechanical and electrical maintenance (See Paragraph 8, Management Interview).
i ' Licensee management also committed to the preparation of written instructions regarding the handling and use of special test equipment as well as testing or other work on non-safety related instrumentation and control systems. -(See Paragraph 8, Management Interview) 5. Initial Criticality, Zero Power and Low Power Testing Members of the Special Inspection Team witnessed initial criticality and . portions of all zero power and special low power tests. Details regarding these observations are discussed in Attachment 3.
Portions of the following Natural Circulation Demonstration Tests, including those tests repeated for the purpose of operator training for
each operating crew were witnessed. The objectives of each test were j successfully. demonstrated. Operating crew performance was judged to be t good, with no discrepancies observed.
Test 1.1 - Natural Circulation i
- Test.1.2 - Natural Circulation With Loss of Pressurizer Heaters
Test 1.3 - Natural Circulation at Reduced Pressure Test 1.4 - Natural Circulation With Loss of Offsite Power Test 1.5 - Effect of Steam Generator Isolation on Natural Circulation j 6. Post-Trip Information System Reliability
:
i f a a i i
~ , , , _ _ . _ . _ . _ . . _ , ._,. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ._. . , , _, , , . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . -
. . __ -
_ ._ . . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ - - _ - _ _ _
.. . . * 8 ..
Following a reactor trip and Safety Injection initiation on May 8,.1984, .i e it was observed that information from the sequence-of-events (P-250) computer was not available due to apparent frequency drift /re-synchronization problems associated with the computer's inverter } power source.
i Information provided by the P-250 computer is a significant input in the i licensee's post trip review procedure. Attempts during the current
- inspection to reproduce the conditions of May 8, 1984 were not successful
' in identifying the exact cause of the loss of information from the.
' computer. Licensee management committed to .a continuing priority effort
- to improve the-reliability of this equipment.
-
.
- _. A problem simil'ar to thaY of the sequence-of-events computer was i experienced with the Main Annunciator Recorder (typewriter) following a ,
j simulated loss of AC power test. As a result, attempts to obtain an
- alarm summary were unsuccessful. ' This information, like that of the
} sequence-of-events computer, is important during operation and for post " trip reviews by plant operators. Priority attention to a' resolution of this problem was committed to by licensee management. (See Paragraph 8, Management Interview)
,
i
1 7. Manaaement Involvement
!
l During the course of the inspection numerous opportunities were available
- to observe the involvement of both site and corporate -level management in j the day-to-day operation of Diablo Canyon, Unit 1.
! Frequent discussions, at least weekly, were held by telephone or in l person at the site with corporate level management, particularly the j Executive Vice President, Manager of Nuclear Plant Operations, and - Assistant Manager of Nuclear Plant Operations. Essentially daily
- discussions were held with senior site management.
I ) From the above discussions a assessment was made of management
- involvement in plant operations. The results of this assessment are presented below. ,
i , Site Manaaement Involvement I A significant program of site management involvement in plant operations was initiated by the licensee in early April 1984. This program, which was fully implemented prior to commencement of the current inspection,
- involves the assigarent of one of the following senior managers on shift-at all times.
) j Assistant Plant Manager - Technical Services
.
Assistant Plant Superintendent j Operations Manager i Training Manager i i These individuals were relieved of their normal duties and l responsibilities to enable them to spend full time in the role of ; ,' assessing and supporting shift personnel in the conduct of plant l L f
. _ _ . _ .
_ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ , - . _ . _ . - . . _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ , _ - _ . . _ - _ - . . , _ _ . ,, _ ..__._, _ , _ _ _, _ _ - - - - , , , _
_ . __ ___--
. .
. -
operations. These shift management personnel made several recommendations for the improvement of plant operations. Among the significant recommendations made were: a. Reduce the administrative tasks assigned to the Control Operator by reassigning many record keeping duties not directly related to plant operation to an Assistant Control Operator.
An additional study was undertaken to further minimize the nonessential duties performed by both the Control Operator and the Assistant Control Operator.
- b. Interim changes be made to improve the timeliness of reporting the completion of surveillance testing by all departments to - the Shift Technical Advisor so that a computer based status tracking system will be more current and complete. Such improvements were determined to be essential to keep plant i operators better informed of the current status of these tests.
c. Agressively pursue a program to reduce the number of outstanding electrical jumpers by more carefully scrutinizing requests for the use of jumpers. - Implementation of this recommendation placed responsibility on the shift managers to approve all jumpers. This interim measure reduced the number of outstanding jumpers by more than 50 percent.
d. Improve the timeliness of operator knowledge of plant modifications which may impact them, by having such changes documented in such a manner that they can be covered in shift-briefings rather than during requalification training sessions.
e. Continue efforts, including exchange of information with other ' nuclear utilities, to more effectively and efficiently handle equipment clearances and configuration control. A continuing effort in this area was recognized due to the large number of equipment and components out of service for preventive maintenance and surveillance testing.
f. Continue an assessment program similar to that implemented by the on-shift management by assigning many of the responsibilities presently assigned to them to the Shift Advisors and Shift Technical Advisors - with periodic management review.
Corporate Office Manaaement Involvement During the period of the current inspection corporate office management personnel were observed at the plant on frequent occasions, including back shift hours. For example, the Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations (NPO) was at the plant more than 25 percent of the time during the period
.
from mid-April through mid-May 1984. The Assistant Manager, NPO spent a similar period of time at the plant. These individuals were observed on other than day shift on several occasions. The Manager, NPO personally participated in a decision to discontinue the approach to initial e l
-- _. - _. - __ __ - .
.-
wp- r- - ,- y-g,i-r v. - --yy- - , , .g-- v- ,y- ,,,w.9 , , y. -.._,,-9 _ ,.~, ., .--e- -+-----+,gia+-r ag- , -- yr-- s +-
+evwnv -- e &--< - - - ---m
*; 3 - -- n;:: n . . : ^^ :u uw _, _n .. * .
. - !
. criticality on April 22, 1984 to perform repairs on a reactor coolant pump 0-ring seal, although, leakage past the seal was at the time well within limits of the technical specifications. He expressed the view that his participation, while at the site, on this occasion was partially to demonstrate by example corporate management's support of such '
decisions when in the interest of prudent and safe operation _ Both the Manager, NPO and the Executive Vice President were on site at
- the time of initial criticality.
Daily reports of plant status are issued by the Assistant Manager, NPO.
These reports are given wide distribution within the corporate office.
At least weekly discussions were held by the Special Inspection Team leader with the Executive Vice President. The status of plant operations and the findings of the inspection team were routine topics of discussion
, '
during these contacts, which revealed a high degree of awareness and personal involvement in such matters by the Executive Vice President.
Goals have been established by licensee. management to insure continued management involvem(nt in the day-to-day operation of the Diablo Canyon , plant. (See Paragraph 8, Management Interview) 8. Management Interview On June 12, 1984, a meeting was held by the' leader of the Special Inspection Team with those licensee representatives indicated in Paragraph 1. The scope and findings of the inspection as described in i ' this report were discussed. The following information and commitments were provided by licensee representatives. (References are to Paragraphs-of this report where the subject is discussed) A. Independent Verification of Operational Activities , i Licensee representatives stated that a change had been made to i Administ.rative Procedure HPAC C-104 requiring that, except for unusual circumstances such as ALARA considerations, persons performing independent verification are not to accompany the person ' j performing.the operational activity to be independently verified.
i ( ,
(P2ragraph 3)
< l B. Work Planning i i ' Offers-have been made to individuals to fill two vacant positions in the I&C Work Planning group. 'It is expected that these individuals ] will be on board by July 1, 1984.
, i l Authorization has also be given to procure the contract services of six additional persons in the Work Planning section.
j C. Post-Trip Information System Reliability i J ? e f
~,g e-m.
- - ~ - , =-m.- --q ,e,.ce w; w ,w- .-.,p- -- - - *,E '
- - + - - - ,,-y , . -
-,-gs.-- - , - , - w gr y e T- * -1- +
. _ _
_, .
- - - - -
s_ .
.. s -
_- ..
'
.
.
.
-
. Testing and maintenance have identified and corrected the.
reliability problems experienced with both the sequence-of-events - computer and the main annunciator typewriter. (Paragraph 6)
~
D. Management Involvement Goals have been established for continued management involvement in - ~ the operational activities at the Diablo Canyon plant, as follows: Corporate Office Persennel - The Manager, NPO and Assistant Manager, NPO will each average approximately four days per month at the Diablo Canyon Site.
. Site Management Personnel - Senior Managers will spend approximately 20 percent of their time in the plant observing and evaluating the conduct of personnel and operational performance. (Paragraph 7)
.
m
=
m m W
--- .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. '
normonau
, dEGiG id no c., u7 ^ Date 5-10-84 '
To Jesse Crews p, R. L. Sailor h g org. NRC Oro.
EG&G Idaho Address Address DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT SPECIAL INSPECTION
'
.
As a member of the on shift special inspection team at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant from April 20 to April 22, 1984, I observed the 12-8AM shift and made several plant tours to verify compliance and ensure plant cleanliness was satisfactory for startup. The operating crew was rated at an above average performance level as compared to similar vendor group operating crews. The crew operated with a " team concept" in all operations that were observed and applied a questioning attitude to any abnormalities. The crew had an above average academic knowledge level on their plant.
The Shift Advisor maintained a true advisory position with respect to control room operators. He was given the ability to observe all operations and gave his input to operators and crew supervision. This action was required very infrequently however, in the three shifts observed. The Shift Advisor appears to be effectively utilized at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.
eb ATTACHMENT 1 !
. . . - -
-*
_.-4_. . . _ . ,
__ _ _ s
* .o.
- .. *
'
SPECIFIC ITEMS NOTED DURING DIABLO CANYON STARTUP OPERATION (12-8AM) 1. 'Noted a large number of personnel (approx.12) "on the carpet" while the 8:00 AM shift turnover was in pr gress. Many of these people were not on the actual shift crew. 4-20-84) 2. All shift turnovers were excellent. (4-20 through 4-22-84) 3. The shift briefs held by the SF (L. Collins) were structured and thorough. All watchstanders are given the opportunity to report to the crew on the status of their watchstations. Coordination for evolutions. is planned at the briefing. (Best I have ever seen.)
(4-20 through 4-22-84) 4. Annunciator response procedures were utilized as expected when alarms were received. (4-20 through 4-22-84) 5. The heatup procedure was utilized at all times. (4-21 through 4-22-84) 6. When RCP alarms were all " locked in" on annunciator board, the watch - section placed the ACO at the alarm typewriter to monitor any additional alarms that might be received. (4-21-84) 7. Engaged in group discussion (SCO, CO, ACO, SA) to ensure that RCP seal package leakage was in fact identified and could not be considered either boundary or controlled leakage. (4-22-84) 8. When decision was made to c5oldown for repairs on #4 RCP seal package, the cooldown from hot standby procedure needed to be entered midway based on the actual plant conditions. Both the CO and ACO reviewed the entire procedure to ensure no steps could be omitted prior to entry into a midpoint in the procedure. Oncoming C0 performed complete review of procedure as above prior to relief. (The degas step of RCS that was necessary was in the beginning of the procedure.) (4-22-84)
' . - - - . - . _ - _ _
. _ . . -. -
-
.
I E R O idaho
' -, NOTEGRAM i"""" 5-16-84 pm .
Date '
' To From P. T. Isaks Mr.JesseC[rews org. NRC org. INEL Address Address
-
.
.
DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT SPECIAL INSPECTION I was a member of the Special Inspection Team at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant from May 7 through May 11, 1984. I observed crew operations during low power operations and testing. These observations included shift relief / turnover, shift briefings, operator logs and awareness of plant / system status, procedural compliance, li;aiting conditions for operation and controls utilized during removal and restoration of system components from service during maintenance and surveillance testing. The overall rating of crew operations is above average.
' The three Shift Advisors observed took an active interest in assessment of ongoing and upcoming significant shift activities, especially in regard to Technical Specification requirements. They appeared to be effectively utilized in their primary roles by crew members.
~ eb cc: T. F. Pointer A. J. Vinnola P. T. Isaksen File
.
_
- .
ATTACHMENT 2 MAY 18 Ea
.
O
, ,#.- ---.- . - -
w -----,m,
_ - - .
. . .
,
*
.. SPECIFIC ITEMS NOTED DURING DIABLO CANYON LOW POWER TESTING OPERATION (5/7/84 - 5/11/84) 1. All shift briefings observed were excellent except for swingshift on 5-7-84, which did not include status and plans for Unit 1. (Unit was in Hot Standby, Mode 3.) , 2. Operator respon'se and procedure compliance for recovery from spurious safety injection on 5-8-84 was excellent.
3. Noted no discrepancies on clearance for maintenance on the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.
4. All operators were aware of Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation and action statement requirements.
5. Conscientious reviews and group discussions, including Shift Advisors, for surveillances performed (i.e., STP M-16N slave relay testing for FCV-95).
6. On a plant tour, noted that the required fire watches were set and knowledgeable of their responsibilities.
7. No concerns identified on the Reactor Trip and Safety Injection, Reactor Trip Reviews.on 5-6 and 5-8-84 respectively.
8. One on watch Control Operator did not know without checking graph, the control rod withdrawal limits for current plant conditions (boron concentration and reactor power). Initially reported incorrect (unconservative)value and was invaediately corrected by the ACO. Control rods were well within the withdrawal limits at the time.
.--
._
_. -
=
. '
'
I E' E.
. p" Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
'- ,i y ;: ;,r NUCLEAR SYSTEMS SAFETY PROGRAM May 18, 1984 HFE 84-05-02 Jessa Crews, Senior Reactor Engineer U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Region V 199C' N. California Boulevard Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza Walnut Creek, California 94596
Dear Mr. Crews:
Enclosed is a statement of my participation as a member of the NRC Region V Special Inspection Team during the initial reactor startup and zero power reactor physics tests at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1.
Included are my observations and evaluations of the reactor startup activities and zero power reactor physics tests.
Please contact me at (415) 423-0952 or FTS 8-543-0952 if further information is needed.
Sincerely, fWA= + - L. Rolf Peterson Nuclear Systems Safety Program 0025R encl.
l ATTACHMENT 3
.
i i An Equal CttxstintyE@w elknusttyd Cahhxrma * PO Bon 808 Lmrirxxa Cattma 94550 * Te%ohonel415)d22 It00 * Twx 910-386-8339 UCLLL LVMR
-.-
._ \
- - - --
_
. _ _ _ _ . _ . - . . . t
. . .
Observations and Coments Initial Reactor Startup and Zero Power Reactor Physics Tests Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 NRC Region V Special Inspection I l
'
by i L. Rolf Peterson Nuclear Systems Safety Program Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory May 18, 1984 i
'
! , ? I 0025R
i i I
- ,- . , - .- , . - . --, . ,,
- - - . - _ . .,A - _.
.-
- .
_
. .
Observations and Comments Initial Reactor Startup and Zero Power Reactor Physics Tests Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 by L. Rolf Peterson Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory May 18, 1984 I participated as a consultant member of the NRC Region V Special Inspection Team at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, thit 1, during April and May 1984 Prior to initial reactor criticality I was on site at Diablo Canyon from April 19 until April 22, 1984. Initial reactor criticality was achieved at 0007, April 29, 1984 After initial reactor startup, I was on site from April 30 until May 2,1984, and from May 7 until May 9,1984, to evaluate the zero power reactor physics tests and to observe the performance of startup and operating personnel during these tests.
The initial startup of Diablo Canyon 1 was conducted in accordance with Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) Test Procedure No. 40.0, Startup Program Master Document, Sections 13.0 through 17.0. Zero power physics tests were conducted in accordance with Section 18.0.
Detailed PG&E test procedures used in conjunction with Test Procedure 40.0 were: Test Procedure No. 41.2 Initial Criticality Test Procedure No. 41.3 Nuclear Design Checks Test Procedure No. 41.4 Rod and Boron Worth Measurements During Baron Dilution Test Procedure No. 41.5 Control Bank Worth Measurements (with Overlap) During Boron Addition Test Procedure No. 41.6 Rod Control Cluster Assembly (RCCA) Pseudo Ejection at Zero Power Test Procedure No. 41.7 Minimum Shutdown Verification and Stuck Rod Worth Measurement , On April 19, 1984, I attended the briefing given by Bob Fischer on the Diablo Canyon plant operations organization and the briefing on initial criticality and zero power testing given by Mike Norem (lead startup engineer) and Steve Banton (startup engineer). A synopsis of the detailed test procedures listed above was reviewed during the latter briefing.
-1-S r
, - - ,
_ _
- , . - - _ _ _ _
__ , _ _
.* l . . , . .
f
. .During the remainder of this 4/19-22/84 plant visit I made complete tours' of the Unit 1 turbine and auxiliary buildings and the Unit 1 containment building. .
I familiarized myself with the Unit I control room and observed preparations - to heat up the plant and make the transition from Mode 5 Cold Shutdown to . l Mode 4 Hot Shutdown.
'
'
c ; I reviewed in detail Test Procedure 41.2, Initial Criticality. I found that l the procedure was complete and incorporated good operating practices for a safe approach to initial reactor criticality. The procedure included proper precautions to prevent an unanticipated criticality and to ensure proper detection of the neutron multiplication and neutron population by the source range detectors and the intermediate range detectors during reactor startup.
The procedure incorporated proper coordination of boron dilution and control rod asse21y withdrawal to ensure an orderly and safe approach to initial reactor criticality. The procedure also included proper steps after initial criticality to detect the onset of nuclear heating, to determine.the flux level upper limit for zero power physics testing, to check the basic kinetic behavior of the reactor by measuring the doubling time or reactor period after a small reactivity addition, and to check the operation of the reactivity computer.
Initial reactor criticality of Diablo Canyon 1 was achieved at 0007 hours -
(12:07 am), April 29, 1984. The predicted boron concentration for initial criticality with all control rods withdrawn was approximately 1310 + 52 ppm.
Actual measured boron concentration during initial criticality was T344 ppm.
This value was within the acceptable uncertainty tolerance of the predicted value. ,
,
During my visit to the plant on April 30 until May 2,1984, I reviewed Test Procedures 41.3, 41.4, 41.4, 41.5, 41.6, and 41.7 and observed the progress of zero power physics tests. In the control room, I observed measurements of control rod bank reactivity worth, critical boron concentration at control rod bank endpoints, isothermal temperature coefficient, and zero~ power core flux distribution. These measurements were conducted using Test Procedures 41.3 and 41.4 I also observed a calibration check of the reactivity computer against reactor doubling time (reactor period) measurements in accordance with Standard Test Procedure G-8C. s The PG&E crews on shift properly followed test procedures in making all measurements. I observed that the lead startup engineer on each shift was experienced in reactor startup and test operations and understood the-measurements being made. They used proper testing techniques to ensure that
~
valid data was obtained. The PG&E startup organization also used these .! nuclear design checks to give less experienced personnel important on-the-job ) {' training in performing startup core physics measurements. I observed good . cooperation between the PG&E startup personnel and the Westinghouse startup j ' representatives while the nuclear design verification measurements were being made.
.
-
-2-i
,
- - - . . - - _
--
. .. l
. _ - , -. - - .__ - . - _ -. . - . . - . - - - - - - . , . - - - -
_., _
--
_
- -. .- -.--. *
, . i' .
>+L .
l
., .
l u +
. When I left the plant on May 2,1984, I was satisfied that PG&E had adequate !
safe procedures in place for the Diablo Canyon 1 zero power physics . tests and ' that the plant startup personnel were conducting those tests ccrrectly and I
. safely. PG&E completed zero power physics tests on May 6,1984.
l
- I visited the Diablo Canyon plant again on May 7 until May 9 -1984. During l
! this visit. I reviewed the data and results of the zero power physics tests. I also reviewed the control rod withdrawal limits imposed to ensure that a, negative moderator temperature coefficient is maintained to meet Technical Specification 3.1.1.3. I concur with the rod withdrawal limits chosen by PG&E which were based on measured isothermal temperature coefficient data obtained i April 30 - May 2,1984.
On May 8,1984, I met with PG&E startup engineers . Steve Banton and Pete Sarafian and reviewed all zero power physics test data and results. In all cases except two, the measured parameters conformed to p;edicted design. values and tolerances that were provided by Westinghouse and incorporated into the PG&E test procedures. For both exceptions, the measured values were more
- conservative from a safety standpoint than the predicted values.
During Test Procedure 41.7, the measured integral worth of Shutdown Control Rod Bank D was 948 pcm reactivity. This measured value exceeded the predicted " value of 854 pcm with a + 10% tolerance that had been provided by Westinghouse.
The measured integral reactivity worth was verified by comparison with boron concentration endpoint measurements made for Shutdown Bank D fully withdrawn , and fully inserted. The PG&E startup personnel and the Westinghouse startup , representative determined that the measured reactivity worth was acceptable.
I concur with this evaluation. The intergral reactivity worth measurements
and the boron endpoint measurements are consistent. The larger measured j reactivity worth of Shutdown Bank D indicates that a greater shutdown 3 capability is available from this control rod bank than was originally I predicted.
i
- During Test Procedure 41.6, the measured integral reactivity worth of psuedo
! ejection of Rod Control Cluster Assembly B-6 (RCCA B-6) of Control Bank D was i 275 pcm reactivity. The predicted value provided by Westinghouse was 480 pcm ! with a + 10% tolerance. The worth of RCCA B-6 was measured during both.
i boration and boron dilution with less than 1 pcm reactivity deviation.
The PG&E Startup personnel and the Westinghouse startup representative determined that this result deviated from Westinghouse design review criteria but did not violate safety review criteria. I concur with this determination. The measured worth indicates that a smaller positive reactivity increase would occur from ejection of the single rod control
cluster assembly that had been predicted.
- The test data supports the accuracy of the RCCA B-6 pseudo ejected rod '
measurements. The predicted 480 pcm reactivity worth of the single ejected '
- control rod assembly appears to be too large. Control Bank D has nine control rod assemblies, including RCCA B-6. The Control Bank D integral worth was
_
- j i
! l j -3-l l- -_ ____._ _ _
. . _ _
_ ~ . _ - _ .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ ___ ..
_ - _ _
-
.
,
,a . *
.. .
. measured during Test Procedure 41.4 with all other control rods withdrawn.
The measured total integral worth of Control Bank D was 938 pcm reactivity.
The measured 275 pcm reactivity worth for ejection of single assembly RCCA B-6 , is reasonable when compared to the measured worth of the entire Control Bank D < in a similar core configuration.
Conclusions I found that PG&E had adequate and complete procedures in place to safely conduct the initial reactor startup and zero power physics tests at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1.
The Diablo Canyon 1 operating crews and startup personnel that I observed on
~~
shift in-the control room followed the established procedures and performed competently.
I reviewed the data and results of the Diablo Canyon 1 initial reactor criticality startup and zero power reactor physics tests. I concur with the test data analyses and evaluations made by by PG&E and Westinghouse startup personnel. No deviations from expected reactor nuclear design characteristics that would adversely affect safety of operations of Diablo Canyon 1 were observed during initial reactor startup and zero power reactor physics tests.
! l I i 0025R-4-
.. .. ..- .
}}