IR 05000272/2012007
| ML120620329 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 03/01/2012 |
| From: | Rogge J Engineering Region 1 Branch 3 |
| To: | Joyce T Public Service Enterprise Group |
| Rogge J | |
| References | |
| IR-12-007 | |
| Download: ML120620329 (26) | |
Text
UNITED STATES r;--ffi NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 March I, 2A1.2 Mr. Thomas President and Chief Nuclear Officer PSEG Nuclear LLC - N09 P. O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 SALEM NUCLEAR GENEMTING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT O5OOO272I2O12OO7 AND 0500031 1t2012007
Dear Mr. Joyce:
On February 9,2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on February 9, 2012, with Mr. Carl Fricker and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed station personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)
component of the NRC's document system, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rmladams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely, fr^7'8of---"-
John F. Rogge, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-272. 50-311 License Nos. DPR-70. DPR-75
T. Joyce 2
Enclosure:
I nspection Report 0500027 21 20 1 2007 a nd 05000 3 1 1 l 20 1 2007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION I 50-272,50-311 DPR-70, DPR-75 Report No.: 0500027 21 201 2007 a nd 05000 3 1 1 l 201 2007 Licensee: PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG)
Facility: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and2 Location: P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Dates: January 23,2012 - February 9,2012 Inspectors: A. Rao, Reactor lnspector (Team Leader)
W. Schmidt, Senior Reactor Analyst L. Scholl, Senior Reactor Inspector K. Young, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Richmond, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved by: John F. Rogge, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS f R 0500027212012007, 0500031 112012007;0112312012 - 0210912012; Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2; Triennial Fire Protection Inspection.
This report covered a two week on-site triennialfire protection team inspection by specialist inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
Cornerstone: M itigating Systems No findings were identified.
Other Findings None Enclosure
Backqround This report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure (lP) 71 11 1.05T, "Fire Protection." The objective of the inspection was to assess whether PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) had implemented an adequate fire protection program and whether post-fire safe shutdown capabilities had been established and were properly maintained at Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (Salem).
The following fire areas (FAs) were selected for detailed review based on prior inspection results and risk insights from the Salem Individual Plant Examination of External Events.
. 1FA-DG-100E. Unit 1 Diesel Generator Room No. 1B
. 1FA-DG-100E1, Unit 1 Diesel Generator Control Room No. 1B o 2FA-AB-100A, Unit 2 Relay Room
. 2FA-AB-848, Unit 2 Reactor Plant Auxiliary Equipment Area Inspection of these 4 fire areas fulfills the inspection procedure requirement to inspect a minimum of three samples.
The inspection team evaluated PSEG's fire protection program (FPP) against applicable requirements which includbd Technical Specifications, Operating License Conditions 2.C.(5)
and 2.C.(10) for Unit Nos. 1 and 2 respectively, NRC Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs),
10 CFR 50.48, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, and Branch Technical Position (BTP) Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1 and Appendix A. The team also reviewed related documents that included the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR),
Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Plan, Fire Hazards Analyses (FHA), and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Safe Shutdown Analysis Report.
The team also evaluated aspects of two mitigating strategies for responding to large fires and explosions, as required by Operating License Conditions 2.C.(16) and 2.C.(32) for Unit Nos. 1 and2 respectively, and 10 CFR 50.54(hhx2). The team also reviewed related documents that included NEI 06-12, "B.s.b Phases 2 & 3 Submittal Guidance," Revision 2 (ML070090060).
Inspection of the selected strategies fulfills the inspection procedure requirement to inspect a minimum of one sample.
Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment to this report.
Enclosure
Report Details REACTOR SAFETY lnitiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity 1R05 Fire Protection (lP 711 1 1.05T)
.01 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the FHA, safe shutdown analyses, and supporting drawings and documents to verify whether the safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected from fire damage. The team evaluated equipment and cable separation to determine whether that applicable separation requirements of Section lll.G of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, and the Salem design and licensing bases were maintained for the credited safe shutdown equipment and their supporting power, control, and instrumentation cables. The review included an assessment of the adequacy of the selected systems for reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and associated support system functions.
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
.02 Passive Fire Protection a. lnspection Scope The team walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to evaluate whether the material conditions of the fire area boundaries were adequate for the fire hazards in the area. The team compared the fire area boundaries, including walls, ceilings, floors, fire doors, fire dampers, penetration seals, electrical raceway and conduit fire barriers, and redundant equipment fire barriers and radiant energy heat barriers to design and licensing basis requirements, industry standards, and the Salem FPP, as approved by the NRC, to identify any potential degradation or non-conformances.
The team reviewed selected engineering evaluations, installation work orders, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to determine whether the fill material was properly installed and whether the as-left configuration satisfied design requirements for the intended fire rating.
The team also reviewed recent inspection and functional test records for fire dampers, and the inspection records for penetration seals and fire barriers, to verify the inspection and testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met, and any Enclosure
potential performance degradation was identified. In addition, the team reviewed recent test results for the carbon dioxide (COt and Halon fire damper functionality tests for the 1B emergency diesel generator room (CO2) and Unit 2 relay room (Halon) to verify the testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met, and any performance degradation was identifiec.
Findinqs No findings were identified.
.03 Active Fire Protection a. lnspection Scope The team evaluated manual and automatic fire suppression and detection systems in the selected fire areas to determine whether they were installed, tested, maintained, and operated in accordance with NRC requirements, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes of record, and the Salem FPP, as approved by the NRC. The team also assessed whether the suppression systems capabilities were adequate to control and/or extinguishes fires associated with the hazards in the selected areas.
The team reviewed the as-built capability of the fire water supply system to verify the design and licensing basis and NFPA code of record requirements were satisfied, and to assess whether those capabilities were adequate for the hazards involved. The team reviewed the fire water system hydraulic analyses to assess the adequacy of a single fire water pump to supply the largest single hydraulic load on the fire water system plus concurrent fire hose usage. The team evaluated the fire pump performance tests to assess the adequacy of the test acceptance criteria for pump minimum discharge pressure at the required flow rate, to verify the criteria was adequate to ensure that the design basis and hydraulic analysis requirements were satisfied. The team also evaluated the underground fire loop flow tests to verify the tests adequately demonstrated that the flow distribution circuits were able to meet design basis requirements. In addition, the team reviewed recent pump and loop flow test results to verify the testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met, and any potential performance degradation was identified.
The team reviewed initial discharge testing, design specifications, vendor requirements, engineering evaluations, and routine functional testing for the carbon dioxide (CO2) and Halon suppression systems for the 1B emergency diesel generator room (CO2) and Unit 2 relay room (Halon). The team walked down accessible portions of the CO2 and Halon systems, including storage tanks and supply systems, to independently assess the material condition, operational lineup, and availability of the systems. The team also reviewed and walked down the associated fire fighting strategies and COz and Halon system operating procedures.
Enclosure
The team walked down accessible portions of the detection and water suppression systems in the selected areas and major portions of the fire water supply system, including both diesel driven fire pumps and fire water storage tanks, interviewed system and program engineers, and reviewed selected condition reports (CRs) to independently assess the material condition of the systems and components. In addition, the team reviewed recent test results for the fire detection and suppression systems for the selected fire areas to verify the testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met, and any performance degradation was identified.
The team assessed the fire brigade capabilities by reviewing training, qualification, and drill critique records. The team also reviewed PSEG's fire fighting strategies (i.e., pre-fire plans) and smoke removal plans for the selected fire areas to determine if appropriate information was provided to fire brigade members and plant operators to identify safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation, and to facilitate suppression of a fire that could impact post-fire safe shutdown capability. The team independently inspected the fire brigade equipment, including personnel protective gear (e.9., turnout gear) and smoke removal equipment, to determine operational readiness for fire fighting.
In addition, the team reviewed PSEG's fire brigade equipment inventory and inspection procedure and recent inspection and inventory results to verify adequate equipment was available, and any material deficiencies were identified.
b. Findinss No findings were identified.
04 Protection from Damaqe from Fire Suppression Activities a. lnspection Scope The team walked down the selected fire areas and adjacent areas, and reviewed selected documents to determine whether redundant safe shutdown trains could be potentially damaged from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems. During the walkdowns, the team evaluated the adequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations, and spray protection.
Specifically, to determine whether a potential existed to damage redundant safe shutdown trains, the team evaluated whether:
. A fire in one of the selected fire areas would not release smoke, heat, or hot gases that could cause unintended activation of suppression systems in adjacent fire areas which could potentially damage all redundant safe shutdown trains; or
. A fire suppression system rupture, inadvertent actuation, or actuation due to a fire, in one of the selected fire areas, could not directly damage all redundant trains (e.9. sprinkler caused flooding of other than the locally affected train); and o Adequate drainage was provided in areas protected by water suppression systems.
Enclosure
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
05 Alternative Shutdown Capabilitv lnspection Scope The team reviewed the safe shutdown analysis, operating procedures, piping and instrumentation drawings (P&lDs), electrical drawings, the UFSAR, and other supporting documents for the selected fire areas to verify PSEG had properly identified the systems and components necessary to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown conditions.
The team evaluated selected systems and components credited by the safe shutdown analysis for reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions to assess the adequacy of PSEG's alternative shutdown methodology. The team also assessed whether alternative post-fire shutdown could be performed both with and without the availability of off-site power. The team walked down selected plant configurations to verify they were consistent with the assumptions and descriptions in the safe shutdown and fire hazards analyses. In addition, the team evaluated whether the systems and components credited for use during post-fire safe shutdown would remain free from fire damage.
The team reviewed the training program for licensed and non-licensed operators to verify it included alternative shutdown capability. The team also verified personnel required for post-fire safe shutdown, using either the normal or alternative shutdown methods, were available on-site at all times, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigade members.
The team reviewed the adequacy of procedures utilized for post-fire shutdown and performed an independent walk through of procedure steps to assess the adequacy of implementation and human factors within the procedures. The team also evaluated the time required to perform specific actions to verify operators could reasonably be expected to perform those actions within sufficient time to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.
Specific procedures reviewed for normal and alternative post-fire shutdown included:
. 51.OP-AB.FIRE-0001(Q), Control Room Fire Response, Rev. 4
. 52.OP-AB.FIRE-0001(Q), Control Room Fire Response, Rev. 7
. S2.OP-AB.CR-0002(Q), Control Room Evacuation Due to Fire In The Gontrol Room, Relay Room, 4601230V Switchgear Room, or 4KV Switchgear Room, Rev.27 Enclosure
The team reviewed selected operator manual actions to verify they had been properly reviewed and approved and whether the actions could be implemented in accordance with plant procedures in the time necessary to support the safe shutdown method for each fire area. The team also reviewed the periodic testing of the alternative shutdown transfer and isolation capability, and instrumentation and controlfunctions, to evaluate whether the tests were adequate to ensure the functionality of the alternative shutdown capability.
b. Findinos No findings were identified.
.06 Circuit Analvsis Inspection Scope The team reviewed PSEG's post-fire safe shutdown analysis for the selected fire areas to ensure the analysis identified both required and associated electrical circuits and cables for the systems and components necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. The team reviewed electrical schematics and cable routing data for the power and control cables associated with selected components. Specifically, the team evaluated the selected circuits and cables to determine whether they were (a) adequately protected from potential fire damage, or (b) analyzed to show that fire-induced faults (e.9., hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground) would not prevent safe shutdown, or (c) analyzed to show that any adverse effect of potential damage could be mitigated with approved operator manual actions, in order to verify fire-induced faults would not adversely impact safe shutdown capabilities. The team's evaluations considered credible fire scenarios, cable insulation attributes, cable failure modes, cable routing, and common power supply or electrical bus configurations.
In addition, the team reviewed cable raceway drawings and cable routing databases for a sample of components required for post-fire safe shutdown to determine whether those cables were routed as described in the safe shutdown analysis. The team also reviewed equipment important to safe shutdown, but not part of the success path, to assess whether PSEG's safe shutdown methodologies were appropriate, conformed to design and licensing basis requirements, and appropriately considered the guidance in NRC Regulatory Guide 1 .189, "Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2.
Circuit analysis was performed for the following components:
. 1 Ll-1649, Pressurizer Level.
o 2CY4O and 2CV41, VCT lsolation Valves (to charging pump suction);
. 2SW26, 2 Service Water Discharge Header Valve (to turbine generator area);
. 21SW20, 21 Discharge Header Valve (to turbine generator area);
o 225W20, 22 Service Water Pump Discharge Valve (to 2l system Header);
o 23SW20, 23 Service Water Turbine Generator Area Header Supply Valve;
. 245V,'120, 22 Service Water Nuclear Header Supply Valve; and Enclosure
The team reviewed a sample of circuit breaker over-current protection coordination studies to determine whether equipment needed for post-fire safe shutdown activities could be adversely affected due to a lack of coordination that could result in a common power supply or common electrical bus concern. The team also evaluated whether coordination studies appropriately considered multiple faults due to fire. In addition, the team reviewed a sample of circuit breaker maintenance records, for components required for safe shutdown, to determine whether the breakers were properly maintained.
The team assessed the transfer of control from the control room to the alternative shutdown locations to determine whether it would be affected by fire-induced circuit faults (e.9., by the provision of separate fuses and power supplies for alternative shutdown control circuits).
b. Findinos No findings were identified.
.07 Communications a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed safe shutdown procedures, the safe shutdown analysis, and associated documents to verify an adequate method of communications would be available to plant operators following a fire. Specifically, the team evaluated plant telephones, page systems, and/or portable radios would be available for use and were properly maintained. During this review, the team considered the effects of ambient noise levels, clarity of reception, reliability, and coverage patterns. The team inspected selected emergency storage lockers to independently verify portable communication equipment was available for the fire brigade and plant operators. In addition, the team evaluated whether radio or phone repeaters, transmitters, and power supplies would be reasonably unaffected by a fire.
b. Findinss No findings were identified.
.08 Emeroencv Liqhtinq a. Inspection Scope The team walked down the emergency lights in the selected fire areas to independently evaluate the placement and coverage areas of the lights. The team assessed whether the lights provided adequate illumination on local equipment and instrumentation required for post-fire safe shutdown, to ensure local operations could be reliably performed under expected post-fire conditions. Emergency light placement was also evaluated to determine adequate illumination of local area access and egress pathways.
Enclosure
The team verified whether the emergency light batteries were rated for at least an eight-hour capacity. Preventive maintenance procedures, the vendor manual, completed surveillance tests, and battery replacement practices were also reviewed to evaluate whether the emergency lighting was being maintained in a manner that would ensure reliable operation.
b. Findinos No findings were identified.
.09 Cold Shutdown Repairs a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed PSEG's dedicated repair procedures, for components which might be damaged by fire and were required to achieve post-fire cold shutdown. The team evaluated selected cold shutdown repairs to determine whether they could be achieved within the time frames assumed in the design and licensing bases. In addition, the team verified the necessary repair equipment, tools, and materials (e.9., pre-cut cables with prepared attachment lugs) were available and accessible on site.
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
.10 Compensatorv Measures a. lnspection Scope The team verified compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.9., detection and suppression systems and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps, valves, or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). The team evaluated whether the short term compensatory measures adequately compensated for the degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective action could be taken and whether PSEG was effective in returning the equipment to service in a reasonable period of time.
Section lll.G.2 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, provides acceptable methods for meeting the requirement that one train of systems required for post-fire safe shutdown remains free from fire damage. In some cases, plants have utilized operator manual actions as interim compensatory measures while non-compliances with section lll.G.2 are being resolved. The team did not identify any open issues at Salem Units 1 and 2 that relied on operator manual actions as interim compensatory measures.
b. Findinss No findings were identified.
Enclosure
.11 Review and Documentation of FPP Chanqes a. lnspection Scope The team reviewed recent changes to the approved fire protection program to verify the changes did not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown.
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
.12 Control of Transient Combustibles and lqnition Sources a. lnspection Scope The team reviewed PSEG's procedures and programs for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the FHA. A sample of hot work and transient combustible control permits were reviewed to assess the adequacy of PSEG's fire protection program administrative controls. The team performed plant walkdowns to independently verify whether transient combustibles and ignition sources were being properly controlled in accordance with the administrative controls.
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
.13 Larqe Fires and Explosions Mitiqation Strateoies Inspection Scope The team reviewed the licensee's preparedness to handle large fire or explosions by reviewing two mitigating strategies to verify they continue to meet operating license conditions 2.C.(16) and 2.C.(32) for Unit Nos. 1 and 2 respectively by determining that:
. Procedures are being maintained and adequate; o Equipment is properly staged and is being maintained and tested; and,
. Station personnel are knowledgeable and can implement the procedures.
for the following strategies:
o Manually Depressurizing Steam Generator and Feeding with the Portable Diesel Driven Pump; and,
. Manual Operation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump.
Enclosure
I Findinss No findings were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4c.A2 ldentification and Resolution of Problems (lP 71152)
a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with the fire protection program, post-fire safe shutdown issues, and mitigation strategy issues to determine whether PSEG was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these areas and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The condition reports reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findinos No findings were identified.
40A6 Meetinqs. includinq Exit The team presented the inspection results to Mr. Carl Fricker, and other members of PSEG's staff on February 9,2012. The team verified that this report does not contain proprietary information.
Enclosure
A-1 ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee Personnel M. Adair, Salem Fire Protection Program Engineer .
J. Bricker, Senior Reactor Operator K. Colville, Engineering Programs Manager C. Dahms, Regulatory Assurance Engineer J. Gebely, Fire Department Supervisor A. Johnson, Design Engineering Manager S. Markos, Mechanical Design Engineering Manager K. Mathur, Design Engineer M. Richers, Appendix R Engineer S. Savar, Appendix R Engineer D. Shumaker, Corporate Fire Protection Program Engineer B. Thomas, Regulatory Assurance Engineer K. Wolf, Fire Protection System Engineer NRC Personnel D. Frumkin, Fire Protection Branch, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
A. Patel, Resident Inspector - Hope Creek D. Schroeder, Senior Resident Inspector - Salem LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSEO AND DISCUSSED None LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Fire Protection Licensinq and Desion Basis Documents DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A3-SSAR(25), Unit-2 Aux Bldg Elev. 84 ft. Compliance Assessment, Rev. 3 DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A3-SSAR(47), 1B EDG Control Room Compliance Assessment, Rev. 0 DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A3-SSAR(60), Unit-2 Relay Room Compliance Assessment, Rev. 0 DE-PS.ZZ-0001(O)-A3-SSA, Salem Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis, Rev.S DE-PS.ZZ-0001(O)-A3-SSAR (003), Safe Shutdown Manual Action Feasibility Assessment, Rev. 1 NC.DE-PS.ZZ-0001, Programmatic Standard for Fire Protection, Rev. 3 NC.DE-PS.ZZ-0001-A6-GEN, Comparison of Salem Fire Program to BTP 9.5-1 App-A, Rev. 2 NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1 and Appendix A, Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Attachment
A-2 NRC Letter dated 1l7lO4, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2, lssuance of Amendment RE: Request for Changes to License Condition 2.C.(10)
NRC Letter and Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Amendment No. 21 to Facility Operating License - Fire Protection Review (ML011660040), dated 11120179 PSEG Letter dated 511102, Request for Exemption from 10CFR50, Appendix R, for Fire Areas 1(2)-FA-AB-648, 1(2)-FA-AB-84C, and 1(2)-FA-AB-84B, Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-31 1 , Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 and DPR-75 PSEG Letter dated 711103, Request for Change to Operating License Condition 2.C.10 "Fire Protection" Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2 Facility Operating License Not. DPR-75. Docket No. 50-311 Safety Evaluation dated 6124103, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 -
Exemption from the Requirements of 1OCFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections lll.G.3 and lll.L.3 for Fire Areas 1(2)-FA-AB-648, 1(2)-FA-AB-84B, and 1(2)-FA-AB-84C SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A2, Fire Hazards Analysis, Rev. 0 USFAR, Salem Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Section 9.5 Calculations. Analvsis. and Enqineering Evaluations DE-PS.ZZ-0001(O)-A3-SSA, Salem Fire Protection Report-Safe Shutdown Analysis, Rev. 5 DE-PS.ZZ-0001(O)-A3-SSAR(001), Unit 1-Safe Shutdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 DE-PS.ZZ-0001(O)-A3-SSAR(002), Unit 2-Safe Shutdown Equipment List, Rev. 1 DE-PS-ZZ-0001(O)-A3-SSAR-SSAR(047), Unit 1 Fire Area Compliance Assessment, Diesel Generator Room 1B and Diesel Generator Control Room 18, 1FA-DG-100E and 1FA-DG-100E1, Rev.0 DE-PS.ZZ-0001(O)-A3-SSAR(060), Common and Unit 2 Fire Area Compliance Assessment Control Room Complex and Unit 2 Relay Room 12FA-AB-1 22A & 2FA-AB-100A, Rev. 0 ES-13.006(Q), Breaker and Relay Coordination Calculation Safety Related AC System, Rev. 3 ES-44.018, Salem Units 1&2 Electrical Coordination for Appendix R Applications, Rev. 1 SC.ER-PS.FP-0001-A2, Salem Fire Protection Report - Fire Hazards Analysis, Rev. 0 S-C-ZZ-EEE-1430, Loss of Offsite Power Evaluation for a Postulated Appendix R Fire at Salem Generating Station Units 1 and2, Rev.2 S-C-ZZ-EEE-1733,10CFR50, Appendix R Common Power and Common Enclosure Evaluation for Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 and 2, Rev. 0 S-C-CVC-MDC-1901, Analysis of CVCS Configurations in Support of Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis, Rev. 0 S-C-ZZ-NEE-0839, Salem Units 1 & 2 Alternate Shutdown Capability Time Analysis for Appendix R Events, Rev.4 S-C-FP-MDC-2300, Salem Appendix R Multiple Spurious Operations Evaluation, Rev. 1 S-C-M500-EEE-1636, Availability of the UHF Radio Systems Following an Appendix R Fire, Rev.0 S-C-FP-FEE-1746, Acceptable Operator Response Times to Appendix R Failures, Rev. 2 S-C-CBV-MEE-1 979, Containment Pressure/Temperature Response With RCP Seal Leakage During Control Room Fire, Rev. 1 S-C-CVC-MDC-1901, Analysis of CVCS Configurations ln Support of Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis, Rev. 0 S-1-FP-FDC-2113, Hydraulic Analysis for 460V SWGR Room Pre-Action System, Rev. 0 S-1-FP-FEE-1986, Fire Suppression System Performance Capability, 1FA-AB-84A, Rev. 8 Attachment
A-3 S-C-FP-FEE-1888, Relay Room Halon System Acceptance Test Review, Rev. 0 S-C-WD-MDC-2116, 460V SWGR Electrical Equipment Room Water Drain, Rev. 2 S-C-ZZ-SDC-1203, Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) Analysis, Rev. 3 S-O-FP-MEE-0756, Fire Pump Piping As-built Configuration, Rev. 3 Technical Evaluation, 70032871-40, EDG Area COz System Deficiencies, performed6130104 Technical Evaluation, 70066205-40, Pressure Retaining Capability of Non-safety Piping, performed 7131108 Technical Evaluation, 70066205-60, Seismic Adequacy of Fire Protection Piping in Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Area, performed 7l12lo7 Technical Evaluation, 70066205-360, SQUG Evaluation for Heating Steam & Heating Water Piping, performed 12117 107 Technical Evaluation, 70095323-0070, Loss of RCS Makeup Due to Control Room/Relay Room Fire Scenario. dated 01117/2012 Technical Evaluation, 70095323-0090, Operation of RCPs Without Seal Cooling - Control Room/Relay Room Fire Scenario, dated 0211212012 Technical Evaluation, 70098495-20, NRC lN 2009-02 Biodiesel Fuel Oil, performed 9/09 Technical Evaluation, 70105122-10, NRC lN 2009-29 Fire Pumps Failto Start, performed2ll0 Drawings and Wirinq Diaqrams Unit 1 ,203002 A 8789, 4160V Vital Buses One Line, Rev. 34 Unit 1, 203038 89772, Sht. 1, Unit-18 4160VVital Bus 1B EDG, Rev.25 Unit 1, 203038 89772, Sht. 1, Unit-18 4160VVital Bus 1B EDG, Rev.28 Unit 1 ,205202 A 8760-81 (Sht. 3), Steam Generator Feed and Condensate, Rev. 81 Unit 1 ,205203 A8760-77 (Sht. 1 of 6), Main, Reheat & Turbine By-pass Steam, Rev. 77 Unit 1 ,205203 A 8760-76 (Sht. 2), Main, Reheat & Turbine By-pass Steam, Rev. 76 Unit 1 ,205236 A8761-57 , Auxiliary Feedwater, Rev. 57 Unit 1, 205236-SIMP-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System Simplified P&lD, Rev. 1 Unit 1 ,211298 B 9507-24 Penetration Area - No. 11 & 13 Steam Generators Main Steam Pressure. Rev. 24 Unit 1 ,211310 B 9508, Reactor Containment No. 1 PZRs & PZR Relief Tanks, Rev. 27 Unit 1, 61 1616 D, Reactor Coolant PZR Channel 1 1 1 Level, 1LT1649, Rev. 0 Unit 2, 203061 A 8789, 4160V Vital Buses One Line, Rev. 34 Unit 2, 203063 A, 460V & 230 Vital and Non-vital Bus One Line, Rev. 37 Unit 2, 205303 A8762-67 (Sht. 1 of 6), Main, Reheat & Turbine By-pass Steam, Rev. 67 Unit 2, 205303 A8762-61 (Sht. 2), Main, Reheat & Turbine By-pass Steam, Rev. 61 Unit 2, 211582B 4025, Sht. 2, CVCS No. 2CV40 Volume ControlTank First Discharge Stop Valve, Rev. 14 Unit 2, 211583 A9773, Sht. 2, CVCS No. 2CV41 Volume Control Tank Second Discharge StopValve, Rev. 18 Unit 2, 220901 B 9786, Service Water lntake 2C 230V Vital Bus lsolation Valve Bus lsolation Valve No 24SW20, Rev. 11 Unit 2, 220902 B 9786, Service Water Intake 2C 23OV Vital Bus lsolation Valve No.23SW20, Rev. '16 Unit 2, 220903 B 9786, Service Water Intake 28 230V Vital Bus lsolation Valve No.2SW26, Rev.16 Unit 2, 220904 B 9786, Service Water Intake 2A230V Vital Bus lsolation Valve No. 22SW20. Rev. 11 Attachment
A-4 Unit 2, 220906 B 9787 , Service Water Intake 2A230V Vital Bus lsolation Valve No.21SW20, Rev. 19 Unit 2, 222475 A 1778,2A Service Water Intake 230V Vital Cont. Center One Line, Rev. 27 Unit2,222477 A1778, 82 ServiceWaterlntake230VVital Cont. CenterOne Line, Rev.22 Unit 2, 222478 A 1779,2C Service Water Intake 230V Vital Control Center One Line, Rev.29 Unit 2, 222484 A 1779, Auxiliary Building 28 West Valves and MISC. 230V Vital Contr.
Ctr. One Line, Rev.45 Unit 2, 222485 A 1779, Auxiliary Building 2C West Valve and MISC. 230V Vital Contr.
Ctr. One Line. Rev. 53 Units 1 & 2, 203000 SIMP, 500KV-4KV Electrical Distribution, Rev. 3 Units 1 &2,203776 Sht. 1, Fire Pump #1 Engine, Controller, and Dual Battery Charger, Rev. 9 Units 1 &2,203776 Sht. 2, Fire Pump #1 Engine, Controller, and Dual Battery Charger, Rev. 10 Units 1 & 2,203778, Sht. 1 , Fire Pump #2 Engine, Controller, and Batteries, Rev. 8 Units 1 & 2, 203778, Sht. 2, Fire Pump #2 Engine, Controller, and Batteries, Rev. 10 Units 1 &2,205678 A 8939, Aux. Building EL. 84'-0' No. 13 and 23ds Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Panel 207, Rev.26 Units 1 &2,207095, Door Schedule, Rev. 40 Units 1 &2,211581 A 586, CVCS No. 1CV40 & 2CV40 Volume Control Tank First Discharge Stop Valves, Rev. 2 Units 1 &2,219456 A 8933, Aux. Building EL. 84'-0' Hot-Shutdown Station Panel207, Rev.26 Unit 1 & 2,220060 B 9537-10, Reactor Prot. & Process Cont. Systems Steam Dump lnterconnections, Rev. 1 0
't Unit & 2.231400 ABL 5007-2. Main Steam No. 1 1 & 21 Relief Valves, Rev. 2 Unit 1 &2,231404 A 1403-25, Penetration Area No. 11 & 21 Main Steam Panels 683-1A thru 689-14 & 832 -1A, Rev. 25 Unit 1 &2,239912B 9647-2, Main Steam System No. 11MS1O & 21MS10 Relief Valves &
No. 11MS26, 21MS26, 12MS26, 22M526 Turb. Dr. VA's, Rev. 2 Units 1 &2,247904E 9707, Penetration Area Hot Shutdown Fire Protection Process Rack 781-1(2), Rev. 11 Units 1 &2,247907 u-9707, Hot Shutdown Fire Protection Systems PZR Pressure & Level Interconnections, Rev. 6 Units 1 &2,247911E 9707, Auxiliary Building IASDS and 2ASDS 115VAC Distribution Panel, Rev. 15 Units 1 & 2, 605818, Auxiliary Building Boundary Locations Floor Plan Elevation 45'0" and 55'0",
Rev.0 Units 1 & 2, 605819, Auxiliary Building Boundary Locations Floor Plan Elevation 64'0", Rev. 0 Units 1 & 2, 605820, Auxiliary Building Fire Boundary Locations, Elev. 84 ft., Rev. 0 Units 1 &2,605821, Auxiliary Building Fire Boundary Locations, Elev. 100 ft., Rev. 0 Units 1 & 2, Fire Pump Model 8AEF17N Certified Shop Test Curve, dated 2118193 Units 1 & 2, PSWR 6259, Penetration Seal F-25504-279 Detail, Rev. 0 Units 1 & 2, PSWR 6593, Penetration Seal N-15404-049 Detail, Rev. 0 S-C-MPOO-MGS-0001, Piping Schedule SPS28, Rev. 4 VTD 304390, Fire Door Schedule & Detail, Auxiliary Building, Rev. 4 WD 900979, Fire Protection Sprinkler System, Control Area Elev. 64 ft., Rev. 0 Attachment
A-5 WD 900980, Fire Protection Sprinkler System, ControlArea Elev. 78 ft., Rev. 1 VTD 900981, Fire Protection Sprinkler System, 480V SWGR Room 84 ft., Rev. 3 Pipinq and lnstrumentation Diaqrams Unit 1, 205201-SlMP, Sht. 1, Reactor Coolant - Simplified P&lD, Rev. 1 Unit 1, 205201-SIMP, Sht. 2, Reactor Coolant - Simplified P&lD, Rev. 0 Unit 1 ,205201A 8760, Sht. 1, Reactor Coolant P&lD, Rev. 63 Unit 1 ,205201A 8760, Sht. 2, Reactor Coolant P&lD, Rev. 38 Unit 1 ,205201A 8760, Sht. 3, Reactor Coolant P&lD, Rev. 36 Unit 1,205228A8761 Sht. 1, Chemical &Volume Control P&lD, Rev.72 Unit 1 ,205228 A 8761 Sht. 2, Chemical & Volume Control P&lD, Rev. 81 Unit 1 ,205228 A 8761 Sht. 3, Chemical & Volume Control P&lD, Rev. 49 Unit 1 ,205231-SlMP, Component Cooling - Simplified P&lD, Rev. 2 Unit 1 ,205232-SlMP, Residual Heat Removal - Simplified P&lD, Rev. 1 Unit 1 ,205234 A 8761 Sht. 1, Safety Injection P&lD, Rev. 54 Unit 1 ,205234 A 8761 Sht. 3, Safety lnjection P&lD, Rev. 57 Unit 1 ,205242-SIMP, Sht. 1, Service Water Simplified P&lD, Rev. 0 Unit 1, 205250-SlMP, ECCS - Simplified P&lD, Rev. 1 Unit2,205301-SIMP, Sht. 1, Reactor Coolant Main Loops, Rev. 2 Unit 2, 205328-5lMP, Chemical and Volume Control, Rev. 2 Unit 2, 205328 A 8763, Sht. 1, Chemical and Volume Control Operation, Rev. 56 Unit 2, 205328 A 8763, Sht. 2, Chemical and Volume Control Operation, Rev. 66 Unit 2, 205328 A 8763, Sht. 3, Chemical and Volume Control Operation, Rev. 40 Unit 2, 205331-SlMP, Component Cooling, Rev. 0 Unit 2, 205332-SIMP, Residual Heat Removal Simplified, Rev. 2 Unit 2, 205334-SIMP, Safety Injection Simplified, Rev. 1 Unit 2, 205335-5lMP, Containment Spray Simplified, Rev. 1 Unit 2, 205336-SlMP, Auxiliary Feedwater System Simplified, Rev. 0 Unit 2, 205342-SlMP, Sht. 1, Service Water Simplified, Rev. 0 205222, SIMP, Fire Protection, Rev. 0 205222, Sht. 1, Fire Protection System P&lD, Rev.61 205222, Sht.2, Fire Protection System P&lD, Rev.60 205222, Sht.3, Fire Protection System P&lD, Rev.59 205222, Sht.4, Fire Protection System P&lD, Rev.59 205222, Sht.5, Fire Protection System P&lD, Rev.2 M-22-0-SlMP, Fire Water Piping, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Evaluations of Modifications and Desiqn Chanqes Unit 1, 80008507, 1PR1 and 1PR2 PORV Control Circuit Modification, Rev. 0 Unit 1, 80045583, Service Water and EDG Circuit Changes - Hot Shorts, Rev. 0 Unit 1, 80089441, COz System Replacement, Rev. 4 Unit 1, 80089441, COz Replacement - 64', 78' and 84' Elevation, Rev. 4 Unit 2, 80008741, 2PR1 and 2PR2 PORV Control Circuit Modification, Rev. 0 Unit 2, 80045584, Service Water and EDG Circuit Changes - Hot Shorts, Rev. 2 Unit 2, 80089591, COz System Replacement, Rev. 2 Unit 2, 80093313, MOV Motor Upgrades for 22RH1 9, 2CC118, 2CC136,2CV284, Rev. 0 S-C-M500-EDM-0612, UHF Radio Communication System Modification to Comply with BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and 10CFR50 Appendix R, Rev. 0 Attachment
A-6 Qualitv Assurance Audits and Self-Assessments LS-AA-1 26-1001-F2, Focused Area Self-Assessment Report, 917 11 1 NOSA-HPC -10-07, Fire Protection Audit Report, 91 131 1 0 to 1 1 I 41 10, 1017 l 10 NOSPA-SA-10-1C, Appendix R Inventory, dated March 3,2010 Svstem Health Reports Unit 1 ,4 t4y 4160 VAC and AUX. PWR. XMER., 4th Quarter 2011 Unit 1, 460 - 460 VAC, 4th Quarter 2011 Unit 1 ,230 - 230 VAC, 4th Quarter 2011 Unit 1 ,125 - 125 VDC, 4th Quarter 2011 Unit 1 , 115 - 115 VAC, 4th Quarter 2011 Unit 1 ,28 - 28 VDC, 4th Quarter 201'1 Unit 2, 4KV -4160 VAC and AUX. PWR. XMER., 4th Quarter 2011 Unit 2. 460 - 460 VAC. 4th Quarter 2011 Unit 2, 230 - 230 VAC, 4th Quarter 2011 Unit 2, 125 - 125 VDC, 4th Quarter 2011 Unit 2, 115 - 1'15 VAC, 4th Quarter 2011 Unit 2, 28 -28 VDC, 4th Quarter 2011 Fire Protection System SHR, 3rd Quarter 201't Fire Protection System SHR, 4th Quarter 2011 Procedures CC-AA-104, Document Change Requests, Rev. 9 CC-AA-309, Control of Design Analysis, Rev. 10 CC-AA-102, Design Input and Configuration Change lmpact Screening, Rev. 19 CC-AA-211, Fire Protection Program, Rev. 4 FP-AA-005, Fire Protection Surveillance and Periodic Test Program, Rev. 0 FP-SA-003, Actions for lnoperable Fire Protection, Rev. 0 LS-AA-104-1002,50.59 Applicability Review Form, Rev. 2 LS-AA-128, Regulatory Review of Proposed Changes to the Approved Fire Protection Program, Rev 1 NC.FP-PM .ZZ-0007, Fire Fighting and Rescue Equipment Inventory, Rev. 5 SC.FP-ST.FS-0004, Fire Suppression Water System Flush, Rev. 7 SC.FP-ST.FS-0006, Fire Pump Capacity Test, Rev. 12 SC.FP-ST.FS-0008, Fire Main Flow Test, Rev. 3 SC.FP-SV.FBR-0026, Flood & Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection, Rev. 4 SC.FP-SV.FS-0003, Fire Water Flow Path Verification, Rev. 5 SC.FP-SV.ZZ-0058(Q), lnspection of Class 1 Fire Doors and Safety Related Areas for Transient Combustibles, Rev. 14 SC.MD-AB.ZZ-0001(Q), Installation of Temporary 4KV Power Cables to CCW and RHR Motors, Rev.6 SC.MD-ST.ZZ-0004(Q), Containment Penetration Molded Case Circuit Breaker Test, Rev. 34 SC.MD-ST.ZZ-0005(Q), Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance, Rev. 9 SC.OP-LB.DF-0001, Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program, Rev. 0 SC-ZZ-NEE-0839, Alternate Shutdown Capability Time Analysis for Appendix R Events, Rev. 4 51.FP-ST.FBR-0028, Fire Damper Operability Test, Rev. 5 S1.FP-ST.FD-0029, Smoke & Thermal Detector FunctionalTest, Rev. 14 S1.FP-ST.FS-0021, Diesel Area COz Systems Operability & Partial Discharge Test, Rev. 6 Attachment
A-7 S1.FP-SV.FBR-0031, Fire Damper Visual Inspection, Rev. 4 S1.FP-SV.FBR-0056, Fire and HELB/MELB Barrier Inspection, Rev.4 S1.OP-AB.Fire-0002(Q), Fire Damage Mitigation, Rev. 4 S1.OP-lO.ZZ-0004(Q), Power Operation, Rev. 56 S1.OP-SO.CVC-0023(Q), CVCS Cross-Connect Alignment to Unit 2, Rev. 8 52.FP-ST.FS-0048, Halon 1301 System FunctionalTest and lnspection, Rev. 5 52.FP-SV.FS-0066, Relay Room Halon Cylinders Volume & Pressure Check, Rev. 7 S2.OP-AB.Fire-0002(Q), Fire Damage Mitigation, Rev. 4 S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0001(Q), Overhead Annunciators - Window A, Rev. 52 52.OP-SO.HSD-0001(Q), Fire Related Alternate Shutdown Equipment, Rev. 8 51.OP-AB.FIRE-0001(Q), Control Room Fire Response, Rev. 4 Larqe Fires and Explosions Mitiqation Strateqies Documents Technical Evaluation 80096177, SG Depressurization Using Portable Pump, Attachment 6 SC.OP-AM.TSC-0001 Manually Depressurizing Steam Generators Utilizing MS10s, Rev. 1 SC.OP-AM.TSC-0012, Feeding Steam Generators Utilizing Portable Diesel Driven Pump, Rev.2 SC.OP-AM.TSC-005, Manual Operation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP), Rev. 1 Operator Safe Shutdown Training NOS05ABCR02-04, Control Room Evacuation Due To Fire, Rev. 4 52.OP-AB. FIRE-0001, S2OP-AB.CR-002, Simulator Training Scenario, Rev. 2 Fire Fiqhtinq Strateqies (i.e., Pre-Fire Plans)
FRS-Il-433, Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Area, Elev. 84 ft., Rev. 6 FRS-Il-434, Charging Pump, Spray Additive Tank Area, Elev. 84 ft., Rev. 3 FRS-ll-435, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Area, Elev. 84 ft. Rev. 5 FRS-11-441, Relay and Battery Rooms, Elev. 100 ft., Rev. 7 FRS-ll-445, Diesel Generator Area, Rev. 11 Fire Briqade Traininq FP-AA-O14, Fire Protection Training Program, Rev. 0 Fire Briqade Drills, and Critiques Fire Drif l, S4850929 10, 91291 10 Fire Drill, SAP# 52531884,1113111 Fire Drill, SAP# 52793260,1113111 Fire Drill, SAP# 52807439,2110111 Fire Drill, SAP# 52816866, 3102111 Fire Drill, ADS# 33011 ,3130111 Fire Drill, SAP# 52838239, 4107111 Fire Drill, SAP# 52850780, 4127111 Fire Drill, SAP# 52851138, 5/06/11 Fire Drill. SAP# 52851157.5126111 Fire Drill, SAP# 52851158,6102111 Fire Drifl, SAP# 52873514,6121111 Attachment
A-8 Fire Drill, SAP# 52897715,8122111 Fire Drill, SAP# 52904072,9102111 Fire Drill, ADS# 2103111, 10131111 Fire Drill, SAP# 52958825, 12106111 Fire Drill, SAP# 52960795, 12107111 Transient Combustible Permits and Evaluations FP-AA-002-F5, Transient Combustible in Safety Related Areas lmpairment Log for Fire, Rev. 0 FP-AA-O1 1, Control of Transient Combustible Material, Rev. 2 FP-AA-O15-F3, Hourly Fire Watch lnspection Log from 1-10-1 2 to 1-15-12, Rev. 1 Fire Protection lmpairment Tracking Report, 2-9-12 SC-FBR-FEE-1685, Combustible ControlZones, Equipment Hatches and Selected Fire Doors S1-FP-FDC-2220, Combustible Loading Calculation for Fire Area 1FA-DG-100E S1-FP-FDC-2221, Combustible Loading calculation for Fire Area 1FA-DG-100E-1 S2-FP-FDC-2239, Combustible Loading Calculation for Fire Area 2FA-AB-848 S2-FP-FDC-2241, Combustible Loading Calculation for Fire Area 2FA-AB-'1004 Completed Tests and Surveillances NC.FP-PM.ZZ-0007, Fire Fighting and Rescue Equipment Inventory, performed 10111111 NC.FP-PM.ZZ-0007, Fire Fighting and Rescue Equipment Inventory, performed 11123111 SC.FP-ST.FS-0004, Fire Suppression Water System Flush, performed 6128111 SC.FP-ST.FS-0004, Fire Suppression Water System Flush, performed 5l09l10 SC.FP-ST.FS-0006, Fire Pump Capacity Test, performed 5/30/09 SC.FP-ST.FS-0008, Fire Main Flow Test, performed 11114109 SC.FP-ST.FS-0008, Fire Main Flow Test, performed 5131l0o SC.FP-SV.FBR-0026, Flood & Fire Barrier Penetration Seal lnspection, performed 10110111 SC.FP-SV.FBR-0026, Flood & Fire Barrier Penetration Seal lnspection, performed 3/30/10 SH.FP-PM.ZZ-0046, Fire Dept. & EMS Equip Inspection and lnventory, performed 12105111 S1.FP-ST.FBR-0028, Fire Damper Operability Test, performed 1l25l1o S1.FP-ST.FD-0029, Smoke & Thermal Detector Functional Test, performed 8125111 S1.FP-ST.FD-0029, Smoke & Thermal Detector FunctionalTest, performed2ll9l11 S1.FP-ST.FS-0021 , EDG COz Systems Operability & Partial Discharge Test, performed 3/05/10 S1 . FP-SV. FBR-0031, Fire Damper Visual Inspection, performed 212411 1 S1.FP-SV.FBR-0056, Fire & HELB/MELB Barrier lnspection, performed 11114109 S1.FP-SV.FBR-0056, Fire & HELB/MELB Barrier Inspection, performed 6108111 S1.OP-PT.HSD-0002(Q), Hot Shutdown Panel/Local Panel Functional Test, Performed 10124111 52.FP-ST.FD-0029, Smoke & Thermal Detector Functional Test, performed 3128111 52.FP-ST.FD-0029, Smoke & Thermal Detector FunctionalTest, performed 9/06/10 S2.FP-ST.FD-0029, Smoke & Thermal Detector Functional Test, performed 10118111 52.FP-ST.FS-0016, Pre-Action Sprinkler System FunctionalTest, performed3l0TllO 52.FP-ST.FS-0016, Pre-Action Sprinkler System Functional Test, performed 3/03/11 52.FP-ST.FS-0048, Halon 1301 System FunctionalTest and lnspection, performed 8/19/10 52.FP-ST.FS-0048, Halon 1301 System FunctionalTest and lnspection, performed2119109 S2.FP-SV.FS-0066, Relay Room Halon Cylinders Volume & Pressure Check, performed 12t21t10 Attachment
A-9 52.FP-SV.FS-0066, Relay Room Halon Cylinders Volume & Pressure Check, performed 6t22t11 52.OP-PT.HSD-0002(Q), Hot Shutdown Panel/Local Panel Functional Test, Performed 4123111 Condition Reports 20040402 20040505 20309221 20378382 20378979 20383329 20385925 20402023 20402904 20453729 20455713 20455713 20456489 20461537 20461538 20461539 20490083 20490085 20494790 20496191 20510412* 20520102 20520103 20528349 20530536 20532622 20541683. 20541775.
20541931* 20541934* 20541 936* 20541949*
20543808* 20543890* 20543894* 20543895.
20544097* 20544100* 20544670* 20544671" 20544847* 20545104* 20545311 20545393.
20545394" 20545612* 20545731* 20545946.
20546012* 20546085" 20546086* 20546143.
20546202* 20546213" 20546246* 20546248.
20546249* 20546282* 20546292* 20546294" 20546303" 20546327* 20546402* 20546403.
20546445* 70032871 70095069 70095069 70095114 70121783 70127250 70127314 981221206 (. initiated during this inspection)
Work Orders 30108656 301 18936 30120733 30134027 30144348 30174027 30211105 301 89830 30189830 60038798 600781 31 60079805 60084403 60093920 80099009 Vendor Manuals WD 315981, Fire Pump, Diesel Driver, and Controller, Rev.2 Industrv Standards NEI 00-01, Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis, Rev. 2 NEI 2006-1 2, 8.5.b Phase 2 and 3 Submittal Guideline (M1070090060), Rev. 2 NFPA 13-2002, Installation of Sprinkler Systems NFPA 20-1990, lnstallation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps Miscellaneous Documents 70104005-0050, Salem Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Compensatory Measures for Potential Fire Induced Multiple Spurious Operations 8N44/T3.11, lndividual Plant Examination of External Events -Tier 1 Report, Internal Fire Risk Evaluation, Rev. 2 Attachment
A-10 EE-SNGS-MSO-0O1, Engineering Evaluation of Multiple Spurious Operation Scenarios ldentified by Salem MSO Expert Panel Report and NEI 00-01 Appendix G,5117110 Fire Water Storage Tank No. 1 and 2 lnspection Reports, 11115110 NRC lnformation Notice (lN) 2006-22, Ultra-Low-Sulfur Diesel Fuel Oil Could Adversely lmpact Diesel Engine Performance, 101 12106 NRC f N 2009-02, Biodiesel Fuel Oil Adverse lmpact to Diesel Engine Performance,2l23l09 NRC lN 2009-29, Potential Failure of Fire Water Supply Pumps to Automatically Start Due to a Fire, 11124109 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.189, Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 2 Report - Expert Panel for Addressing Multiple Spurious Operations, Rev. 0 Standing Order (SO), Operator Fire Hazard Recognition and Mitigation for Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Compensatory Measure, Effective Date 4l30l1o T8-06-22, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Performance - Appendix R Compliance and Loss of All Seal Cooling, Rev. 1 LIST OF ACRONYMS ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System APCSB [NRC]Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASSS Alternate Safe Shutdown System BTP Branch Technical Position ccw Component Cooling Water CDF Core Damage Frequency CFR Code of Federal Regulations COz Carbon Dioxide CR Condition Report DCP Design Change Package EDG Emergency Diesel Generator Elev. Elevation FA Fire Area FHA Fire Hazards Analysis FPP Fire Protection Program ft. Foot FW Feedwater FZ Fire Zone HELB High Energy Line Break HRR Heat Release Rate IN INRCI Information Notice IP [NRC] Inspection Procedure IR INRCI Inspection Report LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident MELB Moderate Energy Line Break MOV Motor Operated Valve MSO Multiple Spurious Operation NEI Nuclear Energy Institute NFPA National Fire Protection Association Attachment
A-11 NCV Non-Cited Violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR [NRC] Nuclear Reactor Regulation PARS Publicly Available Records System P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Drawing PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment PSEG PSEG Nuclear LLC RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RG INRCI Regulatory Guide RWST Refuel Water Storage Tank SDP [NRC] Significance Determination Process SER INRCI Safety Evaluation Report SSC Structures, Systems and Components SQUG Seismic Qualification Utility Group SW Service Water SWGR Switchgear UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report VCT Volume ControlTank VTD Vendor Technical Document Attachment