IR 05000272/1990099

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Final SALP Repts 50-272/90-99 & 50-311/90-99 for 900801-911228
ML18096A706
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 02/26/1992
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18096A705 List:
References
50-272-90-99-01, 50-272-90-99-1, 50-311-90-99, NUDOCS 9205190070
Download: ML18096A706 (34)
v • d • e


Text

ENCLOSURE l(a)

FINAL SALP REPORT U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

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SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE REPORT NO /90-99 50-311190-99 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM GENERA TING ST A TION UNITS 1 AND 2 ASSESSMENT PERIOD: AUGUST 1, 1990 - DECEMBER 28, 1991 BOARD.MEETING DATE: FEBRUARY 26, 1992 9205190070 920512 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G

PDR

SUMMARY OF RESULTS I Overview PSE&G operated both reactors of the Salem facility in a generally safe and conservative manner. A strong level of management involvement in facility activities promoted a safety conscious approach. -Improvements were noted relative to unit operations, though instances-of personnel errors affecting plant performance occurred occasionally. An improving performance trend was noted in the area of radiological controls. Facility material condition, the quality of procedures, and system engineer performance also improved. The security and emergency_ preparedness areas maintained a superior level of performance. Independent review groups arid station review committees provided safety conscious assessments of related activitie The Unit 2 turbine generator failure was a significant event that occurred during the perio Several contributing causes_ were identified which indicated deficienCies in several functional areas. The most promfoent causes involved personnel error, insufficient preventive maintenance, and inadequate surveillance. The licensee conducted a thorough review of the event, adequately determined root causes and related causal factors, and implemented or planned effective corrective actions. Aggressive resolution of several performance related issues were in process* at the end of this SALP perio Several initiatives indicated continued management support and consequent improvement in the radiological controls program. However, occasional instances of insufficient corrective actions, lapses in control and oversight of some activities, and deficieneies in the maintenance of quality relative to the on-site dosimetry processing laboratory detracted from an otherwise strong and effective progra The licensee's programs and efforts relative to maintenance and surveillance activities have been effective in assuring plant system reliability and_ sufficiency. Problems with material

- condition of certain plant systems, while improving, still persist and challenge plant performance, and continue to require intensive maintenance and surveillance effort Instances of personnel errors, insufficient adherence to procedures, and inattention to detail still persisted earlier in the period. The licensee's efforts to correct these types of deficiencies resulted iri a reduced frequency of discrepant performance later in the perio The licensee's corrective action programs functioned well at times as evidenced by the irnprov,ements previously mentioned. Occasional weakness was noted relative to the effectiveness of some specific corrective actions, and some personnel errors due to a lack of attention to detail indicated inconsistent performance. Notwithstanding these performance deficiencies, there was an overall slight improvement noted during the SALP perio.

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1 Facility Performance Analysis Summary.

I.. ~unctional Area Plant Operations Radiological Controls Maintenance/

Surveillance Emergency

  • Preparedness Security Engineering/

Technical Support Safety Assessment/*

Quality Verification Previous Assessment Period:

Present Assessment Period:

Rating, Trend Last Period

2 2, Declining

1

2 May 1, 1989 through July 31, 1990 Rating, Trend This Period

2, Improving

1

2

August 1, 1990 through December 28, 1991

r--

I Unplanned Shutdowns, Unit Trips and Forced Outages Power Level 8/17/90 25%

UNIT 1 Root Cause Inadequate Preventive Maintenance Functfonal Area Maintenance/

Surveillance An automatic reactor trip occurred due to low-low water level in the No. 14 steam generator (SG). A loss of power to one non-vital bus occurred during supply-breaker switching, resulting in a loss of power to the No. 14 reactor coolant pump (RCP) motor. The breaker failure was due to lack of cubicle preventive maintenance. The resultant decreased loop flow caused a level*shri.nk in the No. 14 SG. The unit subsequently proceeded to Mode 5 to replace the No. 14 RCP motor when a phase-to-ground fault occurred during restart preparation.

9110190 78%

Personnel Error.

Operations The reactor tripped automatically due to low-low water level in the No. 13 stearri generator (SG). While preparing to isolate a high pressure turbine drain line steam leak; operators inadvertently caused-all turbine governor valves to close. This unexpected closure caused SG level shrink to the trip setpoint. Licensee post-trip review determined that operations personnel failed to initiate an adequate plan and procedure for the troubleshooting and repair activitie.

6/16/91 100%

External Cause NIA An automatic reactor trip occurred due to a lightning strike on the phase "B" main power transformer. The main generatoroutput breakers opened to protect the main generator, -

resulting in an automatic main turbine and reactor tri * /16/91 100%

Inadequate Installation/

Deficient Design Maintenance/

Surveillance &

Engineering/

Technical Support An unplanned shutdown was made to repair an unisolable leak on the turbine electro-hydraulic control system (EHC). The EHC leak was due to poor EHC piping installation (insufficient thread engagement), and a deficient design that used dissimilar metals at the EHC block connection. The condition was worsened by a missing EHC pipe hanger, which resulted in increased vibration of the susceptible component Power Level /4/90 60%

UNIT2 Root Cause

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Multiple Component Failures Functional Area NIA An automatic main turbine and reactor trip occurred on high-high water.level in the No. 24 steam generator (SG). While at 100%-power, the No. 21 steam generator feed pump (SGFP)

tripped* on low suction pressure. Unit operators immediately initiated a rapid load reduction to 60% power; however, the No. 24 SG water level reached the high-high setpoint before the operator could effectively control an associated feedwater flow transient caused by a failed Feedwater regulator valve. Two additional equipment problems resulted in the No. 21 SGFP trip: a failed suction pressure switch; and a heater drain pump* discharge control valve which failed closed, causing a reduction in suction pressur.

11/9/91 100%

Multiple Component Failures/Personnel Error Main tenan eel Surveillance and Operations An automatic main turbine and reactor trip occurred during main turbine trip testing. The rna{n turbine and generator sustained severe damag~ when the t~rbine failed to trip and proceeded to overspeed. Causal factors included lack of preventive maintenance and surveillance testing on the turbine trip solenoid valves and operator procedure non-compliances regarding failure to resolve a test deficiency during unit turbine generator startu II PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS III.A Plant Operations III. Analysis The previous SALP rated the Salem Operations functional area as Category 2. The quality of the emergency operating procedures was noted as being an operations strength. The operator requalification program was successful in _that all licensed operators tested, passed the NRC administered exam. Improvements were noted in management involvement, supervisory oversight, and root cause analysis initiatives. A reduced reactor trip and personnel error rate was observed. A weakness was noted relative to the quality of the abnormal operating procedure During this assessment period, both reactor units were generally operated in a safe and conservative manner. Examples include effective and conservative midloop operations, a well planned 10-day maintenance and testing outage at Unit 2 and a prompt Unit l shutdown due to increased electrohydraulic control system leakage. However, examples of deficient performance were also observed. For example, a Unit 1 safety injection charging pump was operated with its suction valve closed due to multiple personnel errors, communication deficiencies, and breaches of several programmatic barriers in the safety tagging progra Late in the period, a boric acid transfer pump was similarly operated with its suction valve closed due to miscommunication and procedural non-compliance. Similarly, several licensed personnel, including supervision, permitted a Unit 2 startup to proceed without resolving a test discrepancy that indicated that the turbine overspeed protection system was not functioning properly. That deficiency contributed to the Unit 2 turbine-generator failure even Licensee efforts continued to be effective in reducing the frequency of reactor trips caused by operations personnel. During the current period, there were a total of five reactor trips for both units. This compares to six reactor trips in the last assessment period. During the period, Unit 1 did not experience a reactor trip for over nine months and Unit 2 for over 14 months, during which Unit 2 operated continuously for 245 days. -One of the five reactor_

trips during this assessment period was attributed to personne~ error by a licensed operator while troubleshooting a sheared turbine drain instrument line. Operator error contributed to

. the Unit 2 turbine-generator failure event. Operator response to reactor trips and plant transients was excellent. In several instances, prompt operator actions averted-the necessity for reactor trips. One example included a Unit 2 steam generator feedwater pump trip, where operator response was sufficiently effec~ive and timely to prevent a unit tri The five* operating shifts are effectively staffed, as each has three senior reactor operator (SRO) and four reactor operator (RO) licensed individuals. Additionally, one separate SRO licensed individual supervises _the work control group for each shift. Tl1ere are a total of 47

licensed operators, including 40 on-shift, and 7 in staff and training positions. Aggressive management attention has been effective in resolving previously identified licensed operator staffing weaknesses by training and qualifying several additional *SROs and RO The licensed reactor operator training programs continued to be effectively implemente Licensed operator initial and requalification examination performance demonstrated that the candidates were generally well prepared for examinations. However, because of operator performance and written test issues, one licensed operator initial examination administered

  • during-this period did not demonstrate good performance. Additionally, the licensee was ineffective in correcting self-identified training deficiencies identified during a facility audit examination. This demonstrated a weakness in the corrective action proces Licensed operators' safety perspective and awareness of plant conditions were consistently evident. The procedure upgrade project has made a positive contribution toward improved operations. Procedural adherence was generally good. Shift turnovers were formal and included thorough.briefings of the oncoming crew. Control room access was effectively controlled, and activities were limited to those directly related to plant operation Aggressive man_agement attention has resulted in reductions in the number of lit annunciator The use of overtime was properly controlled. Good performance of non-licensed equipment operators was observed during unit tou-rs and equipment testing and operatio The licensee's emergency operating procedure (EOP) program and implementation have generally functioned_ well. EOP quality and implementation were good. The licensee was responsive in correcting specific EOP deficiencies; however, the licensee did not broadly review other EOPs for similar deficiencies. Consequently, similar deficiencies existing in other EOPs were not addressed. This indicated a narrowly focused review of identified deficiencies. Abnormal operating procedures were being revised during the assessment period to correct weaknesses identified in the previous SALP perio Operations supervision and managernent oversight and attention to operations on a daily basis were evident during this assessment period. An operational perspective of plant problems and work prioritization was well communicated and understood in daily meetings. The daily meetings provided the operations shift personnel a direct and effective interface with operations and station managemen Plant housekeeping has continued to improve during this period. General area and-component painting and cleaning, enhanced housekeeping area responsibility controls, and continued management emphasis have been effective in improving overall plant housekeepin The licensee generally made timely and appropriate 10CFR50.72 NRC notification report However, initial corrective actions for reporting and event classification deficiencies that were identified in the last SALP period were ineffective and resulted in examples of untimely and inconsistent reporting. One example included a late NRC notification of an auxiliary feedwater system actuation, due to licensee reportability guidance that was inconsistent with

reportability requirements. Effective progr~mmatic improvements were made later in the period. The overall quality of written licensee event reports submitted during this period was very goo *

The overall fire protection program was effective. Dedicated fire protection personnel performed well and were knowledgeable, which demonstrated an effective training progra Of particular noteworth_iness was the fire brigade's excellent response to the Unit 2 main generator explosion and fire: Appropriate operator involvement and interface in fire.

emergencies were evident. Plant and site management strongly supported the fire protection progra Summary The Salem reactor units were operated safely and conservatively. Operator response to plant transients and reactor trips was good; however, multiple errors and/or programmatic barrier breakdowns contributed to several operational events. EOP quality and implementation were good. Corrective actions for identified weaknesses were at times incomplete. Increased management involvement was effective in resolving licensed operators staffing weaknesses; however, the licensed reactor training programs demonstrated some weaknesses. Dai1y supervision and management oversight of plant operations was goo *

III. Performance Rating: Category 2 lll.B Radiological Controls IIL Analysis The previous SALP rated radiological controls at Units 1 and 2 as Category 2. Th('. program was characterized as good with a sufficient level of management involvement. Overall ALARA efforts were very. good, but there were weaknesses in the corrective action process for self-identified radiological concerns and the radioactive material and contamination control programs. The radwaste handling, transportation, and environmental monitoring programs were effective, and performance in the area of liquid and gaseous effluent controls was adequat During the current period, NRC identified that the licensee took a number of actions to improve overall radiological controls and address previously identified weaknesses. The actions included sending personnel to visit similar stations, establishing incentive programs for good personnel performance, and developing a Unit 1 Outage Handbook that included organizational descriptions and responsibilities of key personnel. Very good efforts were made to respond to a strike by contractor r~diological controls personnel. For example, during the Unit 1 outage, work packages were prioritized to ensure that proper radiological controls were implemented for on-going work. NRC observations at Unit 2 noted no

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negative impact on the effectiveness of radiation protection coverage of non-outage activitie There was a good level* of expertise available within the staff, and no excessive use of overtime was note There were no external br internal personnel exposures in excess of NRC or administrative limits during the perio The NRC's performance-based review of significant Unit 1 outage radiological work activities (e.g., steam generator sludge lancing) identified performance deficiencies including improper monitoring of personnel exposure relative to large radiation dose rate gradients, insufficient monitoring of airborne radioactivity, instances of personnel unnecessarily. working in elevated radiation fields, and poor contamination control practice These lapses in t_he quality of radiological controls were attribu_ted to weaknesses in procedures and the oversight of work activities by radiation protection personne These deficiencies were promptly corrected by procedure revisions and appropriate training of applicable personnel. Subsequent NRC review during the Unit 2 outage later in the period

  • . -* identified significantly improved oversight of work activities. There was a high degree of management and supervisor oversight of ori-going radiological work activities, effective shift-to-shift planning of work, and excellent oversight of work activities from an ALARA perspective. In* light of the significant improvement identified late in the period, the overall external and internal exposure control programs were considered goo Relative to ALARA efforts, the licensee exhibited effective planning and preparation for steam generator work activities which resulted in the possible reduction of personnel radiation exposure. For example, the licensee increased the number of steam generator tubes to be tested in each generator, resulting in all tubes being tested within four outages (versus the previously scheduled five outages), at a significant exposure saving. The station's aggregate personnel exposure continues to be well below industry averages and among the lowest in the industry for comparable facilities. Exposure goals were challenging and were me The training and qualification program for radiological controls technicians contributed to a good understanding of program requirements. Although there was no specific training and qualification program for radiation protection supervisors, this did not result in any observed operational performance problems. A specific training program was established late in the period. In addition, as a result of the weaknesses in radiation protection oversight of Unit 1 outage activities identified by the NRC, PSE&G management discussed their expectations regarding the level of oversight of work activities with radiation protection personne Radiation workers were provided appropriate trainin Late in the.period, an evaluation of the on-site dosimetry processing laboratory by personnel from the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) identified a number of -significant weaknesses in the management of tbe PSE&G processing laboratory. The licensee 'immediately suspended processing of dosimeters and implemented extensive corrective actions to improve processing. NRC reviews at the end of the period indicated corrective. actions were on-going and dosimetry system performance met applicable

performance standards. The NRC's review of this matter found that the weaknesses stemmed

. from the loss of key supervisory and management personnel-and a lack of understanding, by replacement personnel, of regulatory aspects associated with maintaining an accredited personnel dosimetry program. Although no decrease in the quality of dosimetry processing information was identified, this matter indicated weak understanding of program and personnel qualification requirements by managemen The radioactive material and contamination control programs were effective. Weaknesses*

identified during the previous period were addressed by a task action plan which included revision of procedures, training of personnel, and purchase of new equipment. The licensee has been aggressively decontaminating, cleaning and painting the radiologically controlled areas (RCAs) of the station.. As a result, total station contaminated area comparf'.(I very favorably to similar facilities.* Jsolated lapses in contamination control within the RCA were noted, but quickly corrected. The efforts to minimize personnel contamination were commendable, with very few personnel contaminations occurring during the Unit 2 outag The radiological occurrence report program, while continuing to be weak into the early part of this SALP period, improved over time.. NRC review late in the period found that the program was enhanced, self-identified concerns were resolved in a timely manner,.

appropriate corrective actions were taken, and root causes were clearly identified. Findings were discussed at appropriate levels of management, including weekly station management

  • meetings. *Monthly radiological controls performance summaries were provided to management. A radiological controls assessor was assigned to support the Unit 2 outag The licensee's efforts to improve the program were commendable* and indicated better management oversight of self-identified problem The licensee has been proactive in improving chemistry programs and hardware. For example, installation of an in-line secondary monitoring system, including an ion-chromatograph, was completed during the period. A successful secondary chemistry program has resulted in excellent steam generator performance. Likewise, excellent primary chemistry and active management oversight has resulted in excellent fuel perform_ance and reliabilit This has resulted in reduced exposure associated with fuel leaks and unplanned steam generator work activitie A strong radioactive waste management and transportation program was implemente Personnel demonstrated good understanding of program requirements as the result of an effective training program. Prompt corrective actions *were evident when problems were identified. Overall performance was very good. The volume of waste shipped for burial was well below the industry average. The organization and staffing exhibited stability and strength. The radwaste processing methods continue to operate well, and the on-site

storage of radwaste was generally minimal. There was sufficient oversight of radioactive waste activities. The involved personnel demonstrated adequate technical depth and scope in the management and control of radioactive waste processing and shipping operation I

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The licensee continued to conduct an effective Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP). The meteorological monitoring program was sufficient in ensuring that meteorological instruments were operable, maintained, and calibrated, meteorological data were obtainable from various locations on and off site and an effective QC program was in place to assure the quality of REMP sample analyses. Audits by the Quality Assurance Department personnel were thorough and of appropriate technicaldepth to assess the REM NRC reviews of the radiological effluent monitoring and control program indicated acceptable calibration of effluent/process radiation monitoring systems (RMS), but there were a number

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of Engineered Safety Feature actuations during this assessment period due to spurious RMS signals and equipment failures. NRC review of the progress of the short and lortg term RMS *

upgrading projects, established during the previous SALP period, indicated the licensee was on schedule in pursuing these projects. An effective effluent control program was conducted by the Chemistry Departmen Overall QA oversight of program areas was good. However, the observations of isolated problems indicated a potential need for expansion of quality oversight into areas not previously evaluated (e.g., NYLA~ adherence).

Summary Weaknesses in the radiation protection program were noted during the Unit 1 outage early in the assessment period.* The licensee took effective corrective actions to resolve the

  • weaknesses, including those associated with dosimetry processing, and implemented a good radiological 'controls program. Overall staffing and training were good.* ALARA efforts and performance were commendab.le. Overall radwaste processing, storage and transportation activities were very good. Tlie licensee continued to implement effective confirmatory measurements, effluent controls and a REM. Performance Rating: Category 2 Trend: Improving

III. C Maintenance/Surveillance III. Analysis*

The Salem Maintenance and Surveillance functional area was rated as a Category 2, with a declining trend, in the previous SALP assessment. Maintenance program strengths were noted in management invol_vement, work standards, and reliability centered maintenance initiatives. Weaknesses were identified relative to the large maintenance backlog, procedure quality, contractor maintenance control, and spare parts availability and control. The poor overall material condition of the plant was *also noted as a significant weakness. Surveillance testing activities were characterized as being conducted in a well controlled fashion by knowledgeable and experienced personnel, although weaknesses were noted in procedure quality and in the ineffective actions which led to missed surveillance Maintenance:

The Salem maintenance program was effective and was satisfactorily imple~ented during this assessment period. The maintenance organization performed a large volume of successful

  • maintenance activities and effectively supported plant operations. Management involvement was evident, as many of the deficiencies noted in the previous assessment were addressed and progress was achieved toward their resolution during this period. Improvements were accomplished in the maintenance backlog, procedure quality and parts availability, but deficiencies continued to exist in personnel error. The maintenance organization successfully responded to plant equipment problems over the course of the assessment period and functioned well with other Salem departments, as management initiatives began to reverse the trends identified in the last assessmen The Salem maintenance staff remained stable and experienced, and Maintenance Department personnel were well trained and qualified. The three senior managers in the Maintenance Department were relatively new to the Salem Station during this period, yet succeeded in irriplementing a new work standards program and improving overall personnel performance and teamwork. Despite the staff's experience level and management's direction, instances of personnel error due to inattention to detail continued to exist. Examples included reactor protection system actuations and plant system inoperabilities which resulted from improper procedure adherence. Factors contributing to the number of personnel error events that occurred during the SALP period were incomplete training and weak supervision of non-Maintenance Department personnel, such as contractors and site services, performing work at

. Salem: The majority of these instances occurred in the beginning of the period, and as a sense of ownership developed over this period, the frequency of these events decrease Personnel training continued to receive strong management attention and was well supported by the excellent training center facilitie The Salem maintenance facilities are well equipped and adequately support all maintenance*

activities at the site. Management has taken steps to improve the previously identified problems with spare parts control and availability. The PSE&G inventory management,

improvement initiative included a newly formed organization mider a general manager, a new warehouse for centralizing and storing the parts inventory onsite, and the state-of-the-art computerized warehouse automated material management system (WAMMS). The effort taken by PSE&G to gain control* of the spare parts inventory showed indications of being effective,,as the new warehouse went into service and parts availability began to improve at the end of the SALP perio Good management involvement_ and oversight resulted in the successful completion of a refueling outage at each unit during the assessment period. Good outage performance at Salem was partly attributable to the institution of dedicated _unit outage managers during the last period. In addition, a mid-cycle outage was performed at Unit 2 for the accomplishment of maintenance activities, and six forced outages occurred at the two units. The last forced outage at Unit 2 was caused by a turbine overspeed event at the end of the period.and became the unit's s.ixth refueling outage. Core alterations, plant modifications, and other refueling-activities were well supported by maintenance operations. The Maintenance Department responded especially well to the Unit 2 turbine overspeed event, as event clean-up, plant repairs and early outage implementation were well executed on extremely short notic Effective planning, the improvement in spare parts availability, and the introduction of a reliability centered maintenance program have helped increase maintenance productivity and reduce the maintenance backlog. The number of overdue preventive maintenance activities,.

while still high, had reached its lowest point in three years by the end of this assessment period. Despite the improvement in planning and work controf, two events occurred which..

showed the need for continued attention in this area. A follow-up to the NRC Maintenance Team Inspection (MTi) revealed that corrective actions taken for several MTI findings were not thorough, predominately due to inadequate planning..

The Unit 2 turbine overspeed event in November 1991 revealed additional maintenance planning weaknesses which directly contributed to the occurrence. Over a year prior to the event, PSE&G committed to replace the Unit 2 solenoid valves that were directly responsible for the overspeed event, at the first outage of sufficient duration. Due to a failure in the planning process, the solenoids were not replaced in the May 1991 Unit 2 mid-cyde outag Further, though information and experience -was available that indicated that the solenoid valves could fail to function, the licensee did not establish any preventive maintenance program for these device,

One reactor trip was attributed to maintenance activities during this period. The trip occurred during 4kV non-vital auxiliary power transformer feeder breaker switching. The failure of the feeder breaker to properly close caused the loss of a reactor coolant pump, and

the reactor tripped on low-low water level in the respective steam generator. The root cause of the reactor trip was mechanical failure of the breaker due to a lack 9f preventive maintenance of the breaker cubicl An area noted in the previous assessment as a weakness was the plant material condition of both Salem units. Recognizing a need to improve in this area, PSE&G created a special task force with a dedicated supervisor to address material condition and equipment improvement While a large amount of work remains to be done, this licensee initiative has resulted in significant improvements in the appearance and functionality of a: number of Salem plant areas. For example, the number of internal plant system leaks was reduced by over 50 percent during this assessment perio Surveillance:

The Salem surveillance program was safely implemented during the assessment period and positively contributed to the safe operation of the Salem station. The personnel performing the surveillance testing were well trained and fully successful in carrying out the Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance program. The number of plant events related to surveillance test performance decreased from the last period and showed a positive trend over this period. The licensee completed an audit in the middle of this assessment period to ensure the adequacy of the surveillance program in meeting all TS requirements. As a result of the audit, PSE&G adequately resolved the existing administrative problems in the program, and the number of missed surveillance tests dropped over the remainder of the SALP perio There were, however, five missed surveillance tests this period. Similar to last period, the root cause of the missed tests was inadequate administrative controls. This number is down from seven during the last SALP period, and the problem was successfully addressed by the licensee's TS audit. There were no missed surveillances after May 1991. The number of plant events related to surveillance testing also dropped this period, despite the increased challenge posed by the problems encountered with the Salem 4kV vital bus undervoltag relays and the Salem radiation monitoring system (RMS). Fourteen Licensee Event Reports were submitted by PSE&G this SALP cycle documenting surveillance personnel errors and related engineered safety feature actuations. While nine of these events were related to the 4KV bus relays and the RMS, many events remained due to personnel error and inattention to detail. Plant events such as a chemical and volume control system valve misalignment, a steam generator pressure channel inoperability, and circuit breaker TS non-compliance were all attributed to personnel error and show the need for continued management attention in this are No plant trips during this assessment period were directly caused by improperly performed surveillance activities. Surveillance related improvements noted during the period included the institution of a self-verification process designed to reduce personnel errors, and the initiation of *a system to transmit trending data from the Maintenance Department to the plant

Technical Department to better evaluate system and component performance. The lack of this trending data was cited as a weakness in the previous peri<? The Unit 2 turbine overspeed event exposed a weakness in the Salem surveillance *test program relative t9 balance of piant systems.. Surveillance tests were performed to comply with the Technical Specifications relative to turbine overspeed protection system, but the surveillance method was not sufficient to verify the independent operability of systems and components that actually effected turbine overspeed control. The licensee's failure to provide sufficient suveillance testing was one of the contributing factors to the turbine overspeed even The Salem Inservice Testing (IST) and Inspection (ISI) programs were effectively implemented over the assessment period. In order to correct a deficiency noted in the last period, all affected Salem equipment was marked with the proper locations for vibration *

probes for repeatability during testing. Other activities reviewed with positive results during the period *included the Unit 1 containment integrated leakage rate test, the Unit 1 steam generator inspection program, the Unit 1 outage radiography weld examination program, and the installation of a service water full flow test line for the ease and repeatability of pump testin Summary The Salem maintenance and surveillance programs were successfully implemented during this assessment period and contributed to the assurance of nuclear safety during the operation of the Salem power plants. The majority of the problems noted over the course of this SALP cycle, in both the maintenance and surveillarice areas, were the result of personnel error and inattention to detail. Although continued management attention is warranted in this area, the programs and initiatives undertaken by Salem management following the previous SALP have been effective in arresting the negative trend documented in _that repor III. Performance Rating: Category 2 III. SALP Board Comment Although the SALP Board recognized the reversal of the previous negative trend in the Maintenance/Surveillance functional area, continued PSE&G management attention is warranted in previously identified weak areas, such as personnel errors, plant material condition and maintenance planning, in order for the Salem maintenance program to continue to improv ID.D. Emergency Preparedness (EP)

111. Analysis During the previous SALP, EP was rated Category 1. That rating was based on strong management involvement, a highly qualified EP staff, prompt resolution of technical issues, and excellent training. PSE&G was very effective in exercise performance and in response to-actual events requiring emergency classificatio *

During this SALP period, the operational status of PSE&G's Emergency Preparedness Program was found-superior by NRC review. Management was directly involved in the daily operation of the EP program. Three levels of management provided oversight. Managers at each level were qualified as members of the emergency response organization (ERO),

reviewed all changes to the Emergency Plan and Procedures, reviewed drill scenarios, and regularly participated in drills. A thorough audit of the EP program by two independent

  • groups from the Quality Assurance Department identified no deficient program area Management also fostered an excellent relationship-with state, county, and local governments through numerous meetings and training sessions, and in support of resolving FEMA-identified concern *

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PSE&G was aggressive in handling technical issues. The EP Department effectively maintained emergency response facilities and implemented a number of significant facility improvements. These included the installation of a new callback system for ERO members, completion of the control roo*m simulator and Safety Parameter Display System data links to the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility. Emergency Response Data System installation is in progress. The new emergency news/community center, which is under construction, also represents a significant PSE&G off-site commitment. The Public Alerting System throughout the Emergency Planning Zone was maintained at 98.8% siren availability, exceeding Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) standard Operators at Salem and Hope Creek responded to several actual Unusual Events and one Alert during this assessment period. Operators consistently displayed good knowledge and familiarity with emergency action levels contained in the Event Classification Guide (ECG).

Events were correctly classified, and timely notification was made to the States and the NR All response actions were consistent with Emergency Plan requirements. During the Alert at Salem Unit 2, PSE&G activated the Salem Operations Support Center which was instrumental in providing good in-plant support and assistance in response to the turbine-*

generator failur Staffing of the EP program remained strong. The program was maintained by a full time, fully qualified staff of fourteen individuals. The well-balanced mix of disciplines included five senior reactor operators, experienced health physicists, and additional staff with

  • experience in radiological controls and equipment operations. The ERO was also fully staffed, with all key managerial positions fille..

EP training was comprehensive, innovative, and thoroughly implemented. Operati0

  • personnel training continued to be significantly enhanced through drills on the oor simulator. Training drills for shift operators were conduetecLweekly at both faci*

nin*e additional extensive training exercises conducted during the period testecl of the Emergency Plan. Changes and innovations to EP training methodolo' *

constructive in qualifying ERO staff. ERO qualification was kept at a hi'

demonstrated in walkthrough training sessions with ERO members. Of

, also a strength, with well developed training and quality information prov* *

dnd countie Training effectiveness was demonstrated by the excellent perf0 NRG-observed annual exercises. Both scenarios were very r

'exercise, which included full state participation, and invol'

ingestion (50-mile) exposure pathways. Only minor are<>

this exercise. Also, there were no FEMA deficiencie'

performance was also effective. A poorly worded r however, cause an exercise weakness involving ti

  • This w~kness had not been identified in any pr

. Summary

~

<".{~

.J _during two

.olarl y the 1990

.J-mile) and*

.c were noted during

/ 1 exercise, ERO

.:ation guide did,

. a Site Area Emergenc.* ercises.

PSE&G has maintained a sound and eff $:)~

"-<§-n with clear. ma~agement

.*

comm!tme~t to m~intainin~ a highly,ff'.

. ~ualified staff. The EP ~it~.staff was proficient rn ensunng readiness for <v ~

~f emergency response activltles. The

~raining. program was thorough!~* * q; ~-~~tively impleme~ted with d.ifferent

.

innovative performance-based

~O was well qualified as evidenced by

  • . *

exercise performance. Faci 1

$fit were well maintained, and upgraded in cases *

where improvements werF

. 47'-'ee support for local governmental and support

.* organizations was stror 111. Category 1 111.E Secur*

III. The IP

.. ated this area Category 1. That rating was based on the licensee*

Jrmance orientated security program which reflected significant

.Jd which exceeded regulatory requirement JALP period, station security management, which consisted of dble µnd experienced security professionals, continued to provide effective

  • of the security program, even under adverse cond_itions. When a security
  • i

18 a EP training was comprehensive, innovative, and thoroughly implemented. Operations and EP -

personnel training continued to be significantly enhanced through drills on the control room simulator. Training drills for shift operators were conducted weekly at both facilities. The nine additional extensive training exercises conducted during the period tested major portions_

of the Emergency Plan. Changes and innovations to EP training methodology were constructive in qualifying ERO staff. ERO qualification was kept at a high level, as demonstrated in walkthrough training sessions with ERO members. Off-site training was also a strength, with well developed training and quality information provided to the states and countie Training effectiveness was demonstrated by the excellent performance of the ERO during two NRC-observed annual exercises. Both scenarios were very challenging, particularly the 1990 exercise, which included full state participation, and involved both plume (IO-mile) and ingestion (50-mile) exposure pathways. Only minor areas for improvement were noted during this exercise. Also, there were no FEMA deficiencies. During the 1991 exercise, ERO

- performance-was.also.effective. A poorly worded description of an emergency action level in the Emergency Classification Guide caused an exercise weakness involving tardy declaration of a Site Area Emergency. This weakness had not been identified in any previous drills or exercise Summary PSE&G has maintained a sound and effective EP program with clear management commitment to maintaining a highly -professional and qualified staff. The EP site staff was proficient in ensuring readiness for implementation of emergency response activities. The training program was thoroughly defined and effectively implemented with different innovative performance-based techniques._ The ERO was well qualified as evidenced by exercise performance. Facilities and equipment were well maintained, and upgraded in cases_

where improvements were needed. Licensee support for local governmental and support organizations was stron III. Performance Rating: Category 1 111.E Security 111. Analysis The previous SALP rated this area Category 1. That rating was based on the licensee maintaining a performance orientated security program which reflected significant enhancements and which exceeded regulatory requirement During this SALP period, station security management, which consisted of knowledgeabie and experienced security professionals, continued to provide effective oversight of the security program, even under adverse conditions. When a security

officer sustained a serious self-inflicted injury while on duty at the station, management conducted an intensive investigation of the incident, and contracted a team of psychological and security consultants to counsel members of the security force. and to conduct a study of security operations. This was indicative of management's sensitivity to the impact of. the incident on the security organization and whether the organizatic;m contributed to the inciden Management's attention to and involvement in the security program remained evident throughout this period, especially during construction.of a new war.ehouse which required the reconfiguration of the protected area barrier. The construction project progressed without any negative program impact. The licensee continued to aggressively address

, NRC findings and concerns. Operability of security monitoring equipment was high as evidenced by the minimum number of compensatory posts and a decreasing number of security events that required loggin The licensee also*continued to conduct very aggressive, in-depth and comprehensive audit and self-assessment programs. These programs were very effective in identifying potential weaknesses and correcting them before they became security problem Staffing of the security organization was very good, with limited use of overtime and a.

minimum backlog of work on security equipment. Overtime use during scheduled refueling outages was necessary and adequately controlled. Late in the period, the licensee increased its security force by 30% in order to minimize the impact of.overtime on the force which was identified as a potential weakness during the security stud Security related contingency plans that were implemented during a union job action were excellent. The use of the auxiliary guard house was effective in separating work group Security force members were thoroughly briefed on contingency actions, and good communications among station groups were maintaine Corporate management continued to provide appropriate financial and technical support for the security program and orgaruzation. This was evident early in the period when consultants were contracted to conduct a comprehensive study of the security program and organization, and throughout the period as a systematic upgrade of the aging assessment aids continued. Support was also apparent by the increase in security force staffin As evidenced by responses to two Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) events during the period, the licensee continued to implement a clear and strong FFD policy. The policy was effectively promulgated to employees and contractors, and measures established to implement the policy were properly maintained. In addition, supervisors continued to demonstrate their knowledge of the program and its implementatio...

In addition to a team of licensee security supervisors who provided effective day-to-day oversight of the contractor security force, the licensee continued1 to maintain a well-developed and administered security force training.program: The effectiveness and quality of the supervision and training were apparent' by security officers' display of (1)

knowledge in security matters, (2) attentiveness to security responsibilities, (3)

responsiveness to security problems and (4) aggressiveness in following up on identified security deficiencies. There were also a minimal number of events that were attributed to security-personnel erro * *

The licensee's event reporting procedures were found to be clear and consistent with NRC reporting requirements. Two event reports were submitted to the NRC during this period. One report involved a security officer being inattentive to duty and the other

.involved delayed arrival of a shipment of fuel. The licensee's reports were clear, concise and indicated appropriate responses in each cas.

.

During.. this.period;* the.lieensee submitted one revision to the training and qualification plan. The.revision was of high quality, technically sound and reflected well-developed policies and procedure Summar The licensee continued to maintain an effective, performance-based security program which, in many areas, exceeded regulatory requirements. The licensee demonstrated sensitivity in effectively managing events that challenged the performance of the security

. organization. The audits and self-assessments of the security organization, program upgrades and enhancements were indicative of excellent support from both corporate and station management for the security progra *

lll. Performance Rating: Category 1 111.F Engineering/Technical Support lll. Analysis The previous SALP rated Engineering and Technical Support as Category 2. The previous assessment identified weaknesses in the implementation of the temporary plant modification.program. The previous SALP also identified deficiencies involving inconsistencies in the quality of work performed by system engineers and a problem with the im_plementation of the Station Qualified Reviewers (SQR).

During this SALP period, noted improvements in the implementation of temporary modifications were observed. Increased management control and oversight, including periodic _Station Operations Review Committee review, and increased* engineering effort

have been successful in reducing the duration and backlog of temporary modification Improvements have also been noted in the area of Station Qualified Reviewers (SQR).

The required SQR training was completed. Safety review group audits of this area also have noted program improvement Engineering and Technical Support for the Salem plants was organized with a corporate engineering group, known as Engineering and Plant Betterment (E&PB), and the onsite system engineering group. E&PB handled those major engineering efforts such as plant modifications, and design bases reconstitution. The onsite system engineering group also supported operational, maintenance, testing and minor design change activities. E&PB was appropriately staffed with experienced personnel in various engineering discipline E&PB engineering problem evaluations were generally good. A good root cause analysis was effective in identifying causes of reactor coolant system resistance temperatur detector drifting problems. Design change packages were of good quality. They were

  • complete-and in -accordance with applicable procedures. Two deficiencies were observed in the plant modification control area. There was a lack of an independent, in depth review of the emergency diesel generator load studies, and an inadequate control in the use of fuses. The lack of adequate review resulted in the emergency diesel generator load studies containing substantial technical errors. The inadequat~ control of fuses resulted, in the use of six undersized main fuses in safety-related 125 volt DC syste Although no operability issues resulted, this condition was known to the licensee for a considerable period of time. Prompt management attention was not implemented to assure system reliabilit A problem involving lack of required evaluations of control room habitabllity for all chemicals stored on-site was identified. The NRC was reviewing this matter at the end of the period. During the previous SALP period, concerns were identified involving air balance and humidity testing for air cleaning systems and high oxygen concentrations in the Unit 1 waste gas decay tank., The licensee's progress in resolving air balance and humidity issues has been slo The E&PB organization worked well with the onsite system engineering group, and communications were noted as being improved. This was evidenced during the followup of the main steam isolation valve design change. The onsite system engineering group was well staffed with engineers. The establishment of a Small Design Change Project team has been effective in reducing the system engineering workload; As a result, improvements were noted relative to system engineer involvement in periodic field inspections of their systems. System trending, knowledge of system outage work, and increased management awareness have been effective in improving safety system a vaila bili t System engineers' questioning attitude, and overall sense of safety perspective were good, with noted improvements during this period. For example, system engineer **

troubleshooting activities and corrective action plans for the* radiation monitoring system deficiencies, vital bus undervoltage relay setpoint drift problems, steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump problems, Unit 2 turbine generator failure and higher than normal river

  • water temperatures were effective and thorough. Additionally, system engineer presence in the field was apparent, as evidenced by their identification of several hardware issues, such as degraded small bore service water piping and main steam isolation valve air control valve problems.. Of the five automatic reactor trips during the period, none were attributed to the engineering activitie Technical support for refueling and maintenance outage periods and for post-outage recovery activities was effective. Both E&PB and onsite system engineering participated in and interfaced with the,outage organization on a daily basis. System engineering was noted as providing strong support durfog reactor startup and power ascension te~tin The licens~e has established effective project management task forces led by E&PB managers to address specific technical issues, modifications and problem areas. These included the configuration baseline documentation (i.e., design basis reconstitution),

service*water and radiation monitoring system (RMS) modifications, and the Salem material condition revitalization project. These task forces successfully integrated offsite, onsite and contractor engineering activities. A large number of licensee event reports were due to actuations caused by the poorly designed radiation monitoring systems. The licensee has a plan in-place to correct these RMS design probl~m The Procedure Upgrade Project (PUP) showed good progress during the period. The PUP was managed through the station Technical Department during the last SALP period. During this SALP period, management of PUP was moved out of the line organization to a dedicated Salem revitalization group. This management shift appeared to be effective as the project completed about 50% of the procedure upgrade. *The revised PUP procedures have been effective in decreasing errors and events previously caused by inadequate or poor procedure Improvement was noted in the engineering procurement activities. Until 1990, the licensee had 110 formal procedure for controlling the commercial grade item dedication program. The licensee's personnel had worked closely with Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) personnel in the development of the EPRI commercial. grade dedication program guideline Engineering's Self-Assessment Program emphasizes the key performance elements to the engineering and management personnel. By setting goals and tracking them and by having upper management support, significant improvements have been achieved. The.

'.

contribution from this effort was a positive factor in improving engineering performance, as evidenced by a reduction in overdue engineering items, improved safety evaluation quality and improved performance concerning design change project timelines There was generally strong evidence of management support for improving the engineering effort. Funding was provided by management, not only for routine engineering activities, but also for engineering enhancement projects, such as the Salem Revit.alization Project (SRP), the Configuration Baseline Document (CBD) project, for planned additional engineering facilities, and for additional computerized material to increase efficien_cies in engineering activities. The CBD project involves the design basis reconstitution of 87 systems and structures for Salem. During this SALP period, 24 systems were completed. The licensee also implemented the computerized Document Information Management System to complement the hard copy CBD for the completed systems. However-, one example where a lack of aggressive management attention existed regarding the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs). Insufficient vendor and 'engineering *guidance for material specifications and torquing requirements has resulted in numerous PORV failure The technical content of license amendment requests and other licensee initiated submittals was generally good and continues to improve. However, the technical content of responses to certain NRC generic communications has required significant additional information submittals by the licensee; Examples include submittals relative to station blackout specifications, thermal stresses in piping systems connected to the reactor coolant system (NRC Bulletin 88~08) and information concerning the vendor information interface program (NRC Generic Letter' 90-03). In some cases, the initial responses provided only a schedule for submission of the requested information. However, when the additional technical information was submitted, it was of high quality and responsive to the staff's reques Summary The control and limitations of temporary modifications improved, ~nd improvements were made in the quality of work performed by the systems engineers and in the SQR program. Corporate engineering performed well with only a few deficiencies in the design change control area being observed. The, onsite system engineering performed well in supporting plant operations. Corporate and* onsite engineering management involvement was generally effective, although some plant issues resulted from a lack of management attention. Progress was observed in two of the engineering enhancement projects, the Salem Revitalization Project and the Configuration Baseline Document Project. At the end of the period, improvements in the engineering procurement program were also observed. The engineering for license amendments was of good quality; however, weaknesses were observed in the responses to NRC generic communication IIl. Performance Rating: Category 2 IIl. SALP Board Comment There was a distinct difference in the level of quality between the licensee's responses to generic issues and its other submittals. The licensee should pay particular attention to improving the overall quality of its responses to generic issue.G Safety Assessment/Quality Verification 111. Analvsis The previous SALP rated this area as Category 2. That assessment noted that

  • management was involved -in problem resolution and the assurance of nuclear safet Onsite, offsite and event followup review groups had provided effective, independent evaluation of plant activities. A weakness was noted concerning the use of the station qualified reviewer, which prevented some issues from being reviewed by the onsite review committee. Quality Control (QC) involvement was not sufficient to maintain an independent review of station activities.. The material condition of the plant was poo The implementation of the procedure upgrade project was delayed, and inadequate procedures continued to contribute to plant event During this assessment period, corporate and station management continued to be involved in the conduct of daily station operations and in effectively responding to unplanned occurrences. Daily station manager accountability ineetings were effective in ensuring an appropriate level of oversight of station activities. In addition, the daily morning meeting provided a useful operational summary for station management with emphasis on current unit problems and identification of high priority work. That meeting also provided the senior nuclear shift supervisor with direct access to station management. On a semi-annual basis, the Salem General Manager conducted State-of-the-Station meetings, which effectively communicated management's assessment of performance. Management and supervision were observed to be present in the field, including weekend Strong management attention and support were provided during this assessment period to develop programs to improve the material condition of the Salem facility and to improve the procedures. As a result, the procedure upgrade project (PUP) has made noticeable progress during this assessment period. Station procedure overall quality has likewise improved, with clear improvement noted in the procedures which have been processed through the PUP. Plant material condition has shown some improvemen Conversely, a l~ck of management assessment and untimely correction of known deficiencies contributed to the existence of long-standing cone.ems associated with the pressurizer power-operated relief valve *

.

.

The licensee's Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) effectiveness improved during this assessment period. SORC reviews of reactor trips, proposed design changes, -

significant technical issues, and reportable events were generally very good and displayed an excellent safety perspectiv The independent onsite safety review groups continued to provide effective reviews of station activities and identification of safety concerns, including the Station Quality Assurance (SQA) Department and Safety Review Group (SRG). Two specific examples are the SQA identification that Technical Specifications were inappropriately exited during surveillance testing because of ineffective communications, and the identification that testing of the Unit 1 containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices-was not properly implemented. SQA *performance-bas_ed inspections continued during this period, and Quality Control (QC) increased direct inspection activities by providing increased department notification and hold points. SRG investigations were comprehensive, focused on safety issues and provided meaningful recommendations to

. plant management. The independent Offsite Safety Review (OSR) group was also used effectively and provided a safety conscious review of licensee activitie The Significant Event Review Team (SERT) process provided a multi-disciplined, independent review of reactor trips or other safety significant events. SERTs conducted during this assessment period were generally of excellent quality, including proper root cause determinations* and effective corrective actions. In one instance, however, the NRC identified a minor weakness associated with a SERT evaluation in which the licensee's prior recognition of existing deficiencies which contributed to the event was not identified by the SERT. The SERT process was used effectively by station management and was appropriately complemented by those evaluations performed by the SR The licensee had previously placed increased emphasis on attention to detail in an attempt to reduce the number of personnel errors and procedural problems at Sale While PSE&G's efforts had initially been successful, station performance has been inconsistent during this SALP period. Specifically, at about the middle of the period, a high number of events, across all functional areas and in -a relative short time period, were attributed to personnel errors and procedural compliance/adequacy problem PSE&G management took action and the error rate had decreased. However, near the end of the assessment period, several licensed operators permitted a Unit 2 startup to proceed without resolving a test discrepancy, and this was identified as one of several causal factors that led to the Unit 2 turbine generator failur Communications and interfaces among the various station groups were generally goo However, several ineffective intradepartmental and interdepartmental communications were contributing causes for plant events and equipment concerns. Prompt management action was taken and was effective in improving performanc Outage preparations for the Salem U:riit 1 refueling outage were excellent and proactiv Aggressive outage goals were established, and thorough SQA/QC inspections and surveillance plans were developed. Likewise, the Salem Unit 2 10-day maintenance and testing outage was well planned._ PSE&G management displayed an excellent safety perspective in electing to conservatiVely shut down the _unit to perform the planned activitie The licensee's corrective action program generally func;tioned well. Improvements were noted relative to the material condition of both units, the quality of procedures, and in system engineer performance. However, weaknesses were noted in the LER commitment tracking system (one causal factor of the Unit 2 turbine failure), in correcting licensed operator training and EOP deficiencies, in addressing undersized 125 volt DC fuses, and in their investigative efforts relative to security program concern Also, deficiendes were noted in personnel performance and attention to detail, which resulted in personnel errors. At times, this resulted in degraded performance trends during the perio * The quality of requests for routine licensing actions has shown some improvement in that the_ number requests for additional information has declined. There was one notable

.

exceptiOn, however, which was the request to change the diesel generator surveillance requirements. Significant additional information was required from the licensee. (See Section 111.F.) There was only one non-routine licensing action, a Waiver of Compliance for a containment fan cooler unit, which was issued by the NRC Regional office: The quality of the licensee's submittal wa_s goo The quality of the responses to NRC generic communications has not significantly improved. On occasion, requests for additional information have been necessary for completion of staff review (See 111.F.)

Summary PSE&G management continued-to be effectively involved in station activities and in problem resolution. The SERT process has been effective, and the independent review groups ( onsite and offsite) provided safety conscious reviews of licensee activities. An increase in QC involvement in direct inspection activities was noted. An improvement in SORC effectiveness was also noted. The PUP made noticeable progress during this period that resulted in an overall improvement in station procedures. Personnel errors

and procedure compliance continued to be a source of periodic performance problem Improvements were noted in routine license submittals, but additional m_anagement attention will be necessary to improve the responses ro generic communications to the same leve III. Performance Rating: Category 2 III. SALP Board Comment The SALP Board noted cyclic performance relative to attention to detail resulting in

.personnel errors. The licensee should evaluate ihe effectiveness of their corrective action programs to ensure that a higher level of consistent performance is achieve..

' 28 I SITE ACTMTIES AND EVALUATION CRITERIA I Licensee Activities Both Salem Units began the SALP period in Hot Standby and prepariP following resolution of main steam isolation valve (MSIV) concern startup activities, the reactor automaticaily tripped on August 17, 1<'

to Cold Shutdown to replace the No~ 14 RCP motor. The unit ori September 7, 1990, and operated until September 10, 199r reactor trip occurred while preparing to isolate a high pres~

Po.wer operation resumed on September 12, 1990*.

. 14

.down

.lervice

.a tic

.ng _line lea Unit 2 was placed in service on August 20, 1990, and September 4, 1990, when the unit tripped autoinafr transient caused by equipment failures. Power OT

. continued until.

.ondary system

. Unit 1 shutdown on February 9, 1991; for its completed on March 2, 1991, and core rek reactor was made critical on April 23, 19' ~

April 29, 199.

.

~"'f-

, on September 8, 199 utage_.. Core offload was J on March 16, 1991. The

... r operation was achieved on

.

?;>

~~

On May 10, 1991, following a 245 t" #

A..~ the unit, Unit 2 was shut down for a scheduled maintenance o~tage <v ~

~started and achieved criticality on May 21, 1991, and power ascension

~

'~.

Unit 1 tripped on June 16

/

__ ~=_{r;..":."5_~:.tm.*ng stri.ke o.n the main tr-.an_sfo. rmer. The unit restarted on June 2'

'jl'.f!

On September 16, 1'

initiated a shutdown of Unit 1 due to an unisolabl electro-hydraulic r Aem fluid leak. The unit initially proceeded to Ho Standby. Howe'*

~met leak was observed on one of the two pressurizer spray valves, r*

.o Cold Shutdown for valve repair. The unit was restarted un Septemb/

..vas*synchronized. to the grid on September 27, 199 On Octc to reir line tli'

, licensee began a Unit 2 power reduction from 100% in order j from the steam generators. The turbine generator was taken off

,Dideout recovery evolution was performed. The iicensee initiated*

... ry evolution because of a vendor calculation that concluded the

.:oncentration due to a September 22, 1991, condenser tube failure was

.*.earn generator tubes were subject to accelerated denting over tim,_1ower reduction, the uriit remained in Mode 2 at 0% power. Final chloride

28a I SITE ACTIVITIES AND EVALUATION CRITERIA I Licensee Activities Both Salem Units began the SALP period in Hot Standby _and preparing for unit startup following resolution of main steam isolation valve (MSIV) concerns. During Unit 1 startup activities, the reactor automatically tripped on August 17, 1990, after the No. 14 reactor coolant pump (RCP) lost electrical power. The unit was subsequently shutdown to Cold Shutdown to 'replace the No. 14 RCP motor. The unit was returned to service on September 7, 1990, and operated until September 10, 1990, when an automatic_

reactor trip occurred while preparing to isolate a high pressure turbfoe sensing line lea Power operation resumed mi September 12, 199 Unit 2 was placed in service on August 20, 1990, and power operation continued until September 4, 1990, when the unit tripped automatically due to a secondary system transient caused by equipment failures. Power operation resumed on September 8, 199 Unit *1 shutdown on February 9, 1991, for its ninth refueling outage. Core offload was completed on March 2, 1991, and core reload was completed on March 16, 1991. The reactor was made critical on April 23, 1991, and full power operation was achieved on April 29, 199 On May 10, 1991, following a 245 day record run for the uriit, Unit 2 was shut down for a scheduled maintenance outage. The unit was restarted and achieved criticality on May 21, 1991, and power ascension followe Unit 1 trippea on June 16, 1991, due to a lightning strike on the main transformer. The unit restarted on June 24, 199 On September 16, 1991, the licensee initiated a shutdown of Unit 1 due to an unisolable electro~hydraulic control (EHC) system fluid leak. The unit initially proceeded to Hot Standby. However, a body to bonnet leak was observed on one of the two pressurizer spray valves, requiring entry into Cold Shutdown for valve repair. The unit was restarted on September 25, 1991, and was synchronized to the grid on September 27, 199 On October 18, 1991, the licensee began a Unit 2 power reduction from 100% in order to remove chloride ions from the steam generators. The turbine generator was taken off li11e, and a chemical hideoµt recovery evolution was performed. The licensee initiated this hideout recovery evolution because of a licensee calculation that concluded the chloride crevice concentration due to a September 22, 1991, condenser tube failure was such that the steam generator tubes were subject to accelerated denting over tim During this power reduction,. the unit remained in Mode 2 at 0% power. Final chloride

concentration on all steam generators was within the chemistry goal. The unit was synchronized with the grid on October 20, 1991, and was subsequently returned to full powe On November 9, 1991, Salem Unit 2 experienced an automatic main turbine and reactor trip during performance of turbine mechanical trip testing. The turbine trip subsequently reset, resulting in overspeeding the turbine and causing significant damage to the turbine/generator set. The unit proceeded to Cold Shutdown and commenced its sixth refueling outage, which had previously been schedule_d to begin in January 199 The licensee continued to experience problems with service water leaks, spurious radiation monitor alarms and actuations, and Safeguards Equipment Cabinet failures and actuations. The licensee continues to pursue both short and long-term solu_tions to these issue I NRC Inspection and Review Activities Four NRC resident inspectors were assigned to Artificial Island during the assessment

  • period. NRC team inspectio_ns were conducted in the following areas:

Emergency Preparedness inspections conducted on October 29 through November 2, 1990, and on December 3 through 6, 1991 to observe the Artificial Island annual exercise Safety System Functional inspection conducted at Salem Units 1 and 2 on April 15 through April 26, 1991, to assess the design basis and operational readiness of the Residual Heat Removal syste Augmented inspection Team inspection conducted at Salem Unit 2 on November 10 through December 2, 1991, to review and evaluate the circumstances and significance of the November 9, 1991 turbine/generator failure even I SALP Evaluation* Criteria Licensee performance is assessed in selected functional areas, depending on whether the facility is in a construction or operational phase. Functional areas normally represent areas significant to nuclear safety and the environment. Some functional areas may not be assessed because of little or no licensee activities or lack of meaningful observations

  • in that area. Special areas may be added to highlight significant observation The following evaluation criteria were used, as applicable, to assess each functional area:

.. r

.1...

Assurance of quality, including management involvement and control; Approach to the identification and resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint;

Enforcement history; Operational events (including response to, analysis of, reporting of, and corrective actions for);

Staffing (includi!lg management);

Training and qualification effectiveness; Based upon the SALP Board assessment, each functional area evaluated is classified into one of three *performance categories. The definitions of these performance categories are:

Category 1: Licensee management attention to and involvement in nuclear safety or safeguards activities resulted in a superior level of performance. NRC will consider reduced levels of inspection effor Category 2: Licensee management attention to and involvement in nuclear safety or

  • safeguards activities resulted in a good level of performanc NRC will consider maintaining normal levels of inspection effort.

. Category 3: Licensee management attention to and involvement in nuclear safety or safeguards activities resulted in an acceptable level of performance; however, because of the NRC's concern that a decrease in performance may approach Of reach an unacceptable level, NRC will consider increased levels of inspection effor The SALP report may include an appraisal of the performance trend in a functional area for use as a predictive indicator. Licensee performance during the assessment period i examined to determine whether a trend exists. Normally, this performance trend would be used only if both a definite trend is discernable and continuation of the trend would result in a change in performance rating. -

The trend, is used, is defined as:

Improving: Licensee performance was determined to be improving during the assessment perio Declining: Licensee performance was determined to be declining during the assessment period and the licensee had not taken meaningful steps to address this pattern.

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