IR 05000272/1980011
| ML18082A807 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1980 |
| From: | Hill N, Keimig R, Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18082A806 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-80-11, 50-311-80-07, 50-311-80-7, NUDOCS 8007310055 | |
| Download: ML18082A807 (17) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION I
50-272/80-11 Report Nos. __,s....,o,....-..,.,31=--1..... l-'"80_-_0_7 __
50-272 Docket No D-P-R--7-0 ___ _
License No DPR-75
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Licensee:
Pub 1 i c Service* El ectri t and* Gas *Company- * *
so Park Place****
Newark~ *New* Jersey*
01101* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Facility Name: *Sal em* Nuclear* Generating* Station*.;.* Units* 1*and*2 Inspection At: *Hancocks Bridge~*New*Jersey* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Inspection cond c ct0 )'1aV=31J980 * * * * * *. *.* *..**.* *
u
- * **
- **
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Inspectors:
,
~~*************************** *****G[,/}d * Norrholm, Senior Resident Reactor Inspector I date
~
m. 74-Lt
- * * * *.. * *._. * :*. *._.._. * *:*. * *.. * * *
- * * ~//J> loo
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I W. M. Hill, Resi nt Reactor Inspector Approved by: * * * ~
- .* * * '.p* * * * * :*. * _.._. * *:*:.*.**: *._.._ *.*.. *.**
.J.(R. Keimig,_,,.Chief,/Reactor Projects Section No. 1, RO&NS Branch-"
Inspection Summary:
date
... *~~z:.;,.g!'.J date Ins~ecti ons *on May J.:.31 ~ * l980 *(Combined* Report* Numbers* 50.:.212;ao.:.11 *and 50- ll/80.:.07)
Unit 1 Areas Ins~etted: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors of plant operations inclu ing tours of the facility; log and record reviews; review of licensee events; operational safety verification; review of strike contingency plans; and, followup on previous inspection items. The inspections involved 46 inspector-hours By the resident NRC inspector Unit 2 Areas *rnseected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors of plant startup testing including tours of the facility; preparations for and conduct of core loading; operating license conditions; non-routine report followup; review of licensee events; and, followup on previous inspection items. The inspections involved 53 hours6.134259e-4 days <br />0.0147 hours <br />8.763227e-5 weeks <br />2.01665e-5 months <br /> by the resident NRC inspector Results: No items of noncompliance were identified *
- DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted R. Griffith, Site QA Engineer A. Meyer, Site QA Engineer H. Midura, Manager - Salem Generating Station P. Moeller, Associate Engineer W. Reuther, Site QAD F. Schnarr, Station Operating Engineer R. Silverio, Assistant to the Manager J. Stillman, Station QA Engineer J. Zupko, Chief Engineer The inspectors also interviewed and talked with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspections including management, clerical, maintenance, operations, performance, quality assurance, and construction personne. Status of Previous Inspection Items (Closed) Follow Item (272/79-08-03)
SORC review of procedures. The in-spector reviewed the identified secondary plant procedures to verify that they had been presented for SORC review as required by Regulatory Guide 1.3 SORC review had been completed and an evaluation conducted to ensure that all Regulatory Guide 1.33 -
listed procedures had SORC approva (Closed)
(Closed)
(Closed)
Deviation (272/79-28-02)
Entry into Mode 4 prior to completion of seismic re-analysis of Auxiliary Feedwater Syste Licensee corrective action on this item appears to have been effectiv No recurrence has been identified. The seismic re-evaluation program for Unit 1 has now been complete Follow Item (272/79-31-03) Procedure to ensure less than 1%
free-standing water in resins prepared for shipmen The inspector reviewed procedure PD-15.7.016, Securing Demirteralizer Operations and Dewatering, Revision 0, dated January 3, 1980. A water level of less than 2 inches in the center annulus of the resin cask is taken to represent less than 1% free-standing liquid. If level exceeds 2 inches, additional de-watering steps are require Noncompliance (272/80-01-01) Undetected calibration procedure data recording errors. The two procedures in question were re-peated and confirmed that the data errors were due to recording mistakes made by the technicians involved. Personnel. conducting data review have been reinstructed on their responsibilitie *
{Closed) Unresolved Item {272/80-01-04) Calibration requirement for Cardox level indicator. Calibration of the instrument was completed on January 25, 198 An instrument number has been assigned and the calibration requirement placed in the Inspection Order system to ensure recall for periodic calibratio (Closed) Unresolved Item {272/80-01-05) Thermocouple functional test dat To resolve the inspector's concern in this area, the licensee has prepared a new procedure, PD-14.2.018, Thermocouple Temperature Verification, which specifies the recording of data to demonstrate functional test apceptabilit (Closed) Noncompliance (272/80-05-01)
Change in operating mode with one channel of heat trace inoperable. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions to prevent recurrence, which define in better detail the operability requirements of the vital heat tracing circuits. The inspector had no further questions relative to actions taken:
(Closed} Unresolved Item (272/80-07-05)
Operability of control room ventilation damper The inspector reviewed surveillance test data for January through March 1979 which confirmed, based on monthly surveillance testing, that the dampers were operable prior to the start of the 1979 outage. This item is resolved as acceptabl (Closed) Unresolved Item (311/78-09-01) Acceptability of anchor bolt embedmen The bolts questioned by the inspector were identified on Deficiency Report (DR) 663 Resolution resulted in a random verification of bolt embedment, followed by a complete inspection program pursuant to IE Bulletin 79-0 The concerns identified in this item have been resolve (Closed) Noncompliance (311/78-41-01)
Failure to maintain Fuel Handling Building access control. Corrective actions specified by the licensee appear to have been effective in preventing recurrence of this ite Complete site access control was established prior to receipt o.f the Unit 2 operating licens (Closed) Follow Item (311/78-44-04) Conduct of Emergency Drill - Unit The licensee conducted an emergency drill on May 17, 1980, which was observed by the inspector (Closed) Unresolved Item (311/79-21-01)
SORC review and issue of SUP's 80.13, 80.14, and 80.1 All the identified Startup Procedures have been reviewed by SORC and have been approved by the Station Manage This item is resolve (Closed) Unresolved Item (311/79-37-02)
Replacement of Component Cooling Pump impellers. All three Unit 2 Component Cooling Pump impellers have been replaced with stainless steel. This item is re~olved as acceptable.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (311/79-37-04) Modification to valve 2VC5 and 2VC Unit 2 containment pressure-vaccuum relief valves have been modified by the vendor to ensure design closure in an accident condition. The modification is identical to that made on Unit This item is resolved as acceptabl (Closed) Unresolved Item (311/79-34-02) Preventive Maintenance progra Through continuing review, the inspector verified that an active program of pump rotation and system chemical analysis was main-tained during the extended layup period between completion of Hot Functional Testing and Core Loa This item is resolved as acceptabl *
Unit 1 3. Shift Logs and Operating Records The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the licensee established requirements in this area in preparation for a review of selected logs and record AP-5, Operating Practices, Revision 9, April 23, 1979; AP-6, Operational Incidents, Revision 6, February 22, 1979; AP-13, Control of Lifted Leads and Jumpers, Revision 4, February 11, 1980; Operations Directive Manual; and, AP-15, Tagging Rules, Revision 0, April 13, 197 TAe inspector had no questions in this are Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
Control room log sheet entries are filled out and initialled; Auxiliary log sheets are filled out and initialled; Log entries involving abnormal conditions provide sufficient detail to communicate equipment status, lockout status, cor-rection and restoration; Log book reviews are bei~g conducted by the staff; Operating orders do not conflict with Technical Specification requirements; Incident reports detail no viola~ion of Technical Specification LCO or reporting requirement; and, Logs and records were maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications and the procedures in 3.a abov The review included the following plant shift logs and operating records as indicated and discussed with licensee personnel:
Log No. 1 Control Room Daily Log, April 30 - May 29, 1980 Log No. 3 - Control Console Reading Sheet, April 30 - May 29, 1980 Log No. 6*- Primary Plant Log, April 30 - May 29, 1980 Log No. 7 - Secondary Plant Log, April 30 - May 29, 1980 Log No. 8 - Unavailable Equipment Status Log, April 30 - May 29, 1980
Incident Reports - Numbers 80-65, 97, 117~ 119, 126-128, 130, 131, 135-137 Tagging Requests - All active (SSS file)
Night Orders, April 21 - May 23, 1980 Lifted Lead and Jumper Log - A 11 active The following observations apply to logs and records reviewed during this reporting period:
On several occasions, the inspector reviewed the control room file of current surveillance procedures; the most recently completed surveillance test conducted which reflects completion within the required time interval and thus, demonstrates operability of the equipment tested. A number of instances were identified in which the most recent surveillance was not filed, and a search of other locations or reconstruction from other records was required to prove equipment operabilit No actual failure to conduct the required surveillance testing was identified. The licensee initiated a comprehensive review of surveillance documentation to ensure that control room records reflected current operable status of all equipment covered in Technical Specification In a review'of outstanding tagging requests, the inspector identi-fied several problems with temporary releases of tags. The temp-orary release procedure permits the senior shift supervisor to authorize a temporary lifting of a red tag for a specific purpose and usually for a short interval, on the order of a da Instances were identified in which temporary release of a tag was still authorized after several months but the tags had been replaced and the equipment placed in the secured condition specifie In other cases, temporary releases were still in effect after time intervals up to one yea The licensee initiated a complete review of station tagging reque~ts to correct the above situation The inspector had no further comments relative to station record review.
Plant Tour a. During the course of the inspections, the inspector made observations and conducted multiple tours of plant areas, includi.ng the following; (1) Control Room (daily)
(2) Relay Room (3) Auxiliary Building (_ 4) Vital Switchgear Rooms (5}
Turbine Building
(6)
Yard Areas (7)
Radwaste Building (8)
Penetration Areas (9)
Control Point (10) Site Perimeter 7 The following determinations were made:
Monitoring instrumentation: The inspector verified that selected instruments were functional and demonstrated parameters within Technical Specification limit Valve positions. The inspector verified that selected valves were in the position or condition required by Technical Specifi-cations for the applicable plant mod This verification in-cluded control board indication and field observation of valve position (Containment Spaay and Auxiliary Feedwater System).
Radiation Controls. The inspector verified by observation that control point procedures and posting requirements were being followe The inspector identified no failures to properly post radiation and high radiation area Plant housekeeping conditions. Observations relative to plant housekeeping identified no unsatisfactory conditions.
Fluid leak No fluid leaks were observed which had not been identified by station personnel and for which corrective action had not been initiated, as necessar Piping vibratio No exces*sive piping vibrations were observed and no adverse conditions were note Selected pipe hangers and seismic restraints were observed and no adverse conditions were note Equipment taggin The inspector selected plant components for which valid tagging requests were in effect and verified that the tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specifie Control room annunciators. Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being take By frequent observation through the inspection, the inspector verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54
{k) and the. Technical Specifications were being me In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintaine The inspector periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of plant conditions and knowledge of emergency procedure *
Fire protection. The inspector verified that selected fire extinguishers were accessible and inspected on schedule, that fire alarm stations were unobstructed, that cardox systems were operable, and that adequate control over ignition sources and fire hazards was maintaine Release On a sampling basis, the inspector verified that appropriate documentation, sampling, authorization, and monitoring instrumentation, were provided for effluent release Technical Specifications. Through log review and direct observations during tours, the inspector verified compliance with selected Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operatio The following parameters were sampled frequently:
accumulator levels and pressures, RWST level, BIT temperature, AFST level, rod insertion limits, containment pressure and temperature, valve power lockouts, axial flux differenc In addition, the inspector conducted periodic visual channel checks of protective instrumentation and inspection of electrical switch-boards to confirm availability of safeguards equipmen Security. During the course of these inspections, observations relative to protected and vital area security were made, in-cluding access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort, and badgin No notable conditions were identified~
Surveillance. The inspector observed portions of the following surveillance tests in progress; Seismic Instrumentation, RCS Chemistry (Boron Analysis). The following acceptance criteria were used for the above items:
Technical Specifications Operatings Directives Manual Inspector Ju~gement The following specific comments apply to observations made during plant tour Examination of instrument cabinets identified the use of Instrument Cabinet 211 (Containment Spray Pump instrumentation) for temporary storage of a plastic container containing oil. The bottle was removed and an inspection conducted to ensure no similar misuse of instrument cabinets existe *
During control room observations, the inspector noted continual spiking of the #14 High Steam Flow channel, requiring constant operator attention to that section of the console, in order to acknowledge the alan The cause of the problem appears to be nonnal variability of steam flow at 100% power and inadequate damping in new flow transmitters. Correction is.being pursued by the license In order to preclude excessive operator atten-tion to a nuisance alarm, a temporary jumper was placed on the alarm function onl Operability of the protective channel and status lights was verifie During operator interviews, the inspector questioned the degree of agreement expected between redundant protection channel Channel Checks are conducted as required by Technical Specifica-tions and documented in operating logs. However, operators are inconsistent relative to the amount of diagreement between channels considered acceptable. Operators reported that channels have been called unsatisfactory and subsequently, when checked by Performance Department technicians, the amount of disagreement found has been within design limits of the instrumentatio The licensee stated that acceptance criteria for protection instrument channel checks will be investigated and provided on the logs, if feasible. This item is unresolved pending completion of the licensee evaluation (272/80-11-02).
The inspector had no further questions relative to plant tour. Operational Events On two occasions on May 11, 1980, controlled floor drains in the Auxiliary Building, on elevation 84', backed up, resulting in minor contamination of a normally clean narrow passagewa The area was posted to preclude spread of contaminatio Maximum contamination, based on survey results was 1800 dp The licensee's limit for establishing contamination control is 1000 dp The overflow was caused by simultaneous discharge of two sump/drain pumps into the drain header and an apparent flow blockage at the inlet valve to the waste holdup tank in service. The contractor employee (security guard)
who discovered the standing water received measurable contamination of his shoes (reportedly 300 CPM), which were decontaminated and re-turned. After reporting the water backup, the individual traversed several clean areas in the plant prior to decontamination of his shoe Surveys of these areas identified no measurable contamination level No release outside the Auxiliary Building was involved. The licensee is investigating possible blockage of the drain lin The inspector had no further questions on this event *
- 10 At approximately 7:00 PM on May 16, a containment piping penetration was declared inoperable due to a failed seal weld inside containmen The penetration, which is used for sample system 3/8 11 tubing, is a
11 diameter cylinder sealed at both ends by end caps and penetrated axially by sleeves which contain the process tubing. Seal welds are.:*
applied at the sleeve/cap boundary and at the junction of the sleeve end with the process tubing (external to the penetration). Failure of the sleeve to tubing connection inside containment, coupled with failure of the sample tubing itself within the penetration sleeve, had permitted motion of the tubing approximately 8-9 11 into containmen Steam leakage into containment was observe The plant began a controlled shutdown to comply with Technical Speci-fication requirements to be in Hot Standby within 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />s~ Repairs, consisting of rewelding the failed weld, c~pping the sample tubing, and pressure testing both the penetration and the sleeve to 47 psig, were completed by midnight and the power reduction terminate Based on the repair and retest, it appears that the containment external pressure boundary of the penetration remained intact, maintaining containment integrit In the course of investigating the problem, four individuals were slightly contaminated to exposed facial hair while in containmen Decontamination was accomplished by washin Nasal swipes and whole body counts indicated no uptak The subsequent repair work was accomplished with respiratory protectio The inspector had no further questions relative to this even At approximately 9:00 PM on May 17, the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building was evacuated as a precautionary measure due to increasing airborne activity on elevation 64'. Activity levels to SE-9 uci/ml were measure Subsequent investigation identified that the Boric Acid Evaporator vent condenser gas vent line drain was aligned to the drain syste The lineup was corrected and air activity returned to normal level Due to carryover.problems on evaporator startup, operator practice has been to open the vent condenser drain on startup to drain the line, then shut it so that vent condenser gas is directed to the waste gas syste The inspector noted that the above steps, apparently necessary to successfully start up the Boric Acid Evaporator are not included in the operating procedur In order to preclude future problems of this nature, a licensee representative stated that the procedure will be modified to ensure proper valve alignment during operatio The inspector had no further question on this item.
11 At 1954 EDT on May 23, Unit 1 tripped due to low level and feed flow/
steam flow mismatch in # 12 steam generato Loss of feedwater control was experienced when shifting from automatic to manual control in sup-port of steam generator level instrument surveillance testing. The feedwater control valve would not respond to manual control, resulting in the low water level. Repairs were made to the control system on May 2 All safety systems responded properly. Restart was accomp-lished on May 25 at 012 The plant was at 100% power at 0110 EDT on May 2 The inspector's review of this trip identified no problems with personnel or equipment respons. Other Items On May 12, 1980 the inspector observed several contract security guards during weapons requalification at a local rang The inspector verified that shoo.ting scores were evaluated by a qualified range officer and that scores recorded for each individual were accurate representations of performance on the range. Qualification is based on a 11short course
consisting of 30 rounds fired at three types of target The inspector had no questions on this ite On May 14, 1980 the inspector attended a meeting of the Station Operations Review Committee (SORC).
The inspector had no questions relative to items reviewed or followup on Committee item Quorum requirements were met in accordance with Technical Specifications and meetings are scheduled weekl Relative to quorum, the inspector identified the following concerns:
More than one individual holds the title Senior Shift Supervisor and Senior Maintenance Supervisor. These titles are listed as members of SOR The inspector stated his position that the intent of Technical Specifications was that no more than one individual with an identical title could complete the number for a meeting quoru No such instance has been identified but the practice would not be prohibited by present licensee administrative procedure Alternates are not designated for specific individual member Alternates are designated 11at large," resulting in a situation where a member and 11his" alternate could both count toward a quorum resulting in dominance by one department at a meetin The inspec-tor stated his position that alternates should be designated for a specific member and that a member and his designated alternate should not both be included in the same quoru The above items are unresolved pending further review by the licensee and the inspector (50-272/80-11-01 *
Unit 2 Core Load License Conditions Salem Unit 2 Operating License Number DPR-75, issued on April 18; 1980 authorized core load and testing at low powe The license and accompany-ing Technical Specifications contain several conditions to be met prior to core loa The following conditions were verified as described below by the inspectors. Verification was accomplished before entry into operating Mode 6 on May 23, 198 The following conditions, listed by license paragraph were verified:
2.C.(3~ Secondary Water Chemistr¥*
The inspector reviewed pro-cedure PD-3.8.020, Sampling Schedule, Revision 5, dated May 8, 1980. This procedure, coupled with Emergency Instruction 4.21, defines the monitoring program and corrective actions to take in the event of condenser leakag.C.(~ia. Shift Technical Adviso The inspector verified that interim Shift Technical Advisors were on duty, that they
. had received the requisite training, and that the permanent group of 1981 STA's were in trainin In addition, pro-cedure STAP-2 was reviewed, which provides for STA shift turnove.C.(5~b. Shift Supervisor Duties and Shift P.ersonnel Responsibilitie The management directive addressing these areas was previously reviewe Annual reissue will take place in August 198 The inspector also reviewed Administrative Procedure AP-5, Operating Practices Program, Revision 10, which was issued May 21, 1980, and which covers the remaining items in this license conditio.C.(5}c. Shift Mannin AP-5 Covers shift manning consistently with Table 6.2-1 of the Technical Specification Crew augmentation is addressed through "call-out" authority given to the Senior Shift Supervisor. Overtime limitations for licensed operators identical to those outlined in the license are also imposed, and have been observe.C.(S)n. Revised Scope and Criteria for Licensing Examination Licensed Operators had been previously trained in TMI re-lated design changes. Prior to core load, non-licensed shift personnel were similarly traine.C.(5)2. Organization and Management Criteria. The inspector re-viewed the PSE&G Recovery Management Plan, Revision 1, dated May 19, 1980. This plan describes the methods, responsi-bility, and authority of corporate office personnel in pro-viding technical suppor *
-- 2.C.(5).f. Safety Engineering*Group*and*onsite Evaluation Capabilit The inspector verified that the five individuals assigned to the Safety Review Group were on site May 21, 1980, before initiation of core loa In addition, a document entitled,
"Organization and Responsibilities, On-Site Safety Review Group Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 2
, dated May 12, 1980, was reviewe The group's responsibilities conform with the requirements of the license. The group reports off-site to the General Manager-Licensing and Environmen.C.{5lg. Operating Experience Evaluation and Dissemination. The inspector reviewed procedure EPDN 16.8, Review of Significant Licensee Event Reports*or*operatiri9 Incident'Reports, Revision 0, dated May 13, 1980. This procedure provides for the review and evaluation of significant events at Salem or other facili-ttes and the dissemtnation of this infonnation to the station and to corporate office personnel.
...
..... 2,c,(SI-O~ *snift.Relief*and*Turnover*Procedure. Shift relief and turn-over procedures were verifi'ed in place and in use as required By the license. Effectiveness evaluation is a function of the STA as described in the STA procedures *
..... 2.c. (51t~ *control Room*Actes AP-5, Revisi*on 10, limits the total number of persons in the control room during an emergency to 1 The revised Emergency Plan details communications and authority for persons not in direct command of operations *
2,C,(5lJ~ *oesraded*care*Trairiin~. As detailed in correspondence from Westrnghouse, dated April 29, 1980, preparations have been initiated to provide operating personnel with. degraded core traini_ng as required By tne ltcense conditio,C,(51{!~ *Measures*to*Mitigate*sma11 *sreaR*1:.ocAs. Tnese measures, applicable to both Salem units, were reviewed in NRC Inspection Reper~ 50-311/80-0 *
2.C.l5}.r. Onsi'te*Tetliriical *support*center. Tne onsite TSC is estaolished and operational with required data capabiltty and commuriicati'on.C.(51s~ *onsite*operatibnal *support*center. Tfie onsite osc ts es-tablished as the corridor between tne respective Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room *2,C. (S~u~ *In-Plant *Radiation *MonitOri.ng *... Tfle.. tnspector reviewed pro..
cedures PD-15~12w315~*Fteld"M61ittottri9-~Ilisttoctions, and PD-15.8.036~ *oberati61i*of*tfie*sAM~2/Rb.:.19, These procedures pro-vide a capa ility for determining projected accident levels of radio-iodin *
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2.C.(5lv. Communication Dedicated telephone lines between the NRC Incident Response Center, each control Room, the Technical Support Center, and the Senior Shift Supervisor's Office are installed and maintaine The following license.condi'tions were addressed in Supplement 4 to the Safety Evaluation Report, dated April 18, 1980:
2.C.(5}.k 2.C.(5).1 2.C. (5).m 2.C.(5).n 2.t. (5).o 2.C. (5}.p 2.C.(5.2.E. Ppysical Security Plan, Provisions of this license condition were verified by special inspection 50-311/80-0 Technical Specification 7.1.(1) Emergency Drill. The drill was con-ducted on May 18, 1980. Details are di'scussed in report paragraph Technical Specification 7.1.(2). *Radiation*Protection Organizatio The inspector reviewed correspondence between the licensee and the contractor which indicated that adequate notice of tennination will be provided by contractor supervisors and that overlap considerations have been incorporate Technical Specification 7.1.(3). Switchgear Room Temperature Sensor The inspector verified that temperature instrumentation is provided in the elevation 64' and 84' switchgear rooms and available for read-out at the plant compute Technical Specification 9.4. Radiation Protection Manage The in-spector reviewed a memorandum dated May 14, 1980 which reiterates management policy that the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) ha~
based on his own judgement, direct access to the Station Manager for matters of radiological health and safet The inspector had no further questions relative to license conditions for core loa.
Non-Routine Reports By correspondence dated June 11~ 1979, Westinghouse reported, pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, a problem identified with Barton Lot 1 transmitters used at a number of facilities for measurement of steam generator narrow-range level. The problem is related to potential inaccuracy in the temperature range 250-280° Corrective action recommended included return of an identified group of transmitters to Barton for evaluation and possible modification to demonstrate the required accuracy over the service range. Four transmitters supplied to Salem Unit 2 were identified as being included i'n the suspect grou The inspector verified that the licensee had been notified of the potential problem, that the four specific transmitters in question had been returned to Barton, and acceptaole performance verified prior to reinstallation. All the above activities were completed prior to core loa The inspector had no further questions on this ite By correspondence dated December 21, 1980, the applicant reported a significant deficiency, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e), relating to testing of the eng~neered safety features actuation system. Specifically, the interlock (P-4) function provided by trip breaker p9sition to pennit safety injection reset had not been included in testing procedure Details of this item and corrective measures taken by the licensee for both Salem Units are provided in Inspection Reports 50-311/79-37 and 50-311/80-0 The inspector had no further questions on this ite By correspondence dated February 15, 1980, the applicant reported a significant deficiency, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.SS(e), relating to check valve 2DR This check valve is the last valve in the demineralized water supply to the Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank, and had not been designed to seismic specifications. Failure of the valve would result in draining of the tank in a seismic event. Corrective action included testing of the valve to IEEE-344 (1975) standards, and qualifying the existing valve for seismic desig One additional support for the valve was required to meet this design, and was installed prior to core loa As detailed in the licensee's response dated April 7, 1980 to Inspection Report 50-272/79-33, a review of systems is being conducted to detect similar failures to properly specify piping system component The inspector had no further questions on this ite.
Emergency Drill On May 18, 1980, the licensee conducted a site emergency drill simulating an
- uncontrolled off-site release. The magnitude of the simulated release was considered to have affected the general public. The drill exercised several aspects of a new Emergency Plan which included use of the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operational Support Center (OSC).
The drill identified several weak areas i~cluding recall of designated personnel, command and control of the TSC, off-site dose rate calculations, post-accident personnel access control, and communication The licensee has scheduled training with regard to these weaknesses and will perform another drill prior to criticality of Unit The inspector had no further questions relative to this drill. Corrective actions will be verified by the inspector when observing the pre-criticality emergency exercis.
Operational Event At approximately 1:30 PM on May 27, Salem Unit 2 experienced an inadvertent safety injection while in Mode 6 with the core fully loade System align-ment was such that only the high pressure charging pumps injected water into the RC The injection of RWST water (2000 gpm Boron at 104°F) into the Reactor Coolant System (2000 ppm Boron at 96 F) was tenninated before water level reached the flang The vessel head and upper internals were still removed with water level just above the nozzle *
The cause of the safety injection was related to instrument bus alignment and testing in progress. The 2A Vital Instrument bus was powered by a solatron backup supply which is in turn powered by the 2B Vital 4 KV Bu Additionally, testing of Tave channels had removed the block of high steam flow safety injection nonnally present in cold shutdown. A bus transfer of the 2B Vital 4 KV Bus from #21 to #22 Station Power Transformer resulted in a loss of power sufficiently long to initiate four high steam flow signals and generate the unblocked safety injection signa The inspector identified no regulatory concern relative to this event. It further appears that the event is not reportable under the Unit 2 Technical Specifications due to the operating Mode (Mode 6). The inspector did express his concern over the apparent lack of coordination between various groups of personnel perfonning separate activities in preparation for plant heat u Recognizing this situation, the licensee has placed a knowledgeable management representative in an overall coordinating function through the heat up and initial criticality perio The inspector further noted that lOCFRS0.72 requires prompt reporting (with-in one hour).of any manual or automatic actuation of Engineered Safety Features, which would appear to include this event. The licensee acknow-ledged the reporting requirement and rationalized the failure to make such a report based on the technical insignificance of the event in this operating mod After verifying that operating personnel were aware of the prompt notification requirements of lOCFRS0.72, the inspector had no further questions on this ite.
Core Load Operations On May 23, 1980 at 6:06 PM, Unit 2 entered Mode 6 with insertion of the first fuel assembl Core load was completed on May 27, 1980 at 3:34 AM with inser-tion of the 193rd assembl The resident inspectors verified minimum crew requirements, correct procedures, and use of Inverse Multiplication Plots on a daily basis. Inspection also verified conformance to licensee's commit-ments and compliance.with Mode 6 Technical Specifications requirements applic-able during initial fuel loading. This included a review of test prerequisites and initial conditions. Actual fuel movement was performed by a Westinghouse Refueling tea Supervision was provided by a licensed SRO on the refueling floor during core alterations. The observed performance of the refueling team indicated that each individual was aware of his responsibilitie Two work shifts, ten hours each, satisfied the maximum work time limits. Refueling status boards were used and were properly maintained. A review of the "master" copy indicated that the procedure was technically adequate. Final acceptance of tne procedure is awai:ttng QA audit and Engineering Department approval of tne dat The inspector had no questions relative to fuel load activities observe If
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SITE
~ 12. Strike Contingency Planning l-..
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The licensee's contract with bargaining unit personnel. including control room operators (RO}, utility operators and equipment operators expired on May 1, 1980. Negotiations continued through tne inspection perio No job action occurred or was indicated and negotiations are proceedin The inspector reviewed licensee plans for coping with strikes should the need arise. The following aspects of planning were reviewed; staffing by management personnel for licensed positions and in non-licensed support functions, currency of training, stocking and delivery arrangements for consumable items, medical arrangements, and law enforcement suppor Guard and communications coverage were also reviewe Adequate staffing to operate at least one unit appears to be availaol The inspector had no further questions in this area, 13. Unresolved Items Areas for which more information is required to determine acceptability are considered unresolved. Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs 4 and 6 of this repor.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and find-ings.