IR 05000272/1980020
| ML18085A248 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1980 |
| From: | Hill W, Keimig R, Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18085A243 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-80-20, 50-311-80-16, NUDOCS 8011180814 | |
| Download: ML18085A248 (14) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION I
50-272/80-20 Report No /80-16
50-272 Docket No _____
...;;..;;.. ___ _
License No Licensee:
- DPR-75
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 F aci l i ty Name: __ s_a_l.... em_N.... u..;..c l_e--a_r_G __ e_n_er--a--t_i __
ng""--"S_t_a t_i--o_n_* --* _U_n_i t--s---l_a--n.... d_2 _
Inspection At: __
H_a_nc_o_c_k_s_B_r_i __
dg.._e....,_Ne_w_Je_r_s_e.._y _________ _
L. J. No rholm, Senior Resident Reactor Inspector date
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7/;f, /JI; 1 W. M. Hill, Jr., Res1dent Reactor Inspector Approved by: P~~
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t/tzbo dat~
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R:R:Keiillfg :ef, :Meactor Projects Section No. 1, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Ins~ections on August 1-31, 1980 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/80-20 and 50- 11/80-16)
date Unit 1 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors of plant operations including tours of the facility; log and record reviews; review of licensee events; operational safety verification; IE Bulletins; review of periodic reports; fuel receipt activities; and, followup on previous inspection item The inspections involved 42 inspector-hours by the resident NRC inspector Unit 2 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors of plant startup testing including tours of the facility; operating license conditions; initial criticality; low-power and special test program; IE Bulletins; and, followup on previous inspection items. The inspections involved 79 inspector-hours by the resident NRC inspector Results:
One item of noncompliance was identified (Infraction - Failure to follow procedures, Detail paragraph 4).
8011180
DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted
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J. Gallagher, Assistant Maintenance Engineer S. LaBruna, Maintenance Engineer H. Midura, Manager - Salem Generating Station P. Moeller, Nuclear Licensing Engineer W. Reuther, Site QAD F. Schnarr, Station Operating Engineer R. Silverio, Assistant to the Manager J. Stillman, Station QA Engineer R. Swetnam, Senior Performance Supervisor-HP J. Zupko, Chief Engineer The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspections including management, clerical, main-tenance, operations, performance and quality assurance personne. Status of Previous Inspection Items SITE (Closed) Unresolved Item (272/80-08-02) Update of Reactor Engineering Manual Part 12 to include.cycle 2 data. The inspector confirmed that the Reactor Engineering Manual (Unit 1) now contains para-meters applicable to the cycle 2 cor *
(Closed) Unresolved Item (272/80-13-08)
Complete response to IE Bulletin 80-0 As discussed in report paragraph 5, the' licensee has supplemented the original response to this Bulleti. Shift Logs and Operating Recdrds The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the licensee established requirements in this area in preparation for a review of selected logs and recor~ AP-5, Operating Practices, Revision 10, May Z1, 1980; AP-6, Operational Incidents, Revis.ion 6, February 22, 1979; AP-13, Control of Lifted Leads and Jumpers, Revision 4, February 11, 1980; Operations Directive Manual; and,.
AP~l5, Tagging Rules, Revision 0, April 13, 197 The inspector had no questions in this are.*
b. *Shift logs and operating re~ords were reviewed to verify that:
Control room log sheet entries are filled out and initialled;
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Auxiliary log sheets are filled out and initialled; Log entries involving abnonnal conditions provide sufficient detail to cor1111unicate equipment status, lockout status, correction
. and restoration; Log book reviews are being conducted by the staff; Operating orders do not conflict with Techni ca 1 Speci fi ca ti on requirements; Incident reports detail no violation of Technical Specification LCO or reporting requirement; and, Logs and records were maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications and the procedures in 3.a abov c. The review included the following plant shift logs and operating records as indicated and discussed with licensee personnel:
Log No. 1 - Control Room Daily Log, August 1-31, 1980 Log No. 3 - Control Console Reading Sheet (Mode 1-4), August 1-31, 1980
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L99 N9,: 6..... Prtroar,y Plant Log, August 1-31, 1980
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Log No, 7 ~ Secondary Pl ant Log, August 1... 31, 1980
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Log No~* &.... Unavatlable Equipment Status L.og, August 1-31, 1980
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I'nctdent Reports... Numbers 80-.14Q, 163, 166.. 167, 170-171, 175, 178, 180., 182-185, 187-198, 200-216*, *221, 223-230, 234-237' 240, 242, 244, 246, 247, 249, 251, 253, 256...,257, 259, 262, 264, 267-269 Taggtng Requests.. Al 1 active (SSS fil el
..... Night Orders, August 1-28, 1980 Lifted Lead and Jumper Log~;~ - A 11 active
4 The following observations apply to logs and records reviewed during this reporting pertod:
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During a review of control room 1.ogs for the period August_22...:2s, 1980, the inspector noted that the Control Console Reading Sheet (Log No. 3} was not completed i'n accordance with station procedure Speciftcal ly, whtle the positfon of ECC~ valves was recorded by the operator at least every twelve hours as required by Technical Specification 4.5.2, the additional requtrement listed on the log was not accomplished;* Note 1 J "Ori comtng and off going NCO to
. initial at watch relief or the on duty NCO to verify position at
- least every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. 11 During the period above, no tniti al s in the log were noted. This failure to comply witfl a statton operating procedure contributes to an apparent item of non-compliance (272/80-20-01 and 311/80-16-01 The inspector had no further questions relative to logs reviewed durtng this inspection period, 4. Plant*Tour During the course of the inspections, the inspector made observations*
and conducted multiple tours of plant areas, including the following; (ll Control Room {daily}
(21 Relay Rooms (_31 Auxiliary Building (_4) Vital Switchgear Rooms (51 Turbine Building (6} Yard Areas (_71 Radwaste Buildi.ng (Bl Penetration Areas (_91 Control Point (101 Site Perimeter 011 Fuel Handling Building The following determinations were made:
Monitoring instrumentation: The inspector verified that selected instruments were functional and demonstrated parameters within Technical Specification limit *
- Valve positions. The inspector verified that selected valves were in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications for the applicable plant mod This verification included control board indication and field observation of valve position (Charging/
Safety Injection, Auxiliary Feedwater, and Containment Spray Systems}.
Radiation Controls. The inspector verified by observation that control point procedures and posting requirements were being followe The inspector identified no failures to properly post radiation and high radiation area Plant housekeeping conditions. Observations rel~tive to plant housekeeping identified no unsatisfactory condition Fluid leak No fluid leaks were observed wfiich had not been
- identi.fied by station personnel and for which corrective action had not been initiated, as necessar Piping vibratio No excessive piping vibrations were observed and no adverse conditions were note Selected pipe hangers and seismic restraints were observed and no
- adverse conditions were note *
Equipment tagging. The inspector selected plant components for which valid tagging requests were in effect and verified that the*
tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specifie Control room annunciators. Selected lit annunciators were di'scussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being take By frequent observation through the inspection, the inspector verified that control room manning* requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (k) and the
Technical Specifications were. being me In addition, the inspector*
observed shift turnovers to veri'fy that continuity of system status was maintained. The inspector periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of plant conditions and knowledge of emergency procedure *
Fire protection. The inspector verified that selected fire extinguishers were accessible and inspected on schedule, that fire alarm stations were unobstructed, that cardox systems were operable,~.and that adequate control over _ignition sources and fire hazards was maintaine Release On a sampling basis, the inspector verified that appropriate documentation, sampling, authorization, and monitoring instrumentation, were provided for effluent releases *
Technical Specifications. Through log review and direct observations during tours, the inspector verified compliance with selected Techni-cal Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation. The following parameters were sampled frequently: accumulator levels and pressures, RWST level, BIT temperature, AFST. level, rod insertion limits, con-tainment pressure and temperature, valve power lockouts, axial flux difference. In addition, the inspector conducted periodic visual channel checks of prQtective instrumentation and inspection of elec-
. trical switchboards to confinn availability of safeguards equipment *
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Security, During the course of these inspections, observations relative to protected and vital area security were made, including access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort, and badgin No notable conditions were identifie c. The following acceptance criteria were used for the above items:
Techn1cal Specifications
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Operatings Directives Manual Inspector Judgement The inspector had the following observations relative to tours:
--* * On August 1, 1980, during a tour of the Unit 1 Control Room, the inspector noted that the Refueling Water Storage Tank level was less than the minimum specified by Technical Specification 3. Based on review of logs and discussions with personnel, the condition had persisted for 1 ess than one hou No operator *action recognizing the situation and implementing corrective measures had been take On August 15, 1980, during a tour of the Unit 2 Control Room, the inspector noted that the Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank level was less than that specified in Technical Specification 3.7. Again, no recognition of this situation, nor corrective action to recover level was evident. Based on log reviews it was probable that the low level condition was consistent with time limits specified in the Technical Specification The Operations Directives Manual requires that log entries be made when entering Action Statements of the Technical Specification On August 21, 1980, during a tour of the plant, the inspector identified a tagging request dated March 16, 1978 which called for the installation of "Do Not Operate" tags on valves 13LW16 and 14LW1 Inspection of the valves indicated that the tags were not in place as specified in the request, which was still valid. This finding is contrary to station Administrative Procedure 15 (AP-15).
In aggregate, the above findings, coupled with the finding detailed in paragraph 3 of this report constitute an apparent item of non-
.compliance (272/80-20-01 and 311/80-16-01).
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. 7 IE Bulletin and CircularFollowup a. The IE Bulletins discussed below were reviewed to verify that:
Licensee management forwarded copies of the response to the bulletin to appropriate onsite management* representative Information discussed in the licensee's reply was supported by facility records or. by visual examination of the. facilit Corrective action taken was effected as described in the repl The licensee's reply was prompt and within.the time period des-cribed in the bulleti The review included discussions with licensee personnel and observation and review of items discussed in the details belo By correspondence dated June 6, 1980 and July 29, 1980, the licensee responded to IE Bulletin 80-05, Vacuum Condition Resulting in Damage to Chemical Volume. Control System (eves) Holdup Tank The response is applicable to both units and addresses the eves Holdup Tanks, Pressurizer Relief Tank and Reactor Coolant Drain Tan Vacuum breakers have been installed on CVCS Holdup Tanks in both units. The PRT is protected by a rupture disc*and the RCDT has a low pressure alarm and is designed to withstand full vacuum conditions. The liquid Waste Holdup Tanks are not addressed in the licensee's response. Based on discuss.ions with licensee personnel and. review of drawings, the inspector confinned that these tanks are continuously vented to the Auxiliary Building ventilation syste By correspondence dated June 13, 1980, the licensee responded to IE Bulletin 80-10, Contamination of Nonradioactive System and Potential for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release of Radioactivity to Environmen The response, applicable to both units, states that the requested evaluation has been completed. The inspector reviewed Safety Evaluation SGS/M-SE-057 dated June 6, 1980 and noted that the analysis addressed only non-radfoactive, non-nuclear systems. Specific systems addressed in Item 1 of the_ Bulletin, such as secondary water clean-up, instrument air, and sanitary*waste, are not addressed. Additional system interfaces which could be the source of releases in the opinion of the inspector are also not considered; specifically, component cooling, the auxiliary building drain system and the yard drains. Additionally, Item 2 of the Bulletin, relating to a routine sampling and analysis program to detect contaminating events is not adequately addressed. The licensee stated that a supplemental evaluation will be made to cover the areas requested in the Bulletin. This item is unresolved pending review of the licensee's completion of this analysis (272/80-20-04) *
8 By correspondence dated July 2, 1980, the licensee responded to IE Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Wall Design, for Salem Unit 1. The licensee's *
- response asserts that masonry walls used' in the Auxiliary Building are partition walls and are not used to support seismic category I piping. A detailed analysis of proximity to safety related piping and components will be provided within the 180 days specified in the Bulletin. The inspector conducted a walkthrough of the plant to con-finn the licensee's response. The dividing wall between Units 1 and 2 at elevation 100' is partly masonry block construction. Attached to this wall are three Control Air System piping supports: Unit 1 side - CTtA4-1120, Unit 2 side - CTAA-1005 and CTAA-103 The ~icensee's preliminary evaluation does not appear to have identified these supports nor evaluated the safety significance of their attachment to a masonry wall. The licensee stated that a re-evaluation will be conducted to confinn the statements made in the original Bulletin response. This item is unresolved pending review of a revised analysis by the inspector (272/80-20-03).
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The. inspector had no further questions relative to Bulletins reviewe.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 are reviewed by the inspector *.
This review includes the fol.lowing considerations:
The report includes the infonnation required to be reported by NRC requirements; Test results and/or supporting infonnation are consistent with design predictions and perfonnance specifications; Planned corrective action is adequate for resolution of identified problems; and, Detennination whether any infonnation in the report should be class-ified as an abnormal occurrenc Within the scope of the above, the following periodic reports were reviewed by the inspector:
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Monthly Operating Report - March 1980 through July 198 The above listed r~ports were submitted for Unit 1 only. However, the inspector noted that the July report included a listing of design changes completed on Unit No reports have been submitted for Unit 2 which "
received an operating license in April 1980 *
- The licensee acknowledged the failure to submit monthly operating.reports for Salem Unit 2. It was further noted that initial criticality did not
- occur until the current reporting month, August 198 The licensee stated that the reports were being prepared and will be -
submitted, reflecting the required informatio The inspector had no further questions relative to periodic report. Plant Staff Training On August 21, 1980, the inspector observed a presentation of the annual requalification training provided to licensee employees in the areas of emergency plan, security, and radiation protection for radiation worker The training consists of approximately three hours, including time for short written examinations in each area. The inspector had the following specific comments relative to the training activity observed:
The instructor appeared to be unfamiliar with the plant and the subject matte The presentation of an important part of the emergency plan, accountability stations, was confusin Respiratory protection review was cursory in the opinion of the inspecto Proper use of the Radiation Exposure Permit (REP) was not covered in the presentatio The examinations did not measure the effectiveness of the instructio In some cases, the examination elicited information not covered in the class. In other cases, the presentation provided only the coverage of a subject necessary to answer a given questio Subsequent discussions with licensee pel"sonnel indicated that the above deficiencies had already been identified and steps toward resolution instituted. The inspector stated that this area will be reviewed again to confirm effectiveness of corrective actions for the deficiencies note This item will be followed up during a subsequent inspection (272/80-20-05).
8. Operational Events _ At approximately 12:45 AM on August 20, 1980, it was discovered that between 40,000 and 50,000 gallons of water from the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) had spilled to the yard areas. The RWST was being circulated through a temporary demineralizer to remove chloride The pump discharge hose had separated from the pump, resulting in continued loss of wate When discovered by the control room operators who observed the loss in water level, the leak was secured. Activity samples at the leak site indicated no detectable activit MDA for-Co58 was on the order of 2E-8 uCi/m In compliance with Technical Specifications for an inoperable RWST, plant cooldown from Mode 3 was initiated at 013 Makeup to the RWST was also initiate *
RWST level was restored to within limits* at 8:30 AM and the cooldown secured. The plant was at nonnal operating temperature and pressure at 2:08 P The inspector had no further questions on this even b *. On August 22, 1980, document review and field verification by the licensee confinned that the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV} position limit switches installed in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0578 and the requirements for Near Tenn Operating Licenses (NTOL) were not seismically and environmentally qualified as
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previously stated in correspondence dated March 28, 1980 and in the Safety Evaluation Report (Supplement 4). Discussions between the licensee and NRR indicated that the situation was consistent with the implementation schedule of NUREG-0578 if the switches were replaced with qualified components after the special low-power test program or the next intervening cooldow On that basis, the unit remained in Mode 3, and the special test program began on August 23, 198 At the conclusion of this inspection period, the unit had been brought to cold shutdown for maintenance. Replacement of the PORV position limit switches prior to plant heatup is an unresolved item (311/80-16-02}.
9. Blocking of*Eccs*valves As a result of a problem at another conmercial reactor, the inspector evaluated the "lockout feature" of several primary system valves. The Technical Specifications require that certain valves supportive of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) be in a.specific required position with power (electrical) removed (locked}. Subsequent to ECCS actuation,
- operation of tflese valves may be require At Salem Units 1 and 2 this locking capability is accomplished in two separate means, Some of the valves have a switch separate from the operating console switch located on a separate pariel tn the control room. This swi*tch has a "lock out" posiUon that precludes inadvertent operation. The remaintng valves have their breaker/controller locked in the uoFF,. positi*on with-further admini"strative controls implemented by a 1*RED - BLOCKrNGu tag attached to the controller. The identified problem referenced above required entry into containment to remove the "lock" and restore operability to the componen This is not the sttuation at Salem. The "lock out" switches are in the control roo The breaker/controller switchboards are located outside con-tainment, tn areas expected to be accessible. *Access to the containment is not required to restore operability to these valve The inspector had no further questions in this area *
UNIT 1 10. Fuel Receipt
- The inspector monitored the delivery of two new fuel shipments from the vendor. The inspection covered initial receipt, inspection of the fuel, removal from the shipping case, and storage in the new fuel storage rack Two areas of concern were identified: (1) The load cut-out for the fuel handling crane and (2) testing of miscellaneous equipment {slings, shackles, cables, etc.) which is used to support fuel directly or indirectly in the shipping cas Relative to the load cut-out on the fuel handling crane, the inspector -
noted that the signature sheet posted on the crane had not been annotated to reflect the performance of the safety cut-out within the last seven days as required by Technical Specification 4.9.7. The supervisor demon-strated that during the performance of the refueling procedure the load cut-out had been checked within the required time fram The check sheet was signed to reflect the date the test had been performed. The inspector had no further questions regarding this ite Relative to load testing of miscellaneous lifting equipment, the inspector discussed previous maintenance checks with the maintenance*supervisor An inservice program providing for Visual inspection of such equipment is in place but no program exists to demonstrate operability by physically l~ad testing on a periodic basis. The inspector observed a sling in use which had some internal fibers which were no longer serviceable. During fuel handling, the sling did not appear to be under excessive strain nor subject to immediate failure. The inspector stated that the licensee should be able.to demonstrate operability (load capacity) and reliability (periodic tests) for all lifting equipment used directly or indirectly to lift fuel. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concern. This is an unresolved item pending.inspector review of an acceptable weight* handling equipment surveillance program (272/80~20-02).
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UNIT 2 1 Low Power Testing a. Salem-Unit 2 Operating License Number DPR-75, issued on April 18, 1980, authorizes core load and testing at low powe The license and accompanying Technical Specifications contain several conditions to be met prior to heat up, criticality, operations beyond zero power testing, and prior to specified dates. The following conditions, listed by license reference were verified:
2.C.(6)a. Short-Term Effort-Analysis and Procedure Modification As previously documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-311/80-03, the licensee has implemented vendor guidelines into emergency operating instructions for both unit As vendor guidelines are modified and NRR conments are received as a result of pro-cedure review and simulator/plant walkthroughs, the procedures are being further modified on a continuing basi..
. 12 2.C,(6}o. *Nsss Vendor Review of Low Power Test Procedure As documented in Westinghouse letters to the licensee dated July
- 8, 1980 and August 1, 1980, Sa 1 em Emergency procedures and the special test program procedures were reviewed by the NSSS vendo In addition, vendor coverage of the special low power test program was provided on-shif *
2,C.(6}c, Low Power Test Program. Staff approval of the low power test pr.ogram was received by amendment to license DPR-75
- on August 22, 198,C,(6}d. Additional Accident Monitoring Instrumentatio By correspondence dated July 8, 1980, tfie licensee described an tnterim method for monitoring high level releases, utilizing a detector located midway between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 vent stack The inspector verified that the instrument was in place, that readout in the Unit 1 control room was available, and that pro-cedures for quantifying the release rate were in plac Supplement 4 to the Safety Evaluation Report dated April 18, 1980, contains several items to oe confirmed prior to issuance of a full power licens !terns reviewed during this inspection period are as follows:.
--**control *Room*oesign*Review*~*tabeling. The inspector verified that all Ontt 2 control board identifying labels, previously attacned oy ma~nets, have been permanently affixed in the correct location DY. means *Of double-backed adhesive tape *.
.... * * CE>ntro 1 * Room *Des iSn * Revi'ew * ~ *Vert i ca 1 *Meter *Fa i 1 ure. In order to ensure operator awareness of the failure mode experienced by panel meters, the licensee, on July 22, 1980~ circulated a memorandum from the Chief Controls Engineer dated April 18, 198 Tne memorandum detatls the fatlure mode expected and provides the approprtate caution for mid-range meter readings. The inspector confirm~d tnat operators were aware of the failure~position for console meter Staff reviews for full-power licensing are continuing. Related to this effort, the inspector reviewed certain aspects of action items detailed in NUREG-0694 and proposed licensee resolution. The following comments apply to the areas reviewed:
III.D.1.1 (NUREG-0578 Section 2.1.6.a} Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containmen The inspector verified that a leakage monitoring and reduction program is in effect at both Salem units. The licensee's implementing procedure, PD-15.1.014, Liquid Radioactive Waste Volume Reduction Program, Revision 1, dated July 9, 1980, outlines a program of daily monitoring for increases in liquid waste volum Noted increases are followed up by investigation and evaluation to identify and reduce sources of liquid waste. Through interviews and review of data, the inspector confirmed that the program is in place and functionin II.B.4 Training for Mitigating Core Damag By correspondence to NRR dated April 1, 1980, the licensee committed to a training program for all operating personnel relating to the use of installed plant systems to control or mitigate an accident in which the core is severely damaged. A subsequent submittal to NRR on August 19, 1980 provides additional detail concerning the training to be provided. The inspector reviewed the training program and records of attendance and examinations give At the conclusion of this inspection period, the program was still in progress. The inspector noted that two areas were not covered; vital instrumentation and radiation monitoring effects under severe core damag The detailed su1TDT1ary of training submitted to NRR on August 19, 1980 reflects these omission The licensee stated that the areas were omitted due to lack of infonnation available at the present time. The inspector also noted that the training provided relative to the use of in-core thermocouples for extended range readings was insufficien No detailed account of instrumentation, test points, nor walk through of procedures to obtain core temperatures. when installed instrumentation is overranged was provided. The licensee's described program indicates that such methods will be included in the trainin This is an unresolved item pending completion of this portion of the training program (311/80~16-03).
II.B.3 Post-Accidents Sampling (NUREG-0578 section 2.1.8.a).
The licensee's interim method for post-accident reactor coolant system sampling is described in correspondence to NRR dated July 8, 1980. The inspector verified that hardware to accomplish sampling under high specific activity conditions was installe Further review revealed that a procedure for conducting the sampling operation had not yet been approved and issued. This is an unresolved item pending review of an appropriate sampling procedure for interim use (311/80-16-40).
The inspector had no further questfons relative to the above review b. Initial criticality of Salem Unit 2 was achieved at 10:49 AM on August 2, 198 Approach to criticality was witnessed by the resident inspector Critical conditions, 165 steps on Control Bank D at 1318 ppm boron con-centration, compared well with predicted conditions, 165 steps at 1282 pp Following criticality, the low power physics test program was initiate On August 22, 1980, license amendment 2 was received, which authorized the performance of a sequence of natural circulation tests, at power levels not to exceed 5%, for demonstration and training. The special test sequence was interrupted due to a cooldown on August 30, 1980 caused by an identified leak at a CROM vent connectio At that time, each natural circulation test had been conducted at least once. All operators had not yet participated in the testing. Licensee plans for resuming the special test program to complete operator training had not been fonnulated at the end of the inspection perio The inspectors observed portions of testing conducted during this period. Observations included the following; correct procedure in use, crew requirements, test prerequisites, plant conditions, cali-brated test equipment, adherence to procedure, coordination, data collection, and data revie The following tests were observed:
SUP 70.9 - Rod Control System Operation SUP 80.2 - Initial Criticality SUP 80.3b - Isothermal Temperature Coefficient Measurement SUP 80.4 - Rod and Boron Worth Measurements SUP 80.3c - Neutron Flux Distribution at Zero Power
- SUP 90.l - Natural Circulation Test SUP 90.2 - Natural Circulation Test With Loss of All Off-Site AC Power SUP 90.3 - Natural Circulation Test With Loss of Pressurizer Heaters SUP 90.4 - Effect of Secondary Side Isolation SUP 90.5 - Natural Circulation at Reduced Pressure SUP 90.7 - Simulated Loss of All Onsite and Offsite AC Power SUP 9Q,l was initially conducted on August 25~ 1980. wttft reactor coolant pumps tripped at 3% rated tflermal power, sta!Jle natural circulation wttff a delta T of approximately 400f between tne fiat and cold legs was establtshe *
The inspectors had no questtons relative to testt:ng ooserved, 12. Unresolved*rtems Areas for which more infonnation ts* required to determi'ne * acceptaDil i'ty are considered unresolved, Unresolved items* are contai'ned* tn Paragrapffs*
5, 8 and_l. * *EXtt*rntervtew At pertodtc tnterva 1 s durtng tne course of tl'tts inspection, meetings* were
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held witfl sentor factltty m.an.agement to dtscuss inspection* scope and ftndtngs,