IR 05000272/1980021
| ML18085A392 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1980 |
| From: | Hill W, Keimig R, Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18085A391 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-80-21, 50-311-80-17, NUDOCS 8012190707 | |
| Download: ML18085A392 (17) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
"-:
REGION I
50-272/80-,21 Report Nos *...__50.._-.... 3.... 1..... 1 /._.8.... 0..... -1.... 7 __
50-272 Docket No License No. DPR-70 DPR-75
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Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza - 15A Newark, New Jersey 07101.
Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 1980 Inspectors:
Inspection Summary:
trJ/L-7 fie date 1"/z.. 71~l)
' da't?e u£g#"
_, *date Inspections on September 1 - October 11, 1980 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/80-21 and 50-311/80-17)
Unit l Areas Insaected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors of plant operations inclu ing tours of the facility; log and record reviews; review of
- licensee events; operational safety verification; IE Bulletins; preparations for refueling; Licensee Event Reports; and, followup on previous inspection item The inspections involved 60 inspector-hours by the resident NRC inspector Unit 2 Areas Inseected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors of plant startup testing including tours of the facility; operating license conditions; Licensee Event Reports; IE Bulletins; and, followup on previous inspection item The inspections involved 50 inspector-hours by the resident NRC inspector Results:
No items of noncompliance were identifie !19010]
DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted J. Driscoll, Chief Engi~eer J. Gallagher, Assistant Maintenance Engineer S. LaBruna, Maintenance Engineer H. Midura, Manager - Salem Generating Station P. Moeller, Nuclear Licensing Engineer W. Reuther, Site QAD
.
F. Schnarr, Station Operating Engineer R. Silverio, Assistant to the Manager J. Stillman, Station ~A Engineer R. Swetnam, Senior Performance Supervisor-HP The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspections including management, clerical, main-tenance, operations, performance and quality assurance personne. Status of Previous Inspection Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (272/78-27-01) Corrective actions to correct deficiencies in administrative controls. In correspondence* dated December 4, 1978, the licensee provided a description of changes to administrative procedures and practices designed to correct th~ items identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-272/78-27. The inspector verified that the actions detailed had been accomplished.
Continuing effectiveness of the administrative controls outlined
- is.. being reviewed as part of the on-going inspection programs in the area of maintenance activities. The inspector had no further questions at this tim (Closed)
Noncompliance (272/79-15-02) Failure to submit reportable occurrence reports within the time frame established by Technical Specifications and Environmental Technical Specification Licensee corrective action included assignment of the reporting function within the operations department and establishment of procedures to assure adequate opportunity for review in the corporate offices. Recent submittals of reportable items have been consistent with regulatory requirement The inspector had no further questions on this ite (Closed) Unresolved Item (272/80-01-02) Significance of non-zero voltage reading in solid state protection system periodic test procedur The inspector reviewed procedure PD-18.1.001, Solid State Pro-tection System - Periodic Test, Revision 6, On-The-Spot change 3, dated February 15, 1980. Ah_additional note has been added, stating,.
11/f normal reading of 25 VAC or less is noise." Instru-mentation and Control personnel stated that this 1nstance is an isolated case of antenna effect. The inspector had no further questions on this item.
(Closed)
(Closed)
(c1ase~>
(Closed)
- (Closed)
(Closed)
(Closed)
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Open Item (272/80-06-07.) Applicability of IE Circular 79-07 to Scott Air breathing apparatus on site. The licensee's subsequent review indicated that the problems associated with the air breathing apparatus identified in the Circular are not applicable to the Scott 4.5 units in place at Sale A periodic inspection program for the units has been established. The
- inspector had no further questions on this ite Unresolved Item (272/80-07-03)
Complete design change to pro-vide penetration area freeze protection. The inspector reviewed documentation and confirmed through personnel interviews that the proposed design change to provide freeze protection through venti.lation modifications had been complete Additionally, *a *
supplement to Licensee Event Report 79-04 dated September 2, 1980 has been submitted, documenting completion of this corrective actio Unresolved Item (272/80-13-02) Submit followup Licensee Event Report 79-57/01, relating to* failed supports. The required up-date (LER 79-57/0lX-1) was submitted on September 4, 1980. Th service failure' of the supports in question is attributed to failure of the poppet in Number 13 Charging Pump (positive dis-*
placement pump) which resulted in excessive loading of the asso-ciated pipin The inspector ha~ no further questions on this ite Follow Item (311/78-44-02)
Reference to Unit 2 Radiation Monitoring System in emergency instruction. The inspector reviewed EP-I-10, Emergency Dose Calculations, Revision 12, dated August 18, 1980. *
Appropriate reference for each unit is made to the respective radiation monitors to obtain data for emergency dose calculation The inspector had no further questions on this ite Follow Item (311/78-44-03)
Operability of radiation monitoring syste As documented in* NRC Inspection Report 311/80-12, oper-ability of the Unit 2 Radiation Monitoring System was confirmed prior to unit initial criticality. The inspector had no further questions on this ite Open Item (311/79-17-04)
The Reactor Engineer was also designated the Startup Engineer for Phase III tests of Unit 2. Appropriate changes were made to approval record, procedure change and on-the-spot startup procedure change cover shee:t Inspector review of completed procedures and changes showed these to be approved and released for.test in conformance to the FSAR and the Salem Start-up Manua Unresolved Item (311/80-16-04)
Procedure for post-accident high coolant activity sampling. The inspector reviewed procedure PD-3,5.071 - Interim Sampling System, Revision 0, dated September 8, 198 The procedure provides sufficient guidance to obtain a coolant sample utilizing the interim shielded sample syste The inspector had no further questi ans on this. i ter *
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- SITE 3. Shi ft Logs and Operating Records a. The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the licensee established requirements in this area in preparation for a review of selected logs and record AP-5,* Operating Practices, Revision 10, May 21, 1980; AP-6, Operational Incidents, Revision 6, February 22, 1979; AP-13, Control of Lifted Leads and Jumpers, Revision 4, February 11, 1980; Operations Directive Manual; and, AP-15, Tagging Rules, Revision 0, April 13, 197 The inspector had no questions in this are b. Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
Control room log sheet entries are filled out and initialled; Auxiliary log sheets are filled out and initialled; Log entries involving abnormal conditions provide sufficient detail to comnunicate equipment status, lockout status, correction and restoration;
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Log book reviews are being conducted by the staff;
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Operating orders do not conflict with Technical Specification requirements; Incident reports detail no violation of Technical Specification LCO or reporting requirement; and, Logs and records were maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications and the procedures in 3.a abov c. The review included the following plant shift logs and operating records as indicated and discussed with licensee personnel:
Log No. 1 - Control Room Daily Log, September 1 - October 11, 1980 Log No. l - Control Console Reading Sheet (Mode 1-4), September 1-20' 1980 Log No. 6 - Primary Plant Log, September 1 - October 11, 1980 Log No. 7 - Secondary Plant Log, September 1 - October 11, 1980
- Log No. 8 - Unavailable Equipment Status Log, September 1 -
October 11, 1980
-- * Incident *Reports - Numbers80-199, 217-220, 222*, 231-233, 238, 239, 241, 243, 245, 250, 254, 255, 258, 263, 265, 266~ 271, 273-279' 280-287, 292-294' 296
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Tagging Requests - All active (SSS file)
Night Orders, August 29 - October 10, 1980 Lifted Lead and Jumper Log - All active The inspector had no questions relative to logs reviewed during this inspection perio.
Pl ant Tour a. During the course of the inspections, the inspector made observations and conducted multiple tours of plant areas, fncluding the following; (1) Control Room (daily)
(2)
Relay Rooms (3) Auxiliary Building ( 4) Vital Switchgear Rooms (5) Turbine Building (6) Yard Areas (7) Radwaste Building (8). Penetration Areas (9) Control Point (10) Site Perimeter (11) Fuel Handling Building (12) Containment* (Unit 2)
6 The following detenninations were made:
Monitoring instrumentation: The inspector verified that selected instruments were functional and demonstrated parameters within Technical Specification limit.*Valve positions. The inspector verified that selected valves were in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications for* the applicable plant mode. This verification included control board indication and field observation of valve position (Charging/
Safety Injection, Auxiliary Feedwater, and Containment Spray Systems).
Radiation Controls. The inspector verified by observation that control point procedures and posting requirements were being followe The inspector identified no failures to properly post radiation and high radiation area Plant housekeeping conditions. Observations relative to plant housekeeping identified no unsatisfactory condition Fluid leak No fluid leaks were observed which had not been identified by station personnel and for which corrective action had not been initiated, as necessar Piping vibratio No excessive piping vibrations were observed and no adverse conditions were note *
Selected pipe hangers and seismic restraints were observed and no:
adverse conditions were note Equipment taggin The inspector selected plant components for which valid tagging requests were in effect and verified that the tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specifie Control room annunciators. Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being take By frequent observation through the inspection, the inspector verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (k) and the
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Technical Specifications were being me In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was* maintained. The inspector periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of plant conditions and knowledge of emergency procedure Fire protection. The inspector verified that. selected fire exting-uishers were accessible and inspected on sche.dule, that fire alarm stations were unobstructed, that cardox systems were operable, and that adequate control over ignition sources and fire hazards was maintaine *
Release On a sampling basis, the inspector verified that appro-.
priate documentation, sampling, authorization, and monitoring instrumentation, were provided for effluent release Technical Specifications. Through log review and direct observations during tours, the fnspector verified compliance with selected Techni-cal Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation. The following parameters were sampled frequently: accumulator levels and pressures, RWST level, BIT temperature, AFST level, rod insertion limits, con-tainment pressure and temperature, valve power lockouts, axial flux difference. In addition, the inspector conducted periodic visual channel checks of protective instrumentation and inspection of elec-trical switchboards to confirm availability of safeguards equipmen Security. During the course of these inspections, observations relative to protected and vital area security were made, including
- access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort, and badgin No notable conditions were identifie c. The following acceptance criteria.were used for the above items:
Technical Specifications
- Opera ti oh. Directives Manual Inspector Judgement The inspector had no questions relative to tours made during this inspectio *
5. Plant Maintenance During the inspection period, the inspector observed various maintenance and problem investigation activities. The inspector reviewed these activ-ities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, including those stated in the Technical Specifications; compliance with the administrative and maintenance procedures; compliance with applicable codes and standards; required QA/QC involvement; proper use of safety tags; proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers; personnel qualifications; radiological con-trols for worker protection; fire protection; retest requirements and determination of reportability as required by Technical Specification The following activities were included during this review:
Unit 2 - Repair of CROM vent connection leak Unit 1 - 18 month Diesel Engine Inspection (lA D/G)
The following comments-* apply to the CROM vent leak~ The magnitude of the *
_ leak was mitigated by the lifting eyebolt which had not been remove Leakage developed when the eyebolt 110 11 ring failed. After plant cooldown*
and depressurization, maintenance personnel were unable to establish the exact position of the vent plug, however, the venting tool engaged the vent plug during insertion. This masked any accurate determination as to the plug's exact position or torqu To resolve the possibility of plug in-stallation with inadequate torque, all eyebolts were removed and their
. respective vent plugs properly torque None were found with inadequate torque.* All eyebolts were reinstalled to provide a multiple barrie Although the exact cause was not determined, the licensee performed appro-priate corrective/preventative maintenanc A Westinghouse design engineer concurred with the licensee maintenance action The inspector had no further questions relative to maintenance observe * IE Bulletin Followup a. The IE Bulleti.n discussed below was reviewed to determine that:
Licensee management forwarded copies of the response to the bulletin to appropriate onsite management representative Information discussed in the licensee.'s reply was supported by facility records or by visual examination of the facilit Corrective action taken was effected as described in the repl The licensee's reply was prompt and within the time period described in the bulleti The reviews included discussions with licensee personnel and observation and review of items discussed in the details belo By correspondence dated May 3, 1979, September 14, 1979, October 11, 1979, and October 18, 1979, the licensee responded to IE Bulletin 79-07, Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety Related Pipin *
Previous review of activities precipitated by this Bulletin are docu-mented in NRC Inspection Reports 50-272/79-27, 79-28, and 79-32.. To verify completion of all required modifications, the inspector confirmed that two design change packages implementing the Bulletin (1 EC 620 and 1 EC 697) had been completed and reviewed by the Station Operations Review Conmittee. These reviews were accomplished in meetings 84-79 and 28-8 *
The inspector had no further questions on this Bulleti '.
- By correspondence -dated July 6, 1979, the licensee responded, for both
.units~ to IE Bulletin 78-12,78-12A, and 78-128, *.Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vesse.l Weld NRC staff review of responses, based on generic information provided by the vendors is continuin No further action on the part of the licensee i.s required at this time *.
- The inspector had no questions on this* ite d *. By correspondence dated August 29, 1980, the licensee responded to I Bulletin 80-15, Possible Loss of Emergency Notification System (ENS)
With Loss of Offsite Power for both units, stating that the ENS system
- had been placed on an emergency lighting inverter. When reviewed by the inspector, it was determined that the HP Network (HPN) had been provided with uninterruptible power but not the EN Emergency power was then established for the ENS and a test conducted to confirm that the power source was in fact fed by an emergency source which would provide continuity of power in the event of loss of off-site powe The inspector had no further questions on this ite By correspondence dated August 29!t 1980, the licensee responded for both units to IE Bulletin 80-19, Failures of Mercury-Wetted Matrix Relays in Reactor Protective Systems of Operating Nuclear Plants Designed by Combustion Engineering. The response states that no mercury-wetted matrix relays are used in the Salem RP The inspector, through interviews with personnel and inspection, identified no such relays in the reactor protection syste The inspector had no further questions on this ite.
Licensee Event Reports (LER 1s) In Office Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector reviewed LERs submitted to the NRC:RI office to verify that details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, and whether the event warranted onsite followu The following LERs were reviewed:
UNIT 1
80-21/03L 80-22/03L
. 80-23/03l Missed Surveillance, Service Water Valve Lineup No. 11 Containment Fan Coil Unit Inoperabl No. 12 Containment Fan Coil Unit Inoperable
'~
e*
e
80-24/03L
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No. 12 Containment Fan Coil Unit Inoperable
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so-25/03L Loss of Containment.Integr1ty 80-26/03L Steam Generator Low Level Trip Setpoint Out **
of Specification 80-27/03L Missed Surveillance - Fire Pump Diesel Inspection
80-28/03L Missed Surveillance - Fire Detectors 80-29/03L
- Loss of Meteorological Instrumentation,.Air Temperatu,re. A * T
80-30/03 Failure of the Fire Detection Instrumentation
80-31/99X Failure of Steam Pressure Transmitters Resulting in a Safety Injection 80-32/03L Containment Air Lock Inoperable
80-33/03L Failure to Perform a Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio 80-34/03L Failure.of Meteorological Instruments 80-35/03L No. 1 Fire Pump Inoperable
80-36/03L Boric Acid Storage Tank Level Below Minimum Required 80-37/03L
. Failure. of Steam Generator Wide Range Level Transmitter 80-38/03L No. 12 Charging Pump Inoperable 80-39/03L No. 12 Fan Coil Unit Failure
80-40/0lT Loss of Site Comnunication
80-41/03L No. 11 Safety lnjectton Pump Inoperable
UNIT 2
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80-0l/03L 80-02/03L 80-04/03L 80-05/03L 80-06/03L 80-07/03L 80-08/03L 80-09/03L 80-10/03L 80~11/03L 80-12/03L 80-13/03L 80-14/93L 80-15/03L 80-16/03L 80-17/03L 80-i8/03L 80-19/03L 80-20/03L 80-21/03L 80-22/03L
Lack of Fire Barrier 28 Diesel Inoperable Two Safety Injection Pumps available when
< 3120F
. Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (POPS) Inoperable No. 21 Residual Heat Removal Pump (RHR)
Improperly Assembled *
No. 21 Containment Fan Coil Unit Inoperable Containment Air Locks Inoperable Steam Generator Flow and Pressure Instruments Inoperable Pressurizer Pressure Channel Failures Vital Bus Undervoltage Relay Out of Speci-fication Failure of Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Containment Spray System Inoperable Reactor Coolant Pumps Out of Service for Greater than one Hour Pressurizer Pressure Channel III Inoperable Safety Valve Improperly Set Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank (AFWST)
<: 200,000 Gallon~
Auxiliary Alann.Typewriter Inoperable Inadvertent Equipment Starting of 2C SEC *
Pressurizer Pressure Channel III Inoperable Containment Air Lock Elevation 100' Inoperable 2A Diesel Generator Inoperable
80-23/03L 80-24/03L
80-25/0l /03L
80-27/03L
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80-28/03L
Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Inoperabl Rod Position Indication Inoperable Inoperable Power Operated Relief Valves Limit Switches Missed *survei 11 ance - Source Range Nl Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank (AFWST)
< 200~000 Gallons Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST}~ 364,500 Gallons* Onsite *Licensee Event Followup For those LERs selected for onsite followup (denoted by asterisks in detail paragraph a}, the inspector verified that reporting requirements of Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.16 had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event was reviewed by the licensee as required by AP-4, 6, and 7, and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specification limits. The following findings relate to the
- LERs reviewed on site:
UNIT 1 80-2l/03L and 80-28/03L 80.;.25/03L
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80-30/03L Corrective action for these events included the provision of an outstanding surveillance listing to the Shift Supervisor. The inspector confinned that this action is taken on a continuing basis to preclude missed sur-veillance testin The inspector verified the interim actions taken at the time of the occurrence. Additionally, Design Change Request 1EC973 has been issued to provide pennanent correction during the current outag Review of corrective action identified that other test equipment is not available to prevent damage to these detectors. Action to prevent recurrence has not been taken as described in the Licensee Event Report. This is an unresolved item pending development and implemen-tation of an appropriate mechanism for periodic testing of heat detectors in the battery rooms and submission of a supplemental.report describing that action (272/80-21-01).
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. 80-31/99X This event is discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-272/80-13. The licensee is evaluating the lightning-in.duced failure of protective instrumentation to deter-mine whether more effective lightning protection or grounding schemes may be employe The evaluation and subsequent implementation will be reviewed when completed (272/80-21-02).
80-33/03L The inspector confirmed that corrective action included implementation of an operator's checklist to ensure completion of routines dictated by the Operations Directives Manua Continuing use of the checklist has been observe *
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80-36/03L The inspector confirmed that operating Instruction OI-II-3.3.5, Boric Acid Solution Preparation and Transfer~
Revision 4, dated August 3, 1978, has been modified by * *
On-The-Spot change P-9, dated Apri 1 8, 1980, to require verification that the remaining Boric Acid Storage Tank con.tains the required amount of solution prior to.isola-tion of a tank. The same change has been made in the Unit 2 procedure. *
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80-40/0lT This event is discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-272/80-16. Investigation of the circumstances sur-rounding the loss of ENS communications is continuin and will be included in a supplemental report. This item is unresolv.ed pending receipt of that supplement (272/80-21-03).
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80-41/03L As a result of this cooler failure, the licensee stated in the Licensee Event Report that all service water coolers would be teste Review on site indicated an intent to test only coolers of similar typ In a follow-up report dated October 1, 1980 (LER 80-41/03Xl)
the licensee clarified the intended test program to include only Safety Injection and Centrifugal Charging Pump The inspector had no further question UNIT 2 80-04/03L This occurrence is addressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-311/80~09. Corrective action will be evaluated in follow up of the related item of noncomplianc /03L This report states that discussions of air lock operation*
will be restored to the annual station requalification program. This will be confirmed during a subsequent inspection of the training program (311/80-17-01).
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- 80-09/03L The inspector confirmed that Operating Instruction OI-.3.2, Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby, Revision 2, had been modified.. by permanent On-The-Spot change P-14, dated July 30, 1980, to require completion of the Main Steam System valve lineup, precluding* recurrence of this ite /03L Thfa item is reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 50-311/
- 80-12, Corrective measur~s will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection *.
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80-13/03L Corrective action for this event will be reviewed in followup on the related.item of noncompliance identified in NRC Inspection Report 50.. 311/80-1 *
8Q.. l6/03L This event is reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 50-311/
80-11,
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80-19/03L The licensee has implemented an evaluation program to determine the cause of spurious SEC signals.* Conclusions*
and corrective action wi 11 be reviewed upon completion of the program and receipt of a supplemental report. This i'tem is unresolved {50-311/80-17-02).
80-25/0lT The inspector confirmed that Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV} limit switches have been replaced with NAMCO model EA 180-11302 switche /03L The referenced guidance to operators was issued by
. memorandum dated September 15, 1980. Effectiveness will be evaluated as part of the continuing inspection progra /03L This event is reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 50-311/
80-1.
The inspector had no further questions relative to event reports reviewe. Qualifications*of*shift.Tethnital *Advisors On or about August 1, 1980, the licensee stated an intent to replace Shift Technical Advisors with contracted personnel who did not meet the training and experience requirements of ANS 3,1 (draft}, The qualifications of the proposed individuals were reviewed by the inspectors and found to lack college degrees in some cases and site experience in*all case By correspondence fran NRC:Region I dated August 5, 1980, an understanding with the licensee was confirmed, to the effect that any replacements for Shift Technical Advisors (STAsJ would not be less experienced than the ANS 3.1 guidelines unless prior approval of NRC was obtained. Accordingly, the licensee~s plans for replacement were* not implemented at that time *
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.
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By correspondence dated September 10, 1980, the licensee proposed to NRR a group of replacement STAs who met the education requirements of the
. standard but not the site experience. The NRC response, dated September..
- 24, 1980, approved the use of contracted personnel until the end of calendar 1980, as an interim measur *
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Interim contracted STAs were p.laced on shift following receipt of NRR approva *
The inspector had no further questions on this ite UNIT 1 9. Preparation For Refueling Salem Unit 1 shutdown for the second refueling *outage on September 19, 198 The inspector conftnned that appropriate schedules had been prepared as well as adequate procedures for fuel handling and vessel component removal and reassembl The inspector also reviewed the preliminary Westinghouse draft of the re-fueling procedure. The procedure provides operating procedures, selected individual responsibilities for shift personnel and functiona*l area respon-sibilities as well as detailed instructions for operation of refueling equipmen The procedure details a step by step format for moving the
.
fuel assemblies, which provides adequate control to ensure that the assemblies and inserts are properly positioned in the core during refueling. A signature certification at* the completion of the procedure, specifies a satisfactory review by comparison of the video tapes with the cor.e 1 oad map, Westinghouse will also perfonn a surveillance program of,selected-.
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fuel assemblies. Video tapes of selected fuel assemblies are recorded by a camera scan. A detailed study of video tapes is perfonned to monitor the condition of the fuel assemblies, which are selected to provide a represen-tative cross section of the core. The same assemblies are evaluated after each cycle to monitor fuel assembly condition and clad integrit The inspector had no further questions relative to refueling preparation UNIT 2 10. Verification of Full Power License Items a. Salem Unit 2 Operating License Number DPR-75, issued on April 18, 1980, authorizes core load and testing at low powe The license and accom-panying Technical Specifications contain several conditions to be met prior to heat up, criticality, operations beyond zero power testing, and prior to specified dates. The following conditions, listed by license reference were verified:
- Technical Specification 7.4(1). The inspector reviewed the Recovery Management Plan and the implementing procedures which detail the responsibilities of the various support managers. The plan and procedures.were in place on August 1, 1980 and are being revised
- as neede In addition, the Engineering and Construction Department Emergency Response Procedures were reviewed and a tour of the Corporate Headquarters Emergency Response Center in the new location at 80 Park Plaza, Newark, was conducted. The inspector had no questions relative to the established accident mitigation and re-covery procedure Technical Specification 7.4(2). The inspector reviewed training conducted for*corporate staff involved in operation of nuclear power plants *.In the Electric Production Department, primary training consists of continuing day-to-day awareness of plant activities and governing requirements. * Relative to emergency response, implementing procedures, referenced above, are reviewed by the cognizant manage The Engineering and Construction Department has conducted initial training of personnel who would be called upon in an emergency relative
. to their anticipated roles in such a respons Both departments ar included in a system of disseminating operating experience infonnatio The inspector noted that no fonnal system to ensure dissemination and distribution of relevant Salem Licensee Event Reports has been developed. Discussions with personnel at the corporate offices con-finned that such infonnation is made available to cognizant engineers and managers. Fonnalizing the practices which already exist in this regard is an open item (311/80-17-03). *
The inspector stated his position that adequate training and demon-stration of the corporate recovery plan should include an instruc-tional drill or walk-through of the plan. The licensee stated that such a drill is planned and will be conducted prior to the full emergency exercise to be conducted during the Fall of 1~80. This item will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (311/80-17-04).
Suppl~ment 4 to the Safety Evaluat~on Report dated April 18, 1980, contains several items to be confinned prior to issuance of a full power license~ Items reviewed during this inspection period are as follows:
Section IV, Item 1, Control Room Design Review, Emergency Procedure The inspector confinned that all emergency procedures had been retyped in acceptably large type to reduce the probability of reading error Additionally, referencing to other procedures had been reduced to the maximum extent practicabl Section IV, Item 1, Control Room Design Review, Lamp Test. The inspector confinned that a control board position has been provided to enable operators to test bezel lamps to verify operabilit The inspector had no further questions relative to the above review *
. 17 Areas for which more information is required to determine acceptability are considered unresolved. Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs 7 and 10 of this repor. *Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings *