IR 05000272/1980013
| ML18082B263 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 07/18/1980 |
| From: | Hill W, Keimig R, Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18082B258 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-80-13, 50-311-80-09, 50-311-80-9, NUDOCS 8010010631 | |
| Download: ML18082B263 (17) | |
Text
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION I
50-272/80-13
- Report No /80-09
~--=-50---2~72......_~--=---=-~
Docket No DP R - 70 License No DPR-75
Licensee: ________ P_ub_l_i_c_S_e_r_v_i _ce ___ E_l_ec_t_r_i_c_a_n_d ___
Ga_s ___ C_om_.p._a_n..... Y __________ _
80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 eactor Inspector Approved by: __ _..._.,~-------------------------------------------------
r R. imig, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 1, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspections on June 1-30,'1980 (Combined Report Numbers 50~272/80-13 and 50-311/80-09)
8' 0 Unit 1 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors of plant operations including tours of the facility; log and record reviews; review of licensee events; operational safety verification; organization and administration; on-site review committee; IE Bulletins and Circulars; and, followup on previous inspection item The inspections involved 71 inspector-hours by the resident NRC inspector Unit 2 Areas Inseected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors of plant startup testing including tours of the facility; operating license conditions; pre-critical testing; IE Bulletins and Circulars; organization and administration; on-site review committee; and, followup on previous inspection item The in-spections involved 72 inspector-hours by the resident NRC inspector Results:
No.items of noncompliance were identified relative to Unit One item of noncompliance was identified relative to Unit *
DETAILS Persons Contacted J. Gallagher, Assistant Maintenance Engineer S. LaBruna, Maintenance Engineer
.
H. Midura, Manager - Salem Generating Station P. Moeller, Nuclear licensing Engineer W. Reuther, Site QAD F. Schnarr, Station Operating Engineer R. Silverio, Assistant to the Manager J. Stillman, Station QA Engineer R. Swetnam, Senior Performance Supervisor-HP J. Zupko, Chief Engineer The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspections including management, clerical, main-tenance, operations, perfonnance and quality assurance personne r Status of Previous Inspection Items (Closed)
Unresolved Item (311/79-29-02).
Stage all necessary equipment for cooldown outside control roo The inspector verified that equipment cabinets with the required procedures, jumpers, hand senders, and communications head-sets were placed in the locations required to accomplish cooldown, and that the necessary equipment had been placed in eac (Closed)
Unresolved Item (311/79-29-03).
Complete modification to place wide range temperature and pressure indications in the hot shutdown pane The inspector verified that the design change had been accomplished and the instrumentation calibrated to provide the necessary indications for cooldown outside the control roo (Closed)
Noncompliance (311/79-34-01).
Failure to conduct monthly inspections of portable fire extinguishers. Through continuing review, the inspector verified that corrective action to ensur~ monthly inspection appears to have been effective*. With. issuance of the operating 1 i cense, responsi bi 1 i ty for these inspections shifted from construction to the operating department and all Unit 2 fire protection surveillance is now included in the station progra Frequent sampling has identified no recurrenc (Closed}
Unresolved Item (311/79-37~05). Replace and test orifice to prevent RHR pump runout condition The inspector reviewed the test conducted on Unit 2 to detennine appropriate orifice size and verified that a 5.5 11 diameter orifice has been placed in the line. The inspector had no further questions on thiS ite (Closed)
Follow Items (311/80-04-01, 02, 03, 04).,
These items are addressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-311/80-07. Specifically, they involve the fa 11 owing areas; On-site independent review group, establishment of on-site Technical Support C~nter and Operational Support Center, and systematic evaluation and dissemination of operating experienc All were verified in place prior to core loa *
SITE
(Closed) Unresolved Items (272/78-31-01, 272/78-31-02, 311/79-19-01).
Possible sensitization of safety injection piping due to post,weld heat treatment. The licensee conducted metallographic examination and corrosion testing on a sample of the subject piping. Results of testing were reviewed by the NRC:IE Division of Reactor Construction Inspection and found acceptable based on low susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking, demonstrated slight material sensitization, and lack of failure history in 3/4 11 diameter vent and drain lines installed on pump casings. These items are resolved as acceptabl (Open) Unresolved Item (272/79-27-02).
Corrective action to ensure shift cognizance of Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation. This item was identified when continued operation under the limits of an Action Statement relative to CARDOX system level was not recognized by operators in a timely manne The identified item of noncompliance in this report appears'
to confinn that corrective actions to ensure shift cognizance of Technical Specification Limits have not been effective. This is further amplified by the following observations during this inspection period: maintenance on an intermediate range neutron detector with the concurrence of the shift operators but without a current authorization signature on June 10, 1980: maintenance on the CARDOX master valve relay which retained system operability but without direct knowledge of the shift operators on June 18, 1980:
SSPS train 11A
trouble alann due to loss of one redundant power supply on June 19, 1980 with operators unable to explain the alar The inspector expressed his continuing concern relative to operator awareness and responsiveness to potentially limiting conditions governed by Technical Specification. Shift logs and Operating Records The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to detennine the licensee established requirements in this area in preparation for a review of selected logs and record AP-5, Operating Practices, Revision 9, April 23, 1979; AP-6, Operational Incidents, Revision 6, February 22, 1979; AP-13, Control of Lifted Leads and Jumpers, Revision 4, February 11, 1980; Operations Directive Manual; and, AP-15, Tagging Rules, Revision 0, April 13, 197 The inspector had no questions in this are Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
Control room log sheet entries are filled out and initialled; Auxiliary log sheets are filled out and initialled; Log entries involving abnonnal conditions provide sufficient detail to communicate equipment status, lockout status, correction and restoration; Log book reviews are being conducted by the staff;
Operating orders do not conflict with Technical Specification requirements; Incident reports detail no violation of Technical Specification LCO or reporting requirement; and, Logs and records were maintained in accordance with Technical Speci-fications and the procedures in 3.a abov * The review included the following plant shift logs and operating records as indicated and discussed wfth licensee personnel:
--. Log No. 1 - Control Room Daily Log, May 30 - June 29, 1980 Log No. 2 - Control Console Reading Sheet (Mode 5. & 6), May 30 -
June 29, 1980 Log No. 3 - Control Console Reading Sheet (Mode 1-4), May 30 -
June 29, 1980 Log No. 6 - Primary Plant Log, May 30 - June 29, 1980 Log No. 7 - Secondary Plant Log, May 30 - June 29, 1980 Log No. 8 - Unavailable Equipment Status Log, May 30 - June 29, 1980 Incident Reports - Numbers80-129, 132-134, 138, 141-153, 156, 160, 162, 168 Tagging Requests - All active (SSS file)
Night Orders, May 27 - June 27, 1980 Lifted Lead and Jumper Log - All active The following observations apply to logs and records reviewed during this reporting period:
During a review of operating logs for June 7, 1980, the inspector noted that both # 21 and # 22 Safety Injection Pumps had been operated simultaneousl Concurrent operability of both safety injection pumps is prohibited by Technical Specification 3.5.3 when the plant (Unit 2)
RCS temperature is less than 312°F. This event constitutes apparent noncompliance with the Technical Specifications (311/80-09-01).
5 Pl ant Tour During the course of the inspections, the inspector made observations and conducted multiple tours of plant areas, including the following; (l} Control Room (daily}
(2) Relay Rooms (3) Auxiliary Building (4) _ Vital Switchgear Rooms (5) Turbine Building (6) Yard Areas (7) Radwaste Building (8) Penetration Areas (9) Control Point (10) Site Perimeter The following determinations were made:
Monitoring instrumentation: The inspector verified that selected instruments were functional and demonstrated parameters within Technical Specification limit Valve positions. The inspector verified that selected valves were in the position or condition required oy Technical Specifica-
- ti.on$ for tne ap~ltcable plant mode, Tfi1's veriftcation included
.central board tndicatton and fteld observatton of valve position
__ (Safety Injectton and Auxi 1 i ary Feedwater System ""~ -Radtatton Contra 1 s. The tnspecto.r verif1'ed By observation that
- control poi_nt procedures and posting requtrements were being followed, The inspector identified no failures to properly post radtatton and high.radiation areas, Plant housekeeping conditions. Observations relative to plant housekeeping identified no unsatisfactory condi'tion Fluid leak No fluid leaks were observed which had not been tdenttfied by station personnel and for whicfi corrective action liad not been initiated, as necessar Piping vibratio No excessive piping vibrations were observed and no adverse conditions were noted,
- Selected pipe hangers and seismic restraints were observed and no adverse conditions were noted *.
Equipment tagging. The inspector selected plant components for which valid tagging requests were in effect and verified that the tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specifie Control room annunciator Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being take By frequent observation through the ihspectton, the inspector verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (kl and the Technical Specifications were Being me In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintaine The inspector periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of plant conditions and knowledge of emergency procedure Fire protectio The inspector verified that selected fire ex-tinguishers were accessible and inspected on schedule, that fire alarm stations were unobstructed, that cardox systems were operable, and that adequate control over ignition sources and fire hazards was maintaine *
Release On a sampling basis, the inspector verified that appro-priate doGumentation, sampling, authorization, and monitoring instrumentation, were provided for effluent release Technical Specifications. Through log review and direct observations during tours, the inspector verified compliance with selected Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operatio The following para-meters were sampled frequently: accumulator levels and pressures, RWST level, BIT temperature, AFST level, rod insertion limits, contain-ment pressure and temperature, v~lve power lockouts, axial flux differenc In addition, the inspector conducted periodic visual channel checks of protective instrumentation and inspection of electrical switchboards to confirm availability of safeguards equipmen Securit During the course of these inspections, observations relative to protected and vital area security were made, -including access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort, and Badgin No notable conditions were identifie Surveillance, The tnspector co.served portton$** of tfie fol lowtng sur-::
veillance tests tn pr_ogress; SSPS trC\\tn \\'N' functional.Test~ Sa:fe Injection Pumps,
- Matntenance, The inspector ooserved portions of maintenance activity on tf1e following components to verify compliance with procedure and administrative controls; Neutron detector cftannel N36, lASEC, SSPS train 11A 11 power suppl In addition, outstanding work orders were reviewe c.*, Tne fol lowing acceptance criterta were used for the above items:
Technical Spectftcati'ons Operatings Directives Manual Inspector Judgement Except as noted in Detail Paragrapf'i 2, tne inspector had no questions relattve to ooservattons made durtng plant tour s. IE Bulletin*and'Circular*Followup The IE Bulleti'ns and Circulars dtscussed Below were reviewed to verify tnat:
. Licensee management forwarded copies of tne response to the bulletin to appropriate onsite management representattve Infonnatton discussed in tfte li'censee*s reply was supported by facility records or By visual exami'nation of the facilit Corrective action taken was effected as described in the repl Tlie ltcensee~s reply was prompt and wtthin tne time period described i'n the ou 11 eti'n, The reviews tncluded discussions wttf'i licensee personnel and observation and review of ttems discussed in tne qetails Belo By correspondence.dated April-2, 1980, tne ltcensee responded to IE Bull et in 79.-18 ~ * AudiBtl itY * Prool ems* on* Evacuation* of* Person rte l *From* Hi h
- *Notse*Area Based on the survey conducted, tne licensee has concludea tfiat a 1 ann ltgnts wtll Be necessary in some nign noise areas and that additional speakers and "hear-here" Bootns will be installed. The
. schedule for completion is SeptemBer 30, 1980 for.accessible areas and Novemoer 30, 1980 for inaccesstBle areas. Effectiveness of corrective actions wtll Be verified when tne proposed modifications are complete (_272/80-13-07 By correspondence dated October 23,. 1979, -the.. licensee. responded to IE Bull ettn 79-23 ~ *Paten ti al *Fa i 1 ure *of* Emergency* Dtese l *Generator* Field
- *Exciter* Transformer Tfte endurance runs described oy the 1 i censee were oBserved By the inspector. The licensee furtfter states that the grounding scneme used on the Salem diesel generators is such that circulating currents are adequately limited to prevent the type of potential failure described in the Bulleti.
8 By correspondence dated December 21, 1979, the licensee responded to IE Bulletin 79-25, Failures of Westinghouse BFD Relays in Safety-Related System As stated by the licensee in this response, and as previoUSTY'"'""
verified by NRC inspection, all BFD relays installed in the Salem Units were replaced following receipt of IE Circular 76-0 By correspondence dated June 6, 1980, the licensee responded to IE Bulletin 80-05, Vacuum Condition Resultin in Dama e to Chemical Volume Control System CVCS Ho dup Tank The situations descr1 ed 1n t e Bu et1n include damage to CVCS Holdup Tanks at Salem Unit 1. The licensee details the installation of vacuum breakers. These were verified in place for both units by the inspector. The response, however, does not include a listing of other systems reviewed nor any corrective action required for those systems. This is unresolved pending receipt of an amplifying response to the Bulletin (272/80-13-08).
The licensee stated that a complete response wi 11 be submitted by July 25, 198 By correspondence dated June 10, 1980, the licensee responded to IE Bulletin 80-09, Hydramotor Actuator Deficiencies. The licensee stated that no Hydramotor actuators were installed at Salem, nor were any held in spares. This included a verification with.original equipment manufac-turers. The inspector identified no Hydramotor actuators in a selected review of installed valve actuator The inspector had no further questions on these Bulletin g.. IE Circular discussed below was reviewed to verify that it had been re-viewed for applicability by cognizant management, and appropriate action initiate The review included discussions with licensee personnel and observation and review of items discussed in the details belo IE Circular 80-05, Emergency Diesel Generator Lubricating.Oil Addition and On Site Supply, details several potential problems dealing with on-line addition of lubricating oil and disc~sses the need for adequate supplies of lubricating oil as well as fuel oil to support diesel generator extended operatio The licensee Safety Review Group conducted a detailed review of the issues in this circular and made several recommendations relative to training, procedure, oil inventory, and identification of oil fill line The licensee stated that the recommendations will be incorporate The inspector had no further questions on this Circula Organization and Administration The inspector verified that station organizational changes within the past year, since the previous inspection of this area, were consistent with Technical Specification requirements and had been reported, as requi~ed, to NR Qualifications and responsibilities of newly appointed staff were also reviewed.
The following changes to station organization were identified, and were reported to NRC as they occurred;
-~ The position of Senior Perfonnance Supervisor-HP and Chemistry was split into two positions, each with respective responsibilities in Health Physics and Chemistr The incumbent became the Chemistry Supervisor and a new individual was appointed as HP Superviso Qualifications in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.8 were verifie The station Training Engineer reports to the corporate Manager of Methods instead of the Station Manager. *A senior management repre-sentative, and licensed Senior Reactor Operator, retains the function of Curriculum Coordinator to ensure tr.aining responsiveness to licensed operator requirement The above changes were identified to NRR by a request for license amendment to modify Technical Specification Figures 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. Amendment 25 to license DPR-70 was issued on April 22, 1980 reflecting the above change The inspector noted that the Maintenance Engineer, who is qualified in accordance with ANSI 18.1-1971, has been off-site at the training center for several months while undergoing license trainin An Assistant Main-tenance Engineer has been appointed who meets the requirements of the standard with the exception of one year of nuclear related experience. The intent of section 3.1 of the standard, relative to personnel temporarily filling the position, appears to have been met in that the Assistant Maintenance Engineer has not been appointed to SORC, has been circumspect in approving actions related to safety related equipment, and maintains frequent contact with the position principa The inspector had no further questions relative to station organization at this tim.
Station Operations Review Committee Through continual observation during the past year, and specific evaluation during this inspection period, the inspector.reviewed the activities of the Station Operations Review Corranittee (SORC}.
The following were.included in tflis review:
Administrative Procedure AP-4, Station*operations *Review*con1Jilittee, Revision 6, dated December 12, 1979 Minutes of Meetings 75-79 (October 1, 1979) through 96-79 (December 28, 1979)
--
Minutes of Meetings 01-80 (January 3, 1980) through 26-80 (April 11, 1980)
Toe inspector reviewed the charter CAP-41 and commtttee memoership to verify compl i'ance witff Techrikal Specifications,.
Quorum re.qui'rements* and meetfog frequency for meetings reviewed were conststent witff Technical Specification requi'rement Personnel with the requtred experti*se were. present at meetings as dictated by material presented for review. A sample of proposed Techrii*cal Spectficatiori-cnanges, noncompliance ttems, audit ftndi.ngs and faci'l tty dfa_nges under 10CFR50. 59 were se 1 ected to veri'fy rev1~ew By tfte Corrani tte *
. 1 In addition to the aoove., tne i'nspector attended a meettng of the Committee as documented in NRC Inspection Report S0..-272/80:... J One unresolved item related to quorum requirements* and appotntment,of alternates was identi.fied in that repor The inspector fiad no questions relative to ttems* revtewed By tfie Committe Relative to AP-4, tfie tnspector noted tnat tfie procedure authorizes a
- meeting with only three memoers convened and tfie balance of the quorum in contact oy telepnone, Tfiis provision i*s specified for unscheduled meetings onl No tnstance of sucfi a meeting fiaving oeen field was identifie The inspector stated nis positton tnat a valfd quorum requtred physical presence to conduct oustness*.
Tfie Committee cnairman stated tfiat the matter will be addressed in a revision to AP..... Thts item *ts unresolved pending furtfier revtew oy the inspector and modiftcatton of the procedure (272/80.-.13..-0 *UNIT 1 8. * * Operattona l *Events At 8:44 M1 on June 8, 1980, coincident witfi an ooserved li'ghtning strike to tfie containment, a reactor tr'fp and safety injection occurre The plant was operating at 100% powe First out indication identified steam 1i'ne differential pressure as tne init1"ating signa Suosequent investtgation found that # 12 Steam Generator Pressure Cnannel III had failed low* and tile # 14 Steam Generator Pressure Cnannel I had failed nJg These two simultaneous failures will inittate safety injection fogt Safety injection was tenninated after approximately four minute Tfie lowest pressure reacfied-was *2050 psi and adequate suocooling was matntained during tne even Tfie plant remained in Mode 3 to resolve two pro51ems* co-served during tfie safety injection:
one MSIV did not close witntn five seconds as required, and # 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (s*team drivenl speed instaoili'ty wfttcn resulted in a governor overspeed trtp after approximately four minut~ *
Resolution of the above problems and tfte discovery of a service water leaf<. on No, 11 Containment Fan Coil Unit delayed startup to June 10, 19130, The plant was critical at 11:24 PM on June 10 and synchronized to tne. grid at 5: 25 AM on June 11, 1980, Tlie unit trtpped from* 80% reactor power at 7: 06 PM on June 12, 198 The trip was* caused By a tecfiritcian '*s error while conducting power range nuclear instrument functional check A test.signal was placed tn N43 as intended, however, N44 otstaBles nad been tripped in erro Tfie resulting two..-cfiannel trip initiated reactor trip, Tfle plant was ag~tri critical at 8:54 PM and syncfiroriized to tile grid at 11:51 PM *
- 11 At 3:06 PM on June 13, 1980, the plant again tripped from 70% power due to steam generator low level caused by main feedwater pump instabilit Prior to the trip, troubleshooting of the lA Safeguard's Equipment Cabinet (SEC), had been in progress and had resulted in loss of the lA Vital 4 KV bus at 2:35 PM and 3:04 PM *. The trip occurred on reenerg5zin_g __ -*
the bus at 3:06 P Main feedwater control systems--were powered from th~- !lt_
Vital Bus due to a prior failure of the Essential Controls -rnverter. --
Operability of the lA SEC was restored by replacement of several circuit boards in the sequence The plant was critical at 10:43 PM and synchro-nized at 1:52 AM on June 14, 198 At 2:42 AM on June 14, 1980, another plant trip was experienced due to loss of# 12 Steam Generator Feed Pump, possibly due to low suction pressure, with resulting low levels.* The plant was critical at 4:50 AM and synchronized at 6:13 AM on June 14, 1980. The plant was at 100%:,*
power at 2:20 AM on June 15, 198 *
d. Auxiliary Building elevation 84 1 was evacuated as a precautionary measure between 1:34 PM and 1:53 PM on June 16, 1980 due to increased activity measured by a continuous air monito Samples indicated activity levels to 2E-8 uci/cc, later confirmed to be short live When activity was determined to be less than MPC for isotopes present, access to the Building was restore The emergency plan was not implemente Shortly thereafter, levels returned to normal (ro' E-11).
The source was not confirmed but is believed.to be related to continuing problems with draining of liquid
_
waste header The point of apparent blockage is under investigation using radiograph At the conclusion of this inspection period, plans were
- underway to clear a section of drain piping which appears to be the cause of the proble *
The inspector had no further questions relative to the above events at this tim.
Licensee Event Reports (LER's) In Office Review.of Licensee Event Reports The inspector reviewed LERs submitted to the NRC:RI office to verify that details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, and whether the event warranted onsite followu The following LERs were reviewed:
78-74/990 Loss of 1B Vital Instrument Bus and Resulting Safety
. Injection 78-76/03L Inoperable Meteorolgical Tower Instrumentation
78-82/03L Plant Vent Flow Recorder Inoperable
79-48/0lT Degradation of Steam Generator Tubes 79-53/0lT Pipe Support Stress Calculations 79-57/0lT Failed Seismic I Systems.Pipe Hangers 79-72/03L Loss of Meteorological Instruments 80-0l/03L Exceeding Axial Flux Difference Target Band
..,.,. * "8Q.,.Q2/CI3L Fatl ure to Perfonn a Fun ct tonal Test of tlie Power Range Neutron flux Low Trtp Setpotnt Wfien Greater than 25%
Reactor Power
....,.. * 8Q.,..Q3/03L Fatlure of Air Parttcul ate Detector
"""'. 8Q..,.;Q4/03L Boron lnjection Tank Inoperaole
.... * 80-05/03L No. l Containment Pressure Greater Tfian Tecfiritcal Specifi-cation L imtt 80-06/03L Loss of Meteorological Tower Instrumentation
...,. * so.... Q7/01T Check Valve 1DR7 Failure To Meet Intended Design 80-08/03L Non.-Safety Related Procedures Applied to Safety Related Equipment
-... * 80.-09/03L teak in Spent Fuel Pit 80-10/03L Missed Surveillance on Manipulator Crane 80-11/03L Jnoperable Containment Air Lock 100' Elevation 80-12/03L Fatlure of the Air P~rticulate Detector 80-13/03L fatlure of Vita 1 Heat Tracing
- 80-14/03L Loss of Off.. Site Power Source 80-15/03L AFD Monitor and Containment Sump Level Monitoring System Inoperaole 80-16/03L Loss of Air Particulate. Detector Untt
80-17/0lT Envtronmental Qualification of Reactor Coolant System
Wide Range Pressure Transmitters 80-18/Q3L Failure of Steam Generator Steam Flow Channel 80-19/03L Missed Surveillance on Rod Position Indication 80-20/03L Auxiliary Feedwater Valve, 14AF10, Out of Position
13 Onsite Licensee Event Followup For those LERs selected for onsite followup (denoted by asterisks in detail Paragraph 9.a), the inspector verified that the reporting requirements of Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.16 had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that*
the event was reviewed by the licensee as required by AP-4, 6, and 7, and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specification limits. The following findings relate to the LERs reviewed on site:
-- 78-74/990 The inspector verified that power source lists, as described in the report, have been provided to the operators in the control roo The licensee has undertaken a program to improve reliability of vital instrument inverters as de-tailed in NRC Inspection Reports 50-272/78-29 and 79-3 /03L Based on the inspector's review, it appears that the de-sign change to provide permanent heat tracing for subject sample piping has not been complete This is an unre-solved item (272/80-13-01).
-- 79-48/0lT As detailed in the LER, the SG tubes in question were plugged in # 11, 13, and 14 steam generators during the 1979 refueling outag Proper reinstallation of the tube lane blocking device was also verified by licensee personne /0lT As detailed in the licensee's supplemental report dated May 30, 1980, all modifications to seismic supports to restore design conditions have been complete A total of 845 supports required modification due to re-analysis precipitated by IE Bulletin 79-0 Further details of this program are contained in NRC Inspection Reports 50-272/79-27 and 79-2 /0lT This LER contains a commitment to evaluate the failure of three seismic supports and to suomit a followup report discussing failure mode and corrective actions take No analysis or supplemental report has been received. This item is unresolved,* (272/80-13-02).
-- 80-0l/03L This report details failure of the Axial Flux Difference Monitor while at 40% reactor powe The failure was attributed to a signal isolator. The inspector noted that Technical Specifi~ation 3.2.1, dealing with AFD limits, applies only in Mode 1 above 50% reactor power.
-- 80-02/03L The inspector verified that instrument procedures have been modified to ensure tfiat tne low power trip point is tested at the same frequency as the remainder of the power range detector functtonal check The inspector noted that this testing at sustained power levels in excess of 25% will require disconnecting the signal cable /03L Failure of the Boron Injection Tank flow meter was related to foulring by bori*c acid crysta 1 s and, in at.least one instance, improper reassembl The LER states that, following an engineering evaluation, a supplemental re-port wtll be submitte The inspector stated that the supplement should address both the design and the observed proolems with.. assembly tci completely document corrective actions taken. This item ts unresolved pending completion of the licensee*s revtew and submittal of a supplemental report (272/80-13-03}.
_.., 80.-05/03L Contatnment pressure relief to restore pressure within Techntcal Specifi'cation limits was inhiDi'ted by high con-tatnment activity readings and the resulting containment tsolatton stgnal. Pressure was restored to within limits in the hour provided By Techntcal Specifications. The tnspector verifted that the referenced design change to ratse tne alarm setpoint had Been accomplished *
.... 8Q~06/03L The inspector noted that tfie design change to provide automattc transfer of meteorological tower i'nstruments to
.alternate sources of power had not yet Been implemente Tfiis ttem ts unresolved pending completion of corrective acttons Hsted in tfie LER (272/80-13~04).
.
......: 8Cl.-07/01T Incorrect classification of check valve 1DR7 is detailed tn NRC rns~ection Report 50~272/79-33. The existing valve was qualtfted to setsniic standards by testing a prototyp Th~ tnspector had no furtfler questtons at this time *
..... 8Q.,.OQ8/03L Valve 1VC6 was restored to design condi'tions By the valve vendo The source of tne problem, fatlure to have a valid safety related equipment list, is discussed tn detail in NRC rns*pectton Report 50-272/80-04,
..... 8Q... Q9/03L During this report pertod, temporary repairs to.the spent fuel pool welds-, made usfog epoxy, were removed and per-manent repairs effected, Repairs consisted of welding half-round channels over the suspected leaRtng welds in the pool wall. Initial.leak determinations appear to confirm resolution of tne proble LeaRoffs are sti'll.sflowing significant boron concentrattons and.activity levels two orders of magnitude Below tfiat of tne poo Due to the possiBTlity of leaching from the collectton channels, a final determination of re-pair completton ts yet to oe mad A supplemental report ts required. This item* fs unresolved pendtng evaluation of the repair and receipt of a supplement to the LER (272/80-13-05)
- UNIT 2
-- 80-10/03L The inspector verified that maintenance procedure M2F, Manipulator Crane Pre-Operational Inspection, Revision 7, dated April 16, 1980, includes a load test to 3250 -
0, +50 pounds as required by Techincal Specification /03L A ground on the 13KV bus resulted in loss of# 2 Station Power Transformer, such that only one path for incoming power was available. The appropriate Technical Specifi-cation Action Statement was invoked, and repairs made within the required 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> During this interval, the inspector verified that the required testing to confirm availability of redundant sources was conducte /0lT *The LER details the potential for flooding of the wid range pressure transmitters during a loss of coolant accident, and further states that environmental qualifi-cation for submergence has not been documente The re-port provides justification for continued operation based 80*19/03L and 80-20/03L on redundancy of indication. Guidance to operators relative to possibly erroneous indication in a containment flooding event is being provided. The licensee stated that the transmitters will be relocated above the postulated flood level prior to conclusion of the Fall 1980 refueling outag This item is unresolved pending completion of this relocation (272/80-13-06).
These items are detailed in NRC Inspection Report 50-272/80-0 Corrective actions will be verified through inspection follow-up on items of noncompliance related to these event The inspector had no questions relative to LER's at this tim.
Pre-Critical *Te~ting a. Salem Unit 2 Operating License Number DPR-75, issued on April 18, 1980 authorized core load and testing at low powe The license and accompanying Technical Specifications contain several conditions to be met prior to heat up and prior to criticality. The following conditions were verified as described below by the inspectors. At the conclusion of this inspection, tne unit was in Mode 5 and vente No conditions for heat up were out-standing. Several open items remained to be resolve All had direct impact on system operaoility as descriDedin Technical Specification 4. *The following license conditions, listed by license paragraph were verified:
Technical Specification 7.2(?) Design changes for pressurizer heater power supply. The inspector verified that the vital bus feed to pressurizer heaters had been installed and teste Technical Specification 7.2(2) Design changes and equipment to support plant cooldown outside control roo The inspector ver-ifi"ed that wide range temperature and pressure instruments were in place and calibrated at the hot shutdown pane In addition, placement of all necessary procedures, communications, keys, and equipment in appropriate field locations had been complete J
Technical Specification 7.3(3) Completion of test program requirements of IE Bulletin 79-02, Revision 2. The inspector verified through selected document review and field inspection that testing, analysis and modification work dictated by re-views under IE Bulletins 79-02, 79-07, and 79-14 had been complete The support modification program for all three Bulletins involved approximately 1600 piping support The inspectors observed portions of testing conducted during this period. Observations included the following; correct procedure in use, crew requirements, test prerequisites, plant conditions, cali-brated test equipment, adherence to procedure, coordination, data collection, and data revie The following tests were observed:
SUP 70.7 Rod Drive Mechanism Timing SUP 70.8 Rod Drop Time Measurement (Cold).
The inspectors had no questions in this are c. Salem *unit 2 entered Mode 5 at 3:15 PM on June 4, 1980 completing initial core loa The inspector reviewed the core loading procedure for Salem Unit 2, STARTUP P80CEDURE (SUP) 60, change 14, dated May 28, 198 SUP 60 incorporated the basic Westinghouse Procedure N FP-PNJ-IF, Revision 0, dated April 23, 198 The inspector *conducted spot checks to assure that data was not ommitted and procedural place-ment of fuel assemblies and inserts corresponded to the grid locator map (SUP-60, Appendix A. page 37, change 5).
Westinghouse and the licensee acknowledged "Core Mapping Completed and Tapes Verified" on May 27, 1980..
The core mapping verification states in part:.
11A core Map of the as loaded core has been recorded on video tape and all fuel assemblies are in the designated core locations.
The inspector noted that the verification statement was not specific with respect to assembly inserts or azimuth alignment of the assemblie The statement also did not provide for specific identification of the video tape nor source document, table, or grid map used as the 11designated core location.
The licensee explained that during fuel movement, the gripper tool in the containment building operated in a fixed position with respect to the fuel handling crane. This provides for proper fuel assembly align-ment during the core loa Inserts and assembly serial numbers were verified as the fuel was withdrawn from the storage rack The licensee stated that non-symmetrical inserts were visually verified by both licensee and Westinghouse personnel after core load, although no pro-cedural sign offs were recorded nor require.
As a result of discussion with personnel and review of records the inspector identified no location or alignment problems; however, the verification ~tatement was found to be insufficiently specific as to what was actually verified. Tnis remains an open item (311/80-09-02)
pending review of the next refueling procedur The inspector observed, in part, Salem Unit 2 test procedure, "Verify the Correct Throttle Position of 21-24 SJ 143" (DTP-SIS-04, Revision 0, dated May 28, 1980). This procedure was performed to satisfy Technical Specification (4.5.2.h.lJ surveillance requirements for flow Balancing low head safety injection lines. Tfle inspector had no com-ments relative to tfle conduct of tne procedure; however, some errors were noted in the procedure, such as "Cal. Date" which should have read
"Cal. due date and "start" valve 2SJ 135. These items were corrected oy an on-tne-spot chang Final inspector review will be conducted wften licensee data review and test procedure acceptance are complete On June 17, 1980 at approximately 4:30 AM, the licensee performed an Emergency Drill simulating an off-site release and exercising the Emergency Pla Inspector comments relating to the functional assign-ments for staffing the Technical Support Center (TSC) and ommission of Emergency Duty Officer (EDO} responsiDilities from the EDO checklist were provided to the licensee for consideration in the rewrite of the Emergency Pla During the drtl 1, the inspector noted that the Emergency Duty Offtcer was using a superceded checklist. Tfte licensee checked tne control room to insure tnat only updated copies of the EDO check-1 tst were available. Tne tnspector nad no further comments relative to tEi.e drt-1. * Unresolved*rtems Are.as* for wb.ich more information is required to determine acceptability are consi'dered unresolved. Unresolved Hems are contained in Paragraphs 57 7_and 9. of tnis repor. * * EXtt *Interview At pertodtc intervals during th~ course of this inspection, meetings were held with sentor factlity management to discuss inspection scope and finding _j