IR 05000311/1980011
| ML18085A118 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1980 |
| From: | Bettenhausen L, Caphton D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18085A117 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-311-80-11, NUDOCS 8010230539 | |
| Download: ML18085A118 (9) | |
Text
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_ U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report N /80-11
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Docket N Li cens_e No. * DPR-75 Priority Category c
Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Unit 2 Inspection at: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection conducted:
June 30-August 2, 1980 Inspectors: ~~
L. A. Bettenhauseri::o:;Reactor Inspector Approved by:
D. L. Capt:CJ1iJ,NUCiar Support Sectiori 1, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on June 30-August 2, 1980 (Report 50-311/80-11)
date signed date signed date signed
~Wn~
Areas I~sp~tted: Routine, unannounced inspection by region based inspector of the startup test program, precriticality startup testing and preparation for and conduct of initial criticalit The inspection was performed concurrently with inspections by Resident Inspector Tne inspection involved 106 hours0.00123 days <br />0.0294 hours <br />1.752645e-4 weeks <br />4.0333e-5 months <br /> by one region-based inspecto Results:
Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were foun Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
8010230 5 39
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- DETAILS Persons Contacted
- J. Driscoll, Operating Engineer C. Johnson, Nuclear Plant Engineer H. Midura, Manager
M. Murphy, Technical Supervisor
- J. Nichols, Reactor Engineer T. Robbins, Instrument Supervisor W. Schell, Test Engineer
- R. Silverio, Assistant to Manager
~J. Zupko, Chief Engineer
- W. Treston, QA Engineer
- W. Hill, Resident Inspector, USNRC The inspector also held discussions with and interviewed other licensee employ-ees, and. contractor personnel including administrative, engineering,. mainte-nance, performance and operating. personne *Denotes those present at the exit interview August 14, 1980~ Precritical Test Witnessing At various times during the inspection period, the inspector witnessed por-tions of precritical startup test The tests witnessed in part were:
SUP70.7, Rod Drive Mechanism Timing SUP70.8, Rod Drop Time Measurements SUP?0.5, RCS Flow Measurement SUP70.6, Rod Po~i~ion Indication System Observations incl~ded the following:
Test Engineer used master copy of procedure; crew members had appro-priate revision copie Minimum crew requirements*for each test.were me Test prerequisites and initial conditions were me Special test equipment bore current calibration stickers and users were knowledgeable of equipment.
. Crew actions were correct, timely and coordinated_ *
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Summary analysis was made upon completion of tes Test data collected in master copy for complete analysi The inspector noted. that overall test acceptance criteria were met or ttacked by test deficiency/work order syste No -items of noncompliance or devia-tions were observe The data sheets reviewed were legible, traceable and permanen.
Conformance to License Requirements and Technical Specifications The inspector reviewed completed system line-up checklists, surveillance tests and component status lists and directly observed control room indica-tors to verify that the following Technical Specifications were met for initial criticality:
T.S. 2.1.1 RCS Temperature and Pressure T.S. 2.1.2 RCS Pressure T.S * 3. 1.1.1 Shutdown Margin Requirements T.S. 3.1.1.5 Minimum Temperature for Criticality T.S. 3.1.2.2 Boron Injection Flow Paths Operable T.S. 3.1.2.4 Charging Pumps Operable T.S. 3.1.2.8 Borated Water Sources T.S. 3.1.3.1 Movable Control Assemblies T.S. 3.1.3.2 Rod Position Indicating Systems T.S. 3.1.3.3 Rod Drop Times T.S. 3.4.1.1 Reactor Coolant Loops T.S. 3.4.4 Pressurizer Operability T.S. 3.4.5 Steam Generator Operability T.S. 3.4.6.1 and T.S. 3.4.6.2 RCS Leakage T.S. 3.4.7 RCS Chemistry T.S. 3.5.1 Accumulators
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T.S. 3.5.2 ECCS Subsystem T.S. 3.5.4.1 Bofon Injection Tank T.S. 3.5.5 Refueling Water Storage Tarik T.S. 3.7.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System T.S. 3.7.1.3 Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank T.S. 3.7.1.5 Main Steam Isolation Valves T.S. 3.7.3.1 Component Cooling Water System T.S. 3.7.4.1 Service Water System T.S. 3.7.6.1 Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System T.S. 3.7.7.1 Auxiliary Building Exhaust Air Filtration T.S. 3.8.1.1 A.C. Electrical Power Sources T.S. 3.6.4*.1 Hydrogen Analyzers T.S. 3.6.4.2 Hydrogen Recombiners T.S. 3~8.2.1 A.C. Distribution-Operating T.S. 3.8.2.3 125V D.C. Distribution-Operating.8.2~5 28V D.C. Distribution-Operating Selected channel cali~rations, channel*checks and channel functional tests were reviewed for instrumentation identified in the following Technical Specifications:
T.S. 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation T.S. 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation T.S. 3.3.3.5 Remote Shutdown Instrumentation T.S. 3.3.3.6 Post Accident Instrumentation In addition, the following pertinent start-up procedures were reviewed for completeness and for administrative control and closeout or continued follow-up on test deficiencies:
- SUP20.5, Reactor Plant System Set Point Verification, released for test October 20, 1978, approved by Pre Operations Review C?mmittee (PORC) May 21, 198 SUP20.1, Reactor Protection System and Emergency Safeguards Actuation System Time Response, approved by PORC for core load only April 5, 1979,
,final approval July 17, 198 SUP26, Computer and Input and Data.Printout Verification, released for test June 20, 1978, approved by PORC July 17, 1980 with Work Order 906710 identifying data points to be verified for full power operatio SUP24, Nuclear Instrumentation System, released for test February 20, 1979, PORC approved April 3, 197 SUP21," Radiation Monitoring System (_RMS),. released for test October 8, 1979, PORC reviewed July 30, 1980, with exception The RMS provides control room alarm and digital display for all required monitor The system does not have all features called for in SUP2 Inspector obser-vations of frequent false alarms and apparent -Operator mistrust con-firm that the RMS performance is not completely satisfactory. Opera-tion of the RMS does appear adequate for monitoring radiation in the low-power test progra Completion of SUP21 and satisfactory operating experience of the RMS, wi 11 be an i tern for inspector fa 11 owu During this precriticality review, the inspector noted the following items:
(1)
T.S. 3.4.3 requires pressurizer code safety valves to be operable with a lift setting of 2485 psig +1%. *A footnote states that the lift sett-i"ng pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at n*ominal operating temperature and pressur Valves 2PR3, 2PR4 and 2PRS were sent *to the manufacturer, Crosby Valve and Gage Company, fo'r rework and test; *lift setting were made at Crosby on June 8, 1980 at 2500 psig with air at room temperatur When the inspector pointed this out to licensee representatives, arrangements were made to test the pressurizer safety valves in place, using a test proc~dure to
- 'verify proper lift settings using a pneumatic assist devic Proce-dure T-27, In~Place Testing of Pressurizer Relief Valves, was approved by Station Operations Review Committee '(SORG} on July 11, 1980 and carried out on July 16-17, 198 The inspector independently verified the test calculations and reviewed the gage calibration test The 11as left 11 settings (average of 3 lifts)
were as follows:
Valve 2PR3 2PR4 2PRS
Setpoint 2501 psig 2470 psig 2501 psig The test was conducted with the reactor coolant system at a pressure of 2050-2100 psig and about 540F, providing nominal operating tempera-ture and pressure for the valve The test was also conducted in the presence of a Crosby Valve and Gage Company representativ The inspec-tor had no further questions in this are (2) All main steam safety valves had their lift settings checked on July 9 and July 10, 1980 after a nominal 890 psig steam pressure was attaine in the steam generator The lift settings were obtained by using a pneumatic Tift assist in a manner similar to that described for the pressurizer safety valve The inspector verified the calculated lift settings for 24MS15 as 1066 psig (average of 2 lifts) as tested on July 9, 198 No problems were noted in the testing of the main steam safety valve The inspector had no further questions in this are (3)
The inspector reviewed draft procedure OII 3.10, 110perating (Unit 2)
with an Emergency in Unit 1 11 prior to review by the Station Operations Review Committee (SORC).
This procedure provides guidance to the Unit 2 Shift Supervisor regarding actions to be taken and unit condi-tions to be obtained as a result of emergencies in Unit The proce-dure was approved by SORC on July 9, 198 The inspector had no further questions in this are * (4) Several of the licensees* outstanding items list for initial criticality
. dealt with vital heat trace repairs.. The inspector examined this area, speci fi ca lly re viewing hanger modi fiCati ans to the piping around the Boron* Injection T~nk. Procedures for modifications, administrative control of the work and calibration of instruments used in testing were found to be adequat The inspector had no further question No ite~s of noncompliance were identifie.. Procedural and Test Sequence Controls The initial criticality is performed as prescribed in startup procedure SUP 80.2, Initial Criticality. Conditions for performance of SUP 8 are established by the sequential steps outlined in SUP 80.1, NSSS Startup Sequenc These startup procedures detail the sequence of tests and checks to be performed prior to initial criticality and the necessary prerequisite The three prerequisites of SUP 80.2, Initial Criticality, were (1) source range monitor instrument plateau determinations, (2) verification of esti-mated critical position and (3) checkout of the reactivity compute ~----* *- -- ------ ------------- - -
Source range instruments, chan*nels NI31 and NI32~ were calibrated by per-formance of 2PD16.4.001, "Source Range Discriminator and Plateau Adjustments",
on July 31, 198 Other calfbrations and checks on source and intermediate range detectors were performed in the course of plant preparation and were reviewed by the inspecto Instrument response and signal-to -noise ratio were checked and data logged as part of the initial conditions for the
- approach-to _critica.lit The inspector had no, further question An estimated critical position determination for initial criticality was made in accordance with Reactor Engineering. Procedur The calculation gave an estimated crit_ical condition of all rods except Control Bank D out, Control Bank D at 165 steps, critical boron concentration 1282 ppm The reactivity computer was checked out in accordance with procedure 2PD 16.4.019, "Calibration of the Reactivity Computer"..
The inspector reviewed the procedure completed July 18, 1980. -
SUP 80.1, NSSS Startup Sequence, describes the sequence of steps in the startup test progra ln addition to performance of precritical startup tests and rod position indication calibration, SUP 80.1 specifies an
. administrative step and an instrumentation connection-prior to criticalit The administrative step is review of test.program and permission to perform initial crticiality from SOR SORC Meeting 55-80 held on August 1, 1980 granted this permissio The inspector verified the connection of NI 41-Power Range signals to the reactivity compute The inspector had no fur-ther questions regarding procedural and administrative prerequisite No.items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Conformance to Administrative and Procedural Requirements The inspector frequently verified during the conduct of the initial cri-ticality test, SUP 80.2, that:
Crew requirements of the procedure were me Control room manning was in accordance with Technical Specifications and test requirement The master copy of.the test procedure was available, in use, and being
. followe Referenced procedures had been reviewed and approved and were curren Inverse multiplication plots were in use, were updated at appropriate intervals and were analyzed in the conduct of the tes The inspector spot~checked data, calculations and plottin *
Adequate. technical support and NSSS.vendor assistance was availabl Quality Assurance coverage and periodic witnessing were provided throughout the test..
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Initial Criticality
- initial Criticality of Salem Unit 2 was attained at 1049 am on August 2, 198 Critical conditions were Control Bank D at 165 steps, critical boron concen-tratibn 1318 ppm Th.is compares favorably to the 1282 ppmB predicted in the licensee's Estimated Critical Position and to an. independent calculation.*
of 1370 ppmB by the inspecto The inspector reviewed the master copy of SUP 80.2, Initial Criticality, approved March 9, 1979 and released for test August 1, 198 Five on-the-spot changes were made to correct typographi ca 1 errors,. de 1 ete a step no longer required by the NSSS vendor, and update the procedure to reflect test dat The changes were properly reviewed and approve The reactivity computer checkout marginally met acceptance criteria in the initial reactor
- period - reactivity computer comparison; the problem was investigated and traced to the initial calibration of the reactivity compute Constants
- were recalculated, the reactivity computer recalibrated and successfully retested on August 3, 198 Overlap of the source range and intermediate range nuclear instrumentation was observed for more than one decade; overlap data was recorded in Appendix E to SUP 80.1, NSSS Startup Sequence on August 2, 198 The NSSS vendor provided t~chnical support throughout the test perio The inspector observed frequent involvement of NSSS vendor staff in planning, execution and review of test result Unit 2 Control Room logs were reviewed for July 31,* August 1, and August 2, 198 The inspector had no further question No items of noncompliance or deviations were observe.. Special Test Procedure Review The inspector reviewed special test procedures as noted below to ver"i fy that the test described meets the test objectives and is consistent with the test title:
SUP 90.o, Special Tests Sequence Document, Rev. 2, transmitted August 6, 198 *
SUP 90.1, Natural Circulation Test, Rev. 2, transmitted August ;6, 198 sup 90.2, Natural Circulatirin With Simulated Loss of Offsite AC Power, Rev. 2, transmitted August 6, 198 SUP 90. 3, Natural Circulation with Loss of Pressurizer Heaters, Rev. 2, transmitted August 6, 1980.
. SUP 90.4, Effect of S/G Secondary Side Isolation on Natural Circulation, Rev. 2, transmitted August 6, 198 *
SUP 90.5, Natural Circulation at Reduced Pressure, Rev. 2, transmitted August 6, 198 SUP 90.6, Cooldown Capability of Changing and Letdown, Rev. 2, trans-*
mitted August 6, 198 *
SUP 90.7 Simulated Loss of All Onsite and Offsite AC Power, Rev. 2, transmitted August 6, 198 The inspector had no further question r Exit Interview
- .The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
on August 14, 198 At the meeting, the purpose, scope and findings of this inspection were discussed.