IR 05000269/1980005

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IE Insp Repts 50-269/80-05,50-270/80-04 & 50-287/80-04 on 800107-31.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Adhere to Stated Housekeeping Practices in Areas Occupied by safety-related Equipment
ML15238B090
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/20/1980
From: Jape F, Martin R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML15238B086 List:
References
50-269-80-05, 50-269-80-5, 50-270-80-04, 50-270-80-4, 50-287-80-04, NUDOCS 8004250357
Download: ML15238B090 (8)


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-269/80-05, 50-270/80-04 and 50-287/80-04 Licensee:

Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Facility:

Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 Inspection at Oconee Site near Charlotte, North Carolina Inspector:

JapeDa ned F. Jape

/atd Signed Approved by:

/Q,

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2 5/

R. D. Martin, Section Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on January 7-31, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 58 inspector-hours on site in the areas of plant operations, outage activities, housekeeping, followup of IEB's, IEC's and IE IN's, plant tours and witnessing a tes Results Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identi fied in five areas; one apparent deviation was found in one area (inadequate housekeeping - paragraph 6).

8004256

DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • J. E. Smith, Station Manager
  • J. M. Davis, Superintendent of Maintenance
  • J. N. Pope, Superintendent of Operations
  • T. B. Owen, Superintendent of Technical Services
  • R. T. Bond, Licensing and Projects Engineer J. Brackett, Senior QA Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included 20 operations supervisors,, 8 technicians, 25 operators, 6 mechanics, 2 security force members, and 3 office personne *Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 1, 1980, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 abov Discussions were also held with licensee management on-January 10 and 18, 198 The inspection findings were acknowledged without significant commen Licensee management assigned immediate attention to resolution of the deviation regarding housekeepin. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.

Plant Operations The inspector reviewed plant operations, throughout the report period, to ascertain conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications and administrative directives. The control room logs, shift supervisor's logs, shift turnover records, and the removed and restoration record books for all three units were reviewe Interviews with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics and performance personnel were held on the day and night shift Activities within the control rooms were observed and monitored during day and night shifts and at shift change The actions and activities were conducted as prescribed in Section 3.08 of the Station Directive The number of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum

-2 required by IEB 79-05 Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and appeared to be cognizant of plant condition An operator was assigned special duty for Unit 2 as an "HPI Valve Watch" and "KI Inverter Watch".

The assigned operator was knowledgeable with his dutie Unit 1 was in a refueling outage throughout the report period and hence did not require this special assignmen Unit 3 has been modified such that the special assignment is not require Plant tours were taken during the inspection period as follows: Turbine Building Auxiliary Building Unit 1 Reactor Building d. Unit 1, 2 and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms Unit 1, 2 and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Station yard areas within the protected area During the plant tours, observations were made of ongoing activities, housekeeping security, equipment status and radiation control practice On several occasions, the inspector observed security guards stationed at controlled doors due to problems being experienced with the locking equipmen Also in all areas of observation, except housekeeping, there were no problems identified. A deviation concerning housekeeping is discussed below in paragraph.

Housekeeping An inspection was conducted On January 30 and 31, 1980 of the Low Pressure Injection (LPI),

Building Spray (BS)

and High Pressure Injection (HPI)

rooms for all three unit The inspector found each room to contain materials, tools and equipment apparently left over from previous maintenance of modification activitites. The inspector recognized that some of the equip ment and materials in the Unit 1 HPI rooms may be required for the ongoing activities related to modification 1080,

"HPI Crossconnection."

This job is in progress for Unit 1 and has been completed on Unit The debris found consisted of the following: excess insulation material hand tools scaffold planks air hoses welding cables light bulbs

-3 paper (obsolete procedures)

Within the QA Plan for Operations (DUKE-1),

the licensee committed to RG 1.39 Rev 1, "Housekeeping Requirements for water-cooled nuclear Power plants", which endorses ANSI N45.2.3-197 This commitment is implemented through Station Directive 3.11.4, "Cleanness Zones in Safety-Related Areas" Section 7.OE. of SD 3.11.4 requires safety-related work areas to be kept clean and orderly. Excess tools and materials are not permitted to accumu late and are required to be removed upon completion of the jo This matter was discussed with licensee management at the 2/1/80 management meeting. The inspector stated that the matter is a deviation from the commitment in the QA pla Licensee management assigned responsibility to correct the deviations (269/80-5). Keowee Maintenance Outage Followup was completed on the licensee identified event, which was reported in IE Inspection Report 50-269/79-41, 50-270/79-39 and 50-287/79-41, paragraph During the Keowee maintenance outage it was necessary to load the Lee Station gas turbine generator to improve reliability of its operation as an emergency power sourc This was accomplished thru a revision of OP/0/A/

1107/03,

"100KV Power Supply".

The revision required separation of Unit 1 4160V switchgear and the Lee Station gas turbine generator would energize Bus 2. The operating procedure failed to require re-energerzation of Standby Bus 1 to comply with Technical Specification 3. During a routine audit of PT/1/A/600/1, "Periodic Instrument Surveillance,"

the operating engineer noted the discrepancy PT/1/A/600/1 required verifica tion of standby bus status every four hours during the Keowee extended outag Upon discovery the discrepancy was correcte Standby Bus 1 was deenergized during the period from 0609 hours0.00705 days <br />0.169 hours <br />0.00101 weeks <br />2.317245e-4 months <br /> on 11/26/79 until 1551 hours0.018 days <br />0.431 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.901555e-4 months <br /> on 11/30/79 (105 hours0.00122 days <br />0.0292 hours <br />1.736111e-4 weeks <br />3.99525e-5 months <br /> and 42 minutes).

Emergency power for each unit thru 4160V engineered safeguards switchgear was automatically available from the Lee Station gas turbine generator via standby Bus Standby Bus 1 breaker is located in Unit 1-2 Control Room and available to the operator if neede Operating procedure, Op/0/A/1107/03, has been corrected to require both Standby Buses 1 and 2 to be close This event was verbally reported to the NRC at 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br /> on 11/30/79, followed by letters dated 12/5 and 12/10/7 The inspector discussed the event with licensee personnel, reviewed the procedures and verified corrective action There are no further questions or comments on this matte.

IEB 79-21, Temperature Effects on Level Measurements Followup Item 4 of Bulletin 79-21 required revision, as necessary, of emergency procedures and training of operators on these revision Procedures EP/0/A/1800/08, Steam Supply Rupture, EP/O/A/1800/14, Loss of Steam Generator Feedwater have been revised in compliance with IEB 79-21 with effective revision dates of 4 January 80, 28 December 79 and 4 January 80 respectively. The applicable tables of correction factors are embodied in the procedures for operator avaliabilit Operator training on the procedure revision is scheduled during operator requalification training which is ongoin.

The inspector performed a review of the following IE Circulars and Information Notices determining they were adequately reviewed and documented:

IE Circular 79-25

-

Shock Arrestor Strut Assembly Interference IE Circular 79-24

-

Proper Installation and Calibration of Core Spray Pipe Break Detection Equipment on BWR's IE Circular 79-23

-

Motor Starters and Contactors Failed to Operate IE Circular 79-22

-

Stroke Times for Power Operated Relief Valves IE Circular 79-21

-

Prevention of Unplanned Releases of Radioactivity IE Circular 79-20

-

Failure of GTE Sylvania Relay Type PM Bulletin 7305, Catalog 5U12-11-AC With A 120V AC Coil IE Circular 79-19

-

Loose Locking Devices on Ingersoll-Rand Pumps IE Circular 79-18

-

Proper Installation of Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves IE Circular 79-17

-

Contact Problem in SB-12 Switches on General Electric Company Metalclad Circuit Breakers IE Circular 79-13

-

Replacement of Diesel Fire Pump Starting Contactors IE Circular 79-12

-

Potential Diesel Generator Turbocharger Problem IE Information

-

Cracking in Low Pressure Turbine Discs Notice 79-37 IE Information

-

Computer Code Defect in Stress Analysis of Piping Notice 79-36 Elbow IE Information

-

Control of Maintenance and Essential Equipment Notice 79-35 IE Information

-

Inadequate Design of Safety-Related Heat Exchangers Notice 79-34 IE Information

-

Improper Closure of Primary Containment Equipment Notice 79-33 Access Hatches

-5 IE Information

-

Separation of Electricial Cables for HPCI and ADS Notice 79-32 IE Information

-

Use of Incorrect Amplified Response Spectra (ARS)

Notice 79-31 IE Information

-

Reporting of Defects and Noncompliances, 10 CFR Notice 79-30 Part 21 IE Information

-

Loss of Nonsafety-Related Reactor Coolant System Notice 79-29 Instrumentation During Operation IE Information

-

Overloading of Structural Elements Due to Pipe Notice 79-28 Support Loads IE Information

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Steam Generator Tube Ruptures at Two PWR Facilities Notice 79-27 IE Information

-

Breach of Containment Integrity Notice 79-26 IE Information

-

Reactor Trips at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Notice 79-25 IE Information

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Overpressurization of Containment of a PWR Plant Notice 79-24 After a Main Steam Line Break IE Information

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Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Coolers Notice 79-23 IE Information

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Qualification of Control Systems Notice 79-22 IE Information

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Transportation and Commerical Burial of Radioactive Notice 79-21 Materials IE Information

-

NRC Enforcement Policy NRC Licensed Individuals Notice 79-20 (Rev. 1)

IE Information

-

Pipe Cracks in Stagnant Borated Water Systems at Notice 79-19 PWR Plants (Correction Enclosure)

IE Information

-

Pipe Cracks in Stagnant Borated Water Systems at Notice 79-19 PWR Plants IE Information

-

Skylab Reentry Notice 79-18

-6 IE Information

-

Source Holder Assembly Damage From Misfit Between Notice 79-17 Assembly and Reactor Upper Grid Plate IE Information

-

Deficient Procedures Notice 79-15 IE Information

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NRC Position of Electrical Cable Support Systems Notice 79-14 10. Foreign Objects in Reactor Vessel - Unit 1 On December 19, 1979 while performing core verification, following comple tion of the fuel shuffle, foreign material was discovered on top of a fuel assembly in the reactor-vesse An investigation, conducted by the licensee, revealed that an underwater lamp had broken and part or all of the glass and plastic fell into the reactor vesse Recovery efforts were conducted and licensee estimates that at least 50% of the debris has been recovere A safety analysis by the licensee, assuming the remaining debris is in the vessel, shows that the plastic will become fluid at 325 0 F and should present no problem. Any remaining glass debris will be, or already is, pulvarized and likewise would not present any mechanical or chemical hazar The inspector reviewed the licensee's recovery efforts, the event report, startup testing program, and safety analysi These were found satisfactory and there were no questions or comment.

Emergency Feedwater Turbine The NRC was notified, by letter from Terry Corporation to NRC dated November 6, 1979, of a modification to the governor linkage for the Terry turbin This turbine serves as the emergency feedwater pump drive and the change was neces sary to prevent unintended closure of the governor valve due to vibratio Oconee Nuclear Station uses a General Electric turbine as the emergency feedwater pump driver. A review of the equipment at Oconee revealed that a governor lock has been provided to prevent unintended closure of the governor valve. Discussion with licensee personnel responsible for maintaining this equipment servicable revealed no problem with governor positio. Witnessing Testing Activity The inspector observed and witnessed performance of PT/1/A/610/1J," EPSL ES Actuation Keowee Emergency Start Test" on 1/31/8 The procedure had been checked against the control copy prior to use, and minor changes to the pro cedure were made in accordance with Station Directive 4. The procedure had been reviewed and approved as required by Technical Specification 6. Qualified personnel performed the test and special test equipment required was calibrate Limitations and precautions were observed, and plant system prerequisites were me The test results were within predetermined accepance criteria and the test was considered successfu The test verified that Keowee will start on engineered safeguards actuations and supply load to the main feeder buse Also the test verified that the Keowee unit can supply a load of up to 17MW thru the underground lin An emergency condition was simulated and actuation of ES channels 1 and 2 and opening switchyard breakers to the startup source at the same tim These two conditions transfer the units auxiliaries to the standby bus when Keowee comes up to rated speed and voltag The inspector had no comment or questions concerning performance of the test. There were no items of noncompliance or deviations identified.