IR 05000269/1980033
| ML20003A608 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 11/26/1980 |
| From: | Jape F, Martin R, Myers D, William Orders NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003A599 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-80-33, 50-270-80-29, 50-287-80-26, NUDOCS 8102040385 | |
| Download: ML20003A608 (12) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. , . g>3 EECog% [[}\\*'-'W UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION , s,..gy j REGION 11
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[y. e - 101 MARIETT A ST.. N.W.. SUITE 3100 ! o, E ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 %.'.%,/ o ... Report Nos. 50-269/80-33, 50-270/80-29, and 50-287/80-26 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 Inspection at Oconee Nuclear station near Seneca, South Carolina Inspectors: Date Signed F. Jape Date Signed W. Orders Date Signed ~D. Myers [/#[ b/2 / h Approved
Date Signed R. Martin, Section ep RONS Branch SUMMAR' Inspection on October 1-31, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine, inspection involved 182 resident hours on site in the areas of operation observation, maintenance observation, surveillance observation, LER followup, IEB followup, witness of spent organization and administration, fuel cask cavity measurements, and re-review of category A requirements of NUREG 0578.
Results the eight areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were ofidentified in four areas; three items of noncompliance were found in three areas Failure to comply with Technical Specification 4.1.2 test requirement paragraph 8; Failure to comply with a limiting condition for operation as specified by Technical specification 3.14, paragraph 5; and Failure to follow procedure while performing surveillance resulting in an unplanned radioactive gaseous release, paragraph 8.)
8102020 g yy
. . DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager
- J. M. Davis, Superintendent of Maintenance
- H. Lowery, Acting Superintendent of Operations
- T. B. Owen, Superintendent of Technical Services
- T. Cribbe, Licensing Engineer
- J. Brackett, Senior QA Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included 10 operations supervisors, four technicians, 12 operators, four mechanics, five security force members and two office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 10, 17 and 31, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspection findings were acknowledged without significant comment or rebuttal.
Licensee management acknowledged the items of noncompliance and stated that the events were under investigation.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during thic inspection.
5.
Maintenance Observation Maintenance activities were observed and reviewed throughout the inspection period to verify that activities were accomplished using approved pro-
cedures and the work was done by qualified persennel. Where appropriate, l-limiting conditions for operation were examined te ensure that while the equipment was removed from se rvice the appropriate requirements of the technical specifications were satisfied.
The following. were used as acceptance criteria: )
. . . -2-Station Directives 3. 3.1, 3.3.2, 3. 3. 5, 3. 3.11 and 3. 3.15 - Administrative Policy Manual, Sections 3.3. and 4.7 - Maintenance activities observed were as follows: a.
Anual Preventive Maintenance on Keowee Governor. This activity involved removing each Keowee unit from service, performing planned maintenance (PM) checks, and restoring the system to service.
Portions of the activity were witnessed by the resident inspector. The work sas done as authorized by Work Request 58713, and using procedures OP/0/A/12200/03, " Inspection and Maintenance of Governor Actuator," and OP/0/A/2000/25, "Keowee Annual PM of Turbine Guide Bearing".
The work was accomplished within Technical Specification 3.7 require-ments and system restoration was satisfactorily completed as per OP/0/A/1102/6, " Removal and Restoration of Station Equipment". No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified with this activity.
b.
Accessible Hydraube bubber Inspection Technical Specification 4.18 requires a periodic visual inspection of accessible hydraulic snubbers.
This was performed on August 18-20, 1980 for Unit 3.
The inspector reviewed the records and results of this inspection activity.
Noncompliance with the limiting condition for av eration, Tecnnical Specification 3.14, was identified with this s_ civity.
During the visual inspection, maintenance personnel identified snubber 3-54A-3-0-2435B-SR22 as having an empty reservior. This finding was recorded on the work data sheets and submitted to ' the Mechanical Maintenance Support Engineer (MMSE) for review. The MMSE reviewed these data on August 26, 1980 and prepared Work Request 54499 to remove, test and repair the failed snubber. On September 8, 1980 the snubber was removed from service and functionally tested. The snubber failed the test. Repairs were completed and the snubber retested and returned to service at 1500 hours on September 9,1980.
The licensee submitted licensee. event report R0-287-80-13, RB Spray ' System Suppression Reservoir found Empty.
By reviewing this report, the work requests and the maintenance procedures, the inspector determined that the snubber had been inoperable - for approximately 3 ' weeks, from August 19, to September 9.
This is an infraction with Technical Specification 3.14, which allows 72 hours for repair-of an inoperable snubber,- (287/80-26-01). c.
NSM 1659, "Distt ibuting Valve Bushing Clamp - Keowee Hydro Station" On September 25, 1980, Keowce Unit 2 failed to reach synchronous speed on a normal start. This constituted operation in a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.7.2 and was investigated by the licensee, i
. . -3-A modification was prepared in conjunction with the Woodward Governor Company to correct the problem. The inspector witnessed the installa-tion of their modification and reviewed the records related to the job. The records reviewed were as follows: 1.
Internal Incident Report B 1037 2.
Reportable Occurrence Report R0-269/80-29 3.
Work Request 97179 4.
NSM 1659 5.
TN/KE0/1&2/1659/A 6.
MP/0/A/2200/03 7.
OP/0/A/1107/02, Section 11 8.
OP/0/A/1106/19, Enclosure 9.5 9.
OP/0/A/1102/6 inspected and witnessed, no items of noncompliance or Within the areas deviations were identified.
6.
Plant Operations The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the report period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications, and administrative directives.
Control room logs, shift supervisor logs, shift turnover records, and removal and restoration record books for the three units were reviewed. Interviews with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics and performance personnel were held on the day and night shif ts.
Activities within the control rooms were monitored during portions of all three shifts and at several shift changes. The actions and activities were conducted as prescribed in Section 3.08 of the Station Directives. The number of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by IEB 79-05C.
Operators were responsive to plant annunicator alarms and appeared to be cognizant of plant conditions.
Plant tours were taken during the inspection period as follows: Turbine Building l Auxiliary Building Units 1, 2 and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Station yard zone within the protected area During the plant tours, observations were made of ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices.
Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Organization and Administration Compliance with Technical Specification 6.1.1, Organization, and 6.1.2, , Technical Review and Control, were examined by reviewing the current organi-zational structure and administrative programs established to accomplish these activities.
Within these areas no items of noncompliance or i deviation were identified.
Details of the technical review and control activities are presented below.
a.
Procedures i
~ The program for implementation of the TS requirement for procedure i review and approval, including changes to these procedures, is prescribed in Administrative Policy Manual (APM) 4.2 and 4.3.
Inter-i views with plant personnel responsible for the program revealed
satisfactory compliance with the TS. The station manager has delegated approval of procedures and changes to these procedures to the ' Superintendent of Operations, Superintendent of Maintenance, and Superintendent of Technical Services. A random review of control , ! copies of procedures for each of these three organizational divisions disclosed compliance with the T. S.
i b.
Proposed Technical Specification Proposed changes to the Technical Specifications are prepared by station personnel or corporate office personnel.
Each change is reviewed within the preparer's organization and may also receive cross-disciplinary review if deemed necessary.
Following this activity, each change is approved by the Station Manager for submittal '. to the DPC's Licensing Unit, who then submits the change to the NRC.
No problems were identified concerning.this Technical Specification requirement.
c.
Qualified Reviewers To comply with this Technical Specification requirement, the Station Manager issued a letter listing station supervisory staff who are qualified teviewers. The letter is updated as required and is posted.
in several locations within the plant. During the inspection of T.S.
6.1.2.1, activities a, b, and c, the inspector verified that personnel performing the reviews were on the designated list.
d.
Incidents The incident reporting and investigating system was reviewed using APM j 2.8, " Reporting", and Station Directives 2.8.1, " Station Investigation ! Report (SIR) Program" and 4.2.2, " Technical Review Committee", as the l basis.
The review was conducted by examining records. of incident j reports and by examining other'-records maintained by the Technical Services Engineer to keep. track of - the investigation process, ' l l L- ___ __
_ - . _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _. - - _. _ .- - _ -. ~ ] -
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i corrective actions, and recommendations made by the Technical Review . Committee (TRC).
The inspector found the program to be functioning ' satisfactorily.
Each incident is assigned to an investigator who prepares a report for review by the TRC.
The TRC reviews the incident and concurs with corrective actions or recommend, additional actions to correct the problem. The report and the TRC's findings are then submitted to the . Station Manager for approval.
If the incident is determined to be
rr. portable to the NRC, a final report is prepared by the System Engineer, , ! Licensing, for submittal by the Vice President', Steam Production, to ! the NRC. All incidents are followed up by plant personnel. Site QA sersonnel perform audits of selected incidents.
The LER's reviewed during this report period are listed in Paragraph 9.
c.
Special Reviews This Technical Specification requires the Station Manager to cause special reviews to be performed when requested by the Vice President, , j Steam Production.
The Station Manager has established the TRC, thru- ! Station Directive 4.2.2, to comply with this requirement. Discussions with the TRC chairman and several members disclosed no questions with
this item.
! s No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
' i l 8.
Surveillance Testing i - Surveillance testing activities, listed below, were witnessed or reviewed by the inspector to ascertain procedural compliance and performance adequacy.
In each case noncompliance was identified as described.
l I a.
LPI Pump Surveillance Testing " . l Inspector surveillance of quarterly performed PT/3/A/0203/06, ~ LPI Performance Test, revealed non-compliance regulatory requirements,in : ! that the procedure did not incorporate Technical Specification 4.1.2 i requirements for venting the pump casing prior _ to testing.
, j On 10/7/80 the inspector accompanied Performance Group Technicans to l the Unit 3 LPI pump room for the 15 minute run of the "A" LPI Pump;as ^ required in PT/3/A/0203/06.
During.the. course of; testing _ the ~ inspector noted that the pump was started'and run without having been vented.
No_ abnormal noises were apparent, the. discharge pressure was steady-and within specification, and no signs of cavitation were ' t noted. Subsequent review of the procedure revealed no reference to the: ,
venting required by T.S. 4'.1.2.
The unit supervisor was contacted to y l _ determine if the. pump had been vented prior to turnover,for _ testing.
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. . . . -6-The inspector found that the pump had not been vented prior to turn-over and review of operator logs indicated the last venting occured at 2030 hours on 9/13/80 during PT 0/A/0203/13, HPI and LPI Pump Venting.
The inspector informed the Performance Group Technicans of the venting requirement and verified that the Unit 2 LPI pumps were vented prior to performing the same test later in the day.
This item is considered to be in noncompliance with Technical Specifi-cation 4.1.2, Table 4.1-2, item 10, which requires non-operating LPI pump casings to be vented prior to testing. This is an infraction and applies to Unit 3 (287/80-26-02).
b.
ES Logic Subsystem 1, HPI and RB Isolation Channel 1 on Line Test On October 13, 1980 surveillance tests IP/0/A/310/12A and IP/0/A/310/ 13A were scheduled to be performed on Unit 2.
During performance of these tests an unplanned, radioactive gaseous release occurred. The event was reported to the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.72.
Investiga-tion by the resident inspector identified Technical Specification 6.4.1.J. which requires nuclear safety-related periodic test procedures to be performed using appropriate, check-off lists and instructions.
Review of these test procedures and the computer logs revealed that an open flow path through the reactor building (RB) purge valves existed for 46 seconds allowing air from the RB to escape. Test procedure IP/0/A/310/12A is designed to test one inlet and one outlet purge valve sequentially.
IP/0/A/310/13A tests the remaining two inlet and two outlet purge valves sequentially.
Thus, if the two tests are performed independently, and an error in sequence occurs, no open path will result. It appears that an error in sequence and conducting both tests simultaneously resulted in the open flow path. Tests are required to be performed in sequence unless permission to change the sequence is obtained as prescribed by Station Directive 4.2.1.
Failure to follow prescribed sequence has been identified as noncompliance with T.S. 6.4.1.j. (270/80-29-01).
9.
Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector performed a review of licensee events reports listed below to verify that the report details met licerise requirements, identified the cause of the event, described corrective actions appropriate for the identified cause, adequately assessed the event, and addressed any generic implications.
In addition, the inspector examined selected operating and maintenance logs, records, and internal incident investigation reports.
Personnel were interviewed to verify that the report accurately reflected the circumstances of the event, that the corrective action had been taken or responsibility assigned to assure completion and that the event was reviewed by the licensee as stipulated in the Technical Specifications.. . m ( ) . 6-
. . . . -7-LER Event R0-269/80-09, Fire Detection System Inoperable R0-269/80-10 RB Personnel Hatch Declared Inoperable R0-269/80-11, Procedural Heatup Curves Non-Conservative with Respect to TS R0-269/80-12, TDEW Pump Isolated from SGIB R0-269/80-13, TDEW Pump Declared Inoperable R0-269/80-14, Keowee Unit 2 Inoperable R0-269/80-15, Four Broken Holddown Springs in SF Pool R0-269/80-16, Analysis of SG Tube Failure Non-Conservative R0-269/80-17, CBAST Pump Removal from Service R0-269/80-18, HPSW Pump Out of Service R0-269/80-19, Inoperable CBAST Pump R0-269/80-20, Lack of 125 VDC Instr. and Control Power System Redundaacy R0-269/80-21, Overheating in "B" Loop HPI Lines R0-269/80-22, B HPSW Pump Declared Inoperable R0-269/80-23, Reactivity Anomaly During Reactor Startup R0-269/80-24, Cable Controlling Auto Initiation of HPI SW Pumps Removal from Service due to construction Inter-ference R0-269/80-29, Keowee Unit 2 Declared Inoperable R0-270/80-02, Hydraulic Shock Suppressor declared inoparable R0-270/80-03, Unplanned reactivity insertion at cold shutdown R0-270/80-04, Inoperable RB Pressure Switch R0-270/80-05, CF Tank Boron Concentration below Limit R0-270/80-06, Valve 2LP21 Inoperable R0-270/80-07, Penetration Room Ventilation system Inoperable R0-270/80-08, 2B HPI Removal from Service R0-270/80-10, Power Operations Failure of 2LPSW-19 R0-270/80-23, CBAST Pump Declared Inoperable R0-287/80-05, One BWST Level Channel Inoperable R0-287/80-06, BWST Unavailable Due to Low Level' R0-287/80-08, Power Lost to RPS Ch. B R0-287/80-09, Inoperable Portion of the EPSL R0-287/80-10, SG Tube leak , 10.
IEB Followup
l The licensee's response and actions ' for the following IEB's were reviewed and where appropriste verified.
- I IEB 80-03, Loss of Charcoal from Standard Type II,- 2 inch, Tray Absorber - l Cells.
, The licensee's response is dated 3/21/80.
A supplemental rerponse was . requested 10/20/80 to. describe - filter construction details that prevent degradation as described in ' the bulletin. The inspector examined spare-( filters and agrees.with the licensee's ' conclusion ;that degradation. will not occur due to construction differences.
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_, . . . . -8-IEB 80-04, Analysis of a PWR MSL Break with Continued Feedwater Addition.
The inspector had no comment with the licensee's response, dated 5/7/80.
IEB 80-05, Vacuum Condition Resulting in Damage to CVCS Holdup Tanks A modification, NSM 1051, has been prepared, as stated in the licensee's response, dated 5/6/80.
Installation is scheduled during the next refuel-ing outage for each unit.
IEB 80-06, ESF Reset Controls The licensee's response, dated 7/14/80, to Item 2 of this bulletin was verified by the inspector. Items 1 and 3 are being evaluated by NRR.
> IEB 80-08, Examination of Containment Lines Penetration Welds.
The inspector verified that the licensee response dated 7/1/80 was received on time. The response is currently being evaluated by the NRC.
IEB 80-09, Hydramotor Actuator Deficiencies.
The licensee's response, dated 6/6/80, was verified by the inspector.
IEB 80-10, Contamination of Nonradioactive System and Resulting Potential for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release to Environment.
The inspector verified the actions taken by the licensee as described in the response of 8/1/80.
IEB 80-11, Masonry Wall Design.
The licensee's response, dated 7/7/80, is being evaluated by IE:RII and IE:HQ.
IEB 80-12, DKR System Operability The inspector verified actions taken by the licensee as described in their response, dated 6/6/80.
l l IEB 80-15, Possible Loss of Hotline with Loss of Off-site Power The licensee has prepared a modification, NSM 1113, to connect the ENS to a non-load-shed, vital bus power source.
Their work is scheduled to be completed in December 1980. Additional evaluation of the licensee's response, dated 8/27/80 is currently underway by IE:RII.
l IEB 80-19, Failure of Mercury-Wetted Matrix Relays in RPS of Operated Nuclear Power Plants Designed by CE ! L
. . . . -9-The subject relays are not used in the RPS at Oconee. The licensee's response is dated 8/22/80.
11.
Spent Fuel Shipping Cask NAC-1B Integrity Verification A consulting finn was contracted by the licensee to perform required spent fuel shipping cask cavity integrity verification on the NAC-1/NFS-4 container at Oconee Nuclear Station on October 22-24, 1980. The resident inspector reviewed NAC Document No. 580, NAC-1 Cask Cavity Measurement Procedure, for technical adequacy prior to performance of the verification measurements.
The inspector also witnessed the calibration of the applicable test' equipment, observed installation of said test equipment, observed selected portions of cask measurement and reviewed accumulated raw data.
Preliminary data analysis on 10/27/80 revealed that the cask did not comply with certificate acceptance criteria.
A telephone communication held with the licensee corporate offices on 10/28/80 confirmed that the cask measurement failed to meet the acceptance criteria as dictated in the certificate of compliance.
The licensee has indicated that the cask cavity is to be cleaned and remeasured at a later date.
This area will be perused during a subsequent inspection.
12.
Re-review of Category A Requirements of NUREG 0578 The status of THI-1 lessons learned category A items, delineated in NUREG 0578 and clarified, amended or extended by letters between NRC and DPC, were reported in the following Inspection Reports:
Oconee 1 Oconee 2 Oconee 3 269/79-12 270/79-12 287/79-12 269/79-14 270/79-14 287/79-15 269/79-23 270/79-21 287/79-18 ! 269/79-31 270/79-29 287/79-23 l 269/80-07 270/80-05 287/79-31 l 269/80-23 270/80-08 287/80-05 l 270/80-20 287/80-08 287/80-11 i 287/80-17 l Additional documentation for two items is presented below: 2.1.1 Emergency Power Supply Requirements (Pressurizer Heaters) (II.E.3.1 TAP Designation)
The pressurizer heaters for the Ocones Units are supplied from motor i control centers (MCC) which are in turn powered via load centers from the i l l
. . . -10-4160 volt engineered safeguard busses. The inspector verified this through review of drawings and discussions with plant personnel. The following table summarizes the inspectors findings: OEE Drawing Heater Bank Number of Load Number Number Number MCC Heaters Shed 149-11
A IXK
No 249-14
A 2XK
No 349-14
A 3XK
No 149-8
B IXH
No 149-9A
C IXI
No 149-9
D 1XJ
Yes 149-11
K 1XK
No 249-10
B 2XH
No 249-12
C 2XI
No 249-11
D 2XJ
Yes 249-14
K 2XK
No 349-10
B 3XH
No 349-12
C 3XI
No 349-11
D 3XJ
Yes 349-14
K 3XK
No 149-6A
E IXH
No 149-5
F IXI
No 149-6
G IXJ
Yes 249-8
E 2XH
No 249-6
F 2XI
No 249-7
G 2XJ
Yes 249-8
E 3XH
No 349-6
F 3XI
No-349-7
G 3XJ
Yes 149-3A
H IXH
No 149-3
I IXI
No 140-2
J IXJ
Yes 249-4
H 2XH 4.
No 249-3
I 2XI
No 249-2
J 2XJ
Yes 349-4
H 3XH
No 349-3
I 3XI
No 349-2
J 3XJ
Yes From the above it can be seen that the heaters are divided among the engineered safeguard busses such that a loss of one 4160 volt bus will not preclude the capability to supply sufficient heaters to meet this Lessons Learned require.nent. Also from the table, it can be noted that only one of the MCC's will load-shed, the other two remain energized upin transfer to the emergency power source.
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___ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . .... o-11-2.1.1 Emergency Power Supply for Pressurizer Relief Valves, Block Valves, and Level Indicators (TAP Number II, G.1.)
a.
Pressurizer Relief Valves As shown on OEE 150-7, 250-7 and 350-7, the PORV for each Oconee Unit is actuated by a DC solenoid operated pilot valve that is energized by vital bus ID1B, 2DIB and 3DIB. Additionally, modification NSM 1531 was installed to provide motive power for the pilot valve thru the KU inverter if the KI inverter failed.
b.
PORV Block Valves The PORV block valve for each Oconee Unit is an AC motor operated valve that is powered from a non-load shed power source.
Review of drawings and interviews with plant personnel revealed the following: Drawing MCC Load Load Unit Number Number Center Shed
0-703-E 1XP 1X6 No
0-1703-D 2X0 2X5 No
0-2703-D 3X0 3XS No Modification 1287 was completed on 12/4/79 for Unit I to change the power supply for the block valve (IRL4) to a non-load shed source. The original design for Units 2 and 3 was a non-load shed source and therefore no change was required for NUREG 0578 requirements.
c.
Pressurizer Level Indicators Three channels of presurizer level indication are provided for each Oconee Unit. Two channels are powered through the KI inverter and the third channel from the KU inverter. These two inverters are backed up by batteries and are automatically transferred to the emergency power source upon failure of the inverter.
The innpector had no comments or questions on the satisfaction of NUREG 0578, Item 2.1.1. }}