IR 05000269/1980014
| ML19320B295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 05/23/1980 |
| From: | Conlon T, Miller W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19320B288 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-80-14, 50-270-80-09, 50-270-80-9, 50-287-80-09, NUDOCS 8007100151 | |
| Download: ML19320B295 (10) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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E REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST N.W SUITE 3100
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 MY 2 71980 Report Nos. 50-269/80-14, 50-270/80-09 and 50-287/80-09 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: Oconee Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 Inspection at Ocone si near' neca, South Carolina Inspector:
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2 0/ 'd W.11. Miller, Jr.
Dite Signed
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Approved by:
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E. Conlon, Section Chief, RCES Branch D4te Signed SUMMARY
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Inspection on April 28 through May 1, 1980 Areas Inspected This special, unannounced inspection involved 33 inspector-hours on-site in the creas of fire protection / prevention.
Results Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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8007100151'
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- 11. B. Tucker, Manager, Nuclear Production Division
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager
- G. Vaughn, Assistant Manager
- J. T. McIntosh, Supervisor of Administration
- D. Austin, Training and Safety Coordinator
- W. G. Itin, Safety Supervisor T. King, Fire Protection
- J. McBride, Engineer S. Baldwin, Engineer
- R. T. Bond, Licensing and Protectu Engineer
- T. C. Matthews, Licensing - Technical Specialist
- T. E. Cribbe, Licensing Engineer NRC Resident Inspectors
- F. Jape
- D. O. Myers
- Attended exit ir terview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 1, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Insiaction Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about whicu more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in, Paragraphs 5.b and 5.c (seven items).
5.
Fire Protection / Prevention Modifications This inspection evaluated the licensee's progress and corrective action on the fire protection modification and improvement commitments made to the NRC.
The NRC Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report (FPSER) for this facility dated August 11, 1978 (Amendment Nos. 64, 64 and 61 to Operating License No. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55), and the licensee's Fire Hazards
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Analysis (FHA) for Oconee dated December 31, 1976 were used in this eval-uation.
These documents describe the fire protectir,n modifications and schedule dates for implementation of the modificationp. The modifications and findings of this inspection are as follows:
a.
Modifications:
FPSER Comnitment Number Location / Item Paragraph Status Reactor Building - Unit 1 5.1 (1)
RCP oil collection system 3.1.12
- 0 pen (2)
Hose stations / low pressure 3.1.6
- 0 pen service water system
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Reactor Building - Unit 2 5.1 (3)
RCP oil collection system 3.1.12 Open (4)
H;se stations / low pressure 3.1.6 Open service water system Reactor Building - Unit 3 5.1 (5)
RCP oil collection system 3.1.12 Open (6)
Hose stations / low pressure 3.1.6 Open service water system Control Room - Units 1 and 2 5.2 (7)
Smoke detectors 3.1.1 Open (7A)
Beneath ceiling Open (7B)
In cabinets and consoles Open (7C)
Adjacent rooms Open (8)
Seal cable penetrations to 3.1.3 Closed cable spreading room (9)
Fire extinguisher / Class A 3.1.8 Closed Control Room Unit 3 5.2 (10)
Smoke detectors
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Beneath ceilings Open (10B)
Cabinets Open (10C)
Adjacent Rooms Open (11)
Seal cable penetratiwu te 3.1.3 Closed spreading room (12)
Fire extinguisher / Class A 3.1.6 Closed
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FPSER Commitment Number Location / Item Paragraph Status Auxiliary Building - 838 Foot Elevation 5.3 (13)
Fire detectors 3.1.1 Open (13A)
Storage areas Open (13B)
Protective clothing areas Open (14)
Hose stations 3.1.6 Open Auxiliary Building - 796 Foot Elevation 5.4 (15)
Smoke detectors 3.1.1 Open (16)
Fire barrier / cable shaft 3.1.3 Closed (17)
Fire door /HVAC Room - Unit 3 3.1.3 Open (18)
Hose stations 3.1.6 Open (19)
Water spray system each 3.1.16 Open equipment rooms and cable shafts Auxiliary Building - 771 Foot 5.5 and 783 Foot Elevations (20)
Hose stations 3.1.6 Open (21)
Smoke detectors / storage areas 3.1.1 Open (22)
Smoke detectors / shutdown 3.1.1 Open equipment areas (23)
Hose station connection 3.1.2 Closed (EL 771 Foot and 783 Foot)
Auxiliary Building - 758 Foot Elevation 5.6 (24)
Smoke detectors 3.1.1 Opra (24A)
High pressure injection pump area (24B)
Low pressure injection pump area
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(25)
Hose stations 3.1.6 Open Cable Spreading Room - Unit 1 5.7 (26)
Hose stations 3.1.6 Open (27)
Cable penetration to 3.1.3 Closed equipment room (28)
Manual water spray system 3.1.16 Open i
Cable Spreading Room - Unit 2 (29)
Hose stations 3.1.6 Open (30)
Cable penetration te 3.1.3 Closed
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equipment room
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(31)
Manual water spray system 3.1.16 Open
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FPSER Commitment Number Location / Item Paragraph Status Cable Spreading Room - Unit 3 (32)
Hose stations 3.1.6 Open (33)
Cable penetration to 3.1.3 Closed equipment room (34)
Manual water spray system 3.1.16 Open (35)
Fire door /HVAC room 3.1.3 Open Battery Rooms 5.8 (36)
Hose stations 3.1.6 Open (37)
Smoke detectors / Unit 3 3.1.1 Closed Penetration Areas 5.9 (38)
Hose stations 3.1.6
Turbine Building 5.10 (39)
Smoke detectors / area of 3.1.1 Open shutdown cables (40)
Hose stations 3.1.6 Closed Yard Area 5.13 (41)
Propane tanks 3.1.7 Closed Block Houses 5.14 (42)
Upgrade bus duct penetration 5.14.6 Closed between transformer and
switchgear
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Keowee Hydro-Station (43)
Hose stations to reach 3.1.6 Open all safety-related areas General Plant Areas (44)
Water flow alarm on 3.1.5 Closed sprinkler systems (45)
Control room fire alarm 4.2 Open signal (46)
Dual supply / auxiliary 3.1.2 Closed
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building hose stations
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(Cont'd.)
FPSER Commitment Number Location / Item Paragraph Status Gener; Plant Areas (Continued)
(47)
Fire protection control valve 4.3.1.3 Closed supervision (48)
Fire hose nozzles / spray type 3.1.11 Closed (49)
Portable smoke removal 3.1.9
- Closed equipment (50)
Emergency breathing 3.1.10 Closed apparatus (50A)
Breathing apparatus units Closed (50B)
Refill unit Closed (51)
Portable hand lights for 3.1.4 Closed fire brigade (52)
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(52A)
Replace unlisted fire 3.1.3 Open doors and frames with labeled units (52B)
Double fire doors /one 3.1.3 Open door latched close (52C)
Modify fire doors between Closed turbine and auxiliary buildings (53)
Fire dampers /all fire 3.1.3 Open barriers (54)
Interim safe shutdown 3.1.17 measures (54A)
Dedicated spare cable for Closed low pressure injection pumps (54B)
Dedicated spare cable for
high pressure injection pumps (55)
Dedicated safe shutdown 3.1.14 Open facility (56)
Administrative Procedures 3.1.15 Open (57)
Reactor building 3.1.18
- Closed communications
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Notes:
- Refer to IE Report Nos. 50-269/80-7, 50-270/80-5 and 50-287/80-5 for details.
- Refer to Paragraph 5.b for additional information.
- This item not inspected.
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4 b.
Findings Additional information on the "open" items and on the " closed items in Paragraph 5.a marked by "**" is listed below. The below listed number correspond to the numbered items in Paragraph 5.a.
(1), (3) and (5) The housings for the oil collection system to the upper and lower bearing oil level devices and upper bearing oil coolers are made of lightweight sheet metal. These housings do not appear capable of meeting the intent of their design for any appreciatable period of time due to their lightweight construction. Also, the drain lines from the housing to the drain tank are only approximately \\ inch tubing which appears too small for removal of an oil discharge into the housings.
This item is identified as Unresolved Item (269/80-14-01, 270/80-09-01, 287/80-09-01), Reevaluation of Oil Collection Systems for Reactor Cool-ant Pumps, and will be reevaluated during a subsequent NRC inspection.
(2) (4) and (6) The standpipe (fire hose) system within the reactor building is supplied from the low pressure service water system. This system normally provided approximately 80 psi pressure at the low pressure service water pumps which are located on the 771 foot elevation of the turbine building with only approximately 50 psi being available at the highest hose system in the reactor building. Section 5-4.2 of National Fire Protection Association Standard 14 (hTPA-14), Standpipe and Hose Systems, requires a minimum water supply at the hydraulically most remote hose connection sufficient to provide a residual pressure of 65 psi with 100 gpm flowing.
Section 2-1.10 of NFPA-14 specifies that the minimum size of piping for systems not exceeding 50 feet shall be at least 2 inches in size and if over 50 feet in height the mininum
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size is required to be 2 inches. The standpipe system within the reactor building contains extensive amounts of 1 -inch piping which further reduces the pressure and volume of water available to the hose system.
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Section E.3 of the FHA does not list the design commitments for the fire hose systems. However, Section 4.3.1.4 of the FPSER states that the fire hose systems meet the requirements of Appendix A of NRC's Branch Technical Position (BTP) 9.5-1, " Fire Protection Program". BTP 9.5-1 references and contains pertinent portion of the NFPA-14 criteria required to be provided to assure that effective fire streams are avail-able from interior fire hose systems. This is identified as Unresolved Item (269/80-14-02, 270/80-09-02 and 287/80-09-02). Interior Fire Hose Systems'Do Not Meet NRC Guidelines, pending further review by the licensee and the NRC.
(7) Section E.1 of the licensee's FHA lists the areas in which the fire detection systems deviate from the NRC guidelines of NFPA-72D, Proprietary Signaling Systems. An exception is not taken to the fire detection requirements of Section 3330 of NFPA-72D which requires detection equipment to meet the location and spacing requirements of NFPA-72E, Automatic Fire Detectors.
However, the smoke detectors
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installed as part of the fire protection modirication program as well as those detectors previously installed do not meet the provisions of Section 4-3 of NFPA-72E primarily due to excessive spacing between detectors and improper location of detector. Section 4.2 of the FPSER states that the system "in general" complies with the essential provi-sion of NFPA-72D. This item is identified as Unresolved Item (269/80-14-03, 270/80-09-03 and 287/80-09-03) Fire Protection Smoke Detection Systems Do Not Meet the NRC Guidelines, pending further review.
(10), (13), (15), (21), (22), (24), and (39) Refer to above item No. 7.
(14) The interior fire hose (standpipe) systems do not meet the NRC guidelines of Section C.3.d.1 in Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 due to the following:
(1) Piping systems utilize extensive amounts of 1\\-inch pipe whereas the minimum size permitted is 2 -inch pipe for single hose stations.
(2) Volume of water available in some areas is inadequate to produce effective fire streams.
(3) Hose connections in many areas are located within unoccupied areas whereas the BTP requires these to be located outside the entrances to the areas.
This item is identified as another example of Unresolved Item (269/
80-14-02, 270/80-09-02 and 287/80-14-02), Interior Fire Hose Systems Do Not Meet The NRC Guidelines.
(18), (23), (25), (26), (29), (32), (36), (38) and (40). Refer to above item (14).
(17) The door into the FVAC Room on the 796' elevation has not been replaced with a fire rated door. Also, refer to items (52) and (53)
for additional information.
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(19), (28), (31) and (34) The water spray systems installed in the cable spreading and equipment rooms do not conform to NRC guidelines or any recognized industry standards and the description of the systems in the FPSER is inadequate to permit a detailed inspection and evalua-tion of the systems.
This item is identified as Unresolved Item
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(269/80-14-04, 270/80-09-04, 287/80-09-04). Water Spray Extinguishing Systems For Cable Spreading and Equipment Rooms Do Not Conform to NRC Guidelines, pending further evaluation.
(43) The hose stations for the Keowee hydro plant are supplied from the suction piping to the plant fire pump. The pressure on the suction piping to the pump is too low to produce effective fire streams. This
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arrangement is also prohibited by the fire pump installation criteria
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of NFPA-20, Centrifugal Fire Pumps. This is identified as another example of Unresolved Item (269/80-14-02, 270/80-09-02, and 287/80-09-02), Interior Fire Hose Systems Do Not Meet NRC Guides.
(45) A unique alarm signal has not been provided for the fire alarm control panels in the control rooms as stated by Section 4.2 of the FPSER.
This is identified as Unresolved Item (269/80-14-05, 270/
80-09-05 and 287/80-09-05), Unique Alarm Signal For Fire Alarm Panels Not Provided in Control Rooms, pending further review.
(50) Two portable smoke removal fans have been provided for fire brigade use.
However, during this inspection these two fans were being used for removal of welding fumes from operations being con-ducted in a poorly vented area. The licensee advised that this was a special one time application of these fans and that instructions were to be established to control the future unauthorized use of these fans.
(52) and (53) The FPSER required a number of modifications to be made to the fire barriers within the plant. However, the details provided within the FPSER and the FHA are inadequate to permit an evaluation of the licensee's accomplishments and commitments. This item is identified as Unresolved Item (269/80-14-06, 270/80-09-06 and 287/80-09-06), Fire Barriers Are Not Delineated, pending further review.
(56) Administrative procedure (1) A new procedure is to be prepared by the licensee for the control of combustible / flammable materials used within the plant.
This procedure and its implementation will be reviewed during a subse-quent NRC inspection.
This item is identified as Inspector Followup Item (269/80-14-07, 270/80-09-07 and 287/80-09-07),
Review of Administrative Procedure For Control of Combustible Materials.
The licensee advised that the preparation of this procedure should be completed by July 1,1980.
(2) The procedure for open flame permits requires permits to be approved by a responsible supervisor, but the procedure does not require this supervisor to be trained in the area of fire preven-tion prior to approving permits. The licensee has recognized this problem and has provided the required training for most of the supervisor. The licensee advised that the remaining supervisors will also be trained and the procedures will be revised prior to July 1, 1980 to restrict open flame approval authority only to those who have completed the required training. This item is identified as Inspector Followup Item (269/80-14-08, 270/80-09-08 and 287/80-09-08), Revisions to Open Flame Permit Procedure, and will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.
(3) The Keowee Hydro-Plant is considered safety-related; however, the fire protection systems are not included in the Oconee Plant's
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Technical Specifications.
The licensee agreed to review the inspection and test procedures for the fire protection system at
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Keowee to assure that these requirements are consistent with the requirements at the Oconee Plant.
This item is identified as Inspector Followup Item (269/80-14-09, 270/80-09-09 and 287/80-09-09), Inspection and Test Procedures for Fire Protection Systems at Keowee Plant, and will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.
c.
Plant Tour A tour was made of the plant to review the above completed fire pro-tection modifications, to verify that the existing fire protection systems were in service and to review the licensee's compliance to t'le administrative procedures for the control of fire hazards within the plant. The following discrepancies in addition to the above identified items were noted:
(1) Battery Room Ventilation The ventilation system for U-its 2 and 3 battery rooms appear marginal, but the system for Unit I battery room appears totally inadequate.
There is a mechanical air supply to the room but there is not an exhaust outlet. The licensee advised that a new ventilation system is to be designed (Design No. I NSM 1230) for this room by August 1980 with construction scheduled for 1981.
This item is identified as Inspector Followup Item (269/80-14-10),
Installation of Unit 1 Battery Room Ventilation System, and will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.
(2) Combustible Fire Loading - Room 347 The combustible fire loading adjacent to the personnel entrance hatch to the Unit 2 reactor building (Room 347) is very high and appear to warrant additional fire protection considerations.
Section D.1(6) of the FHA states that the FHA will be reviewed and updated as necessary.
Current data in the FHA does not reflect this very high fire loading. The licensee advised that this item would be referred to the corporate office for further review. Therefore, this item is identified as Unresolved Item (270/80-09-11), Review of fire loading room 347 (Unit 2), and will be reevaluated upon completion of the licensee's review.
Within the areas examined, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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