IR 05000269/1980030
| ML19347B221 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 09/17/1980 |
| From: | Martin R, Myers D, William Orders NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347B209 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-80-30, 50-270-80-26, 50-287-80-23, NUDOCS 8010140051 | |
| Download: ML19347B221 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES 8"
o,7, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.. SUITE 3100 jis ATLANTA. GEORGIA 3o3o3 s
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Report Nos. 50-269/80-30, 50-270/80-26 and 50-287/80-23 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242
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l Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station t
Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 l
l License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 l
l Inspection at Ot.onee Nuclear Station Inspectors: D$
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p W. Orders Date Signed l
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Date Signed
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Approved by: D$
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gS.R.'D. Martin, Section Chief, RONS Branch Da(e Si'gned l
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SUMMARY Inspection on August 1 - 31, 1980 i
l Areas Inspected j
This routine inspection involved 173 (resident) inspector-hours on site in the areas of plant operations, surveillance testing, instrument calibration, physical security, LER review, contaminated tendon galleries, hydrogen generation inside containment, and load center location.
Results Of the eight areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS l
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Persons Contacted l
Licensee Employees
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- J. E. Smith, Station Manager l
- J. M. Davis, Superintendent of Maintenance
- J. N. Pope, Superintendent of Operations l
- T. B. Owen, Superintendent of Technical Services
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- R. T. Bond, Licensing and Projects Engineer
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- J. Brackett, Senior QA Engineer I
l Other licensee employees contacted included eight operations supervisors, eight technicians, fifteen operators, four mechanics, twelve security force members, and six office personnel.
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- Attended exit interview I
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Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 1, 15, 22, and 29, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
Licensee management acknowledged inspectors' findings without significant comment.
Licensee stated that aluminum ladders as discussed in paragraph 7, will be removed from containment buildings.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or l
deviations.
A new unresolved item identified during this inspection is l
discussed in paragraph 11.
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Plant Operations
i The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the report period, to
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verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications,
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and administrative directives. Control room logs, shift supervisors logs, shift turnover rec <rds, and removal and restoration record books for the three units were scrutinized. Interviews with plant operations, maintenance, i
chemistry, health physics and performance personnel were held on the day j
ar,d night shifts.
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Activities within the control rooms were monitored during portions of all three shifts and at several shift changes. The actions and activities were conducted as prescribed in Section 3.08 of the Station Directives. The l
number of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum i
required by IEB 79-05C. Operators were responsive to plant annunicator j
alarms and appeared to be cognizant of plant conditions.
l Plant tours were taken during the inspection period as follows:
l Turbine Building Auxiliary Building I
Units 1, 2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms i
Station yard zone within the protected area l
During the plant tours, observations were made of ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices.
Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Testing The surveillance tests tabulated below were an_1yzed or witnessed by the inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy.
l The completed test procedures examined were analyzed for embodiment of the necessary test prerequisites, preparations, constructions, and acceptance criteria and for sufficiency of technical content.
The selected tests witnessed were examined to ascertain that current written j
approved procedures were available and in use, test equipment in use was l
calibrated, test prerequisites were met, system restoration completed, and l
test results were adequate.
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The procedures selected for review demonstrated conformance with applicable Technical Specifications and procedural requirements, they appeared to have received the required administrative review, and they apparently were performed within the surveillance frequency specified.
Test Title PT-1-A-251-9 LPI Check Valve Functional Test
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PT-0-A-230-13 MOV Off Main Steam l
PT-2-A-600-1 Periodic Instrument Surveillance PT-2-A-600-10 RCS Leakage PT-2-A-150-22A Refueling Valve Functional Test PT-1-A-251-03 Concentrated Boric Acid Transfer Pump Test PT-0-A-115-07 Reactor Building Spray Valve Verification PT-0-A-600-15-CRD Movement PT-0-A-610-4A Oconee Central Tie Control Logic PT-0-A-610-06 100 KV Power Supply From Lee l'
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I IP-0-A-250-5B Fire protection System Detector Test IP-1-B-125-3 Seismic Switch Calibration I
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IP-0-A-275-5T Emergency Feedwater Instrument Cal. and Function PT-0-A-110-5D RB Hydrogen Purge Filter Test PT-1-A-203-6 LP Injection System Performance Test PT-1-A-251-1 LPSW Pump Performance Test PT-1-A-251-2 Spent Fuel Pool Pump Performance Test PT-1-A-600-11 Emergency Feedwater System PT-1-A-800-01 Reactivity Anomaly Calculated at Power
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PT-2-A-170-5 Pentration Room Ventilation System
PT-0-A-290-04 Turbine Valve Movement.
The inspector employed one or more of the following acceptance criteria for evaluating the above items:
10 CFR ANSI N18.7
Oconee Technical Specifications Oconee Station Directives
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this area.
7.
Instrument Calibration Verification The inspector conducted a review cf the following measuring and testing devices used as a primary standard in the calibration of plant equipment.
Instrument Number Description OCIAC 27306 Current / Voltmeter OCIAC 27132 Twin Seal pressure pump OCiAC 27134 Pneumatic pressure tester The following items were verified for the above listed instruments:
The calibration frequency and accuracy were met.
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The calibration standard is traceable to the National Bureau of Standards.
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Storage and control is in accordance with approved procedures (Station Directive 2.3.1).
The inspector conducted a review of the following calibration and functional procedures and test results on safety associated instruments not covered by technical specifications:
IP/0/B/202/IN Letdcwn Storage Tank Flow Inst. Calibration IP/0/B/161/1B Reactor Building Stack Flow Instrument Cailbration IP/1/B/240/1A Surge Tank Level Instrument Calibration IP/1/B/202/1C RC Pump Seal Flow Inst. Calibration IP/1/B/202/1B RC Pamp P/P Instrument Calibration IP/1/B/202/1E Letdown Storage Tank Pressure Instrument Cal.
IP/1/B/202/1K RC Makeup Flow System Instrument Calibration
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The following safety related procedures were reviewed:
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IP/0/A/3000/05 Oconee Diode Monitoring Test IP/0/A/0203/01A BWST Level Instrument Calibration IP/0/A/310/12A ES High Pressure Injection Logic Channed 1 On Line Test IP/0/A/305/01A RPS Channel A Pump / Power Monitor Instrument Calibration i
IP/1/A/305/03/C RPS Channel C On Line Test
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IP/0/A/305/03D RPS Channel D On Line Test
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IP/0/A/203/IE Reactor Building Emergency Sump Level Instrument i
Calibration l
IP/0/A/310/3C ES Reactor Building Narrow Range Pressure Calibration and Analog Channel 1 Test.
The above procedures and test results were reviewed to verify that:
Reviews and approvals were being conducted and data was recorded and
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evaluated.
Test instruments used were listed and identified in the test results.
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Technical contents were correct and verification of return of equipment l
to service and removal of test equipment was being performed.
Adherence to technical specification requirements and limiting conditions
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l for operation.
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Calibration frequency specified in the technical specifications (and local schedules for safety associated instruments) are being met.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following procedures:
l IP/0/A/200/10 RC Pressurizer Instrument Calibration l
IP/0/A/0275/05 P Steam Generator Level Instrumentation Calibration IP/0/A/275/5Q Steam Generator Compensated Level Instrumentation Calibration IP/2/A/305/3C RPS Channel-C On-Line Test.
Verification was made that performance was consistent with approved procedures, calibration of test equipment was current and traceability of test equipment to a National Standard was maintained.
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In the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified.
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8.
Physical Security During the month of August, implementation of the physical security program was observed and selected records were reviewed. Also, interviews were l
held with several members of the physical security organization. The areas inspected included:
physical security organizations, physical barriers,
i access and badge controls, pat down searches and communication checks. The
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guidance and acceptance criteria used for this inspection is provided in 10 l
CFR 73.55(b), (c), (d), (f), and (g), Regulatory Guide 5.20 and NUREG-0219.
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The review of the physical security organization revealed the following:
A member of the physical security organization who has the authority a.
to direct the shift activities is present at all times. This item was verified on August 26, shifts I and 2, August 27, shifts I and 2 and August 28, Shif ts 2 and 3.
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Shift complement requirements were checked on August 27 to verify the l
l shif t was properly manned.
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Inspection of physical barriers consisted of walking the protected area fence on August 28, and observing that all gates were locked closed, and the isolation zone was free of objects. Within the building vital area door barriers were noted to be closed and locked. Throughout the month of August it was noted that guards were posted at control room doors when the doors were malfunctioning.
Access control was checked each time the inspector entered the protected area. Persons and packages were observed being searched on August 25, 26, 27, and 28. This review also included observation that all persons within the protected area properly displayed their identification badge.
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To detennine compliance with escorting procedures, the inspector spot checked visitors and their escorts during the report period.
The escort is required to remain with the visitor at all times and keep control of the visitor. Appropriate procedures and requirements were followed during the period of observation.
Records were selectively examined throughout the month to determine if required communications checks were performed. Checks are required to be done at the beginning of each shift for onsite communications and once per day for offsite equipment.
For the period examined all checks were completed as required.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.
9.
Review of Licensec Event Reports
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The i=pector performed an in-office review of nonroutine event reports to
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verify that the report details met license requirements, identified the cause of the event, described corrective actions appropriate for the identi-fied cause, and adequately addressed the event and any generic implications.
In addition, the inspector examined selected operating and maintenance logs and records and internal incident investigation reports. Personnel were interviewed to verify that the report accurately reflected the circumstances i
of the event, that the corrective action had been taken or responsibility l
assigned to assure completion and that the event was reviewed by the licensee, l
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t l-as stipulated in the Technical Specifications. The following event reports were reviewed:
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Report Number Title l
R0-269/80-9 Fire Detection System Inoperable l
R0-269/80-10 Reactor Building Personnel Hatch Declared Inoperable l
R0-269/80-11 Procedural Heatup Curves Non-Conservative with Respect
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to Technical Specifications R0-269/80-12 Turbine-Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Isolated from Steam Generator IB R0-269/80-14 Zeowee U-2 Inoperable Due to Failure of Partial Shutdown l
Solenoid Circuit l
R0-269/80-15 Four Broken Holddown Springs Discovered in Spent Fuel Pool l
RO-269/80-16 FSAR Analysis of Steam Generator Tube Failure Found to
be Non-Conservative l
R0-269/80-17 Concentrated Boric Acid Storage Tank Pump Removed From
Service
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R0-269/80-18 High Pressure Service Water Pump Out of Service l
R0-269/80-19 Inoperable Concentrated Boric Acid Storage Tank Pump l
FO-269/80-20 Lack of 125 VDC Instrumentation and Control Power System Redundancy R0-269/80-21 Overheating in the "B" Loop High Pressure Injection Lines R0-269/80-22
"B" HPSW Pump Declared Inoperable R0-270/80-2 Hydraulic Shock Supressor Declared Inoperable R0-270/80-3 Unplanned Reactivity Insertion at Cold Shutdown R0-270/80-4 Inoperable Reactor Building Pressure Switch R0-270/80-5 Core Flood Tank Boron Concentration Below Required Level R0-270/80-7 Penetration Room Ventilation System Inoperable 10.
Tendon Gallery Contaminated Water During an inspection of the Unit 2 reactor building on May 29, 1980 prior to the performance of an Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT), approximately 45,000 gallons of water were discovered in the tendon gallery. This water covered the entire tendon gallery floor to a depth of about 20 inches, and was sampled and found to be contaminated. The Tendon Galley Sump Pumps (TGSPs) for Unit 2 were inoperable at that time, and the licensee stated that the water resulted from normal inleakage. An investigation was begun to determine the source of the contamination.
'The tendon galleries' of Units 1 and 3 were inspected. The TGSPs for these units were found to be effectively keeping any inleakage pumped out.
Samples of ' the water found in the sumps of these tendon galleries were analyzed. These analyses indicated that Unit 1 sample consisted of similar isotopes as found in Unit 2, but with a lower activity, and that Unit 3 had only trace activity.
Based on these results, the TGSPs of Units 1 and 3 were stopped, halting transfer of any water from the tendon galleries until
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l the source of contamination could be identified.
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During the search for the sources of contamination, an inspection of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building revealed that two High Pressure Injection (HPI)
system valves in the West Penetration Room were leaking. This leakage was seeping through the West Penetration Room floor / Reactor Building wall interface and into the Decon Tank Room below. This interface consists of 2 inches of self-expanding cork which separates the Reactor Building wall from the West Penetration Room floor. This arrangement is also used to separate the Decon Tank Room floor from the Reactor Building wall. The licensee feel that the water from the leaking valves, after entering the Decon Tank Room, seeped through the cork interface between the Decon Tank Room floor and the Reactor Building wall and into the soil below. The Decon Tank Room is the lowest room on the west side of the Auxiliary Building that is adjacent to the Reactor Building.
It is further considered that the seepage of this water continued through the soil into the top of the tendon gallery.
Water in a pipe trench in the Unit 2 Decon Tank Room was isotopically analyzed and compared to a sample from Unit 2 tendon gallery.
The two samples indicated nearly identical isotopes; therefore, it is believed that these two samples had the same source.
The licensee plans to prepare a procedure to dispose of the water from the tendon galleries, accounting for the total activity content of each release and providing for proper monitoring during the release. Also, a modification l
is being examined to permanently reroute the water from the tendon galleries l
to provide monitoring prior to and during release.
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l In order to eliminate the potential flow path of contaminated water from j
the Auxiliary Building, the licensee is reviewing the adequacy of the
current design of the interface between the Auxiliary Building floors and the Reactor Building wall to establish an effective seal in this interface.
l Additional followup on this matter will be conducted during future inspections.
11. Hydrogen Generation l
The inspector discussed with the licensee the practice of storing aluminum ladders within the reactor containment building. The chemical reaction of alumimum with boric acid is exothermic and results in byproduct generation l
of hydrogen. The safety implications associated with hydrogen production inside containment dictate further discussions with the licensee.
Unresolved item: This item of the storage of aluminum ladders within the reactor building is unresolved pending further inspection by the resident inspectors (269/80-30-01).
12. Location of Load Centers to Locaticas Outside Containment During the RCP Seal Leak Event at Arkanas Nuclear One, Unit I on May 10, 1980, it became necessary for a person to enter containment to unlock and close breakers which provided power to isolation valves of the core flood
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Only after this was accomplished could the operator close the t
isolation valves and bring the reactor to a normal cold shutdown. If the (
containmentenvironmentwassuchthatapersoncouldnotenter!thecontain-l ment, the operator would need to deviate from normal operating procedures l
to bring the plant to cold shutdown.
f It is the NRR Technical position that any valve which is required by Technical Specifications to be locked in a particular position during operation and requires entry into the containment to actually unlock the valve locking capability (such as a locked open breaker) should have its locking capability located outside the containment where access can be provided.
Technical Specifications were reviewed by the Resident Inspector to identify locking requirements of motor operated valves and licensee operations personnel were interviewed. The review indicated that identified locked valves are in conformance with the NRR stated position.
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