IR 05000269/1980039
| ML19350C047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 02/09/1981 |
| From: | Economos N, Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350C022 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-80-39, 50-270-80-34, 50-287-80-30, NUDOCS 8103240785 | |
| Download: ML19350C047 (10) | |
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p UNITED STATES
O NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E
o REGION 11 3 E f
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 D
%.,,.. * 'af ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 FEB 101961
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Report Nos. 50-269/80-39, 50-270/80-34 and 50-287/80-30 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 Inspection at Oco, e n Seneca, South Carolina Inspecto
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Date
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N.Ec6p Approved by:
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A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RCES Branch Uate SUMMARY Inspection on December 15-18, 1980 and January 5-8, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 50 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of Inservice inspection procedure review, record review, work observation, Safe Shutdown Facility - pipe weldina and NDE; Control rod drive mechanism nozzle flange gasket replacement; Cracked manway studs.
Results Of the four areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in three areas; one violation was identified in one area (Violation-Axial and Circumferential UT of pipe welds, paragraph 8).
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o DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager
- R. J. Brackett, Station Senior QA Engineer
- C. B. Cheezem, Inservice Inspection Engineer
- R. T. Bond, Technical Service Engineer G. Rothenburger, Support Engineer Mechanical Maintenance
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M. Alexander, Maintenance Coordinator, Unit 3 B. Carney, Associate Engineer B. Calhoun, Associate Project Engineer Other Organizations Babcock and Wilcox, Nuclear Power Generation Division (NPGD)
H. W. Stoppelmann, ISI Coordinator / Level II Examiner G. Baker, Level II, ET Examiner G. Alberti, Level II, ET Examiner M. Gallagher, ET Analysis NRC Resident Inspector
- D. O. Myers
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview-The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 18 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
Findings between~ January 5-8, 1981 were summarized on January 9,1981 by _J.
Lenahan, NRC inspector.
The findings documented in paragraph 6 of this report were discussed with the licensee by telephone on ' January 12, 1981.
3.
Licensee-Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item 269/78-21-02, Steam Generator Tubing Surveillance.
DPC's alternative to R.G.1.83 for surveillance of once thru steam generator (OTSG) tubing that was submitted for-review on June 21, 1977 has been incorporated into the technical specification (TS) under paragraph 4.17 Steam Generator Tubing surveillance.
Provisions include acceptance criteria, tube selection and testing inspection frequencies and reporting.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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5.
Independent Inspection Effort a.
Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF), (Units 1-3)
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This is a followup to the work effort documented under Region II report 50-269/80-15, 50-270/80-10.
At the time of this inspection, concrete forms were being constructed in preparation for concrete pour on the upper sections of the building walls.
There was no pipe welding in progress.
The controlling document is entitled "Information in Support of Standby Shutdown Facility, GS-1014-5M-19".
It identifies the structure as Seismic Category I and commits pipe design to ASME Section III. The project is being handled as Station Modification 1012 part H.
Pipe and welding requirements are controlled by Pipe Design Specification OS-27-A.1 and the
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Power Piping Quality Assurance Manual.
Portions of the auxiliary service water system installed at this time were as follows:
(1)
16" pump suction line from the low point off Unit 2 component cooling water line (CCW) to the 1st isolation valve no. SSF-CCW-166.
(2)
12" return line from tie-in to the top of Unit 2 CCW line back to the 1st isolation valves no. SSF-CCW-182,183, 310.
(3)
6" feed line from the SSF structure to the exterior of the penetration rooms at each unit.
Small diameter
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piping associated with the diesel fuel system has been fabricated but has not been installed.
The inspector observed completed pipe welds in the auxiliary service water system (System 13) and selected a random sample for detail record review and evaluation -
these were as follows:
Weld-Size ISO Type
12" Schedule 20
Pipe to Pipe
- 8 12" Schedule 20
Elbow to Pipe
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12" Schedule 20
Pipe to Elbow
- 10 12" Schedule 20
Pipe to Elbow
- 15 12" Schedule 20
Pipe to Pipe
16" Schedule 20
Pipe to Pipe
16" Schedule 20
Pipe to Elbow 18-16" Schedule 20
Pipe to Elbow
6" Schedule 80
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The above welds were identified as ASME Section III Class C. Within these areas the inspector observed /
inspected workmanship, bead appearance, cleanliness, weld and welder identification.
In addition the inspector reviewed welder qualification records, consumable material receipt inspection records and quality certifications, pipe material quality records and weld fabrication quality control records including radiographs of indicated welds.
Discussions with the licensee's representatives disclosed that DPC0 has decided to invoke ASME Section III require-ments for material and weld fabrication and thereby attain consistancy and code compliance with design require-ments for this projects.
To reach this objective DPC0 is reviewing and, where necessary, obtaining the required soft ware for piping, components and other material used in this project. The inspector stated that this area will be inspected for code compliance on a subsequent inspection. This matter was identified as an inspector followup item 50-269/80-39-01, 50-270/80-34-01 and 50-287/80-30-01, "SSF Code required Fabrication / Material Records."
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle Flange Gasket Replacement, (Unit 3).
During a visual inspection of the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) hold down bolts and flange rings performed as part of the scheduled ISI inspection the licensee observed deposits of boric acid crystals around certa n CRDM nozzle flanges.
The condition was similar in nature but not to the degree experienced on the Crystal River 3 reactor v'essel.
Discussions with the licensee's representative and cognizant B&W personnel disclosed that a tctal of fourteen CRDM motor drive assemblies would be.taken apart, inspected, cleaned and reassembled with new fTexitallic gaskets.
The work was being performed to Oconees's maintenance procedure MP-0-A-1140-2B
" Motor Tube Removal and Installation to Repair Flange Leaks".
'The procedure contains sign-off requirements and QC/QA inspec-
.tions. The inspector observed the removal of certain motor tube drive assemblies and inspected a random sample of hold down bolts, some. of which exhibited. pronounced galling over certain portions of the-threaded surfaces. Also, the inspec-tor observed video tapes of CRDM nozzle flanges after dis-assembly..Various. degrees of boric acid crystal deposits and in some instances evidence of material wash on the flange surfaces.
This condition was limited to a narrow zone which cut across from the ID to the OD and always in line with the indexing hole on the flang _4-
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It was believed that possible seating problems between the indexing pin and hole may have contributed to this condition.
Thickness measurements of removed flexitallic gaskets produced uniform values in the range of 0.106" to 0.113".
These gaskets were made of 304 stainless steel material with a design thick-ness of 0.125" +.005".
However, since the as-built thickness was not taken aiid/or documented prior to field installation, no attempt was made to determine to what extent they (gaskets)
had been compressed. The present procedure requires as built thickness to be documented before installation.
A review of quality records was performed for the following replacement items including CRDM hold down bolts and washers, segment rings, flange rings and gaskets.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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Steam Generator Manway Cracked Studs The inspector discussed with cognizant DPC0 personnel the progress of the pending B&W report on the OTSG manway cracked s tuds. The inspector was informed that the report is under-going review and evaluation by DPC0 and would be forwarded to the Region II offices shortly.
The studs from "A" and "B" 0TSG, Unit 3 were removed and ultrasonically examined by B&W; no cracking was identified.
The studs were removed and installed with the use of maintenance procedure, MP-0-A-1130-2 " Primary Side Manways and Handles Installation and Removal".
Changes from previous removal and installation practices included:
(a) the use of a hydraulic wrench to loosen and tighten the studs; (b) restrictions on the hydraulic pressure applied during removal and installation; (c) identification of studs relative to location and number.
Within the. areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Inservice Inspection - Observation of Work and Work Activities -
Unit 3 This work effort was related to the fifth refueling outage which began on/or about December 15, 1980 and was in progress at the time of thist inspection. Nondestructive examinations /ISI activities were being performed by B&W under contract with DPC.
The controlling document is.B&W!s 1980 ISI manual of Unit 3. - Section XI of the ASME Code 1974 Edition through the 1975 summer addenda controls NDE requirement.
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The inspector reviewed completed and projected percentage of examinations for class 1 and 2 components for compliance with Tables IWB-2500 and IWC-2500 of ASME Section XI. Personnel quali-fication/ certification records were reviewed in order to ascertain whether they were consistent with applicable requirements.
The inspector observed various methods of NDE examinations which included ultrasonic inspection, radiography, eddy current and magnetic particle inspection.
Components, type of examinations and results are listed below.
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Ultrasonic Examination Figure / Weld System Procedure Examination C2.1.2 12" Decay Heat ISI-120 R.10 45, 0 Radiographic Examination C2.1.77 12" Main Steam (B)
ISI-300 R.11 Films Reviewed, no rejectable indications Mj9netic Particle Inspection C2.5.102 Integrally Welded ISI-270 R.9 No rejectable
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C2.5.48 Attachments (Lugs)
indications Eddy Current Inspection Steam Generator'"A" Steam Generator "B" 40-23 51-482 31-17'
50-505 28-03 47-528 28-04 27-553 30-08 15-576 42-36 53-598
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46-32 07-619 35-16 56-641 50-37 47-34 Discussions with B&W and licensee personnel relative to tubes plugged to date,. prior to this outage, in (OTSG's)
"A" and "B"
'dtsciosddEthe'lf6T1owf ng:
0TSG "A" Tube
.Date Plugged Cause 64-122.
11-76 Shop plugged 77-17
.5-79 ET indication
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75-3 5-79 ET indication 77-3 6-80 Leaker, Upper tube Sheet OTSG "B" 77-11 7-76 ET indication 37-6 7-76 ET indication 81-63 7-76-ET indication 75-02 2-77 ET indication 77-12 thru 21 2-77 ET indication 77-01 7-77 ET indication 77-02 7-77 Leaker, Upper tube Sheet 77-10 5-79 Crack indication 78-01 6-77 ET indication 13-69 11-77 ET indication 78-126 Shop plugged
. During this outage B&W inspected approximately 2071 tubes in OTSG
"A" using a frequency of 400 KHz, the B&W representative stated that one hundred (100) of these tubes were inspected at-35KHz for debris above the lower tube shut.
No pluggable tubes were identified.
In OTSG "B", B&W identified two tubes, 4-4 and 150-4, with indica-tions in excess of the 40% allowable throughwall degradation during the initial run (sample) of 1958 tubes.
Two (2) more tubes 58-2
.and 62-113, with similar type indications were identified during the second inspection sample of 1052 tubes. The third inspection sample of 750 tubes produced no tubes requiring plugging.
Both OTSGs were inspected as per the requirements delineated in the technical specification, paragraph 4.17 Steam Generator tubing.
Surveillance procedure ISI-401 Rev.11 " Eddy Current Examination for Defects in OTSG Tubing" controlled inspection requirements and parameters.
Within the areas _ inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
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Inservice Inspection - Procedure Review (Unit 3)
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Procedures used by B&W to conduct nondestructive examinations during this inservice inspection period were reviewed to ascertain whether they were consistent with applicable code, ASME Section XI l
(74S75) requirements, Regulatory Guides and licensee comitments as applicable. A number of these procedures had been reviewed and the
.results documented in IE:RII report 50-287/79-40.
This work effort was perfonned in order to review the latest revisions to the procedures listed below:
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ISI-105 Rev. 9 Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Vessel Closure Studs ISI-104 Rev.15 Ultrasonic Examination of Ligaments Between Threaded Holes and of Studs and Bolts 1" and greater in diameter ISI-120 Rev. 10 Ultrasonic Examination of Piping and Vessel welds joining Similar and Dissimilar Material ISI-130 Rev. 14 Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Vessel Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections ISI-416, Rev. O Multifrequenri Examination of OTSG Tubing Using MIZ-12 Instrumentation ISI-240 Rev. 10 Penetrant Examination of Welds and Base Materials Including Studs and Nuts.
ISI-270 Rev. 7 Wet and Dry Methods of Magnetic Particle Examination of Welds, Studs, Bolts and Pump Motor Wheels ISI-300 Rev.11 Radiographic Examination of Welds and Base Materials ISI-350 Rev. 12 Visual Examination of Welds and Surface Conditions ISI-353 Rev. 3 Visual Examination of Pipe Hangers Supports and Restraints.
Within these areas the inspector noted that although the revisions to these procedures had been prepared by-B&W Level III examiners there was no objective evidence to verify that the procedure manual had been reviewed and approved by B&W's designated Level III.
The inspector discussed this matter with the licensee and B&W who agreed to provide the document.
This matter was identified as inspector followup item 287/80-30-02." Level III Approval of ISI Procedure Manual."
8.
Inservice Inspection Data Review and Evaluation (Unit 3)
This work effort was related to the fifth refueling outage which began on/or about December 25, 1980 and was still in progress at the time of this inspection. Nondestructive examinations /ISI activities were conducted by.B&W under contract with DPC. The controlling document is B&W's 1980 ISI Manual for Unit 3.
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manual and related ISI procedures had been approved by DPC's cognizant QA representative on November 17, 1980.
The manual contains the current ISI scope and the projected ISI program over
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Section XI of the ASME Code 1974 Edition through the 1975 summer addenda controls NDE requirements.
Components / Parts scheduled for ISI during this outage include the reactor vessel head, once through steam generators (A&B), nozzles, pressure boundary piping, various class 2 parts and components including supports and valves.
The inspector selected a random sample of available pressure boundary pipe weld NDE records for review, These records were reviewed to ascertain whether they contained information on, or provided reference to; examination results, examination equipment data, calibration data sheets, evaluations of indications, extent of examination, programatic deviations, disposition of findings and identification of NDE material e.g., UT couplant.
Records selected for this review were as follows:
Letdown Cooler (Pressure Boundary Piping)
Figure 3pe, Size Exam Results e
B4.5.71 Pipe to Tee 2.90"x.38 UT-0 +45 NRI
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B4.5.72 Ell to Pipe 2.90"x.38 UT-0 +45 NRI B4.5.73 Pipe to Ell 2.90"x.38 UT-0 +45 NRI Additional NDE records of pipewelds, pressure boundary and class 2 category were reviewed to ascertain whether calibrations were com-plete and legible, examinations and data evaluation were perfonned
.by qualified personnel and evaluations were consistent with proce-dural and code requirements. These welds were listed as follows:
Decay Heat Suction figure hpe.
Size Exam Results
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C2.1.20 Tee to Pipe 14"x.25" UT-0 +45 NRI l
l Cooler "A" Discharge
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C2.1.37 Tee to Pipe 10.25"x.25" UT-0 +45 NRI
Borated Water Supply C2.1.49 Ell to Pipe 6.62x.28" UT-0 +45 NRI Decay Heat B4.75 Branch Reinforce-PT Indications ment Collar submitted to DPC for dis-position, ER No. 599-0443-034
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Within these areas the inspector noted that the UT procedure designated for the examination of welds B4.5.71-73 was ISI-120 Rev.
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Paragraph #8 of this procedure rr sires the instrument to be calibrated on the circumferential an< axial holes of the calibra-tion blocks and the results documented.
In a similar manner the procedure requires the weld to be scanned in the axial and circum-ferential directions and the results documented accordingly.
However in the case of the welds in the letdown cocler system, the inspector noted that the calibration sheet No. 950023 and data made no reference to or gave any values / data for the calibration and examination in the directions described above. This matter was discussed with the licensee and B&W's coordinator who agreed to caution NDE personnel on the calibration and scanning requirements
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of the revised procedure. Also B&W agreed to reexamined the afore-mentioned welds.
The inspector stated that failure to follow procedural requirements was in violation with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B Criterion V, as implemented by DPC Topical Report Duke-1-A Section 17 paragraph 17.1.5.
This violation was identified as item 287/80-30-03 " Axial and Circumferential UT of Pipe Welds".
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