IR 05000270/1980016
| ML15251A140 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1980 |
| From: | Moon B, Upright C, Whitener H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15251A138 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-270-80-16, NUDOCS 8007280425 | |
| Download: ML15251A140 (5) | |
Text
0 oUNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
o
&101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-270/80-16 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name:
Oconee Docket No. 50-270 License No. DPR-47 Inspection at Oconee site near Seneca, SC Inspectors:
,7 H. L. Whitener,
/Datd Signed B. T. Moon
/Date/Signed Approved by:
je C. M. Upright, Ac Se n Chief, RONS Branch ate Aigned SUMMARY Inspection conducted on May 28 -
30, 198 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 72 inspector-hours on site in the areas of containment integrated leak rate testing which included inspection of the test procedure, instrument calibration, data processing and valve alignmen Results Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in three areas; two items of noncompliance were identified in one area (Infraction - Fail ure to follow procedure, Paragraph 7; Infraction - Failure to provide adequate procedure, Paragraph 7).
$800r280
DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. E. Smith, Plant Manager
- J. N. Pope, Operations Superintendent
- T. S. Barr, Performance Supervisor W. Neuman, Test Engineer, Performance J. W. Collier, Test Engineer, Performance
- R. T. Bond, Project License Engineer
- T. Cribbe, Project License Engineer
- J. Snyder, Engineer, Corporate Office Corporate Office (contact by telephone)
K. Wilson NRC Resident Inspectors
- F. Jape, Senior Resident Inspector
- W. Orders, Resident Inspector
- D. Meyers, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 30, 1980, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors discussed two apparent items of noncompliance which related to the performance of the containment integrated leak rate test. Details of these items are discussed in paragraphs 7.a and 7.b of this repor.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Open) Unresolved Item (269/270/287/80-06-02)
concerned the identification of closed systems inside containment which penetrate containment and may rupture as a result of the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).
The inspector reviewed Duke internal correspondence between Canady and Blackley dated April 9, 1980, and May 8, 198 These letters stated the Duke Power Company position that any seismic qualified closed system will remain intact post LOC The inspector advised the licensee that this position has been referred to IE Headquarters for further evaluatio A-2 Unresolved Items'
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Primary Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test The inspector reviewed surveillance activity to determine that the primary containment integrated leak rate test (ILRT)
was performed in accordance with appropriate sections of Technical Specification 4.4; the "Reactor Building Integrated Leak Rate Test Procedure", PT/0/A/150/3; Appendix J to 10 CFR 50; and ANSI N4 The inspection was a coordinated effort involving Resident Inspectors and Region II specialist Selected sampling of the licensee's activities which were inspected included (1) review of PT/O/A/150/3 to verify that the procedure was approved and conformed to Technical Specifi cations; (2) observation of test performance to determine that test pre requisites were completed, special equipment installed and calibrated, appropriate data were recorded and analyzed; and (3) preliminary evaluation of leakage rate test results to verify that leak rate limits were me Pertinent aspects of the test are discussed in the following paragraph.
General Observations The inspectors witnessed and/or reviewed portions of the test preparation, containment pressurization, temperature stabilization and data processing in the period of May 28-30, 198 The following items were inspected: The test was conducted in accordance with an approved procedure maintained at the test control cente Changes to the procedure were documented and approved as require Selected test prerequisites were verifie Plant systems required to maintain test control were in operatio Calibration and use of special instrumentation was verifie Venting and draining of specific systems were verifie Problems identified in this area are discussed in paragraph Data required for performance of the containment leak rate calculations were recorded at 15 minute interval g. Problems encounted during the test were described in the test event lo Pressurized gas sources were reviewed for proper isolation and venting to preclude in-leakage or interference of out-leakage through containment isolation valve Final analysis of leak rate data will be performed by the licensee and documented in the test report to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR).
The inspector's preliminary review indicated that the calculated
-3 leakage rate was less than the allowable leakag With the exception of item e. above, no items of noncompliance or deviations were foun.
System Venting and Draining At a previous inspection the licensee had agreed to revise the "Reactor Building Integrated Leak Rate" test procedure, PT/0/A/150/3, to provide for adequate venting and draining of systems prior to using this procedure for the Unit 2 integrated leak rate test (see IE Report No. 50-269/80-06). The inspectors reviewed the revision to the procedure and inspected selected penetration alignment Problems were identified in these areas as follows: System Venting While preparing for the reactor building integrated leak rate test on Oconee Unit 2, on or about May 28, 1980, operations personnel performed prerequisite valve line-ups in accordance with the revised test procedure, PT/0/A/150/3 dated May 24, 198 Detailed within section 8.1 of this procedure are instructions to remove pipe caps from all drains and vents which are required to be open during the tes While inspecting selected completed valve line-ups for systems required to be drained and vented during the ILRT, the inspector observed two vent/drain paths which were inadequat Although the vent/drain valves (component cooling system valves CC-68 and CC-67) were properly positioned and tagged, pipe caps on the ends of the vent/drain lines had not been remove The inspector reported his findings to the licensee who issued an amendment to procedure PT/0/A/150/3 to verify pipe cap removal. The results of the pipe cap verification revealed a total of 18 vent or drain lines were capped in violation of the procedur The vent/drain lines from which the caps had not been removed were as follows:
Valve N Valve Name Test Position RC-69 Press. Steam Samp. Ven Open RC-70 Press. Water Samp. Vent Open FDW-234 OTSG "A"/Shell Samp. Ven Open CC-68 Supply Inside Vent Open CC-67 Supply Inside Test Drain Open FDW-261 OTSG "B"/Shell Drain Backup Open BS-15
"A" Spray Header Drain Open BS-24 Spray Test Header Vent Open BS-25 Spray Header "B" vent Open BS-20
"B" Spray Header Drain Open CS-146 Quench Tank Return Vent Open CS-477 Component Drain Header to CST Open
-4
Valve N Valve Name Test Position CA-38 Boric Acid Pump "C" Suction Telltale Open CC-85 CRD Header Inside Test Drain Open CC-83 CRD Header Inside Test Vent Open HP-366 HPI Supply to CF Vent Open CC-107 CRD Cooling Supply Outlet Vent Open SF-79 Canal Fill & Drain Line Vent Open The instruction in section 8.1 of the procedure to remove the caps was in the form of a note and as such required no action step sign-off or double verification. Discussions with operations personnel indicate this procedure inadequacy contributed significantly to the operational deficiency identified. Failure to remove caps from drains and vents as required by section 8.1 of procedure PT/O/A/150/3 constitutes failure to follow the procedure. This was identified as noncompliance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.4.1, which requires, in part, that procedures will be followed in the performance of periodic testing.(50-270/80-16-01). System Draining During the review of the revised test procedure, PT/O/A/150/3, dated May 24, 1980, the inspectors found that the instructions did not require an action step sign-off or double verification of each system drained. When this matter was discussed with the performance and operations personnel no documentation could be found that all required systems were adequately draine The license issued procedure change No. 24, "Drain Verification Procedure" as enclosure 13.9 of PT/0/150/A/ The results of the drain verification revealed that five systemswere not adequately drained. These systems were as follows:
Penetration Title Line Size (inches)
RB Spray Inlet Line
14 RB Spray Inlet line
29 Quench Tank Drain Line
38 Quench Tank Cooler Inlet Line
56 Canal Fill and Drain Line
The licensee stated that in most of the above, the lines had been drained but that water between the isolation valves had not been draine Failure to incorporate appropriate instructions and check-off lists to accomplish the proper draining of systems was identified as an example of an inadequate procedure. This was identified as noncom pliance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.4.1, which requires, in part, that the procedure contain adequate instructions and check-off lists (50-270/80-16-02).