IR 05000261/1994022
| ML14181A592 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 09/01/1994 |
| From: | Christensen H, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14181A591 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-94-22, NUDOCS 9409140009 | |
| Download: ML14181A592 (14) | |
Text
ft REG&i UNITED STATES o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199 Report No.:
50-261/94-22 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-261 License No.: DPR-23 Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Unit 2 Inspection Conducted: August 15 -
19, 1994 Lead Inspector:
2/
//e J. e ow, Sen r Resi ent Inspector HNP bite Signed Other Inspectors: C. Ogle, Resident Inspector P. ay, Inspector, NRR RSIB Approved by:
H. Christensen, Acting Chief D e Signed Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This special, announced inspection was conducted to review the deficiency identification and corrective action process to determine the effectiveness of the corrective action program in preventing the recurrence of similar problems. Due to previous program deficiencies identified by the licensee, third party audits and NRC inspectors, the licensee's program procedures were also reviewed. The licensee's assessments of the corrective action program indicated programmatic problems. This inspection concentrated on the licensee's efforts to correct these identified problems and the thoroughness of the self-assessments performe Results:
No violations or deviations were identified. An unresolved item was identified regarding the licensee's action for monitoring the pressurizer cooldown rate, paragraph Nuclear Assessment Department assessments in the CAP/OEF area were thorough, paragraphs 2.c, 3.a, and PDR ADOCK 05000261 GPDR
The licensee has established an appropriate threshold for deficiency identification, paragraph The licensee's prioritization/classification of adverse conditions for increased scrutiny was found to be satisfactory with only a few conditions inappropriately classified, paragraph Subprogram trend analysis failed in some cases to provide sufficient, concrete recommendations, paragraphs 2.a and An appropriate standard had not yet been fully established for the content/conduct of evaluations, paragraph The licensee's corrective actions for event precursors has not effectively prevented the occurrence of similar events at the Robinson plant, paragraph The quality of previously closed items is questionable, paragraph Several opportunities to prevent similar industry problems from occurring at plant Robinson were being missed, paragraph REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees B. Clark, Manager, Maintenance
- W. Dorman, Manager, Corrective Action Program,/Operating Experience
- J. Eaddy, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Support
- D. Gudger, Specialist, Regulatory Affairs
- S. Hinnant, Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Project
- K. Jury, Manager, Licensing/Regulatory Programs
- R. Krich, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- R. Moore, Acting Manager, Operations
- J. Moyer, Manager, Nuclear Assessment
- D. Nelson, Manager, Outage Management
- M. Pearson, Plant General Manager L. Woods, Manager, Technical Support Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, and corporate personne *Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap.
Deficiency Identification (92720)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's deficiency identification procedure PLP-026, Corrective Action Management, and generated Adverse Condition Reports (ACRs) were reviewed to determine appropriate priority assignment. As part of this review, several ACR subprogram data bases were reviewed to ensure that significant and important ACRs were appropriately identified. The inspectors assessed the licensee employee's threshold for identification of deficiencies through routine plant tours and discussions with licensee personne The licensee utilizes the same four ACR priorities and criteria at all three nuclear sites. For Level I (significant) and Level II (important)
ACRs, evaluations are conducted. Level III (minor) and Level IV (improvement item) ACRs are delegated to subprograms. The licensee established subprograms for security, outage, project management, operations, maintenance, materials control, environmental and radiation control, work control, regulatory affairs, plant support, training, and engineering. Subprogram data bases are required to be reviewed for adverse trends on a quarterly basi For any adverse trends identified, the unit manager is required to develop an action pla The inspector reviewed a list of ACRs delegated to the work control group subprogram since January 199 This data base contained about 40 ACRs. The inspector found that licensee personnel had appropriately classified the ACRs. The quarterly work control group trend report dated August 15, 1994, was also reviewed. Trending was considered margina One adverse trend was identified regarding the age of open level III ACRs. Trending incorporated month-to-month comparisons of ACR and corrective action status but only a snapshot of trend analysis categorie This interfered with a quantitative trend analysis versus time and also hindered a meaningful assessment of corrective actions taken to address any adverse trend The inspector reviewed a list of 115 ACRs delegated to the maintenance group subprogram since January 1994. A detailed review of 21 of these ACRs indicated an appropriate classification of level II The inspector also found that the corrective actions were adequate for resolution of the deficiencies. The maintenance Level III ACRs were reviewed for primary causes and trended in an appropriate manne A listing of Level III ACR's assigned to the operations subprogram was also reviewed. This effort was to verify that the ACRs were properly prioritized; that component operability was addressed; and that any reportability issues were identified. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's trending of these minor ACRs to determine if adverse trends were captured and corrective actions identifie Based on this effort, the inspectors concluded that for the most part, the prioritization, as well as the operability and reportability of the ACRs were appropriate. The inspectors noted one instance of a potentially reportable TS 3.0 entry tracked as a Level III ACR. The ACR evaluation concluded that the declaration of entry into TS 3.0 was inappropriate for the circumstances and no NRC notification was required. The inspector independently reviewed this event and concurred in this evaluation. However, procedure PLP-026 specifically identified potentially reportable conditions as events that may be included as Level II ACR's. The licensee's regulatory staff also independently discovered another case of an ACR involving a potentially reportable issue being assigned as a Level III. The licensee informed the inspectors that the ACR had also subsequently been determined to address a non reportable condition. The inspectors noted that since Level III ACRs have a more restricted distribution/processing span, these miscategorizations resulted in reducing the involvement of plant management and the regulatory staff in these potentially reportable issues. The licensee generated an ACR to address the miscategorization The inspectors reviewed the licensee's current Operations Trend Report. This report, dated August 15, 1994, represented the first
report prepared by operating personnel to formally meet the requirements of procedure PLP-026 for a trend report on Level III ACRS. The lack of operations subprogram trend reports was an issue previously identified by the Nuclear Assessment Department (NAD) during a corrective action assessment in early August 199 The inspectors reviewed the trend report for adequacy and compliance with the requirements of procedure PLP-026. The trend report identified document content as the leading causal factor for operations Level III ACR evaluations completed from October 1993 to August 1994. Procedure preparation/revision was identified as the activity in which the majority of these ACRS occurred. The trend report also noted an initial decline and then an apparent increase in the "hits" associated with this activity near the end of the evaluation period. Based on this analysis, the trend report specified an action plan item for operations management to "reinforce the expectation for high standards of quality and the need to ensure that procedure content is correct."
No other action items were addressed though the report did state that additional data will be necessary to verify the significance of the apparent increase in ACRs associated with procedure preparation/revision. The inspectors observed that 10 of the 87 ACRs contained in the operations subprogram dealt with control of plant equipment (conditions ranging from unlabelled plant components to temporary tags not being removed following testing).
This potential trend was not captured in the subprogram trend report. The inspector informed the subprogram coordinator of the ACRs dealing with this observatio Based upon observations of plant activities over the last two years, the inspector concluded that the licensee has a satisfactory threshold for identifying adverse condition Furthermore, the inspectors have noted a marked improvement in the willingness of plant personnel to seek out and document adverse conditions during the last year. This improvement is attributed to a strong personal involvement in the ACR process by senior plant management. The inspector reviewed the licensee's Operator Work Around List to verify that adverse conditions identified were appropriately captured in a corrective action program. The inspectors identified work request and/or ACR numbers to address all active operator work-arounds involving adverse condition Though the Work Around List database is actively managed, and fields are available for entries such as work request number, this information was not entered for all items. The inspectors obtained this information only after interviewing numerous site personne The inspectors concluded that active items in the Work Around List are captured in the corrective action program. The inspectors noted that the Work Around List, though receiving regular management review, may not be utilized to its full potentia The inspectors were advised that only two new item log entries have been made since the initial effort to identify work-arounds during the program inception approximately a year and half ag Additionally, the inspectors noted several items in the caution tag log which could probably be classified as work-arounds which were not contained in the Work Around List databas The inspectors concluded that the subprogram trend analysis failed in some cases to provide sufficient, concrete recommendations to satisfy the requirements of procedure PLP-026. The inspectors acknowledge that the licensee is in the process of developing meaningful trend report The inspectors considered the maintenance subprogram trend analysis to be a good example of meaningful trend analysis. The inspectors concluded that the licensee had established an appropriate threshold for deficiency identification. The licensee's prioritization/classification of adverse conditions for increased scrutiny was found to be satisfactory with only a few conditions inappropriately classifie No violations or deviations were identifie.
Deficiency/Event Evaluation (92720)
The inspectors reviewed ACR investigations and event review team reports, ACR trend analysis, and NAD assessments of the corrective action progra The licensee evaluates significant and important ACRs. In addition, significant ACRs undergo a root cause evaluation to determine corrective action to prevent recurrence. Minor ACRs and improvement items are simply assigned corrective actions. Little evaluation is performed on minor ACR The licensee's procedure contained specific time requirements (30 days)
for the conduct of evaluations. This requirement had recently been added due to Near Term Improvement Plan effort The licensee utilizes very similar investigative techniques at all three nuclear sites. Techniques employed include event and casual factor charting, task analysis, change analysis, barrier analysis, and root cause analysi Human performance evaluation systems are employed to investigate personnel/procedural errors. In addition, the plant general manager or nuclear shift supervisor can request an event review team be formed to investigate significant plant events and adverse condition These multi-discipline teams investigate the event to determine the cause and identify appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrenc Management involvement in the review of significant and important ACRs was also evident in morning management meetings where selected ACRs were discussed. The inspector considered that appropriate ACRs were being discussed during these meetings. The PNSC reviewed any ACRs involving TS violations or reportable event After significant and important ACRs are received by the applicable supervisor, they are required to be hand carried to the main control
room for an operability/reportability determination. If operability of the affected component is uncertain, the operability determination process described in procedure OMM-039, Operability Determination, is initiate Level I and II ACRs are required to be analyzed for adverse trends and a quarterly report issued to the section managers (including the plant general manager) and unit managers. Corrective action plans for adverse trends are initiated but not formally require ACRs/OEF evaluations reviewed by the inspectors indicated mixed results. Some evaluations (2 OEF, 3 ACR of 15 total) lacked sufficient detail to support the final conclusions. Several licensee self-assessments, third party audits, along with NRC violations have underscored the weaknesses in the licensee's evaluations. From the review of the NRC enforcement history and the subsequent violation response from the licensee, the inspector found that a contributing cause for one recent violation (50-261/
94-08-02) was from an inadequate initial event evaluatio A NAD assessment in March 1994 identified that the quality and timeliness of ACR evaluations were ineffective. In addition, large backlogs existed. Just before this inspection was commenced, another NAD assessment was performed in August 199 The NAD determined that management had failed to adequately address the previous deficiencies identified. Subprogram trending was still deficient and action plans were inadequate. The NAD assessment concluded that insufficient training had been provided to appropriate personne To address this deficiency, licensee management implemented a desk top guide for evaluators which included typical evaluation questions to be asked. This guide was issued in April 1994. The inspectors reviewed this guide and determined that it should be beneficial in improving the quality of assessment Trending of the level I and II ACRs were undergoing a transition from monthly to quarterly reports. The informal methodology in the first quarterly report for the first quarter of 1994 provided the licensee with a percentage breakdown of the level I and II ACRs by cause codes for each manager to evaluate for action plan response. The report did not make an attempt to quantify ACRs by cause codes for trending, but targeted the largest percentage of cause codes within each working unit, i.e. operations, maintenance. The licensee acknowledged the weakness in the continued use of the percentage method and has planned for the use of this quarterly report as a baseline for future trendin A third party audit was performed in February 1994 of the corrective action/operating experience feedback program which stated that management expectations were not appropriately communicated to workers. Also no accountability for timely ACR
resolution had been established. Identification and trending of recurring adverse conditions needed improvement. Potential adverse trends were identified in this third party audit in the areas of procedure quality, procedure adherence, valve mispositioning, clearances, chemical spills, and FME. These trends had not been identified by licensee personne The inspector inquired as to the corrective actions taken by the licensee in response to these potential adverse trends. The inspector was informed that no formal corrective action had been documented or undertaken. The inspector queried the 1994 ACR data base to determine if the previously identified adverse trends still existed. The inspector found that 39 of the 1994 ACRs included a cause code of document content, 30 for document usage, 9 for clearance removal, and 10 for mispositioned equipment. The inspector considered that this data warranted further investigation by the licensee to determine if an adverse trend was indicate As part of the NTIP, development of action plans for any identified adverse trends was required. However, the inspector found that these action plans were not formally required by procedure for level I and II ACR When questioned about corrective action accomplishment for adverse trends identified in the quarterly trend reports, the inspector received only verbal explanations since formal corrective action assignments were not required. Following notification of this deficiency, licensee personnel initiated a change to the procedure to incorporate a formal requiremen Event review teams were established to investigate plant events involving Cycle 16 fuel and core loading problems (November 1993),
NI indication errors (November 1993), sulfate intrusion incident (July 1993), fire in the "A" EDG (June 1994), and loss of generator load (August 1994).
The cycle 16 core loading and NI indication error event were previously reviewed by the NRC in NRC Inspection Report 50-261/93-34 and were not reinspected during this inspectio The inspectors considered the most recent investigation on the loss of load event to be very thorough and detaile The event review on the EDG fire stated that this fire and a previous fire initiated from lube oil leaks from the exhaust system. The report stated that the engine design resulted in lube oil accumulating in the exhaust headers during operation and barring evolution Lube oil leaks out of the exhaust system allowed the oil to accumulate on the engine, ignite and thereby cause the fire. Licensee personnel concluded that the lube oil leaks occurred on different sections of the exhaust system (one on the exhaust manifold next to the engine and another near the ring catcher which is further downstream near the inlet to the turbocharger) and had different causes for leak initiatio The
licensee's corrective action included repair of the specific leaking flanges by checking the torque check of flange bolts, replacing gasket material, inspection of mating surfaces, and cleanup of existing oi In addition, future corrective action included a surveillance program to monitor the exhaust manifold for oil leaks and proper bolt torque as interim action until an investigation into a long term solution is found. Since the licensee's corrective action can not correct the condition of lube oil inside the exhaust header and that subsequent exhaust header leaks would likely develop, the inspector was not convinced that further fires would not occur on the engin The ERT formed for unusual high RCS leakage experienced in March 1994 was reconvened to readdress the event classification and declaration timeliness. The initial team evaluation did not adequately address this aspect of the charte Licensee management has acknowledged previous deficiencies in the ERT process. Procedure PLP-063, Event Review Team has been issued to formalize the process. As part of the NTIP effort, formal charters are now assigned for each ER The inspectors concluded that an appropriate standard has not yet been fully established for the content/conduct of evaluations. Although evaluators have been provided with desk top guides, training of personnel had not been included to reinforce the standard. The inspectors concluded that without the establishment of an appropriate standard for evaluations, the adequacy of future root cause determinations and associated corrective action would be unsur Incorporation of formal requirements for adverse trend corrective actions was also neede No violations or deviations were identifie.
Corrective Action (92720)
The inspectors reviewed the history of NRC enforcement action, SALP reports, NAD assessments, and ACR trends to determine if the licensee's implemented corrective action was preventing recurrence of similar problems. Also, reports of incomplete corrective action assignments were also reviewe The review of the NRC enforcement history indicated that in the last six months three violations were issued regarding inadequate corrective action A NAD assessment in March 1994 identified quality and timeliness of corrective actions as ineffective. In addition, repeat occurrences had not been prevented by precursors; causes for problems were not being corrected, only the effects on the plant were addressed; and a large backlog existed. Just before this inspection commenced, another NAD assessment was performed in
August 199 The NAD determined that management had failed to adequately address the previous deficiencies identifie Corrective actions were closed without action taken (paperwork transfer), inadequate corrective actions were taken for 3 examples, and in some cases different corrective action had been taken than specified by the plant general manager and PNS Closure date goals were not being me The SALP report covering the period June 1992 - December 1993, issued February 8, 1994, stated that previous efforts to improve the quality of maintenance procedures was not effective. Further, inadequate corrective action resulted in recurring problems regarding foreign material exclusion in safety injection pumps, and the EDG air distributor failure. The NRC considered that the emergency planning critique and audit findings were not provided with timely corrective action. Security corrective actions/technical resolutions were considered margina The licensee issued a status report dated August 5, 1994, for ACR evaluations, corrective actions, and commitments which were overdue. This report listed 35 evaluations and 112 corrective actions as being past their due dates. The inspector considered that the extension process was not being utilized for these item The large backlog indicated additional resources might be necessary to effect needed improvement in this area. However the NTIP initiative for CAP improvements had made a positive impact in this area. Specific times were established for corrective action and evaluation completion - this action appeared to be effective as new items were usually being accomplished on time. In addition weekly reports of overdue actions/evaluations were also published to increase management attention to this. However, the inspector noticed that the procedure did not formally require a weekly overdue report. When informed of this, licensee personnel initiated an advanced change to the procedure to incorporate the formal requiremen The ACR backlog reduction/review plan is ensuring that all open ACRs prior to 1994 are reviewed by a management team, which is a subcommittee of the PNSC, to check the quality of the evaluation and appropriateness of the corrective action assigned. The inspector attended one of these subcommittee meetings and found that these type of ACRs received additional detailed scrutin The overall result of these efforts is that the backlog of ACRs was trending down and level I and II open corrective actions have begun a downward trend (still at 500 however).
As a direct result of the event/deficiency evaluation problems noted in the previous section of this report, the licensee's corrective actions for event precursors has not effectively prevented the occurrence of similar events at the Robinson plant. The NRC enforcement history, SALP findings, and the licensee's own self-assessments have indicated problems in this area. Although the licensee's NTIP effort has made
- 0
improvements in this area, additional management attention is indicate The open ACR backlog reduction and review process was effectively establishing appropriate evaluations and corrective action for ACRs initiated prior to 1994. Considering the NRC enforcement history and NAD assessment findings mentioned above, the quality of previously closed items is also in question. A similar review of previously closed items is indicated to ensure prior corrective actions will prevent recurrence of problem No violations or deviations were identifie.
Operating Experience Feedback Program (92720)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Operating Experience Feedback (OEF) program, RP-006, Operating Experience Feedback, to determine program inputs and verify appropriate corrective action for selected events. Applicable NAD assessments were also reviewe Inputs for this program included ACRs from the other licensee nuclear plants, industry reports, and NRC information notices. Significant ACRs generated were sent to the other licensee nuclear plants as well. A quarterly report of OEF action status is issued to the plant general manager and an annual assessment is also conducted. All plants are included in the distribution list of NAD assessment reports. Third party audit findings are likewise share As part of the NTIP, self assessments of OEF effectiveness were directed to be performed. In addition, consideration of OEF type of information was required to be included in ACR evaluations. OEF action items were tracked separately from other CAP item Internal self assessment (December 1993) of SOERs identified one out of six evaluations and corrective action was inadequat NAD assessment of SOER dated April 21, 1994, identified 3 of 28 SOER responses were deficient. A third party technical review in February 1994 also identified similar problem The inspectors reviewed five OEF items. The disposition of these items was found to be adequat The inspector reviewed a list of 100 open items in the licensee's operational event history data base. The inspector found that 56 of those 100 items were past due for evaluation. A large steady backlog of OE evaluations existed. The licensee acknowledged that more effort was needed to evaluate industry information to identify possible precursors to operational event The inspectors examined the licensee's disposition per procedure RP-006, Operating Experience Feedback, of Harris plant ACRs forwarded to the Robinson plant. Seven Harris ACRs were selected by the inspectors from a list generated at the Harris facility of ACRs forwarded to Robinson. The results of the inspectors review were as follows:
- 2 of the ACRs were not in the Robinson OEF program for review
- 3 of the ACRs were appropriately processed
- 2 of the ACRs did not receive adequate evaluatio When the inspectors requested the disposition packages associated with Harris ACRs92-540 and 92-403, they were advised by the Robinson OEF organization that no record existed of these ACRs being received at Robinson for review. Following the inspectors'
request, both ACRs were obtained for processing. Harris ACR 92-540 details a fuel mispositioning event during core reload on October 30, 1992. Approximately one year later, on October 16, 1993, Robinson also experienced a mispositioned fuel element during core reload. The inspectors reviewed ACR paperwork associated with both events and noted that while the events were not identical, similarities existed. The inspectors did not attempt to determine the circumstances that resulted in the Harris ACR not being reviewed at Robinson. However, the inspectors did note that this failure to communicate may have resulted in a missed opportunity to prevent a significant adverse condition at this facility. In addition to the ACR described above, the inspectors were advised that Harris ACR 92-403, also selected for review by the inspectors, was likewise missing. This ACR dealt with a spray valve failure which resulted in a slow RCS depressurization. The inspectors were not aware of any similar occurrences of this event at Robinso The inspectors reviewed the packages associated with Harris ACRs92-236, 92-263, and 94-1737. The inspectors concluded that the disposition of these ACRs was appropriat The inspectors reviewed the licensee's disposition of Harris ACR 94-064. The subject of this ACR was an inadequately designed indicating light bulb which failed and rendered a TDAFW pump control circuit inoperable. The light bulb was identified by the Harris facility in the ACR as a "120 MB."
When received at Robinson, the ACR was disseminated for information only. The inspectors were informed that this categorization was made on the belief by the Robinson OEF personnel that the 120 MB light bulbs were not used at Robinson. With the help of procurement personnel, however, the inspectors determined that light bulbs categorized as 120 MBs are stocked onsite. Following this discovery, the licensee determined that the bulbs on hand were not the particular style of 120 MB bulbs that were vulnerable to the failure described in the Harris ACR. The inspectors were subsequently provided paperwork which indicated that the system engineer had linked failures of 120 MB containing fixtures at Robinson to similar failures reported at Wolf Creek. Furthermore, the paperwork indicated that the system engineer had initiated
proposed corrective actions earlier this year. The inspectors concluded that while the safety significance was minimal, the Harris ACR was inappropriately classified for disseminatio Harris ACR 92-616 dealt with a TS violation due to exceeding pressurizer heatup rates while collapsing the bubble. This ACR was distributed at Robinson for information only. The inspectors reviewed the most recently completed shutdown procedure GP-007, Plant Cooldown From Hot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown, to determine if the lessons learned from the Harris event were incorporated into the Robinson procedure. No precautions or procedural guidance appropriate to the Harris event were noted in procedure GP-00 Additionally, despite explicit TS limits on pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates, no plot of pressurizer temperature with time was included in the completed procedure GP-007. The inspectors were informed that pressurizer temperatures are not routinely plotted while collapsing the bubble. The inspectors requested and then reviewed historical pressurizer temperature data associated with the last pressurizer cooldown. From this information, the inspectors noted cooldown rates which appeared to be in excess of the TS limit. On the morning of August 20, 1994, the inspectors requested amplifying information from the licensee on this transien Later that evening, the inspectors were informed that a preliminary analysis by the licensee indicated that, for approximately 45 minutes during the pressurizer cooldown, a cooldown rate of 201 degrees F per hour was calculated. The maximum cooldown rate allowed by TS is 200 degrees F per hou The licensee stated their intention to forward the transient data to a contractor for a more sophisticated analysis. This item will be considered unresolved pending completion of this analysi Unresolved Item 50-261/94-22-01: Pressurizer temperature transien The inspectors concluded that the licensee's initial categorization of the Harris ACR for information only removed a potential opportunity for licensee identification of the inadequacies in procedure GP-00 The inspectors concluded that several opportunities to prevent similar industry problems from occurring at plant Robinson were being misse.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on August 19, 199 During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report, with particular emphasis on the Unresolved Item addressed below. The licensee
representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. No dissenting comments from the licensee were receive Item Number Description and Reference 50-261/94-22-01 Unresolved Item:
Pressurizer temperature transients, paragraph.
Acronyms and Initialisms ACR
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Adverse Condition Report CAP
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Corrective Action Program CFR
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Code of Federal Regulations EDG
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Emergency Diesel Generator ERT
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Event Review Team FME
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Foreign Material Exclusion NAD
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Nuclear Assessment Department NI
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Nuclear Instrumentation NRC
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR
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Nuclear Reactor Regulation NTIP -
Near Term Improvement Team OEF
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Operating Experience Feedback PNSC -
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee RCS
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Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance SOERS -
Significant Operational Event Reports TDAFW -
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater TS
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Technical Specification