IR 05000261/1994002
| ML14178A433 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1994 |
| From: | Aiello R, Lawyer L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14178A432 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-94-02, 50-261-94-2, NUDOCS 9401250042 | |
| Download: ML14178A433 (13) | |
Text
PRE UNITED STATES 0 oNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION il o
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199 Report No.:
50-261/94-02 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-261 License No.:
DPR-23 Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Inspection Conducted:
January 4-6, 1994 Inspector:
9/
onald F. Aiello Date Signed Approved By:
Lawrence L. Lawyer, Chief Date Signed Operator Licensing Section Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
The NRC conducted this announced AIT follow-up inspection in order to evaluate the licensee's corrective actions for certain events that occurred during the November 1993 refueling and startup of Robinson Unit 2. This inspection evaluated 8 of the 16 short term corrective actions delineated in reference 1 of Enclosure 2. The inspector grouped these eight items in three areas; Training, procedures and work practices, and managerial method Result The inspector found the licensee's corrective actions to be adequate for each of the eight items inspecte The inspector identified an improvement in the area of startup from refueling training (paragraph 2.b.1).
9401250042 940118 PDR ADOCK 05000261
REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. Allen, Manager Simulator C. Baucom, Regulatory Compliance
- D. Baur, Regulatory Affairs
- A. Burkhart, Director NSD Licensing
- H. Carter, Manager Licensed Operator Requalification
- C. Dietz, Vice President -
Robinson Nuclear Project
- W. Dorman, Manager Regulatory Affairs
- M. Herrell, Manager Training
- C. Hinnant, Director Site Operations -
Brunswick
- R. Moore, Manager Operations
- P. Morris, Manager Licensing Support Unit NSD C. Olixek, Manager NAD
- M. Pearson, Plant General Manager
- A. Sanders, Manager Operations Training
- D. Whitehead, Manager Plant Support Services Other licensee employees contacted included instructors, engineers, technicians, operators, and office personne *
NRC Personnel W. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector-Robinson C. Ogle, Resident Inspector J. Starefos, Project Engineer E. Wang, Intern
- Attended exit interview 2. Discussion a. Summary The NRC conducted this inspection to evaluate the licensees implementation of eight of the sixteen short term corrective actions delineated in reference one of enclosure tw The inspector grouped these eight items in three areas; Training, procedures and work practices, and managerial method All eight short term corrective actions were satisfactory and are close b. Training (1) Corrective Action #9 The facility conducted training for the operations crews, STAs, and reactor engineers assigned to the shifts performing the startup on Startup After Refueling (SAR).
Operations and training management, collectively determined the crews' training
Report Details
needs and designed the training to meet those needs. They designed this training to include training on the November 14, 1993, H. B. Robinson mismatch between actual and indicated reactor power, new fuel cycle core changes, importance of monitoring diverse indications, appropriate industry events which have occurred during plant startups, and simulator scenarios that included realistic equipment malfunctions and Nuclear Instrument System (NIS) error The first phase of SAR training consisted of the following:
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The sequence of events that occurred during the Robinson startup event on November 14, 1993 - This included a summary of the causes of the event as stated in Adverse Condition Report (ACR)93-284
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The diverse, redundant indications which could be used to determine core power level - This included a summary of the importance of monitoring these indications, particularly for a new core startup
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The industry events that had occurred during plant startups
- This included lessons learned and how these similar events could be prevented at H. B. Robinso Following phase one training, the facility identified that GP-003, "Normal Plant Startup From Hot Shutdown to Critical;"
GP-005, "Power Operation;" and EST-050, "Refueling Startup Procedure;" required additional improvements. Therefore, training and plant management determined that SAR training should be repeated after procedure upgrades were completed. The training department also used the feedback acquired from the operating crews during phase one to help modify the training conducted in phase tw The second phase of SAR consisted of the following:
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Assessed the diverse, redundant indications which could be used to monitor reactor power during a reactor startup following a refueling outage
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Outlined the various types of failures which could lead to reactivity mismanagement events - These were events that could potentially cause fuel damage, extended plant shutdowns, and threaten the health and safety of the publi The inspector confirmed that SAR training was satisfactorily conducted. The inspector also identified that the second phase of SAR training was an improvement over phase on Report Details
(2) Corrective Action #16 The inspector monitored the training presented to the operators on operation of the voltage regulator. Students received handouts on the Westinghouse voltage regulator and excitation system for the main generator. Practical exercises required the operators to explain the voltage regulator operation and understand the reasons for the 1993 problems encountered with the voltage regulator. The inspector confirmed that voltage regulator training was satisfactorily conducte The facility did not administer written examinations following the lectures and practical exercises conducted in the classroom. However, The training staff effectively critiqued the operators actions following the simulator exercises. Furthermore, when the evaluators noted a major deficiency during an exercise, the evaluators immediately froze the simulator and discussed the deficiency with the crew. The inspector concluded that the training of the five operating crews on the startup and power ascension plan was adequat No violations or deviations were identifie c. Plant Procedures and Work Practices (1) Corrective Action #12 The inspector reviewed GP-005, "Power Operation," Revision 37, to ensure that the following additional instructions were included:
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Independent indications of reactor power are used to validate the Nuclear Instruments (NIs)
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Power escalation is stopped when any of the independent power indication parameters reach 20 percent
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At 20 percent reactor power, verification is made to ensure that the indications of reactor power are within 5 percent of each other
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All applicable ramp rate restrictions are applied
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Power escalation is stopped when the independent power indication parameters show a deviation greater than 5 percent when reactor power is greater than 20 percent The inspector confirmed that the above additional instructions were included in GP-00 Report Details
(2) Corrective Action #13 The inspector reviewed GP-003, "Normal Plant Startup From Hot Shutdown to Critical, Revision 41;" GP-005, "Power Operation,"
Revision 37; and PLP-37, "Conduct of Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions," Revision 2; to ensure that the following additional instructions were included:
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Specify that the Management Designated Monitor (MDM) should review the fundamental priorities on nuclear safety when briefing the operating staff
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Provide guidance on how and when the MDM is expected to intervene, while maintaining a clear chain of command within the operating staff The inspector confirmed that the above additional instructions were included in GP-003, GP-005, and PLP-37 respectivel (3) Corrective Action #8 The inspector reviewed FMP-002, "NIS Post Refueling Adjustment Determination," Revision 1, to ensure that the following additional instructions were included:
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Proper methodology will be used for each core or required fuel vendor to supply excore instrumentation adjustment factors
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A means for self checking to ensure reasonableness of calculated results such as comparing expected results from Fuels or the Fuel Vendor, comparison with previous cycle results, et The inspector confirmed that the above additional instructions were included in FMP-00 (4) Corrective Action #1 The inspector reviewed several recent daily outage plans (Daily Schedule Report (DSR)) developed for this forced outage, to confirm that the PLP-037 Case I and II important evolutions were incorporated into the DSR. The inspector confirmed that the PLP-037 Case I and II important evolutions were incorporate (5) Corrective Action #2 The inspector reviewed the format for the outage shift turnover meetings that will ensure each shift's tasks which involve a PLP-037 case determination are identified and the MDM noted. The
Report Details
inspector confirmed that each shift's tasks on the outage shift turnover sheet included the additional instructions abov No violations or deviations were identifie d. Managerial Methods (1) Corrective Action #4 The inspector reviewed CP&L's letter dated December 22, 1993, from T. Cleary to M. Pearson and attended training both in the classroom and the simulator to confirm that an experienced Reactor Engineering (RE) staff will be available and involved in refueling outages and power ascensions. Specifically, the above letter stated that an adequately experienced RE staff will be available to support safe restart of the plant, just as it was for SAR 1 This will include adequate staffing to support startup physics testing around the clock, to be in the control room when the plant is brought on line, and to be available to support power ascension testing and power level changes. The inspector confirmed that the utility adequately assessed the necessary RE involvement in the current forced outage and power ascension activities and took appropriate actions to ensure sufficient experienced RE staff will be availabl No violations or deviations were identifie. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 6, 1994, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The NRC described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No proprietary material is contained in this report. No dissenting comments were received from the license ENCLOSURE 2 CP&L Carolina Power & Light Company Robinson Nuclear Plant PO Box 790 Hartsville SC 29550 Robinson File No.: 13510 Serial: RNP/93-3228 DEC 3 1 1993 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-261/LICENSE NO. DPR-23 RESTART REQUIREMENTS Gentlemen:
The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC with the list of actions that Carolina Power
& Light Company (CP&L) has identified as required for completion prior to restart of the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 from the current forced outage. The list, enclosed, comprises certain corrective actions from CP&L's teams formed to investigate problems related to Diesel Generator operability, Nuclear Instrumentation indication error, and Siemens fuel problems, as well as the readiness self-assessment required by Plant Procedure PLP-059, "Plan For Restart Readiness And Startup And Power Ascension," and the requirements of the November 19, 1993, Confirmatory Action Lette Questions regarding this matter may be referred to Mr. Jan S. Kozyra at (803) 383-187 Very truly yours, Charles R. Dietz Vice President JSK:lst Enclosure c: Mr. S. D. Ebneter Ms. B. L. Mozafari Mr. W. T. Orders Highway 151 and SC 23 Hartsville SC
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
bcc:
T. A. Baxter, Es Mr. F. A. Murray Mr. R. S. Beverage Mr. C. S. Olexik, J Mr. R. K Buckles (LIS)
Mr. W. S. Orser Mr. W. R. Campbell Mr. M. P. Pearson Mr. J. M. Curley Mr. H. A. Pollock Mr. C. R. Dietz Mr. R. S. Stancil Mr. D. T. Gudger Mr. R. B. Van Metre Mr. H. W. Habermeyer, J Mr. A. R. Wallace Mr. E. M. Harris Siemens Pwr. Corp. c/o T. Dresser Mr. J. D. Heidt File: RC/A-2 Mr. J. S. Kozyra File: R-2- (J. S. Kozyra)
Mr. R. E. Morgan, J Enclosure to Serial: RNP/93-3228
RESTART REQUIREMENTS Requirements The following requirements will be satisfied prior to restart of the Robinson Nuclear Plant from a forced outage which began on November 17, 1993:.Completion of corrective actions required to restore both Emergency Diesel Generators to an operable statu.3, Completion of the sixteen (16) short-term corrective actions recommended by the
"Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Indication Error" Event Evaluation Team (Reference 1). Completion of the eleven (11) short-term corrective actions recommended by the
"RNP Cycle 16 Fuel and Core Loading Problems" Event Evaluation Team
..(Reference 2). Completion of a line management self-assessment of System Readiness to support the safe and reliable startup and operation of Robinson Unit 2 through the next operating cycl Thirty-nine (39) systems will be evaluated in accordance with References 3 and.
Completion of a line management self-assessment of Organizational Readiness to support the safe and reliable startup and operation of Robinson Unit 2 through the next operating cycl Six (6) organizations will be evaluated in accordance with Reference.
Completion of a line management self-assessment of Organizational Readiness by each of the five (5) Shift Operating Supervisors, in accordance with Reference 4, to determine that Robinson Unit 2 is in a condition of material readiness to support safe and reliable startup and operation during the next operating cycle and that each operating crew is in a state of readiness to startup and operate the plant in a safe and reliable manne.
Completion of startup required corrective actions identified through the line management self-assessments of System Readiness, Organizational Readiness, and Operational Readines.
Completion of a Collective Evaluation of System Readiness, including a review of the status of plant material condition with respect to pre-established restart targets, in accordance with Reference Enclosure to Serial: RNP/93-3228 2 Completion of a Collective Evaluation of Operational Readiness in accordance with Reference.
Completion of startup required corrective actions identified through the Collective Evaluations of System Readiness and Operational Readines.
Completion of training of the Startup Organization and of the five (5) operating crews on the Startup and Power Ascension Plan, respective roles, responsibilities and expectations, and the schedule of activities to be performed from plant heatup through full power operation.
Completion of Assessment Hold Point #1 in accordance with Reference.
Completion of the requirements specified in NRC Confirmatory Action Letter, CAL 2-93-08, dated November 19, 199 References Memorandum dated November 24, 1993, from Mr. C. S. Hinnant (Team Leader) to Mr. C. R. Dietz, "Recommended Corrective Actions Prior to Restart". Memoranda dated December 2, 1993, and December 3, 1993, from Mr. L. H. Martin (Team Leader) to Messrs. Dietz and Habermeyer, "Recommended Corrective Actions Prior to Fuel Handling and Inspection and Plant Restart". PLP-027, "System Startup Readiness Determination." PLP-059, "Plan For Restart Readiness and Startup and Power Ascension".
CP&L To:
Mr. C. R. Dietz From:
Nuclear Instrumentation Incident Evaluation Team Date:
November 24, 1993 Subject:
Recommended Corrective Actions Prior to Restart Attached for your use and implementation are the Team's recommended corrective actions that should be implemented prior to H. B. Robinson's restart. This list supersedes the "Short Term Corrective Action" list transmitted to you in my letter of November 19, 199 If in the Team's view specific actions should be completed prior to a planned activity, this activity is identified on the list. This list provides both short term event corrective actions and any other recommendations we have developed to resolve weaknesses found by the Team during our investigation. The final Team report will only contain short and long term actions specific
.
to prevent this and similar events from recurrin If you have questions or concerns with the recommendations, please contact m C. S. Hinnant, Team Leader Enclosure CC:
Mr. W. S. Orser Mr. L. I. Loflin Mr. C. S. Olexik Mr. Marc Pearson Mr. Tony Dobbs Mr. Bill Lewis Mr. Bo Clark Mr. Max Harrell Mr. Bill Flanagan Mr. Tim Cleary Mr. Dave Waters
Short Term Corrective Actions Corrective Action #1 - Perform as soon as possible Incorporate the PLP-037 Case I and II important evolutions into the Outage Plan developed for the Forced Outag Corrective Action #2 - Perform as soon as possible Develop a format for the Outage Shift Turnover meetings that will ensure that each shift's tasks which involve a PLP-037 Case Determination are identified and the MDM note Corrective Action #3 - Perform as soon as possible Ensure that any document, calculation or work activity requiring a review be reviewed by another individual knowledgeable in the subject matte Corrective Action #4 - Perform as soon as possible Assess the necessary Reactor Engineering involvement in the current Forced Outage and Power Ascension activities and take appropriate actions to ensure sufficient experienced Reactor Engineering Staff is availabl Corrective Action #5 - Perform as soon as possible Operations Management to ensure that Operations personnel do not develop tunnel vision and only concentrate on Reactivity Management. Operations management should revisit The 3/24/93 letter from Mr. Kenneth Strahm of INPO addressed to Mr. R.A. Watson. Mr. Strahm's letter points out the need to maintain control of key primary plant parameter Corrective Action #6 - Perform as soon as possible Operations Management should review with operators the basic concepts of procedural compliance when faced with challenging situations. Operators should not be so focused on an activity that a Tech Spec or administrative requirement is violated/exceeded.. More specifically, the belief of some Operations personnel that it is OK to violate the Tech Spec ramp rate limit in order to get the feedwater system in automatic and stable should be addresse Corrective Action #7 - Perform as soon as possible Ensure that plant personnel clearly understand the management chain of command, and the responsibilities of the various management personnel that they interface wit Corrective Action #8 - Perform prior to fuel load A)
Revise FMP-002 to:
1)
ensure the proper methodology is used for each core or require fuel vendor to supply excore instrumentation adjustment factor )
include a means of self-checking to ensure reasonableness of calculated results such as:
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compare to previous cycle result compare calculated BOC currents to previous BOC and EOC currents and verify change in expected directio require Fuels verification of result compare to expected result from Fuels or Fuel Vendo B)
Use the revised FMP-002 to calculate the excore instrumentation factor C)
Ensure the Power Range and Intermediate Range NIs are adjusted as neede Short Term Corrective Actions continued Corrective Action #9 - Perform prior to 200 degrees Conduct Simulator and/or classroom training for operations crews, including STA and Reactor Engineers who are assigned to the shifts performing the start-up. Operations and Training management shall determine the crew training needs. and design the training to meet those needs. The following specific topics are recommended:
a)
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The November 14,1993 HBR mismatch between actual and indicated reactor powe b)
Fuel cycle 16 core changes and how the core, reactivity control and NIs may react differently from previous cycle Consider having Reactor Engineering and Fuels personnel present portions of the trainin c)
Stress the importance of monitoring diverse indications of Reactor Power. particularly for a new core start-up prior to the first calorimetric and adjustment of the NI d)
Appropriate industry events that have occurred during plant start-ups should be covered, such as those described in SOER 90-00 e)
Simulator scenarios should include realistic equipment malfunctions and NIS error Corrective Action #10 - Perform prior to 200 degrees Ensure that OST-001 and OST-006 are revised to include the new Intermediate Range Setpoints following the completion of the setpoint adjustments by the I&C technician Corrective Action #11 - Perform prior to start-up Verify valve line-ups required for start-u Corrective Action #12 - Perform prior to Criticality Provide instructions in the body of procedure GP-005, Power Operation, to:
a)
Use independent indications of Reactor Power, to validate the Ns. Ensure the instructions assign responsibility for comparing the NIs with the independent indication b)
Stop power escalation when any of the independent power indication parameters indicate that the reactor power has reached 20%, or if there is a significant discrepancy between the Reactor Power indicators when below 20%
powe c)
At 20% Reactor power, verify that the indications of Reactor Power are within 5% of each othe d)
If the Power Ramp Rate Restrictions apply 1)
Increase power to less than or equal to 30% at 3% per hour, based on the highest indication of Reactor Powe )
Perform a Calorimetric and adjust the NIs, if applicable, prior to increasing power above 30%.
e)
Stop power escalation when the independent power indication parameters show a deviation of Reactor power greater than 5% when the Reactor is above 20% powe Corrective Action #13 - Perform prior to criticality Identify GP-003 and GP-005 as PLP-037 Case I evolutions and:
a)
specify that the MDM should review the fundamental priorities on Nuclear Safety when briefing the Operating Staff. This review should include a discussion about how the fundamental Nuclear Safety parameters can be monitored, and how specific action levels can be determine b)
provide guidance on how and when the MDM is expected to intervene, while maintaining a clear chain of command within the operating staf Corrective Action #14 - Perform prior to GP-005 Provide a label for the RCS Delta-T recorder that will indicate both Degrees F and % powe Corrective Action #15 - Perform prior to GP-005 Ensure Feedwater Flow Indication problems are resolve Corrective Action #16 - Perform prior to GP-005 Enhance the Operators knowledge of the operation of the Voltage Regulator.