IR 05000261/1992030

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Insp Rept 50-261/92-30 on 921116-20.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Observation & Evaluation of Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise
ML14178A308
Person / Time
Site: Robinson Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/23/1992
From: Barr K, Sartor W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML14178A307 List:
References
50-261-92-30, NUDOCS 9301200041
Download: ML14178A308 (19)
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Text

REG6 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:

50-261/92-30 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:

50-261 License No.:

DPR-23 Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Inspection Conducted:

November 16-20, 1992 Inspector:

Da M SatorJ

.Date Signed Team Members: B. Haagensen (Sonalysts, Inc.)

L. Kelle Approved by:

C. 0 K. Barr, Chier Date Signe Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:

This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise. Emergency organization activation and response were selectively observed in the Simulator Control Room (SCR),

Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).

The inspection also included a review of the exercise scenario and observation of the licensee's post-exercise critiqu Results:

In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified. The licensee's emergency response organization demonstrated the ability to implement the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures in a manner which provided adequate protection for the health and safety of the publi Exercise strengths included the dose assessment teams in the TSC and EOF; the 9301200041 921222 PDR ADOCK 05000261 G

PDR

prompt formulation and transmittal of protective action recommendations to the State and local authorities; and the formation.and dispatch of damage control teams. The inspector also noted that the licensee's first use of the simulator during a graded.exercise was well coordinated and the associated real-time plant parameter displays in the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs)

contributed significantly to the demonstration of exercise objective Negative observations included the delayed Site Area Emergency classification, the delayed activation of the beeper system for the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) staffing, and some inaccuracies in the notification messages to the State and local authoritie REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • R. Barnett, Manager, Outages and Modifications
  • C. Baucom, Project Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
  • S. Billings, Technical Aide, Regulatory Compliance
  • G. Bowen, Senior Specialist, Training
  • M. Burch, Program Director, Plant Support
  • B. Clark, Manager, Maintenance
  • J. Clery, Manager, Technical Support
  • R. Crook, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
  • J. Eaddy, Manager, Environmental and Radiological Control Support
  • E. Gardner, Radiation Control Supervisor
  • W. Gainey, Manager, Plant Support
  • J. Harrison, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
  • J. Huntley, Supervisor, Maintenance Planning
  • P. Odom, ProgramDirector, Plant Support
  • F. Pearce, Senior Specialist, Maintenance Support
  • E. Shoemaker, Manager, Mechanical Systems
  • B. Slone, Supervisor, Records Management
  • W. Stover, Shift Supervisor, Operations
  • L. Williams, Manager,.Security Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personne NRC Resident Inspectors
  • L. Garner, Senior Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview Exercise Scenario (82302)

The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated emergency response capability and a major portion of the basic elements within the licensee's Emergency Plan, as required by 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(14) and Section IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 5 The scenario for this partial participation exercise (State and local governments participating for notifications and communications only) was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and discussed with

licensee representatives prior to the exercise. The exercise scenario was well organized and of sufficient detail for the licensee's emergency response organization to demonstrate the exercise objectives. The scenario sequence of events was relatively straight forward with all levels of emergency classifications being made and separated by approximately an hour or more. This sequence permitted the activation of the emergency response facilities during this daytime exercise.to progress in an orderly response and not unduly challenge the respons The scenario added impetus to a needed change to the licensee's Emergency Action Level flowchart on determining the status of the containment fission product barrier (FPD).

Specifically, a radioactive release was occurring and the Site Emergency Coordinator adhered to a close interpretation of his flowchart and waited for confirmation of which containment penetration was unisolable prior to declaring the containment FPB breached. Compared to the exercise scenario timeline, this resulted in a Site Area Emergency classification approximately 30 minutes lat Since the emergency declaration made during this exercise was within the technical interpretation of the flowchart as currently approved, this issue was not considered a finding. The licensee is currently processing an EAL flowchart revision which should correct such a delay and improve the flowchar No violations or deviations were identifie. Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)

The licensee's organization was observed during the exercise to determine whether the requirements of Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 (as addressed in the Emergency Plan) were implemented with respect to descriptions, responsibilities, and assignments of the onsite emergency response organizatio The inspector determined that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined and that primary and alternate assignments-for the positions in the augmented emergency organization were clearly designated. During the exercise the inspector observed that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the initial onsite emergency organization. Following the decision to activate the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC), designated individuals were notified and responded to their respective onsite emergency facility to assume the duties of assigned emergency position Likewise, following the Site Emergency Coordinator's (SEC) decision to activate the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), designated personnel responded and staffed the EOF in accordance with their preassigned responsibilitie No violations or deviations were identifie. Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)

This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made, whether

arrangements to accommodate State and local personnel at the EOF were adequate, and whether other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified as specified by -10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),

Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and guidance promulgated in Section.II.C of NUREG-0654 (Revision 1). An inspector noted that the licensee's Emergency Plan and procedures identified other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response. The limited participation of this exercise did not include these organizations; however, arrangements for requested offsite assistance resources were in plac No violations or deviations were identifie.

Emergency Classification System (82301)

This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and to determine whether that scheme was adequately implemente The licensee's EAL-1 flowchart was used to identify and classify each emergency condition and to escalate to more severe classifications as the simulated accident progressed. The licensee's classifications and emergency declarations were appropriate throughout the exercise with the exception of the delayed SAE classification previously discussed in Paragraph 2. The Notification of Unusual Event was declared by the Shift Foreman at 0750 based on a confirmed earthquake. The Alert was declared at 0850 on the basis of R-9 exceeding a 5R/hr rise in 30 minutes. The Site Area Emergency was declared at 1121 by the Emergency Response Manager (ERM) in the EOF on the basis of 2 fission product barriers breached. At 1235 the ERM upgraded the emergency classification to a General Emergency based on 3 fission product barriers breache No violations or deviations were identifie.

Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)

This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and a means to provide early notification to the population within the plume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),

10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.d, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures for providing emergency information to Federal, State, and local response organizations, and for alerting and mobilizing the licensee's augmented emergency response organizatio The inspector noted that implementing procedures for notifications had been established and were adequate to provide guidance to personnel responsible for initial notification to the State and local authoritie The initial notifications were timely for the emergency declarations, but some inaccuracies were noted as follows:

o Follow-up notification message #3, approved at 1000, did not report that a leak in the RCS was causing a build-up of radioactive source term inside containment. This leak had commenced at 0830 and was positively diagnosed at 0849 in the control roo The existence of this condition was not reported to the State and local authorities until the next sequential follow-up message at 1105. This should have been reported immediately as a significant change in the condition of the plan o Follow-up notification message #5 understated the dose projections and source term estimates. The message was approved for transmission at 1131 and the release magnitude was incorrectly reported to be 3.6 curies noble gas, and 0.54 curies Iodine. These values were based on an out dated dose projection that had been completed at 104 More recent dose projection results at 1108 and 1122 showed a substantially higher source term. The best estimate for the magnitude of the source term had been completed at 1122 and had indicated 111.6 curies (noble gas) and 16.5 curies iodin o Follow-up notification message #7 understated the dose projections and source term estimates. This message was approved for transmission at 1247 and the release magnitude was incorrectly reported to be 72.0 curies noble gas and 10.8 curies Iodine. These values were based on an out-dated dose projection that had been completed at 121 The best estimate for the magnitude of the release had been completed at 1220 and had indicated 122.4 curies of noble gas and 18 curies Iodin The above inaccuracies were discussed with the licensee at the exit interview. The licensee stated the decision to limit changes to the message preparation had resulted in earlier cut off times for the source term data. The inspector emphasized the need for the latest data

.

available to be transmitted but did not make the issue a finding since the protective action recommendations remained correct. Notifications observed were a significant improvement over the previous year's exercise notifications. Exercise Weakness 50-261/91-26-03 remains open to follow corrective action on this issu An inspector also noted that the NRC Notification Worksheet, NRC Form 361, had been transcribed by the licensee into a local form.- This local form listed the "Notification of Unusual Event" as an "Unusual Emergency".

The Control Room Communicator reported the "Notification of Unusual Event" to the (simulated) NRC Operations Officer as an "Unusual Emergency" which had the potential to cause confusion. The licensee also identified this issue in their critique and-indicated the corrective action was being take In accordance with the exercise scenario, the Alert Notification System (ANS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) was not actuated during the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie.

Emergency Communications (82301)

This area was observed to verify that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that adequate communications capability existed among the licensee's emergency organizations, and between the licensee's emergency response organizations and offsite authoritie The inspector did not note any significant problems with the communications equipment utilized during the exercise; however, the licensee indicated the delayed beeper call out for the activation of the ERFs was partially due to the limited number of phone lines available from the simulato No violations or deviations were identifie. Public Education and Information Information was provided to the media and the public with press releases issued during the exercise from the Joint Information Center (JIC)

located in the Florence District Office. These activities were not observed by the NRC during this exercis No violations or deviations were identifie. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)

This area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency facilities-and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities to include the Simulator Control Room (SCR), TSC, OSC, and the EO In all cases, the facility and its dedicated equipment facilitated the emergency response. Of particular note was the remodeling of the TSC and EO In both instances, the improvements to the layout and equipment significantly contributed to improved emergency response for licensee personne No violations or deviations were identifie.

Accident Assessment (82301)

This area was observed to assure that methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)((9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The accident assessment program reviewed by the inspector included an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the simulated accident. The dose assessment teams in the EOF and TSC were coordinated and were able to provide accurate and rapid dose projections and source term estimates for the accident sequenc No violations or deviations were identifie.

Protective Responses (82301)

This area was observed to verify that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations (PARs) for the offsite populace within the 10-mile EPZ. Protective actions were quickly formulated in accordance with PEP-105 and transmitted to the State and-local authorities within 15 minutes of the declaration of the General Emergenc No Violations or deviations were identifie.

Exercise Critique (82301)

The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine the deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise, and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The licensee conducted player critiques in the facility immediately following the exercise. On November 19, 1992, the licensee also conducted evaluator/controller critiques prior to the formal presentation to facility management on the following day. The licensee's critique to their management on November 20 was comprehensive and addressed items needing improvemen No violations or deviation were identifie.

Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

a. (Open) Exercise Weakness (EW) 50-261/91-26-03:

Failure to provide complete information regarding the simulated casualty to State and local governments. Although licensee performance in this area was vastly improved over the previous year, the inaccuracies previously described in Paragraph 6 result in this issue remaining ope b. (Closed) EW 50-261/91-26-04:

Failure to conduct damage control activities in a timely manner. This issue was closed based on observations during this exercise which included: damage control activities were rapidly formulated, directed, dispatched and controlled from the OSC. The teams were correctly prioritized in the TSC and damage control efforts were rapidly focused on stopping the breach in containmen c. (Closed) EW 50-261/91-26/06:

Failure to demonstrate adequate assessment of the radiological consequence of the accident (dose assessment).

This issue was closed because of the successful dose assessment team activities described in Paragraph 1 d. (Closed) EW 50-261/91-26-07:

Failure to demonstrate the formulation of protective action recommendations. This issue was closed based on the timely protective action recommendations provided to the State and local authorities during this exercis.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on November 20, 1992, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The exercise Team Leader described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection observations. No proprietary information is contained in this repor Dissenting comments were not received from the license Attachments Drill and Exercise Objectives, Narrative Summary

ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DRILL & EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 1992 N Objectives Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room to detect accident conditions and formulate near term mitigating action.

Demonstrate the adequacy of the Technical Support Center in providing accident assessment and mitigation, dose assessment, and other activitie.

Demonstrate the ability to identify and properly classify the emergency in accordance with the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure.

Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for alerting, notifying, and mobilizing Emergency Response Organization Personne.

Demonstrate the timeliness of initial and follow-up notifications to responsible state and local government agencie.

Demonstrate the adequacy of the information provided to responsible state and local government agencies in the initial and follow-up notification.

Demonstrate the capability to make timely and accurate notifications to the Nuclear Regulatory Commissio (Actual participation of the NRC Operations Center may be simulated.) Demonstrate the ability to effectively communicate with plant emergency teams and company environmental monitoring team.

Demonstrate the ability to communicate between Emergency Response Facilitie.

Demonstrate the ability to support the radiological assessment process while maintaining personnel radiation exposure as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).

1 Demonstrate the capability to perform radiological monitoring activities and assessmen.

Demonstrate the ability to provide adequate radiation protection services such as dosimetry and personnel monitorin Annual Exercise Novembar 17, 1992 2.0-1

ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DRILL & EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 1992 N Objectives 1 Demonstrate the ability to adequately control the spread of contamination and the radiological exposure of on-site and off-site emergency worker.

Demonstrate the ability to formulate appropriate protective action recommendations to off-site government authoritie.

Demonstrate the ability to augment the on-shift emergency organization within the time limits specified within the Emergency Plan and its Implementing Procedures (normal working hours).

1 Demonstrate that the Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility can be activated in accordance with the Emergency Plan and its implementing procedure Demonstrate corrective action for the following 1991 exercise weaknesses:

1 Failure to provide complete information regarding the simulated emergency to state and local governments, as require.

Failure to demonstrate the ability to conduct damage control activities in a timely manne.

Failure to demonstrate adequate assessment of the radiological consequences of the simulated accident/dose assessmen.

Failure to fully demonstrate the formulation of Protective Action Recommendation Annual Exercise Novembar 17, 1992 2.0-2

RNPD Annual Exercise 1992 1992 ANNUAL EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY The scenario begins at 07:30 with Reactor Coolant System (RCS) activity higher than normal due to "leakers" in the fuel. Tube plugging is in progress on HVH-2 (Containment Fan Cooler). A resin transfer is also scheduled to occur today in the Radwaste Buildin At 0748 a seismic event occurs which is followed by a call from the load dispatcher confirming seismic activity in northeastern South Carolina. Operations will consult the seismic activity abnormal operating procedure and begin to perform plant walkdowns and prescribed Operational Surveillance Tests (OSTs). An Unusual Event should be declared based on confirmed seismic activity around 08:0 At 08:18 the results of the seismic instrumentation should be available and will indicate that the earthquake was below the threshold for declaring an Alert. At 08:30 RCS activity begins to increase on R-9 (letdown) and R-4 (charging pump room) area monitor The R-9 reading will increase to the alarm setpoint and the R-4 reading is elevated. Based on the continued increase of R-9 the fuel fission product barrier will be considered breached and at approximately 09:00 an Alert should be declare A small RCS leak (-2 gpm) will then occur at about 09:10. This will result in increasing readings for the containment gas and particulate monitors (R-11 and R-12) to the alarm setpoint. The operations crew will be alerted to the fact that there is a leak in the RCS inside containment. The leak rate is well below the threshold for considering the RCS fission product barrier breached and no upgrade of the emergency classification is expecte A condenser vacuum leak will occur at about 09:20. This malfunction will prompt the decision to shut down the reactor if the decision has not already been made by this tim During the shutdown, control rod H-8 will be noted as stuck in positio At 10:30 an after-shock will occur causing the failure of the service water piping for HVH-2 in the charging pump room. This provides a direct pathway from containment through the open service water piping in containment to the pipe break in the charging pump room to the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System. The leak of the Containment Vessel atmosphere into the charging pump room through the failed service water piping will cause a single train of fire alarm to be received in the Control Room. A small release will be detected through the plant vent stack by the stack monitor (R-14). The containment fission product barrier should then be evaluated as breache At 11:00 a Site Area Emergency should be declared based on the loss of two fission product barriers (fuel and containment).

The second seismic alarm will also cause additional fuel failure which will be MGvolumel\\exnarr.92 3.0- 1

RNPD Annual Exercise 1992 reflected in rising R-4 readings. The small release with increasing fuel failure and a direct pathway to the environment may result in a conservative early General Emergency to be declared, even though the RCS fission product barrier leakage is well below the threshold for breach of that barrie At 12:30 the leak from the RCS increases substantially to 400 gpm, well above the leakage required to consider the RCS breached (50 gpm). The loss of the third fission product barrier (RCS) should result in a General Emergency to be declared at about 12:4 The Protective Action Recommendation chosen should be either to evacuate the five mile radius and ten miles downwind (shelter all other sectors) or to shelter the five mile radius and evacuate 5-10 miles downwind. These recommendation choices should be made based upon the breach of three fission product barriers (release in progress). The decision between the two choices will be made based upon the judgement of the Site Emergency Coordinator whether or not an estimate of the duration of the release is known and that estimate is less than the evacuation tim At approximately time 14:30 the exercise will be terminate MGvolumel \\exnarr.92 3.0-2

UPDATE:

ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCENARIO UNe r1 E9 CONSOLIDATED TIME LINE November 13,1992 (ALL TIMES ARE APPROXIMATE)

T-Time Clock Simulator Instruction Event Description Emergency Plan Actions Missions Dispatched, 0000 0700 Set IC=20 Shift Turnover Briefing for Control Control Room turnover briefin * No one Is In containmen to Set Met Data Flag = False Room, Maintenance & E&RC:

-

Turnover of the HVH 2 work MSGs 1A 0730 Boron - 507 ppm, fuel @ MOL Reactor Coolant Activity is higher

- 2 M nics H

IB Update Rods than normal due to a leaker fuel 2 Mechanics and 1 HP to be 1C LOA EPS 125 elemen sent Into Containmentto resume Override HVA D, F, H

- Tube plugging is In progress on (HVH 2 O.O.S. per OWP-009)

the service water cooler of HVH Drain SI Accum. to low end

- Resin shipment loading Is in Lower Lake temp to 67 deg progres Lower Outside temp to 50 deg XmItter Override:

R-2:

12 mR/hr R-4:

5 mR/hr R-7:

9 mR/hr R-9:

95 mR/hr R-11:

20,000 CPM R-12:

1,200 CPM R-14A*

20,000 CPM R-14B:

1,200 CPM R-14C:

400 CPM R-19A&B:

1000 CPM R-19C:

500 CPM MISSION #1 R-14B Setpoint 1.4E6 CPM 0015 0745 Upon attempting to open the CV Dispatch a maintenance team alriock, hand wheel will not tur to fix the CV air lock MSG 2MISSION

  1. 9 MSG 2 0018 0748 Override MSC: Seismic Alarm

- A seismic event occurs and the l&C is dispatched to read the seismic monitoring system alarm seismic monitors per MST-904 MSG 3(P)

The crane used to move resin Dispatch a maintenance team MSG 4 becomes Inoperable with a resin to fix the cran drum in mid-air suspended by a sling.MISSIONS 2 & 3A 0020 0750 Load dispatcher calls into Control The load dispatcher calls to confirm Approximate time that Emergency Room: "An earthquake occurred in seismic activit Action Levels will be reviewe MSG 5 northeastem South Carolina. The possibilityof aftershocks exis Annual Exorcise: November 17, 1992 Page 3.0-3

ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCENARIO UPDATE:

CONSOLIDATED TIME LINE November 13, 1992 (ALL TIMES ARE APPROXIMATE)

T-Time Clock Simulator Instruction Event Description Emergency Plan Actions Missions Dispatched 0110 0920 Inhibit Alarm:

During shutdown of the unit, the OSC requested to dispatch an

-*

-

Turbine at Zero Spee Individual rod position Indicator I&C team to investigate H-8 0148 0958 MAL CRF-4 for H-8 Indicates that the rod has not move MSG 12(P)

MISSION #6 0135 0945 Darlington County decides to close all schools. Darlington Co. also MSG 13 reports earthquake damag Approximate time that TSC and OSC should be activate Override MSC: Seismic Alarm Aftershock occurs. The seismic OSC Requested to send teams to Xmitter Override:

monitoring system in the control check seismic recorders per MSG 14(P)

R-2:

15 mR/hr in 6300 se room alarm MST-090 R-4:

5000 mR/hr in 120 se The charging pump area R-7:

13 mR/hr in 6300 se radiation monitor (R-4) begins to R-9:

1.0E+5mR/hrin 240 se rise again. - The service water R-12:

2.1E+5CPM in 6300 se pipe in the charging pump room R-14.OE+6CPM In 900 se Is rupture R-148:

1.0E+6CPM In 900 se Small release begins. The R-14C:

3655 CPM In 900 se stack airborne monitor (R-14)

Increases but does not alar MISSIONS #38 & #7 0182 1032

- Waste Disposal Boron Recycle

- A waste disposal boron recycle Operator sent to Investigat Alarm alarm is received in the control

- Fire alarm (one train only) in room. The source of the alarm is Zone 4 the charging pump seal leakoff tank leve A fire alarm is received in Zone Load dispatcher calls Into Control

- -The load dispatcher calls to Alarm and PA announcement for AOs dispatched for AOP-021 Room: *A second earthquake confirm a second seismic event In local evacuation of Charging pump walkdown of the plan MSG 17 occurred near the first one in the region, roo Team will be requested to northeastern South Carolina. The HVE 5B starte A dose projection based on the dispatch a team to the charging possibilityof more aftershocks current R-14 readings maybe pump room to repair service exist.-

mad water pip I MISSION #8B Annual Exercise: November 17,c1992 Page 3.0-

ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCENARIO UPDATE:

CONSOLIDATED TIME LINE November 13, 1992 (ALL TIMES ARE APPROXIMATE)

T-Time Clock Simulator Instruction Event Description Emergency Plan Actions Missions Dispatched 0195 1045 Xmitter Override:

EALs should be consulte During the post seismic R-14C:

16,725 CPM In 5400 se walkdown, a service water pipe in the charging pump room for HVH-2 is discovered failed. This creates a direct path from containment air to the charging pump room via the open HVH unit in containment.,

0210 1100 Clear Override MSC 14 when Approximate time that the results Approximate time that a Site Area I&C reports back to the Control notified by seismic controller of the seismic monitoring system Emergency is declared based Room with the results of the MSG D alarm Is interpreted. The results upon failure of two fission product seismic monitor are.09G horizontal acceleration barriers (fuel breach based upon and.06G vertical acceleratio R-9 monitor and containment breach based on pathway for fission products to escape to the environment).

0215 1105 Approximate time that Site Evacuation Alarm and PA MSG 18 announcement is made of Site Area Emergenc Xmitter Override:

Approximate time that unit Is off Approximate time that States and Damage Control Team to R-33:

0.8 mR/hrin 4500 se lin Counties will be notified of the Site discover ruptured pip MSG 19(P)

CONTINGENCY BASED ON Area Emergenc ISOLATION OF LETDOWN:

R-4:

3,621 mR/hr In 3600 se R-9:

21,000 mR/hr in 10800 se Time that public warning system sirens and EBS will be sounded MSG 20 (controller Injected message).

0270 1200 Approximate time for EOF activation if not done at an Aler Annual Exercise: November 17, 1992 Page 3.0-7

ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCENARIO UPDATE:

CONSOLIDATED TIME LINE November 13, 1992 (ALL TIMES ARE APPROXIMATE)

T-Time Clock Simulator Instruction Event Description Emergency Plan Actions Missions Dispatched 0300 1230 Malfunction RCS 9A 400/10 A large break Loss of Coolant The EALs will be consulte Xmitter Override:

Accident (400 gpm) occurs inside MSG 21(P)

R-2:

1.0E+4mR/hrin 1200 se containment. This corresponds to R-4:

1.0E+4mR/hrin 300 se loss of the third fission product R-7:

1.OE+4mR/hrin 1200 se barrier. Activity in the charging R-12:

4.5E+6CPM In 300 se pump room Increases R-14C:

5.OE+4CPM in 300 se dramaticallydue to the service R-32A'

140 R/hr in 6300 se water pipe break and R-4 rises to R-32B:

140 R/hr In 6300 se high level R-33:

78 mR/hr In 6300 se Xmitter Override:

The stack monitor (R-14) alarm A dose projection based upon R-12:

1.OE+7CPM In 1200 se A significant radiological release the R-14 monitor reading will be MSG 22(P)

R-14C:

1.0E+6CPM in 1200 se begin made. Environmental Monitoring MSG 23(P)

Teams close In may begin to see increases In monitor reading Xmitter Override:

Approximate time that a General Approximate time that first PASS R-14D:

296 CPM In 900 se Emergency is declare results will be available to the MSG E R-14E:

15 CPM In 10 se TS MAL TUR 13 Turning Gear falls to engag Approximate time that the state Turbine Turning Gear motor tri and counties are notified of the MSG 24 Xmitter Override:

General Emergency. A protective R-14D:

725 CPM in 5400 se action recommendation will be mad MISSION #10 0345 1315 Approximate time that State decides on what public protective MSG 25 action will be made. State will order an evacuation of the ten mile EPZ (Controller message).

0360 1330 Approximate time that sirens and EBS will be sounded (Controller MSG 26 message).

Annual Exercise: November 17, 1992 Page 3.0-8

ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCENARIO UPDATE:

CONSOLIDATED TIME LINE November 13, 1992 (ALL TIMES ARE APPROXIMATE)

T-Time Clock Simulator Instruction Event Description Emergency Plan Actions Missions Dispatched 0420 1400 Terminate Exercis Notify all affected partie MSG 27 R-6 Simulator Instructions:

Set R-6 to Value Shown at times Indicated. Return R-6 to 2x original value when sample complet All ramp times are 30 second T-Time Clock (Normal RCS Sample) mR/hr (PASS Sample) mR/hr 0075-0135 0845-0945 900 100 0135-0195 0945-1045 1800 200 0195-0255 1045-1145 15000 5000 0255-0315 1145-1245 14500 1000 0315-0375 1245-1345 11000 600 0375-0435 1345-1415 9000 500 0435-1415-5000 250 Annual Exercise: November 17, 1992 Page 3.0-8a

ROBINSON PROJECT ANNUAL EXERCISE 1992 RADIATION MONITORS 11/11/92 03:47 PM PAGE 3.0-9 07:30 07:45 08:00 08:15 08:30 08:45 09:00 09:15 09:30 09:45 10:00 10:15 10:30 10:45 RADIATION MONITORS R2 CV LOU RANGE mR/hr

12

12

12

12

12

12

12 R4 CHARGING PUMP AREA n/hr

5

5

262 359 558 543 532 524 515 5000 5000 R7 SEAL TABLE mR/hr R9 LETDOWN LINE AREA mR/hr

99

99

5248 7185 11167 10860 10646 10489 10306 100000 100000 R11 CV PURGE PARTICULATECPM 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 229580 433287 632872 829400 1000000 1000000 1000000 R12 CV PURGE GAS CPM 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 3293 5313 7297 9255 11180 38062 63880 R14A PLANT VENT PAR CPM 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 R148 PLANT VENT IODINE CPM 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 R14C PLANT VENT GAS LOU CPM 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 3655 R14D PLANT VENT GAS MID CPM

10

10

10

10

10

10

10 R14E PLANT VENT GAS HIGH CPM

10

10

10

10

10

10

10 R15 COND. AIR EJECTOR CPM

10

10

10

10

10

10

10 R19A SG "A" SLOWDOWN CPM 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 R19B SG "B" BLOWDOWN CPM 1000 1001 1001 1001 1001 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 R19C SG "C" BLOWDOWN

.CPM 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500, 500 500 R23P RADWASTE BLDG PART. CPM

60

60

60

60

60

60

60 R231 RADWASTE BLDG 10 CPM

10

10

10

10

10

10

10 R23NG RADUASTE BLDG GAS CPM

20

20

20

20

20

20

20 R31A MAIN STEAM "A" mR/hr.3.3.3.3.3.3.3 R31B MAIN STEAM "8" mR/hr.4.4.4.4.4.4.4 R31C MAIN STEAM "C" mR/hr.6.6.6.6..6.6 R32A CV HIGH RANGE R/hr

1

1

1

1

1

1

1 R328 CV HIGH RANGE R/hr

1

1

1

1

1

1

1 CV OUTSIDE 2 "X" mi/hr 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 R33 MONITOR BLDG. AREA n/hr.3.3.3.3.3.3.3

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