IR 05000261/1992005
| ML14178A207 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1992 |
| From: | Christensen H, Garner L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14178A204 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-92-05, 50-261-92-5, NUDOCS 9204140084 | |
| Download: ML14178A207 (8) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
o
.101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-261/92-05 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.: 50-261 License No.: DPR-23 Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Inspection Conducted: Februar 8, 1992, -
March 13, 1992 Lead Inspector:
_-
J;2-
-f 3/
'2 1L. W. Garner, Senior Resident Inspector(
Ddte Bigned Other Inspectors:
K. R. Jury, Resident Inspector A. Keller, Resident Inspector Approved by:-
L
.o Ch istensen, Section Chief Da Sfgned Division of Reactor Projects Summary Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of operational safety verification, -surveillance observation, maintenance observation, and followu Results:
A non-cited violation was identified involving failure to perform tamper switch surveillance in accordance with procedures (paragraph 3).
A turbine runback resulted when a rod control system supply breaker was inadvertently tripped during a breaker compartment inspection (paragraph 2).
9204140084 920324 PDR ADOCK 05000261 G
REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted R. Barnett, Manager, Outages and Modifications
- C. Baucom, Acting Manager, Regulatory Compliance
- W. Biggs, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department Site Unit R. Chambers, Plant General Manager T. Cleary, Manager - Balance of Plant Systems and Reactor Engineering, Technical Support D. Crook, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
- C. Dietz, Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Project
- J. Eaddy, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Support R. Femal, Shift Supervisor, Operations D. Knight, Shift Supervisor, Operations
- L. Lynch, Supervisor, Quality Control A. McCauley, Manager -
Electrical Systems, Technical Support R. Moore, Shift Supervisor, Operations A. Padgett, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
- M. Page, Manager, Technical Support D. Seagle, Shift Supervisor, Operations R. Smith, Manager, Maintenance
- R. Wallace, Coordinator, Operations
- L. Williams, Manager, Site Nuclear Security D. Winters, Shift Supervisor, Operations Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne *Attended exit interview on March 18, 199 Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap. Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors evaluated licensee activities to confirm that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirement These activities were confirmed by direct observation, facility tours, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel and management, verification of safety system status, and review of facility record To verify equipment operability and compliance with TS, the inspectors reviewed shift logs, Operation's records, data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunction Through work observations and discussions with Operations staff members, the inspectors verified the staff was knowledgeable of plant conditions, responded properly to alarms, adhered to procedures and applicable administrative controls, cognizant of in-progress surveillance and maintenance activities, and aware of
inoperable equipment statu The inspectors performed channel verifications and reviewed component status and safety-related parameters to verify conformance with T Shift changes were observed, verifying that system status continuity was maintained and that proper control room staffing existe Access to the control room was controlled and operations personnel carried out their assigned duties in an effective manner. Control room demeanor and communications were appropriat Plant tours and perimeter walkdowns were conducted to verify equipment operability, assess the general condition of plant equipment, and-to verify that radiological controls, fire protection controls, physical protection controls, and equipment tagging procedures were properly implemente Uncontrolled Security Key On February 17, 1992, a security key was found on the first level of the turbine building. Because control of the key had not been maintained, all security lock cores were replaced. The key was determined to belong to the outside auxiliary operator's key rin The security key was only one of approximately twenty keys on the rin How and when the security key became separated from the ring could not be determined. The licensee has reviewed this event with shift personnel and has implemented additional controls to maintain accountability of security key Turbine Runback On March 12, 1992, the unit experienced a turbine runback from 100 to 97 percent power when supply power was momentarily interrupted to the rod control syste All plant systems responded as expected during the transien The event occurred when an engineer performing a verification of breaker nameplate information, allowed the MCC compartment door/breaker latch interlock to trip the breaker when he closed the MCC compartment doo The engineer reclosed the breaker and reported the event to the control roo Prompt action to reclose the supply breaker limited the severity of the transien However, restoration of the breaker to its normal position was the operating shift's responsibilit The engineer was counseled concerning his action ACR 92-058 was issued on March 12, 1992 to review this even The inspectors will followup on this ACR as part of the routine inspection progra New Fuel Receipt Inspection The inspectors observed performance of FMP-013, Inspection Of New Fuel Assemblies And Shipping Container Fuel assembly W34 was found not to meet the rod to guide tube separation acceptance criteria between the third and fourth tie plate The separation was determined to be 0.049 inches whereas the acceptance criteria was 0.060 inches minimu Subsequent review revealed that the fuel assembly had been reworked during its manufactur The fuel vendor determined that the fuel assembly would be acceptable to us However, the licensee elected to return the
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assembly to the fuel vendor for repair. The other new fuel assemblies met the procedure acceptance criteri Discussion with a fuel vendor representative revealed that the inspection at the factory was a statistical based inspection and was not as comprehensive as the licensee's receipt inspectio No violations or deviations were identifie. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed certain safety-related surveillance activities on systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirement For the surveillance test procedures listed below, the inspectors determined that precautions and LCOs were adhered to, the required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to test initiation, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure, test instrumentation was properly calibrated, the tests were completed at the required frequency, and that the tests conformed to TS requirement Upon test completion, the inspectors verified the recorded test data was complete, accurate, and met TS requirements; test discrepancies were properly documented. and rectified; and that the systems were properly returned, to servic Specifically, the inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following test activities:
MST-012 Maintenance And Testing Of Reactor Trip And Bypass Breakers OST-401 Emergency Diesel(Slow Speed Start).
OST-551 Turbine Valve And Trip Functional Test Tamper Switch Surveillance Not Performed On February 25, 1992, during performance of PM-401, Security System Tamper And Line Supervision Test, a tamper switch failed to function properl The tamper switch was. found to have its lead attached with tap The tamper switch was associated with a card reader which allows access into a vital are During the review it was determined that the switch had not given an alarm since September 25, 199 At that time a series of spurious alarms had been received from the tamper switc Since this tamper switch is tested quarterly per PM-401, a review was conducted of the surveillance test completed in December 199 The completed procedure indicated that the tamper switch had functioned satisfactorily. However, computer alarm records contained no record that an alarm had been received during the December 1991 test. Further review of this completed procedure revealed similar discrepancies for approximately 40 percent of the tamper switche Review of the latest completed test, the one which was performed in February 1992, revealed no similar discrepancies. Selective reviews of other previously completed PM-401 procedures likewise revealed no additional discrepancie '0
The December 1991 discrepancies was associated with one I & C technicia The technician indicated that he had transferred information from a messy field copy to an official record copy of the procedure. He indicated that the steps had been performed by other individuals and he was just transcribing the information using his initials. The other technicians involved in the test indicated that they had not signed a field copy. The Maintenance Manager indicated that the practice of transcribing information by an individual not directly involved in the evolution and then initialing the procedure step did not meet management expectations and was unacceptabl During a special meeting of the maintenance staff, management standards and expectations for the conduct of maintenance activities were reviewed by the Maintenance Manage The technician involved in this problem has resigne The failure during December 1991 to perform the surveillance test in accordance with procedure PM-401 was a violatio This violation will not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation met the criteria specified in Section of the Enforcement Polic This NCV is identified as: Failure To Perform Tamper Switch Testing In Accordance With PM-401, 92-05-0 MST-012 The inspectors observed performance of MST-012, Maintenance And Testing Of Reactor Trip And Bypass Breaker The maintenance included lubrication, contact cleaning and undervoltage device trip testing. All maintenance actions observed were adequate and the undervoltage trip device tested satisfactoril However, the inspector noted weakness in step 35 of the procedure. This step directs the maintenance personnel to apply 125 VDC to energize the undervoltage trip device for testing, but does not specify which secondary terminals on the breaker to apply the voltage. There are twelve secondary terminals on the back of the breaker which were not numbered or labeled. The maintenance personnel determined the appropriate terminals by placing a temporary short circuit across the input and output wires of the undervoltage trip device and then measuring the resistance between the various secondary terminal The electrical maintenance supervisor indicated that a procedure change would be submitted for this ste RT Bypass Breaker UV Device Actuation Point Drift On March 12, 1992 while performing MST-012, the B RT bypass breaker UV device was determined to actuate at 38.7 VDC, approximately 14 percent below the 44.9 VDC reference valu The three consecutive tests which were averaged to determine the actuation point yielded values of 39.2, 37.9 and 39.1 VD The UV device was replaced and the breaker -test was satisfactorily completed. The device in its as found condition would have performed its safety function; however, the failure of the UV device to actuate within plus or minus 10 percent of its reference value (the value determined when the device was originally installed) indicated that degradation had occurre The removed UV device will be returned to the vendor for analysi The UV devices on the other three RT and bypass
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breakers tested satisfactorily. The UV devices on all the RT and bypass breakers were scheduled to be replaced in the March 1992 RO. The licensee plans to review the PM frequency to determine if a replacement interval shorter than a three refueling cycle interval is warrante One NCV was identifie. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed safety-related maintenance activities on systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with TS, approved procedures, and appropriate industry codes and standard The inspectors determined that these activities did not violate LCOs and that required redundant components were operable. The inspectors verified that required administrative, material, testing, and fire prevention controls were adhered t In particular, the inspectors observed/reviewed the following maintenance activities:
PM-007 Emergency Diesel Generator Inspection Number 1 (quarterly)
WR/JO 92-ACGAl Maintenance and Testing of Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker A (MST-012)
WR/JO 92-ACSN1 Troubleshooting and Repair of Reactor Protection RPS Isolation Amplifier Failure The inspectors observed troubleshooting and repair of. the RPS C S/G steam pressure channel II isolation amplifier PM-495 The C-S/G channel pressure indicator, PI-495 was reading out of tolerance low, e. g.,
the reading was greater than 4 percent lower than the redundant two indicators, PI-494 and PI-49 Operations personnel tripped the bistables associated with the S/G steam pressure channel II as required by T Subsequent troubleshooting determined that the C S/G steam line pressure was normal and that the problem was with the Hagan input isolation amplifier PM-495 This amplifier prevents a fault in the indication circuitry from affecting the protection channe This fault would not have prevented the protection circuitry from performing its functio Several capacitors were replaced in the isolation amplifier. The channel was returned to service and the indication was then consistent with the other two channel No violations or deviations were identifie.
Followup (92700, 92701, 92702)
(Open)
LER 90-01, Loss of. All Control Rod Position Indicatio The cause of this event was the failure of the 120 volt AC circuit breaker which supplies the RPI The cause of failure for the circuit breaker was poor electrical contact between an input 12 AWG wire and breaker fastening clip due to the presence of a metal sliver on the threaded fastener of the wire fastening cli The metal sliver prevented adequate mechanical engagement between the wire and connector which resulted in arcing, thermal degradation, and subsequent failure of the breake The breaker and receptacle were replace The licensee verified positive contact between the replacement input wire and fastening clip and has included inspection of this connections in their PM progra Additionally, this connection, as well as others within the RPIS, is now checked periodicall by thermal imagin The turbine runback which resulted from the breaker failure was a much greater power reduction that anticipated. As committed to in the subject LER, an investigation into the abnormal turbine runback was conducted. However, the investigation did not discover the cause of this proble The licensee-was still considering additional trouble shooting or special testing to determine possible abnormalities in the turbine runback circuitry. This items remains open pending any additional actions that will be taken to review the turbine runback circuitr No violations or deviations were identifie. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March.18, 1992, with those persons indicated in paragraph The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below and in the summary. Dissenting comments were not received from the license The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials. provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio Item Number Description/Reference Paragraph 92-05-01 NCV -
Failure To Perform Tamper Switch Testing In Accordance With PM-401 (paragraph 3) List of Acronyms and Initialisms AC Alternating Current AWG American Wire Gauge ACR Abnormal Condition Report FMP Fuel Management Procedure I&C Instrument & Control LCO Limiting Condition for Operation
LER Licensee Event Report MST Maintenance Surveillance Test NCV Non-cited Violation PI Pressure Indicator PM Preventative Maintenance RO Refueling Outage RPIS Rod Positioning Indicating System RPS Reactor Protection System RT Reactor Trip S/G Steam Generator TS Technical Specification UV Undervoltage VDC Volts Direct Current WR/JO Work Request/Job Order