IR 05000261/1990028
| ML14178A075 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 01/03/1991 |
| From: | Kreh J, Rankin W, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14178A071 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-90-28, NUDOCS 9101230070 | |
| Download: ML14178A075 (16) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 JAN 0 4 1991 Report No.:
50-261/90-28 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-261 License No.:
DPR-23 Facility Name:
H. B. Robinson Inspection Conducted:
December 3-6, 1990 Inspectors:
i/
T
.
W. M. Sartor, Jr., Team L ead Date gigned J. L. Kreh D te digned Accompanying Personnel: T. Guilfoil (Battelle)
Approved by:
-,
I L_
<
/
W. H. Rankin, Chief /'
Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This special, announced inspection was the observation and evaluation of a redemonstration exercise to demonstrate completion of corrective actions to a violation and weakness identified in the June 18, 1990 exercise. The violation was for failure to correct a weakness from the 1989 exercise for failing to staff the Technical Support Center and Operational Support Center in a timely manner. The weakness for the 1990 exercise was a failure to classify a General Emergency. The inspection also included a review of the Alert declaration on September 11, 199 Results:
The exercise was successful for demonstrating adequate corrective actio The performance of the emergency response organization also permitted closure of four outstanding exercise findings from the 1989 exercis The licensee's
.performance was significantly improved from the previous exercise; however, additional training will enhance the corrective actions in many case PDR ADOCK 05000261 G
REPORT DETAILS
.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. Barnett, Manager, Outage and Modifications
- C. Bethea, Manager, Training
- G. Bowen, Specialist, Technical Training
- R. Chambers, Unit 2 Operations Manager
- R. Crook, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
- J. Curley, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
- M. DiCerbo, Senior Specialist, Site Information Services
- C. Dietz, Manager, Robinson Nuclear Project Department
- J. Eaddy, Environmental and Radiation Control Supervisor
- M. Gann, Specialist, Emergency Prepardeness
- A. Garrou, Project Specialist, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
- E. Gates, Project Specialist, Site Information Services
- J. Gerald, Specialist, Health Physics and Chemistry
- M. Goodson, Specialist, Maintenance
- G. Graham, Project Specialist, Site Information Services
- E. Harris, Jr., Manager, Onsite Nuclear Security
- R. Howell, Senior Specialist, Quality Assurance, Quality Control
- J. Huntley, Project Specialist, Planning
- R. Indelicato, Project Specialist, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
- J. Kloosterman, Director, Regulatory Compliance
- E. Lear, Senior Mechanical Specialist
- G. McCoy, Material Control Supervisor
- M. Morrow, Senior Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
- T. Niemi, Project Engineer, Quality Assurance Engineering
- P. Odom, Project Specialist, Maintenance Support
- C. Oates, Maintenance Staff
- M. Page, Manager, Technical Support
- D. Quick, Manager, Plant Support J. Sheppard, Plant General Manager
- R. Smith, Manager, Maintenance
- D. Stadler, Onsite Licensing Engineer
- D. Taylor, Director, Fuel Processing and Control
- M. Thompson, Manager, Emergency Preparedness and Spent Fuel Management Section
- A. Wallace, Operations Coordinator
- L. Williams, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness/Security
- H. Young, Manager, Quality Assurance, Quality Control Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included operators, security force members, technicians, and administrative personne Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- L. Garner, Senior Resident Inspector
- R. Lo, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- Attended exit interview Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for this redemonstration exercise was reviewed and determined to be adequate for demonstrating the objectives established for the exercis Because of the limited scope of this exercise, the objectives addressed only six areas of exercise activities:
a. Accident Detection and Assessment Emergency Classification c. Notification of Onsite and Offsite Emergency Response Personnel d. Communications e. Staff Augmentation f. Scenario and Exercise Control The extent of participation further reduced the applicability of some of these area For example, the exercise was a utility only exercise with no participation from State and county emergency response agencies, nor from the Headquarters Communications Center and the Joint Information Center; therefore, the spectrum of communications was reduced. The above limitations also affected the notifications to off-site emergency response agencie No violations or deviations were identifie. Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9); 10.CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the acciden The degrading in-plant conditions were the emergency action level (EAL) used to determine the emergency classification and concomitant protective actions recommended to protect health and safety outside the site boundary. The scenario did not provide for a radiological release and the deployment and evaluation of offsite monitoring teams was not an objective of this exercis No violations or deviations were identifie.
Emergency Classification (82301)
This area was observed to determine that. a standard emergency classification -and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4);
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I An EAL scheme was used to promptly identify and properly classify the emergency that escalated to more severe emergency classes as the simulated emergency progresse An inspector noted that the Shift Foreman in the control room exercise area was hampered by the lack of instrument panels to 'obtain data required for classifying the emergenc He was able to obtain the needed data from an exercise controller and promptly identified and properly classified the condition as previously stated; however, it was readily apparent that access to instrument panels, such as those available with the simulator, would significantly enhance this aspect of the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of emergency response personnel and State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway had been established. as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed the initial call-out of emergency response personnel which was conducted from the Drill Control Roo The call-out procedure as implemented successfully staffed the Technical Support Center (TSC)
and Operational Support Center (OSC)
in a timely manne An inspector observed that the'Shift Technical Advisor and the Control Room Communicator also activated the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) along with the TSC and OSC at the Alert declaration without direction from the Site Emergency Coordinato The effect of this on EOF activation is further discussed in Paragraph The contents of the initial and followup messages from the exercise were reviewed and found to be accurate and timel During the exercise, the messages were reported to a licensee representative simulating the offsite communications link since offsite participation was not include A review of the licensee's logs in the EOF indicated that protective action recommendations (PARs) and siren activation were properly simulate No violations or deviations were identifie. Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6);
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and emergency organizations were goo No onsite communications related problems were identified during this exercis OSC repair team communications were not demonstrated during this limited scale exercise which had the OSC personnel participating only for initial staffing of the facility and then returning to refueling activitie No violations or deviations were identifie. Staff Augmentation (82301)
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that emergency assignments were made to the licensee's emergency response organization (ERO) as personnel reported to the site in response to the pager system activation for this exercis Sufficient personnel were available to fill required emergency response positions such that the OSC was activated in 30 minutes and the TSC was activated in 73 minute The EOF was activated approximately 72 minutes following. the Site Area Emergency (SAE)
declaratio Because the EOF
'personnel had received the beeper signal to respond following the Alert declaration, the licensee identified the activation time of the EOF as a deficiency during their critiqu The deficiency emanated from the time the clock started.for EOF activation. The inspector observed that the EOF appeared to be adequately staffed to have activated earlier than it did; however,- there was no impetus to do so in the EOF as they were using the SAE declaration in lieu of the Alert declaration as their start tim No violations or deviations were identifie.
Scenario and Exercise Control The licensee had established as an exercise objective "Provide a technically consistent scenario and demonstrate proper exercise control."
The adequacy of the scenario was discussed in Paragraph 2. The inspector also observed that the licensee demonstrated proper exercise contro This was best illustrated by the initial delay of the exercise initiatio Because of the use of a room in the Training Building as the exercise Control Room, a security check had to be made of the room prior to its becoming part of the protected area along with the TSC. This check had to
be completed prior to exercise initiation; and the lateness of the security check resulted in a 30 minute delay from the published time line in the scenario. The licensee's controller organization was notified by the lead controller of the delay and it was coordinated in such a manner that all messages and data were promptly corrected and the revised exercise timeline created no problem No violations or deviations were identifie. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702) (Closed) Exercise Weakness (EW) 50-261/89-27-01:
Failure to produce a technically consistent scenario to demonstrate proper exercise contro The scenario for this exercise was technically consistent and good exercise control was maintained by the controller staf (Closed) EW 89-27-02:
Failure of the Shift Foreman to recognize an initiating condition for a NOU During this redemonstration exercise, the Shift Foreman promptly recognized initiating conditions that were properly classified as an Alert and a Site Area Emergency; this open item is therefore close (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-261/89-27-04:
Considering placement of potassium iodide (KI) at the OSC and Control Roo In May 1990, the OSC and Control Room emergency kits were each stocked with 1000 KI tablet Attachment 8.2 of procedure RST-003,
"Emergency Kit Inventory,
" Revision 16, dated May 23, 1990, displayed these additions to the subject supply inventorie (Closed) IFI 50-261/89-27-06:
Considering manual actuation of the emergency mode of the TSC/EOF HVAC system when a significant release is known to be occurrin Although no explicit PEP revision was made to address the subject IFI, the inspector observed during the December 5, 1990 exercise that the Radiological Control Manager decided at about 7:00 a.m. to manually actuate the emergency ventilation mode (i.e., recirculation)
at the TSC/EOF Building (simulated actuation). (Closed) EW 90-13-01:
Failure to classify the General Emergenc The inspector observed during the December 5, 1990 exercise that the Site Emergency Coordinator consistently evaluated the degrading plant conditions against the EALs and made an appropriate General Emergency declaratio (Closed)
Violation 50-261/90-13-02:
Failure to correct previous weakness of-not activating TSC and OSC in a timely manne The license response dated August 20, 1990, was considered acceptable by Region II. The licensee identified key positions for augmentation of the ERO and instituted a "beeper" activated group call-out system for key positions of the ER During the December 5, 1990 redemonstration exercise, the TSC and OSC were fully activated in 73 minutes and 30 minutes respectively, thereby demonstrating the capability to fully activate the TSC and OSC within 75 minutes of an Alert declaratio Corrective actions stated in the licensee's response had been implemente.
Review of Alert Declaration on 9-11-90 (92702)
On September 11, 1990, at 8:50 a.m., a personnel error resulted in severance of a pressurized refrigerator line in the HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning) equipment room for the Main Control Room, releasing Freon into the immediate area. The Shift Foreman declared a NOUE based on the existence of a toxic gas release into the Protected Are However, the event was reclassified as an Alert at 9:46 following the belated recognition that the Freon release had occurred within a building designated as a Vital Area. The untimely declaration of the Alert was previously determined to represent a violatio A second violation (non-cited) in connection with the subject event concerned inadequate implementation of Procedure PEP-171 for notification of the State and county Emergency Operations Center Both of these violations, as well as further operational details, are discussed in Paragraph 5 of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-261/90-2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on December 6, 1990, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection result The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio Dissenting comments were not received from the license Licensee management was informed that a previous violation, three EWs and two IFIs discussed in Paragraph 9 were closed during this inspectio
Attachment:
Objectives, Guidelines, and Master Timeline
1990 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REDEMONSTRATION EXERCISE OBJECTIVES ACCIDENT DETECTION AND ASSESSMENT Demonstrate the ability to detect emergency a
REGION 11:
000 000 OPS. CENTER:
000 000 RESPONSE TEAM:
000 000 EOC = DERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER FEOC
= FORWARD EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER NRC = NUCLEAR REGUlATORY COMISSION FEMLA
= FEDERAL DERGENCY UANAGEMENT AGENCY 2.0-5 MXBL1 11/8/90
Table #2 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT C ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTMENT EXERCISE BASICS DATE:
Unannounced BEGIN TIME:
Unannounced END TIME:
Unannounced ANNOUNCED EXERCISE XXX UNANNOUNCED EXERCISE FULL SCALE PARTIAL PARTICIPATION XXX UTILITY ONLY MAXIMUM EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY PARnahlN mmrCmH ACTWATON N
S L
F P
S S
A P
I I
U E
I T
C R
T M
W L
M U
A T
E U
I L
U a
U S
I L
T P
L T
A T
N A
E P
R A
/
L A
V T
D L
T F
a
E A
C E
I E
L
P Y
E D
N V
L D
I
[
A U
S D
Y R
H CP&L ON-SITE ERO:
DRILL CONTROL ROOM:
@00 00 (a)
TSC:
.o**
000
@0 Osc:
- 000
- 00 000 _
(b)
EOF:
_ee 000
CP&L OFF-SITE ERO:
BILL WESTER:
000
Hcc:
- 00 000 JIc:
000
-
OFFSITE SUPPORT:
FIRE DEPT:
000 AMBULANCE:
000 BYERLY HOSPITAL:
o l
.
WILSON HOSPITAL 000 PHYSICIAN:
000 LOCAL MEDIA*
000 TSC -
TEcMcm SUPPORT cDHRw OSC
%
OPEWIL SPPORT CENTER EOF -
EMERGENCf OPER1nONS FACIUTY JIC - JONT INFORMATION CENTER HCC -
HEADQUARTERS COWULMCAONS Coim (a) A Control Roorn plaiq sI wM be caed ito pouition prior to the rharaL (b) Acivate and then releose mecancs, I&C ond EARC Techiris not ivoled In eoderslip ro.0-6 xo2 11/s/so
MASTER TIMELINE TIME EVENT 0345 PLANT AT 100% POWER 0400 A REACTOR TRIP SIGNAL IS INITIATED BY A
REDUCED FREQUENCY CONDITION ON THE GRID THAT RESULTS IN AN OTDT TRIP SIGNA THE REACTOR DOES NOT TRIP BUT THE TURBINE TRIP AN ALERT CONDITION EXIST REACTOR IS TRIPPED MANUALLY FROM THE REACTOR TURBINE GENERATOR BOARD (RTGB)
0405 A LOW PRESSURE ALARM FROM THE CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT HATCH PPS SEAL COMES IN INDICATING A PROBLEM WITH CONTAINMENT INTEGRIT LOAD DISPATCHER CALLS TO INFORM THE CONTROL ROOM THAT FREQUENCY PROBLEMS WILL CONTINUE 0410 A START-UP TRANSFORMER TROUBLE ALARM COMES IN AT THE RTGB 0413 OPERATOR REPORTS HOT OIL IS THE CAUSE OF THE TRANSFORMER TROUBLE ALARM, THE ALARM LIGHT DOES NOT RESET 0418 BURNS SECURITY REPORTS A LARGE LEAK AT THE STEAM DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (SDAFW) PUMP 0420 MULTIPLE ALARMS ARE RECEIVED AT THE RTGB INDICATING THE LOSS OF THE START-UP TRANSFORME A SITE EMERGENCY CONDITION EXIST AN ALERT SHOULD BE DECLARED BY NO THE PLANT PA SYSTEM IS NOW OUT OF SERVIC EMERGENCY DIESEL
"B" TROUBLE ALARM IS RECEIVED AT THE RTGB INDICATING A POTENTIAL REASON FOR THE DIESEL NOT STARTING 0430 OPERATOR DISPATCHED TO INVESTIGATE
"B" DIESEL TROUBLE REPORTS START FAILURE LIGHT AT THE ENGINE CONTROL PANEL AND AN UNSUCCESSFUL START ATTEMPT WHERE LOW FUEL OIL PRESSURE WAS OBSERVED 0438 600 GPM REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL LEAK OCCUR INDICATIONS OF A BREACH OF THE RCS AND CONTAINMENT (VIA RCS PRESSURE AND EQUIPMENT HATCH SEAL PRESSURE) WILL BE EVIDEN.0 -
MASTER TIMELINE (Continued)
TIME EVENT 0440 A SITE EMERGENCY SHOULD BE DECLARED BY NO I&C PERSONNEL REPORT THAT NITROGEN IS SUPPLIED TO THE STEAMLINE PORVS 0452 OPERATOR DISPATCHED TO START DS DIESEL REPORTS THAT IT IS RUNNING 0504 DS DIESEL OPERATOR REPORTS
"A" CCW,
"A" CHARGING,
"D" SERVICE WATER PUMPS ARE RUNNING AND RECOMMENDS LOADING MCC-5 AND "A" BATTERY ON THE DS DIESEL 0510 OPERATOR REPORTS MCC-5 AND "A" BATTERY ARE LOADED ON -THE DS DIESEL 0511 AN ALARM IS RECEIVED INDICATING THE LOSS OF "B" BATTERY (A-B BATTERY LOW VOLTS)
0515 OPERATOR DISPATCHED T'
fNVESTIGATE LOW BATTERY VOLTAGE ALARM REPORTS
"B" BATTERY VOLTAGE IS SO LOW THAT THE INVERTER OUTPUT BREAKER HAS TRIPPE THE TSC AND OSC SHOULD BE ACTIVATED BY NO THE EOF SHOULD BE ACTIVATED BY NO.0630 SEAL LEAKAGE INCREASES (TOTAL FAILURE)
0654 700 DEGREES ON THE CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLES IS REACHE WHEN THE TEMPERATURE REACHES 700 DEGREES, A
GENERAL EMERGENCY CONDITION MAY EXIST DUE TO FUEL JEOPARDY COMBINED WITH A BREACH OF THE RCS AND CONTAINMEN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM EMPTIES AND THE CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE TEMPERATURES INCREASE RAPIDL Declaration of a
General Emergency at this early stage hinges on the interpretation of the PPS problem as Containment breac EOP guidance states that conditions are assumed satisfactory until information otherwise is presen The total leakage in excess of Technical Specifications requirements is not measured by the P-netration Pressurization System (PPS),
because the PPS is an early warning syste Technically, procedures allow for the Containment to be considered intact because the actual leakage rate will not be know However, the AO will be reporting to the Control Room that a
lot of air is escaping from the equipment hatc.0 -
0700 A BUBBLE FORMS IN THE COR DEGREES ON THE CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE IS REACHE WHEN THE TEMPERATURE REACHES -1100 DEGREES, A GENERAL EMERGENCY CONDITION EXISTS DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO THE El AND E2 BUSES AND THE CORE HAS BEEN UNCOVERE THE "B" EMERGENCY DIESEL IS RETURNED TO SERVICE AND READY FOR LOADING 0718 THE "B" RHR PUMP IS LOADED ON THE EMERGENCY DIESE THE "C"~ SI PUMP IS LOADED ON THE EMERGENCY DIESE THE 3 & 4 HVH UNITS AND THE
"C" CHARGING PUMP ARE LOADED TO THE EMERGENCY DIESE TERMINATE REDEMO EXERCIS.0
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