IR 05000261/1990026
| ML14178A074 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 01/04/1991 |
| From: | Christensen H, Garner L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14178A073 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-90-26, NUDOCS 9101230059 | |
| Download: ML14178A074 (6) | |
Text
pR REGQ, UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, S-tATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-261/90-26 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-261 License No.: DPR-23 Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Inspection Conducted:
November 11 - December 10, 1990 Inspector:
>
L. W. Garner, Senior Resident Inspector Dat Signed Other Inspectors:
M. M. Glasman, Project Engineer K. R. Jury, Resident Inspector Approved by:
,
i q K. 0. Christensen, Section Chief ate Signed Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of operational safety verification, maintenance observation, and action on previous inspection finding Results:
The licensee agreed to submit a Technical Specification amendment to correct an improper reference in instrumentation table 3.5-PDR ADOCK 05000261 a
REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted R. Barnett, Manager, Outages and Modifications C. Baucom, Shift Outage Manager, Outages and Modifications J. Benjamin, Shift Outage Manager, Outages and Modifications
- W. Biggs, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department Site Unit S. Billings, Technical Aide, Regulatory Compliance
- M. Burch, Foreman, Environmental and Radiation Control R. Chambers, Manager, Operations D. Crook, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance J. Curley, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control C. Dietz, Manager, Robinson Nuclear Project D. Dixon, Manager, Control and Administration J. Eaddy, Supervisor, Environmental and Radiation Support S. Farmer, Supervisor - Programs, Technical Support E. Harris, Manager, Onsite Nuclear Safety
- Kloosterman, Director, Regulatory Compliance D. Knight, Shift Foreman, Operations E. Lee, Shift Outage Manager, Outages and Modifications A. McCauley, Supervisor - Electrical Systems, Technical Support R. Moore, Shift Foreman, Operations D. Nelson, Shift Outage Manager, Outages and Modifications
- M. Page, Manager, Technical Support
- R. Parsons, Manager, Robinson Engineering Support
- D. Quick, Manager, Plant Support D. Seagle, Shift Foreman, Operations
- J. Sheppard, Plant General Manager
- R. Smith, Manager, Maintenance R. Steele, Shift Foreman, Operations D. Winters, Shift Foreman, Operations H. Young, Director, Quality Assurance/Quality Control Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne *Attended exit interview on December 18, 199 Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap. Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors evaluated licensee activities to confirm that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirement These activities were confirmed by direct observation, facility tours, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel and management, verification of safety system status, and review of facility record To verify equipment operability and compliance with TS, the inspectors reviewed shift logs, Operations records, data sheets, and records of equipment malfunction Through work observations and discussions with Operations Staff members, the inspectors verified the staff was knowl edgeable of plant conditions, responded properly to alarms, adhered to procedures and applicable administrative controls, and aware of inoperable equipment statu Shift changes were observed, verifying that system status continuity was maintained and that proper control room staffing existe Access to the control room was controlled and operations personnel carried out their assigned duties in an effective manne Control room demeanor and communications continued to be informal yet effectiv Plant tours and perimeter walkdowns were conducted to verify equipment operability, assess the general condition of plant equipment, and to verify that radiological controls, fire protection controls, physical protection controls, and equipment tagging procedures were properly implemente Improper TS Reference Technical Specification Instrumentation Table 3.5-4 item 2.b, Steam Line Isolation High Containment Pressure, referenced item no. 1 of Table 3.5-3 for minimum operable channels and minimum degree of redundancy require ment The referenced item was the safety injection functional uni This item specified that for High Containment Pressure (Hi level), the minimum channels operable and minimum degree of redundancy are 2 and 1, respectivel However, TS Table 3.5-1 item 2, listed the steam line isolation channel action as being associated with the high containment pressure (Hi-Hi level) functional units, not the high containment pressure (Hi level)
functional uni Review of safeguards system drawings 5379-3233 and 5379-3235 confirmed that the high containment pressure (Hi-Hi level) were the correct functional unit The minimum channels operable and minimum degree of redundancy requirements for the high containment pressure (Hi-Hi level) function units were specified in TS Table 3.5-3 item 2.b, as being 2/set and 1/set respectively. These were the requirements which should have been referenced by TS Table 3.5-4 item The inspectors discussed this discrepancy with the Director of Regulatory Compliance. The licensee has agreed to submit a TS amendment to correct the improper referenc Radiological Barriers During the report period, the inspectors inadvertently entered roped-off radiologically controlled area In one instance, the rope barrier was routed inside scaffolding such that the inspector when stooping to climb through the scaffolding unintentionally ducked under the yellow-magenta rope delineating an airborne are An HP observed the inspector and motioned him to back out of the area. The area had been designated as an airborne area because of the potential for airborne contamination due to check valve SI-876B inspection activities in the overhead. The inspector
expressed concern to the HP that the rope did not form an obvious physical barrier. The HP immediately placed a sign on this section of rope such that the area boundary was more readily identifie Approximately five minutes after the inspector had entered the area, another individual without a respirator was seen exiting this same area after passing through the are The HP discussed with the individual what he had done and cautioned him to be more observant of posting At the time of these events it was fortuitous that no work was in progress and the previously open system was covered, e.g. area was not airborn In the other instance, a portion of the rope barrier had been removed to facilitate material removal such that the inspector unknowingly walked into a contaminated are An HP immediately stopped the inspector who was later determined not to be contaminated. The inspectors observed that the step-off pad was partially folded on top of itself. The HP was apparently preparing to correct these conditions at the time of the event. However, since the removed material was no longer in the area, it was apparent that the barrier had not been immediately restored. The inspectors discussed with E & RC Manager the above items including the desirability of establishing and maintaining radiological controlled areas with physical barriers to restrict acces No violations or deviations were identifie. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed safety-related maintenance activities on systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with TS and approved procedure The inspectors determined that these activities did not violate LCOs and that required redundant components were operabl The inspectors verified that required adminis trative, material, testing, radiological, and fire prevention controls were adhered t In particular, the inspectors observed/reviewed the following maintenance activities:
SP-961 (Revision 4)
Special Procedure for Expanded Maintenance and Repair of CCW Heat Exchangers A and B WO/JO 90-ALUJI CCW Heat Exchanger Tube Plug Removal and Leak Detection WO/JO 90-ANMN2 Removal and Retubing of CCW Heat Exchangers A and B
WO/JO 90-APUS1 Removal/Cleaning/Reinstallation of CCW Heat Exchanger End Covers No violations or deviations were identifie. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
(Closed)
IFI 88-28-07, Inspect PM to Establish' Isolation as Required by Appendix R for TE-410 and TE-413. The licensee's review of plant modifi cation M-896 indicated that cables associated with RCS temperature elements TE-410 and TE-413 (T hot and T cold respectively) were routed through fire area A. These instruments are used in the dedicated/safe shutdown system to stabilize the plant in case of fire in fire area Per an earlier modification, M-445, the cables were removed from the fire area A. Due to an inadequate engineering review, however, plant modifi cation M-896 rerouted the cables back into fire area To solve this problem, the licensee implemented field change DCN 896-15 to install isolation devices in the north and south cable vault rooms where the electrical penetrations are located. These isolators fulfill the require ments of RG 1.97 and Appendix R by preventing faults in parallel channels (such as might be caused by a fire) from interfering with T hot and T cold indications on the safe shutdown panels. This item is considered close (Closed)
Violation 88-28-09, Failure to Correct Sump Pump Controls Which Resulted in Radioactive Releases to the Storm Drain System. On August 8, 1988, the licensee discovered radioactive contamination in three storm drains near the E & RC buildin The licensee strongly suspected the source of contamination to be from the E & RC building sump, which receives primary coolant samples following analysi Further investi gation revealed the E & RC sump was full, and the sump pump high and low level switches were hooked up backward This resulted in contaminated liquid backing up into the E & RC laboratory floor drains, spilling onto the laboratory floor, seeping through bolt holes in the floor flange of the drain, and into voids between the poured concrete floor and the outside of the drain pip The contaminated liquid then flowed into a french drain beneath the E & RC building, and into the storm drain The licensee's immediate corrective actions included repair of the sump pump controls, and pumping the contaminated liquid out of the storm drains and the E & RC sump into the radioactive waste system for treatmen The licensee indicated no radionuclides were detected at the site release poin The licensee grouted the void around the laboratory drain pipe, and tested the laboratory waste drainage system with satisfactory result In addition, the sump pump level control system was repaired, tested with satisfactory results, and CP-013, E & RC Building Sump Surveillance, was written to ensure E & RC sump level is monitored and abnormal conditions are reported promptly. The inspector also reviewed SCR-88-017, Investi gation Into the Release of the Root Cause of the Uncontrolled Release of Radioactive Material From the E & RC Building on August 9, 198 In addition to the above corrective actions, the SCR also successfully addressed:
the licensee's failure to realize that the E & RC sump was a
[
highly probable contamination release point or could indirectly cause a release; the lack of a root-cause analysis on a previous E & RC sump level control malfunction, and unclear definition of responsibility for owner ship of the E & RC sump. The inspector conducted interviews with the E &
RC support supervisor, and a chemistry technician, walked down portions of the E & RC laboratory and sump system, and reviewed the CP-013 daily log L
of the E & RC sump level. During the walkdown, the inspector found the high-level alarm on the E & RC sump was in need of repair in that the alarm sounded constantly, even though the liquid level was well below the upper limi The licensee compensated for this problem by checking the sump level at least dail A work request, 90-ANGJ2 was written on November 1, 1990, to repair the high level alarm, which at the time of the inspection, had not been performed. In addition, the licensee indicated to the inspector that the E & RC sump and associated systems was assigned to the radioactive waste system engineer. The inspector had no further concerns, as the primary problem of an uncontrolled release pathway to the environment was repaired, and the daily surveillance performed by E & RC should identify E & RC sump problems, should they occu This item is considered close No violations or deviations were identifie. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 18, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed in the summar Dissenting comments were not received from the license Proprietary information is not contained in this repor. List of Acronyms and Initialisms CCW Component Cooling Water CP Chemistry Procedure DCN Design Change Notice E & RC Environmental and Radiation Control HP Health Physicist IFI Inspection Follow Item LCO Limiting Condition for Operation M
Modification NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PM Plant Modification RCS Reactor Coolant System RG Regulatory Guide SCR Significant Condition Report SP Special Procedure TE Temperature Element TS Technical Specification WR/JO Work Request/Job Order