IR 05000261/1987028
| ML14191A871 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1987 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Krug H, Latta R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14191A870 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-87-28, NUDOCS 8710140262 | |
| Download: ML14191A871 (13) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 R. E. Morgan, Plant General Manager Report N /87-28 Licensee Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket N License No. : DPR-23 Facility Name H. B. Robinson Inspection Conducted : August 11 - September 10, 1987 Inspector (1 H._F._P.Krug, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed ( atta, Resident Inspector Date Signed Approved by:
-
P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief ate Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of Technical Specification (TS) compliance; including observance of any Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO), plant tour, operations performance, reportable occurrences, housekeeping, site security, surveillance activities, maintenance activities, quality assurance practices, radiation control activities, outstanding items review, IE Bulletin and IE Notice followup, organization and administration, independent inspection, Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP), Plant Status Report, and enforcement action. followu Results:
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte PDR ADOCK 05000261 Ci PDR
REPORT DETAILS 1. Licensee Employees Contacted R. Barnett, Maintenance Supervisor, Electrical G. Beatty, Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Project Department R. Chambers, Engineering Supervisor, Performance D. Crocker, Supervisor, Radiation Control J. Curley, Director, Regulatory Compliance J. Eaddy, Supervisor, Environmental and Chemistry R. Femal, Shift Foreman, Operations W. Flanagan, Manager, Design Engineering W. Gainey, Support Supervisor, Operations P. Harding, Project Specialist, Radiation Control E. Harris, Director, Onsite Nuclear Safety D. Knight, Shift Foreman, Operations E. Lee, Shift Foreman, Operations F. Lowery, Manager, Operations R. Miller, Maintenance Supervisor, Mechanica D. McCaskill, Shift Foreman, Operations A. McCauley, Principal Specialist, Onsite Nuclear Safety R. Moore, Shift Foreman, Operations R. Morgan, Plant General Manager M. Morrow, Specialist, Emergency Preparedness D. Myers, Shift Foreman, Operations D. Nelson, Operating Supervisor B. Murphy, Senior Instrumentation and Control Engineer M. Page, Engineering Supervisor, Plant Systems R. Powell, Principal Specialist, Maintenance D. Quick, Manager, Maintenance B. Rieck, Manager, Control and Administration D. Sayre, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
. Seagle, Shift Foreman, Operations R. Smith, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control R. Steele, Shift Foreman, Operations R. Wallace, Manager, Technical Support L. Williams, Supervisor, Security H. Young, Director, Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC)
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne. Exit Interview (30702, 30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 10, 1987, with the Plant Vice President, the Plant General Manager and the Acting Director of Regulatory Compliance. The licensee acknowledged the findings without exceptio The licensee identified certain core design information reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection as
proprietar No written material was given to the licensee by the Resident Inspectors during this report perio. Plant Tour (71707, 62703, 71710)
The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions and maintenance activities, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspectors determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, excess equipment or material was stored properly, and combustible material was disposed of expeditiously. During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint abnormal settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment clearance tags and component status, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration date Some tours were conducted on backshift Plant housekeeping and contamination control were observed to be excellen The inspectors performed system status checks on the following systems:
a. Safety Injection (SI) System b. Component Cooling Water (CCW) System c. Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) System d. Vital Station Batteries (VSB)
e. Electrical Switchgear f. Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)
g. Emergency Diesel Generators h. Residual Heat Removal System (RHR)
i. Containment Spray System No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte.
V Technical Specification Compliance (71707, 62703, 61726)
During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with selected limiting conditions for operation and reviewed results of certain surveillance and maintenance activities. These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and record In addition, on a daily basis in the control room, the inspectors independently examined Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS)
and Safety Parameter Display Systems (SPDS)
display of safety related parameters, including component status information, for indications related to conformance with the T No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Plant Operations Review (71707, 62703, 61726, 61707)
On work days during the reporting period, the inspectors arrived in the control room at 6:00 and stayed until approximately 7:30 a.m. at which time a plant tour was conducted. The inspectors supplemented these regular control room tours with random plant and control room tours during the weekends and at night, to ensure that operations and security were maintained in accordance with plant procedure The control room inspections. included a review of the control board with an emphasis on changes in indications, alarm lights and switch positions from their previously observed statu Each morning, the inspectors interviewed the operators concerning the present condition and configuration of the plant, any evolutions performed during the night, as well as plans in place for work to be performed during the day. The inspectors then reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunction This review included control room logs, maintenance work requests, auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs, and equipment tagout record The inspectors questioned the operators regarding entries, the implications of which were not immediately obviou The inspectors also observed the performance of the shift turnover in the control room during 6:45 a.m. to 7:15 a.m. every morning, including the tours made by other licensee personnel at the beginning of the working da As time permitted, in the control room prior to the shift turnover, the inspectors reviewed documentation, correspondence, reports and drawings related to plant operation The inspectors periodically verified the reactor shutdown margi The inspectors also periodically observed the reactor axial flux difference and compared the observed values with those required by the TS.'
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Physical Protection (71707)
In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The inspectors verified by general observation, perimeter walkdowns and interviews that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the. facility met current requirement The inspectors routinely observed the alertness and demeanor of security force personnel during plant tours. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory posts. In addition, the inspectors observed protected area lighting, protected and vital areas barrier integrity and verified an interface between the security organization, operations, and maintenanc The inspectors visited the central and secondary alarm station The inspectors also
reviewed approximately one-third of the procedures in the Security Procedures Boo No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726, 61700, 71710)
The inspectors observed certain surveillance related activities of safety-related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirement The inspectors observed portions of selected surveillance tests including all aspects of one major surveillance test involving safety-related system The inspectors determined that the surveillance test procedure conformed to TS requirements, that all precautions and LCO's were met and that the surveillance test was completed at the required frequency. The inspectors also verified that the required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the test, that the testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure and that the required test instrumentation was properly calibrated. Upon completion of the testing, the inspectors observed that the recorded test data was accurate, complete and met TS requirements; verified that test discrepancies were properly rectified, and, independently verified that the systems were properly returned to servic On August 25, 1987, the inspectors witnessed the operational verification of the charging pumps in accordance with OST-101 (Revision 10), titled
"Chemical and Volume Control System Component Test, Monthly". The purpose of this surveillance test was to verify the mechanical performance and assess the operational readiness of the A, B, and C positive displacement charging pumps in accordance with ASME Section XI "Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plants Components".
The inspectors determined that-all of the required test prerequisites, precautions, and limitations had been met, that the chemical and volume control system was properly aligned, and that the operations personnel involved were using the latest revision of the subject surveillance tes The inspectors verified that the test instrumentation needed for the evolution had been calibrated within the required time frame and that the pump vibration data, in both the horizontal and vertical direction, was properly taken at the pump coupling to the fluid drive unit for all three pump Additionally, the inspectors verified that the suction pressure for all three pumps was in the acceptable range and that the pump rotational speed (1600 plus or minus 25 RPM)
was maintained during the conduct of the tes While observing the operation of the "B" charging pump, the inspectors detected an abnormal noise emitting from the pump housin When questioned on this matter, the operations personnel conducting the surveillance test stated that the noise had been previously noted and a work request had been written to investigate the abnormalit The
inspectors verified that a work request had been generated (WR/JO 87 AMBX 1).
Upon completion of the test, an evaluation of the charging pump total flow data revealed that the "B" charging pump fell within the low flow required action range of the surveillance test. The licensee took immediate steps to declare the pump inoperable and initiate corrective actio The inspectors determined through a review of the completed work requests that the subject charging pump suction and discharge valves had been replaced, that the pump had been successfully tested and returned to servic No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Monthly Maintenance Observation and Maintenance Program Evaluation (62703, 62700, 62704, 62705)
The inspectors observed several maintenance related activities of safety-related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, TS and appropriate industry codes and standard The inspectors determined that these activities were not violating LCO's and that redundant components were operable. The inspectors also determined (1) that the procedures used were adequate to control the activity, (2) that required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to work initiation, (3) that proper radiological, and appropriate ignition and fire prevention controls were implemented, and (4) that replacement parts and materials used were properly certified. The inspectors verified that these activities were accomplished by qualified personnel using approved procedure The inspectors verified that equipment was properly tested before being returned to servic a. "C" Charging Pump The inspectors witnessed the corrective maintenance activities associated with the "C" charging pump on August 21, 198 As documented in work request WR/JO 87-ALQJ1 the subject positive displacement charging pump was determined to have an external packing leakage on the center plunge The inspectors observed portions of the pump stuffing box disassembly and reassembly, including:
inspection of the stuffing box internals, replacement of the primary and secondary packing, plunger o-rings and plunger The inspectors determined that a working copy of the controlling maintenance procedure; CM-034 (Revision 1) titled
"Charging Pump Maintenance, Stuffing Box",
was present at the work site and was referred to by the maintenance personnel involve During the conduct of this maintenance activity, the inspectors verified that the effected equipment was properly tagged out and isolated, that the torque wrench used to tighten the cylinder head was properly calibrated, that the replacement Q-list parts were
properly controlled, and physically matched the work list descriptions, and that required tools and expendable materials were prestaged. Also, it was observed that maintenance personnel involved adhered to the applicable procedural steps directing the use of a designated storage area for removed pump parts; that system cleanliness requirements were observed; and that when not required for maintenance, the charging pump stuffing box was covered to preclude the entry of foreign materia Subsequent to the above described repairs, the "C" charging pump underwent post maintenance acceptance testing in accordance with OST-101 (Revision 10) titled "Chemical and Volume Control System Component Test". This test confirms the operability of the charging pumps as prescribed in ASME Section XI
"Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plants Components".
The inspectors determined that the stated prerequisites, precautions, and limitations had been satisfied and that the acceptance criteria had been satisfactorily achieve b. "B" Containment Spray Pump On September 3, 1987, with the reactor at 100% power, the licensee observed that the "B" containment spray pump was running rough, during its surveillance tes The containment spray pump is an Ingersoll-Rand, single suction volute type single stage horizontal centrifigual pump - Model 4 x 11 Type The pump has a design pressure of 300 pounds per square inch gage, a design temperature of 200 degress F and a design flow rate of 970 gallons per minut After verifying the operability of the "A" containment spray pump, the licensee removed the "B" containment spray pump for repairs in accordance with Corrective Maintenance Procedure CM-004 (Revision 1)
"Containment Spray Pump Overhaul" and in compliance with TS 3.3. CM-004 provides instructions for disassembly, inspection and reassembly of the containment spray pump and its associated mechanical shaft sea The maintenance team obtained the necessary equipment clearance from the Shift Foreman and with the assistance of a Health Physicist assigned to the job, prepared and roped off the area against possible contamination. The mechanics then removed the impeller assembly. The pump casing was then sealed with tape against the intrusion of dirt and other foreign materia A radiation control area was established in the hot machine shop and the impeller assembly delivered to it. The inspectors discontinued observations of CM-004 at this point. The licensee subsequently installed a new impeller, pump shaft, bearings and wearing ring The pump was returned to service within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO limi C. "A" Emergency Diesel Generation (EDG)
On September 9, 1987, the inspectors witnessed portions of the corrective maintenance associated with the "A" ED This work was controlled under the auspices of work request WR/JO 87-AMRY 1 and was precipitated by the overspeed trip of the "A" EDG on September 8, 1987, as discussed in paragraph 12 of this report. The inspectors witnessed the replacement of two injection pumps (number 5 and 9 on the control side of-the diesel) with new unit The subject units were observed to be properly controlled from an administrative and cleanliness standpoint and the maintenance personnel involved had prestaged all needed materials including a properly calibrated torque wrenc The removed injector pumps were evaluated for deficient conditions and then segregated for further examination by the manufacturer's technical representativ Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several outstanding job orders to determine that the licensee was giving priority to safety-related maintenance and that a backlog which might affect its performance was not developing any given syste No violations or deviations were identified within the areas. inspecte. Operational Safety Verification (71707, 82301)
The inspectors observed licensee activities to ascertain that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements, and that the licensee management control system was effectively discharging its responsibilities for continued safe operation by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee management and personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation, and reviewing facility record No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte.
ESF System Walkdown and Monthly Surveillance Observation (71710, 61726, 56700, 61715)
The inspectors verified the operability of an engineered safety features system by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
system as prescribed in Operations Surveillance Test Procedure OST-251 (Revision 13) titled "RHR Component Test (Monthly)".
The purpose of this surveillance test is to verify the mechanical performance and assess the operational readiness of components in the RHR system to fulfill their required safety function On the evening of September 8, 1987, the inspectors confirmed that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuratio The inspectors looked for equipment conditions and items that might degrade performance (hangers and supports were operable, housekeeping, etc.)
and inspected the interiors of electrical and instrumentation cabinets for debris, loose material, jumpers, evidence of rodents, et The inspectors verified that valves were in their proper positions, power
was available, and valves were locked as require The inspectors compared both local and remote position indication The inspectors determined that OST-251 conformed to TS requirements, that all precautions and LCOs were met and that OST-251 was completed at the required frequenc The inspectors also verified that the required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the test, that the testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure and that the required test instrumentation was properly calibrate In particular, the inspectors witnessed the verification of proper oil levels in each of the RHR pumps tested, the starting and running of both the "A" and the "B" RHR pumps, the recording of pump discharge and differential pressures, and the recording of pump vibration amplitude Upon completion of the testing, the inspectors observed that the recorded test data was accurate, complete and met TS requirements; and verified that the systems were properly returned to service. The inspectors noted that the housekeeping in the RHR pit had improved from the conditions observed on previous entrie However, the cleanliness was still below the standards normally witnessed during routine plant tour No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte.
In-office Review of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities (90712)
The inspectors ascertained via systematic review of written reports of nonroutine events, that corrective action discussed in the licensee report appears appropriate, that information reported satisfied reporting requirements, that generic issues, if applicable, were addressed, and that the event was appropriately classifie Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective measures taken in response to 10 CFR Part 21 Notification 85-0 This item concerned the acknowledgement of an error in 10 CFR 50.46 loss of coolant accident (LOCA) analysis performed by Exxon Nuclear for the H.B. Robinson Unit 2 and the D.C. Cook Unit 1 reactors. As documented in Exxon Nuclear Company, In correspondence dated September 30, 1985 from:
M C. Malody, Manager Corporate Licensing, to:
Mr. John B. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region V, the discrepancy was an input error in the TOODEE2 code which is used to calculate fuel rod heatu The subject error resulted in the rod decay heat power being too low which caused the calculated peak cladding temperature to be under predicte On September 28, 1985, when Exxon Nuclear informed Carolina Power and Light Company, the plant was operating at 100% reactor powe Revised TOODEE2 analyses were performed and applied to show that a reduction in peaking (Fq),
insured the peak clad temperature remained below 2200 degrees F. In response to the above noted condition, plant management determined that the appropriate immediate corrective action was to implement administrative controls to reduce both reactor power, and the
high flux trip setpoint by 8 percent, which corresponded to the reduction in the allowable F In-core flux maps subsequent to the power reduction appeared to establish Fq to be below the administratively controlled reduced power limi Operational controls were further enhanced by the application for and approval of Amendment N to the TS on December 23, 198 Review of this amendment which provided a revision to the Appendix "A" TS stipulated a change to the graph of "Normalized Axial Dependence Factor for Fq versus Elevation" depicted in Figure 3.10-3 of the stated amendmen As delineated in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated November 15, 1985, the staff concluded that operation of the H.B. Robinson Unit 2 within the revised values of Fq and the K(Z)
curve satisfied the criteria of 10 CFR 50.4 The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's response to 10 CFR Part 21 Notification 85-0 This issue involved an error detected in the modification which installed the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS).
Specifically, the plant modification contained a design feature in which certain computer input signals, taken from nuclear safety-related circuits, were incorrectly assigned to a non-nuclear safety-related multiplexer cabinet As delineated in a letter from Mr. W. G. Hegener of Sargent and Lundy Engineering, the architect engineer (AE)
for the ERFIS system, to:
Mr. A. B. Cutter of CP&L, dated December 11, 1985, the design error was detected prior to modification completio As identified by the AE in their reference letter, the design error was not related to a system component but rather a deficiency in the design for the ERFIS Modification specific to H.B. Robinson, Unit The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions which had been accomplished by the AE and by the licensee including a review of pertinent design change notices (DCN's),
control wiring diagrams, and cable and conduit lists for the ERFIS modification. This review indicated that the subject design error had been corrected by issuing design changes which revised the termination input signal cables for the affected auxiliary feedwater and auxiliary ventilation systems to provide proper safety/Q-list designation and cable separation. The inspectors verified the correctness of these design changes by inspecting selected wiring terminations in the Auxiliary Relay Panel Room for the ERFIS multiplexer cabinet The inspectors determined that the physical wiring configuration for selected Class IE systems matched the associated control wiring diagram.
Onsite Followup of Events and Subsequent Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Operating Power Reactors (92700, 90714, 93702)
On August 26, 1987, the Senior Resident Inspector was notified of a significant event which was reported by the licensee in accordance with
10 CFR 50.72. The event involved a failure of the "A" EDG to start due to an overspeed trip which occurred during the conduct of a surveillance test (OST-401).
At the time of the event, the "B" EDG was out of service for maintenance
.and the unit was operating under a 7-day limiting condition for operation (LCO).
As described in TS 3.7.2.d, with one EDG out. of service, the remaining EDG must be tested daily to ensure operabilit At 1:45 while attempting to start the "A" EDG in accordance with the constraining LCO, the diesel tripped on overspeed. A second attempt to start the "A" EDG at 1:48 a.m. also proved unsuccessful. It was noted that the failure of the "A" EDG to start while the "B" EDG was out of service placed the licensee in Section 3.0 of the TS which requires the unit to be in a hot shutdown condition within eight hours if this condition cannot be me In accordance with the controlling procedure (OST-401),
the operations personnel conducting the test attempted a third start of the "A" EDG which was successfu The "A" EDG was then secured and restarted a fourth tim The "A" EDG was then paralleled to the grid and OST-401 which specified a 90 minute run time at 2500 kw was successfully completed. The "A" EDG was declared operable and placed back in service at 4:00 a.m. Subsequently, the "A" EDG was successfully started a fifth time at 5:01 a.m. and again completed the subject OS The probable cause of the overspeed trip was attributed to a sticking plunger assembly on the number four injection pum The injection pump was replaced with a new unit and the original pump was disassembled and examined by the manufacturer's technical representativ All other plunger assemblies on the "A" EDG were examined in place on the diesel and determined to be acceptable. The sticking plunger condition was evaluated by the licensee to be an isolated case based on the physical examination of the fuel racks and plunger assemblie On September 8, 1987 at 10:36 p.m. while attempting to locally start the
"A" EDG in accordance with OST-401, the diesel tripped on overspee At the time of this occurrence, the "B" EDG was out of service for maintenanc As described earlier, with one of the EDG's inoperable, the remaining diesel must be tested daily. A second attempt to start the "A" EDG at 10:38 p.m. was also unsuccessful, with the diesel again tripping on overspee The maintenance activities on the "B" EDG were terminated and the diesel was placed back in service at 4:06 a.m. on September 9, 1987, after having completed OST-401. The inspectors determined that the licensee complied with the four hour reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was continuing work on the "A" EDG and had shutdown the unit to repair leaking main generator hydrogen cooler Evaluation of the "A" EDG failure to start is continuing with the assistance of a vendor technical representativ The preliminary indication is that two additional injector pumps (number 5 and 9) were
- sticking which precipitated the overspeed trip. The licensee has replaced these pumps with new units from their onsite spares, however they are continuing to evaluate the operational problems with the "A" ED The inspectors will continue to monitor this activity during subsequent inspection No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Onsite Review Committee (40700, 36700)
The inspectors reviewed the on-site licensee organization to ascertain whether changes made to the licensee's onsite organization are in conformance with the requirements of the TS by verifying that (1) the established organization is as described in the TS and is functioning effectively, (2) personnel qualification levels are in conformance with applicable codes and standards, and (3) the lines of authority and responsibility are in conformance with TS and applicable codes and standard The inspectors also reviewed appropriate licensee records to ascertain whether the licensee's use of overtime is in conformance with regulatory requirements and that any deviations from maximum overtime limits were authorized in accordance with TS and/or plant administrative procedure Comprehensive discussions of current safety-related activities were conducted with plant management and technical personnel during this reporting period including, and in particular, Operations, Environmental and Radiation Controls, Quality Assurance, Regulatory Compliance and Onsite Nuclear Safety organizations. Topics discussed included licensee activities associated with plant operations activities; plant modifications, including the security system upgrade; the fire protection system; ongoing construction activities; and communications interface The inspectors reviewed certain activities of the plant nuclear safety committee (PNSC)
to ascertain whether the onsite review functions were conducted in accordance with TS and other regulatory requirements. The inspectors (1) attended the special PNSC meeting held on September 9, 1987 and observed the conduct of the meeting, (2) ascertained that provisions of the TS dealing with membership, review process, frequency, qualifications, etc., were satisfied, and (3) reviewed meeting minutes to confirm that decisions and recommendations were accurately reflected in the minutes, and (4) followed up on previously identified PNSC activities to independently confirm that corrective actions were progressing satisfactorily. Subjects included a review of an engineering evaluation concerning the component cooling water system design analysis, a proposal from the Nuclear Fuels Department and representatives of Exxon Nuclear for lead test assemblies to be used in the next core load, and a synopsis of the current "A" EDG overspeed trip proble No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Core Thermal Power Evaluation (61706)
On August 21, 1987, the inspectors verified that the calculation of core thermal power was properly performed in accordance with Revision 6 to Operations Surveillance Procedure OST-010 titled "Power Range Calorimetric During Power Operation Daily"; and that the power level instruments indicated that the reactor power was within prescribed limits. The inspectors also reviewed the current revision of OST-010 for technical adequacy and reviewed the results for a specific evaluation at 100% powe The licensee performed the evaluations daily, which is within the frequency prescribed by the T No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte.
Follow-up on Special Activities (92704)
The inspectors have continued to monitor the onsite activities associated with the installation of the Independent Spent Fuels Storage Facility (ISFSF).
Current site activities are centered on familiarization with the Dry Shielded Canister (DSC)
support assemblies and closeout of discrepancies on the DS The inspectors observed portions of the DSC handling procedure check-out which involved mockup training on a dummy canister assembly. These operations were determined to be successfu The licensee is also in the process of preparing the heavy haul roadway which extends from the hot machine shop to the ISFSF. Actual movement of fuel is currently scheduled for December 198 No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte II