IR 05000261/1987031

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Insp Rept 50-261/87-31 on 871005-07.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Three Concerns Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Evaluation of Annual Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise
ML14191A874
Person / Time
Site: Robinson Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/19/1987
From: Decker T, Testa E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
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ML14191A873 List:
References
50-261-87-31, NUDOCS 8710270190
Download: ML14191A874 (27)
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Text

NR REG(/4 '9UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION Ii 101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:

50-261/87-31 Licensee:

Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.: 50-261 License No.:

DPR-23 Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Inspection Conducted: October 5-7, 1987 Inspector: C7 o L T

E. b. Testa Dath Signed Accompanying Personnel: H. Krug R. Latta J. Kreh C. Rapp K. Clark ictor Approved by:

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/2 T. R. Decker, Section Chief Datd Signed Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:

This routine, announced inspection involved evaluation of the annual radiological emergency preparedness exercis Results:

No violations or deviations were identified; however, three concerns were identified addressing the delay in conducting a media briefing, the delay in preparing an appropriate news release and exposure control for environmental monitoring team PDR ADOCK 05000261 G

PDR

REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • R. E. Morgan, General Manager
  • D. C. Stadler, Project Engineer-Operations
  • D. L. Taylor, Control and Planning
  • D. R. Quick, Manager, Maintenance
  • A. R. Wallace, Manager, Technical Support
  • F. L. Lowery, Manager, Operations
  • D. W. McCaskill, Unit 2 Operations
  • B. Gainey, Operations
  • B. Slone, Document Control
  • J. Cubb, Quality Assurance/Quality Control
  • D. Gainy, Quality Assurance/Quality Control
  • R. M. Smith, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
  • D. S. Crocker, Radiation Control
  • E. Bean, Corporate Communications
  • T. Dunn, Corporate Communications
  • A. Sheperd, Regulatory Compliance
  • D. Sayre, Regulatory Compliance Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security office members, and office personne Nuclear Regulatory Commission
  • H. E. Krug, Senior Resident Inspector R. Latta, Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview 2. Exit interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 7, 1987, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding Major emphasis was directed toward the findings identified in Paragraphs 11 and 1 No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee

did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio. Exercise Scenario (82301)

The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements defined in the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-065 The scenario was reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives in advance of the scheduled exercise dat No major scenario problems were identifie No major inconsistencies or last minute changes to data or exercise message packets were revealed during the licensee's controller/evaluator meeting held on October 5, 198 The scenario provided information to the States, counties, local government and federal agencies consistent with their participation in the exercis The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise. The inspector observed neither prompting nor undue interaction between the controllers and the player No violations or deviations were identifie. Assignment of Responsibility (82301)

This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1),

Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-065 The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's emergency response organizations, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergency. Discussions with the licensee representatives and a review of the site Radiological Emergency Plan indicated that a sufficient number of trained technical personnel were available for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency organizations, if neede The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC),

Operations

Support Center (OSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and Plant Media Center.(PMC).

The scenario developed for this exercise exercised the onsite emergency organization, corporate, State of South Carolina and Local County emergency response organization The scenario developed for this exercise was a small loss of coolant accident with elevated reactor coolant activity caused by loose parts in the core. A reactor trip combined with a loss of steam dump and loose parts in the core provide a transient which produces increased reactor coolant activit During the cooldown cycle the Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) cycled open and shut and one failed open providing a leak path to the environment.. A steam Generator tube leak of approximately 600 gpm produced the source term for the releas A medical emergency occurred in the Safety Injection Roo A decontamination technician slipped and accidentally struck his head and fell while working in a contaminated area necessitating First Aid rescu He was transported to Byerly Hospital by the responding ambulance servic The exercise began at 6:30 am on October 6, 1987, and terminated about 1:30 pm the same da No violations or deviations were identifie. Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)

The licensee's offsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),

Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:

(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; and (3) specification of onsite and offsite support organizational interaction The inspectors observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined and that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the organization. Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift personne The on-duty Shift Foreman assumed the duties of Site Emergency Coordinator upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Plant General Manager. Required interactions between the licensee's emergency response organization and State and local support agencies were adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie. Emergency Classification System (82301)

This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance recommended in IE Information Notice 83-2 An Emergency Action Level matrix was used to identify and properly classify an emergency, and escalate it to more severe emergency classifications as the simulated accident sequence progresse Licensee actions in this area were timely and effectiv Observations confirmed that the emergency classification system was effectively used and was consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures. The system was observed to be adequate for classification of the simulated accident sequence The emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergenc No-violations or deviations were identifie. Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)

This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively-using assistance resources had been made and whether other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I An inspector observed that the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures provided for requesting and using assistance resource During the exercise the licensee demonstrated the ability to coordinate with local agencies the evacuation, transportation, and treatment of a contaminated injured individua The victim was provided immediate first aid, contamination control was adequate And the victim made ready for transport using appropriate back board and neck restraint The victim was moved in an expeditious manner to the waiting offsite ambulance which provided transportation to Byerly Hospita No violations or deviations were identifie. Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)

This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations were establishe This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the

  • II5 populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),

Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-065 An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were established and available for use in providing information regarding the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organizations, if require Notification of the.State of South Carolina and other designated offsite response organizations was completed. Timely followup notification messages were made and hard copies appropriately distribute No violations or deviations were identifie.

Emergency Communications (82301)

This area was observed to determine whether provisions existed for prompt communications among the principal response organization and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6);

10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed the communication links available to the emergency response organizations and the communications links proved to be adequate throughout the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie.

Public Education and Information (82301)

This area was observed to determine whether information concerning the simulated emergency had been made available for dissemination to th public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7);

10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspectors observed that communication systems exist to notify offsite news.media organizations. It was also observed that messages concerning the emergency were transmitted and received by licensee personnel in accordance with the licensee's procedure Status boards were updated in a timely manne The licensee demonstrated the ability to develop and disseminate news releases in an accurate manne The news release associated with the classification and declaration of a General Emergency at 10:53 am was inexplicably delayed for about 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 16 minutes. The failure to make a timely announcement, with a news release, of the declaration of a General Emergency was identified as an exercise weaknes Exercise Weakness (50-261/87-31-01) Failure to make a timely news release following declaration of a General Emergenc The inspector observed that the licensee demonstrated the ability to hold joint briefings with State and local counterpart Two joint briefings were conducted during the exercise. The first briefing was not held until 12:00 noon about 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 7 minutes after the declaration of the General Emergency. This delay was identified as an exercise weaknes Exercise Weakness (50-261/87-31-02)

Failure to conduct a timely initial news briefin No violations or deviations were identifie.

Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)

This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),

Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.H of NUREG-065 The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities, and evaluated the equipment provided for emergency use during the exercis a. Control Room -

The inspector observed that following review and analysis of the sequence of accident events, Control Room operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergenc Emergency procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercise Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those personnel assigned routine and special operational dutie The Shift Foreman and the Control Room operators were cognizant of their duties, responsibilities, and authoritie Control Room personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and declare the proper emergency classificatio It was observed that data and information provided as the scenario's initial sequence of accident events and conditions were readily interpreted by the Control Room staff and factored into commencin the exercise in a timely manner. The Control Room staff demonstrated the capability to effectively assess the initial conditions and implement required mitigating action b. Technical Support Center - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed following notification by the Site Emergency Coordinator of the simulated emergency conditions leading to the Alert classificatio The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilitie Required operations at the facility proceeded in an orderly manne This facility was provided with adequate equipment for support of the assigned staf TSC security was promptly established. Radiological habitability was monitored during the exercise. Dedicated communicators were assigned to the TSC and required notifications were implemente The TSC staff identified, classified and declared the Site Area and General Emergency. Notification of State, Federal and local agencies was readily completed within 15 minute Protective action recommendations to the State were consistent with the EAL matrix and guidance promulgated in IE Notice 83-2 c. Operations Support Center - The OSC was promptly staffed following activation of the emergency plan by the Site Emergency Coordinato The inspector observed that teams were promptly assembled, briefed, and dispatche d. Emergency Operations Facility -

Consistent with the exercise objectives, the EOF was staffed and activate The Emergency Response Manager demonstrated management and control of the facilit After declaring the EOF staffed and operational, communications between the EOF and TSC were maintaine Exchange of technical information and frequent consultation with the TSC were implemented by the staf Dose assessment and projections were performed. The dose assessment group demonstrated proficiency using the computerized.dose assessment metho Close contact between assessment groups in the EOF and TSC were maintaine Status boards were strategically located to facilitate viewing by the EOF staf Status boards were updated as required to chronicle changes in plant status, accident assessment and mitigation throughout the exercis The EOF security was not established during facility activation and was not maintained throughout the exercise. There are three outside entrances into the portion of the building housing the EO The inspector observed that the licensee had no security coverage of these entrances. Although road blocks were placed at the 2 entrance roads to the plant, news media personnel were allowed in the east entrance to reach the Plant Media Center. An inspector observed that from the parking lot of that facility to the EOF was a short walk down a hil This was identified as an Inspector Followup Ite Inspector Followup Item (50-261/87-31-03)

Failure to establish and maintain EOF securit *

The Plant Media Center was activated in accordance with facility emergency procedure No violations or deviations were identifie. Accident Assessment.(82301)

This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(),

Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria in -Section II.I of NUREG-065 The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the acciden Offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plum Radiological effluent data was received in the TSC and EO No violations or deviations were identifie. Protective Response (82301)

This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions, consistent with federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of non-essential personnel, were implemented promptly pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific criteria promulgated in Section II.3 of NUREG-065 The protective measures decisionmaking process was observed by the inspectors. Recommendations implemented by the TSC staff were timel No violations or deviations were identifie.

Radiological Exposure Control (82301)

This area was observed to determine that methods for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented for emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11),

and specific criteria defined in Section II.K of NUREG-065 Four Environmental Monitoring Teams (EMTs)

were dispatched during the exercise. The decision was made to simulate having the EMT members take a Thyroid Blocking Agent (KI) to reduce the dose to the thyroid based on the significant quantities of radioiodine being detected by the EMT The EMTs were told following discussions of the logistics to return to the plant dosimetry office to obtain the K The EMTs were defining and measuring the plume characteristics with the attendant exposure to radioiodin Review of the inventory for the plant EMT kits indicated that each kit contained 2 bottles (28 tablets) of KI. The return route to the plant required additional transects of the plume and unnecessary exposure to plume. The authorization form controlling the administration

of the KI was located at the dosimetry office. The unnecessary additional exposure delivered to EMTs returning to the dosimetry office to pick up the KI tablets was identified as an exercise weaknes Exercise Weakness (50-261/87-31-04) Exposure control for offsite emergency worker The inspector observed that during the preparation to dispatch an Auxiliary Operator (AO)

to manually open the Steam Dump the Shift Foreman directed the AO to don full protective clothing and reminded him that he was limited to 25 rem (emergency dose).

Procedure PEP 451, Attachment 9.4, Emergency Work Permits and Exposure Control, states that the Shift Foreman acting as Site Emergency Coordinator has the authority to authorize the emergency exposure only in the absence of the Plant General Manager or the Radiological Control Director (both onsite and available). This was identified as an Inspector Followup Ite Inspector Followup Item (50-261/87-31-05)

Knowledge and familiarity with Emergency Work Permits and Exposure Control Procedur No violations or deviations were identifie. Exercise Critique (82301)

The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies and improvements identified during the exercise, were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),

Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria promulgated in Section I of NUREG-065 The licensee conducted a post-exercise critique on October 6, 1987, and presented the results to licensee management the following da The management critique was attended by exercise controllers and observers and the NRC representative Findings identified during the exercise and plans for corrective action were discussed. Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed during subsequent inspections. The licensee's critique was detailed, and addressed both substantive deficiencies, and indicated improvement items. The conduct of the critique was consistent with regulatory requirements and guidance cited abov No violations or deviations were identifie.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Report A report of FEMA's evaluation of offsite preparedness will be provided by a separate transmitta. Public Meeting A public critique of the exercise was held at the H. B. Robinson Visitor Center at 2:00 p.m. on October 7, 198 Agencies participating in the critique included the licensee, State of South Carolina and local agencies, FEMA, and NR.

Inspector Followup (82301)

(Closed)

Inspector Followup Item (IFI)

50-261/86-30-01:

Excessive Controller Prompting in the Control Roo (Closed) IFI 50-261/86-30-02:

Exercise Weakness - Scenario not adequately reviewed by controller II 0II

ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTMENT CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY 1987 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

-

87-05 ANNUAL EXERCISE OBJECTIVES/GUIDELINES SCN-87-3501 RNPD-87-05-RO 2.0-0

1987 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OBJECTIVES OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT Demonstrate the Control Room staff's ability to recognize operational Tymptoms and parameters indicative of degrading plant condition.

Demonstrate the ability to properly classify emergency condition.

Demonstrate the ability to formulate appropriate offsite protective action recommendation.

Demonstrate the ability to properly escalate the emergency response based upon event classificatio.

Demonstrate the adequacy of the RNPD Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures applicable to the scenari.

Demonstrate the ability to effectively coordinate emergency response with state and county emergency response agencie.

Demonstrate effective coordination of information and plant status with the South Carolina Emergency Preparedness Division (EPD)

emergency response organizatio COMMUNICATIONS Demonstrate that appropriate communication systems exist to accomplish notification of offsite agencies in accordance with emergency plans and procedure.

Demonstrate the ability to adequately notify and activate emergency response organization personne.

Demonstrate the ability to effectively communicate with plant emergency teams and company environmental monitoring teams located offsit.

Demonstrate proper recordkeeping at emergency response facilitie.

Demonstrate that accurate messages concerning the emergency are transmitted in accordance with established procedure.

Demonstrate that status boards are accurately maintained and updated in accordance with emergency response plans and procedure.

Demonstrate that appropriate briefings are held and incoming personnel are briefed and update SCN-87-3501 RNPD-87-05-RO 2.0-1

1987 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OBJECTIVES (Continued) RADIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 1. Demonstrate the proper use of post-accident sample results to support the dose projection proces.

Demonstrate the ability to evaluate field radiologi-cal monitoring data, offsite radiological dose projections, and plant conditions, to arrive at appropriate protective action recommendation. Demonstrate the activation, operation, and reporting of the field monitoring teams within and beyond the site boundar. Demonstrate the capability to perform radiological monitoring activities and assessment.

Demonstrate effective coordination of the radiological and environmental assessment process with the South Carolina Bureau of Radiological Healt. Demonstrate the ability to support the radiological assessment process while maintaining personnel radiation exposure ALAR. Demonstrate the use of post-accident sampling equipment to obtain, transport, and analyze samples of reactor coolant or a containment air sample under conditions specified by the scenario. Actual liquid sample will be demineralized wate EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES 1. Demonstrate that sufficient and adequate emergency equipment exists to effectively perform necessary emergency action. Demonstrate that adequate security of facilities can be maintaine. Demonstrate that emergency response facilities (TSC, OSC, EOF, and Plant Media Center) can be activated in accordance with the emergency plan and-procedure PUBLIC INFORMATION 1. Demonstrate the activation of the Plant Media Center in accordance with the emergency procedure. Demonstrate the ability to develop and disseminate accurate news releases in accordance with established emergency procedure. Demonstrate that briefings concerning plant events are provided to the media during the emergenc. Demonstrate that public information is coordinated between CP&L and state and/or county official SCN-87-3501 RNPD-87-05-RO 2.0-2

1987 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OBJECTIVES (Continued) EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION Demonstrate that sufficient emergency response organization personnel are available to support -the emergency response on a round-the-clock coverage schedul.

Exhibit proper response of emergency personel to activate 9amergency response facilities and carry out assigned roles and responsibilities in accordance with emergency response procedure.

Demonstrate the ability to transfer command and control responsibilities between the Control Room, Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facilit PERSONNEL PROTECTION 1. Demonstrate that the accountability process within the Protected Area can be accomplished in accordance with emergency response procedure.

Demonstrate the ability to provide onsite access to local offsite emergency services and/or support in accordance with emergency response procedure.

Demonstrate the ability to conduct area surveys under emergency condition.

Demonstrate the ability to provide adequate radiation protection services such as dosimetry and personnel monitorin.

Demonstrate the ability to provide first aid for an individual who has been contaminated and requires transportation to a suitably prepared medical facility for treatmen.

Demonstrate the ability to coordinate with local agencies the evaluation, transportation, and treatment of a contaminated injured individua.

Demonstrate the ability to adequately control the spread of contamination and the radiological exposure of onsite and offsite emergency worker.

Demonstrate the decision-making process for consideration of thyroid blocking agent distribution to emergency personne.

Demonstrate proper radiation exposure recordkeeping for emergency personne SCN:87-3717 RNPD-87-05-RO 2.0-3

1987 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OBJECTIVES (Continued) GENERAL Demonstrate the ability to conduct a controller/evaluator meeting before the beginning of the exercise which addresses final concerns about the conduct of the exercis.

Demonstrate the ability to self-critique and to identify areas needing improvemen.

Demonstrate that previously identified NRC deficiencies, exercise weaknesses or inspector follow-up items (IFIs) from the 1986 annual Emergency Preparedness exercise have been resolve SCN-87-3501 RNPD-87-05-RO 2.0-4

"CONFIDENTIAL" Preliminary 1987 Annual Exercise Guidelines Annual Exercise Date & Time

October 6, 1987

06:00 (A.M.) to 14:00 (2 P.M.) Annual Exercise Timeline & Emergency Classification Activity

  • T -

60 mi (06:30)

Exercise Controllers Assembly and Delivery of Initial Plant & Exercise Conditions

  • T (07:30)

Declared "Unusual Event" Classification

  • T + 0 Hr. 45 mi (08:15)

Declared "Alert" classification

  • T + 3 Hr. 45 min. (10:15)

Escalate to "Site Emergency" Classification

  • T + 4 Hrs. 45 min. (11:15)

Escalate to "General Emergency" Classification

  • T + 7 Hrs. 30 min. (14:00)

Exercise complete -

Participant and Controller facility critiques

  • T + 8 Hrs. 30 min. (15:00)

Controller Summary Critique SCN:87-3717 RNPD-87-015-RL 2.0-5 Meteorological Conditions

  • All meteorological data will be "simulated."
  • Initial Conditions: Hurricane Felix struck the South Carolina Coast on Sunday, October 4, 198 This Category II storm caused severe damage and flooding along the coast from Charleston, SC to Brunswick County, NC. _Winds of over 100 mph with 8 to 12 inches of rain fell over the coastal regions during the stor The storm continued northwest over Sumter, Camden, and Rock Hill, SC diminishing to a tropical storm status near Charlotte, NC and continuing north to West Virginia where it is currently breaking-u The five county area of Chesterfield, Lee, Darlington, Florence, and Kershaw suffered winds to 55 mph, 6 to 8 inches of rain during the period before 7 A.M. on Monday morning, October 5th. From Monday morning until present, about another 0.5 inches of rain has fallen in the general are Plant personnel have reported that numerous power outages and flooding have occurred in the area. On Monday, some areas were restored service before dark. There has been no problem with the offsite power to the Plant sit For the past five (5) hours, no rain has fallen on the Plant sit The forecast from the CP&L Weather Center calls for improving conditions throughout the day, October 6, 198 Currently, skies at RNPD are partly cloudy with no precipitatio Winds are from the southwest at 5 to 10 mp Extent of Participant Actions
  • All RNPD Emergency response facilities will be activated. The Technical Support Center (TSC) will be incorporated into the Protected Area of the Plan Plant personnel from the TSC, PMC, and OSC will not be prepositioned at their emergency response facilities. Personnel responding to the EOF and the PMC from the Harris Energy and Environmental Center (HE&EC) near New Hill, NC or the Corporate Office in Raleigh, NC will be in the vicinity of the RNPD site and will be appropriately called to the facility. The actual drive from the HE&EC and Corporate offices will not occu * RNPD control room personnel who will "play" during the exercise will be positioned in the control room before the beginning of the exercis SCN:37-3717 RNPD-87-05-R1 2.0-6 Extent of Participant Actions (Continued)
  • Exercise will commence with simulated Plant condition requiring declaration on an "UNUSUAL EVENT," escalating to a "GENERAL EMERGENCY".

Accident conditions will result in a simulated radiological release requiring consideration of protective actions for the plume Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).

  • Radiological monitoring teams will be dispatched onsite and offsite to perform monitoring and sampling procedures. Plant offsite environmental monitorings teams will initially be dispatched in accordance with Plant procedures, and then will be augmented/relieved by teams from the HE&EC organization when the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) has been notified and mobilized at the Robinson site. The HE&EC teams will be initially located in the Hartsville area until called to activate with the EOF staf * RNPD Emergency Alarms and announcements will be demonstrate * Initial and continuous RNPD Accountability procedures will be implemente Emergency Assembly of non-essential personnel will be conducted in accordance with Plant procedures. Evacuation of non-essential personnel of offsite locations will be simulate RNPD Emergency Call-Out procedures, beepers, and/or manual system will be utilized as appropriat * Activities initiated or performed by offsite governmental emergency response agencies with the state and counties will be demonstrate * The monitoring, transportation, and treatment procedures and equipment for a contaminated and injured onsite emergency worker will be demonstrated. This includes the use of the appropriate ambulance service and the facilities at the Byerly Hospital in accordance with established procedure SCN:87-3717 RNPD-87-05-RL 2.0-7

CAROLINA POWER MID LICHT COWhUY ROBINSON1 NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTHENT 1987 DC PREPARDNESS ANNUAL EUCISE 3. 0 SCENARO SCN:87-3717 RNPD-87-05-RO 3.0-0

NARRATIVE SUMMARY This exercise scenario is initiated by a small loss of coolant accident with elevated reactor coolant activity caused by loose parts in the core. A reactor trip combined with a loss of steam dump and loose parts in the reactor core provide a transient.which produces increased reactor coolant activit During the cool down cycle the Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) will cycle open and shut continuously because the steam dump system is unavailable due to its clearance for repair Eventually the -PORV on "C" Steam Generator will fail full open, thereby providing a potential release path to the environment..Shortly thereafter, a Steam Generator tube leak of approximately 600 gpm will occur in "C" Steam Generator, caused by a loose part on the secondary sid Initial conditions establish that the Plant has been at 100% power for the last 98 days with 200 effective full power days left on Cycle 1 Maintenance on "A" Safety Injection Pump has been completed and area decontamination is scheduled for first thing that morning. Maintenance is also scheduled to rebuild the relief valve (SDN-12) on the Steam Dump Nitrogen Accumulator System. The Nitrogen System has already been cleared for repair The initiating event occurs when a Reactor Coolant System leak of approximately 12 gpm is detected after completing OST-05 The cause of the leak is unknown but a Reactor Coolant Pump seal failure is suspected. OST-051 was performed when an alarm on RMS 11 was received in the Control Room and RCS makeup occurre A conference call between the Shift Foreman and the Operations Supervisor ha established that based on increased reactor coolant activity and an unidentified RCS leak, a shutdown rate of 10% an hour will be initiated to be offline in eight hours. An Unusual Event should be declared at this time due to RCS leakage greater than 10 gpm. A Security search of the TSC should be initiate Higher than normal RCS radioactivity has increased the sampling frequency to every two hours. The 0600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> sample showed an 1-131 Dose Equivalent of approximately 0.179 uCi/m Subsequent RCS sample analysis will be unavailable due to a momentary interruption of power in the E&RC Building Chemistry Lab. This will dictate the re-calibration of all counting equipment disabling the lab for approximately two hour Several Loose Parts Monitor alarms are received in the Control Room and the dispatched Auxiliary Operator (AO) will find multiple signals collected on the lower Reactor Vessel channels. Shortly afterwards the reactor coolant activity will increase causing RMS-9 to alarm. Due to this increase of greater than 5R/hr within 30 minutes, an Alert should be declared and the onsite Emergency Response Organization (ERO) should be activated. Failed fuel monitor (RMS-9) will experience detector problems at around 0925 rendering it out-of-servic A medical emergency will occur in the SI Pump Room when a IRM decontamination technician (deconnerY accidently knocks his head and falls while working in a contaminated area. Subsequent rescue efforts will mandate the transport of this contaminated individual to Byerly Hospital by the responding ambulance servic SCN:87-3717 RNPD-87-05-R2 3.0-1

A Reactor trip will occur at 0945 when "C" Steam Generator (MSIV) closes causing a low low level in the steam generator. Loss of steam dump capability provides sufficient pressure to cycle all steam generator PORVs. The subsequent transient increases reactor coolant activity and combined with the 35 gpm leak in the RCS increases R-32A/B to greater than 1OOR/hr. A Site Emergency should be decl-a-r-ed at this time due to R-32A/B reading greater than 10OR/hr. (Module 3.)

A radioactive release to the environment is generated when "C" PORV fails.full open and a loose part on the secondary of "C" Steam Generator produces a 600 gpm tube leak. A Safety Injection will occur when the Pressurizer pressure decreases to less than 1760 psig or through manual initiatio Initial Maintenance efforts to isolate "C" Steam Generator PORV wilL be unsuccessful due to high radiation levels. The release will continue until adequate depressurization of the faulted Steam Generator reduces the PORV area dose rates to acceptable levels allowing Maintenance personnel to make repair A General Emergency will be declared around this time due to offsite dose projections reflecting doses greater than 1.0 Rem (Whole Body) or greater than 5.0 Rem (Thyroid). The General Emergency could also be declared due to the loss of the 3 to 3 Fission Product Barrier The exercise will be terminated upon isolation of release and/or the Plant reaches stable operation SCN:87-3717 RNPD-87-05-Rl 3.0-2

87-05 ANNUAL EXERCISE TIMELINE INITIATING MESSAGE TIME NUMBER 0630

  1. 1 ESTABLISH INITIAL CONDITIONS Reactor Power 100%

Middle of Life (MOL) Cycle 12 RMS 11 and 12 have been increasing slowly Last RCS Sample results 0.179 uCi/ml 1131 dose equivalent taken at 0600 RCS Sampling frequency increased to every 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Main Feedwater Pump "A" experiencing slightly increased vibrations and is being monitore Steam Dump Nitrogen Accumulator cleared for leaking valve replacement scheduled to commence at 0730 this mornin Safety Injection Pump "A" was returned to service following seal replacement and SI Pump area is scheduled to be deconned at 0730 Lake Level is 220 Fee Meteorological Conditions:

Corporate Meteorology has issued warning fo localized flooding in area from previous heavy rainfal Wind direction -

from 231 degrees Wind speed = 5.3 mph delta T = 8.7 degrees C/100m Potential wind shift around 0900 0645

  1. 2 Charging Pump Hi-Speed Alarm - APP-01-038 Process Monitor High Radiation Alarm on APP-02-031 (RMS -

11 ALARM)

0650

  1. 3 Auxiliary Operator discovers HVH 1-4 indicators on CMS are all pegged high. Dew Cell shows an increase of approximately 150 on all point SCN:87-3717 RNPD-87-05-R1 3.0-3

INITIATING MESSAGE TIME NUMBER 0700

  1. 4 Chemistry Sample Counting Lab has experienced a-voltage spike, momentarily interrupting powe (A complete calibration taking approximately two hours is required to return Counting Lab to operational status).

Floating 0700-0715

  1. 5 OST-501 results indicate approximateLy 12 gpm Leak rat (RMS 11 and 12 and RMS 2 trending upscale).

Floating 0700-0730

  1. 6 Operations Supervisor has determined a shutdown rate of 10%/hour, (Unit offline in eight hours) will be utilizie mi #7 An Unusual Event should be declared at this time after CONTINGENCY based on Module 3 (a) Unusual Event due to RCS Message #5 leakage greater than 10 gp A Security search of the TSC should be initiated at this tim #8 Shift Foreman calls Mechanical Foreman to ensure CONTINGENCY Steam Dump Nitrogen repair is being initiate #9 LPMS has just alarmed on APP-036-0 #10 Auxiliary Operator finds multiple alarm signals on Channels 752 and 753 Lower Reactor Vesse AO can hear audible impact signals. Monitor shows 7 impacts above and 300 impacts below setpoin #11 Areas Monitor Alarm on APP-02-023 due to R-N/A R-9 reading on SPDS sheet shows an increase of more than 5R/hr in less than 30 minute #12 An Alert Classification should be declared at this CONTINGENCY due to:

ALERT Module 7(c) -

R-9 increase > 5R/hr within 30 minute TSC/OSC mobilization begin SCN:87-3717 RNPD-87-05-R2 3.0-4

INITIATING MESSAGE TIME NUMBER 0820-

  1. 13 Individual reports an unconscious IRM 0840 Floating decontamination technician found in SI Pump Roo The victim apparently fell, hit his head and is potentially contaminate Floating
  1. 14 Medical response personnel find unconscious victim 0825-0845 in SI Pump Roo Vital signs are:

Blood Pressure:

168/93 Pulse:

103 Color:

Pale Other indications of possible shock condition Contamination levels:

2700 to 5000 cpm on right side of bod #15 Damage Control Team Leader gets message that Steam CONTINGENCY Dump System is needed ASA #16 Parts for the Relief Valve on Steam Dump Nitrogen Accumulator are incorrect. Valve must be re-lappe #17 Corporate Media Center getting calls from publi Floating Activate Rumor Contro #18 Segars Mill Pond Bridge on SC-151 is out. Ambulance Floating driver to take alternate rout #19 Hot Lab is now ready for sample analysi N/A R-9 fails "off scale low".

0930

  1. 20 LPMS ALARM (2nd time) APP-036-03 0935
  1. 21 AO finds multiple alarm signals on channels 0752, 0753, Lover Reactor Vesse AO can hear audible signal impact Monitor shows 400 impacts above setpoint 2000 impacts below setpoint 0945
  1. 22 Reactor is presently at 75% power. The following alarms are received:

(C MSIV) APP-004-16 S/G 3 lLO LO Level Trip Reactor Trips from 75% power Turbine Tri SCN:87-3717 RNPD-87-05-R2 3.0-5

INITIATING MESSAGE TIME NUMBER (NO STEAM DUMP) Due to clearance on the Steam Dump Nitrogen Accumulator. Note:

Repairs cannot be done within three hours NOR can system be put back i servic Indications are that PORVs RV-1, RV-2, and RV-3 have opene (Reactor Trip generated by MSIV safeguard solenoid closing LO-LO S/G level in "C")

0950

  1. 23 LPMS Alarm on APP-036-03 1000
  1. 24 Audible signal impacts can be hear Monitor shows 450 impacts above setpoint 2100 impacts below setpoint 1005
  1. 25 Indications are that RV-1, RV-2 have reseate RV-3 indicates valve is stuck open (Operations should isolate feed to "C" Steam Generator).

1010

  1. 26 Repairs on Steam Dump Relief Valve are complet #27 A Site Emergency should have been declared at this CONTINGENCY time due to:

Site emergency Module 3 -

R-32A/B > 100R/h #28 Damage Control Team Leader gets information that CONTINGENCY RV-3 is stuck ope #29 Mechanics discover valve operator to body bolts are loose and additional tools are neede #30 LPMS alarms on APP-036-03 1046

  1. 31 Multiple signals have been generated on S/G "C" primary side of tube sheet. Channel 758 shows 5 impacts above and 100 impacts below. When AO monitors all channels Channel 759 has louder impacts and display indicates larger amplitudes. Same number of impacts on both side #32 RMS-31C and RMS-19C are increasing rapidly and alarm. (Release in progress due to 600 gpm tube leak generated on "C" S/C).

SCN:87-3717 RNPD-87-05-R2 3.0-6

INITIATINC TIME NUMBER

  1. 33 Control Room rece 1055 CONTINGENCY Pressurizer Pressu
  1. 34

&RC coordinator told radiation levels prohibit CO1I00NC work on RV CONTINGENCY tod

  1. 35A enrLEegnysolhaebe d

odurl Room ssece e

of any 2 of the 3 Fissiog d

Product Barrier OR toldradition theevlirohibt Module 15 (1) any release resulting in excess Of 1.0 REM (Whole Body) or 5.0 REM (Thyroid).

haction reco edation to "evacuate

CONTINENCY 5 M e radis nd 10 mile downwind, shelter those arteiea at s caot be evacuated before plume arrival Barres.ta cn

  1. 31 AFTE 113 $37Questions for Plant Media Center (see Mesage/Drill AFTER 1130
  1. 37 Cr)
  1. 38 Radiation levels will allow PORV repair efforts to CONTINGENCY Afte 120

$~

QustiflSforPlant Media Center (see Mesage/Drill After 1230

  1. 39Qusin fo card).

1300$40Repar ativties on RV3 are successfu #40Rearatv n ed The valve is closed and the release is terma rted AQuestions for Plant Media Center (see Message/Drl1 Card).

$42 Terminate the 10 mile EPZ exercis CONTINGENICY SCN: 87-37173.

RNP-8705-R2

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