IR 05000261/1987008
| ML14175B466 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1987 |
| From: | Blake J, Chou R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14175B465 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-87-08, 50-261-87-8, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8706120340 | |
| Download: ML14175B466 (5) | |
Text
R REG UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-261/87-08 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-261 License No.:
DPR-23 Facility Name:
H. B. Robinson Inspection Conducted:
April 6-9, 1987 Inspector:
R
.TCETu Date Signed Approved by./- Blike, Section Chief Dath Signed E
eering Branch vsion of Reactor Safety
!
SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection onsite was conducted in the areas of previous open items on seismic analysis for as-built safety-related piping system (IEB 79-14),
safety-related pipe supports, base-plate designs using concrete expansion anchor bolts (IEB 79-02).
Results:
No violations or deviations were identifie f8 PDR ADOCK 05000261
REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees R. E. Morgan, Plant General Manager
- J. M. Curley, Director -
Regulation Compliance
- A. R. Wallace, Technical Support Manager
- D. A. Sayre, Senior Specialist - Regulation Compliance
- H. L. Willians, Principle Engineer - Civil/Stress
- G. R. Campbell, Sr. Engineer - Civil/Stress J. Hologa, NELD -
Project Engineer S. Flowers, Design Engineer -
Site
- E. M. Harris, Jr., Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety
- H. S. Young, Director -
QA/QC Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors
- H. E. P. Krug, Senior Resident Inspector
- R. W. Latta, Resident Inspector
- S. J. Vias, Project Engineer for Robinson
- Attended exit interview 2. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 9, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No dissenting comments were received from the license No new items were identified during this inspectio The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Unresolved Item (UNR) 261/79-25-01,
"OBE/DBE Design Comparison."
This matter concerns the fact that the original plant was designed for Static OBE loading only. The licensee was required to reanalyze for Static DBE loading conditio In Inspection Report 261/84-12, the inspector stated, "The licensee's piping analysis commitment in Section 3.7.3.2 of the updated FSAR was reviewed, discussed with the licensee, and inspected. The inspector had no further questions regarding the FSAR committed piping analysis."
The derivation of the Static OBE 'G' and the 'K' values used in the conversion of Static OBE to Static DBE is now fully explained in the following documents" (1) "Historical Overview of Pipe Stress Analysis for Class
Piping", Revision 0, Document N RXX-XXX-DE01, April 24, 1984, and (2) "Pipe Stress Analysis",
Procedure N /M3, Revision 6, November 17, 198 The piping reanalysis was completely redone based on the Impell Corporation Independent Review performed in 1984. For each analysis; either a static computer method (factored OBE)
or a dynamic method was used, and all were properly checked for input verification. This item is considered close (Closed) Infraction (INF) 261/79-25-03, Failure to Identify all Pipe Supports and Restraints as Specified in IEB 79-14".
This concern was identified during a reinspection of portions of Drawing; ISO-SI-9, ISO-SI-10, and ISO-SI-Discrepancies were identified with regards to supports differing between installed condition and the support documented on the drawing The licensee performed a benchmark evaluation of the adequacy of information obtained from walkdowns, procedure reviews, etc., for 20 package Results of this evaluation indicated that additional information was required. Systems were reinspected in 1984 by Ebasco and CPL. Corrected and/or new information was used in the reanalysis completed in 198 All stress ISO's were reviewed and revised as necessary to incorporate the proper support type This item is considered close (Closed) IFI 261/84-48-03, "Stress ISO's Weld Locations."
This matter was identified during an inspection made of the Service Water System in reference to the location of welds. The inspector at the time was shown project stress isometric The stress isometrics included information on geometry, orientation and other data required for the IEB 79-14 effort, which were taken at time when the insulation remained installed. The stress isometrics were used only for information for orientation and routing of the service water piping. The location of the welds required for the repair of service water is noted on weld map drawings drawn for the service water modification Information for the weld map drawings was taken from
several sources, such as stress iso's, B. F. Shaw pipe fabrication drawings and other system drawings. The dimensional data provided by the stress isometrics did not impact the final sleeve installation in any way. A comparison by EBASCO was made of the isometrics used for the IEB 79-14 analysis and those generated by CPL for the service water system repair. Discrepancies found in the review in all cases resulted from the use of the EBASCO analysis, showing no detrimental effect on the IEB 79-14 analysis. This item is considered close (Closed)
Violation 261/85-06-01,
"Technical Specification Violation Regarding Piping/Restraint Operability."
This matter concerns piping/restraint operability due to the safety factor of Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolt being less than two for interim operation requirement per IEB 79-0 After the plant was shut down due to the above reason, the licensee and its A/E, EBASCO performed re-evaluation and modification to bring all inoperable piping and restraints to meet interim operation requiremen The subsequent design revisions and field modifications were made to bring the safety factor to four or above during 1985 and 1986 to meet final design requirement per IEB 79-0 The inspector reviewed the following support calculations and all of them met final design requiremen SI-20-2310 AC-3-150/1 MS-1c/1062 CH-15-22N1 CH-15-19/1 C-1-35/5 SW-9-23/8A CP-1-2 SI-6-23 The inspector selected the following six restraints in the area of dynamic pipe supports and component supports structures that had been QC final inspected to see if they complied with IEB 79-02 and 79-1 The restraints were reinspected with the assistance of licensee engineer C-1-35/5 CH-15-19/1 CH-15-22/11 CP-1-2 AC-5-40/2 AC-3-150/1 The above restraints were reinspected against their detail drawings for configuration, identification, fastener/anchor installation, member size, welds, and damage/protectio Since five restraints were in high radiation area with different systems and locations, the inspection was done based on overall visual inspection with some
detail measurements. In general, the restraints were installed in accordance with design drawings with good workmanshi This violation is considered close (Closed)
Violation 261/85-06-02,
"Pipe Restraint Calculation Discrepancies."
This matter concerns the design calculations which did not use the latest stress analysis load for Qualified Support MS-1C-1062 and the capacity reduction for Qualified Support SI-20-2310 due to violation of 7 1/2" minimum concrete edge distance requirement for Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolt. The inspector reviewed both calculations at their latest revisions. Licensee engineering told the inspector that EBASCO reviewed all the support calculations and did not find any other similar discrepancie The inspector reviewed support calculations on systems CH-15 and AC-3 on capacity reduction documentation required for minimum concrete edge distance violation and did not identify any similar discrepancie Therefore this violation is considered close.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.