IR 05000219/2002006
| ML022110015 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 07/25/2002 |
| From: | Rogge J NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB7 |
| To: | Skolds J Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR-02-006 | |
| Download: ML022110015 (20) | |
Text
uly 25, 2002
SUBJECT:
OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-219/02-06
Dear Mr. Skolds:
On June 29, 2002, the NRC completed an integrated inspection at your Oyster Creek reactor facility. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection. The results of this inspection were discussed on July 15, 2002, with Mr. Ron DeGregorio and other members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your operating license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
On the basis of the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
The NRC has increased security requirements at Oyster Creek in response to terrorist acts on September 11, 2001. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the NRC issued an Order and several threat advisories to commercial power reactors to strengthen licensees capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack. The NRC continues to monitor overall security controls and will issue temporary instructions in the near future to verify by inspection the licensee's compliance with the Order and current security regulations.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Mr. Jack Skolds 2 We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at 610 337-5146 if you have any questions regarding this letter.
Sincerely,
/RA/
John F. Rogge, Chief Projects Branch No. 7 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-219 License No. DPR-16
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-219/02-06 Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION I==
Docket No.: 50-219 License No.: DPR-16 Report No: 50-219/02-06 Licensee: AmerGen Energy Company, LLC (AmerGen)
Facility: Oyster Creek Generating Station Location: Forked River, New Jersey Dates: May 12, 2002 - June 29, 2002 Inspectors: Robert Summers, Senior Resident Inspector Steve Dennis, Resident Inspector Steve Pindale, Reactor Engineer Paul Kaufman, Senior Reactor Engineer John McFadden, Health Physicist George Morris, Reactor Engineer Fred Bower, Resident Inspector, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Greg Cranston, Reactor Engineer Approved By: John F. Rogge, Chief Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000219-02-06; AmerGen Energy Company, LLC; on 05/12-06/29/02; Oyster Creek Generating Station; integrated resident inspector report.
The inspection covered a seven week period and was conducted by resident and region based inspectors. There were no findings during this inspection. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. Inspector Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B. Licensee Identified Violations No licensee identified violations were identified.
Report Details Summary of Plant Status:
Oyster Creek began the inspection period at full power and except for minor power reductions to support maintenance and test activities, remained there for the duration of the inspection period.
1. REACTOR SAFETY Initiating Events/Mitigating Systems/Barrier Integrity (REACTOR - R)
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection a. Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the licensees seasonal readiness preparations to verify that safety-related equipment would remain functional when challenged by high summer temperature conditions. The inspector reviewed the licensees seasonal readiness procedure (OP-AA-108-109, Seasonal Readiness, Revision 0), seasonal check lists, and performed walk downs to verify that the safety-related equipment would remain functional during adverse weather conditions. The inspector evaluated the condition of the Reactor Building Heating, Cooling and Ventilation System, Emergency Service Water System and Emergency Diesel Generators before the adverse weather conditions exist.
The inspector also reviewed a sample of deficiencies associated with AmerGens summer readiness action item list to verify that problems were entered into the corrective action program and appropriately addressed for resolution in timely manner.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment a. Inspection Scope Equipment alignment partial system walkdown inspections were performed to evaluate the operability of the below listed systems. The inspectors walked down the equipment, reviewed a selected sample of breakers and accessible valves, and verified proper alignment for standby readiness in accordance with operating procedures, technical specifications, the updated final safety analysis report, and associated system drawings.
Control room indications and controls were verified to be appropriate for the standby or operating status of the system and system maintenance action requests were reviewed to assure no degraded conditions existed to adversely affect operability. The inspectors reviewed critical components to identify any discrepancies which could affect operability of the system. Minor discrepancies were discussed with AmerGen personnel for resolution.
- Core Spray System 2, on May 21, 2002
C No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator, on May 21, 2002
- No. 2 Diesel Driven Fire System, on June 12, 2002
- Isolation Condenser System - Trains A and B, on June 28, 2002 b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted fire protection inspection activities consisting of plant walkdowns, discussions with fire protection personnel, and reviews of procedure 333, Plant Fire Protection System, and the Oyster Creek Fire Hazards Analysis Report to verify that the fire program was implemented in accordance with all conditions stated in the facility license. Plant walkdowns included observations of combustible material control, fire detection and suppression equipment availability, and compensatory measures. The inspectors conducted fire protection inspections in the following areas due to the potential to impact mitigating systems:
C RB-FZ-95, Reactor Building 95 foot elevation on May 21, 2002 C RB-FZ-75, Reactor Building 75 foot elevation on May 23, 2002 C DG-FA-15, No. 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Room on May 31, 2002 b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures a. Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the Oyster Creek Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Section 5.2, External Floods, Technical Specifications, Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Report (IPSAR), and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) concerning external flooding events. The inspector reviewed the procedure for high winds (2000-ABN-3200.31, High Winds, Revision 20) and evaluated the Isolation Condenser and Condensate Storage Tank which are risk significant components.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted maintenance rule implementation inspection activities to verify that: (1) failed structures, systems and components (SSCs) were properly characterized in the OC Maintenance Rule Performance Reports, (2) goals and performance criteria were appropriate, (3) corrective action plans were appropriate, and (4) performance was being effectively monitored in accordance with OC procedure 2000-ADM-1220.01, Implementation of the Maintenance Rule. The inspectors selected the following safety significant system in (a)(2) status:
C Standby Gas Treatment System on June 12, 2002 b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation a. Inspection Scope On May 20, 2002, the licensee identified two hot spots on the disconnect jaws of switch GC-11 on the 230 KV Distribution System in the Oyster Creek switchyard as a result of routine thermography evaluation. A failure of this disconnect switch could result in a load reject event initiator under certain postulated conditions. The inspector reviewed the risk assessment performed by the licensee in accordance with procedure ER-AA-600-1042, On-Line Risk Management, and verified that the planned actions associated with monitoring and repair to switch GC-11, were appropriately addressed since other planned activities for this same period would also impact the 230 KV Distribution System during restoration of the Bank 8 Transformer. The inspectors also reviewed and found acceptable the OC extent of condition review and planned corrective actions as described in CAP 02002-0800.
On June 8, 2002, the licensee determined that the #1 fire diesel engine control isolation relay had failed during a routine operational surveillance test. At the time, the surveillance test was to demonstrate that the remote manual control of the diesel fire pump would override the normal auto start and stop function of the pump controls that are based on water header pressure sensors. The inspector reviewed the licensees risk assessment and verified that activities previously scheduled to remove the #2 fire diesel from service were delayed and appropriate administrative controls were established to protect both the #2 fire diesel and the alternate fire pump, while repairs were made to the #1 fire diesel. The inspectors reviewed the OC extent of condition review described in CAP 02002-0869 and the apparent cause evaluation described in Condition Report (Action Request) # A2035668. The failed relay was of a design that was used in this single application at the plant and had been installed during a system overhaul and modification conducted in April 2002. The corrective actions, to replace the failed relay with a modification using a relay design used in several similar applications at the plant, were found appropriate.
On November 11, 2001, the 4160 Volt feeder to load center 1B2 failed (see Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000219/2001001- Reactor Shutdown). The faulted section was removed and a new section was spliced in place as an immediate corrective action.
Long term corrective actions include replacing the cable feeds for both the 1A2 and 1B2 Unit Substations during the next refueling outage. To support this cable replacement project, the licensee has initiated the installation of the new cables with the plant on line and will complete the cable terminations during the outage. On June 25, 2002, the inspectors reviewed the supporting documentation for modification ECR 02-00537, Reroute Cable Feeds for 1A2 and 1B2 Unit Substations; LER 2001001 - Reactor Shutdown (caused by failure of the 1B2 feeder cable); and interviewed plant personnel and performed walkdowns of the initial floor slab cable trench demolition work in progress to assess the risk associated with this emergent work, including possible impact on nearby operating equipment, such as the feedwater pumps, and degradation of fire barriers and other fire protection features.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations in order to determine that proper operability justifications were performed for the following items. In addition, where a component was determined to be inoperable, the inspectors verified that the Technical Specification limiting condition for operation implications were properly addressed.
C Following repairs to a reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) heat exchanger in May 2002, the licensee discovered a baffle plate support beam calculation deficiency. On June 12, 2002, the inspectors reviewed the operability determination prepared by OC engineering and recommended operational procedural changes to ensure that the RBCCW system could fulfill its intended design functions. (CAP-02002-0823)
C During the six month inspection of the #2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) in May 2002, the licensee discovered two wiring deficiencies. On June 3, 2002, the inspectors reviewed the operability determination prepared by OC engineering and recommended actions to compensate and subsequently correct the deficient wiring conditions for the EDG. (CAP-02002-0813)
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing a. Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed and observed portions of the post maintenance testing associated with the following maintenance activities because of their function as mitigating systems and their potential role in increasing plant transient frequency. The inspectors reviewed the post maintenance test documents to verify that they were in accordance with the licensees procedures and that the equipment was restored to an operable state.
C Containment Spray/Emergency Service Water System 1 pump operability and in-service test per procedure, ST 607.4.004 on May 30, 2002, following scheduled preventive maintenance.
C Fire Diesel Pump No. 1-1 functional test per procedure, Test No. 247/11 on May 13, 2002, following controller and diesel engine driver replacement per Modification No. OC-MD-H750-001.
C Core Spray System 1 pump operability and in-service test per procedure, ST 610.4.012 on May 21, 2002, following scheduled preventive maintenance.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing a. Inspection Scope The inspector observed pre-test briefings and portions of the surveillance test (ST)
performance for procedural adherence, and verified that the resulting data associated with the test met the requirements of the plant technical specifications. The inspector also reviewed the results of past performances of the selected STs to verify that degraded or non-conforming conditions were identified and corrected. The following STs were observed:
C Core Spray System # 2 instrument channel calibration, test and system operability per procedure 610.3.205 on May 21, 2002.
C Reactor Coolant System sampling and analysis for Dose Equivalent Iodine per procedures, 827.1, Primary Systems Analysis: Reactor Water and 826.10, Radiochemical Instrumentation: Genie2k Gamma Spectroscopy on June 4, 2002.
C Reactor Water Level Triple Low Level test and instrument calibration per procedure 619.3.006 on June 26, 2002.
- Emergency Service Water System 1 Pump Accelerated Testing per procedures 607.4.007 and 607.4.004 on June 25, 2002.
The inspector observed that this test was a reinstituted test now conducted monthly between the quarterly surveillance tests. Previously, the technical specifications required that the surveillance test be run monthly. In March 2001 the technical specifications were revised to allow quarterly tests. During the first quarterly run the licensee observed that the emergency service water (ESW)
pump P-3-003B experienced degraded flow (about 10 to 15%) to below the low action in-service test limit. The pump remained operable. Corrective action program (CAP) report 02002-0201 was written to identify and resolve the problem. The cause was attributed to increased build up of marine bio-fouling (algae and marine worms) of the ESW pump suction piping, which had more time to build up during the extended intervals between pump operation. The corrective action was to clean the suction piping and run the ESW pumps monthly, as before, to minimize bio-fouling buildup. Pump performance, as determined by this test, was acceptable and within the expected normal range.
The inspector determined that the corrective actions were appropriate.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed temporary modification No. 2002-012 Rev.1, dated May 7, 2002, which provides a temporary control cable for fire diesel # 1 until new cables are installed to replace the existing degraded cables. The review included a verification that the change did not adversely impact the design function of fire diesel # 1 through a review of 10 CFR 50.59 screening No. OC-2002-S-0306, system procedures, technical specifications, and the updated final safety analysis report. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the modification was performed in accordance with OC procedure 108.8, Temporary Modification Control.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2. RADIATION SAFETY Occupational Radiation Safety (OS)
2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas a. Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed radiological work activities and practices and procedural implementation during observations and tours of the facilities and inspected procedures, records, and other program documents to evaluate the effectiveness of Exelon/Oyster Creeks access controls to radiologically significant areas.
The inspector observed activities at the routine radiologically-controlled-area (RCA)
access control point on June 11, 12, and 13, 2002 to verify compliance with requirements for RCA entry and exit, dosimetry placement, and issuance and use of electronic dosimeters. On June 11 and 12, 2002, the inspector toured with a radiation survey meter, observed work activities, verified dose rate postings on various elevations in the reactor building and on the operating floor of the turbine building. During these observations and tours the inspector reviewed, for regulatory compliance, the posting, labeling, barricading, and level of radiological access control for locked high radiation areas (LHRAs), high radiation areas (HRAs), radiation and contamination areas, and radioactive material areas. The inspector attended a pre-job briefing on June 13, 2002, for work under Radiation Work Permit (RWP) No. OC-1-02-00001(Rev. 00) for an entry into a LHRA on the turbine buildings operating floor at power.
Additionally, the inspector discussed with radiological engineering personnel the need for any recent internal dose assessment and the adequacy of controls for non-fuel materials stored in the spent fuel pool. The inspector reviewed the site procedure for high and very high radiation areas for regulatory compliance.
The inspector performed a selective examination of RWPs, procedures, and other program documents (as listed in the List of Documents Reviewed section) to evaluate the adequacy of radiological controls.
The inspection in this area included a review of three Corrective Action Program (CAP)
items (i.e., CAP Nos. 2002-0562, 2002-0672, and 2002-0886) for the appropriateness and adequacy of event categorization, immediate corrective action, corrective action to prevent recurrence, and timeliness of corrective action.
The review in this area was against criteria contained in 10 CFR 19.12, 10 CFR 20 (Subparts D, F, G, H, I, and J), site Technical Specifications, and site procedures.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls
a. Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the effectiveness of the licensees program to maintain occupational radiation exposure as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA).
The inspector attended a station ALARA committee meeting on June 10, 2002, in which the statuses of current dose-significant work and preparations for the upcoming refueling outage were topics of discussion. The inspector also attended a meeting of the drywell outage support High-Impact-Team (HIT) team on June 13, 2002. The inspector also reviewed the work plan/action items for the shielding HIT team.
The inspector discussed with radiological engineering personnel the radiological controls described in the ALARA plans for the condenser water box repairs at power and for the refurbishment of the B low pressure turbine rotor at power.
The inspector performed a selective examination of procedures, records, and documents (as listed in the List of Documents Reviewed section) for regulatory compliance and for adequacy of control of radiation exposure.
The review was against criteria contained in 10 CFR 20.1101 (Radiation protection programs), 10 CFR 20.1701 (Use of process or other engineering controls), and site procedures.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation a. Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the programs for health physics instrumentation and for installed radiation monitoring instrumentation to determine the accuracy and operability of the instrumentation. Also reviewed was the program to provide self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) to occupational workers.
During plant tours on June 11 and 12, 2002, the inspector reviewed field instrumentation utilized by health physics technicians and plant workers to measure radioactivity and radiation levels, including portable field survey instruments, hand-held contamination frisking instruments, small article monitors, whole-body friskers, and portal monitors.
The inspector conducted a selective review of the instruments observed in the toured areas, specifically verification of current calibration, of appropriate source checks, and of proper function. The inspector reviewed the licensees 10 CFR 61 source term reviews to determine if the calibration sources used for contamination monitoring equipment were representative of the current plant source terms, if scaling factors were used to account for hard-to-detect radionuclides, and if the source terms were reviewed on a periodic basis for changes which could require changes in scaling factors.
The inspector reviewed the licensees evaluation of the capability of its contamination monitoring equipment to detect contamination. Specifically, the inspector reviewed the capabilities of the instrumentation (given the ratios of radionuclides present) to determine if instrument detection capabilities were sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that radioactive contamination could be detected given the fractional abundance of the radionuclides present in its plant mix.
On June 11 and 13, 2002, the inspector met with the radiological engineer responsible for dosimetry and SCBA operations and discussed the corrective actions and action plans for the issues and areas for improvement raised in CAP Nos. 2002-0330 (supplies of breathing air) and 2002-0186 (independent assessment of radiological health activities). Also, on June 13, the inspector reviewed the training and qualification of the individuals authorized to perform maintenance on SCBA equipment. The inspector also verified that the training and qualification for wearing SCBA equipment were current for a number of randomly selected personnel on the list of current fire brigade members which included individuals from operations and maintenance.
On June 12, 2002, the inspector discussed the current calibration records for the steam jet air ejector off gas radiation monitors and the main steam line radiation monitors with the system engineer responsible for those monitors. The discussion included the corrective actions taken in response to CAP Nos. 2002-0542 and 2002-0825 which dealt with the off gas radiation monitors.
The inspector performed a selective examination of procedures, records, and documents (as listed in the List of Documents Reviewed section) for regulatory compliance and adequacy in this area.
The review was against criteria contained in 10 CFR 20.1501, 10 CFR 20 Subpart H, site Technical Specifications, and site procedures.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the Oyster Creek performance indicator (PI) data against applicable criteria specified in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, to verify that all conditions that met the NEI criteria were recognized and identified as PI occurrences.
The inspectors verified the accuracy of the reported data through reviews of monthly operating reports, shift operating logs, Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and other station records. The inspectors reviewed 12 months of reported data (April 2001 - March 2002)
for the following Pis:
C Reactor Coolant System Activity C Reactor Coolant System Leakage b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution a. Inspection Scope During the course of the inspection period while conducting the inspection activities described in this report, the inspectors reviewed a sample of issues identified on the structures, systems, and components at the plant for proper handling per the licensees corrective action program. The licensees method for identifying the problem, determining how long the problem existed, and determining the plant-specific risk consequences, as well as actions taken to evaluate the root causes, extent of condition, and associated corrective actions were assessed. Issues selected for review by the inspectors are listed in the attachment to this report, identified by CAP number.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit Exit Meeting Summary On July 15, 2002, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Ron DeGregorio and other members of licensee management. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
ATTACHMENT 1 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION a. Key Points of Contact Licensee (in alphabetical order)
A. Agarwal, Manager, Electrical Power and Instrumentation V. Aggarwal, Director, Engineering R. Brown, Assistant Manager, Operations J. Derby, Radiological Safety Supervisor R. DeGregorio, Vice President A. Farenga, Radiological Safety Supervisor J. Frank, System Engineer E. Harkness, Plant Manager R. Heffner, Radiological Engineer R. Hillman, Manager, Chemistry & Radwaste A. Judson, Radiological Engineer G. Kester, Radiation Protection Technician J. Magee, Director, Maintenance M. Massaro, Director, Work Management D. McMillan, Director, Training M. Moore, Radiation Protection Manager J. Murphy, Radiological Safety Supervisor M. Newcomer, Senior Manager, Design R. Pruhti, Senior Electrical Engineer D. Prusik, Radiological Health Technician J. Renda, Radiological Safety Supervisor J. Rogers, Licensing Engineer B. Sands, Radiological Safety Supervisor P. Sawyer, Radiological Engineering Manager S. Schwartz, System Engineer G. Seals, Radiological Engineer D. Slear, Manager, Regulatory Assurance M. Trum, Director, Operations C. Wilson, Senior Manager, Operations J. Wyjas, Radiation Protection Technician b. List of Acronyms ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System ALARA As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable AmerGen AmerGen Energy Company, LLC CAP Corrective Action Program CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR Condition Report ESW Emergency Service Water HIT High Impact Team HRA High Radiation Area IST In-Service Test JO Job Order LHRA Locked High Radiation Area NCV Non-Cited Violation NEI Nuclear Energy Institute NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OS Occupational Safety PI Performance Indicator RCA Radiologically Controlled Area RWP Radiation Work Permit SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus ST Surveillance Test TS Technical Specification UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report c. List of Documents Reviewed - The following list describes documents reviewed by the inspector during the conduct of this inspection.
Procedure, 2000-ABN-3200.31, High Winds, Revision 20 IPEEE, Section 5.2, External Floods Procedure, OP-AA-108-109, Seasonal Readiness, Revision 0 Procedure 329, Reactor Building Heating, Cooling and Ventilation System, Revision 46 Licensee Event Report 05000219/2001001 - Reactor Shutdown Modification Package, ECR 02-00537, Replacement of Feeder Cables for Load Centers 1A2and 1B2 Safety Evaluation, OC-2002-S-0265, 50.59 Screening for ECR 02-00537 Action Request, A2021871-02, Fire Hazards Analysis for ECR 02-00537 Procedure, ES-019, Cable Pulling Standard, Rev. 2 Procedure, 101.2, Oyster Creek Site Fire Protection Program, Rev. 47 RWP OC-1-02-00001, Entry into LHRA on turbine buildings operating floor at power, Rev. 00 RWP support guideline for turbine building steam sensitive areas dated January 2, 2002 LHRA/ALARA briefing checklist, Rev. 2 Procedure RP-AA-203, Exposure control and authorization, Rev. 2 Procedure RP-AA-403, Administration of the radiation work permit program, Rev. 1 Procedure RP-MA-403-1001, Radiation work permit processing, Rev. 0 Procedure RP-AA-460, Controls for high and very high radiation areas, Rev. 2 Procedure 6630-ADM-4100.01, Supplemental control of occupational radiation dose, Rev. 0 Procedure 6630-ADM-4200.01, Radiological surveys, Rev. 6 Procedure 6630-ADM-4330.02, Monitoring for personnel contamination, Rev. 14 Procedure 1002.5, Spent fuel pool management and inventory control, Rev. 11 Documented explanation for locking items hanging from the edge of the spent fuel pool, August 15, 2001 Documentation of the fundamentals of radiation protection at Exelon Nuclear Radiation
Protection Improvement Plan Nuclear oversight continuous assessment report (NOSA-OC-02-1Q) for January - March 2002 Nuclear Oversight Section field observations RP Management RCA tour, April 10, 2002 Down power operations and maintenance activities, April 13, 2002 Pre-job, locked high radiation area, and confined space briefings, April 13, 2002 Radiological performance (improvement) committee meeting, April 15, 2002 Protected area/outside RCA yard tour, April 18, 2002 Plant tour, April 19 & 24, 2002 Dry cask spent fuel storage activities/ISFSI, April 22 - 23, 2002 Dry cask spent fuel storage activities/ISFSI, May 5 - 6, 2002 Dry cask spent fuel storage activities/ISFSI, May 9, 2002 Follow up on RP records CAP O2001-1725, May 14, 2002 Dry cask spent fuel storage activities/ISFSI, May 16 - 17, 2002 Procedure RP-AA-400, ALARA program, Rev. 2 Procedure RP-AA-401, Operational ALARA planning and controls, Rev. 2 ALARA plan 02-009B, Turbine condensers A, B, C water box repairs at power, Rev. 1 ALARA plan 02-002F, B low pressure turbine rotor refurbishment at power, Rev. 1 Station ALARA committee meeting minutes for June 10, 2002 Drywell outage support HIT team meeting agenda for meeting of June 13, 2002 Work plan/action items for the shielding HIT team Procedure RP-AA-605, 10 CFR 61 program, Rev. 0 Procedure 6633-PMI-4224.41, Calibration of the Bicron-NE small articles monitor, Rev. 2 Gamma spectrum analysis for reactor water sample taken on June 10, 2002 Graphs of Co-58 and Co-60 activity in reactor water samples, May 2001 to May 2002 Waste stream sample characteristic summary for mix of reactor water clean-up and condensate demineralizer resins (sample date of March 30, 1999)
Waste stream sample characteristic summary for condensate demineralizer resin (April 30, 2001)
Waste stream sample characteristic summary for floor drain filter media (April 5, 2001)
Monthly inspection sheet and check log for SCBAs for May 2002 Training certificates for test and repair of MSA self-contained breathing apparatus Calibration record 621.3.003, Main steam line radiation monitor check source functional test, Rev. 21, performed in September 2000 Calibration record 621.3.031, Main steam line radiation monitor calibration, Rev. 12, performed in September 2000 Procedure, ST 607.4.004, Containment Spray/Emergency Service Water System 1 Operability and In-Service Test Procedure, Test No. 247/11, Fire Diesel Pump No. 1-1 Functional Test Procedure, ST 610.4.012, Core Spray System 1 Pump Operability and In-Service Test Procedure, ST 610.3.205, Core Spray Instrument Channel Calibration, Test and System Operability Procedure, ST 619.3.006, Reactor Water Level Triple Low Level Instrument Test and Calibration Corrective Action Program Reports:
CAP 01999-1375 CAP 02001-1619 CAP 02001-1718 CAP 02002-0201
CAP 02002-0562 CAP 02002-0672 CAP 02002-0758 CAP 02002-0800 CAP 02002-0813 CAP 02002-0823 CAP 02002-0869 CAP 02002-0886