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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217K3161999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Amend 195 to License DPR-61 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Deletes Certain TSs Either No Longer Applicable to Permanently Shutdown & Defueled State of Reactor or Duplicate Regulatory Requirements CY-99-137, Notifies NRC of Intent to Apply Haddam Neck Plant 10CFR50 App B,Qa Program to Activities Related to Development of ISFSI at Haddam1999-10-12012 October 1999 Notifies NRC of Intent to Apply Haddam Neck Plant 10CFR50 App B,Qa Program to Activities Related to Development of ISFSI at Haddam DD-99-11, Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-11) Expired & That Commission Declined Any Review.Decision Became Final Action on 9910041999-10-0808 October 1999 Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-11) Expired & That Commission Declined Any Review.Decision Became Final Action on 991004 ML20212L1261999-10-0404 October 1999 Forwards Viewgraphs Presented by Licensee at 990923 Meeting with Nrc,In Response to Request ML20212D0341999-09-20020 September 1999 Expresses Appreciation for Accepting NRC Request for Tour of Haddam Neck Facility During on 991014.Invites R Mellor to Participate in NRC 1999 Decommissioninng Power Reactor Work- Shop:Nrc Insp Program at Decommissioning Power Reactors CY-99-111, Submits Clarification of Changes Made to Connecticut Yankee QA Program,Per Util 990810 Submittal.Change Will Be Submitted to NRC in Dec 1999 as Part of Annual Update1999-09-0202 September 1999 Submits Clarification of Changes Made to Connecticut Yankee QA Program,Per Util 990810 Submittal.Change Will Be Submitted to NRC in Dec 1999 as Part of Annual Update ML20211E8051999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-213/99-02 on 990420-0719.No Violations Noted.Completion of Corrective Actions for Spent Fuel Bldg Ventilation Issues Adequate ML20210J6021999-08-0202 August 1999 Informs That Info Re Orise Technical Survey Assistance to NRC at CT Yankee Is to Include Copies of Listed Documents CY-99-048, Forwards Cyap Rept CY-HP-0031,Rev 0, Bounding Dose Assessment for Offsite Radioactive Matls1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Cyap Rept CY-HP-0031,Rev 0, Bounding Dose Assessment for Offsite Radioactive Matls CY-99-066, Forwards Revised Plan for Recovery of Licensed Matl from Offsite Locations.Completion of Implementation of Plan During Summer of 1999 Is Planned,Contingent on Support Extended by Property Owners,Weather & Uncontrolled Factors1999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Revised Plan for Recovery of Licensed Matl from Offsite Locations.Completion of Implementation of Plan During Summer of 1999 Is Planned,Contingent on Support Extended by Property Owners,Weather & Uncontrolled Factors ML20210C1491999-07-0101 July 1999 Responds to ,Which Responded to NRC Ltr & NOV & Informs That Engagement in Any Similar Wrongdoing in Future May Result in More Significant Enforcement Action. No Further Action Will Be Taken at This Time ML20209C3911999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards TS Page 6-3 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20195H1741999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards Original & Copy of Request for Approval of Certain Indirect & Direct Transfer of License & Ownership Interests of Montaup Electric Co (Montaup) with Respect to Nuclear Facilities Described as Listed ML20195F9011999-06-0909 June 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp 50-213/98-06 on 990226. Util Did Not Agree with Disposition of Issue Cited as Severity Level IV Violation.Violation Will Be Noncited ML20195H3591999-06-0202 June 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp of License DPR-61.Corrective Actions:Disciplinary Actions Were Taken by Util Against Jm Foley & Individual & Departmental Emphasis Is Placed on New HP Stds & Expectations ML20207E9031999-06-0202 June 1999 Informs That NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization,Div of Licensing Project Mgt Created.Mt Masnik Will Be Section Chief for Haddam Neck.Organization Chart Encl ML20207B9301999-05-25025 May 1999 Responds to 990114 Correspondence Re Changes to Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan Rev 1 Submitted Under 10CFR50.54(p).Implementation of Changes Subj to Insp to Confirm Changes Have Not Decreased Security Plan ML20207G1761999-05-21021 May 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-213/99-01 on 980119-990419 & Closure of CAL 1-97-010.No Violations Noted.Conduct of Activities Associated with Control of Radiological Work at Haddam Neck Generally Characterized as Careful & Thorough ML20206R7221999-05-12012 May 1999 Refers to Investigation 1-97-031 on 970616-0718 & Forwards Nov.Investigation Found That Recipient Deliberately Did Not Follow Radiation Protection Procedures,Falsified Documents & Provided Incomplete & Inaccurate Info to NRC ML20206R8051999-05-12012 May 1999 Responds to 3 Investigations,Repts 1-97-031,008 & 1-98-008 Between 970314 & 980722 as Well as Insp Conducted Between 980720 & 1102.Forwards Synopsis of 3rd OI Investigation ML20206R7021999-05-12012 May 1999 Refers to Investigation 1-97-008 Conducted by Region I & Forwards Notice of Violation.Investigation Found That Recipient Deliberately Attempted to Conceal Release of Contaminated Video Equipment ML20206J2801999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Financial Repts for CT Light & Power Co,Western Ma Electric Co,Public Svc Co of Nh,North Atlantic Energy Corp,Northeast Nuclear Energy Co & North Atlantic Energy Svc Corp,License Holders CY-99-057, Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Rept for HNP, & Rev 10 to Remodcm. with Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents,As Well as Summary of Assessment of Max Individual Dose1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Rept for HNP, & Rev 10 to Remodcm. with Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents,As Well as Summary of Assessment of Max Individual Dose ML20206C8631999-04-28028 April 1999 Forwards Amend 194 to License DPR-61 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Authorizes Relocation of Requirements Related to Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from TSs to Technical Requirements Manual ML20206A6871999-04-22022 April 1999 Informs of Completion of Review of Re Nepco in Capacity as Minority Shareholder in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp,Yaec,Myap & Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co ML20210V5221999-04-0808 April 1999 Discusses Continued Performance of Technical Assistance Activities for NRC & Environ Survey & Site Assessment Program (Essap) Survey Assistance at Cy IR 05000213/19960121999-04-0505 April 1999 Discusses NRC Insp Repts 50-213/96-12 & 50-213/98-04 on 961102-27 Re Airborne Radioactivity Contamination Event That Occurred in Fuel Transfer Canal & Reactor Cavity in Nov 1996.Notice of Violation Encl ML20205J7931999-04-0505 April 1999 Discusses NRC Insp Repts 50-213/96-12 & 50-213/98-04 on 961102-27 Re Airborne Radioactivity Contamination Event That Occurred in Fuel Transfer Canal & Reactor Cavity in Nov 1996.Notice of Violation Encl CY-99-042, Provides Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Haddam Neck Plant1999-03-31031 March 1999 Provides Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Haddam Neck Plant CY-99-024, Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-06. Corrective Actions:Meetings Were Held with Contractor Mgt, Disciplinary Action Against Worker Was Taken & Notices Alerting Workers to HRA Controls Were Posted1999-03-29029 March 1999 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-06. Corrective Actions:Meetings Were Held with Contractor Mgt, Disciplinary Action Against Worker Was Taken & Notices Alerting Workers to HRA Controls Were Posted ML20206A6951999-03-29029 March 1999 Request Confirmation That No NRC Action or Approval,Required Relative to Proposed Change in Upstream Economic Ownership of New England Power Co,Minority Shareholder in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp,Yaec,Myap & Connecticut Yankee B17697, Notifies NRC of Amount of Property Insurance Coverage, Effective 990401,for HNP & Mnps,Units 1,2 & 3,per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(w)1999-03-12012 March 1999 Notifies NRC of Amount of Property Insurance Coverage, Effective 990401,for HNP & Mnps,Units 1,2 & 3,per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(w) CY-99-032, Clarifies Info Re TRM Change Submitted with Re Proposed Rev to TSs on Seismic Monitoring1999-03-0909 March 1999 Clarifies Info Re TRM Change Submitted with Re Proposed Rev to TSs on Seismic Monitoring ML20207B6641999-02-26026 February 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-213/98-06 on 981103-990118 & Notice of Violation Re Locked High Radiation Area Doors That Were Found Unlocked by Staff.Security Program Was Also Inspected ML20204C6901999-02-22022 February 1999 Informs That Public Citizen Waives Copyright for 5th Edition of Nuclear Lemon So NRC May Reproduce for Purpose of Contributing to NRC Recommended Improvements to Oversight Process for Nuclear Power Reactors ML20203H9621999-02-17017 February 1999 Responds to to Dk Rathbun Which Forwarded Number of Questions from Constituent Re Spent Fuel Decommissioned Nuclear plants.NUREG-1628, Staff Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Re Decommissioning of NPPs Encl.W/O Encl CY-99-005, Responds to NRC 981221 RAI Re Amend 193 to License to Reflect Permanent Shutdown Condition of Plant.Licensee Withdrawing 981030 (CY-98-199) Request & Will Submit Corrections in Future Proposed Rev to TS1999-01-29029 January 1999 Responds to NRC 981221 RAI Re Amend 193 to License to Reflect Permanent Shutdown Condition of Plant.Licensee Withdrawing 981030 (CY-98-199) Request & Will Submit Corrections in Future Proposed Rev to TS CY-99-023, Provides Summary of Understandings Reached During 990108 Meeting Between Util & CT Dept of Environ Protection Re Dike Area Rainwater Reporting Protocol1999-01-28028 January 1999 Provides Summary of Understandings Reached During 990108 Meeting Between Util & CT Dept of Environ Protection Re Dike Area Rainwater Reporting Protocol ML20203H9711999-01-21021 January 1999 Requests Response to Concerns Raised by Constitutent M Marucci Re Spent Fuel at Decommissioned Nuclear Plants CY-99-002, Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Proposed License Amend to Relocate Requirements for Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from Section 3/4.3.3.3 of TS to Trm. Supporting TSs Encl1999-01-18018 January 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Proposed License Amend to Relocate Requirements for Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from Section 3/4.3.3.3 of TS to Trm. Supporting TSs Encl CY-99-010, Provides Special Rept Concerning Potential of Radiation Exposure Due to Hypothetical Explosive Attack to Facility. Without Encl1999-01-14014 January 1999 Provides Special Rept Concerning Potential of Radiation Exposure Due to Hypothetical Explosive Attack to Facility. Without Encl CY-99-009, Forwards Rev 1 to Haddam Neck Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 & 2.7901999-01-14014 January 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Haddam Neck Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 & 2.790 ML20206R6051999-01-11011 January 1999 Ack Receipt of Submiting Sf Mgt Plan.Staff Has Reviewed Plan & Notes Plan to Store Sf in SFP Until DOE Takes Physical Possession of Fuel DD-98-12, Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision DD-98-12 Has Expired.Decision Became Final Agency Action on 981211. with Certificate of Svc.Served on 9812221998-12-22022 December 1998 Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision DD-98-12 Has Expired.Decision Became Final Agency Action on 981211. with Certificate of Svc.Served on 981222 CY-98-142, Forwards Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Info & Approval of Exception Number 8 of App E of Cy Qap.Copy of Rev 2 Showing Changes from Rev 1 Also Included1998-12-22022 December 1998 Forwards Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Info & Approval of Exception Number 8 of App E of Cy Qap.Copy of Rev 2 Showing Changes from Rev 1 Also Included ML20198R1321998-12-21021 December 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-213/98-05 on 980720-1102.No Violations Noted.Insp Completes Review of Licensee Actions Described in ,In Response to NOV & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties ML20198K8651998-12-21021 December 1998 Ack Receipt of ,Requesting Corrected Pages to Be Issued for License Amend 193,issued on 980630.Informs That Inconsistencies Found When Comparing Corrected Pages Submitted on 981030 & License Amend Application CY-98-201, Provides Clarification of NRC Staff SE for Amend 193 Which Approved HNP Defueled TSs1998-12-0303 December 1998 Provides Clarification of NRC Staff SE for Amend 193 Which Approved HNP Defueled TSs IR 05000213/19980041998-11-27027 November 1998 Forwards Special Insp Rept 50-213/98-04 of Licensee Performance During Reactor Coolant Sys Chemical Decontamination ML20195J3571998-11-19019 November 1998 Forwards Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50.54(w) & 10CFR140.Exemption Submitted in Response to 971007 Application & Suppls & 1218,requesting Reduction in Amount of Insurance Required for Facility 1999-09-20
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARCY-99-137, Notifies NRC of Intent to Apply Haddam Neck Plant 10CFR50 App B,Qa Program to Activities Related to Development of ISFSI at Haddam1999-10-12012 October 1999 Notifies NRC of Intent to Apply Haddam Neck Plant 10CFR50 App B,Qa Program to Activities Related to Development of ISFSI at Haddam CY-99-111, Submits Clarification of Changes Made to Connecticut Yankee QA Program,Per Util 990810 Submittal.Change Will Be Submitted to NRC in Dec 1999 as Part of Annual Update1999-09-0202 September 1999 Submits Clarification of Changes Made to Connecticut Yankee QA Program,Per Util 990810 Submittal.Change Will Be Submitted to NRC in Dec 1999 as Part of Annual Update CY-99-048, Forwards Cyap Rept CY-HP-0031,Rev 0, Bounding Dose Assessment for Offsite Radioactive Matls1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Cyap Rept CY-HP-0031,Rev 0, Bounding Dose Assessment for Offsite Radioactive Matls CY-99-066, Forwards Revised Plan for Recovery of Licensed Matl from Offsite Locations.Completion of Implementation of Plan During Summer of 1999 Is Planned,Contingent on Support Extended by Property Owners,Weather & Uncontrolled Factors1999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Revised Plan for Recovery of Licensed Matl from Offsite Locations.Completion of Implementation of Plan During Summer of 1999 Is Planned,Contingent on Support Extended by Property Owners,Weather & Uncontrolled Factors ML20209C3911999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards TS Page 6-3 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20195H1741999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards Original & Copy of Request for Approval of Certain Indirect & Direct Transfer of License & Ownership Interests of Montaup Electric Co (Montaup) with Respect to Nuclear Facilities Described as Listed ML20195H3591999-06-0202 June 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp of License DPR-61.Corrective Actions:Disciplinary Actions Were Taken by Util Against Jm Foley & Individual & Departmental Emphasis Is Placed on New HP Stds & Expectations CY-99-057, Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Rept for HNP, & Rev 10 to Remodcm. with Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents,As Well as Summary of Assessment of Max Individual Dose1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Rept for HNP, & Rev 10 to Remodcm. with Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents,As Well as Summary of Assessment of Max Individual Dose ML20206J2801999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Financial Repts for CT Light & Power Co,Western Ma Electric Co,Public Svc Co of Nh,North Atlantic Energy Corp,Northeast Nuclear Energy Co & North Atlantic Energy Svc Corp,License Holders ML20210V5221999-04-0808 April 1999 Discusses Continued Performance of Technical Assistance Activities for NRC & Environ Survey & Site Assessment Program (Essap) Survey Assistance at Cy CY-99-042, Provides Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Haddam Neck Plant1999-03-31031 March 1999 Provides Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Haddam Neck Plant ML20206A6951999-03-29029 March 1999 Request Confirmation That No NRC Action or Approval,Required Relative to Proposed Change in Upstream Economic Ownership of New England Power Co,Minority Shareholder in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp,Yaec,Myap & Connecticut Yankee CY-99-024, Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-06. Corrective Actions:Meetings Were Held with Contractor Mgt, Disciplinary Action Against Worker Was Taken & Notices Alerting Workers to HRA Controls Were Posted1999-03-29029 March 1999 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-06. Corrective Actions:Meetings Were Held with Contractor Mgt, Disciplinary Action Against Worker Was Taken & Notices Alerting Workers to HRA Controls Were Posted B17697, Notifies NRC of Amount of Property Insurance Coverage, Effective 990401,for HNP & Mnps,Units 1,2 & 3,per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(w)1999-03-12012 March 1999 Notifies NRC of Amount of Property Insurance Coverage, Effective 990401,for HNP & Mnps,Units 1,2 & 3,per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(w) CY-99-032, Clarifies Info Re TRM Change Submitted with Re Proposed Rev to TSs on Seismic Monitoring1999-03-0909 March 1999 Clarifies Info Re TRM Change Submitted with Re Proposed Rev to TSs on Seismic Monitoring ML20204C6901999-02-22022 February 1999 Informs That Public Citizen Waives Copyright for 5th Edition of Nuclear Lemon So NRC May Reproduce for Purpose of Contributing to NRC Recommended Improvements to Oversight Process for Nuclear Power Reactors CY-99-005, Responds to NRC 981221 RAI Re Amend 193 to License to Reflect Permanent Shutdown Condition of Plant.Licensee Withdrawing 981030 (CY-98-199) Request & Will Submit Corrections in Future Proposed Rev to TS1999-01-29029 January 1999 Responds to NRC 981221 RAI Re Amend 193 to License to Reflect Permanent Shutdown Condition of Plant.Licensee Withdrawing 981030 (CY-98-199) Request & Will Submit Corrections in Future Proposed Rev to TS ML20203H9711999-01-21021 January 1999 Requests Response to Concerns Raised by Constitutent M Marucci Re Spent Fuel at Decommissioned Nuclear Plants CY-99-002, Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Proposed License Amend to Relocate Requirements for Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from Section 3/4.3.3.3 of TS to Trm. Supporting TSs Encl1999-01-18018 January 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Proposed License Amend to Relocate Requirements for Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from Section 3/4.3.3.3 of TS to Trm. Supporting TSs Encl CY-99-009, Forwards Rev 1 to Haddam Neck Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 & 2.7901999-01-14014 January 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Haddam Neck Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 & 2.790 CY-99-010, Provides Special Rept Concerning Potential of Radiation Exposure Due to Hypothetical Explosive Attack to Facility. Without Encl1999-01-14014 January 1999 Provides Special Rept Concerning Potential of Radiation Exposure Due to Hypothetical Explosive Attack to Facility. Without Encl CY-98-142, Forwards Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Info & Approval of Exception Number 8 of App E of Cy Qap.Copy of Rev 2 Showing Changes from Rev 1 Also Included1998-12-22022 December 1998 Forwards Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Info & Approval of Exception Number 8 of App E of Cy Qap.Copy of Rev 2 Showing Changes from Rev 1 Also Included CY-98-201, Provides Clarification of NRC Staff SE for Amend 193 Which Approved HNP Defueled TSs1998-12-0303 December 1998 Provides Clarification of NRC Staff SE for Amend 193 Which Approved HNP Defueled TSs CY-98-191, Provides Notification That Util Implemented Defueled Emergency Plan for HNP on 981001.Util Completed Annual Exercise Required by Subj Plan & 10CFR50.471998-11-0505 November 1998 Provides Notification That Util Implemented Defueled Emergency Plan for HNP on 981001.Util Completed Annual Exercise Required by Subj Plan & 10CFR50.47 CY-98-140, Provides Commitment to Maintain Water Chemistry Requirements in HNP Technical Requirements Manual1998-11-0202 November 1998 Provides Commitment to Maintain Water Chemistry Requirements in HNP Technical Requirements Manual CY-98-183, Forwards Revised License Amend 193 TS Pages to Correct Amend Number on Pages Not Changed by Amend 193.No Commitments Contained within Ltr1998-10-30030 October 1998 Forwards Revised License Amend 193 TS Pages to Correct Amend Number on Pages Not Changed by Amend 193.No Commitments Contained within Ltr CY-98-199, Forwards Listing of Corrections Made & Revised Pages for Proposed License Amend 193.Ltr Also Transmits Repaginated Pages for TS Index & Section 1,per Request of NRC Project Manager1998-10-30030 October 1998 Forwards Listing of Corrections Made & Revised Pages for Proposed License Amend 193.Ltr Also Transmits Repaginated Pages for TS Index & Section 1,per Request of NRC Project Manager CY-98-062, Updates Info of Historical Nature in Response to Both NRC Historical Review Rept & NRC Insp Rept 50-213/97-11 Open Items1998-10-28028 October 1998 Updates Info of Historical Nature in Response to Both NRC Historical Review Rept & NRC Insp Rept 50-213/97-11 Open Items CY-98-154, Forwards Sf Mgt Plan for Haddam Neck Plant.Plan Submits Info on Mgt & Funding for Program to Safely Store Sf Following Permanent Cessation of Power Operations Until Title Is Transferred to DOE1998-10-28028 October 1998 Forwards Sf Mgt Plan for Haddam Neck Plant.Plan Submits Info on Mgt & Funding for Program to Safely Store Sf Following Permanent Cessation of Power Operations Until Title Is Transferred to DOE CY-98-129, Provides Supplemental Info to 980629 Response to 2.206 Petition Questions on Spent Fuel Cooling Methods.Util Pending Commitment Made within Ltr Stated1998-10-14014 October 1998 Provides Supplemental Info to 980629 Response to 2.206 Petition Questions on Spent Fuel Cooling Methods.Util Pending Commitment Made within Ltr Stated CY-98-186, Provides Notification of Organizational Changes Which Affect Cyap.Organization Chart,Biographical Profile of K Heider & Revised Distribution List for NRC Correspondence,Encl1998-10-0202 October 1998 Provides Notification of Organizational Changes Which Affect Cyap.Organization Chart,Biographical Profile of K Heider & Revised Distribution List for NRC Correspondence,Encl CY-98-153, Forwards Final Response to NRC 961009 RAI Re Configuration Mgt Project at Plant.No New Commitments Made within Ltr or Attachment1998-09-30030 September 1998 Forwards Final Response to NRC 961009 RAI Re Configuration Mgt Project at Plant.No New Commitments Made within Ltr or Attachment CY-98-157, Responds to NRC Request That Cyap Submit Proposed License Amend to Include Fuel Storage Pool Water Chemistry Program within Haddam Neck Plant Ts.Cyap Considers That Amend Is Not Necessary for Listed Reasons.Procedure Encl1998-09-28028 September 1998 Responds to NRC Request That Cyap Submit Proposed License Amend to Include Fuel Storage Pool Water Chemistry Program within Haddam Neck Plant Ts.Cyap Considers That Amend Is Not Necessary for Listed Reasons.Procedure Encl B17440, Corrects Errors in Ltrs & 980225 Re semi-annual Fitness for Duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1998 & July-Dec 19971998-09-24024 September 1998 Corrects Errors in Ltrs & 980225 Re semi-annual Fitness for Duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1998 & July-Dec 1997 CY-98-151, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-03.Corrective Actions:Root Cause Team Has Determined That Shift Managers Initial Reportability Decision Was Not Correct1998-09-21021 September 1998 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-03.Corrective Actions:Root Cause Team Has Determined That Shift Managers Initial Reportability Decision Was Not Correct ML20153G3891998-09-14014 September 1998 Informs That Union of Concerned Scientists Fully Supports Citizens Awareness Network Petition Filed Pursuant to 10CFR2.206,seeking to Revoke or Suspend License for Haddam Neck Nuclear Plant ML20154J9861998-09-11011 September 1998 Forwards for Service Upon Lj Callan,Jc Hoyle & Commission, Request for NRC to Revoke Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co License to Operate Haddam Neck Reactor Pursuant to 10CFR2.206 ML20154J9991998-09-11011 September 1998 Requests NRC Take Immediate Action to Revoke Util License to Operate Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station Pursuant to 10CFR2.206 B17420, Forwards Semiannual fitness-for-duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1998,per 10CFR26.71(d)1998-08-31031 August 1998 Forwards Semiannual fitness-for-duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1998,per 10CFR26.71(d) CY-98-107, Forwards Decommissioning Cost Study for Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. Adjustments to Cost Estimate Will Be Made as Necessary as Detailed Work Planning Progresses & Elements of Cost Estimate Periodically Reviewed & Updated1998-08-25025 August 1998 Forwards Decommissioning Cost Study for Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. Adjustments to Cost Estimate Will Be Made as Necessary as Detailed Work Planning Progresses & Elements of Cost Estimate Periodically Reviewed & Updated B17384, Submits fitness-for-duty Program Rept for Investigations Re Unsatisfactory Performance Test Results,Per 10CFR26,App a, Subpart B,Section 2.8(e)(4).No New Commitments Are Contained in Ltr1998-08-20020 August 1998 Submits fitness-for-duty Program Rept for Investigations Re Unsatisfactory Performance Test Results,Per 10CFR26,App a, Subpart B,Section 2.8(e)(4).No New Commitments Are Contained in Ltr CY-98-141, Requests Postponement of Defueled Emergency Plan Exercise Until 980923.Ltr Contains No New Commitments1998-08-13013 August 1998 Requests Postponement of Defueled Emergency Plan Exercise Until 980923.Ltr Contains No New Commitments CY-98-145, Provides Remediation Plans for Offsite Location 9621.Work Associated W/Location 9621 Scheduled to Begin on 9808171998-08-13013 August 1998 Provides Remediation Plans for Offsite Location 9621.Work Associated W/Location 9621 Scheduled to Begin on 980817 CY-98-132, Provides NRC W/Addl Info on Plant Defueled Emergency Plan. Util Stores Resin Liners Inside Area Protected by Vehicle Barriers1998-07-31031 July 1998 Provides NRC W/Addl Info on Plant Defueled Emergency Plan. Util Stores Resin Liners Inside Area Protected by Vehicle Barriers CY-98-127, Provides Clarifying Info Re Spent Fuel Pool make-up Capability at Hnp.Conclusions Reached by NRC Staff in SER Contained in Issuance of License Amend 193 Not Impacted & & Remain Valid1998-07-30030 July 1998 Provides Clarifying Info Re Spent Fuel Pool make-up Capability at Hnp.Conclusions Reached by NRC Staff in SER Contained in Issuance of License Amend 193 Not Impacted & & Remain Valid CY-98-118, Informs NRC Staff That Rev 38 to Plant Emergency Plan Has Been Implemented1998-07-21021 July 1998 Informs NRC Staff That Rev 38 to Plant Emergency Plan Has Been Implemented CY-98-121, Responds to NRC Request for Addl Info on Recent Operational Events at Plant.Corrective Actions That Have Been Taken, Discussed1998-07-16016 July 1998 Responds to NRC Request for Addl Info on Recent Operational Events at Plant.Corrective Actions That Have Been Taken, Discussed ML20151Z0221998-07-10010 July 1998 Informs That R Bassilakis & Gejdenson Share Same Concerns Re Recent Incidents at Connecticut Yankee Reactor in Haddam Neck,Ct & Hope That NRC Address Concerns Promptly ML20236P0971998-07-0909 July 1998 Inquires About Truth of Cyap Having No Shift Compliment of Licensed Operators at Haddam Neck Reactor ML20239A0651998-07-0707 July 1998 Discusses 980620 Inadvertent Radwaste Discharge from Plant Reactor.Team of NRC Inspectors,Completely Independent of Region I,Requested to Investigate Region I Ability to Regulate Effectively 1999-09-02
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'iWOfiTHEAST UTILITIES conor.i Ome.. . s io.n sir..i. e.riin. Conn.ciicut l
1 EsIEE5nYiNcU*~' P.0, BOX 270
.u wi .cemma c"**'
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 001414270 k L J[7.C C,Z (203) 665-5000 I'
January 29, 1993 l
Docket No. 50-213 fLll2.2.E Re: SEP III-5.A I ISAP Topic 1.31 ;
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Attention: Document Control-Desk !
Washington, DC 20555 l Gentlemen:
Haddam Neck Plant l SEP Topic III-5.A I Hiah Enerav Pine Break Inside Containtaent In the NRC Staff letter of January 24, 1992,'" Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) Topic III-5 A, "High Energy Pipe-- Break Inside Containment" was identified as being reviewed by NRC Staff. In subsequent discussions between the NRC Staff and Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO), the NRC Staff requested a summary:of the ten _ open items which were identified in Section 4.8 of NUREG-0826,2 {
CYAPC0 originally provided the _ justifications or clarifications requested by the Reference (2) report in a letter to the NRC Staff dated December 17, 1984. Since the December 17, 1984, letter, various modifications -and commitments have been made by CYAPC0 which impact the information provided previously. Therefore, this letter serves to update the justification or clarification required to address the ten open --items from Reference- (2) and supports final closeout of SEP Topic III-5.A.
(1) Cascadina Effect Seauences The investigation results presented in CYAPCO's December 17, 1984, letter showed that cascading is controlled by separation of piping or by (1) _ A. Wang letter to J. F. Opeka, "Haddam Neck Plant--Closecut and Status of Various Systematic Evaluation Program' Issues," dated January 24, 1992.
, (2) Integrated Plant Safety Assessment, Haddam Neck Plant, NUREG-0826, June, L 1983.
(3) W. G. Counsil letter to J. A. Zwolinksi, "SEP Topic III-5-A, High Energy Pipe Break Inside Containment," dated December 17, 1984.
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CS342J REV,4-88 l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B14298/Page 2 January.29, 1993 i
physical barriers. Due to the position that cascading is controlled, CYAPC0 considers this item resolved.
(2) Jet Imoinoement from Circumferential Breaks
- This open item involves a request from the Staff for additional information regarding the consideration of jet impingement effects as a result of circumferential breaks, CYAPC0's December 17, 1984, letter
- confirms that CYAPCO's high energy pipe breaks- analysis
' considered jet impingement from both longitudinal and(HEPB) circumferential breaks. Additionally, the jet was assumed to travel the arc defined by the whipping pipe. Therefore, CYAPC0 considers this item resolved.
(3) Strain Level Functionability Criteria 4
This item concerns allowable strain levels utilized -in the SEP HEPB analysis. As concluded in CYAPCO's December 17, 1984, letter, this concern is not applicable to the SEP HEPB- study and should be disregarded.
4 (4) Containment Intearity Criteria This open item involves a request from the Staff _-for additional-justification concerning containment integrity when subjected to pipe whip and jet impingement.
CYAPCO's December 17,'1984, letter evaluated- the. effects of a feedwater
, line break on the containment structure utilizing engineering judgement.
i It was concluded that the containment structure was capable of
, withstanding the resultant. jet loads without degrading: the integrity of -
! the liner plate. However, a -detailed analysis _ indicating the- technical
' bases for determining the limiting pipe break and evaluating the effects of the break was not prepared.
As part of _ the current HEPB reverification: program, a c detailed - HEPB evaluation was performed on the main steam and feedwater lines inside i containment to evaluate the effects of a- pipe _ break on the= containment structure. -The calculation developed mainsteam and feedwater jet impingement loads and reviewed the potential _ for- pipe interaction' with the containment structure.
The evaluation concluded- that both the mainsteam and feedwater piping would .not impact the containment wall :following a pipe break. . This conclusion was based on calculations and evaluations which -considered ~
the piping geometry and location, the support scheme,' and the location
- of the pipe breaks..
The effects of the jet impingement loads on the containment structure,
. including the containment liner, were evaluated. It was determined that-1 2
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B14298/Page 3 January 29, 1993 the containment structure is capable of withstanding the resultant jet loads without degrading the integrity of the liner plate.
(5) Jet Imoinaement Effects on Tarcet Ploing In the NRC's October 12, 1982, letter,* the Staff indicated that it was not clear how CYAPC0 utilized size differential criteria in the jet impingement effects evaluation provided in CYAPCO's September 17, 1982, ' letter.
CYAPCO's December 17, 1984, letter indicates that an evaluation of jet impingement of piping targets was performed in order to resolve this open item.
CYAPCO's December 17, 1984, letter concluded that jet impingement would not result in the loss of the three available shutdown methods. This is due primarily to the physical separation of required safety systems.
This further strengthens our position in this area. Therefore, CYAPC0 considers this item resolved.
(6) Effects on Instrumentation CYAPCO's December 17, 1984, letter provided an evaluation of the minimum instrumentation required for safe shutdown. The analysis assumed a worst case incident where nonphysically separated instrumentation are rendered inoperable by a single HEPB. The following instrumentation was addressed:
a) Pressurizer Level b) Pressurizer Pressure c) Steam Generator Level d) Loop Ts or Core Exit Thermocouples e) Refueling Water Storage Tank Level, Volume Control Tank Level, and Demineralized Water Storage Tank Level f) Pressurizer Relief Valve Monitors, Containment Water Level, and Containment High Range Radiation Detectors (4) D. M. Crutchfield let.ter to W. G. Counsil, "SEP Topic III-5.A, Effects of Pipe Break on Structures, Systems and Components inside Containment,"
dated October 12, 1982.
(5) W. G. Counsil letter to D. M. Crutchfield. "SEP Topic III-5.A, High Energy Break Inside Containment," dated September 17, 1982.
1
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory. Commission B14298/Page 4 January 29, 1993 The matrix below shows which of the above instruments is required during each of the three shutdown methods (main feedwater, auxiliary feedwater, i and feed-and-bleed) . However, the. matrix 'does not include instrumentation required due to the HEPB.- For example, steam generator
)ressure and containment pressure would- be required for a steam .line-
- 3reak in addition to instruments required for the shutdown method employed.
1 i Shutdown Method Reauired Instruments l 1(MainFeedwater) a Pressurizer Level
! b Pressurizer Pressure-
- c Steam Generator Level-d) Loop Tg or Core Exit--
Thermocouples 4
2 (Auxiliary Feedwater) a Pressurizer Level
- b Pressurizer Pressure c Steam Generator Level
, d) Loop Tg or Core Exit
. Thermocouples e) Demineralized Water
. Storage-Tank 3 (Feed-and-Bleed) a) Pressurizer Level i b) Pressurizer Pressure
- c) Loop Te or Core Exit i Thermocouples-d) Refueling Water Storage-Tank Level and Volume Control Tank Level e) Pressurizer Relief Valve
-Monitors, Containment Water Level, and r
Containment High' Range
! Radiation Detectors f). Containment Pressure
, g) Reactor.. Coolant System (RCS)-Wide-Range Press t
The analysis for ' pressurizer level -(Item a) in -CYAPCO's : December 17, 1984, letter indicated that Plant Shutdown-Method 3 would be relied upon in case .of loss of pressurizer level -instrumentation. Subsequently, as.
indicated 'under the Integrated Safety. - Assessment Program (ISAP) o
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B14298/Page 5 January 29, 1993 4
Topic 2.04 in CYAPCO's March 2, 1989,"" letter, CYAPC0 replaced transmitters for main control board-mounttd equipment for the three loops of pressurizer level during the Cycle 14 refueling outage. In Enclosure 1, page 12, of the NRL's letter of March 21, 1990,* the Staff acknowledged and accepted that the reactor control and protection system instrumentation modifications did not -reduce the degree of independence, separation, and isolation provided in the original design.
This supports the analysis presented in .CYAPCO's December 17, 1984, letter. Note, however, that plant Emergency Operating Procedures (E0P) would not require the operator to use feed-and-bleed for loss of pressurizer level indication due to a HEPB. Even if there is a loss of pressurizer pressure or level indication, CYAPC0 would continue to use main or auxiliary feedwater and rely on other indications of satisfactory primary system heat removal. CYAPC0 would attempt to use everj other alternative, including use of a condensate pump to feed the secondary side of the steam generators, prior to feed-and-bleed. CYAPC0 considers feed-and-bleed to be the option of "last choice," when all other options have been exhausted. The Haddam Neck Plant E0Ps support this philosophy. However, the termination criteria for safety injection is based in part on regaining pressurizer level. Losing pressurizer level indication will certainly inhibit safety injection termination.
This means that in effect, a partial feed-and-bleed (i.e., the operator will inject but will not open the power operated relief valves) is used in conjunction with Plant Shutdown Methods 1 and 2. However, it is Plant Shutdown Methods 1 and 2 that are being relied upon to remove decay heat.
The analysis for pressurizer pressure-(Item b) indicated that RCS'
- pressure instruments would be utilized in case of loss of pressurizer pressure instrumentation. Subsequently, as indicated in CYAPC0's March 2, 1989, letter, CYAPC0 -replaced transmitters and main control
( board-mounted equipment for the existing three loops- of pressurizer pressure and added a fourth. channel of pressurizer pressura. As was the i case for pressurizer level, this modification to pressurizer pressure did not reduce the dogree of independence, separation, or isciation provided in the original design. Therefore, the analysis presented in CYAPC0's December 17, 1984, letter remains valid. RCS pressure instruments: would be utilized in case pressurizer pressure instrumentation is rendered inoperable by a single HEPD.
l (6) E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Integrated l
Safety Assessment Program (ISAP)," dated March 2,1989.
(7) . A. B. Wang letter to E. J. Hroczka, " Safety Evaluation by the Office of l Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Reactor Protection System . Upgrade (Phase l One)," dated March 21, 1900.
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B14298/Page 6 January 29, 1993 The analysis for steam generator level (Item c) in CYAPC0's December 17, 1984, letter indicates that safe shutdown can be achieved if steam generator level instrumentation is lost due to a single HEP 8.
Modifications to the steam generator wide-range and narrow-range level have occurred since the CYAPC0 December 17, 1984, letter trusmittal.
The modifications have, along with other benefits, improved the adherence to single failure ersterion. Each steam generator now has two redundant Class IE wide-range level detectors to provide wide-range level signals. Steam generator level instrumentation conduit runs in groups of two inside the crane wall, but together in the annulus region.
A break in the annulus region has been identified which could disable the conduit which carries the wiring for the wide-range steam generator level transmitters (LT-1302-1A, 2A, 3A, and 4A) of _ all four steam generators. However, the redundant steam generator level channels will remain operable since the redundant channels have been routed taking into account HEPBs. Under Phase III of the reactor protection upgrade (planned for 1993 refueling outage) eight additional redundant Class IE steam generator narrow-range level transmitters will be installed.
Under the present system, each steam generatcr has one narrow-range level transmitter. After the Phase III modifications, there will be twelve transmitters in total (three per loop). However, the analysis provided in CYAPCO's December 17, 1984, letter remains valid (safe shutdown can be achieved if the subject instrumentation is lost).
The analysis presented in CYAPCO's December 17, 1984, letter for the instrumentation corresponding to items d through f above remains valid.
No modifications performed since the submittal of CYAPCO's December 17, results for this 1984, letter have affected the analysis
, instrumentation.
- (7) Main Coolant looo Breaks I
CYAPC0's December 17, 1984, letter indicated that a limited number of modifications to the RCS were identified as a result of the review of SEP Topic III-6. These modifications were included as part of ISAP (ISAP Topic 1.08). As indicated in CYAPCO's March 2,1989, letter, all but one of the modifications were completed in the Cycle 14 refueling outage and Topic 1.08 is considered resolved. The only remaining modification as documented in CYAPCO's December 17, 1984, letter was the replacement of steam generator hold-down bolts. Per CYAPC0's letter of May 1, 1987,* the modifications specified for the steam generator hold-down bolts are not required (safety factors on the bolts are within allowable limits). Therefore, all required modifications to the RCS are complete.
l l (8) E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "RCS Seismic i Reevaluation and Final Plans for Modifications," dated May 1,1987, i
1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B14298/Page 7 January 29, 1993 CYAPCO's December 17, 1984, letter addressed the ability of the leakage monitoring systems to detect RCS leakage from the postulated circumferential throughwall flaw. CYAPC0's December 17, 1984, letts indicated that the conversion to Standard Technical Specifications woulo ensure that operability requirements and actions are addressed in the event of leakage detection system failure. Generic Letter 84-04""
documents the Staff's response and agreement with the completion of the RCS seismic modifications as recommended by the SEP and the issuance of the leakage detection technical specifications. Generic Letter 84-04 concluded that Unresolved Safety Issue A-2, " Asymmetric Blowdown Loads on Reactor Primary Coolant System" was considered resolved.
(8) Plant Shutdown Method 3 CYAPCO's December 17, 1984, letter, responded to the Staff's request for information regarding Plant Shutdown Method 3 (Feed-and-Bleed).
This shutdown method is to be used only when the reactor coolant pressure boundary remains intact and the steam generators or systems servicing them are not available to remove core decay heat.
Feed-and bleed is needed in the unlikely event that either: (1) a pipe break outside containment were to compromise capability to inject either main or auxiliary feedwater into the steam generators, (2) a pipe break inside containment were to compromise capabil.ity to utilize the steam generators to remove core decay heat, or (3) some other failure resulted in the loss of steam generator decay heat removal.
Feed-and-bleed entails injecting water'into the RCS with a charging pump (or high pressure safety injection pump) and allowing water to discharge from the pressuriter power operation relief valves into the pressurizer relief tank and then into the containment sump. The water would be drawn from the sump, cooled by the residual heat removal heat exchangers, and returned to the suction of the charging pumps (or high-pressurr ,afety injection pumps). - This is the least desirable shutdown method.
Subsequent to the response provided in CYAPCO's December 17, 1984, letter, CYAPC0 has qualified the low temperature overpressure protection system (piping and valves) so that it will be qualified for the temperature, pressure, and flow conditions that would exist ' late in a-feed-and-bleed scenario. Feed-and-bleed modifications were addressed in Reference (7) as ISAP Topic 1.62.
j (9) A. B. Wang letter to E. J. Mroczka, " Generic Letter 84-04 (Safety l
Evaluation of Westinghouse Topical Reports Dealing with Elimination and Postulated Pipe Breaks in PWR Primary Main Loops)," dated July 11, 1989.
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B14298/Page 8 January 29, 1993 (9) Main Steam / Main Feedwater Interactions Per NRC's letter of October 12, 1982, and later per NUREG-0826, .he Staff requested that CYAPC0 clarify the apparent inconsistency between the matrix and interaction evaluation for the main steam line breaks as presented in CYAPCO's September 17, 1982, letter.
In the NRC Staff's letter dated October 12, 1982, the Staff noted that in Section VII.A of CYAPC0's September 17, 1982, letter, interactions between steam and feed lines from breaks in main steam lines from steam generators 2 and 3 are considered not credible. However, the Staff noted that interaction matrices provided in CYAPC0's September 17, 1982, letter showed that for line 24-SHP-601-2 (main steam from #2 generator),
interactions are shown for WFPD-601-7 (feed for #1 generator) and WFPD-601-8 (feed for #2 generator).
CYAPC0 has reviewed the situation and has determined that the scenario given in the interaction evaluation is in fact correct and that for a given main steam line break, the only potential feedwater line interaction occurs with the- feedwater line corresponding to the same steam generator. Therefore, the matrix is in error but the evaluation is correct as stated.
(10) Core Deluae Pioina Breaks Effects This concern involves determining the most limiting single failure that could occur after a core deluge line break between the isolation valve and reactor vessel.
As presented in CYAPC0's December 17, 1984, letter, the Staff questioned whether the loss of the motor operated valve in the unaffected train would be the most limiting case.
The analyses performed in support of the permanent modifications and the in-house small break loss-of-coolant accident analyses lead ts to conclude that failure of the motor-operated valves in the unaffected loop is not the worst single failure. However, CYAPC0 has concluded that acceptable results would be shown for any postulated single failure. The analyses presented in CYAPC0's July 1984 letter"* show that for a break of this size, adequate results are -obtained for the injection phase without any -credit from the low-pressure safety injection (LPSI) system. The limiting single failure for these analyses was the failure of a diesel generator. A postulated core deluge line break would behave differently in the recirculation phase than the same (10) Northeast Utilities Service Company, " Calculative Methods for the Northeast Utilities Small-Break LOCA ECCS Evaluation Model, Volumes 1 and 2," July 1984.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B14298/Page 9 January 29, 1993 size break occurring elsewhere in the RCS. This is due to the higher LPSI flowrate associated with a core deluge line break which' causes an earlier time to recirculation as documented in CYAPCO's December 17, 1986, letter."" The long-term modifications described in CYAPCO's April 1,1987, letteror' have been analyzed and show acceptable results for all postulated single failures.
CYAPC0 believes the information provided above should allow you to close the ten open items listed in Section 4.8 of NUREG-0826 and close SEP Topic III-5.A. Please feel free to contact my staff if you have any questions regarding this topic. As in the past, please provide us with written confirmation of closure of this SEP and ISAP topic.
Please advise if you have any questions.
Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY e
ud-J. F. Qpe.MExecutive Vice Pres (illent cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator A. B. Wang, NRC Project Manager, Haddam Neck Plant W. J. Raymond, Senior Rosident Inspector, Haddam Neck Plant-(11) E. J. Mroczka letter to C. I. Grimes, " Proposed Amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-61, Revisions to Technical Specifications,
~
Flow Control Valve Repositioning," December-17,1986.
(12) E. J. Mroczka to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "ECCS Modification-l Request for Extension of Single Failure Exemption," dated April 1,1987.
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