0CAN098603, Annual 10CFR50.59 Rept for 1985
| ML20206U227 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1985 |
| From: | Enos J ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| References | |
| 0CAN098603, CAN98603, NUDOCS 8610070395 | |
| Download: ML20206U227 (32) | |
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l ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-313 and 50-368 LICENSE NOS. DPR-51 and NPF-6 ANNUAL 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR 1985 l
This report, in accordance with 10CFR50.59, contains a brief description of reportable procedure and design changes made at Arkansas Nuclear One -
Units 1 and 2 (ANO-1 and ANO-2) together with tests and experiments conducted which are not described in the SAR. Only those procedure changes which involved procedures described in the SAR and approved by the Safety Review Committee (SRC) in 1985 are contained in this submittal. Design changes which affected the SAR and were not included in prior 50.59 reports and for which installation was completed during or before December 1985 are contained in this subnittal.
Safety evaluations were performed for these changes, under which it was determined that none of these changes involved a change in the Technical Specifications or an unreviewed safety question. An unreviewed safety question is involved (i) if the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased; or (ii) if a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; or (iii) if the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is reduced.
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4 CONTENTS 4
ANO-1 10CFR50.59 PROCEDURE CHANGES 1 ANO-2 10CFR50.59 PROCEDURE CHANGES 6 ANO-1 10CFR50.59 DESIGN CHANGES 9 4
ANO-2 10CFR50.59 DESIGN CHANGES 16 1
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ANO-1 10CFR50.59 PROCEDURE CHANGES ANO-1 PROCEDURE: 1104.04, Rev. 27
" Decay Heat Removal Operating Procedure" This procedure provides instructions for operating the Decay Heat System.
The. change was made to add valves to the valve lineup listing that were not previously listed.
Figure 9-12 of the SAR shows BW-9 (vent line isolation valve) as a normally closed valve therefore, this procedure change, which requires BW-9 to be normally open, might be construed as a change to a procedure described in the SAR.
Section 6.1.2.4.6 of the SAR makes no mention of the vent nor is it shown in Figures 6.1 or 6.2.
Since BW-9 is only a bypass (4" line) around an unisolable 1" vent line no adverse affects can be expected, therefore, this char.ge does not involve an unreviewed safety question.
It was determined that this procedure change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-1 PROCEDURE: 1104.33, Rev. 21
" Reactor Building Ventilation" This procedure provides instructions for operating the Reactor Building Ventilation System.
The change was made to the surveillance test acceptance criteria for the Hydrogen (H 2 ) Purge flow rate based on the ANO-1 SAR. The criteria was changed from 50 1 5 cubic feet per minute (cfm) to 45 1 4.5.
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The ANO-1 SAR, Section 6.6.3, states that the Hydrogen Purge System is sized to purge at a rate of 50 cfm.
This value has been interpreted to be the design. system
-flowrate for the purpose of performing Technical Specification surveillances required for the H2 Purge System. The ANO-1 Technical Specifications require tests to tue performed on the fans and associated filters at a flow rate which is i 10% of design flow. A specific design flow value-is not stated in the Technical Specifications. After startup of the system for surveillance tests, several_ manual operator adjustments must be made locally at the fan units to attain an acceptable flow rate. This system is required to operate during post accident conditions to limit the H2 concentration in the Reactor Building. Accessibility to the units to make manual adjustments during post accident conditions would be extremely limited, if not prohibited due to radiation levels in the area. A system design flow rate which could be reliably attained and one which was repeatable between test intervals without reliance on manual adjustments to the system was needed. Based on past surveillance testing a flow rate of 45 cfm met this criteria.
A review of the ANO-1 SAR indicated that a purgo rate of 34.5 cfm is necessary to maintain H2 concentration in the Reactor Building below 3.5 percent approximately 11 days after a DBA. Taking into account instrument inaccuracy of i 2 percent of full scale for the purge flow rotometer establishes a minimum required system flow rate of 36 cfm. Figure 6-11 of the ANO-1 SAR illustrates the H concentration 2 versus time while operating the H2 Purge System to control H2 concentration between arbitrary limits of 3.5 percent and 3.3 percent during post LOCA conditions. This graph is based on a purge flow rate of 50 cfm. Although the lower proposed design purge rate would require the system to be operated for a longer period of time for each duty cycle, it would not impair the ability of the system to meet its design function of maintaining the H2 concentration below 3.5 percent in the Reactor Building.
Off site radiation dose rates due to purging of H2 from the Reactor Building following a LOCA are based on a continuous 50 cfm purge rate, therefore these calculations will remain conservative with the lower proposed design flow rate. A system purge flowrate of 45 cfm is consistent with the ANO-1 SAR requirements and assumptions will not affect compliance with ANO-1 Technical Specifications.
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It was determined that this procedure change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of-equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or-malfunction of~a different-type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification; 4
ANO-1 PROCEDURE: 1202.01, Rev. 6
" Emergency Operating Procedure" This is the symptom based Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) developed as required by NUREG-0737, Supplement 1.
The change was made to incorporate the following:
l To include guidance from the steam' generator tube 1.
rupture chapter of the B&W Owners Group E0P Technical Bases Document 74-1149184-02.
- 2. Added a caution when starting RC pumps after a prolonged loss.
- 3. Cycle 7 reload report.
Hardware differences resulting from:
- 5. DCP 83-1075 - Pressurizer Level Instrument Modifications, j
- 6. DCP 83-1170 - HPI/LPI/ Spray Flow Instrument Modifications.
1hese design changes were described in a previous report.
It was determined that this procedure change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-1 PROCEDURE: 1203.02, Rev. 0
" Alternate Shutdown" This procedure was written to address a significant fire in the Control Room or Cable Spread Room and provide the
" alternative or dedicated shutdown capability" required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R II.D. The scenario of a fire in these areas renders all components with control wiring routed through these areas susceptible to the following failures:
(A) Loss of all automatic or manual start capabilities for associated components.
(B) Spurious operation of components in a manner which can cause either specific component damage (i.e.,
start an HPI pump with BWST outlet valve closed) or complicate the plant post-trip conditions (i.e.,
fail open the Electromatic Relief Valve).
For the purposes of an Appendix R evaluation the plant " safety systems" are divided into two categories: " safe shutdown" systems which are used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions in an Appendix R scenario, and other safety systems which are required to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA). The loss of safety systems required for the DBAs is acceptable in an Appendix R scenario per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R I.
This procedure disables some equipment in the last category, however, these systems are already assumed to be disabled by the fire scenario. This procedure also takes steps intended to prevent spurious and uncontrolled operation of " safe shutdown" systems. These steps are necessary to prevent undesirable plant conditions (as a result of spurious operations) or " safe shutdown" component damage.
In summary, this procedure addresses multiple system failures that either have occurred or have a high potential for occurring. It is the scenario itself, rather than the procedure, that might seem to require a "yes" answer to many of the above questions. A fire in the Control Room or Cable Spread Room in conjunction with a loss of off-site power will at worst result in a loss of all AC power. This is not a design basis for the plant but is an analyzed event (Reference Section 14.1.2.8.4 of the SAR). It is for these reasons this procedure does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.
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It was determined that this procedure change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-2 10CFR50.59 PROCEDURE CHANGES ~
ANO-2 PROCEDURE: 2104.04, Rev. 8 (Temporary Change 1)
" Shutdown Cooling System" This procedure provides instructions for operation of the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System.
The change was a temporary change (30 day) to compensate for a leaking mechanical seal on 2P60A, the "A" Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) Pump, by changing the lineup of 2SI-1A (2P60A suction isolation valve) to normally closed.
During the 2R4 refueling outage, 2P60A developed a 2 gpm leak thru its mechanical seal. One LPSI pump is normally used for SDC, and SAR Figure 9.3-5 shows both pumps lined up for SDC. While 2P60B was in use for SDC, 2P60A was still operable and could have been aligned for service in ~10 minutes which was adequate to keep the RCS <200'F based on the existing initial temp of 95'F and the Rx
'having been subcritical for ~ 130 hours0.0015 days <br />0.0361 hours <br />2.149471e-4 weeks <br />4.9465e-5 months <br />. The temporary change was therefore acceptable.
It was determined that this procedure change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 PROCEDURE: 2104.29, Rev. 8
" Service Water, Auxiliary Cooling Water and Cooling Tower Makeup" This procedure provides instructions for operation of the Service Water (SW), Auxiliary Cooling Water, and Cooling Tower Makeup Systems.
The change involved the following:
- 1. Deleted H2 purge system valve alignment from Attachment D because it is covered in 2104.44, Attachment B.
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- 2. Deleted Regenerative Waste Evaporator valve alignment-from Attachment F because it is covered in 2104.21,-Attachment'A.
- 3. Numerous changes, additions, and deletions to Attachment A to correct valve lineup sheet with the print, implement DCPs and actual hands on valve lineup / check with what actually exists'in the system.
- 4. Deleted sections requiring SW to be placed on the emergency pond (i.e. shutdown cooling, surveillances, and system startup).
SAR Figure 9.2-1 shows only one SW supply to Component Cooling Water (CCW) open. ANO-2 normally operates with both valves open; they are both actuated closed on SIAS or MSIS. A review of the ANO-2 SAR, principally Sections 9.2.1 (Service Water System), 9.2.5 (Ultimate Heat Sink), and 9.3.6 (Shutdown Cooling System) found some apparent inconsistencies. This procedure refers to the Emergency Cooling Pond (ECP) as a redundant source of water to Lake Dardanelle. The intent was not to require ECP use as a primary source; only to indicate its availability for normal and abnormal shutdowns in the unlikely event of'a loss of the. lake. The change to 2104.29 Rev. 8 was, therefore, acceptable.
It was determined that this procedure change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility.for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-2 PROCEDURE: 2309.01,;Rev. O
" Emergency Diesel Generator Load Verification" This procedure was issued to document the review of Emergency Diesel Generator loading as required by ANO-2 Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2 Section 3.C.10.
Based on the administrative controls placed on modifications of ANO-2 by Procedure 1032.01, " Design Control," which specifically requires that any changes which may affect the load on the Diesel Generators be reviewed and documented, this procedure provides a means such that those reviews are done in a consistent and documented manner. The scope of the review is confined to changes which affect the connection and single-line distribution diagrams of the 4160V and 480V switchgear, load center and motor control center diagrams associated with the Emergency Diesel Generators.
It was determined that this procedure change did not:
(1) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-1 10CFR50.59 DESIGN CHANGES ANO-1 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 80-1110, 80-1110A-C This design change converted the old entrance foyer into the Unit One Control Room into the Shift Supervisor's office. A new security door was added at the foyer entrance, and a portion of the DCP installed fire and bullet resistant vision panel sections in the old entrance double door to allow visibility between the new office and the Control Room. A new, separate HVAC system was also installed for new office.
SAR Figure 1-3 was revised accordingly.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-1 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 80-1126A, B This design chance installed the ANO breathing air system. The change involved installation of system piping in the ANO-1 reactor building and two air compressors, receiver tanks, purification systems and associated piping. The system allows use of high grade breathing air for respirator use instead of instrument air.
SAR Sections 9.9.2.2, 5.2.5.2, Table 5-1 and Figure 5-6 were affected.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-1 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 80-1169, 80-1169A This design change conterted the old Shift Supervisor's office into a new key room, and adjusted the Control Room security vital island to exclude this area.
SAR Figure 1-3 was revised accordingly.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any fechnical Specification.
ANO-1 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 81-1066 This design change modified the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal controlled bleedoff flow path by installation of an alternate flow path to the reactor quench tank. The RCP seal controlled bleedoff flow is automatically diverted via this alternate flow path to the quench tank upon ESAS actuation of containment isolation.
SAR Section 9.1.2.1 and Figure 9-3 were revised accordingly.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-1 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 31-1071 This design change modified the Hydrogen Purge System. The change involved several piping modifications to minimize the Service Water flooding cf the system: The repressurization air loop now takes suction from the auxiliary building, which allowed removal of the prefilters, the instrument icops were relocated, and a new surveillance test tank, pump and drain arrangement were installed.
Analysis and installation of appropriate new pipe guides and hangers were also included in this change.
SAR Section 6.6.2.1 was modified to reflect deletion of the prefilter by this change.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an' accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-1 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 82-1047 This design change added two new triaxial accelerographs for seismic monitoring. The new units are more reliable and more easily calibrated.
This design change affected the description of this system in Section 2.7.6 of the ANO-1 SAR. The two new triaxial monitors were assigned the instrument numbers corresponding to ANO-2 Technical Specification Tables 3.3-7 and 4.3-4.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-1 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 82-1050, 82-1050A This design change replaced the EFW turbine and governor and enhanced the control and instrumentation system as part of the EFW upgrade project. The turbine startup sequence was improved (ramp start) such that overspeed trips have been virtually eliminated. The increased turbine capacity is reflected in the EFW System description in SAR Section 10.4.8.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for .ny Technical Specification.
ANO-1 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 82-1067 This design change added pressure instrumentation with control room indication for monitoring fluid leakage through RCS/ Decay Heat System suction isolation valves CV-1050 and CV-1410.
The change required SAR Section 9.5.2.4 and Figure 9-12 to be revised to incorporate the new instrumentation.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-1 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 82-2079 This design change installed the capability to cross-connect the ANO-1 and ANO-2 fuel oil transfer pump discharge bypass lines as a result of the Appendix R fire hazards analysis. The change involved addition of a flanged hose connection with an isolation valve and purchase of dedicated flexible metallic hose.
The change has no effect on normal operation of the system.
The change required revisions to ANO-1 SAR Table 1-2 and Figure 8-3.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-1 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 83-1017 This design change completed the re-rack of the ANO-1 Spent Fuel Pool, which increased the spent fuel storage capability from 589 to 968 assemblies.
The following SAR sections were revised to reflect the installation of the new high-density storage racks and the associated criticality, safety, thermal _ load and seismic and structural analyses:
1.4.5.3 9.4 9.6 9.9.2.2 Table 9-14 Table 9-14a Table 9-30 Table 9-31 This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change.
A comprehensive report describing the proposed Spent Fuel Pool storage expansion was submitted to the~NRC l on November 5, 1982 (0CAN118205), reviewed, and j approved by issuance of a Safety Evaluation Report on April 15, 1983 (0CNA048314).
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ANO-1 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 83-1044, 1044A This design change installed a diverse method of opening the Control Rod Drive (CRD) breakers by adding shunt trip coils in parallel with the existing undervoltage trip coils. This modification was in response to Item 4.3 of Generic Letter 83-28 (ATWS).
The shunt trip modification design was approved by NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated January 24, 1984 (1CNA018402).
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(1) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-1 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 83-1063 This design change replaced the reactor upper core barrel bolts. AP&L decided replacement would be prudent as a result of UT indications found in 7 bolts during a refueling outage inspection, described in our letter dated May 11, 1983 (1CAN058302). Interim operation was allowed by NRC letter dated May 13, 1983 (1CNA058304), and bolt replacement was completed during a subsequent refueling outage.
This design change required revision of SAR Section 3.2.4.1.2.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or
, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the l
basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-1 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 85-1061 This design change installed metering valves in the four RPS anticipatory reactor trip (ART) control oil pressure switch lines on MFWPs K2A and X28. The i purpose of these valves was to dampen control i pressure transients which could result in spurious ARTS RPS trips, i
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-2 10CFR50.59 DESIGN CHANGES ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 79-2105D This design change installed control room annunciation for breaker status (these valves are Main Steam Isolation System actuated components) of the redundant MFW isolation valves. These valves were added by a portion of this DCP described in a previous report.
SAR Section 6.2.1.1.2.6 was revised to mention this alarm function.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 79-2132 This design change installed a system for acquiring and recording main generator temperature data from various thermocouples or temperature elements within the generator.
SAR Figures 8.3-2 and 8.3-22 were revised accordingly.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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,- i ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 80-2123D This design change installed the SPDS computer equipment (CPUs and peripherals, disc drives, field input termination panels and multiplexor cabinets) in the SPDS computer room.
SAR Figures 1.2-3 and 1.2-7 were revised accordingly.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 80-2123G This design change installed numerous inputs to the SPDS computer. These inputs were either paralleled from existing plant comouter inputs, or were from recently added plant process instrumentation. These inputs were required to address the critical safety functions display requirements of NUREG-0737, Supp. 1.
The additional inputs were reflected in the SPDS description (SAR Section 7.6.2.5) and various electrical and instrumentation drawings.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 80-2196A This design change installed a cross-connect valve, with Control Room control and indication, between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 instrument air system supply to the reactor auxiliary buildings. This change improves the reliability of the plant instrument air system.
SAR Figure 8.3-65 was revised accordingly.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 81-2063 This design change encompassed the Health Physics areas, Chemistry and Radiochemistry laboratories renovation project, which provided more efficient use of available space and expanded the facilities for these departments.
SAR Section 9.4.2 and the following Figures were revised accordingly:
Figure 3.5-14 Figure 8.3-57 Figure 8.3-62 Figure 8.3-66 Figure 8.3-67 Figure 8.3-17 Figure 9.3-3 Figure 9.3-1 Figure 3.2-2 Figure 9.4-1 Figure 9.5-1 Figure 9.5-5 Figure 3.2-4 Figure 9.4-2 Figure 3.5-14 Figure 1.2-5 18
O a This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 82-2033 This design change modified the annunciator alarm logic for the Startup and Blowdown Demineralizer System and removed a number of non-safety related Control Room annunciators (remote indication was maintained) to eliminate nuisance alarms.
SAR Sections 9.2.3.2.1 and 10.4.10.4 were revised accordingly.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 82-2079 This design change installed the capability to manually cross-connect the ANO-1 and ANO-2 emergency diesel fuel transfer pump discharge bypass lines.
This change was required as a result of the Appendix R fire hazards analysis, and has no effect on the normal l operation of the system.
SAR Table 3.2-6 and Figure 9.5-8 were revised accordingly. l This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 82-2100 This design change added a lift-type check valve in the personnel hatch at the bottom of the reactor vessel cavity. The change was made to prevent flooding and possible thermal shocking of the reactor vessel.
SAR Section 3.4.4.2.1 was revised accordingly.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
l l 20
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 82-2126A,B This design change replaced the four 12" Service Water containment isolation butterfly valves with stainless steel valve bodies and internals to minimize corrosion damage. The motor operators were also replaced. This change also included the necessary mounting and piping support changes.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safaty as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 82-2153 This design change modified the logic for the Service Water through the Spent Fuel Cooler low flow alarm to remove a nuisance alarm when the system is purposely out of service (other loop in operation).
This annunciator upgrade, along with others described in this report, is part of the continuing annunciator upgrade project and is evidence of AP&L's commitment to good human factors engineering principles. Details of the annunciator upgrade project were provided in various CRDR related submittals to the NRC.
SAR Figure 7.4-2, Sheet 3 was modified accordingly.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
- (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the l consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
l l
21
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 82-2160 This design change replaced four valves on the EFW discharge lines. The old electro-hydraulic actuators were replaced with more reliable Limitorque operators, and the power supplies were also rechanneled for improved reliability during degraded power events.
SAR Figure 10.4-2 was revised accordingly.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 83-2006 This design change installed a new switchgear unit in the intake structure and disconnect switches, with key-operated switches in the Control Room, for Service Water Pump 2P4B. This change was a result of the Appendix R fire hazards analysis. The change had no effect on normal operation of the system.
SAR Section 9.2.1.2.2.2 and the following Figures were revised accordingly:
Figure 8.3-26 Figure 8.3-18 Figure 8.3-54 Figure 8.3-57 Figure 8.3-63 Figure 8.3-64 Figure 8.3-65 Figure 8.3-5 Figure 7.4-2 This design changa enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of aquipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or 22
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
l
'ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 83-2007 This design change replaced the Cooling Tower Blowdown flow measurement loop (flow element, transmitter and related electronics) with a more
- reliable system.
SAR Figures 8.3-53 and 10.4-1 were revised accordingly.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or
. (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
i ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 83-2013 4
This design change modified the Loop I CCW heat exchanger high temperature alarm circuit such that the alarm does not come in when the loop is purposely out of service.
SAR Section 9.2.2.5 and Figure 7.3-6 were revised
! accordingly.
This annunciator upgrade, along with others described in this report, is part of the continuing annunciator i upgrade project and is evidence of AP&L's commitment to good human factors engineering principles. Details L of the annunciator upgrade project were provided in
! various CRDR related submittals to the NRC.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
- (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the 1 consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or 4
(ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the 23 4
.- - - , ,e,.-- , .n-,~_,_ . - , .- ,e. . . , , , - , ---, ..---r. ee.,,- ,- - ~ . - , . . . - , - , - ,. - - . , , , , , . - , - , ,,- ,, n , , , ,
, +
basis .for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 83-2021 i This design change completed the re-rack of the
- ANO-2 Spent Fuel Pool, which increased the spent fuel storage capability from 485 to 988 assemblies.
The following SAR sections were. revised to reflect the installation of the new high-density storage racks and the associated criticality, safety, thermal load and seismic and structural analyses:
9.1.1.3 9.1.2
, 9.1.3 9.1. 4 Table 9.1-6 Table 9.1-7 Table 9.1-8 Table 9.1-9 Figure 9.1-15 A comprehensive report describing the proposed Spent Fuel Pool storage expansion was submitted to the NRC on November 5, 1982 (SCAN 118205), reviewed, and approved by issuance of a Safety Evaluation Report on April 15, 1983 (SCNAS48314).
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 83-2038 This design change modified the automatic sprinkler i systems in four areas of the auxiliary building as a result of the Appendix R fire hazards analysis.
SAR Section 9.5.1.2.2 and the following Figures were revised accordingly:
I Figure 3.5-19 j Figure 9.5-1
! Figure 8.3-63 Figure 8.3-64
. Figure 8.3-65 This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this cesign change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated i in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or l 24 I ,
- , - ~-- +., - -- , _-,--- _ n . ------ ---~---------,------=--rn-~,,--,--,n,.,-m , , - n ,, , , , , , - - --- ,. n ,--- , .w,- n.
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 83-2048 This design change upgraded the RWT level transmitter freeze protection system.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change.
It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 83-2052 This design change modified the annunciator logic for the Liquid Radwaste System Panel 2C113 to enhance the usefulness of the common Control Room trouble alarm and to reduce nuisance alarms.
SAR Table 11.2-14 and Figures 11.2-1 (Sheets 1 and 2) and 11.5-1 were revised accordingly.
This annunciator upgrade, along with others described in this report, is part of the continuing annunciator upgrade project and is evidence of AP&L's commitment to good human factors engineering principles. Details of the annunciator upgrade project were provided in
! various CRDR related submittals to the NRC.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was
- determined that this design change did not:
i (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or l_ (ii) create the possibility for an accident or
! malfunction of a different type than any evaluated
! previously in the SAR; or j (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
25 i
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 83-2054 This design change modified the annunciator logic for the Liquid Radwaste System Panel 2C112 alarms to enhance the usefulness of the common Control Room trouble alarm and to reduce nuisance alarms.
SAR Table 11.2-14 was revised accordingly.
This annunciator upgrade, along with others described in this report, is part of the continuing annunciator upgrade project and is evidence of AP&L's commitment to good human factors engineering principles. Details of the annunciator upgrade project were provided in various CRDR related submittals to the NRC.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 83-2077 This design change enhanced the operational convenience of the Steam Generator Blowdown System by installation of a local Blowdown Tank pressure indicator and a permanent flow indicator on the discharge line.
l SAR Figure 8.3-56 was revised accordingly.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR l changes simply reflect this desipr change. It was
! determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the i
consequences of an accident or malfunction of I equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or l (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
t 26 l
e .. o ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 83-2148 This design change replaced some electronic components in the Pressurizer Safety Valve Acoustic Monitoring System with environmentally qualified equipment as a result of IEB 79-01B.
SAR Section 5.5.13.2 and Figures 5.1-3, 8.3-72 and 8.3-74 were revised accordingly.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 83-2178 This design change installed one hour fire wrap on conduit and junction boxes associated with the Service Water Pumps as a result of the Appendix R fire hazards analysis.
SAR Figures 8.3-54 and 8.3-56 were revised accordingly.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
27
e <> e ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: 'DCP 83-2196 This design change replaced the Limitorque motor operator (2CV-0706) with a manual operator (2EFW-0706) on a valve in the EFW system suction header to enhance EFW system reliability.
SAR Section 10.4.9.2.1 and Figure 10.4-2 were revised accordingly.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consecuences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type'than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 84^2018 This design change replaced four butterfly valves and operators (two manual and two motor operators) in the Service Water System to enhance system reliability. This change also modified the valve and piping supports accordingly.
The following SAR Figures were revised accordingly:
Figure 8.3-8 Figure 8.3-9 Figure 8.3-10 Figcre 8.3-11 Figure 8.3-12 Figure 8.3-13 Figure 8.3-14 Figure 8.3-15 This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was t determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
}
I
. 28 i
, e.-o ANO-2 DESIGN CHANGE: DCP 85-2127 This design change modified the RWT level transmitter freeze protection system circuitry.
This design change enhances safety and the SAR changes simply reflect this design change. It was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
29
T E@ E :W1 **
SEP 2 5586 ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY POST OFFICE BOX 551 UTTLE ROCK. ARKANSAS 72203 (501) 371-4000 September 18, 1986 0CAN098603 Mr. Robert D. Martin Regional Administrator Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011
SUBJECT:
Arkansas Nuclear One - Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6 10CFR50.59 Report, 1985
Dear Mr. Martin:
In accordance with 10CFR50.59(b), attached is our report containing a brief description of changes in procedures and in the facility as described in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) together with tests and experiments conducted which were not described in the SAR and a summary of the safety evaluation of each.
Very truly yours, J. Ted Enos, Manager Nuclear Engineering and Licensing JTE/RBT/sg Attachment
\cc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
~ /0 [
l \
MEMBEA MtOOLE SOUTH UTiUTIES SYSTEM
_ . . _ . _ _ -~ . - _ . , _