ML19319E591

Annual Operating Rept,1976.

ML19319E591
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	03/01/1977
From:	ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
References
NUDOCS 8004140592
Download: ML19319E591 (77)

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Arkansas Nuclear One-Unit 1 Docket No. 50-313 License No. DPR-51 Annual Operating Report --- 1977 t

C fe-3/3 V 2a N 3-3-78 L - J

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'd A. Narrative Summary of Operating Experience

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On January 1,1977, the unit was operating it 93% reactor power, down from 100% power gulation bypass as a result of a failed heater drain tank high level dump re-valve.

The unit operated at 93% until January 22 when power was reduced in preparation for the refueling shutdown.

The unit was shutdown all of February, March and the first four days of April due to its first refueling since becoming critical on August 6, 1974.

During the month of April, the unit had a nnit availability factor of 90.3% and the reactor had an availability factor of 10M.

During May, the unit operated satisfactorily with the exception of being shutdown for 85.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for maintenance on the secondary plant.

For the months of June, July, August, September and October, the unit operated av. or near 100% power and had reactor service and availability factors and unit service and availability factors of 100*6.

It is worthy to mention that from May 16 to November 23, the unit exceed-ed a previous record of continuous operation for Br# units, and set a new record of 191 days, 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and 16 minutes.

Except for a forced outage in the latter art of November and early part

[m ' of December due to the failure of a reactor bui ng cooling fan, the unit oper-ated satisfactorily.

In 69.7*

factor of concluding, for thethe availability of the unit was 76.8*6, with a capacity year. The reactor was critical for 6800.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> of a possibic 8760 hours0.101 days <br />2.433 hours <br />0.0145 weeks <br />0.00333 months <br />, and the unit had a gross cicetrical generation of 5,345,895 MWil and a new continuous operating record for Brin units.

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7 Reportable Occurrence Reports for 1977

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On January 10, 1977, a trouble Steam Line Break Instrumentation and Control alarm was indicated in the Control Room (Reportabic Occurrence Report No.

50-313/77-1). The alarm was attributed to frozen sensing lines due to sub-freezing temperatures.

.On January 20,:1977, a leak was' discovered at a weld in the resin transfer line for the spent fuel demineralizer. A section of 2 inch line was cut out and replaced (Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-313/77-2).

O_n January 22, 1977, the bearings on a steam driven emergency feedwater pump had to.be replaced (Reportabic Occurrence Report No. 50-313/77-3).

On January 24, a control room emergency ventilation unit was taken out of service (Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-313/77-4) and on January 28, a pinhole leak was ' discovered and reported on Reportable Occurrence Report'No.

50-313/77-5.-

On February 19, while performing a surveillance test, it was discovered that two High Pressure Injection flow transmitters had failed (Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-313/77-6) due to fatigue. Also, during this time, by means of television surveillance,13 small pieces of metal were found in the reactor in-ternals, these pieces of metal were remnants of those which were removed during the March 1976'SSHT outage. A nondestructive examination of #1 low pressure Q ',urbine rotor revealed cracks in the disc supporting the L-5 row of blades on the governor end and the generator end of the rotor. The condition existed on about 905.' of the blade roots around the perimeter of the rotor. This row of blades was removed during the outage to prevent further problems which might occur at power because of the cracking problem.

On February 24, a new fuel assembly became lodged on adjacent fuel assemblies in the reactor core and in the process of dislodging the assembly, two upper spacer. grids were broken and some of the fuel pins were bent. The damaged assem-bly was removed and returned to the vendor for repair (Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-313/77-7).

There were six Reportable Occurrence Reports processed from March 18 to June 3, 1977. They include ROR #8, failure of a Reactor Building Chilled Water System isolation valve; ROR #9, failure of a Penetration Room Ventilation System Valve; ROR #10, the failure to perfom a complete surveillance test on a leak rate test on the Reactor Building Escape Hatch: ROR #11, a failure to perform a leak test on a Pti-Be Sourse at the designated interval; and ROR #12, the discovery of a pipe-to-pipe weld in the discharge piping to the Spent Fuel Pool.

On June 2, (Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-313/.77-13) a Reactor Building Cooling Fan failed as a result of insufficient lubrication on the motor bearings.

It was removed and sent to the vendor for repairs. An emergency Technical Speci-cp ~

fication change was approved by the Commission to al1ow operation with one fan in

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. each train inoperable.

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The following Reportable Occurrence Reports were reported from June 12 to

( October 23: ROR #14, June 12, inoperability of the standby circuit of the

\s_,/} Penetration' Room Ventilation System; ROR #15, July 26, leakage above allowable -

limits on isolation valves; ROR #16, August 5, failure to perform a surveillance test on the diesel generator at the prescribed interval; ROR #17, August 24, a small Icak discovered in the casing drain line of one primary makeup pump; ROR

1. 18, August 26, filters.on the Ilydrogen Purge System being full of water; ROR

1. 19, Septcmber 6, review of Electrical Equipment, Battery and Charger Rooms having inadequate emergency ventialation; and ROR #20, October 23, failure of Diesel Generator #1_to start during the monthly test.

On November 23_(Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-313/77-22) during a test of the turbine throttle valves, the turbine tripped. During insertion of the Group 6 control rods to prevent auto trip of the reactor, the 25 + 5% overlap was not maintained as required by Technical Specification 3.5.2.5.

During the period of _ November 22. to December 3, there were four other Reportable .

Occurrence Reports submitted. These ROR's are as follows: ROR #21, failure of a Reactor Building Cooling Fan for lack of lubrication; ROR #23, a leak in the Reactor Building Spray heater piping; ROR #24, two pinhole leaks in the spent fuel cooling system; ROR #25, lack of fluid in the reservoir of a hydraulic shock sup-pressor; ROR #26, a Reactor Coolant Pump Seal deterioration; and ROR #27, a leak at the weld in the vent line to a valve, located on the decay heat cooler A inlet piping.

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B. Outages for 1977

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M) -Outage Number'77-1

~ Scheduled outage. Start date: 1/27/77 Duration: 1611.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />

-Cause: Preparation for refueling shutdown Action: See "cause"'

Other maintenance performed: None L

Outage Number 77-2 Forced outage; Start date: 4/25/77 Duration: 12.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Cause: False Ilotwell Level Indication Action: Removed lead from 24 volt power supply and informed personnel of problem.

Other maintenance performed: None Outage Number 77-3 Forced outage. Start date: 4/27/77

-Duration: 0.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> Cause:

Automatic run back to 44% RX power as a result of feedwater pump

-trip.

[ ) Action:

\s_,/ Maintenance was performed on the feedwater oil control systems.

Other maintenanca performed: None Outage Number 77-4 Scheduled outage. Start date: 5/12/77 Duration: 85.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Cause:

Unit shutdown to replace heater drain tank high level dump by-pass valve.

Actiot.: See "cause" Other maintenance performed: Misec11aneous valve replacement Outage Number 77-5 Forced outage. Start date: 6/2/77 Duration: 0.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> Cause:

Transformer bus trip due to Reactor Building Cooling Fan Motor failure.

Action: ~

Motor was removed and returned to vendor and emergency Technical Specification change was proposed and approved to allow operation with one fan in each train inoperable.

Other maintenance performed: None.

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dutage Number 77-6

, Forced outage. Start date: 7/10/77 j Duration: 0.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />s-

, Cause: Feedwater Pump-A speed contislier malfunction resulted in manual

, . runback to 50% RX power.

Action: The controller was repaired.

Other maintenance performed: None Outage Number 77-7 Forced outage. Start date: 11/23/77 Duration: 189.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> Causc: Reactor Building Cooling Fan failure

, Action: Replaced fan.

Other maintenance performed: Miscellaneous maintenance on secondary including weld repair and some valve replacement. Replaced 4 gasket in RCP seal.

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9 ^".. -10CFR50.59 C11ANGES TO-

-ARKANSAS NUCLEAR.ONE-UNIT 1 *

.DURING 1977.

The -following Design Change Requests (DCRs) are ' addressed.in this report:

DCR NUMBER l

'450 l l

-1 509  ;

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A- summary of each change and the associated safety evaluation are provided on the following pages.

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LDesign Change Request No. 450 JDescription:

This change was necessary.to . relocate llP-34 because a fire water line inter-fered with Unit 2 fuel handling.from the railroad bay hatch.

Completion Date: January, 1977 Safety Evaluation This; item was non-safety related as it involves only fire protection systems.

This change did not involve an unreviewed safety question pursuant to 10CFR50.59(a) in that the overlap with it'P#25 is maintained to the south. The service area to the cast continues to be within reach.

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[ Design Change Request.No. 509

Description:

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This change was to plug the auxiliary feedwater no::le that empties into the tube lane of the steam Generator along the 'Z' axis.

Completion Date: February, 1977

' Safety Evaluation This change is safety related because under accident conditions, the emergency feedwater system is required to remove heat.from the steam generators. Our architect engineer has calculated the change in feedwater flow from decreasing the number of no::les per steam generator from 7'to 6 to be unappreciable. The increase in flow resistance due to decreasing the number of no::les by one is less than 1 PSI. Since their calculations show a 705 gpm flow to one steam generator with 7 nozzles which represent 6% of full Ioad capacity, it is not an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR50.59(a) .

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' ' ' Ah\L CCCUP.iTIO.Vd. RADIATION EXPOSud REPORT PERSCSNEL h110LE BODY EXPOS (RUIS FOR CALENDAR YEAR 197.

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Licensee f(eporting (Name 4 Adcress) License No. <

Arkansas Pcwer 4 Light Ccmpany Sixth 5 Pine Street DPR-51 Pine Bluff. Arkansas 71601 Annual Dose Ranges *

(rem) Nu-ber of Individuals in Each Rance No Measurable Exrosure 247 Measurable Excosure Less Than 0.1 251 0.10 -- 0.25 116 0.25 -- U.50 78 0.50 -- 0.75 43 0.75 -- 1 33 1 -- 2 63 2 -- 3~

16 3 -- 4 1

4 -- 5 0

5 -- 6 0

6 -- 7 0

7 -- 8 0

8 -- 9 0

9 -- 10 0

_10 -- 11 0

11 -- 12 0

12 +

0 Total number of individuals reported 848 The personnelabove information monitoring is submitted was (check one) for the total nunber of individuals for who

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_/ calencar required year.

under 10 CFR 20.202 (a) or 10 CFR 34.33 (a) during the

/x 7 provided during the calendar year. '

• Individual be reported in values exactly the higher equal to the values separating exposures ranges.shall range. .

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ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE-UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-313 1; LICENSE NO. DPR-51 ANNUAL OPERATING REPORT - 1976 I

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' Specification 6.12'.2.2 Page  !

. A. Narrative Summary of Operating Experience 1 B. Outages for 1976

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Items (1) through (5) 8 ,

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{. Item (6) 12  !

1 l C. Annual Exposure Report 13 l i

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A. Narrative Summary of Operating Experience

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Ca January 1,1976, the unit was in the process of heatup following maintenance in December on control rod drive mechanisms.

ne unit was returned to the line on January 2.

On January 5 during a condenser tube plugging operation at approximately

, 70% FP, a reactor trip on low pressure occurred (Reportable Occurrence No.

50-313/76-1). The trip was attributed to another ratchet trip of the Group 6 control rods similar to that which occurred in December of 1975. The unit was brought to hot shutdown and repeated attempts to move the rods were made.

Only that rod which received the new drive mechanism in December would operate.

The unit was cooled down and depressurized to inspect for damage. The resulting complete disassembly and inspection of the 6-1 control rod drive mechanism magnets showed nothing wrong, thus eliminating the need for complete disassembly of the other assemblies.

One Group 7 lead screw was inspected to determine if any ratchet trips had ever occurred to another group. No damage was found.

Drive units for Group 6 were completely reconditioned (i.e. honing burrs on inside of motor tubes and on lead screws) and bolted in place. A sim-ulator was set up utilizing brush recorders, a mini-computer, and a power supply with recording capabilities to analyze the co.ntrol circuitry.

Findings from this indicated that both switches for one of the six phases were being energized at the same time, as identified previously. The situation was resolved by replacing all relays with two relays in parallel h (switches in series) for all phases of the circuitry, thereby eliminating

\d the possibility of any phase being neutralized due to a high contact resis-tance but ensuring system reliability and safety. Fill, vent, pressuriza-tion, and heatup operations were begun on January 16, with power operation beins, achieved on January 18.

Full power operation continued through February 20 with no unusual or unexpected equipment failures or malfunctions. On February 20 during a thunderstorm, two breakers in the 500 KV switchyard opened isolating the plant from the transmission lines. Gross generator cutput went from 860 MW to 190 MW rapidly and then returned to 840 MW when the breakers reclosed.

Operator action averted a unit trip. Rclief valves on the moisture separator and reheaters lifted, as well as the feedwater heater E2B shell relief valve, during the incident. H e shell relief valve on the feedwater heater would not reseat and reactor power was reduced to 92% in order to rescat the valve.

On February 29 the Group 1 control rods fell into the core during a routine biweekly control rod exercise. The reactor was tripped manually. The operators had transferred Group 1 rods from the holding power supply to the auxillary power supply and when the handle was positioned to move the rods inwa.u a 1 the Group 1 rods unlatched and fell into the core. Following repair to che control rod drive system, Rods 2, 3, 4 and 6 in Group 1 failed to withdraw on the first attempt to pull Group 1 rods from the core.

Rods were reinserted in the core, relatched'and another attempt was made to o

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pull this rod group. This time Rods 2, 3 and 4 remained on the bottom f ~~s as the others began to withdraw. All rods were again reinserted into tha

( core and the unit was cooled down to 520F where another attempt to pull K-) the rods was successful. Normal operating conditions were restored and <

the reactor was made critical.

r Later on February 29, prior to putting the generator on line, position indication was lost on the pressurizer spray flow control valve CV-1008.

The turbine was tripped and reactor power was reduced to approximately 2% power for electricians to make repairs to the valve.

On March 1, the unit was again started up and placed on line. Also, on this day it was discovered that the daily pilot cell voltage readings for the station batteries were not taken from February 27 to March 1. This was reported as Reportable Occurrence No. 50-313/76-2.

On March 10, rod 2 of Group 7 unlatched and dropped into the core due to a CRD stator failure. The assymetric condition caused by the dropped rod caused the integrated control system to initiate an automatic runback of the plant. Operations drove Group 7 to the bottom (the group was only 9%

withdrawn when Rod 2 dropped) to clear the assymetric rod condition and the plant war stabilized at 84% reactor power. Due to Technical Specifica-tion limitations on plant operation with an inoperable rod, (82.5% limit),

operations continued at approximately 80% reactor power.

On March 19, operations for shutting down the reactor began in order to remove the reactor vessel head and examine the surveillance specimen holder

(~'} tubes because of wear problems identified at another B6W unit. Upon examina-t tion of the holder tubes by use of remote closed circuit television, it was

'/

found that the spring cartridge was missing from 2 of 3 specimen tubes. In addition, one of those tubes, identified as tube no. 3, had the push rod missing and detached from the specimen; the journal bearing missing; and part, if not all, of the holder tube missing from the top of the shroud to the upper hinge of the specimen tube. Tube no. 2 was in the same condition as tube no. 3 except that part, if not all of the push rod was attached to the specimen and part, if not all, of the holder tube was still around the push rod. \11 of tube no. I was intact and the specimen was removed and sent off for analysis and evaluation. A 61/2 foot section of holder tube came out when the specimen was removed. The specimens for tubes no. 2 and 3 were in their proper location (Reportable Occurrence No. 50-313/76-3).

Preparations were made to begin defueling the reactor, remove the internals and retrieve any loose parts. Defueling began on April 2 and was completed on April 6. No major problems were encountered during defueling, except that when removing several assemblies from the core, the spacer grids would .ang on the spacer grids of adjacent assemblies.

A special tool had to be fabricated to rotate the remaining specimen holder tubes so that the internals could be removed from the reactor vessel. This was accomplished and the internals were removed on April 15.

' gs Inspection by remote closed circuit television was initiated inside the reactor vessel to determine if any damage had occurred due to the loose (x_ /) parts and to determine the location of said loose parts. All loose parts were located, removed and the remainder of the holder tubes were removed from the internals.

2

The unit wznt critical on Juna 19 and low power physics testing was per-

~ formed before rolling the turbine on June 20.

,0

!,'v) During the. shutdown a Reportable Occurrence Report concerning the failure of PS-2400, Reactor Building pressure switch to Channel A of the RPS, to ,

trip on increasing pressure above 18.5 psia, was filed. The discovery was made during routine calibration on April 22, and was reported as Reportable Occurrence No. 50-313/76-4. The pressure switch was recalibrated and tested to verify the channel trip <

h o other events reported as. Reportable Occurrences not related to maintenance items were discovered on May 5 and May 6. These occurrences involved finding that the fuel handling area ventilation system was not in operation during fuel handling operations for approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> on May 1 (Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-313/76-6) and identification that the control system for the control room emergency air conditioning system did not agree with design drawings nor did the proper design permit damper closure time to be met (Report-able Occurrence Report 76-7). On June 12, while filling the Sodium Thiosulfate Tank, this tank was overflowed via the borated water recirculation pump due to incorrect valve lineup. Approximately 9500 gallons of water containing approxi-mately 0.262 curies were spilled on the ground. This occurrence was reported as Reportable Occurrence No. 50-313/76-11.

On June 21 the number 9 bearing outboard of the exciter developed 6 mils vibration. Power was decreased and shortly thereafter sparks were observed to be coming from the bottom half of the no. 9 bearing. The turbine was then manually tripped and the bearing was rolled out for examination. It was found to be eroded and pitted. The erosion and wear on the bearing was the result of electrolysis and was enough to allow th, shaft to drop (O / causing the rotating permanent magnets on the pilot exciter ;.o contact the pilot stator. There are two 1/2" pipes installed through the exciter cowling and extended to the bearing which are used to guide wooden dowels that are inserted from outside the exciter cowling to the shaft to measure vibration. These pipes made metal to metal contact with the bearing, and one of the pipes was also in contact with the excite cowling, providing a path for electrical current to flow. Insulating board was installed at a point where both pipes pass through the exciter cowling in order to eliminate any electrical path.

The u lit was brought on line on June 22.

On June 28, during surveillance testing of process radiation monitor RI3814, valve CV3812 failed to open on comand due to apparent binding in valve between stem and bushing. The valve was placed in the ES position awaiting repairs during refueling in January 1977. This incident was reported as Reportable Occurrence No. 50-313/76-13.

On July 1 the shafc seal cavity pressure between the first and second stage seals on the "D" RCP rose to full reactor coolant system pressure, indicating first stage seal malfunction. Seal return flow and temperature remained normal, so operr. tion continued while carefully observing the pump seals for changing conditions.

O t On July 8 the reactor tripped when 'pewer was lost to the non-nuclear J

V instrumentation system. Automatic control action caused reactor power to increase until the reactor protection system tripped the reactor on high pressure. The cause was found, corrected and the reactor was made critical later that day.

3

. On July 9, while putting the unit on line, operators experienced diffi-culty in maintaining turbine generator seal oil pressure, and the air

/7 side seal oil pump finally quit pumping shortly after placing the unit

(") on line. Hydrogen seals were maintained using the seal oil backup pp on the main turbine lube oil reservoir. The unit operated in this manner until July 13 when a non-isolable crack in a weld on the 1/2" drain line at the suction of "B" feedwater pump and a crack in the 1/2" lubricating 1 oil line just below the pump inboard bearing forced a reduction to 50%

power to repair both leaks. The unit was then brought back up to full power on July 15 following an incident of exceeding the reactor power level cut-off without proper xenon reactivity (reported in Reportable Occurrence No. 50-313/76-17) .

On July 12 it was discovered that the Sodium niosulfate Tank (T-9) was belcw the Technical Specification limit for sodium thiosulfate concentration. The cause was a suspected leak from the tank. This event was reported in Reportable Occurrence No. 50-313/76-16.

On July 16, while running the H2 Purge System and Penetration Room Ventilation System surveillance tests, the H2 Purge Inlet fan tripped and would not restart and the Penetration Room Ventilation System fan and filter bleed valve breakers tripped, respectively. H e cause was determined to be that the thermal over-load was set too low for the breaker environment. This incident (s) was reported in Reportable Occurrence 50-313/76-18. _

On July 17 the unit tripped while conducting turbine throttle valve tests.

The cause of the trip was traced to a bad electronic card in the electro-s hydraulic tr.rbine control system. A false turbine overspeed signal was

) generated by the bad component causing automatic control action to trip the s.v/ turbine. The unit was placed back on line shortly after the cause was determined.

On July 19, power was reduced to 90% when the control board indicated that number 3 governor valve was in the test mode of operation. The valve was driven open from the control board until the test light cleared and normal operations continued.

On July 22, it was discovered that surveillance testing of the control room emergency ventilation system was not performed on July 12 as required by Tech. Specs. This discovery was reported in Reportable Occurrence No.

50-313/76-19.

The unit continued to operate nor.nally, except for the abnormal readings in RCP shaft seal cavity pressures on C and D RCP's, until August 6.

A bad stator on CRDM No. 3 in Group 2 was found on July 30, and was repaired during the shutdown on August 6, 1976.

During this shutdown "B", "C" and "D" RCP shaft seals were repaired after excessive shaft leak off was discovered from all three pumps.

On August 14, the Environmental Technical Specification quarterly limit for total curies released in liquid effluents was exceeded and reported in Non-p Routine, Radiological Environmental Report No. 50-313/76-1.

\v ,

On August:16, the unit was brought back on line, but a few hours later the "D" RCP seal failed resulting in a seal leak off of 25 gpm (Reportable

/Q' Occurrence Report No. 50-313/76-22). The generator and reactor were then y/ manually tripped, Investigations show that the seal failure was the result ,

of excenive pump thrust being transmitted from the shaft through two out of position seal ring body drive keys and into the running seal faces.

Procedures have been altered to alleviate the possibility of seal maintenance procedures being any future cause. However, system contaminants from the spring outage were the probable contributors to the earlier degradation of seal components.

On August 23, while reviewing surveillance tests, it was discovered that several weekly tests for the offsite power protective relaying interlocks and circuitry, several monthly tests on the diesel generator protective relaying, starting interlocks and circuitry, and quarterly tests for the station batteries and switchyard batteries had not been performed in compli-ance with the surveillance test schedule. Reportable Occurrence No. 50-313/

76-23 was filed concerning this matter.

On September 13,'the unit was again brought on line. During the escalation in power on September 14, the power level cutoff was exceeded without proper xenon reactivity worth and was repo1*ed in Reportable Occurrence No. 50-313/

76-27. Nevertheless, the unit operated satisfactorily through September 24 when a faulty vibration trip of the generator caused the unit to trip. The unit was brought back on line that same day and operated at 100% through October. However, a burned out stator on control rod drive mechanism 6, Group 4 required that the rod be latched and fully withdrawn until the next shutdown or trip which would necessitate replacement of the stator.

p) l L/ During this operational period several incidents were reported in Reportable Occurrence Reports. These incidents are as follows:

1. Cracks were found in the Spent Fuel Pool Cooler E27B outlet no::le (9/26/76, Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-313/76-28).

2. Failure of Primary Makeup Pump P36B (10/3/76, Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-313/76-29).

3. A leak was discovered in a socket weld in Primary Makeup Pump P36C suction relief lire (10/3/76, Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-313/76-30).

4. Failure to perform the weekly surveillance test on offsite power protective relay interlocks and circuitry (10/20/76, Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-313/76-31).

5. Failure of Reactor Building Chilled Water Inlet Valve CV-6202 to function properly (10/21/76, Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-313/76-32).

On November 1 a perturbation in the feedwater control system caused a large swing on the main generator. During this transient, a main feed pump tripped v

5

and the plant was automatically runback to 40% reactor power. Adj ustments

[^\ - were made to the feed pump speed control system, but, after placing the pump V back in service, wild fluctuations in the pump speed required taking the pump back out of service. These fluctuations also caused a reactor coolant system transient and the reactor tripped. The reactor trip was caused by a malfunctioning pressurizer spray flow control valve. Following the feed pump induced transient to the RCS, the system pressure began to decay, even with all pressurizer heaters energized and the pressurizer g ray control valve indicating closed. However, the valve was leaking oufficiently to cause the RCS pressure to decay until the reactor protection system automati-cally tripped the reactor upon reaching the pressure /ttmperature limits.

The burned out CRD stator was replaced and additional adjustments were made to the feed pump speed control. Plant heatup began on November 2, with the unit being placed on line on November 3.

The unit was limited to about 78% reactor power until November 7 when the "all rods out configuration" was achieved and operation at 100% was resumed.

However, on November 5, it was noted that the Control Rod Drive Mechanism number 8, Group 4 stator was burned out. The rod was latched in the full out position and declared inoperable.

~

On November 22, an inadvertent trip of the fire system deluge while being .

returned to service rendered Diesel Generator #1 inoperable as a result of wet circuitry. This was reported in Reportable Occurrence No. 50-313/76-33.

l The steam flow control valve controlling steam flow to the second stage p}

coil in B moisture separator and reheater was throttled back about 40%

during this time period because of suspected leaks in the second stage tube bundle. This resulted in the B reheat steam temperature being reduced by about 10F. 'This reduced unit efficiency slightly until December 15 when the B and D moisture separators and reheaters were isolated to investigate the leaks.

A leak was discovered in the heat affected zone of valve SF-11 in the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System on December 1. This occurrence was reported in Reportable Occurrence No. 50-313/76-34.

On December 20, power from the inverter holding Rod 8, Group 4 in the latched position was lost. An assymetric condition resulted and caused the Integrated Control System (ICS) to begin running the reactor power back to 40%. The inverter also furnished power to 50% of the ICS and indicating instruments on the control panel in the control room. A false pressure indication caused automatic energization of all pressurizer heater banks, causing a reactor trip on high pressure. Cooldown was initiated to replace the burned out stator on Rod 8, Group 4. l On December 21, the unit was returned to service and operated until December 28, when a level sight glass blew out on a high pressure feed-water heater. The noise and quantity of steam that resulted initially caused operators to believe a major failure had occurred so a reduction

/] in load began. At approximately 92%, the broken sight glass was discovered

(/ and power reduction ceased. During the incident, A heater drain pump tripped 6

and thus required manual control of heater drain tank level by modulating the heater drain tank high level dump regulator bypass valve. The bypass valve would not close subsequently, and it is estimated approximately 1500 to 1600 gpm of water was recirculated back to the condenser rather than -

being. pumped forward to the condensate and feedwater system. Power was

' limited to approximately 93% for the remainder of the year as a result of additional flow through the condensate demineralizers.

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B. Outages'for 1976

( ,) Items (1) through (5) ,

Outage Number 76-1 Forced outage. (Continued from December 1976)

Duration: 60.5 hrs.

Cause: Ratchet trip of Group 6 CRD's.

Action: Replaced and/or refurbished Group 6 CRDM's Other maintenance performed: None.

Outage Number 76-2 Forced outage. Start date: 1/5/76 Duration: 312.8 hrs.

Cause: Ratchet trip of Group 6 control rods. ROR 76-1 filed.

Action: Monitored CRD system operation via computer and determined that control relays sequencing phase rotation in CRD stators were sticking momentarily on infrequent occasions. System design modified to improve probability that incident would not recur.

Other maintenance performed: _

1. Replaced solenoid in air operator to CV-6202, RB isolation chilled water supply to RB.

e-~ 2. Replaced solenoid valve in air supply to RB isolation valve fgj CV-4804.

%/

3. Replaced stem and wedge on RB isolation valve CV-4803.

4. Disengaged stuck locking pins that engage manual operator to pressurizer soray valve CV-1008.

Outage Number 76-3 i Forced outage. Start Date: 2/29/76 Duration: 25.6 hrs.

Cause: Dropped Group 1 Rods due to failed CRD transfer switch.

Action: Replaced transfer switch and six (6) 150 amp fuses in DC power holding.

Other maintenance performed: None.

Outage Number 76-4 Scheduled outage. Start Date: 3/19/76 Duration: 2220.3 hrs.

Cause: Failed Surveillance Specimen Holder Tubes. j Action: See " Operating Experience" for details. 1 Other maintenance performed:

1. Replaced absolute position indication amplifier, Group 6,

(N Rod 3 due to faulty. position indication.

\v 8

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. 2. -Replaced handswitch to Diesel Generator #1. Generator would not start on undervoltage or_ES signal until

/'~'N handswitch was jiggled. (ROR 76-8) l h 3. Replaced gaskets on leaking flanges in RCP lube oil system.

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I

4. Disassembled and adjusted wedge position relative to seat for ,

CV-2410 and CV-2411 to stop leaking through to Decay Heat l System. i S. Repaired crack in weld in instrument line between FE-1401 and flow P transmitter.

6. Replaced defective handswitches for VSF-1 B 6 D to prevent handswitch operation when under ES signal. (ROR 76-9)

7. Valve CV-3814, Reactor Building Cooling Unit Cooler Isolation valve, would not close on ES signal; cleaned contacts on  :

relay. (ROR-76-9)

8. Adjusted torque switch on CV-3643, Auxiliary Cooling Water Valve so closure on ES signal was achieved. (ROR-76-9)

9. Repaired terminal connector in relay panel for CV-7454, Reactor .

Building Particulate Monitor Isolation Valve, so response to ES signal was achieved. (ROR-76-9) s 10. Adjusted torque switch on CV-1300, Makeup Pump recirculation valve so closure on ES signal was achieved. (ROR-76-9)

[G)

11. Replaced reservoir gaskets and oilrings on hydraulic shock suppressors reservoirs. (ROR-76-5)

12. Pipe and valve removed and replaced on 1/2" line in Decay Heat System. (ROR-76-10)

13. Replaced blown fuse in 480V rectifier, inverter Y-13.

14. Replaced defective "NO" charge alarm relay, battery charger 1D04.

15. Repaired leaking oil flow switch on back stop lube oil pump on 'A' RCP.

16. Replaced CRDM stator, Group 7, Rod 8.

17. Modification to Spent Fuel Pool level transmitter.

18. Modifications to fuel handling bridges per manufacturer instructions.

19. Modifications to RCP temperature recorders .

20. Modification to emergency diesel fire pump auto start circuitry.

. 9

21. 31odifications to Control Room Ventilations System.

22. Replaced faulty meter indicator in ESAS analog channel 2.

f-_s\

\s_ ,/ 23. Repaired stuck relay on RFS Channel C module.

24. Replaced rupture disc on Waste Gas Surge Tank (T18B).

25. Replaced stem in CV-4803, gaseous radwaste vent header isola-tion valve.

Outage Number 76-5 Forced outage. Start Date: 6/21/76 Duration: 200.9 hrs.

Cause: Exciter bearing burned out.

Action: Shutdown to replace bearing and repair stator.

Other maintenance performed:

1. Repaired leak in socket weld on P36C Makeup Pump relief line. (ROR-76-12)

2. Replaced leaking piping spool in Emergency Feedwater line to

'A' Steam Generator. (ROR-76-13)

Outage Number 76-6 Forced outage. Start Date: 7/8/76 Duration: 13.9 hrs.

Cause: Loss of nuclear instrumentation channel caused false indication of RCS Pressure - high.

Action: Restored channel.

Other maintenance performed: None.

Outage Number 76-7 Forced outage. Start Date: 7/17/76

Duration

4.9 hrs.

Cause: Defective card in electro-hydraulic turbine control system caused turbine trip. Reactor not shutdown.

Action: Replaced card.

Other maintenance performed:

1. Repaired leak in weld on Resin Sluice Line to Spent Resin Tank.

(ROR 76-14)

Outage Number 76-8 1

Scheduled outage. Start Date: 8/6/76

. Duration: 220.5-hrs.

Cause: Replacement of RCP 'B', 'C', and 'D' shaft seals.

Action: See Cause.

Other maintenance performed:

1. Repairs to piping shock and sway suppressors. (ROR-76-20)

2. Adjusted packing on CV-1008, CV-1009 to alleviate leaks.

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3. Replaced rupture disc, Waste Gas Surge Tank.

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4. Overhauled Pressurizer Electromatic Relief Valve, PSV-1000.

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5. Overhauled PSV-2695, Main Steam Code Relief Valve.

6. Replaced stator on Group 2, Rod 3.

7. Repaired leak in outlet of 'B' Radwaste Demineralizer. (ROR 76-21)

Outage Number 76-9 Forced outage. Start Date: 8/16/76 Duration: 671.4 hrs.

Cause: 'D' RCP shaft seal failure. (ROR 76-22)

Action: Shutdown to repair.

Other maintenance performed:

1. Repaired leaks in welds on DH-1401A r.nd ventline to DH-1012.

(ROR-76-24)

2. Removed and replaced leaking piping in Decay Heat System down-stream of cooler E3 s. (ROR 76-25)

3. Repaired leak in socket weld at PSV-1245 on P36C suction relief.

line. (ROR-76-26)

Outage Number 76-10

( ' - '

Forced outage. Start Date:

Duration: 5.6 hrs.

9/23/76 Cause: Turbine tripped on bearing vibration alarm.

Action: Investigated and reset alarm.

Other maintenance performed: None.

Outage Number 76-11 i

Forced outage. Start Date: 11/1/76 Duration: 37.7 hrs.

Cause: Main Feedwater Pump control malfunction caused reactor trip.

Action: Adjusted feed pump controls.

Other maintenance performed:

1. Critical path item - replaced CRDM stator, Grcup 4, Rod 6.

2. Adjusted pressurizer spray control valve CV-1008 limit switches to alleviate faulty position indication.

3. Replaced lower lift adjust ring lock pin on Main Steam relief PSV-2686.

Outage Number 76-12 Forced outage. Start Date: 12/20/76 O . Duration: 33.6 hrs.-

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Cause: Partial loss of control system power caused auto control action which resulted in a reactor trip on high pressure.

Action: Investigated Y-11 inverter, no trouble found.

'Other maintenance performed:

1. Critical path item - Replaced CRDM stator for Group 4, Rod 8.

2. Replaced noisy cooling fan for Y-11 inverter.

3. Replaced coil wire and checked breaker to alleviate faulty position indication from CV-2670.

Item (6): Abnormal Releases There were no incidents meeting or exceeding 10% of the allowable annual value for any single release of radioactivity or single radiation exposure during 1976.

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I 'D. Indications of. Failed Fuel 1-There were no indications of failed fuel resulting from visual examination i of irradiated fuel during the surveillance specimen holder tube removal I work in the March-June shutdown. "Ihere was no addy current testing or  !

ultrasonic testing of irradiated fuel during the year of 1976, i

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e AMENDMENT No. 53 ARKANSAS POWER 6 LIGi!T COMPANY ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE-UNIT 1-The following pages of Arkansas Power 6 Light Company's Arkansas Nuclear One-Unit 1 Final Safety Analysis Report are to be removed and, where  !

specified, additional pages dated March 1,1977, are to be inserted.

Remove Insert VOLUME I CilAPTER 1 1-79, 1-80 1-79, 1-80 1-81, 1-82 1-81, 1-82 1-85, 1-86 1-85, 1-86 -

1-89, 1-90 1-89, 1-90 j 1-91, 1-92 1-91, 1-92 -

i 1-93, 1-94 1-93, 1-93a  !'

-- 1-94 i

Cl! APTER 2 -

I 2-19, 2-19a 2-19, 2-19a  !

OIAP111R- 3 i Figure 3-59 Figure 3-59 i I

VOLUME II CliAPTER 8 i 8-1, 8-in 8-1, 8-la CIAPTER 9 I

9-13, 9-13a 9-13, 9-13a VOLUME IV GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA 16 16 17 17 f

i

P g w.

TABLE 1-2 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE-UNIT 1 NUCLEAR QUALITY ASSURANCE Q LIST The basic purpose of this list is to specifically identify those items within the scape of the Nuclear Quality Assurance Program. Items listed require special-consideration during design, manufacture, and construction.

The list is to include all Class 1 structures, systems, and equipment.

Class 1 structures, systems and equipment are those whose failure could cause uncontrolled release of radioactivity or those essential for the safe shutdown.and the immediate and long-term operation following a loss of coolant accident. When structures, systems or equipment as a whole are on this list, porti.ons not associated with a loss of safety function are not meant to be included. This includes: Engineered Safeguards as derined in Section 6 of the FSAR.

The Q List is divided into five major sections: 53 O 1. CIVIL STRUCTURAL G 2. NUCLEAR MECHANICAL 3 CONVENTIONAL MECHANICAL

h. AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL

5. . ARCHITECTURAL 53 5

e .

l- 1-79 Amendment No. 53 L March 1, 1977 I

4

1. CIVIL STRUCTURAL SECTION Civil-Structural items within the scope of the Nuclear Quality Assurance Program are limited to the following:

Reactor Building s

Auxiliary building housing the engineered safeguard systems, emergency diesel generators, control room and radioactive materials . 30 Diesel fuel storage facilities Enclosures for service water pumps Eupports for Class I cystem components Dnergency Reservoir and pipelines Spent Fuel Pool (excluding liner plate) 30 Only those portions of the Civil-Structural work which are within the areas listed above are within the scope of the Nuclear QA Program.

Q Number Description 1.1 PRESTRESSED AND REINFORCED CONCRETE 1.11 Reinicrcing Steel 1.111 Cadwelds 1.13 Concrete Including Protentive Mat 1.131 Prestressing System (Excluding Tendon Sheathing) 30 1.132 Sheathing Filler 1.2 LINER PLATE 1.21 Reactor Building Structure Liner Plate (Excluding leak chase piping system not mating with liner plate and tie nuts) 1.22 Locks and Hatch 1.3 FUEL RACKS 1.31 New Fuel Racks 1.32 Spent Puel Racks 1-80 Amendment No. 30 o NW

l

! 1.h STRUCTURAL STEEL

!.. 1.41 Reactor Building Structural Steel t

i j 1.k2 Auxiliary Building Structural Steel 1.43 Miscellaneous Metals l

l.

1.5 EMERGENCY RESERVOIR 1.6 R.C. PUMPS HYDRAULIC SHOCK ABSORBERS 30 17 INTAKE STRUCTURE SLUICE GATE I

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i 1-81 Amendment No. 30 l September 15, 1972 1- ,

1

2. NUCLEAR MECHANICAL SECTION 2.1 REACTOR EQUIPMENT 2.11 Reactor Vessel Equipment 2.1110 Vessel 2.1111 Vessel Internals 2.1112 Incore Instrument Tank 2.1150 Piping (Incore Instrumentacion) 30 2.1170 Supports 2.1190 Internals Indexing Fixture 53 2.lh Fuel Handling Equipment 2.lh50 Fuel Trancfer Tube 2.14 51 Fuel Transfer Canal Recirculating Penetration Piping 2.1461 Valves l30 2.1h70

• Main Fuel Handling Bridge (Trolleys Only) 2.1h71

• Auxiliary Fuel Handling Bridge (Trolleys Only) 53 2.1472

• Fuel Storage Handling Bridge (Trolleys Only) 2.1h73 New Fuel Elevator 2.lh 90 Fuel Handling Crane 30 2.lb91 Shroud Tube Holder 2.15 Control Rod Drive Equipment 2.1550 CRD Cooling Penetration Piping 2.1560 Valves 30 2.1580 Instrumentation and Controls (I & C) 2.1582 Drive Mechanism I & C 30 CThese components and aesociated supporting structures are designed and constructed to retain structural integrity during and after a Seismic Category I event but do not necessarily have to retain operability.

1-82 Amendment No. 53 March 1, 1977 ]

e

/ h.

2.2550 . Piping 2.2560 Valves 2.2570 Supports 2.2580 I&C

'2.2590> Spray Pump Motors 2.26 Decay-Eeat Removal System 2.2610 Borated Water Storage Tank 2.2620 Decay Heat Renoval Pumps .

2.2630 Decay Heat Removal Coolers 2.2650 Piping 2.2660 Valves ,

2.2670 Supports

. 2.2680 I&c 2.2690 Dscay Heat Removal Pump Motors 2.3 RADIOACTIVE WASTE TREAM ENT AND DISPOSAL I 2.31 Gas Radwaste System 2.3110 Waste Gas Decay Tanks 2.3111 Waste Gas surge Tank 2.3112 Vacuum Degasifier and Accessories 2.3120 Degasifier Vacuum Pumps 2.3121 Waste Gas Compresser and Accessories 2.31h0 Gaseous Waste Discharge Filter l30 2.3150 Reactor Building Vent Hdr. Penetration Piping 2.3151 Gaseous Radwaste System Piping i- .2.3160 Valves l

2.3170 Supports- l30

( .

1-85 Amendment No. 30 September 15, 1972 j

r

2.32, Liould Radwaste System 2.3250 Quench Tank Gas Space Sample Penetration Piping 2.3251 Quench Tank Drain Penetration Piping 2.32)2 Reactor Building Sump Drain Penetration Piping 2.3253 Reactor Building Drain Header to Auxiliary Building Drain Tank Penetration Piping 2.3260 Valves 2.3270 Supporta 30 2.h REACTOR ?LANT SERVICE SYSTEMS 2.h1 Intermediate Cooling System 2.h150 Intermediate Cooling Penetration Piping 2.k160 Valves 2.h2 Treated Water Systems 30 2.h251 Filtered Water Supply Penetration Piping 2.k260 Valves 2.h3 Air / Nitrogen System 2.h350 Nitrogen Supply Penetrations Piping 2.h351 Service Air Supply Penetration Piping 53 2.4352 In.*truemnt Air Supply Penetration Piping 2.h353 Rea: tor Building Test connection Penetration Piping i

2.L360 Valves l l

2.hk Process Radiation Monitorine System J.h5 Erection Cleaning on Nuclear SS Pipe 53 l l

l Ol l

I l-86 Amendment No. 53 i March 1, 1977

M 3.2262. R.B. Duct ~P .ier Vaives

-[ ~

'" Penetratis- Roem Duets Isolation Valves

- 3.2263 3.226h Penetration Room Filter'and Bleed Line Sht'+ ialves 30

. 3 2265. .R.B. H2 Purge Isolation Valves 3.2266 R.B. Heating System Isolation Valves Purge Valves'for Auxiliary Building Engineered

~

3.2267 Safeguard Equipment Rooms 3.2270 Supports

I 3.2280 I&C i 3.2290 Reactor Building Cooler Fans 3.2291 Reactor Building and Auxiliary Building Ducts, -

Ducts Supports and Dampers '

30

' 3.2292 Control Room Emergency Air Supply Filter Fan

' 9 r ~s 3.2293 Auxiliary Building Energency Diesel Generator f Room Exhaust Fans J

3 229h Auxiliary Building Make-up Pump Room-Unit Coolers

' Penetration Room Vent System Fans 3.2295 1.2296~ R.B. H2 Purge Exhaust and Supply Fans 53

, 3.2297 R.B. H2 Pu de System Exhaust Electric Heater 3.23 Emergency 'iesel Generator 30 including:

Starting Air Tanks Jacket CW HX

- Fuel Oil (F.O.) Day Tanks 3.2312 Fuel Tanks 3.2320 Diesel 011 Transfer Pumps 1 3.2350 Piping.(Air and F.O.)-

-3.2351 Combustion Air Intake Duct 30 l'~'T .

53

\ ,,/ 3.2352 Wall Louvers l 1.2360 -valves (Air _and F.O.) l l

1-89 Amendment-NO. 53 Maren 1, 1977 ,

$-,' -- , _ . - ,,-- , - - , - - - , , , ,, .__y- -

w.,y.m 7

l 1

3.2370 Supports 3.2380 I&C 3.2390 Electri al Control Cabinets 3.2391 Diesel Oil Transfer Pump Motors l 1

3. 214 Reactor Building Crane 3.25 Fire Water Systems 3.2550 Fire Water Penetration Piping 3.26 Miscellaneous Items 3.2650 Spare Penetration Pipe Caps 30 1 3.2651 Flued Heads 3.2652 Miscellaneous Instruments or Sample Adapter Piping 3.2660 Valves 3.2680 control Panels O

O 1-90 Amendment No. 30 September 15, 1972

fx h. AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SECTION

( )

%.J 4.1 SWITCHGEAR FOR ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS 4.101 4.16 KV Switchgear Bus A3 k.lO2 k.16 KV Switchgear Bus Ah h.11 Load Center Trans. Engineered Safeguards h.111 4160 - 480 V Trans. 1000 KVA X5 -

30 h.112 bl60 h80 V Trans. 1000 KVA X6 4.113 AC Instr. Transf. 120/208 V 30 KVA h.11h AC Instr. Transf. 120/208 V 30 KVA h.12 Load Centers Engineered Safeguard 4.121 L80 V Load Center Bus B5 h.122 h80 V Load Center Bus B6 h.13 Motor Control Center Engineered Safeeuard N h.131 Motor control Center B51, B52, B53 and 355 53 h.132 M.. tor control Center Bf6 30 h.133 Motor Control Center B61, B62 and B63 53 ,

4.2 SWITCilBOARDS AND PANELS h.21 AC Instrument Distr. Panels 4.211 120/208 V AC Instr. Distr. Panel 4.212 120/208 TT AC Instr. Distr. Panel 4

k.2h Power and Dist. Panels Engineered Safeguard 30 l h.241 120/208 V AC React. Protection and Engineered l Safeguard Dist. Panel RS1 h.242 120 V AC React. Protec. and Engineered Safeguard Dist. Panel RS2 h.243 120 V AC React. Protec. and Engineered Safeguard jN, Dist. Panel RS3

\vl l-91 Amendment No. 53 March 1, 1977

)

1

4.2hh 120 V AC React. Protection and Engineered Safeguaid Dist. Panel RSh h.3 RACEWAYS ASSOCIATED WITH ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS 4.31 Conduit-Rigid Steel Seal Tight Flexible Including Fittings h.32 Cable Tray-Associated with Electrical Engineered Safeguard Equipment Power & Control Cables 4.33 Cable Tray Fire Barriers h.35 Pull Boxes and Terminal Boxes -

k.36 Underground Duct, Fittings and Eneasemer.t 4.37 Manholes, Handholes and Fittines 4.h CABLE ASSOCIATED WITH ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD h.kl Instrument Cable 4.k11 Triax.

h.412 Coax 4.bl3 Shielded 4.414 Thermocouple Cable 30 h.h2 600 V Control Cable Switchboard Wire 4.43 600 V Power Cable h.bh 5 KV and 8 KV Power Cable 4.5 DC EQUIPMENT 4.511 Battery Bank #1 h.512 Battery Bank #2 h.52 Battery Chargers 4.521 Battery Charger #1 4.522 Battery Charger #2 h.523 Battery Charger #3 4.53 AC Inverters l

l l-92 Amendment No. 30 September 15, 1972

(N h.531 Inverter Channel #1 4.532 Inverter Channel #2 k.533 Inverter Channel #3 h.53h Inverter Channel #4 h.535 Inverter Computer k.536 Inverter Spare 4.5h DC-Motor Control Centers h.541 DC Motor Control Center #1 h.5h2 DC Motor Control Center #2 30 h.55 Battery Control Panel 4.551 Battery Bank #1 Fuse and Relay Cabinet h.552 Battery Bank #2 Fuse and' Relay Cabinet 4.56 125 V DC Power Panels 4.561 125 V DC Distribution Panel #1 h.562 125 V DC Distribution Panel #2 4.57 125 V DC Distribution Panels h.571 125 V DC Safeguard Actuation System Control Panel RAl i h.572 125 V DC Safeguard Actuation System Control Panel RA2 l 53 h .6 ' MISCELLANEOUS ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT h.61 Reactor Building Electrical Penetrations 4.611 .12" Penetrations for Power 30 h.612 12" Penetrations for Control h.613 12" Penetrations for Instrumentation 53 C\

U 1-93 Amendment No. 53

! March 1, 1977

I'*"' DC Transfer Switches 4.63 Isolation Relays 4.6h RPS Relays

5. ARCHITECTURAL SECTIOff 53 5.1 Impingement Door 5.2 Watertight Door i

O l

1 l

1-93a Amendment No. 53 March 1, 1977

r i.

< J TABLE l-3 b ,

SHARED SYSTEMS 4 SECTION OF.PSAR DESCRIBING .

SERVES SHUTDOWH ' SERVES EMERGENCY COHDITION OF SUFFICIENT

-SYSTD4 FUNCTION FUNCTION MAXIMUM DEMAND REDUNDANCY

+

, Rav water

' . storage tank No- No NA- HA l

~

l Diesel fuel oil bulk sotrage Ho No loss of power. .HA  ;

Communicatioris . . I system Yes Yes. -Variable .7 4.4 4

)

j, Clean instrument shop No Ho NA NA 7 Clean chemistry No No la HA i

y -laboratory r

Fire protection equipment No Yes Fire 98

) Fuel handling crane (Auxiliary Building) Ho No NA HA l l Site and offsite environmental i inonitoring Yes Yes DBA 11.2.6 Chlorination IR i

system No No HA

]

i j' Turbine building j' No Ho NA HA crane

' Amendment No. 21 i September 27, 1971 i l

_ . . _ ._..,_i. . , . _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

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J,

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..q ccted; and areas where major destructive earthquakes may occur.

utte lies well within the zone of expected minor damage.

The l

) The zones are based principally on the known distribution of damaging earthquakes, their intensities and geological considerations.

2.7.5 FOINDATION VS. SITE INTENSITY Figure 2-28 shows the Earthquake frequency versus intensity at Little Rock,

. Ark ans as . Figure 2-29 shows the active teleseismic stations in the area.

The historical data indicates that Arkansas is not an area of earthquake centers; however, the effects of distant shocks should be considered, in particular those along the bussissippi River north and south of New Madrid.

The New Madrid shock, which occurred over 150 years ago, therefore has been considered in evaluating the seismic design of sensitive structures at the site. In this evaluation, the site has several recognized and distinct i advant ages .

I

a. The sensitive structures will be founded on unweathered firm shale bedrock.  ;

J

b. The site is about 220 miles from the New Madrid epicentral zone. '

According to a mathematical formula relating distance to earthquake shock attenuation, developed by H. Kawasumi of the Earthquake Research Institute of Tokyo, a site intensity of about VI could be anticipated from a New Madrid area earthquake of intensity XII.

, \_

c. From Myron Fuller's report it may be estimated that St. Louis ,

Missouri experienced an intensity of VII during the new Madrid shock. St. Louis is about 60 miles closer to New Madrid than the site and is founded, in part, on thick alluvial deposits overlying shale and limestone bedrock. Consequently the intensity at the site due to the New Madrid shock was apparently less than VII.

d. The above tiscussion and the previous paragraphs of this section have demonstrated that assignment of a maximum intensity of VII (MM) for this site is conservative.

4.7.6 STRONG MOTION ACCELEROGRAPH Two tri-axial Strong Motion Accelerographs will be mounted on the outside surface of the Reactor Building vall. These two instruments vill be placed 23-2.]

in the same vertical axis; one at EL.531' 6" and the other at EL.335'-0"

( top o f bas e slab ) . The locations of these instruments represent two key elements 1,n the dynamic model for seismic analysis. A tri-axial 53 Accelerometer -located at the base slab vill be connected to an alarm in the control room for Unit 1. This alarm vill be triggered when the pre- 23-2.]

'~' determined value of 0.1 g for the OBE has been exceeded. Detailed procedures vill be included in the plant operating procedures describing

(' the actions to be taken in the event of this alarm.

2-19 Amendment No. 53 Maren 1, 1977

In addition to the above instrumentation, s. peak-recording accelercaet.e.s vill be installed on equipment inside the Feactor Building. All Class I structures are founded on rock. Therefore, soil-structure interaction is n:t significant at this site. 'Ihe specific instruments to be selected will hnve a simple design which would allow plant personnel to calibrate and maintain the equipment. This seismic instrumentation system conforms to Safety Guide 12, " Instrumentation for Earthquake," published March 19, 1971.

Following an earthquake the resulting measurements will be evaluated by quclified seismology and engineering personnel. If the analysis indicates tha shock may have caused stresses exceeding design limits specified for 23 - 2 . 1 OBE to structures, or components, specific action vill be taken as reconumended by the evaluating personnel.

2.7.7 CONSULTANT'S REPORT Th2 consultant's report on site seismology is Figure 2-30.

2.7.8 SEIS}OIAGY REFERENCC 23 Broadhead, G. C. , "The New Madrid Earthquake", American Geologist, vol. 30, August 1902.

Clarke, Blake, " America's Greatest Earthquake", Shreveport Magazine, March 1069.

E.S.S. A. , Hypocenter Data Cards , January 1968-December 1969 i

l i

OO j 2-19a Amendment No. 23 l January 21, 1972 l

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A S.i t.:'i. 1 i a M . .a' 1 GENERAL ARRANCEMENT 3-59

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Amendment No. 53 ilarch 1, 1977

( .

G ELECTRICAL SYST5!6 8.1 IESIGN BASES The electrical system for Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1 is designed to be electrically self-sufficient and provide adequately reliable power sources for all electrical equipment for startup, normal operation, safe shutdown and handling of all emergency situations. The following criteria have been used in the system and equipment design:

a. All components of the system are sized for operation under normal and emergency conditions.

b. No single component failure will prevent operation of the required engineered safeguards.

c. Redundant sources of power and/or automatic transfer of loads are provided to ensure continuous operation of equipment as required under emergency conditions.

d. As far as practical, the system is arranged in such a manner as to make it possible to test equipment with the plant in operation.

e. The relevant ANSI, NEMA, IEEE and the National Electrical Code recommendations are used as a guide in the design.

f. Class I electrical equipment is reismic qualified in accordance with the 2EE " Guide for Seismic qualification of Class I 1 Electric Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" JCNPS/SC2.5 (to be designated IEEE 3hh) as published in draft form for trial use and cc,mment on August 11, 1971, 22-8.1 I

g. Electrical and physical separation of cables end equipment J associated with redundant elements of the enr, tered safe-guards is provided. All safety related portions of the standby electrical power system conform to safety guide 6 and 9, and IEEE 308 47 '

I

h. The electrical system of Unit 1 is indeperdent of Unit 2, except Startup Transformer No. 2 which is common to both units. 22-8.1 To prevent the concurrent loss of all auxiliary poier the various sources j of power are independent of and isolated from each other. The power supply )

and control of equipment providing engineered safeguards is arranged to 22 l ) minimize the possibility of a loss of their operating functions due to I

physical damage.

l v '. l j 8-1 Amendment No. 47 l March 1, 1975 l

8.2 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM DESIGN 8.2.1 NETWORK INTERCONNECTIONS Unit 1 generates electric power at 22 kV which is fed through an isolated phase bus to the main transfomer bank, consisting of three single-phase transformers, where it is stepped up to 500 kV transmission voltage and dalivered to the station switchyard (see Figure 8-1). The 500 kV sub-station design is a ring bus scheme. The 500 kV station switchyard includes one line to the Mabelvale 500 kV substation, one line to the Ft. Smith 500 kV substation, and one line to the Mayflower 500 kV substation. The 161 kV switchyard at the generating station is also a ring bus design and includes one line to the Russellville East 161 kV substation and one line to the Morrilton East 161 kV substation. A bus tie autotransformer bank consisting of three single phase auto-transfomers interconnects the 500 kV and 161 kV systems in the station switchyard. Tbe 22kV tertiary of the autotransformer bank supplies Startup Transfomer No.1 which is identical to the Unit Auxiliary O

O 8-la Amendment No. 53 March 1, 1977

m

... .. 4... cy is obtained by diviaing the arrvi. e wat.er system int.o two (2)

( )

.(/ lu iepenuent circuits, arranged such that the fad lure of any sinsrle vital

omponent uoes not affect t.he required performance of the renninine system.

'the service water pumps are locateu in the int.ahe s tructure. liaw water rat 4 F rauxit.uu is circulated to the coolers located throuchout the plurit.

Ilormally , one put.ip supplies the service water requirements and another the auxiliary cooling water requirements of the plant. One put::p ic 12 strand by pump. During an emergency, the auxiliary cooling load is shed and all pumps. are available for service water cooling duty.

The performance requirernents of the service water system during a nost-accident situation are described in Cection d. Ilormal operational requirements are listed in 't%bles 9-7 ano 9-h.

.br intermediate coolin6 water pumps and heat exchangers are located in the auxiliary building. This closed loop system provides an additional barrier between high-pressure reactor coolant anu service water to prevent an acclitent.al release of racioactivity to the environment. For normal plant shut down, the emergency cooline, pond water supply is used in the decay 28 neat, coolers. The warmed water is returnea to the ererrency coolinc pond.

um service water syctem and intermediate cooling loops are continuously

.unitured for radioactivity and can be isolated as required.

'the operation of the intermediate cooling water pumps and heat exchangers vil L be rotated on a regularly scheduled basis to ensure uniform wear, t.ach of the four (h) reactor building cooling units contains two separate and indepenuent cooling coils, one coil is for nornal operation and one is for emergency operation. The coils used uurinst nornal oneration are served by chilled water to remove the reactor building heat lona. Service water is circulated through the emergency cooline coils to cool the reactor buliuing atmosphere after a II)CA.

The. operat.ien of the service water and interueuinte cooline systems is moni to re.: by t.he folicwing instrumentation.:

Service Water System

a. Pressure indicators on put::p discharge lines. l20

b. liigh uifferential pressure alarms cn basket ctrainers in pump discharge lines.

e. Pressure inuicators and temperature inuicators in supply headers to the service water systen.

4. 1,ow differential pressure alarms acros? *he reactor building

,. service water cooling ceils. 28

( )

y/ e.- 1.adiation t..onitors and alarts o:. cach set of two (2) reactor bi.il ding cooling units.

9-13 Amendment No.'28 August 18, 1972

r. Hadiation monitors and alama en each outlet line from each decay heat cooler.

g. Motor bearing high temperature alam.

h. Remotely operated valve position indication.

1. Pump trip alams in control room. 28

j. Hour counters en the pump breakers. 53 Intermediate Cooling System

a. Pressure indicators and low pressure alarms on pump discharge lines.

b. Local level indicators on the intermediate cooling system surge tanks. 28

c. Pressure indicators on control rod drive pump discharge lines.

d. Temperature indicator and alarm on control rod drive cooling coils supply line.

e. Flow element and temperature indicator and alarm on control rod drive cooling coils outlet line.

f. Sight flow indicator and temperature alarm on instrument and service air compressors cooling water outlet lines.

g. Flow elements on reactor coolant pterps cooling water heat exchangers.

I l

l

)

i Ol 9-13a Amendment No. 53 March 1, 1977

ry Kiwi ri, power is supplied to the statica switchyard by five separate

) tr.numission lines. Three lines , one from the Mabelvale substation, 53

(

's_/ une from the Ft. Smith substation, and one from the Mayflower substation, feed the 500 kV ring bus. The remaining two lines , one line from the Russellville East substation and the other frcm the Morrilton East substation, feed the 161 kV ring bus. Two physically independent circuits with startup transformers sized to carry full plant auxiliary loads are provided from the station switchyard to the onsite electrical distribution system. Startup trans fotner No.1 is supplied by the auto-'

transformer bank through underground cables, and statrup transformer No. 2 is supplied by the 161 kV ring bus.

The onsite electrical distribution system arrangement minimizes the vulnerability of vital circuits to physical damage. Two independent circuits can supply power from the different offsite transmission lines through the corresponding transformer to safety oriented components during operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions.

If either offsite power source and all onsite AC power sources are lost, specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary will not be exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences, and the core vill be cooled and the reactor building integrity and other vital functions will be maintained in the event of postulated accidents. The remaining offsite power source vill continue to maintain power, without interruption, to the 4160 and 6900 volt b us es . Both offsite power sources are designed for non-interrupted availibility during a loss-of-coolant accident and the two

[m

\s_,/

\ diesel generators are designed for a maximum starting of 15 seconds from admission of starting air to rated voltage and frequency. Normally, the two k160 volt engineered safeguards buses are fed on a one-for-one basis from the ma .a buses. Upon loss of normal (auxiliary transfccmer) and standby (offsite) power sources, the two 4160 volt engineerec ::feguards buses are each energized from their respective diesels. The de system is designed to provide continuous power for control, instrumentation, reactor protection and engineered safeguard systems, safeguard actuation control systems and other loads for normal operation and orderly shutdown. Two independent and physically separated 125 volt batteries mid de control centers are provided for the vital instrumentation, distribution panels, emergency lighting and motors. Each battery is sized to carry the continuous emergency and vital ac load for a minimum period of two hours in addition to supplying power for the operation of momentary loads during the two hour period.

Provisions are included to minimize the probability of losing electrical power from the remaining sources as a result of, or coincident with, a loss of the nuclear power unit, the transmission network, or the onsite power sources. With a loss of the electrical power generated by the nuclear power unit, auxiliary plant loads will be shifted automatically I by fast acting bus transfer devices to the offsite power source fed through the startup transformers while the kl60 and 6900 volt vill continue to receive offsite power. With the loss of offsite power to the r'~'S engineered safeguards buses, the associated bus is cleared of all

( ) auxiliaries and ties prior to application of the associated diesel

'# generator. This prevents loss of the diesel generator as a result of an offsite power fault. Because of the design of the fault protection I

Amendment No. 53 March 1, 1977 le  !

( cy.:t em there is a low probability that loss of the onsite diesel

')

(_,,/ generator pcuer sources could cause loss of either the offsite or nuclear unit electrical pcwer sources.

GINGLE FAILURE AITALYSIS FOR ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS This analysis establishes that:

1. In the~ event of main unit trip, the auxiliary plant load will be shifted automatically to the off-site power source.

2. With the loss of off-site power to the safeguard busses, the 42 associated bus is cleared of all auxiliary loads and ties prior to the application of the associated diesel generator.

3 It further establishes that a single failure vill not jeopardize the redundancy and the safety of the engineered safeguard system.

EVENT FAILURE Comments Main Unit Trip Relay 286-01-1 or Relay Failure of cne [

286-01-2 of these two re- l 53 lays will not I prevent tripping of the Unit Auxiliary

{'si 5 transformer circuit

\' breaker (C.B. 152-112).

One normally open contact of each of the two relays is connected in parallel in the trip circuit of the circuit breaker (152-112), sc that the closure of either h2 contact will trip this breaker and permit transferring to the off-site power.

However, failure of the relay 286-G1-2 vill prevent the fast automatic closing of the start-up trans-former #1 circuit breaker (152-113) or the start-up transformer #2 feeder circuit breaker (152-111)

(/}.

17 Amendment No. 53 March 1, 1977

l I

m l

l

. EFFECTIVE I.IST OF PAGES FOR ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE-UNIT I FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (Through Amendment No. 51) 4

'Page Amend. Page Amend. Page Amend.

No. No. No. No. No. No.

VOLlME I i 21 1-15 Orig. 1-53 '36 Li Orig. 1-16 Orig. 1-54 43 iii Orig. 1-17 Orig. 1-55 38 iv 21 1-18 Orig. 1-56 43 v Orig. 1-19 Orig. 1-57 43 vi Orig. 1-20 Orig. 1-58 36 vil 22 1-21 Orig. 1-59 36 -

Orig.

viii Orig. 1-22 1-60 36 ix Orig. 1-23 Orig. 1-61 36 l x Orig. 1-24 Orig. 1-62 25 xi 27 1-25 Orig. 1-62a 25 CilAPTER I 1-26 Orig. 1-63 Orig.

1-i 21 1-27 Orig. 1-64 36

.1-il Orig. 1-28 Orig. 1-65 36 1-11i Orig. 1-29 Orig. 1-66 Orig.

1-iv Orig. 1-30 Orig. 1-67 36 1-v ' Orig. 1-31 Orig. 1-68 Orig.

1-vi Orig. 1-32 Orig. 1-69 Orig.

1-vii Orig. 1-33 Orig. 1-70 49 1-viii 31 1-34 Orig. 1-70a 49 1-vilia 31 1-35 37 1-71 49 1-ix 21 1-36 37 1-71a 21 1-x 21 1-37 37 1-71b 28 1-1 47 1-38 37 1-71c 28 1-la- 47 1-39 Orig. 1-71d 28 1-2 Orig. 1-40 43 1-3 22 1-41 43 1-4 Orig. 1-42 42 1-5 Orig. 1-43 21 1-6 Orig. 1-44 43 1-7 Orig. 1-45 43 1-8 Orig. 1-46 27 1-9 ' Orig. 1-47 Orig.

1-10 Orig. 1-48 43 1-11. Orig. 1-49 Orig.

] 1-12 45 1-50 43 1-13 Orig. 1-51 Orig.

1-14 . Orig. 1-52 43

. EP'-1 Amendment No. 53 March 1, 1977

PZgo Amend. Page Amend. Page Amend.

No. No. No. No. No. No.

1-71e 37 2-v Orig. Fig. 2-7 Or'. g .

1-72 Orig. 2-vi 21 Fig. 2-8 Orig.

1-73 Orig. 2-1 26 Fig. 2-9 Crig.

1-74 Orig. 2-2 Orig. Fig. 2-10 Orig.

1-75 Orig. 2-3 Orig. Fig. 2-11 Orig.

1-76 Orig. 2-4 Orig. Fig. 2-12 Orig.

1-77 Orig. 2-5 Orig. Fig. 2-13 Orig.

1-78 Orig. 2-6 Orig. Fig. 2-14 drig.

1-79 53 2-7 37 Fig. 2-15 Orig.

1-80 2-7a 37 Fig. 2-16 Orig.

30 1-81 30 2-8 Orig. Fig. 2-17 Orig.

1-82 53 2-9 21 Fig. 2-18 Orig.

1-83 2-9a 21 Fig. 2-19 Orig.

30 1-84 30 2-10 Orig. Fig. 2-20 Orig.

1-85 30 2-11 Orig. Fig. 2-21 Orig.

1-86 53 2-12 Orig. Fig. 2-22 Orig.

1-87 30 2-13 Orig. Fig. 2-23 Orig.

1-88 30 2-14 38 Fig. .

2-24 Orig.

1-89 53 2 -14 a 23 Fig. 2-25 Orig.

1-90 30 2-15 Orig. Fig. 2-26 Orig.

1-91 53 2-16 Orig. Fig. 2-27 Orig.

1-92 30 2-17 Orig. Fig. 2-28 Orig.

2-18 n rig. Fig. 2-29 Orig.

1-93 53 1-93a 53 2-19 53 Fig. 2-30 Orig.

1-94 21 2-19a 23 Fig. 2-31 21 1-95 21 2-20 21 Fig. 2-32 31 1-96 44 2-20a 21 Fig. 2-33 33 Fig.1-1 Orig. 2-21 31 Fig. 2-34 21 Fig.1-2 Orig. 2-22 31 CilAPTER 3 Fig.1-3 41 2-22a 38 3-i Orig.

Fig.1-4 41 2-22b 38 3-ii orig.

Fig.1-5 41 2-23 Orig. 3-iii Orig.

Fig.1-6 41 2-24 Orig. 3-iv Orig.

Fig.1-7 41 2-25 Orig. 3-v Orig.

Fig.1-8 Orig. 2-26 Orig. 3-vi Orig.

Fig.1-9 Orig. 2-27 Orig. 3-vii Orig.

Fig.1-10 Orig. 2-28 Orig. 3-viii Orig.

Fig.1-11 41 2-29 Orig. 3-ix Orig.

Fig.1-12 36 2-30 Orig. 3-1 Orig.

Fig.1-13 44 2-31 Orig. 3-2 Orig.

Fig.1-14 44 2-32 Orig. 3-3 31 J Fig.1-15 44 2-33 Orig. 3-3a 31  ;

Fig.1-16 24 2-34 21 3-4 31 Fig.1-17 2-35 21 3-5 Orig.

Orig.

Fig.1-18 44 Fig.2-1 Orig. 3-6 Orig. l Fig.1-19 44 Fig.2-2 Orig. 3-7 22 ,

CllAPTER 2 Fig.2-3 Orig. 3-8 28 2-i Orig. Fig.2-4 Orig. 3-9 7?  !

2-ii Fig.2-5 Orig. 3-10 Orig. l 22 2-iii 23 Fig.2-6 Urig. 3-11 Orig. l 2-iv 21 '

EP-2 Amendment No. 53 March 1, 1977

p Page Amend. Page Amend. Page Amend.

No. No. No. No. No. No.

3-12 Orig. 3-61 31 3-110 Orig.

3-13 Orig. 3-62 Orig. 3-111 Orig.

3-14 Orig. 3-63 Ori , . 3-112 31 3-15 Orig. 3-64 Orig. 3-117 Orig..

3-16 Orig. 3-65 Orig. 3-114 Orig.

3-17 Orig. 3-66 28 3-115 Orig.

3-18 Orig. 3-67 Orig. 3-116 Orig.

3-:9 Orig. 3-68 Orig. 3-117 46 3-20 Orig. 3-69 Orig. 3-118 Orig.

3-21 Orig. 3-70 Orig. Fig. 3-1 Orig.

3-22 Orig. 3-71 31 Fig. 3-2 Orig.

3-23. Orig. 3-72 Orig. Fig. 3-3 Orig.

3-24 Orig. 3-73 Orig. Fig. 3-4 Orig.

3-25 37 3-74 22 Fig. 3-5 Orig.

4 3-26 Orig. 3-75 Orig. Fig. 3-6 Orig.

3-27 Orig. 3-76 22 Fig. 3-7 Orig.

, 3-28 Orig. 3-77 Orig. Fig. 3-8 Orig.

3-29 Orig. 3-78 Orig. Fig. 3-9 Orig.

Orig.

3-30 3-79 Orig. Fig. 3-10 Orig.

3-31 Orig. 3-80 36 Fig. 3-11 Orig.

i 3-32 Orig. 3-81 Orig. Fig. 3-12 Orig.

3-33 Orig. 3-82 31 Fig. 3-13 Orig.

• 3-34 Orig. 3-83 37 Fig. 3-14 Orig.

3-35 Orig. 3-84 Orig. Fig. 3-15 Orig.

i 3-36 Orig. 3-85 Orig. Fig. 3-16 Orig.

3-37 Orig. 3-86 Orig'. Fig. 3-17 Orig.

3-38 Orig.. 3-87 26 Fig. 3-18 Orig.

3-39 Orig. 3-88 Orig. Fig. 3-19 Orig.

3-40 22 3-89 Orig. Fig. 3-20 orig.

3-41 Orig. 3-90 Orig. Fig. 3-21 Orig.

3-42 Orig. 3-91 Orig. Fig. 3-22 Orig.

3-43 -Orig. 3-92 31 Fig. 3-23 Orig.

3-44 Orig. 3-93 Orig. Fig. 3-24 Orig.

3-45 Orig. 3-94 nrig. Fig. 3-25 Orig.

3-46 22 3-95 22 Fig. 3-26 Orig.

3-47 Orig. 3-96 22 Fig. 3-27 Orig.

3-48 Orig. 3-97 22 Fig. 3-28 Orig.

3-49 Orig. 3-98 22 Fig. 3-29 Orig.

l 3-50 Orig. 3-99 22 Fig. 3-30 Orig.

3-51 Orig. 3-100 22 Fig. 3-31 Orig.

3-52 Orig. 3-101 Orig. Fig. 3-32 Orig.

l 3-53 22 3-102 Orig. Fig. 3-33 Orig.

3-54 22 3-103 Orig. Fig. 3-34 Orig.

3-55 Orig. 3-104 Orig. Fig. 3-35 Orig.

3-56 31 3-105 Orig. . Fig. 3-36 Orig. .

3-57' Orig. 3-106 -Orig. Fig. 3-37 Orig. '

N 3-58 31 3-107 Orig. Fig. 3-38 Orig.

) 3-59 31 3-108 Orig. Fig. 3-39 Orig.

U ~ 46 3-60, 3-109 . Orig. Fig . 3-40 Orig.

Amendment No. 33 EP-3 '

. larch 1, 1977

Pags Amend. Page Amend. Page Amend.

No. No. No. No. No. No.

Fig. 3-41 Orig. 4-11 . Orig, s-53 Orig.

Fig. 3-42 Orig. 4-12 22 4-54 Orig.

Fig. 3-43 Orig. 4-13 22 4-55 Orig.

Fig. 3-44 Orig. 4-14 Orig. 4-56 Orig.

Fig. 3-45 Orig. 4-15 25 4-57 Orig.

Fig. 3-46 Orig. 4-15a 23 4-58 Orig.

Fig. 3-47 Orig. 4-16 29 4-59 24 Fig. 3-48 Orig. 4-16a 29 4-60 24 Fig. 3-49 Orig. 4-17 Orig. 4-61 Orig.

Fig. 3-50 Orig. 4-18 25 4-62 Orig.

Fig. 3-51 Orig. 4-19 25 4-63 24 Fig. 3-52 Orig. 4-19a 25 Fig. 4-1 44 Fig. 3-53 Orig. 4-20 23 ig. 4-2 Orig.

Fig. 3-54 Orig. 4-20a 23 1r. 4-3 Orig.

Fig. 3-55 Orig. 4-20b 23 . ,s . 4 -4 Orig.

Fig. 3-56 Orig. 4-20c 23 Fig. 4-5 Orig.

Fig. 3-57 Orig. 4-21 Orig. Fig. 4-6 Orig.

Fig. 3-58 Orig. 4-22 Orig. Fig. 4-7 Orig.

Fig. 3-59 53 ,

4-23 Orig. Fig. 4-8 Orig. -

Fig. 3-60 Orig. 4-24 31 Fig. 4-9 Orig.

Fig. 3-61 37 4-25 23 Fig. 4-10 Orig.

Fig. 3-62 Orig. 4-26 Orig. Fig. 4-11 Orig.

Fig. 3-63 Orig. 4-27 31 Fig. 4-12 Orig.

Fig. 3-64 Orig. 4-28 Orig. Fig. 4-13 Orig.

Fig. 3-65 Orig. 4-29 Orig. Fig. 4-14 Orig.

Fig. 3-66 Orig. 4-30 31 Fig. 3-67 Orig. 4-31 Orig. VOLUME II Fig. 3-68 Orig. 4-32 Orig, i 21 Fig. 3-69 Orig. 4-33 Orig. ii Orig.

Fig. 3-70 Orig. 4-34 Orig. iii Orig.

Cl! APTER 4 4-34a 22 iv 21 4-i Orig. 4-35 Orig, v Orig.

4-ii Orig. 4-36 Orig. vi Orig.

4-iii 23 4-37 31 vii 22 4-iv Orig. 4-38 40 viii Orig.

4-v Orig. 4-39 Orig. ix Orig.

4-vi Orig. 4-40 Orig. x Orig.

4-1 44 4-41 Orig. xi 27 4-2 37 4-42 Orig. CHAPTER 5 4-2a 37 4-43 22 5-i 27 4-3 Orig. 4-44 22 5-ii 27 4-4 Orig. 4-45 Orig. 5-iii 27 4-5 Orig. 4-46 Orig. 5-iv 27 4-6 Orig. 4-47 Orig. 5-v 24 4-7 37 4-48 Orig. 5-vi 24 4-7a 37 4-49 31 5-1 Orig.

4-8 Orig. 4-50 Orig. 5-2 Orig.

4-9 22 4-51 Orig. 5-3 28 4-10 Orig. 4-52 Orig. 5-4 Orig.

EP-4 Amendment No. 53 March 1, 1977

v i *

? - Ame'nd . Page Ainend . Page Amend.

g;g

~.

.

i

' ( Pake5

'No.- e - No .1 - No . .No. No. No.

.t f5-5; Orig. * ' 5-41a - '23 . 6-12 Orig. -;

15-6. Orig. 5-42! ~38 6-13 Orig.

_5-7 -Orig. 5-43 Orig. 6-14 27 ,

5 23 44~ 24 6-15_ Orig.

5-8a' l23 '5-44a 23 6-16 Orig.

.

5-9 22 5-45 Orig. 6-16a 25 i'

!5-10l 43 5-46 Orig. 6-16b 46 F '

5-10a- 124 5-47 38 6-16c 26

• 10b 24 5-48 28_ 6-16d' 26-5-11l -Orig. 5-48a 28 6-16e 28 5-12 Orig. 5-49 '24 6-16f 28

[4 .5-13 Orig. 5-50 24. 6-16g 31

'- 5-14 Orig. '5-51 24 6-16h 34 j 5-15 22 5-52 24 6-16i 34 6-16j 5-15a- 38 T. 5-1(p.1) 41 34 5 Orig. T. 5-1(p.2) 51 6-17 31 i

5-17 Orig. T. 5-1(p.3) 30 6-18 45 5-18 Orig. T. 5-1(p.4) 30 6-19 45 -

5-19 Orig. T. 5.-1 (p . 5) 30 6-20 Orig. -

- .5-20 Orig. T. 5-1(p.6) 41 6-21 21 5-21 24 T. 5-1 (p.7) 30 6-22 Orig.

5-21a 24 T. 5-2 24 6-23 Orig.

' 5-22 24 Fig. 5-1 Orig. 6-24 Orig.

"5-22a 24 Fig. 5-2 Orig. 6-25 Orig.

'5-23 : Orig. 'ig. 5-3 Orig. 6 Orig.

5 Orig. ' ig . 5-4

. Orig. 6-27 Orig.

5-25 ~ Orig. Fig.

5-5 Orig. 6-28 Orig.

_ 5 Orig.- Fig. 5-6 30 6-29 Orig.

{ 5 Orig. Fig.-5-6A 30 T. 6-13(p.1) 45 5 23 Fig. 5-7. 31 T.'6-13(p.2) 26

5-28a' 23 Fig. 5-8 24 Fig. 6-1 37 i_ '5-28b. 28 Fig. 5-9 24 Fig. 6 37

,: 5-28c. 23 Fig. 10 27 Fig. 6-3 49 t 5-29 28 CllAPTER 6 Fig. 6-4 44 1 5 Orig. 6-i' Orig. Fig. 6-5 Orig, f 5-31 _23: ~ 6-ii 22' Fig. 6-6 43

! 5-31a 24 6-iia . 31 Fig. 6-7 Orig.

5-32 143- 6-iii 26 Fig. 6-8 Orig.

_

5-32a .43 6-iv 28 Fig. 6-9 Grig.

F 15-33 Orig. 6-l'. Orig. Fig. 6-10 46 5-34: . Orig. 6-2' Orig. Fig. 6 28

[ '. ' 5 - 3 5 . Orig. 6 Orig CllAPTER 7 t

5-361 '22 6-4 37 7-i Orig.

5-37, -- 2 2 ~ 6-5 _ Orig. 7-ii Orig. ,

LS-38 l22 6-6_ Orig. 7-lii 24 35-38a 28: 6-7 -31 7-iv Orig. 1 39 Orig. 6-8 Orig. 7- y Orig.

t

5-40 j0 rig. 6' '

37 7-1 46-p ( '

(5-40a- 22' 23' 16-10 Orig. 7-2 37 i' !5-41 6-11: Orig. 7-3. Orig.

1 1 .

t.. .EP-5 Amendment No. 53 ,

[ March 1,:1977~ '

U

\

.. __ - _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ . , _ _ , , _ ..:n . . . . _ . _ _ _ , . _ . - , , , . - . . , - , - , _ . _ , , . , , , -

Paga Amend. Page Amend. Page Amend.

No. No. No. No. No. No.

7 -4 Orig. 7-45 24 8-3 Orig.

7-5 49 7-4 5a 37 8-4 42 7-52 22 7-46 Orig. 8-5 38 7-6 Orig. 7-47 37 8-Sa 23 77 Orig. 7-48 Orig. 8-6 47 7-8 Orig. 7-49 46 8-6a 23 7-9 Orig. 7-50 Orig. 8-7 23 7-10 Orig. 7-51 44 8-7a 23 7 11 31 7-52 22 8-8 22 7-12 Orig. 7-53 Orig. 8-8a 42 7-13 Orig. 7-54 Orig. 8-8b 36 7-14 Orig. 7-55 Orig. 8-8c 28 7-15 46 7-56 36 8-8d 28 7-15a 46 7-57 46 8-9 38 7-15b 46 7-58 46 8-10 45 7-15c 46 Fig. 7-1 36 Fig. 8-1 45 7 -15d 46 Fig. 7-2 Orig. Fig. 8-2 Orig.

7-16 Orig. Fig. 7-3 Orig. CHAPTER 9 7-17 Orig. Fig. 7-4 Orig. 9-1 21 7-18 22 Fig. 7-5 Orig. 9-ii Orig.

7-19 Orig. Fig. 7-6 Orig. 9-lii 21 7-20 Orig. Fig. 7-7 Orig. 9-iv Crig.

7-21 Orig. Fig. 7-8 Orig. 9-v Orig.

7-22 47 Fig. 7-9 Orig. 9-1 Orig.

7-23 22 Fig. 7-10 Orig. 9-2 Orig.

7-24 47 Fig. 7-11 Orig. 9-3 Orig.

7-25 22 Fig. 7-12 Orig. 9 -4 Orig.

7-26 22 Fig. 7-13 Orig. 9-5 Orig.

7-27 44 Fig. 7-14 Orig. 9-6 Orig.

7-28 22 Fig. 7-15 Orig. 9-7 47 7-29 22 Fig. 7-16 Orig. 9-8 42 7-30 22 Fig. 7-17 Orig. 9-9 Orig.

7-31 46 Fig. 7-18 Orig. 9-10 42 7-31a 46 Fig. 7-19 Orig. 9-11 28 7-32 22 Fig. 7-20 44 9-12 28 7-32a 22 Fig. 7-21 Orig. 9-13 28 7-33 44 Fig. 7-22 41 9-13a 53 7-34 Orig. Fig. 7-23 Orig. 9-14 Orig.

7-35 22 Fig. 7-24 Orig. 9-14a 26 7-36 44 Fig. 7-25 47 9-14b 26 7 - 3'i 44 Fig. 7-26 Orig. 9-15 28 7-37a 24 Fig. 7-27 46 9-15a 28 7-38 22 Cl! APTER 8 9-16 28 7-39 Orig. 8-i 38 9-17 Orig.

7-40 Orig. 8-11 38 9-18 27 7-41 22 8-iii Orig. 9-18a 27 7-42 22 8-1 47 9-19 22 7-43 22 8-la 53 9-20 22 7-44 Orig. 8-2 Orig. 9-21 Orig.

EP-6 Amendment No. 53 March 1, 1977

t

.O Page Amend. Page Amend. Page Amend.

), No. No. No. No.

(

.v No. No.

9-22 Orig. Cl! APTER 10 11-21 Orig.

9-23 30 10-i 28 11-22 Orig.

9-;4 Orig. 10-li 28 11-23 Orig.

. 9-25 Orig. 10-1 41 11-24 Orig.

9-26 33- 10-2 47 11-25 Orig.

9-27 40 10-3 28 11-26 Orig.

9-27a 47 10-4 28 11-27 22 .

9-27b 22 10-5 28 11-27a 22 9-28 28 10-6 49 11-28 28 9-29 28 10-7 46 11-29 37 9-30 28 10-8 43 11-30 36 9-30a 46 10-9 46 11-31 45 9-30b 28 10-10 46 11-31a 37 9-31 31 10-11 46 11-31b 37 9-31a 51 Fig. 10-1 38 11-31c 37 9-31b 24 Fig. 10-2 46 11-32 Orig.

9-32 Orig. Fig. 10-3 46 11-33 Orig.

9-33 22 CHAPTER 11 11-34 31 9-34 Orig. 11-i Orig. 11-35 22 9-35 31 11-ii Orig. 11-36 22 9-36 Orig. 11-iii 22 11-37 Orig.

9-37 Orig. 11-iv Orig.11-37a 22

('"'N 9-38 Orig. 11-1 Orig. 11-38 Orig.

\_,) 9-39' . Orig. 11-2 22 11-39 Orig.

9-40 46 11-3 Orig. 11-40 Orig.

9-40a 46 11-4 Orig. 11-41 45 9-41 Orig. 11-5 Orig. 11-42 45 9-4.' Orig. 11-6 Orig. Fig. 11-1 47 9-43 21 11-7 37 Fig. 11-2 49 44 22 11-7a 37 Fig. 11-3 47 Fig. 9-1 30 11-7b 47 Fig. 11-4 Orig.

Fig. 9-2 Orig. 11-8 Orig. Fig. 11-5 -41 Fig. 9-3 47 11-9 22 Fig. 11-6 41 Fig . 9-4 44 11-9a 22 Fig. 11-7 41 Fig. 9-5 47' 11-10 37 Fig. 11-8 41 Fig. 9-6 44 11-11 31 Fig. 11-9 Orig.

Fig. 9-67. 28 11-11a 37 CIIAPTER 12

' Fig. 9-6B Orig. 11-12 22 12-i 49 47 11-13 Fig. 9-7 Orig. 12-ii 49 Fig.'9-8 46 11-14 Orig. 12 49 Fig. 9-9' 31 11-15 22 12-2 49 Fig. 9-10 49 11-15a 22 12-3 49 Fig. 9-10a 26 11-15b 22 12-3a 49 Fig. 9-11 44 11-16 Orig. 12-3b 49 Fig.-9-12 l31 11-17 Orig. 12-3e 49 Fig. 9-13 30 11-18 Orig. 12-3d 49

'N, -Fig. 9-14 31 11-19 22 12 4 49

- Fig. 9-15 24 11-19a 22 12 4a 36

-Y ') Fig.-9-16 47 11-20 33 12-5 28 12-6 28 12-7 28 12-8 28 12-8a 26 EP-7 - Araendment No. 53

?! arch 1 3__1277.

Page Amend. Page Amend. Page Amend.

No. No. No. No. No. No.

12-9 28 12-10 31 13-36 38 14-6 27 12-11 31 13-37 26 14-7 22 12-12 31 13-38 41 14-7a 27 12-13 44 13-39 41 14-8 Orig.

Fig. 12-1 49 13-40 26 14-9 Orig.

Fig. 12-1A 49 13-41 26 14 -10 Orig.

Fig. 12-2 49 13-42 26 14-11 47 Cl! APTER 13 13-43 46 14-12 24 13-1 26 13-44 46 14-13 Orig.

13-ii 26 13-45 46 14-14 d2 13-1 37 13-46 46 14-15 Orig.

13-la 36 13-47 46 14-16 Orig.

13-lb 36 13-48 46 14-17 Orig.

13-Ic 26 13-49 46 14-18 Orig.

13-Id 26 13-50 26 14 -19 27 13-2 31 13-51 26 14-20 Orig.

13-3 31 13-52 37 14-21 Orig.

13-4 Orig. 13-53 46 14-22 Orig.

13-5 41 Fig. 13-1 44 14-23 Orig. -

13-6 Orig. 14-24 Orig.

13-7 38 VOLISIE III 14-25 38 13-8 Orig. i 21 14-26 Orig.

13-9 26 ii Orig. 14-27 Orig.

13-10 26 iii Orig. 14-28 Orig.

13-11 26 iv 21 14-29 22 13-12 26 Y Orig. 14-30 22 13-13 38 vi Orig. 14-31 Orig.

13-14 31 vii 22 14-32 Orig.

13-15 31 viii Orig. 14-33 0:: ig .

13-16 31 ix Orig. 14-34 31 13-17 26 x Orig.14-34a 31 13-18 26 xi 27 14-35 Orig.

13-19 26 Cl{ APTER 14 14-36 Orig.

13-20 26 14-i 31 14-37 Orig.

13-21 26 14-11 31 14 Orig.

13-22 26 14-iii Orig. 14-39 31 13-23 44 14-iv Orig. 14-40 Orig.

13-24 26 14-v Orig. 14-41 Orig.

13-25 26 14-vi Orig. 14-42 Orig.

13-26 26 14-vii Orig. 1J -4 3 Orig.

13-27 26 14-viii Orig. 14-44 Orig.

13-28 26 14-ix 37 14-45 Orig.

13-29 26 14-x 37 14-46 Orig.

13-30 .:6 14-1 Orig. 14-47 Orig.

13-31 26 14-2 Orig. 14-48 Orig.

13-32 26 14-3 Orig. 14-49 Orig.

13-33 26 14-4 Orig. 14-50 Orig.

13-34 26 14-5 27 14-51 Orig.

, 13-35 26 14-Sa 27 14-52 Orig.

EP-8 Auendment No. 53

.tarch 1,1977

/sm) Page Amend. Page _ Amend. Page Amend.

(,,,[ No. No. No. No. No. No.

Orig.

14-53 14-93 31 Fig. 14-30 Orig.

14-54 Orig. 14-94 . Orig. Fig. 14-31 Orig.

14-55 Orig. 14-95 Orig. Fig. 14-32 Orig.

14-56 Orig. 14-96 Orig. Fig. 14-33 Orig.

14 Orig. 14-97 Orig. Fig. 14-34 Orig.

14-58 Orig. 14-98 Orig. Fig. 14-35 Orig.

14-59 Orig. 14-99 Orig. Fig. 14-36 Orig.

14-60 Orig.14-100 Orig. Fig. 14-37 Orig.

14-61 Orig.14-101 31 Fig. 14-38 Orig.

14-62 Orig.14-102 Orig. Fig.-14-39 Orig.

14-63 Orig.14-103 Orig. Fig. 14-40 Orig.

14-64 Orig.14-104 Orig. Fig. 14 41 Orig. ~

14-65 Orig.14-105 Orig. Fig. 14-42 Orig.

14-66 Orig.14-106 Orig. Fig. 14-43 Orig.

14-67 -Orig.14-107 22 Fig. 14-45 Orig.

14-68 33 14-108 31 Fig. 14-46 Orig.14-68a 37 14-109 22 Fig. 14-47 Orig.- 14-68b 37 14-110 31 Fig. 14-48 Orig.- 14-68c 37 14-111 31 Fig. 14-49 Orig.14-68d 37 Fig. 14-1 Orig. Fig. 14-50 Orig.14-68e 37 Fig. 14-2 Orig. Fig. 14-51 Orig.

p r~ss14-68f 37 Fig. 14-3 Orig. Fig. 14-52 Orig.

)14-68g 37 Fig . 14-4 Orig. Fig. 14-53 Orig.

s- / ~ _14-68h 37 Fig. 14-5 Orig. Fig. 14-54 Orig.14-681 37 Fig. 14-6 Orig. Fig. 14-55 Orig.

14-69 31 Fig. 14-7 Orig. Fig. 14-56 Orig.

14-70 31 Fig. 14-8 Orig. Fig. 14-57 Orig.

14-71 46 Fig. 14-9 Orig. Fig . 14 -58 Orig.

14-72 Orig. Fig. 14-10 Orig. Fig. 14-59 Orig.

14-73 22 Fig . 14 -11 Orig. Fig. 14-60 Orig.

74 Orig. Fig. 14-12 Orig. Fig. 14-61 Orig.

14-75 37 Fig. 14-13 Orig. Fig. 14-62 Orig.

14 Orig. Fig. 14-14 Orig. Fig. 14-63 Orig.

14-77 Orig. Fig. 14-15 Orig. Fig. 14-64 Orig.

14-78 Orig. Fig. 14-16 Orig. Fig. 14-65 Orig.

14-79 Orig. Fig. 14 Orig. Fig. 14-66 37 14-80 22 Fig. 14-18 Orig. Fig. 14-o7 37 14-81 22 Fig. 14-19 Orig. Fig. 14-68 37 14-82 22 Fig. 14-20 Orig. Fig. 14-69 37 14-83 Orig. Fig. 14-21 Orig. Fig. 14-70 37 14-84' Orig. Fig.14-21A 24 Fig. 14-71 37 14-85 31 Fig. 14-22 Orig. Fig. 14-72 37

.14-86 Orig. Fig. 14-23 Orig. Fig. 14-73 37 14-87_ Orig. Fig. 14-24 Orig. Fig. 14-74 37 88- 31 Fig. 14-25 Orig. Fig. 14-75 37 14-89 31 Fig. 14-26 Orig. Fig. 14-76 37

/'~ i :14-90 . Orig. Fig. 14-27 Orig. Fig. 14-77 37

\'~' [ 14-91 22 Fig. 14-28 Orig. Fig. 14-78 37 14-92' orig. Fig. 14-29 Orig. Fig. 14-79 37 EP-9

^" " *#"

• March 1, 1977 o,

Pags Am:nd. Pcgo Amsnd. Pago Am:nd.

No. No. No. No. No. No.

Fig. 14-80 37 A-8 38 Fig. A-14 38 Fig. 14-81 37 A-9 38 Fig. A-15 38 Fig. 14-82 37 A-10 38 Fig. A-16 38 Fig. 14-83 37 A-11 38 Fig. A-17 38 Fig. 14-84 37 A-12 38 APPENDIX 1 Fig. 14-85 37 A-13 38 1-i 49 Fig. 14-86 37 A-14 38 1-1 49 Fig. 14-87 37 A-15 38 1-2 49 Fig. 14-88 37 A-16 38 1-3 49 Fig. 14-89 37 A-17 38 1-4 49 Fig. 14-90 37 A-18 38 1-5 49 Fig. 14-91 37 A-19 38 1-6 49 Fig. 14-92 37 A-20 38 1-7 49 Fig. 14-93 37 A-21 38 1-8 31 Fig. 14-94 37 A-22 38 1-9 49 Fig. 14-95 37 A-23 38 1-10 51 Fig. 14-96 37 A-24 38 1-11 49 Fig. 14-97 37 A-25 38 1-12 51 Fig. 14-98 37 A-26 38 1-13 49 Fig. 14-99 37 A-27 38 1-14 49 Fig.14-100 37 A-28 38 1-14a 49 Fig.14-101 37 A-29 38 1-14b 49 Fig.14-102 37 A-30 38 1-14c 49 F ig . 14 -103 37 A-31 38 1-14d 49 CilAPTER 15 A-32 38 1-14e 49 This chapter as A-33 38 1-14f 49 contained in A-34 38 1-14g 49 the FSAR is no A-35 38 1-14h 49 longer valid. A-36 38 1-14i 49 It is now A-37 38 1-14j 49 superseded by A-38 38 1-14k 49 the Technical A-39 38 1-141 51 Specifications A-4 0 38 1-14m 49 as issued with A-41 38 1-14n 49 License No. A-4 2 38 1-14o 51 DPR-51. A-4 3 38 1-14p 49 APPENDICES Fig. A-1 36 1-14q 49 APPENDIX A Fig. A-2 36 1-14r 49 A-i 38 Fig. A-3 36 1-14s 49 A-li 38 Fig. A-4 38 1-15 49 A-iii 38 Fig. A-5 38 1-16 24 A-1 Orig. Fig. A-6 36 Fig. 1-1 49 A-2 Orig. Fig. A-7 38 APPENDIX 2A A-3 45 Fig. A-8 38 2.A-i Orig.

A -4 45 Fig. A-9 38 2.A-ii 29 A-4a 45 Fig. A-10 38 2.A-iii Orig.

A-5 Orig. Fig. A-11 38 2.A-iv 29 A-6 38 Fig. A-12 38 2.A-v 29 A-7 38 Fig. A-13 38 2.A-vi 29 EP-10 Amendment !.'o. 53 March 1, 1977 1

I

'p; t

Page Amend. Page Amend. Page Amend.

No. No. No.

G') No. - No . No.

-2.A-1 Orig. 2. A-4 5 Orig. 3A-12a 31 2.A-2 Orig. 2.A-46 Orig. Fig. 3A-1 36

2. A-3 -Orig. 2. A-4 7 29 Fig. 3A-2 22 2.A-4 Orig. 2. A -48 29 Fig. 3A-3 22 2.A-5 Orig. . 2. A-49 29 Fig. 3A-4 22 2.A-6 Orig. 2.A-50 29 Fig. 3A-5 22

2. A -7 Orig. .

2.A-51 29 Fig. 3A-6 22 2.A-8 Orig. 2.A-52 29 Fig. 3A-7 22 2.A-9 Orig. 2.A-53 29 Fig. 3A-8 22

2. A-10 Orig. 2.A-54 29 Fig. 3A-9 22 2.A-11 Orig. 2.A-55 29 Fig. 3A-10 22

2. A -12 Orig. 2.A-56 29 APPENDIX 4 2.A-13 Orig. 2.A-57 31 4-1 33 2.A-14 Orig. 2.A-58 31 4-2 33 2.A-15 ' Orig. Fig. 2A-1 Orig. 4-3 33 2.A-16 29 Fig. 2A-2 Orig. APPENDIX 5 2.A-16a 29 Fig. 2A-3 Orig, i Orig.

2.A-16b 31 Fig. 2A-4 Orig. 5. A-i 28 2.A-16e 31 Fig. 2A-5 Orig. 5.A-ii Orig.

2.A-16d 29 Fig. 2A-6 Orig. 5.A-iii Orig.

2.A-16e 29 Fig. 2A-7 Orig. 5.A-iv Orig.

2.A-17 Orig. Fig. 2A-8 Orig. 5.A-v Orig.

/'~'N '2.A-18 ' Orig. Fig. 2A-9 Orig. APPENDIX 5A kg ,/ 2.A-19 Orig. Fig. 2A-10 Orig. 5. A-1 Orig.

2.A-20 Orig. Fig. 2A-11 Orig. 5.A-2 Orig.

2.A-21 Orig. Fig. 2A-12 Orig. 5.A-3 24

2. A-22 Orig. Fig. 2A-13 Orig. 5.A-4 24

~2.A-23 Orig. Fig. 2A-14 Orig. 5. A-5 28

- 2. A-24 Orig. Fig. 2A-15 29 5.A-6 28 2.A-25 Orig. Fig. 2A-16 29 5. A-7 28 2.A-26 Orig. Fig. 2A-17 29 5.A-8 28 2.A-27 Orig. APPENDIX 3 5 A-9 28 2.A-28 Orig. APPENDIX 3A 5. A-10 28

2. A-29 Orig. 3A-i 22 5. A-11 28 2.A-30 Orig. 3A-ii 31 Fig. SA-1 Orig.

2.A-31 Orig. 3A-iii 22 Fig. 5A-2 Orig.

2.A-32 Orig. 3A-iv 22 Fig. 5A-3 28 2.A-33 Orig. 3A-1 36 Fig. SA-4 28 2.A-34 Orig. 3A-2 22 Fig. 5A-5 28 2.A-35 Orig. 3A-3 22 APPENDIX 5B 2.A-36 Orig. 3A-4 22 5.B-1 Orig.

2.A Orig. 3A-5 22 5.B-2 Orig.

2.A-38 Orig. 3A-6 22 APPENDIX SC 2.A-39 Orig. 3A-7 31 S.C-1 Orig.

2.A-40 Orig. 3A-8 22 5.C-2 Orig.

2.A Orig. 3A-9 31 5.C-3 Orig.

. 2.A-42 Orig. 3A -10 31 5.C-4 Orig.

2.A-43 Orig. 3A-11 31 2.A-44 Orig. 3A-12 31 J

Amendment No. 53 EP-11 51 arch 1, 1977

.c~

Pago Amend. Page Amend. Page Amend.

No. No. No. No. No. No.

APPENDIX SD APPENDIX SL 1.3 25 5.D-1 Orig. 5.L-1 37 1.3a 25 5.D-2 Orig. 5.L-2 37 1.4 22 APPENDIX SE 5.L-3 37 1.5 25 l 5.E-1 Orig. 5. L-4 37 1.7 22 APPENDIX SF 5.L-5 37 1.8 l 25 l 5.F-1 Orig. 5.L,6 37 1.8a 25 5.F-2 Orig. 5.L-7 37 1.10 27 5.F-3 Orig. 5.LJ 37 1.10a 47 5.F-4 Orig. 5.L-9 37 1.11 31 5.F-5 Orig. 5,L-10 37 1.12 27 5.F-6 Orig. 5.L-11 37 1.14 27 Fig. SF-1 Orig. 5.L-12 37 1.15 27 Fig. 5F-2 Orig. 5.L-13 37 1.15a 42 APPENDIX SG 5.L-14 37 1.18 31 5.G-1 Orig. 5.L-15 37 1.19 31 5.G-2 Orig. 5.L-16 37 1.22 27 5.G-3 Orig. Fig. SL-1 37 1.22a 27 5.G-4 Orig. Fig. SL-2 37 1.24 27 5.G-5 Orig. Fig. SL-3 37 1.27 31 5.G-6 Orig. Fig. SL-4 37 1.28 27 5.G-7 Orig. Fig. SL-5 37 2.5 42 APPENDIX Sil 2.6 25 5 .11 - 1 24 VOLUME IV 2.6a 42 5.H-2 34 i 21 2.6b 25 Fig. 511-1 34 11 Orig. Fig. 2.6-1 25 Fig. 511-2 34 iii Orig. Fig. 2.6-2 25 APPENDIX SJ iv 21 Fig. 2.6-3 25 5.J-1 Orig. v Orig 2.7 28 5.J-2 23 vi Orig. 2.7a 28 5.J-2a 24 vii 22 2.7b 28 Fig. 5J-1 Orig, viii Orig. 2.7c 28 Fig. 5J-2 Orig. ix Orig. 2.7d 20 Fig. 5J-3 Orig. x Orig. 3.2 23 Fig. 5J-4 28 xi 27 3.3 28 Fig. 5J-5 Orig. AEC QUESTIONS 3.4 28 Fig. SJ-6 Orig. i 26 3.5 31 Fig. SJ-7 Orig. 11 26 3.6 28 Fig. 5J-8 Orig, iii 26 3.6a 28 Fig. 5J-9 28 iv 26 3.6b 28 APPENDIX SK v 26 3.6c 28 5.K-1 Orig. vi 27 3.6d 28 5.K-2 Orig. vii 28 3.6e 28 5.K-3 Orig. viii 28 3.6f 28 5.K-4 Orig, ix 28 3.6g 28 5.K-5 Orig. x 28 3.6h 28 5 K-6 24 xi 28 3.6i 28 5.K-7 24 xii 28 4.1 25 Fig. SK-1 Orig. xiii 28 4 la 25 Fig. SK-2 Orig. 1.1 26 4.lb 25 EP-12 Amendment No. 53 March 1, 1977

c. -

.FN .Page Amend. Page- Amend. Page Amend.

No. No.

k% )I .- No. No. No. No.

23 5.62 4.2 Fig. 4.28-8 28 24 4.3 23 Fig. 4.28-9 28 5.63 24 4.3a 23- Fig. 4.28-10 28 5.63a 24 4.7 36 4.29 28 5.65 26 4.7a 26 4.29a- 28 5.67 28 4.7b 23 4.30 28 5.69 28 4.8 25 4.30a 28 5.69a 28 4.9 23 4,30b 28 5.71 28 4.11 25 4.30c 28 5.74- 28 4.12 25 -4.31 28 5.75 28 4.12a 25 4.31a 32 5.77 28 4.12b 25 4.32 35 5.78 28 4.(13-14) 23 4.32A 35 5.79 33 4.15 22 4.32B 35 5.80 31 4.15a 23 4.32C 35 5.80a 28 4.16 23 4.32D 35 5.81 32 Fig. 4.10-1 23 4.32E 35 5.82 31 Fig. 4.10-2 23 4.32F 35 5.83 30 1 4.17 23 4.32G 35 5.84 30 4.18 23 4.32H 35 5.88 30 4.19 23. 4.33 28 6.1 25 4.20 25 4.33a 41 6.3 26 4.20a 25 4.74 31 6.4 23 V- 4.20b 4.22 25 4.35 4.36 28 6.4a 23 25 28 6.5 25 4.22a 25 4.37 29 6.6 24 4.22b 25 5.4 28 6.7 23 4.22c 25 5.4a 24 6.7a 23 4.22d 25 5.6 28 6.8 31 4 4.22e 23 5.13 25 6.9 28 4.23 26 5.13a 25 6.12 28 4.26 25 5.13b 25 6.13 27 4.27 26 5.13c 25 6.13a 27 4.27a 33 5.13d 25 6.14 28 4.28 28 5.13e 25 6.15 27 4.2Sa 28 5.13f 25 6.16 38 4.28b 28 5.13g 25 Fig. 6.16-1 38 4.28c 28 5.13h 25 6.17 28 4.28d 28 5.16 24 6.18 28 1 4.28e -28 5.17 23 Fig. 6.18-1 28 4.28f 28 5.17a 23 6.19 32 4.28g ,

28 5.21 23 6.19a 32 Fig. 4.28-1 28 5.21a 23 Fig. 6.19.1-1 32 Fig. 4.28-2 28 5.22 22 Fig. 6.19.1-2 32 i Fig. 4.28 28 5.25 24 Fig. 6.19.5-1 32 Fig . - 4. 28-4 28 5.25a 24 Fig. 6.19.5-2 32 p)

\ f Fig. 4.28-5 Fig. 4.28-6 28-28 5.40 5.54 24 25 Fig. 6.19.5-3 32=

7.1 23 l

U Fig. 4.28-7 28 5.61 24 7.la 23- I l

EP-13 Amendment No. 53 March 1, 1977 1

P ga Amend. Page Amend. Page Amend.

No. No. No. No. No. No.

7.2 23 Tab. 9-9.2.3 22 Fig. 9.25-2 44 7.3 25 9.4 25 Fig. 9.25-3 28 7.5 25 9.4a 25 Fig. 9.25-4 44 7.Sa 25 9.5 26 9.26 27 7.8 25 9.5a 26 9.26a 27 7.8a 25 9.5b 26 Fig. 9.26-1 27 7.9 42 9.5c 26 9.27 42 7.11 25 Fig. 9.5.1-1 28 9.28 28 7.11a 25 Fib. 9.5.1-2 26 9.29 27 7.12 23 Fig. 9.5.1-3 26 9.30 28 7.13 23 pig. 9.5.2-1 26 Fig. 9.30-1 28 7.14 23 pig. 9.5.2-2 26 9.31 28 7.15 25 pig. 9.5.2-3 26 9.32 28 7.16 23 pig. 9.5.2-4 28 9.33 31 7.18 23 9.6 26 9.34 28 7.19 25 9.6a 26 9.35 28 7.20 22 9.6b 27 9.35a 38 7.21 23 9.6c 37 9.35b 28 7.21a 23 Fig. 9.6.4-1 26 9.36 27 7.22 37 Fig . 9.6.4-2 26 9.37 27 7.24 30 pig. 9.6.4-3 27 Fig. 9.37-1 27 7.27 28 pig. 9.6.4-4 27 Fig. 9.37-2 27 7.28 28 pig. 9.6.4-5 27 Fig. 9.37-3 27 7.29 28 Fig . 9.6.4-6 27 Fig. 9.37-4 27 7.30 27 Fig . 9.6.4-7 27 9.39 27 7.31 34 9.7 28 9.41 27 7.32 27 9.8 36 Fig. 9.41-1 27 8.6 22 9.8a 28 Fig. 9.41-2 27 8.6a 22 9.9 28 9.42 42 Fig. 8.6.1 22 9.10 28 9.43 27 8.8 28 9.11 28 9.44 28 8.10 27 9.12 42 9.44a 28 8.10a 27 9.13 28 9.44b 28 8.12 47 9.14 28 9.44c 28 8.13 27 9.15 28 9.44d 28 Fig. 8.13-1 47 9.16. 28 9.44e 28 8.14 27 pig. 9.16-1 28 9.44f 28 8.15 27 9.17 42 Fig. 9.44-1 28 8.16 28 - 9.18 28 9.45 28 Fig. 8.16-1 28 9.19 42 9.45a 28 Fig. 8.16-2 28 9.20 42 9.46 28 Fig. 8.16-3 28 9.21 27 9.47 34 Fig. 8.16-4 28 9.22 28 9.47a 34

._ Fig. 8.16-5 28 9.22a 28 9.47b 34 9.1 37 9.23 42 9.47c 34 9.la 37 9.24 28 9.47d 34 9.2 22' 9.25 28 Fig. 9.47-1 28 9.2a 22 pig. 9.25-1 28 Fig. 9.47-2 28 EP-14 Anendment Nb. 53 March 1, 1977

4

- /N . Page ' Amend. Page Amend. Page Amend.

(  ? No. No. No. No. . No . No.

9%.2 9.48 28 11.6j. 25 12.11d 41 9.49 42 11.6k 25 12.11e 41 9.50 -28 11.61 31 12.11f 41 9.50a 28 11.6m 31 12.11g 41 9.50b 28 11.6n 31 12.11h 41 9.50c- 28 11.7. 28 12.11i 41

-9.50d 28 11.9 42 12.11j 41 9.50e 28 11.10 28 12.11k 41 i

9.61 27 11.10a 37 12.111 41 9.62 27 11.11 28 12.11m 41 9.63 27 11.12 28 12.11n 41 9.64 28 11.12a 28 12.11o 41 9.65 27 11.13 28 12.11p 41 9.66 27 11.14 28 12.11q 41 9.67 31 11.15 28 12.11r 41 9.68 28 11.16 28 12.11s 41 9.69 47 11.17 28 12.11t 41 4

9.69a 28- 11.17a 28 12.11u 41 .

9.70 28 11.19 28 12.11v 41 9.71 33 11.19a 28 12.11w 41 9.71a 28 11.19b 28 12.11x 41 <

9.71b 28 11.19c 28 12.11y 41

( 9.71c. '3 11.20 28 12.11:: 41

, y 9.72 42 11.21 11.22 27 27 12.11aa 12.11bb 41 9.73 28 'l 9.74 28 11.22a 27 12.11cc 28 9.75 28 11.22b 27 12.11dd 41 9.75a 28 11.23 27 14.1 31 Fig. 9.75-1 28 11.23a 27 14.la 31 Fig. 9.75-2 28 11.24 28 Fig. 14.1-1 31 Fig. 9.75-3 28 11.24a 28 Fig. 14.1-2 31

Fig. 9. 75-4 28 11.25 27 14.2 24

~

9.76 42 11.25a 27 14.2a 24 9.77 28 11.26 27 14.2b 24 10.1 23 11.26a 27 14.2c 24

'10.2 23 11.26b 27 14.3 42 10.1 .28 12.1 26 14.3a 25 10.4a 28 12.2 25 14.4 24 11.3 43 12.4 25 14.5 28 11.6 25 12.5 25 14.6 28 11.6a 31 12.5a 25 14.7 41 11.6b 31 12.6- 36 14.7a 41 11.6c 31 12.7. 25 14.7b 41 11.6d 31 12.8 25 14.7c 41 11.6e 36 12.(9-10) 26 14.8 37 ,

11.6f 31 12.11 41 14.8a 28 12.11a 28 14.9 28 r

_\]j 11.6g 25 12.11b 28- 14.9a 28 11.6h 25 11.6i 25 12.11c 41 Fig. 14.9-1 28 EP-15 Anendment No. 53 starch 1, 1977

Page Amend. Page Amend.

No. No. No. No.

14.10 34 26 25 14.10a 34 27 25 14.10b 34 28 25 14.10c 34 29 25 14.10d 34 30 25 14.10e 34 31 25 14.10f 34 32 25 14.10g 34 33 25 Fig. 14.10.1-1 34 34 25 Fig. 14.10.2-1 34 35 25 Fig. 14.10.3-1 34 36 25 14.11 46 37 25 14.12 33 38 25 14.12a 33 39 25 AS.4 28 40 25 AS.4a 28 41 25 AS.5 28 42 25 43 25 i

RESPONSES TO NEW 44 25 GENERAL DESIGN 45 25 CRITERIA 46 25 47 25 1 25 48 25 2 25 49 25 3 25 50 25 4 25 51 25 5 25 52 26 6 25 53 25 7 25 34 25 8 25 55 25 9 25 56 25 10 25 57 25 11 25 58 25 12 25 59 25 13 25 60 25 14 25 15 25 16 53 17 53 17a 42 17b 42 18 25 19 45 20 25 21 25 22 25 23 25 l

. 24 25 ,

25 25 1 EP-16 Am ndment No. 53 March 1, 1977 1

l

o fM i )

EFFECTIVE LIST OF PAGES FOR ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNIT I FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT EMERGENCY PLAN

_ (Through Amendment 53)

Page No. Amendment No. Page No. Amendment No. Page No. Amendment-No.

i 48 41 Orig. C-12 48 11 Orig. Fig. 1 48 C-13 48 lii 39 Fig. 2 48 C-14 48 iv Orig. Fig. 3 48 C-15 48 v 50 Fig. 4 48 C-16 48 12 Orig. Fig. 5 Orig. C-17 48 2 48 Fig. SA Orig. C-18 48 3 48 Fig. 6 Orig. C-19 48 4 50 Fig. 7 Orig. C-20 48 i 5 48 Fig. 7a 48 C-21 48 6 50 Fig. 7b 48 C-22 48 7 48 Fig. 7c 48 C-23 48 8 Orig. Fig. 7d 48 C-24 48 9 39 Fig. 7e 48 C-25 48 10 48 Fig. 7f 48 C-26 48 48 Fig. 7g 48 C-27 48

-(n}I1-(- 12 Orig. Fig. 7h 48 C-28 48 13- 50 F.ig. 7i 48 C-29 48 14 48 Fig. 7j 48 C-30 48 15 50 Fig. 7k 48 C-31 48 16 48 Fig. 71 48 C-32 48 17 48 Fig. 8 Orig. C-33 48 18 48 Fig. 9 Orig. C-34 48 19 40 Fig. 10(1 of 3) 48 C-35 48 20 Orig. Fig.10(2 of 3) 48 C-36 48 21 48 Fig.10(3 of 3) 48 C-37 48 22 39 Fig. 11 Orig. C-38 48-23 39 APPENDIX A C-39 48 24 48 A-1 50 C-40 48 25 39 APPENDIX B C-41 48 26 39 B-1 48 C-42 48 27 39 B-2 48 APPENDIX D 28 52 B-3 48 D-1 44 29 52 APPENDIX C D-2 Orig.

30 48 C-1 48 D-3 Orig.

31 39 C-2 48 D-4 Orig.

32 Orig. C-3 48 D-5 Orig.

33 39 C-4 48 D-6 Orig.  !

34 48 C-5 48 D-7 Orig.

O 35 Orig. C-6 48 Fig.D-1 Orig.

! 36 .- 4 8 C-7 48 Fig.D-2 Orig.

37 Orig. C-8 48 Fig.D-3 Orig.

38' 52 _C-9 48 Fig.D-4 Orig. i C-10 Fig.D-5 39- '48 48 Orig.

4 L40 39 C-11 48 Fig.D-6 Orig.

EP-17 Amendment .'Jo.

Page Amend. Paga Amend. Page. Amind.

No. No. No. No. No. No.

Fig . 11- 7 Orig. F.1-33 NN F.2-12 NN Fig. D-8 Orig. F.1-34 l NN F.2-13 NN Fig. D-9 Orig. F.1-35 NN F.2-14 NN Fig. D-10 Orig. F.1-36 NN F.2-15 NN Fig. D-11 Orig. F.1-37 NN F.2-16 NN Fig. D-12 Orig. F.1-38 NN F.2-17 NN Fig. D-13 Orig. F.1-39 NN F.2-18 NN APPENDIX E F.1-40 NN F.2-19 NN E-1 52 F.1-41 NN F.2-20 NN E-2 Orig. F.1-42 NN F.2-21 NN E-3 Orig. F.1-43 NN F.2-22 NN E-4 52 F.1-44 NN F.2-23 NN E-5 52 F.1-45 NN F.2-24 NN E-6 Orig. F.1-46 NN F.2-25 NN E-7 Orig. F.1-47 NN F.2-26 NN Fig. E-1 Orig. F.1-48 NN APPENDIX G Fig. E-2 Orig. F.1-49 NN G-1 50 APPENDIX F F.1-50 NN G-2 50 APPENDIX F.1 Title Sheet 50 F.1-51 NN G-3 50 F.1-i Not Numbered (NN) F.1-52 NN G-4 50 F.1-li NN F.1-53 NN G-5 50 _

F.1-iii NN F.1-54 NN G-6 50 F.1-1 NN F.1-55 NN G-7 50 F.1-2 NN F.1-56 NN G-8 50 F.1-3 NN F.1-57 NN G-9 50 F.1-4 NN F.1-58 NN G-10 50 F.1-5 NN F.1-59 NN G-11 50 F.1-6 NN F.1-60 NN G-12 50 F.1-7 NN F.1-61 NN G-13 50 F.1-8 NN F.1-62 NN G-14 50 F.1-9 NN F.1-63 NN G-15 50 F.1-10 NN F.1-64 NN G-16 50 F.1-11 NN F.1-65 NN G-17 50 F.1-12 NN F.1-66 NN G-18 50 F.1-13 NN F.1-67 NN G-19 50 F.1-14 NN F.1-68 NN G-20 50 F.1-15 NN F.1-69 NN G-21 50 F.1-16 NN F.1-70 NN G-22 50 F.1-17 NN F.1-71 NN G-23 50 F.1-18 NN F.1-72 NN G-24 50 F.1-19 NN F.1- 73 NN G-25 50 F.1-20 NN F.1-74 NN G-26 50 F.1-21 NN Appendix F.2 Title Sheet 50 G-27 50 F.1-22 NN F.2-1 NN APPENDIX H F.1- 23 NN F.2-2 NN H-i 39 F.1-24 NN F.2-3 NN 11- 1 O ri g.

F.1-25 NN F.2-4 NN 11-2 O ri g.

F.1-26 NN F.2-5 NN 11-3 Orig.

F.1-27 NN F.2-6 NN H-4 Orig.

F.1-28 NN F.2-7 NN H-5 Orig. -

F.1-29 NN F.2-8 NN 11- 6 50 F.1-30 NN F.2-9 NN 11-9 Orig.

F.1-31 '

..N F.2-10 NN  !!-10 O ri g.

F.1-32 NN F.2-11 NN H-11 Ori g .

EP-18 Amendment No. 53 March 1, 1977

. . , , . . .. . . . . . ~ . . . -- ., . -. . - - - _ - _ - - - _ _ _ - -

a

_.Pai;e Ameud.

- no ,' ~ts>.

11- 1 2 Orig.

=

11 . Orig.

I 11- 1 4 51

,  !!-15 . Orig.

11 - 1 6 Orig.

11- 1 7 - Orig.

Il-18 Orig, f

11- 1 9 Orig. x

• 11 - 2 0 Orig.. \  :

. 11- 2 1 Orig.

1' 11-22 ' Orig.

11- 2 3 39 '

!!-24 39 11- 2 5 39

) 11- 2 6 39 APPENDIX I' 4 I-1 48 l API'ENDIX J j J-i 52 J-1 -Orig.

,- J-2 Orig.

- J-3 Orig.

J-4 Orig.

. J-5' . Orig.

! J-6 Orig.

l . J-7 . Orig.-

J-8 Orig.

APPENDIX K

K-1 Orig.

K-2 Orig.

K-3 Orig.

~~

K Orig.

K-5 Orig.

[ K-6 O ri g.

K-71 Orig. -

K-8 Orig.

K-9 Orig.

K-10 48 i K-11 48-K-12 48 K-13 48

- K-14 48 l K-15 48 i- K-16 48-1 API'ENDIX L

$ L-1 39 i L-2 48

,{

[, EP-19 Amendment No. 53 i:

?! arch 1,'1977 l

.