ML20196E449
| ML20196E449 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 04/11/1998 |
| From: | ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196E446 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9812040014 | |
| Download: ML20196E449 (145) | |
Text
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNIT-1 AND COMMON DOCKET Nos. 50-313 and 50-368 LICENSE Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR 1998 This report contains a brief description of changes in procedures and in the facility as described in the Safety Analysis Repon (SAR), tests and experiments conducted which were not described in the SAR, and other changes to the SAR for which a safety analysis was conducted. The report also contains a summary of the safety evaluation for each change. Included with this summary repon are those evaluations that were common to both ANO-1 and ANO-2. This repon is applicable for the period from October 25,1996 through April II,1998.
The safety evaluations included in this report were performed in accordance with 10CFR50.59 and deterrnined that none of the changes involved an unreviewed safety question.
9812040014 981130
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CONTENTS SECTIONI PROCEDURE CHANGES SECTION II DESIGN CHANGES SECTIONIII TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS l
SECTION IV MISCELLANEOUS EVALUATIONS 1
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SECTION I PROCEDURE CHANGES 1
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ANO-1 PROC: 1000.042 Rsvi:i::n 11, PC-4 i
l Steam Gensrator Wator Chanistry Monitoring l
ANO relies on Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) documents for guidance on secondary chemistry controls.
Br.W endorses the use of EPRI guidelines for operation of the secondary water chemistry. Revision 4 to the EPRI PWR l
Secondary Water Chemistry Guidelines for Once Through Steam Generators does not require performing suspended solids analysis at greater than 15% power.
Integrated iron and copper samples are taken in place of solids analysis. Daily suspended solids analysis will continue to be performed during startup.
Affected SAR Tables:
4-11, 9-3 l
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the contaminant levels allowed in the procedure were not increased and action i
response times were not decreased.
Cont.aminants will continue to be monitored by integrated samples; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since integrated samples, which are more accurate, will be taken in place of suspended solid samples.
i No new corrosion mechanisms were introduced by this change; l
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(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since feedwater suspended solids was not a parameter used in a margin of safety as defined in the l
Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 PROC: 1000.120 R3 vill::n 8 Firo Watch Program This revision to the SAR clarified the definition of a continuous fire watch.
Previously, the text implied that a continuous fire watch could rove between different fire areas. The text was revised to state that the watch may rove between different fire zenes as long as they are in the same fire area.
Affected SAR Sections:
9D.l.3, 9D.3.3, 9D.6.3 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since a fire watch is utilized as a compensatory measure for a deficiency in the fire protection system and i,s not associated with the operation of any equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the fire watch is not associated with any accidents evaluated in the SAR.
There is no possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety that could be affected by clarifying the requirements of a roving fire watch; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-1 PROC: 1000.141 Rsvizi:n 1 Solid Radiosctivo Managemant Procsss Control Program Due to the availability of waste processing by offsite vendors, and in the interest of economics and efficiency, changes to the Solid Radioactive Management Process Control Program were made to allow a different waste processing sequence to occur.
The process used to transfer and contain the waste did not change.
The waste material will not be prepared for burial on site, but will be packaged in an intermediate state of an existing approved process and transferred in accordance with procedure and regulation for final processing by offsite methods to meet all regulatory and burial site criteria.
Affected SAR Sections:
11.1.3.3.1, 11.1.3.3.2, 11.1.3.3.3, 11.1.3.3.4, 11.1.3.3.6, 11.1.3.3.8 Table:
11-20 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the affected process was not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed accidents.
This process change did not affect any equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since these process changes remained bounded by previously analyzed accident scenarios; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases of any Technical specification since the changes in this process did not conflict with any margins of safety as defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO PROC: 1000.152 R3vi irn 1 PC-4 Firo Protection System Specificationo The 1984 ANO Appendix R reanalysis deteratined that the' suppression system in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Fire zone 2007-LL was no longer required as a result of the installation of the service water pump swing switchgear.
Affected FMA sections:
10.2, 10.8, 9D.3.1.A.1, 9D.3.1.A.S It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence of consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the. safety Analysis Report since the Appendix R separation requirements were met with the installation of the service water pump swing switchgear; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since fire was not an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.
There were no other evaluated accidents impacted by not crediting the suppression systemt in zone 2007-LL; i
or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any I
Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO-1 PROC: 1102.004 R:vi:12n 38 i
Partial Bypass of Dcmineralizers Startup from Refueling Outage IR14 resulted in reactor power being limited below full power due to problems with the condensate demineralizers. This change allowed a partial bypass flow around the demineralizers.
Affected SAR Section:
10.4.6 l
It was determined that these changes did not:
1 (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an j
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the Chemistry Departments involvement in the decision to bypass the polishers ensured operation within established limits and only the minimum condensate flow necessary to meet polisher
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limitations was bypassed. The bypass operation was temporary and was terminated as soon as possible; or, j
l (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluate previously in the safety Analysis Report since this activity does not create a new or different mode of failure; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any i
Technical Specification since the condensate polishers are not relied upon to maintain any margin to safety as defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 PROC: 1104.023 Rzvilian 16 Diosol Oil Transfer Proc 2 dure This procedure revision changed the normal position of fuel oil isolation valve FO-18 from open to closed to minimize a fuel oil spill in the event of a piping failure.
Affected SAR Figure:
8-3 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the position of this valve was not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed accidents.
The change in this valve's normal position does not impact the operation of equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since isolation of the fuel oil transfer piping does not create any new configuration such that an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR would be created; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-1 PROC: 1104.024 Rsvizi:n 24 Instrumsnt Air System This procedure revision was made to support the Instrument Air System upgrade that tied the plant's Inste m nt Air System to the startup Boiler's instrument air system.
Instrument Air (IA) valves IA-263 (providing control air to the vent fan serving the hot machine shop an:- drumming station) and IA-620 (providing air to the secondary sample room AC unit and to various secondary sample analyzers) will remain in the open position for all plant operating conditions.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-14 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence ur consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this change to the IA System did not impact its function as it relates to equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibiity for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this change did not inhibit the ability of the IA System to provide air to pneumatic components located throughout the plant; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 PROC: 1302.025 Spant Fuol Removal and Dry Storaga Operations
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This procedure revision incorporated lessons learned from previous dry fuel l
storage operations.
In addition, this change allows the use of permanent plant nitrogen for drying the Multi-assembly Sealed Basket.
Affected SAR Section:
9.10 l
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or uslfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this change did not affect the primary function of the Nitrogen System; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the Nitrogen System is non-Q and has no safety implications; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since thern were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification baser, l
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ANO-1 PROC: 1402.M7 Temporcry Removal /Repiccament of Oil Containment Barrier This procedure provided instructions for removal of the oil containment barrier located at fire door 39.
During the on-line K43 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) maintenance activity, some heavy items needed to be transported into and out of the EDG room.
These items could not be carried over the barrier. This evaluation considered a massive break of service Water pipe as a potential flooding source.
Service Water is considered a moderate energy line since the pressure in the line does not exceed 300 pai.
During K43 maintenanoe, service Water was isolated to reduoe the probability of K43 EDG room flooding.
It was determined that these changes did not:
(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the source of potential flood water for the affected generator was isolated and a continuous barrier watch was established; or (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the flood barrier was not credited in any previously evaluated accident and temporary removal of the barrier did not affect any equipment other than removing the separation between the EDG rooms; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases, j
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l AND PROC: 1817.009 R;viin 13, TC-2 Post Accident Sampling Syotem Valvo Alignment l
The Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) is required to meet the NRC requirements set forth in NUREG-0737 to provide the necessary sampling and analysis capabilities to assist in accident assessment. Recently, a PASS valve stuck closed, preventing reactor coolant from flowing through the "near line" in the gamma spectroscopy system. Maintenance was able to free the stuck valve during uorrective maintenance activities, however, there were no rebuild kits or spare valves available so that the valves could be replaced / refurbished in order j
to reduos the long term potential for problem recurrence. Until the situation could be resolved, an alternate valve lineup sequence was necessary to support PASS sampling activities.
This modified configuration provided the same effluent monitoring performance as did the routine configuration.
The valves were listed as "out of position" in the control roosa log during this time.
a It was determined that these changes did not:
1 (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an i
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since PASS was not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed accidents. Maintaining the valves in the open position i
reduced the risk of being unable to route the required post accident samples for analysis; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or ualfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since maintaining these valves in the open position reduced the risk of being unable to perform the required post accident sampling; or, (iii) reduon the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since this change in valve lineup minimized the possibility of equipment malfunction until the valves could be replaced.
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ANO PROC: 5120.260
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Inscrvico Incpection Program Implementation i
l This change updated the Inservice Inspection (ISI) prograan to a later edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure vessel Code,Section XI.
This change was j
considered a reduction in commitment since soon of the newer code requiressants j
for inservice inspection were less restrictive than the code requirements to which ANO was previously comunitted. The NRC previously reviewed the IsI plan i
and found the plan to provide an acceptable level of quality and safety.
l It was determined that these changes did not:
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(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an j
accident or smalfunction of equipment important to safety j
evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since these changes j
were administrative or program specific in nature, identifying the s.doption of a new code of Record and l
delineating certain aspects of implesmentation of that new g
Code; or, i
l (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a
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different type than any evaluated previously in the safety 1
Analysis Report since adoption of the latest approved edition j
of the ASME Code did not introduce new plant operating
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conditions or configurations outside those employed for the test itself. The operating condition or configuration j
created for testing purposes was specifically evaluated in i
the context of the specific implementing procedure; or, i
3 (iii) reduce the snargin of safety as defined in the basis of any l
Technical Specification sinoe the new cada does not contain specific allowanoes concerning tims allowed to test valves after startup or the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowance before declaring a 4
l valve inoperable following unsatisfactory test results, thereby eliminating conflict with the Technical specifications.
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ANO PROC: 5120.500 R; vision 6, PC-2 Steam Gen 0 rotor Intcgrity Program Implementntion During a review conducted prior to the use of Technical specification Amanchment 191, an error was identified in the basis for determination of the leakage probability of Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack (ODIGA) indication to remain in service during Cycle 15.
In letter to the NRO, ICAN049803, it was stated that the leak rate for an ODIGA indication was calculated at standard pressure and temperature, consistent with the ANO-1 safety analysis for a Main steam Line Break (MSLB) accident. A subsequent review determined that the safety analysis was not conducted at standard temperature and pressure, therefore the calculated l
leak rate identified in 1CAN049003 must be increased to allow for a temperature correction. The effect of the correction reduced the number of ODIGA indications which could leak in a MSLB accident while maintaining primary-to-secondary leakage less than 0.5 gym from 39 to 27.
Because the number of leaking indications to reach the analysis limit was decreased, the number of insitu/ load tests conducted on ODIGA to be left in service was increased to ensure a 956 confidence of not exceeding the 0.5 gym leakage rate.
The correction resulted in an approximate 1/3 increase in the number of insitu pressure / load tests to be performed above the numbers postulated in the original submittal.
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since leaving the IGA flaws in service did not constitute any change in the probability of a stesa generator tube rupture. These flaws were located within the upper tubesheet where the clearance between the tubesheet hole and the tube is small enough that tube burst could not occur. The affected tubes retained the capability of removing heat from the Reactor Coolant system and any assumed leakage from the IGA flaws remained bounded by the original SAR value; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the max 4== estimated normal or accident j
values of less than or equal to 0.5 gym remained bounded by the allowed SAA leakage of 1 gym; or, (iii) reduos the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the revised numbers ensure the leakage values are at a 956 confidence and still provide assurance that the dose is limited to a small fraction of 10CFR100 values. Testing conducted during Refueling Outage 1R14 confirmed that the margin to safety was not reduced by j
leaving the IGA flaws in service.
ANO-1 PROC: 8120.510 R:vl2 ion 0 Emergrncy Feedwntor POriod Toot, Loop A This procedure was developed to provide guidance for functional testing of the isolated portion of the meergency Feedwater (EFW) piping between the last anotor operated valve isolation and the once through steasa generator check valve isolation at naaninal operating pressure and tesperature to verify flow.
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipament important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this activity will not alter or modify the operation of the motor operated valves, steam generator isolation check valve,12W pumps, or P ping; or, i
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report sinoe this activity does not alter or modify' any couponents important to safety. This test only pressurises the identified piping at stensa generator nosainal operating pressure for which the piping is designed. The pressure tubing, fittings, and needle valve connected between the vent and drain valves are rated in excess of 2000 psi and the test is performed at approxianately 875 psig; or, (iii) reduos the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Tec.hnical specification since this activity does not interfere with the Technical specification requirement for functional testing of this piping performed during shutdown.
ANO-1 PROC: 5120.511 R; vision 0 i
Emerg ncy Fcedw3 tor Period Proccuro Toot, Loop D This procedure was developed to provide guidance for functional testing of the isolated portion of the Emergency Feedwater (ETW) piping between the last motor operated valve isolation and the once through steam generator check valve isclation at nominal operating pressure and tesperature to verify flow.
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this activity will not alter or modify the operation of the motor operated valves, steam generator isolation check valve, E N pumps, or i
piping; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety I
Analysis Report since this activity does not alter or modify any components important to safety. This test only pressurizes the identified piping at steam generator nominal operating pressure for which the piping is designed.
The pressure tubing, fittings, and needle valve connected between the vent and drain valves are rated in excess of 2000 psi and the test is performed at approximately 875 psig; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since this activity does not interfere with the Technical specification requirement for functional testing of this piping performed during shutdown.
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--m SECTIONII DESIGN CHANGES
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ANO-1 DCP: 93-1009 Main Chillor Replccement i
This design change replaced the main chillers with new chillers that utilize R-22, an EPA acceptable alternative to the previously used CFC regrigerant, R-11, scheduled to be banned from production.
The replacement chillers are two fully redundant York International rotary screw liquid chilling units, each capable of supporting the entire peak system load with approximately 10% reserve capacity for future system expansion.
In order to support these larger replacement chillers and return main chilled water system operation to a single chiller configuration, a new independent Main Chiller Cooling Water System was provided.
Affected SAR Figurce:
1-10, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5, 1-0, 8-1, 9-1, 9-14, 9-7, 9-9, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-6 Sections:
8.3.1.1.4, 9.3.2.1 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not impact equipment credited with initiating or mitigating any previously analyzed accident, did not affect the function or performance of the main chilled water system, and did not adversely impact any equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification installed equipment of similar form and function and did not alter the extent, type, or quality of interaction between the main chillers and equipment important to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the ability of the main chillers to I
support maintaining normal containment pressure, temperature, and humidity within established limitations was not affected by this modification.
ANO-1 DCP: 94-1019 i
Hydrog n Purga System Train "A" Removal i
4 This design change package removed the Unit 1 Hydrogen Purge System train "A",
also referred to as the red train.
Phase 1 of this modification removed all train "A" components, piping, and supports up to the blank flanges used for hydrogen purge isolation.
Control Room indication and switches were also removed.
Phase 2 removed the blank flanges and outboard containment isolation valves and cut and capped the hydrogen purge portion of the outboard containment
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l penetration piping.
This modification removed two containment isolation valves from the Local Leak Rate Test program, improved accessibility to the Lower South Piping Penetration Room, and eliminated unnecessary Control Room indication.
Affected SAR Figures:
5-7, 6-10, 9-18, 9-20, 9-5, 9-6 Sections:
6.6.2.1, 6.6.2.3.1 Table:
5-1 It was determined that these changes did not:
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(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the Hydrogen Purge i
System was not evaluated as an initiator of any analyzed accident, this modification did not create any new pathways for the release of radioactivity, and containment integrity was maintained by replacing the valves with welded pipe caps in accordance with ASME Section III Class 2 requirements; or, i
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since terminations of piping and wiring were performed in accordance with ASME Code, industry standards, and ANO procedures and the hydrogen recombiners and samplers were unaffected by this change; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no margins of safety associated with the Hydrogen Purge System defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 DCP: 95-1004 Installation of the Control Room Elevated Consolo This design change replaced main operator console, C93, in the Unit 1 Control Room with an elevated console similar in design to that of ANO-2.
C93 serves as a workstation for the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) and also houses the computer equipment necessary to access the Safety Parameter Display System.
The new console is a larger, elevated work station located against the east wall of the primary operating area in the Control Room.
This modification also installed several computers and related monitors in the Control Room to provide access to the site network and the Plant Monitoring System.
The placement of the monitors neither obstructs the view nor distracts operators from the Control Room front consoles and panels. Main annunciator acknowledge / reset pushbuttons were installed on the censole to provide the CRS the capability to acknowledge annunciators following a trip, thus freeing the board operators to respond more efficiently. A fire tone button was also located in the console.
Affected SAR Figure:
7-25 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since none of the previously evaluated accidents were affected by these changes j
in the operator work station, this modification maintained the control Room habitability, seismic, and fire protection requirements, and no equipment important to safety was impacted; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not introduce any new modes of failure; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-1 DCP: 95-1010 l
Main Feedpump Turbino Suparvicory Instrum2ntation i
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This design change replaced the Main Feedpump Turbine Supervisory j
Instrumentation (MFP TSI) originally supplied by Westinghouse, with a microprocessor driven Machinery Health Monitoring System supplied by GEC Alsthom and Lovejoy Controls Corporation.
The MFP TSI System consists of detector elements which monitor turbine and pump bearing temperature, shaft vibration, eccentricity, and bearing wear / shaft endplay.
a Affected SAR Figure:
10-2 It was determined that these changes,did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an j
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety f
evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the new system incorporates a two-of-two sensor redundancy trip logic.
Redundancy in MFP TSI trip circuits will increase their reliability and failure tolerance, and thereby reduce j
challenges to safety systems and decrease the likelihood of causing safety equipment malfunction; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since no credible malfunctions of equipment i
important to safety were identified as a result of these changes; or, i
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any l
I Technical Specification since this modification did not impact j
any margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification j
bases.
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ANO-1 DCP: 951018D101 Main Cond nsor Tubo Bundlo and Watorbox Replac mant This design change replaced the original main condenser tube bundles and waterboxes supplied by Westinghouse Electric Company with shop fabricated titanium tube bundles and carbon steel waterboxes supplied by Senior Engineering Company.
The new design incorporated several reliability improvements to include solid titanium tubes and tubesheets, rolled and sealed welded tube
-)oint s, 22 inch support plate spacing, a more efficient tube bundle design, and a re-designed air removal section. All connections to the inlet and outlet waterboxes were replaced with stainless steel components.
This modification also installed a cathodic protection system to protect the new carbon steel waterboxes from corrosion.
Some additional instrumentation was added to the waterboxes and condenser shell for performance testing and troubleshooting.
Other changes included a decrease in the normal hotwell level from 50 to 40 inches, a 2.4 percent increase in circulating water flow rate, a decrease in the temperature rise across the condenser, and an increase in the quantity of chemicals used to control biological fouling.
Affected SAR Figures:
10-2, 9-10 Sections:
10.2, 11.1.3.8.A It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not change the operation, function, or failure modes of any components, systems, or structures.
This modification to the main condenser tube bundles and wateLbox improved plant efficiency and equipment reliability; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the replacement condenser tube bundles and water boxes were functionally equivalent to the old design. All original codes and standards were met during fabrication and installation; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 DCP: 95-1019 Main Turbino Luba Oil Conditionar Rcplacement This design change replaced the main turbine lube oil conditioner with a unit capable of filtering and purifying lube oil to the current industry recommended l
rating for particulate and water concentration. This modification was necessary to reduce the level of contamination in the lube oil system, thereby reducing the damage that such contamination can cause the main turbine. This reduced l
damage will provide long-term benefits for the turbine-generator set by reducing j
the amount and frequency of turbine maintenance.
i Affected SAR Figures:
1-5, 1-9, 9-14, A-4 It was determined that these changes did not:
J (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not adversely affect systems, structures, or components whose failure or degradation was evaluated as an accident initiator or mitigator, the functionality and performance of the affected systems were not adversely impacted by this activity, and this activity affected only non-Q equipment and systems in non-vital j
areas; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification replaced existing non-Q, 1
seismic category II equipment with new equipment of similar form and function in a manner that did not increase the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 DCP: 951020D101 l
Reactor Building Purga Valva R:placem:nt This design change replaced Reactor Building Purge isolation valves CV-7401, CV-7402, CV-7403, and CV-7404 with new 24" tricentric style valves. All four valves have Bettis spring closed air operators, sized to close against 60 psig within five seconds. The valves were mounted with the shaft side of the disks away from the penetration in order to eliminate the valve packing as a possible leak path.
The penetration was modified by removing the 54" valves and installing new pipe penetration assemblies constructed of 24" diameter schedule 60 pipe and stiffened closure plates.
The stiffened closure plates and the stiffeners are SA 516, Grade 70 material and were purchased to the requirements of the 1989 ASME Code,Section III, Subsection NC.
The new valves were mounted on 24" flanges welded on each end of the 24" pipe.
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Affected SAR Figures:
5-2, 5-7, 9-14 l
Sections:
5.2.6.2.1,
6.6.1 Tables
5-1, 9-25 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety j
evaluated in the safety Analysis report since the new valves and acutators, and the piping on which they were installed, have been evaluated from a seismic standpoint and are qualified to withstand seismic and accident loadings. The reactor building purge system is not used to prevent any accident and is not depended upon to establish the reliability of any other system; or, I
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(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since failure modes and affects were unchanged by the installation of these valves; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there was no margin of safety related to the type or size of valves in the purge system.
Although the flow rate is required to be constant, the requirements for filter performance will remain the same l
and the system will be tested to ensure that those requirements are met.
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ANO-1 DCP: 955010D101 l
Sorvica Water System Crossovar and Boundary Valva R::plac:msnts This modification replaced eight Fisher 9100 series rubber-lined Service Water System (SWS) crossover and boundary valves with new Enertech triple off-set l
rotary disk valves having metal-to-metal sealing surfaces. The rubber-liner failure mechanism was eliminated and the units capability to protect emergency cooling pond inventory and achieve SWS seismic category II/I and loop separation was enhanced.
In addition, the SWS Loop I and Loop II isolation valves were changed from motor operated to manual locked-open valves and the motors and gear units on the Intermediate Cooling Water isolation valves were upgraded.
Affected SAR Figures:
9-10, 9-17, 9-19 Table:
7-5 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety i
evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification installed more reliable valves that would not degrade the capability of the SWS to perform its normal or accident mode cooling function; or, I
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modificaton uid not change the I
operation, function, or failure modes of any component, system, or structure; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the margin of safety related to the SWS was unchanged.
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i ANO-1 DCP: 963111D101 Seal Rscordar Replac::msnt i
This modification replaced the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal recorders with j
new Westronics SmartView microprocessor based recorders that use no chart paper.
i The in put data from the new recorders will be sent to the plant computer via a l
fiber optic link. The data will be archived on the plant computer for display and retrieval at a later date.
These recorders monitor RCP seal staging pressures, temperatures, and bleed-off flow.
Affected SAR Figure:
7-21 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the recorders i
are non-Q and do not provide safety related information.
This modification did not modify or affect safety related systems or components; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not affect the function of the recorders. The recorders and corresponding plant computer points do not affect safety related equipment or give operators safety related data that might affect
)
l safety related components; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any j
Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 DCP: 973806N301 Intako Structuro Trash Troughs and Baskots This modification installed a new trash trough and larger capacity trash collection baskets at the Intake Structure.
The old concrete trough was replaced with a new stainless steel trough to provide improved flow characteristics which should eliminate clogging and overflow problems. The trough's flow path was changed from one that was bidirectional with a common collection point to one that is uni-directional with a common collection point outside the structure.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-10
,?
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not change the design, function, purpose, or operai; ion of the Intake Structure and made only minor changes to it's configuration; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the design, function, purpose, and operation of the system and structure were unchanged; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defir.ed in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Techt.ical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 DCP: 973806P101 Scresn Wcoh Pump cnd Strainer Upgrada This plant change replaced the traveling screen wash pumps and their associated strainers.
The larger capacity pumps will provide additional spray wash capacity to reduce the potential for debris carryover from the traveling The old duplex strainers were replaced with automatic backwashing screens.
strainers to eliminate the need for manual cleaning of the pump discharge g
strainers and to improve the reliability of the screen wash system.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-10 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification will reduce the probability of failure of the Service Water and Fire Water Systems associated with debris in their pump bays; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since there were no new conditions or operating parameters resulting from this modification which could cause a new or different type failure that would not be bounded by existing analyses; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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i ANO-1 DCP: S73985D101 Integrated Control System Coro Tharmal Powar Correction The Integrated control System (ICS) is designed to provide automatic or manual control of the Reactor, Main Feedwater, and Main Turbine Systems under all operating conditions. This modification replaced the Unit Master sub-system Analog Memory and Rate Limited Signal Follower modules with a single Framatome Control STAR 820 module.
The Control STAR is a digital microprocessor-based module designed to fit directly into the old analog module slots and to provide functional unit replacement of multiple analog modules.
The Unit Master STAR module will provide enhanced, adjustable, dual-rate manual cc:entrol of Unit Load Demand and fully automatic integral control of Unit Load Demand based on 30 second average Core Thermal Power based on calculations and setpoints received from the Plant Monitoring System.
The automatic control feature will not affect j
the characteristic power oscillations currently experienced during power operation.
However, it should maintain the average of the power oscillations t
l closer to the desired Core Thermal Power without requiring me.nual control l
adjustments.
I Affected SAR Figure:
7-12 Sections:
7.2.3.2.2, 7.2.3.A 1, 7.2.3.3.3 It was determined that these changes did not:
l (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an r.ccident or malfunction of equipment important to safety l
evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification installed improved manual control features and added new automatic control features to the ICS.
These l
changes will improve operator control and ease operator j
burden during plant operations, reducing the potential for error, thus reducing the possibility of occurrence of a previously analyzed accident.
In addition, the equipment installed by this modification is more accurate, more reliable, and has response characteristics that will improve overall system performance; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since tha.s modification did not impact the function or capability of any safety-related systems and did not affect any failure analysis as described in the SAR; or, l
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 LCP: 861085L101 Renctor Coolent Syctem "B" Loop Temperaturo Element R:placanent This modification replaced a Rosemount dual-element Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) located on the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Loop "B" hot leg piping due to failure of one of the elements. One temperature element provides 1
l a non-safety related RCS temperature input to the Integrated control System for feedwater and reactor control and the other provides a safety related RCS temperature to the Reactor Protection System (RPS).
Both sensors also provide inputs to the Plant Computer and the Safety Parameter Display System.
The i
replacement RTD meets or exceeds all of the requirements for RPS and Non Nuclear Instrumentation.
The temperature transmitter and signal converter were also replaced with identical components.
Affected SAR Figures:
4-1, 7-20 Table:
4-6 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to saftey evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since, except for time response, the new RTD meets or exceeds all of the previous sensor's specifications. Time response requirements were addressed in Engineering Report 90-R-1017-01 which concluded that the new sensor has a response time that is i
bounded by the preses.t safety analysis assumptions; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since equipment functional requirements and modes of operation were not affected by this design change; or, j
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the only functional characteristic affected by this modification did not have a margin of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-1 LCP: 924037 l
l Rolocation of Firo Water System Proccuro Switch The jockey fire pump was designed to maintain fire water system pressure and prevent the electric or diesel fire pumps from operating on an intermittent 1
l basis.
For maintenance purposes, the jockey pump may be isolated by a gate valve.
The pressure switch, which provides control room annunciation on low fire water system pressure, was located upstream of the isolation valve.
Isolation of the jockey pump resulted in a nuisance alarm for the control room.
This modification relocated the pressure switch downstream of the isolation j
valve allowing it to sense system pressure and remain available even when the
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jockey fire pump is isolated.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-16 It was determined that these changes did not:
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(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the components affected by this modification were not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed accidents and were not considered equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since no new modes of failure were created by relocating the pressure switch; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 LCP: 94-5036 High Prcanuro Injection Pump Room Coolor Coil Replactmsnt This limited change installed an orifice in the Service Water (SW) supply lines
(
to the High Pressure Injection pump room cooler. The SW supply piping was shortened approximately 3/8" to allow a 1/4" orifice plate and an additional 1/8" flexitallic gasket to be installed. The installation of the flow orifice reduced excess flow and will minimize coil header and return bend erosion and increase coil life.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-6 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the materials involved in this modification were purchased and installed in accordance with applicable codes, specifications, and approved procedures; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not impact the operation, design, or function of the system. All work associated with this modification was performed in accordsnee with applicable codes, specifications, and approved procedures; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO-1 LCP: 963155P101 Condancor Vacuum Scparator Tenk Makeup Levol Control Valves This plant change installed an external level switch / solenoid valve combination to eliminate valve failures caused by makeup line back pressure forcing the control valves off their seats and subsequently flooding the separator tanks.
The air ejector heating coils were also removed.
This modification increased the reliability of the condenser Vacuum System.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-10 It was detennined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an 1
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety i
evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the function and failure modes of the Condenser Vacuum System were not altered by this modification; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification remained bounded by previously esaluated accident scenarios; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since this modification did not affect the Condenser Vacuum System as to alter the content of the Technical Specification bases or affect any safety related equipment addressed in the bases.
ANO-1 LCP: 973651L101 LTOP S3tpoint Changa for 32 EFPY Reactor Vossol P-T Limits This modification changed the Low Temperature overpressure Protection (LTOP)
Electromatic Relief Valve (ERV) open pressure setpoint from 495 psig to 400 psig, the LTOP ERV close pressure setpoint from 445 psig to 350 psig, and the LTOP enable temperature setpoint from 304 to 272 degrees.
These changes are more limiting and conservative with respect to current licensing bases.
Affected SAR Figures:
4-1, 7-20 Section:
4.2.4.2 Table:
4-1 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since these changes resulted in more limiting / conservative protection with respect to the current 15 Effective Full Power Years (EFPY) based licensing bases.
Changing these setpoints did not create any new equipment malfunction scenarios for equipment related to the LTOP event /traxnsient or to any other safety related equipment; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accide.nt er malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since these setpoint changes remained bounded by existing accident analyses; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since these changes resulted in more limiting / conservative protection with respect to the current 15 EFPY based licensing bases.
l ANO-1 LCP: 974321L101 Emergtncy Fcedwater Steam Trap Modifications This limited change was designed to eliminate the potential for challenging, adverse environmental conditions that could result from structural or mechanical failures of unqualified piping and/or components in the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pump room.
Three high pressure steam traps located at drain points upstream of the EFW turbine were replaced with passive, restricting orifices that vent to the turbine exhaust pipe.
Two traps which drain the turbine casing and the turbine exhaust pipe were replaced with open pipe. All five points were routed to a common drain header that discharges to the Auxiliary Building floor drain system in the south piping area via two redundant mechanical traps.
Affected SAR Figure:
10-2 Section:
9.8.2.3 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification enhanced the condensate removal system that supports proper functioning of the EFW turbine by replacing active condensate removal devices with passive ones where possible and by adding a degree of redundancy where active devices were still necessary; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since these changes to the condensate removal system did not introduce any new malfunctions not presently considered in the SAR; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
ANO-1 LCP: 974374L101 l
Miccellencouc Piping Iocusa and Improvements i
j This revision reflects a number of piping support modifications that were l
completed to ensure that piping and supports meet code requirements, t
i Affected SAR Figures:
4-1, 7-20 i
It was determined that these changes did not:
i J
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety j
evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the changes j
performed by this modification did not affect the function
]
or operation of any components or systems credited with i
initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed v
)
i accident scenarios; or, i
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(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a i
i different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since these modifications remained bounded l
by existing analyses; or, i
l (iii) riduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any 4
Technical specification since there were no safety margins ida tified in the bases that could be degraded by these
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modifications.
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ANO-1 PC: 93 7007 Travaling Spray Heador R0plactm:nt This plant change replaced the carbon steel spray wash headers in the Unit 1 traveling screens with stainless steel headers of a different design.
Additional spray wash nozzles were installed and dual spray headers were added to four of the eight screens for periods of heavy debris loading.
In addition, spray header blowdown valves were added to clear debris blocking spray nozzles.
These changes were made to increase the efficiency and reliability of the traveling screen spray system, thereby reducing carryover of debris and reducing impact to the plant during periods of heavy debris loading on the screens.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-10 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not affect any components or systems credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed accidents and did not impact any equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since there were no new conditions or operating parameters resulting from this modification that could cause a new or different type accident which would not be bounded by existing accident analyses; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-1 PC: 93-7043 Deminoralized Water Makcup Mixed B::d Polisher Tank Removal This plant change removed the demineralized water makeup mixed bed polisher tank, its booster pump, piping, and associated components located on the T-87 skid.
All components associated with this tank were abandoned in place and will not be returned to active status.
Affected SAR Figures:
1-4, 1-0, 9-14, A-3 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the equipment affected by this modification was not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the accidents previously analyzed in the SAR and this change did not change any analy=ed conditions for plant operation; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since no plant operating conditions or parameters were affected by this modification; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO-1 PC: 94-8026 Pormanent Nitrogen Supply to Condansors This plant change installed a permanent nitrogen supply to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 condensers for the purpose of displacing oxygen entrained in the turbine exhaust steam and through air in-leakage.
The tubing was routed from the Low Pressure Nitrogen System to the basket tips of the condensers.
Isolation valves, metering valves, and flow indicators at the origin and termination connection points were installed to provide flow control and isolation capability.
Affected SAR tigures:
10-2, 9-4 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence of consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not impact the ability of the condenser Vacuum Systems to maintain condenser vacuum; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not introduce any new failure modes to the condensers, did not alter any system function, and did not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the Condenser vacuum Systems have sufficient capacity to evacuate the small amount of nitrogen introduced into the condensers by this modification.
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ANO-1 PC: 95-7038 R2 actor Coolant Pump P32D Motor Rafurbishm2nt This plant change involved the refurbishment and upgrade of the Seiroens-Allis Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) motor by US Ecology under an approved ANO specification. All of the changes made involved upgrading the motor such that the motor was equivalent or superior to the original design. One of the approved changes involved installation of an additional temperat2re element in the upper and lower radial bearings.
In addition, Schenck vibration probes were installed in the vibration monitoring system.
Affected SAR Figure:
7-21 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since these changes to instrumentation were for information only and did not degrade or change the probability of failure of any plant equipment and did not impact any assumptions made in existing accident analyses; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a i
different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety f
Analysis Report since the physical operation of the RCP motor and instrumentation was not altered; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since this change did not alter any margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 PC: 95 7051 Installation of Jib Hoist in the Turbino Building Basement i
This plant change installed a two-ton jib hoist in the open area of the Unit 1 Turbine Building basement near column G-10.
The manual jib hoist can be operated during any operational mode of the plant and will be used to transport tools and equipment to the tube pulling pit.
4 Affected SAR Figures:
1-6, A-5 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since installation of 1
the jib hoist did not impact any assumptions made in previously i
evaluated accidents and did not adversely impact any equipment f
important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the jib hoist will be used only to move tools and materials to the tube pulling pit during plant maintenance periods.
The chain hoist will be removed and the jib crane will be secured during power operations; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
a, u
l ANO-1 PC: 95-7052 Firo Water System Control Volvo Upgrada This plant change upgraded the Grinnell model "B" flooding valves in the Fire Water System by replacing the three way valve with two ball valves and installing a facing on the center valve.
The three way valves were replaced due l
to a history of leakage around the seat that contributed to corrosion in the piping.
The water motor gongs were also removed from two control valves since i
they were not hard piped to the floor drain and testing on a quarterly basis generated radwaste.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-16 l
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety l
evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not degrade the performance or reliability of the Fire Water System; or, (ii) increase the possibiP.ty for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the Fire Water System was designed so that any failure of the system would not adversely impact equipment important to safety. This modific tion did not degrade the capability of the system and did not introduce any new modes of failure; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 PC: 95-7054 Treated Wasto Monitor Tank Chemical Addition Pot This plant change installed a chemical addition pot and associated piping to the recirculation line on the Treated Waste Monitor Tanks eliminating the need to add chemicals through the funnel arrangement previously used.
Flow through the pot is obtained by a pressure drop across existing throttle valves.
The pot was designed with a vent and drain line routed directly to a floor drain.
Affected SAR Figure:
11-1 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the Clean Liquid Radwaste System was not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the accidenta previously analyzed in the SAR and addition of a chemical addition pot reduced the probability that safety related equipment in the area will be damaged by the addition of chemicals; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the chemical addition pot and associated piping do not interface with any safety related systems and there are no safety related components in the inmediate vicinity; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases which relate to the addition of chemicals to the Clean Liquid Radwaste System.
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ANO-1 PC: 95-7060 Reactor Coolant Pump Intorgaskot Leak Dstection Switches 1
This plant change replaced the Rochester Instrument Systems (RIS) Model ET-1218 electronic switches and the associated Model 370/1374 signal converters used in the Reactor Coolant Pump Intergasket Leak Detection System.
The switches were replaced with RIS Model SC-7404 switches which incorporate direct input capabiities, allowing elimination of the converters.
The switches were relocated to maximize available space in the cabinet for future modifications.
Affected SAR Figure:
7-21 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an I
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety l
evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since installation j
of the new switches did not affect the Reactor Coolant System failure analysis and did not impact the function or capability of any safety related system; or, l
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not adversely
]
impact the design, function, operation, or failure modes of the Reactor Coolant Pump Intergasket Leak Detection System; l
or, i
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any i
Technical Specification since there were no defined margins j
of safety related to the Reactor Coolant Pump Intergasket Leak Detection System.
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ANO-1 PC: 95-7084 Non-Q Condensato Storaga Tank Hosting Steam Valvo Raplacanant i
This plant change made several modifications to the Non-Q Condensate Storagte Tank (CST) Heating Steam System.
The non-Q motor operated gate valve that controls the extraction heating steam supplied from the E-4A Feedwater Heater to the CST was replaced with an air operated globe valve.
A solenoid operated bypass valve was installed in parallel with the new control valve to allow for more controlled warming of downstream piping. A new temperature control system was installed to operate the two new valves based on temperature inside the tank, which will be maintained at a nominal value of 90 degrees with an upper limit of 110 degrees. The check valve and block valve located downstream of the new control valve was replaced due to degradation.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-14 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the instrument air requirement for this modification was very low and will not prevent any safety related component from receiving its required air flow to perform its safety function; or, (ii) increase the possibilty for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not install components or modify any system that would vary the esircumstances for those considered by previous analyses such tr.st the conclusions of those analyses would not remain bounding; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since this modification did not alter any safety system operation or response that could affect the margin of safety as defined in the bases of the Technical Specification.
1
ANO-1 PC: 963020P101 Snrvica Water Piping Modifications l
This plant change installed a reducing tee in the Loop I Service Water (SW) supply header to the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) suction header, five threaded half couplings on the Loop II SW supply header, and a drain valve on the Loop I supply header.
Installation of the reducing tee increased the margin to the code allowable stresses. The threaded half couplings were installed to repair degraded areas in the piping that were less than the minimma ASME required wall thickness.
The drain valve was installed to facilitate faster draining of Loop I and will reduce the amount of liquid radwaste generated by allowing the water to be drained to the circulating water discharge flume.
)
Affected SAR Figure:
9-6
)
It was determined that these changes did not:
l (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluatnd in the Safety Analysis Report since the pipe fittings and drain valve were installed in accordance with the code of construction, ANSI B31.1, and the design pressure and temperature of the fittings and valve meet the requirements of ANO Specification M-555, piping class HBD; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the operation, perfonnance, and design function of the SW System was not degraded by the piping modifications; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases, l
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ANO-1 PC: 963034P101 Dirty Wanta Drain System Valva R:plac2m:nt This plant change removed the internals from two Dirty Waste Drain System valves and abandoned the valve bodies in place.
The valves were located at the lowest point in the suction line from the dirty waste drain tank.
Trspped debris from the tank prevented closure of the valves.
Two soft seat spring loaded piston check valves were mounted in a vertical run of piping above the centerline of the associated pump.
Affected SAR Figure:
11-2 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an j
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since these valves i
were not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the accidents previously analyzed in the SAR and these valves have no function that would impact any equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since installation of the new soft seat check valves did not change the operating characteristics of the Dirty Liquid Radwaste System and did not create any new i
modes of failure for equipment important to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 PC: 963067P101 Startup Boiler Instrument Air Roliability Upgreda This plant change separated the Startup Boiler Air System into an Instrument Air i
System and a Service Air System.
The instrument air sections will provide air for all of the startup boiler air operated instrumentation demands. The service air section will provide atomizing air and general air hose service to the I
startup boiler and building area.
Service air supplied from the startup boiler I
air compressor will be supplemented by the installation of a receiver tank.
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3 Affected SAR Figures 1-6, 9-14, A-5
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Sections:
9.9.1.1, 9.9.2.2 It was determined that these changes did not:
{
(i) increase the probability or occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Anayris Report since the piping, equipment, and components affected by this modification were not evaluated as initiators or mitigators for any 1
previously analyzed accident, the design parameters of the Instrument and Service Air Systems were maintained, and this modification did not adversely affect any equipment important to safety; or (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not change any i
conditions in the Compressed Air System which would create j
a situation different than those previously considered; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases related to the Compressed Air System.
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ANO-1 PC: 963329P301 Startup Trcnsformar No. 2 Current Limiting R=nctor Modification This plant change installed bypass links on the Startup Transformer No. 2 (ST-2)
Current Lbniting Reactor so that the Current Limiting Reactor will be bypassed during plant operation.
ST-2 is the emergency delayed transfer source of power j
for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
However, ST-2 was not capable of supporting the full house transfer loads from both units simultaneously. During an accident ST-2 must be capable of providing power for Unit 1 or Unit 2 accident loads.
The Current Limiting Reactor was originally installed to reduce fault current in the event of full house transfer of both units simultaneously with no, or reduced, load shedding.
There was a significant voltage drop across the Current Limiting Reactor when ST-2 loading was high.
The load capacity of ST-2 has been j
increased by bypassing the Current Limiting Reactor. Bypassing the Current Lbmiting Reactor increased the available fault current. Calculation 96-D-3329-01 verifed that equipment ratings remain acceptable with the current Limiting Reactor bypassed.
Affected SAR Figure:
8-1 J
It was determined that these changes did not:
)
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the electrical distribution system will be in a configuration allowed by both units' Technical Specifications during implementation of the modification.
The potential for the loss of one off-site power source (ST-2) is bounded by existing accident analyses, and a calculation verified that the increased fault current is within the design rating of equipment affected by the change; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this change involves a potential loss of ST-2 that is not a different accident or malfunction than previously analyzed.
The increase in available fault current resulting from this change remains within equipment design ratings; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there was no margin of safety defined in the Technical Specifications related to the Current Limiting Reactor or this modification.
ANO-1 PC: 963334P301 Addition of Piping to Bulk Funl Oil Storago Tank Drcin Valva The Bulk Fuel Oil Storage Tank pit is provided for water and oil collection from the valves and other equipment located in the confines of the pit.
Water and oil accumulation in the pit occasionally rises to cover the drain valve resulting in valve inaccessibility. This modification consisited of the addition of a flange with a welded 1 inch pipe routed to below the sump cover plate level. An isolation valve was provided for local isolation and will normally be closed. A chicago fitting was provided for the attachmnent of a flexible hose to drain the pit to 55 gallon drums.
Affected SAR Figure:
8-3 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the affected equipment was not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed accidents. The addition of I
the piping and an isolation valve did not affect system operation; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the performance of the affected system and its failure modes were not affected by the addition of j
piping and an isolation valve; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any 1
Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-1 PC: 96333;P101 Permanent Installation of an Emarg2ncy Diosol Ganorator Fual Oil Filter Skid This plant change permanently installed and anchored a new Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fuel oil filter skid in the diesel fuel oil vault lower level hallway. A job box was also anchored in the diesel fuel oil vault lower level hallway for storage of the connecting hoses and hardware of the filter skid when not in use.
The purpose of this permanent installation was to reduce the extensive man-hours required by maintenance personnel to install and remove the duplex filter skin, hoses, and connecting hardware during fuel oil recirculation conducted on both units during EDG system outages or during refueling outages.
Affected SAR Figure:
8-3 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluted in the Safety Analysis Report since there were no previously evaluated accidents associated with anchorage of the fuel filter skid in the fuel storage vault lower level hallway. The skid does not interact with any safety related components; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since failure of the anchorage would not impact any safety related components; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
w-ANO-1 PC: 963540P101 Instrum2nt Air Compressor Removal This plant change removed one of the original Unit 1 instrument air compressors (C-2C) and its related components due to unreliability. The three original air compressors, C-2A/B/C, served only as backup units to the new compressors, C-28A&B.
The other two original air compressors will remain in service in a backup mode of operation.
Affected SAR Figures:
1-6, 9-14, 9-7, A-5 Sections:
9.9.1.1, 9.9.2.2 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluted in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not affect any equipment credited with initiating or relied upon to mitigate a previously analyzed accident. Removal of the instrument air compressor did not reduce the reliability of the Instrument Air System; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not create the potential for conditions not bounded by current accident analyses; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO-1 PC :943550P101 Addition of Plcnt Computcr Inputa from N16 Monitora The N-16 Radiation Monitoring system has the capability to detect either gross gammaa radistion or specifically the N-16 gammen utilizing a Victoreen ratemeter/ spectrometer. As a regular ratematar it monitors gross activity of the steam.
As a spectrometer it monitors the amount of N-16 gasuna radiation in the steam systema. Originally, these monitors fed a common recorder for trending purposes which has since been removed due to obsolescence. Furthermore, the detector's input to the safety Parameter Display System (SPD5) was not archived, making trending cumbersome. This modification added a N-16 output at the SPDS to the Plant Monitoring System for trending and alarm purposes.
Affected SAR Figure:
7-22 It was determined that these changes did not:
(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunc^1on of equipsment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not adversely impact any components credited with initiating an accident, but enhanced the ability to monitor steam generator tube leakage.
N-16 instrumentation and plant computer reliabilities were not affected; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change had a minor positive effect in mitigating steam generator tube failures.
Otherwise, the consequences of safety related equipament failure were not affected; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since this change enhanced the ability to detect steam generator tube leakage.
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l ANO-1 PC: 963560P101 Removal of the Intako Structuro Trash Grindsr Systan l
l This plant change removed the intake trash grinder system, including all mechanical, electrical, and interlock interfaces with other intake structure systems.
The trash grinder equipment was intended to reduce the traveling screen debris size such that it could pass through the condenser tubes and return to the lake.
Maintenance, operational, freezing, and capacity problems j
with the trash grinders resulted in them becoming inactive and eventually I
isolated.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-10 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the trash grinder system was inactive and was not considered an accident initiator or mitigator. The system was completely removed from all adjacent intake systems, none of which were considered equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since there was no safety equipment related to, or interfacing with, the trash grinder system. No new failure modes were added by this modification as to create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than previously evaluated; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any l
Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-1 PC: 96 7016 Main Gensrator Hydrogan Dryar Raplac:msnt This plant change replaced the original turbine generator Lectrodryer brand hydrogen dryer with a new Pneumatics Products dryer.
The old dryer was obsolete and had become a high maintenance item incapable of providing sufficiently high quality hydrogen to the generator.
The old dryer utilized Intermediate Cooling Water (ICW) for cooling whereas the new dryer uses air cooling.
The ICW flow to q
the dryer was very low and had negligible impact on overall ICW System performance.
The original carbon steel piping from the hydrogen dryer to the generator was also replaced with stainless steel piping.
Affected SAR Figures:
9-14, 9-7 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety I
evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification replaced the turbine generator hydrogen dryer with a more efficient one and this change did not affect the plant's response to any previously evaluated accident; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the cecrease in ICW System demand did not alter previous applicable or bounding conclusions; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the removal of ICW supply to the hydrogen dryer, resulting in a lower ICW System flow demand, did not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specification bases.
l ANO-1 PC: 973630P101 Condancato Pump Motor Banring Cooler Supply /Raturn Piping Replacement This plant change replaced the copper Auxiliary cooling Water (ACW) supply / return piping to all three condensate pump motor cooling coils with stainless steel piping to make this portion of the ACW System more reliable and lass susceptible to corrosion and flow accelerated erosion.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-9 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification enhanced ACW System reliability by providing greater erosion resistance to the ACW process fluid and by eliminating the use of soldered joints; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification met applicable codes and standards and remained bounded by existing safety analyses; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable u.argins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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l ANO-1 PC: 97-3690 Zoro Spe d Sensing Circuit Modification This plant change spared in place the malfuncting Reactor Coolant Pump zero speed sensing circuit, thus eliminating the zero speed nusiance indications in the Control Room.
operators currently utilize predictive maintenance personnel to monitor vibration key phasor outputs coupled with comparative and relational outputs of other vibration sensors to verify zero speed indication.
Affected SAR Figure:
7-21 J
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not affect any components credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed accident scenarios. This modification did not alter the function or capability of any equipment related to safety to perform its safety related function; or, 1
l (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a 1
different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the equipment affected by this modification was not considered equipment important to safety a.i did not provide any safety related function. This modification remained bounded by previous accident analyses; or, l
l (iii) reduce the margin of safety as definad in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
1
ANO-1 PC: 973701N101 Emergency Dional Gencrator Exhaust / Rain Hood Removal This modification removed the exhaust / rain hoods for both Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) units.
Stiffner rings were added to the top of each EDG stack i
to preclude pinching off the end of the stack in the event of a tornado missile strike. Without the exhaust / rain hoods, the EDG stacks would be directly exposed to weather.
Therefore, a drain system to remove rain water from the exhaust piping was installed on each EDG's exhaust piping.
Affected SAR Figure:
8-3
)
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not affect the performance of the diesel generators.
The addition of the drain piping reduced the probability of failure due to the collection of moisture in the exhaust system; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analycis Report since this modification did not alter system alignment, configuration, or operation; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the installation of this modification added margin of safety to the EDGs.
ANO-1 PC: 973724P101 RemovD1 of Door 187 This plant change rannoved door 187 at the entrance to the Emergency Feedwater j
(EN) pump roosa. The door was resnoved in reponse to an engineering evaluation regarding increased humidity in the pump roosa resulting from steam traps nearby.
The engineering response recommended that door 187 be removed to enhanoe the passive natural circulation cooling capability of the EFW pump roosa and to help minimize the effects of a leaking or failed steam trap.
It was determined that these changes did not (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since door 187 was not credited with initiating or mitigating any previously evaluated accident and removal of the door did not impact any safety related equipsment; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a j
different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification evaluated the High Energy Line Break i:5ELB) effsats due to removal of the door 3
and concluded that there was no impact on the HELB analysis;
)
or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins j
of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
l ANO-1 PC: 97380GP102 Screen Wach System Piping Upgrada This plant change replaced the traveling screen wash piping from the pump strainers to the screen isolation valves. The Unit 1 supply header size was increased from eight to ten inches.
The headers were relocated from below the floor to the overhead. These changes were made to support increased screen wash capacity to reduce the potential for debris carryover from the traveling screens.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-10 l
l It was determined that these changes did not:
l (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the affected equipment was not credited with accident initiation or mitigation and is not safety related; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since there were no new conditions or 1
operating parameters resulting from this modification which
]
could cause a new or different type accident which would not be bounded by existing analyses for evaluated accidents; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 PC: 973806P301 Travaling Scrann Wach System Control Upgradas This plant change modified the traveling screen controls to eliminate the potential to shutdown the entire system due to a loss of control power to cabinet C160.
This change reduced the potential for a loss of control power by l
removing unneeded relays and electical components and by installing additional I
fuses in the circuit. The reliance of the screen wash system on C160 control power was minimized by removing the pumps and valves from this circuit and providing alternate power to the screen handswitches. The equipment that was removed by this modification was associated with the original automatic control logic which was not used by either unit to operate the traveling screen system.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-10 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the equipmement affected by this modification was not considered equipment important to safety and was not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed SAR accidents; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since there were no new conditions or operating parameters resulting from this modification that could cause a new or different type accident which would not j
be bounded by existing analyses; or, l
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO-1 PC: 973912A101 Travaling Screens Trsch B skots This drawing revision was made to show the addition of trash baskets to the traveling water screens.
The baskets were installed in the mid 1970's to replace the debris elimination function of the trash grinder system which has since been removed from the plant.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-10 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the trash grinder system was not credited with initiating or mitigating an accident and does not affect the function of any safety related system as to increase the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not create any new modes of failure; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-1 PC: 974024P101 l
Snrvico Water Piping Modifications This plant change added a three inch drain valve, with associated attachment piping and flange, just downstream of flow venturi FE-3901 on Service Water (SW)
Loop II.
The drain valve will enhance future maintenance activities by providing a convenient place to drain significant portions of the SW supply header and will help to reduce liquid radwaste generation by allowing SW to be drained directly to the circulating water discharge fiume.
In addition, this modification resolved an interference concern between a fire wator and SW pipe on Loop I by shortening a nipple length. The pipe nipple modification resulted in terminating the end of the pipe nipple stub with a one inch diameter pipe plug.
The plug is rated for 6000 psig, is made of ASME SA-105 material, and is qualified to ISI class 2 criteria.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-6 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the existing programs, processes, and controls for the installation, inspection, and testing of the new components ensured that the probability of failure of the affected equipment did not increase due to installation of this modification; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification remained bounded by existing accident analyses; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there was no increase in the probability of SW equipment failure as a reslut of this modification, there would be no expectation of a reduction in any margin of safety.
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ANO-1 PC: 974106P101 Temporary Cooling Water Flanga Connections on Supply and Raturn Side of the Nuclear Intermediate Cooling Water Cooler This plant change added permanent flange connections at the Service Water (SW) inlet and outlet sides of E-28C, the Nuclear Intermediate Cooling Water cooler.
This modification provides a permanent configuration that will facilitate providing a temporary source of cooling water to E-28C during refueling outages when both loops of SW are not in service. The source of cooling water will be supplied from the fire water header and will serve to provide a heat sink for the Nuclear ICW loop, which in turn provides heat rejection for the Spent Fuel Pool during plant refueling conditions.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-6 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the affected portion of the SW System is considered non-essential and is isolated upon a Loss of Cooling Accident by actuation of the Engineered Safeguards Actuation System.
This modification met all applicable piping code requirements; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification remained bounded by existing accident analyses; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
f
ANO-1 PC: 974293P101 Dom Atic Water Hypochlorinator Removal This plant change removed the inactive hypochlorinator, M-23, and its associated equipment..The supply breaker, wiring, and conduit were spared.
The affected equipment had not been used in many years and was removed to accournodate cleaning and painting of the area.
Affected SAR Figures:
1-4, 1-8, A-3 It was determined that these changes did not:
(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfuntion of equipment iznportant to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since removal of the inactive hypochlorinator did not adversely impact any systems or components credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed accidents; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this change did not create the potential for conditions not bounded by current accident analyses; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no specific margins of safety defined in the bases for any Technical Specification which were affected by the removal of M-23 and its related components.
ANO-1 PC: 974396P101 Main Turbino LP-B Rotor Installation The Unit 1 main turbine low pressure rotors have deteriorated over the years since original installation due to the extreme conditions associated with electrical generation at a nuclear facility.
This plant change modified the ANO-1 main turbine by replacing the "B" low pressure turbine rotor with a partially integral rotor purchased from Shearon Harris. These changes were limited to relocating some stationary blading, modifications to diaphragms and seals, reinstalling an existing shortened flow guide, bearing modifications, and changes to couplings and bolts.
Affected SAR Sections:
10.2, 14.1.2.9.1, 14.1.2.9.2, 14.1.2.9.3, 14.1.2.9.4 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification reduced the probability of a disc rupture or missile generation as a result of stress corrosion cracking.
These changes did not alter or affect any safety related equipment; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the existing accident analysis remained bounding for this modification; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since this modification did not alter any safety system operation or response that could affect the margin of safety as defined in the bases of the Technical Specification.
ANO-1 PC: 974788P101 Control Room Halon System Modifications This plant change installed permanent Ashcroft Duralife 1009 series gauges on each cylinder of the three ANO-1 control room halon systems.
Parker Hannifin needle valves were installed between the cylinder and the gauge to allow for isolation of the gauges for periodic calibration.
This modification will limit the loss of halon during semiannual system testing of the control room halon suppression systems.
Previously, the Chemetron supplied pressure gauges were removed every six months to install a calibrated test gauge to determine halon cylinder pressure. As gauges were removed and reinstalled some pressure was lost when the gauge port check was upset by a pin on the gauge assembly causing the cylinders to fail on low pressure.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-16 Section:
9.8.2.1 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the control room halon systems were not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed accidents. This modification did not change the system configuration in such a manner that it would no longer comply with GDC-3; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not alter overall system function or interaction with other plant systems; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
1 ANO-1 PC: 98013tP101
)
l Containment Icolation Volva Precauro Raliof D= sign Information Notice 96-49 informed utilities of a potential overpressurizaton problem with piping between normally closed containment isolation valves and in j
piping between containment isolation valves that would be closed during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
This plant change modified the piping system such that the bonnet regions of valves CV-1050 and CV-1410 would not be subjected to pressures greater than the upstream piping connected to these valves by installing a small bore bypass pipe between these areas.
Installation of the pressure bypass will ensure that the water trapped above the two discs in these gate valves would not increase in pressure to a point so high that the gate discs would not open.
Affected SAR Figures:
7-20, 9-12 l
It was determined that these changes did not:
l (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipannt important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since installation of the pressure bypass on these valves increased the reliability of these valves by preventing the pressure above the seat disc from becoming excessive to the point that the valve's seat dinc would not open.
All piping and fittings used in the bypasses were standard components identical to other components already installed in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) ; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not create a credible new type of malfunction of the affected control valves, of RCS or Decay Heat System, or of containment isolation.
This modification resulted in increased reliability of these valves to respond to a signal to open; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since this modification resulted in increased reliability of these valves to respond to a signal to open.
ANO-1 PC: 980159P301 Startup Transformer #2 Voltsgn Tap Chango This modification changed the voltage taps on Startup Transformer #2 (ST#2) from tap setting 3 (157 KV) to tap setting 4 (153.075 KV). This will provide an additional 2 1/2% secondary voltage capability nominal for ST#2 during extreme degraded voltage conditions. The ST#2 automatic voltage regulator setpoints were also changed to maintain the ST#2 voltage at previous levels. In addition, the overvoltage relay setting was adjusted for the new tap setting.
Affected SAR Figure:
8-1 Section:
8.3.1.1.1 It was determined that these changes did not:
(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification enhanced system reliability by helping to maintain the voltage on the safety buses during a degraded offsite voltage condition; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification changed the tap setting of ST#2 to maintain the plant voltage within acceptable levels during an offsite degraded voltage condition with a concurrent loss of the switchyard autotransformer; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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SECTIONIII TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS
ANO-1 TM: 97-1-002 Temporary Makeup to tha Intermediato Cooling Water Surgo Tanks and Instrument Air Compressors This temporary alteration provided the capability to makeup to the Intermediate Cooling Water (ICW) surge tanks and seal / cool the Instrument Air (IA) compressors while corrective maintenance was being performed on the backflow preventer for the Condensate Transfer system. Maintenance on the backflow preventer required that the Condensate Transfer system header be drained making the normal means of makeup to the ICW surge tanks and seal water injection makeup to the IA compressors unavailable.
It was determined that these changes did not:
(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this alteration did not affect any components credited with initiating or mitigating a previously analyzed c.ccident.
Installation of this modification did not affect the failure modes of equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously la. the safety Analysis Report since the configuration of this alteration was such that if a failure had occurred while transferring water, valves would have been closed on both ends of the failed hose and the transfer and further loss of water would have been terminated.
This alteration remained bounded by existing analyses; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
i
j ANO-1 TM: 97-1403 Gagging DOvice on "C" Intermedicto Cooling Untor HOat Exch:ingar
{
Isolation This temporary alteration installed a gagging device on the "C" Intermediate Cooling Water (ICW) Heat Exchanger bypass manual isolation valve stent.
The valve was maintained in a throttled position due to a failure in the gearbox i
that prevented the handwheel drive pinion from rotating the stem wormgear. The gagging devios consisted of a collar clasped onto the stemt to prevent rotation.
i Installation of the device was a precautionary asasure in the event of a pressure transient of the nuclear loop of ICW.
J
)
It was determined that these changes did not:
3
]
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an 1
aooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety q
evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since installation of this devios did not affect any components credited with l
initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed j
aooidents. This modification did not affect equipment i
required to ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the capability to shutdown the reactor i
and maintain it in a safe condition; or, 5
(ii) increase the possibility for an socident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification remained bounded by previously evaluated accidents; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since these were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
ANO-1 TM: 97-1-005 Temporcry Debrio Trough at the Intako Structuro This alteration installed a temporary trough at the intake structure necessary for diverting debris to a basket on the northeast side of the intake structure j
during traveling screen and circulating water puq maintenanoe. The trough was angled through a door on the south side of the Kelly Building and routed to the end of the building where the debris and water were allowed to free fall to a debris basket situated under the trough on the concrete slope area.
It was determined that these changes did not:
1 (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipament important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the traveling screen systems was not credited with initiating or mitigating 1
any of the previously analysed accidents. This modification served to increase the reliability of the service Water (sW)
{
system by minimizing SW strainer clogging; or, i
l (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification was necessary to i
maintain the debris elimination process of the traveling j
screen system that filters cooling water to the safety l
related SW system when aligned to the lake and did not add any failure modes not previously considered; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable
)
margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO-1 TM: 97-1-008 Temporary Root Sanoing Lins to Fcedwster Pump Diochargo Precouro Instrumentation This temporary alteration installed a temporary root sensing line to the "A" Main Feedwater Pump (MFWP) high discharge pressure instrumentation tree due to suspected blockage in the root sensing line downstream of the MFWP discharge instrumentation root valve.
Intermittent high pressure spikes were indicated locally and on the plant computer.
This modification provided a shunt around the suspected blocked root sensing line from the MFW discharge pressure drain l
valve to the instrumentation tree in an attempt to eliminate spurious and j
erroneous pressure change indications.
It was determined that these changes did not:
l (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since installation of the temporary root sensing line allowed the associated "A" MFWP high discharge pressure instrumentation to provide accurate indication until the main root sensing line could be inspected and cleaned.
It also allowed the "A" MFWP to operata
)
with all train components necessary for contingency action l
fully functional; or, l
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a j
different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not introduce any new modes of failure; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the the margins defined in i
the Technical sepecificatioa bases as related to the Main Feedwater system pertained specifically to the Main reedwater Isolation Valves and were not affected by other portions of the system.
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ANO-1 TM: 97-1-009 Missing C1can Liquid Radwanto Valva Disk The valve disk for a check valve in line from the dirty liquid waste filters to the clean waste receiver tanks was found missing during maintenance activities.
Due to unavailability of a replacement part, the valve was reassembled without the internals to allow the operability and pressure boundary of the clean and dirty liquid radwaste systems to be maintained.
It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since failure of either the clean or dirty waste system was not considered to be an accident as evaluated in the SAR and does not interface with any equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification remained bounded by previously evaluated accident scenarios; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-1 TM: 97-1012 Temporary H:ndswitchos for Trcycling Scrocn Motoro i;
This temporary modification provided a means of operating the traveling screens independent of existing controls in cabinet C160 to ensure that the screens oculd be cleaned even in the event of a loss of control power.
New switches were added to allow the screen drive motors to be started regardless of the condition of permissive interlocks from the screen wash pump discharge pressure switches. Procedural controls were used to restrict the use of these switches i
to emergency conditions only.
The procedural controls also provided a means of assuring proper operation of the cleaning spray wash while the screens were operated via the new switches.
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this temporary modification did not increase the probability lof a loss of I
the Circulating Water System or the Service Water System.
operating procedures limited the use of the new switches to j
emergency conditions only and required verification of proper spray flow prior to and during operation of the screen drives via the te c rary switches; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since administrative controls were in place j
to prevent a malfunction of equipment important to safety; or, i
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-1 TM: 97-1-013 Temporary ICW Cooling During 1R14 Full Coro Offload This temporary alteration provided fire water as the ultimate heat sink for spent fuel pool cooling during 1R14 while the reactor was defueled and both loops of Service Water were out of service for maintenance work.
Fire water from the main heador was available as the cooling source to Intermediate cooling Water (ICW) cooler, E-20C.
ICW was then used for cooling of the spent fuel l
pool.
Engineering Calculation 980142E101 G % wnted this arrangement would provide adequate cooling to maintain the bulk spent fuel pool temperature at or below 150 degrees during the maximum expected pool heat load.
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety j
evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the makeup j
connection from the Unit 2, Loop II Service Water System remained available.
Sufficient time to establish this connection existed as pool boiling would not occur for a minimum of 4.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> given an initial pool temperature of 145 degrees; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the credible failure mode of a failed hose resulting in flooding, loss of cooling to ICW, and loss of cooling to the spent fuel pool remained bounded by previous accident analyses; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 TM: 98-1-004 Temporary Firo Pump Installation This temporary alteration connected a temporary motor driven fire pump located on the lower grating at the east end of the Unit 2 Intake structure to the fire system test header located outside the Unit 1 Intake Structure. The pump was used to supplement the fire system water supply to allow use of the fire water system for temporary cooling of the spent fuel pool. Use of the temporary fire pump was desirable to prevent undue wear on the permanent fire pumps.
The normal fire pumps and all normal fire protection system components remained functional and available for fire fighting purposes.
i It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this temporary alteration did not affect system performance or reliability, did not cause the system to be operated outside its design j
limits, and did not affect any system interface; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since all equipment and connections associated with this alteration were located outside of plant structures and in an area such that failure would not affect any safety related equipment; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins j
of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-1 TM: 98-1-010 RC-5 Prsssuro Test Apparatus j
l l
This temporary alteration installed a test apparatus consisting of stainless steel piping, a capped swagelok connection, and a pressure relief valve at a flange connection downstream of RC-5.
This apparatus was used to perform a pressure test of the Reactor Vessel Gasket Leakoff. This modification will be removed during Refueling Outage 1R15, and the blind flange will be reinstalled.
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It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this test apparatus was not credited with maintaining pressure boundary integrity and RC-5 was maintained closed.
Failure of the test apparatus would not have resulted in an increase of the probability of a failure of equipment important to safety; or, i
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a l
different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since failure of this modification remained bounded by previously evaluated accident scenarios; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any j
Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
ANO-1 TM: 98-1-011 Cond ncato Suction Isolation Davica This temporary alteration installed a sealing device and water seal at the auction isolation valve to condensate pump, P-2A, to minimize air inleakage through the suction isolation valve while the pump was tagged out for replacement.
The water seal was made at the suction strainer.
It was determined that these changes did not:
(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the standby condensate pump was not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed accidents. The equipment associated with this modification was not considered important to safety and was remote from equipment which was important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this activity rema;.ned bounded by previously evaluated accident scenarios; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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SECTION IV MISCELLANEOUS EVALUATIONS
ANO-1 CALC: 88E009820 Incorporation of Current Dasign Basio Accidsnt Analysis Information This change incorporated the current Design Basis Accident (DBA) analysis input and results contained in Calculation 88-E-0098-20.
The results of the calculation were previously submitted to the NRC via letter ICAN079301 dated July 22, 1993, and were approved in Technical Specification Amendment Number 181.
Affected SAR Figures:
14-110, 14-60, 14-61,14-61A, 14-61B, 14-62,14-62A, 14-62B, 14-63, 14-64, 14-65, 5-5, 6-5, 6-5A sections:
1.4.43, 14.2.2.5.5.1, 14.2.2.5.5.3, 14.2.2.5.5.4, 14.2.2.5.5.5, 14.2.2.5.5.6, 5.2.1.2.2, 6.3.2, 6.3.3, 6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.2 Tables:
14-39, 14-40, 14-41, 14-43, 14-44, 14-45, 14-46, 14-47, 14-48, 6-9 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the results of the reanalysis have been evaluated and determined to create no challenges to the current plant design.
The evaluations included considerations of changes to the reactor building wall profile, normal operating and post-accident environmental qualification of equipment, and Emergency Core Cooling System pump performance; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this change did not introduce any new or different accident initiators or failure modes; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the reactor building DBA reanalysis assumed plant conditions equal to or more conservative than the conditions defined in the bases of the Technical Specifications.
ANO-1 CALC: 88E009820 R:nctor Building Temperaturo 4
j This revision to the SAR corrected the Reactor Building design temperature during a Loss of Coolant Accident to 286 degrees at a design pressure of 59 psig.
The containment design temperature was the temperature applied to the design of the concrete structure.
Affected SAR Section:
5.1.7.1.I.1 9
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the 286 degree value is the temperature of record for the Reactor Building 4
and all safety related equipment was evaluated at that temperature; or, s
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a i
different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since these corrections were to documentation errors, not analysis errors; or,
- )
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since this correction incorporated 4
the actual design value of 286 degrees as stated in j
Calculation H2860-4.
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ANO-1 CALC: 89E001026 l
Decay Hent/ Low Prosauro Injection Pump Nst Positivo Suction Hand Calculation This revision changed the Net Positive Suction Head Available, Net Positive Suction Head Required, and flows listed for the Decay Heat pumps to reflect the revision to Calculation 89-E-0010-26.
This change was made to include the l
effects of recirculation.
Affected SAR Section:
6.1.3.2 It was determined that these changes did not:
l (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment inportant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the margin between required and available Net Poseitive Suction Head l
was determined to be greater than previously thought, making the probability of a malfunction of the Low Pressure Injection pumps due to cavitation less likely; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different~ type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the difference in system head loss is not significant enough to make any difference in the characteristics of the system or in its interaction with other systems; or, I
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the increased Net Positive Suction Head margin will help ensure that the system remains operable.
ANO-1 CALC: 90E004601 Rocctor Building Sprcy Pump N3t Positiva Suction Hecd This revision to the SAR was incorporated to reflect the Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) Available and NPSH Required as determined by ANO-1 Reactor Building Spray (RBS) Pump NPSH Calculation 90-E-0046-01, Revision 5.
Affected SAR Section:
6.2.2.4.2 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since RBS Pump NPSH was not evaluated as an accident initiator or mitigator.
The addition of margin to the spray pung WPSH provided additional assurance that the pumps will not malfunction by reducing the probability of cavitation or air induction; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since no new modes of operation were introduced as a result of this calculation revision.
Increasing the NPSH margin had no direct effect on system performance and cannot influence the malfunction of any equipment; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the increased NPSH margin did not compromise the operability of the spray system and did not reduce the margin to safety as defined in the bases of any Technical Specification.
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ANO-1 CALC :90E006001 Centainment N0t Free Volume This revision corrected an error with respect to the as-built containment not free volume, h containment not free volume was reduoed by less than 0.1% due to plant changes reflected in Calculation 90-E-0060-01.
The actual va!ue is not used in the accident analysis, but rather a conservatively higher or lower value is used that envelopes the actual value.
Affected SAR section:
5.2.1.1 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this revision to the actual containment not free volume had no irapact on the conservative range of values used in previously analysed accidents; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this minor decrease in containment not free volums did not affect the possibility of a malfunction of equipment of a different type than any previously evaluated in the BAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the existing limits on containment pressurization were unaffected by this minor change to the actual containment not free volume as the margins of safety were based upon conservatively higher or lower values, as appropriate.
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ANO-1 CALC: 95E003001 I
Upd3to of Fuel Hnndling Accid:nt Analysin per TS Amsndment 184 This update to the Fuel Handling Accident Analysis incorporated changes approved in Technical Specification Amendment 184 involving the ability to move fuel in l
the reactor building with the personnel airlock door open.
ANO Calculation j
95-E-0030-01 (2), which determined the dose consequences for the fuel handling accident in the reactor building with the personnel airlock door open, used the same assumptions to determine the dose consequences of a fuel handling accident in the fuel handling building. The only difference was that in this analysis, the release was further mitigated by the use of the fuel handling building i
charcoal adsorbers.
Affected SAR Sections:
14.2.2.3.2, 14.2.2.3.3, 14.2.2.3.4, 14.4 Tables:
14-18, 14-24, 14-25 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence of consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since these increased dose consequences of the fuel handling accident were calculated based on assumptions of GAP activity, reactor power history, time since shutdown, etc., and all assumptions were submitted to the NRC and approved in the SER for Amendment 184 to the ANO-1 Operating License; or, (ii) increase the possibilty for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated prevously in the Safety Analysis Report since these dose values did not affect or create any accident initiators and did not impact any equipment important to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the dose consequences associated with the fuel handling accident in the fuel handling building were not specified in the bases of any Technical Specification.
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ANO-1 CALC: 95E003003 Cyclo 14 Fuel Handling Accid:nt Doco Analysis l
The Safety Evaluation Report for Technical Specification Amendment 184 allows l
fuel movement inside the Unit I reactor containment building with the personnel airlocks open.
The analysis, Calculation 95-E-003-01, to support this TS change used assumptions different from those described in the Safety Analysis I
Groundrules document.
95-E-003-01 applied those new assumptions to Cycle 14 operation and parameters to demonstrate acceptable dose consequences for a Fuel Handling Accident.
The following cases were analyzed:
- 1) Puff (two hour release) from Fuel Handling Accident in containment with the personnel airlock and hatch open.
No credit was taken for any mitigation of the release from the containment building other than iodine scrubbing by the water in the refueling canal.
- 2) Puff (two hour release) from the fuel handling building with credit taken for the fuel handling building charcoal adsorbers in reducing the iodine and for iodine scrubbing by the water in the spent fuel pool.
Affected SAR Table:
3A-6 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the doses
)
associated with a fuel handling accident were calculated bases on assumptions of GAP activity, reactor power history, time since shutdown, etc.
There was no interface with any accident initiators, mitigators, or equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibiity for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the dose values generated by this calculation reflect the consequencer of a fuel handling accident and would not affect the operation of any equipment important to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the dose consequences associated with the fuel handling accident are not specified in the bases of any Technical Specification.
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ANO-1 CALC: 95E003004 i
Steam Generator Tubs Rupture Evsnt Doso Conscquencas The previous steam generator tube rupture accident analysis was nonconservative and assumed that the main steam safety valves would remain closed throughout the i event.
The analysis was revised to account for a brief opening of the main steam safety valves during the shutdown scenario.
Affected SAR Section:
14.2.2.2 Tables:
14-22, 14-23 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Raport since the plant conditions expected to open the main steam safety valves remain within the safety valve design limits for normal operation; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a j
different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety i
l Analysis Report since this revision to account for the main steam safety valves lifting during this previously analyzed accident has no adverse impact on the malfunction of equipment; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Speolfication since the existing limits on primary coolant activity which were based on NRC assumptions remained unchanged.
ANO-1 CALC: 95E003006 i
Main Steam Lina Brock Doao This calculation clarified the assumptions and methodology used in the original Bechtel calculation of offsite dose for the ANO-1 Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) event as reported in the FSAR.
The available Bechtel documentation was inconsistent with the dose assumptions reported in the FSAR, however, the assumptions and methodology leading to the reported dose value could be derived using the available Bechtel calculation and supporting documentation of dose calculations performed in that time frame.
j Affected SAR Section:
14.2.2.1.4 Table:
14-21 It was determined that these changes did not:
l (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this change corrected the value of dose equivalent iodine activity released in a MSLB to agree with the calculated value of offsite dose and the established basis for the MSLB dose analysis; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this change corrected an intermediate calculated value in the MSLB dose analysis and did not make any physical or operational changes that could create a new type of malfunction; or, i
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any j
Technical Specification since the value of released activity from the dose analysis was not included in any discussions of margin defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 CALC: 95E003008 Ravincd Rod Ejection Accid:nt Doso Consegunncas This calculation revised the discussion and dose consequences of the control rod j
ejection accident. These changes reflect the use of different atmospheric dispersion factors, the assunption that 50% of the reactor building leakage is exhausted through the penetration room filters and that these filters have an efficiency of 90% for iodine and 0% for noble gases, isotopes Kr-83m and Xe-138 were deleted from the accident discussion, and a minor correction in the I-lh gap activity was made.
Affected SAR Section:
14.2.2.4.6 Table:
14-31 It was determined that these changes did not:
l (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of en accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since there were no input parameters or assumptions in the dose calculation for the rod ejection accident that required any plant operational changes and there were no changes in the assumptions concerning equipment availability or failure modes.
The combined effect of these changes resulted in a net decrease in the offsite dose consequences in the event of a rod ejection accident; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the.iafety Analysis Report since the new assumptions of the dose calculation did not require that the plant operate in any configuration outside what had already been analyzed and did not require the installation of any new equipment; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no margins of
)
safety defined in the bases of the Technical Specifications regarding the control rod ejection accident.
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ANO-1 CALC: 96R102603 l
Cyclo 14 Coro operating Limito Report operation at power with an inoperable control rod in core location L14 was evaluated to determine the effects on maneuvering analysis results.
It is assumed that the L14 control rod will remain fully withdrawn during power operation, sinoe the inoperable control rod is a Group 1 safety rod and is normally fully withdrawn, the rod operation reocassendation is not affected.
Therefore, the design power peaking is unaffseted and the core operating limits and setpoints remain valid. In this revision, the shutdown margin based rod insertion limits were evaluated assuming that the L14 control rod and the maxisman worth control rod are both stuck in the fully withdrawn position.
It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an l
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety l
evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this change did not alter the manner in which the unit is operated, but provides information to ensure the shutdown margin is maintained; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since no equipment isportant to safety was affected and the required operation and configuration of the plant was not altered by this change; cr, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since this change provided additional information to ensure the shutdown margin is maintained as required by Technical specification 3.5.2.1.
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ANO-1 CALC: 98E001901 Removal of External Rentraints for L-3 and 2L-35 Cranos This evaluation removed the requirement for Spent Fuel Pool crane, L-3, and auxiliary crane, 2L-35, to be secured when in their stored positions.
Affected SAR Section:
5.3.2 l
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the cranes function and ability to maintain its stored position internally was not altered. The cranes perform no safety function, were designed against failure during seismic conditions, and will remain in their supported location; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Repc,rt since no new modes of failure were created due to the removal of external restraints; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-1 CALC: 98R101401 Uso of Fuol Assemblica with Damaged Grid Straps This change addressed the continued use of fuel that has experienced varying degrees of minor intermediate spacer grid damage or deformation. A number of fuel assemblies were identified during Refueling Outage IR14 to have damage that was comparable to or less than that found in Refueling Outage IR13 and evaluated for continued use.
The use of damaged grids, demonstrated to be capable of meeting the design and licensing basis requirements, does not invalidate the results of the reload analysis or the operating limits as stated in the Reload Report and Core Operating Limits Report.
Affected SAR Section:
3A.3 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since tests have been performed that prove damaged grids are capable of meeting the structural requirements set by the Loss of Coolant Accident events.
The damaged grids have been judged to have a negligible effect on thermal-hydraulic analyses due to the limited change in flow characteristics of the grid; or (ii) increase the possibility for an accider.t or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the damaged grids continue to meet the structural and hydraulic requirements of their design and no additional failuren of the grids are anticipated during operation; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Speciff cation since there was no margin of safety deJined in the Technical Specification bases related to the intermediate spscer grid design or function.
ANO-1 CR: 1-95-0351 Emergancy Fcedwater Initiation Control Mods of Applicability This revision to the SAR removed the implication that Emergency Feedwater Initiation Control (EFIC) operability is required upon heating up from cold shutdown. Automatic actuation of'the EFIC System on low Once Through Steam Generator level is not required to be operable below a Reactor Coolant System tesqperature of 280 degrees.
Affected SAR Section:
7.1.4.9 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since previously evaluated accidents require EFIC actuation in the power operation mode only.
This change did not impact any accident scenarios; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since no new mode of operation of the EFIC System was introduced by this change; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the Technical Specification bases address the functions of EFIC that are bypassed in cold shutdown, but not the mode of applicability of the EFIC System.
This change had no impact on bypassing EFIC functions in cold shutdown.
ANO-1 CR: 1-96-0104 Spant Fuol System This change modified SAR text and tables containing information related to the Spent Fuel Pool System to make that information accurately reflect the existing plant configuration. This change also corrected and clarified the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System design basis discussion.
Affectad SAR Sections:
9.4.1, 9.4.2, 9.4.2.1.1, 9.4.2.1.2, 9.6.2.4.3.5 It was determined that these changes did not:
(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this change was limited to corrections and clarifications and did not create or modify accident initiators or mitigators; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this change did not make any physical modifications to equipment important to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 CR: 1-96-0180 Funi Accembly Horizontcl Faulted Condition Analysis This change to the SAR reflects Framatome Technologies' application of Leak-Before-Break (LBB) to the fuel assembly horizontal faulted condition analyses. Additional changes were made to reflect the appropriate methodologies used in the structural analysis for the assemblies as identified in Reload Methodology document BAW-10179P.
Affected SAR Sections:
3.1.2.4.2.1, 3.2.4.2.1.2, 3.3.3.3.2.1, 3.4 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the use of LBB technology had no impact on accident initiators, these changes affirmed that the assumptions employed in the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) performance analysis were conservative and valid, and these changes did not affect the way in which equipment important to safety operates or the conditions under which they operate; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since these changes did not represent a new means of accident initiation and did not precipitate any change in accident mitigation which would result in an accident unlike those previously analyzed; or, (iii) reduce the margin of saftey as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the operability and capability requirements of Engineered Safeguards actuated equipment consider the effects of core configuration post LOCA to assure adequate core cooling and control rod insertability.
The ECCS analysis was verified to perform successfully against a conservatively determined post LoCA core configuration given the LBB horizontal faulted load analysis.
ANO-1 CR: 1-96-0650 Em3rgency Cooling Pond Inventory This change clarified the capability of Unit 1 to replenish Emergency Cooling Pond (ECP) inventory when Auxiliary Cooling Water losses to the flume are accommodated by the balance of Service Water (SW) flow returned to the ECP.
Additional clarification was provided regarding the necessity of having the Dardanelle Reservoir available when SW is aligned to the ECP.
Affected SAR Section:
1.7.3 It was determined that these changes did not:
(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the addition of ANO-1 as a potential source for ECP makeup water does not create the potential to deplete another inventory of water assumed in any accident analysis and does not preoccupy equipment assumed to provide other functions in existing analyses; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change did not create any new modes of failure; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the configuration permitted by this change is an enhancement of the preservation of the operator action margin defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-1 CR: 1-97-0021 Gts Collection H2ndar This revision downgraded portions of the gas collection header piping and valves to ANSI B31.1 in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.143, " Design Guidance for Radioactive Waste Management Systems, Structures, and Components Installed in Light Water cooled Nuclear Power Plants."
Affected SAR Tigures:
11-1, 11-3 Table:
11-18 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the reclassification of gas vent header piping did not affect 1
the piping connected to the waste gas decay tank or any equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the reclassification of piping and l
valves in the vent header system was administrative in nature and did not affect the waste gas decay tank rupture accident as analyzed in the SAR; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Techical Specification since this reclassification of vent I
header piping did not affect the operation of equipment or the amount of fission gases stored in the waste gas decay tanks.
i i
ANO-1 CR: 1-97-0267 Dscsy Heat Veult Damp 3r Popition During Normal Operation This revision corrected a SAR table indicating that the ventilation dampers for the decay heat vaults are always closed.
The dampers are allowed to be open to purge the rooms.
These dampers are the only source of outside air ventilation to these rooms to prevent the rooms from becoming a potentially hazardous environment during normal operations. While purge is not needed to reduce airborne activity during normal operations, access to these spaces is needed to conduct inspections and maintenance, and therefore, a continuous purge of the rooms is conducted.
The operability of the dampers and the components in the decay heat vaults is not affected by having the dampers open during normal operations.
The dampers close on air failure and are required to be closed during a Loss of Coolant Accident.
Affected SAR Table:
9-25 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence of consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this change did not affect overall system performance or reliability.
This change did not alter or increase the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety; or, 4
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this change did not alter the method of operation of any equipment or systems; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
1
ANO-1 CR: 1-984258 Smfo Shutdown Ccpability Assosem:nt The Safe Shutdown capability Assessment credits the pressurizer as a radiant heat shield between redundant cabling associated with the pressurizer level temperature compensation elements.
The separation of these components was evalur.ted, however, the evaluation focused on the separation between the tsararature elements and did not address the associated cabling.
Inside the north cavity, the conduits are separated by less than ten feet of clear space.
Consequently, it was believed that the physical arrangement violated the separation requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2.
Further evaluation determined that the temperature compensated pressurizer level indications are not required to achieve saf e shutdown in the event of a reactor building fire.
Pressurizer temperature, by itself, is not an indication that is required to achieve and maintain safe shutdewn. The temperature elements were included in the components of interest list because they were considered essential in providing temperature compensated pressurizer level.
For a fire requiring alternate shutdown, both channels of temperature compensated level are available via the Safety Parameter Display System.
For fires in all other fire areas temperature compensated indication would not be subject to fire damage.
Consequently, no violation of the separation requirements for safe shutdown components exists.
Affected FHA Sections:
5.6.2.B.3.G, 5.7.6.C It was determined that these changes did not:
)
(i) increase the probability of occurence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this change did not alter the function of the pressurizer temperature elements, but clarified that the unit can be safely shutdown without them; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety j
Analysis Report since this change only clarified that the pressurizer temperature elements do not have to be available for safe plant shutdown in the event of a fire and thus do j
not have to be classified as components of interest; or, j
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there was no applicable margin of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-1 CR: 1-98-0336 Opsration with Alternntiva Fual Assembly in Coro Location L15 Fuel assembly NJ074F was inspected during Refueling Outage 1R14 and was found to have a downward slipped intermediate grid.
NJ074F was a thrice burnt batch 14 peripheral assembly. Fuel assembly NJ073R was identified as having nearly I
identical properties to those of assembly NJ074F regarding exposure, enrichment, and cycle histories. Framatome Cogema Fuels provided documentation of anaylsis that showed fuel assembly NJO73R could be loaded into the core without the need to alter boron concentration.
Further analysis was performed to show that the documentation and conclusions of the original reload licensing analyses, based en the use of fuel assembly NJ074F in core location L15, bounded the conclusions of reload analysis performed using fuel assembly NJ073R in core location L15.
Affected SAR Figure:
3A-1 Section:
3A.10 l
2 It was determined that these changes did not:
I (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since no changes to 1
\\
plant equipment or operating procedures were required. The substitution of assembly NJ074F with NJ073R in Cycle 15 did j
not impact any previously analyzed accident initiators or j
mitigators; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a l
different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the substitution of assembly NJ074F with NJ073R in Cycle 15 did not require new equipment or alter the way in which the plant operates. No changes in existing failure modes and no new failure modes of equipment important to safety were created by this substitution; or, l
1 l
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since explicit analysis of this i
revised loading has shown that this bundle replacement will i
have no significant affect on Cycle 15 neutronics including core reactivity, critical boron concentration, core power and exposure distributuions, and power peaking margin.
The maximum allowable linear heat generation rate in the Cycle 15 Core Operating Limits Report will continue to assure that clad integrity limits are met and thermal design evaluation indicates that fuel centerline melt will not occur.
ANO-1 CR: C-96-0068 i
Diosol Firo Pump Day Tank Low Lovel Alarm Sotpoint This revision changed the low level alarm setpoint associated with the diesel fire pump day tank to 29" and the minimum level required to 27".
The former required level of 5/8 full (155 gallons) would not support the eight hour run required by NFPA 20.
Affected SAR Section:
9D.2.4 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since increasing the amount of diesel fuel required in the day tank allows the diesel fire pump to operate longer, thus reducing fire danger; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change did not introduce any new accident scenarios or consequences not previously evaluated; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
m m
ANO-1 CR: C-96-0135 Lenkega Quentitics to Auxiliary Building and Rasultant Donos from a Maximum Hypothetical Accident This change to the SAR reflects a more recent evaluation of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) leakage.
It was discovered that potential leakage paths i
outside of the seal'ed rooms on Elevation 317 exist and that an evaluation of the offsite dose impact was required.
Affected SAR Sections:
14.2.2.5.6, 14.2.2.6.6, 6.4 Tables:
14-52, 6-11
]
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaulated in the safety Analysis report since this increase in offsite dose estimates was relatively insignificant.
The total dose estimate remained far below the 10CFR100 limit I
of 300 Ram for thyroid dose; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a j
different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since no changes were made to the plant condition that would introduce new accident sequences.
'Ihis change was made to clsrify and accurately reflect the current plant condition; or, 1
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the offsite dose increase identified in the SAR change was not contained in the bases of any Technical Specification.
ANO-1 CR: C-97-0059 Location of South Electrical Equipm:nt Room Cooler 1
l This change revised drawings to show the correct location of the soutn electrical equipment room cooler.
Affected SAR Figures:
1-4, 1-5, A-3, A-4 4
i It was determined that these changes did not:
1
)
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this change was adminitrative in nature and did not affect the operation of any equipment or systems; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a j
different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change did not alter equipment performance, but only described its location; or, (iii) zeduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no operating limits, conditions, or procedures were affected by this administrative change.
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ANO-1 DRN: 98-01202 Turbino Firo System During reassembly of the Unit 1 Main Turbine Fire Detection System a discrepancy was identified between the installed Fenwall Heat Detector temperature rating and that shown on the drawing. This revision corrected the drawing to be consistent with field conditions and other controlled design documents.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-16 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction or equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the Turbine Fire Detection System was not credited with initiating or mitigating any previously analyzed accidents and is not considered equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this revision corrected an drawing error and did not change the configuration of the system; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
-.. ~. - _ -
ANO-1 ER: 963555E103 ANO-1 Equipment Hatch Micoilo Shiold Block Removal This engineering report evaluated the reswval of the missile shield blocks located in front of the equipment hatch when the unit is below Hot Shutdown.
)
This early reseval of the missile shield blocks allowed sooess to the equipment hatch for as-found testing to be perforsned and for final preparations of the area for anatorial and personnel access to be soupleted. General Design Criteria (GDC) 4 requires structures to be appropriately protected against dynamic j
effects, including missiles, that ansy result frosa events and conditions caused j
by natural 7 ---
=. The requirements of GDC 4 were not violated by the reswval of the missile shield blocks.
It was determined that these changes did not:
(1) increase the probellity of occurrence or consequence of an socident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the evaluation provided by the engineering report addressed impact to the equipment hatch due to a tornado missile and concluded that containment integrity would be maintained should such an event occurs or, 1
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since no safety systesas required to bring the j
unit to cold shutdown were challenged by the removal of the missile shield blocks; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the removal of the missile shield blocks did not alter the conditions specified in the Technical specification bases and did not reduce any margins of safety.
4
)
ANO-1 ER: 974291D101 Emergrncy Diccel Generator Margin Recovsry I
a This design change modified the Engineered Safeguards (ES) load shedding circuits for Emergeticy Diesel Generators (EDGs) K4A and K4B.
Previously, these j
lead shed circuits shed the spent fuel pool pump, control room chiller, and instrument air compressor from the EDGs whenever an ES signal to start the diesel was present and the EDG output brwaker was closed.
The circuit was modified by removing the "EDG output breaker closed" interlock. With the interlock removed, load shedding will occur whenever the Es signal to start the EDG is present, regardless of the status of the EDG output breaker (i.e. whether on offsite or onsite power).
1 i
It was determined that these changes did not:
j (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since shedding of i
additional loads on ES actuation for a Design Basis Accident reduces the probability of a degraded voltage condition upon f
a plant trip and transfer to offsite power.
This I
modification resulted in a decreased likelihood of degraded voltage to safety buses and thus a decreased likelihood of degraded voltage to the safety equipment being fed by those buses; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated prsviously in the Safety 4
[
Analysis Report since this modification utilized existing
]
equipment in the load shed circuit, therfore, there were no new failure modes and no new accidents created by this l
modification; or, j
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any 1
Technical Specification since this modification decreased the likelihood of the bus voltage dropping below the relay
{
setpoints since it provided an ES load shed circuit for three non-essential loads on each train.
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i ANO-1 ER: 980039D101 ANO-1 Normal Control Room Air Supply Duct Radiation Monitor l
This modification installed a scintillation radiation monitor in the normal air supply duct to the Unit 1 control room. The radiation monitor is the same as that installed on the normal air supply duct to the Unit 2 control room.
The radiation monitor assembly consists of a ratameter, pre-asplifier, and a duct mountad detector. A contact from the new duct radiation monitor was placed in I
parallel with that of existing control room radiation monitor RE-8001 to provide a redundant radiation isolation signal for the control room.
The new monitor is powered from a Class lE diesel backed power source and provides indication of radiation levels locally on the ratemater and in the control room via the plant computer.
Affected SAR Figure:
9-13 Section:
9.7.2.1 l
It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment i g ortant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the equipsment affected by this modification was not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed accidents. All safety related cosponents installed in the plant as a result of this modification were nuclear qualified and seismically mounted; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction or a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since installation of the new radiation j
monitor did not affect the overall system function or failure modes and the new monitor interfaces with other cosponents in the same way as the existing area radiation monitor; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the sensitivity of the new radiation monitor is at least equal to the existing Unit 2 normal air intake duct radiation monitor.
ANO-1 ER: 980084E101 Station Battery Post Maintenanca Test Raquiremsnts This Engineering Request (ER) provided limits and justification for performing a modified service discharge test as " Post Maintenance Test" for the new D06 and D07 batteries.
These batteries were replaced in IR14 with like-for-like cells.
This ER evaluated and justified having the vendor complete the rated discharge test at the factory, prior to delivery. Then, after installation, a modified service discharge test was perfomed to verify the battery connections.
Having the vendor perfczm the rated discharge test did not impact the battery's ability to perform its safety function.
Affected SAR Sections:
8.3.2.1.1, 8.3.2.1.8 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since overall function, performance, and reliability of the 125 VDC system to provide uninteruptable power was not affected; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the batteries and their connected loads were unaffected by these changes; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases concerning the station batteries.
)
)
ANO-1 ER: 940185R101 i
Emerg:ncy Cooling Pond Intako Ccrocn Construction j
The Emergency Cooling Pond pipe intake screens were replaced due to j
deterioration. The new screens were fabricated froen safety related material in the same configuration as the old screens. There was no change in function or f
performance as a result of this modification.
l Affected SAR Figure:
9-34 1
It was S tormined that these changes did not:
5 I
(1) increase the probability of occurrence or ocnsequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the new screens were fabricated fresa safety related material and constructed in accordance with approved station procedures; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a 4
j different type than any evaluated previously in the safety j
Analysis Report since this modification tenained bounded by j
existing accident analyses; or, i
4 (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the materials used in construction were safety related, screen mesh size was not changed, and the screen open area was unchanged.
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ANO-1 ER: 980302E104 Installation of Main Steam Safoty Valva Blenk riangas and Security Barriers This temporary configuration change installed blank flanges for each Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) removed for maintenance during Refueling Outage IR14.
The blank flanges provided foreign material exclusion protection for the steamline pipe and served as a pressure boundary to allow the nitrogen cover to 1:,a maintained on the Once Through Steam Generators (OTSGs).
In addition, the blank flanges provided for containment integrity during the time that any OTSG secondary side openings were breached and when any OTSG tubes were removed.
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since installation of the blind flanges fulfilled the requirement for maintaining a pressure boundary for OTSG layup and provided for reactor building closure had a secondary breach been required; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the blind flanges satisfied the requirements of the MSsys during cold or refueli$g shutdown; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no margins of safety defined for the specified conditions (refueling or cold shutdown).
d 1
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ANO-1 ER: 980302E106 Foreign Material Exclusion Covar for Pressuro Roliof Valva This temporary modification installed a temporary Foreign Material Exclusion j
(FME) cover on the top flange of CV-lOOO after the removal of the ElectroMatic Relief Valve. This alteration allowed the Pressurizer to remain functional as a vent path by permitting the Pressuriz.er level to stay roughly the same as that of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) when the RCS lev 2l was increased or i
decreased.
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It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the primary function of the RCS while in cold shutdown is to maintain water level above the core.
Safety related equipment required to cool the RCS or supply water was not affected by this activity; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this activity was conducted with the RCS in cold shutdown. RCS inventory, Decay Heat, and fuel handling activities were not affected by this installation; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since this activity was performed in a plant condition that had no defined margins of safety.
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ANO-1 ER: 980302E108 High Pr:ccuro Injection Full Flow Test Gaga Installation This modification installed and removed test gages for the purpose of monitoring differential pressures across Makeup and Purification System valves via upstream
{
and downstream vent or drain stacks. This information was needed to determine j
the differential pressure across each stop check valve due to industry problems with high differentials on this style of valve manufactured by Anchor-Darling.
The test was performed with the Reactor Coolant System in a cold shutdown condition.
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this test was performed with the unit in a cold shutdown condition. This modification did not affect Reactor Coolant System inventory, Decay Heat Removal, or fuel handling activities; or, 1
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety
)
Analysis Report since this modification was performed with i
the unit in a cold shutdown condition and did not impact any equipment considered important to safety; or, l
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-1 ER: 940338E101 Temporcry Drains in tho Ranctor Building This evaluation addresses draining bottom water frasa the fuel transfer canal, incore instrn==ntation tank, and floor drain via a two inch vacuum hose to the Auailiary Building Equipment Drain Tank during cold shutdown or refueling.
Modifications to the drain piping resulted in loss of ability to drain the bottosa water to the Reactor Building sump as stated in the SAR.
Affected SAR Section:
9.5.2.2 It was determined that these changes did nott (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this activity will only occur during cold shutdown or refueling and there are no evaluated accidents related to this equipment in these modes; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the consequences of a hose failure are minimal due to constant surveillance and available isolation valves; or, (iii) reduoe the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO-1 ER: 980601R101
]
Low Temperaturo Ov0rproccuro Protection Guidance Regarding j
Pressurizer Level and Reactor Coolant System Pressure j
)
This engineering evaluation provided guidance to operations personnel regarding f
Low Temperature overpressure Protection (LTOP) concerns and issues.
Previously, pressuriser level was very conservatively restricted at all Reactor Coolant system (RCS) temperatures below the LTOP enable temperature to an indicated level of 105 inches. This evaluation reviewed the analytical bases and provided justification for relaxing this overly conservative restriction. The pressuriser level was selected against a limiting RCs pressure and prescribed at all temperatures below the LTOP enable tesperature by operations. However, as 6
pressure is reduced, significant head room is added to allow for relaxation cf this restriction while still providing LTOP.
Therefore, the pressurizer level may be increased when combined with an RCS pressure which allows sufficient head room to accommnodate either a mass addition or thermal expansion transient.
Affected SAR Section:
4.2.4 It wu determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since these chatcges clarified the existing controls pertaining to assumed initial conditions which provide for LTOP.
These controls accommodate a postulated component malfunction and are unrelated to an accident as postulated for ANO-1; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report sinoe these changes pertain only to the permissible ceabinations of RCS pressure and pressurizar level and are unrelated to the way in which equipment important to safety is operated; or, (iii) reduos the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since these changes protect the assumptions and requirements of the limiting LTOP transient.
ANO-1 ER: 980584E101 Opsration without E-3B Extraction Steam
}
This engineering request evaluated operation of the unit with the unavailability of extraction steam for the E-3B feedwater heater due to errors in the B turbine replacement performed during 1R14.
E-3B typically heats the condensate flow l
leaving E-4B from 272 to 302 degrees at 100% power. Without extraction steam, this condensate heating was tranferred to E-2B, which normally heats E-3B j
condensate discharge from 302 to 375 degrees at 100% power.
Thus, the heat duty on E-2B was increased from approximately 73 degrees delta T to 103 degrees delta T, or approximately 40%.
]
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an j
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since there were no f
evaluated accidents relat.r., to, or affected by, the sequence of feedwater heating or the individual heater loads; or, i
i (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety
)
Analysis Report since this change did not affect any equipment l
1 1
important to safety and remained bounded by previously
)
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evaluated accidents; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the Technical specification bases did not specifically address operation of the unit i
with partial flow bypass around the E-2 feedwater heater.
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l ANO-1 ER: 98R101001 i
Bacio for NtOH Tank Laval uced in SOfoty AnolysOs 1
This engineering report addressed the consequenoes of errors involving the sodiusa hydroxide tank for their impact on post Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
Reacter Building (mm) water level, Low Pressure Injection, and Reactor Building
{
spray pump performance during post-LOCA RB sump recirculation (Net Pressure suction Mead), RB sump vortexing analysis, post-LOCA RB pressure and teoperature l
profiles, post-LOCA offsite dose, and RB sump and spray pH.
The parameters j
associated with these evaluations were found to be bounding after accounting for the errors, except for post-LOCA RB susy pH.
This evaluation reduced the low pH j
limit frosa 8.5 to 7.0 in accordance with current NRC guidance in NUREG-0800, SRP j
section 6.5.2, Revision 2.
1 4
]
It was determined that these changes did not J
l (i) increase the probability of ooonrrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipsnent important to safety i
evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since equipment operation and offsite dose consequences remained bounded by the existing plant licensing basis. Reduction of the A
post-IACA RB stg pH lessened potential adverse consequences j
of equipseent exposure to the harsh post-IDCA environment; or, f
j (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change did not create any potential input to the creation of an accident; or, 1
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the sodium hydroxide tank level and concentration limitations were unchanged.
l
ANOl-1 LIR: L964127 Cyclo Spacific Information This change clarified that cycle specific information on radwaste storage and release is historical and will not be updated as it is not pertinent to the current radwaste storage and release controls.
The Radiological Effluent Technical Specification (RETS) and Offsite Dose calculation Manual ensure radioactive waste storage and release is controlled in socordance with j
applicable regulations.
Cycle specific variances such us cycle length are not pertinent to operation of the radioactive waste handling systems.
Affected SAR Ssetion:
11.1.1 It was determined that these changes did not:
)
(i) increase the probability or occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this clarification did not result in a change to the methods of retention or processing of radwaste; or, 1
I (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety I
Analysis Report since this clarification did not alter the j
way the plant is operated and did not impact any equipment; or, 1
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since this clarification did not result in a change to the RETS.
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ANO-1 LIR: L97-0213 i
t Instrumsntation Corrections j
i This revision corrected several SAR discrepancies identified regarding instrumentation ranges.
Affected SAR Section:
4.2.3.8 Tables:
7-11, 7-llA i
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) Increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of sn l
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since these changes to Regulatory Guide 1.97 component descriptions were 1
administrative only; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a j
i different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety 1
i
)
Analysis Report since the function of the components as j
described in all accident scenarios and in the requirements i
of Regulatory Guide 1.97 were not changed; or, 1
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(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since these changes did not affect 1
f any margin of safety as described in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 PEAR: 95-7006 Instrument Air Filtor Differential Prosauro Indication Isolation Valves This revision added two isolation valves for Instrument Air filter differential pressure indication not previously identified on the appropriate drawing.
Affected SAR Figuro:
9-14 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important! to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the affected r
valves do not perform a safety function and were not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed accidents; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since these valves do not perform a safety function or interact with any equipment impestant to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 TS: 2.1 Statictical Coro Dacign Methodology Implementation This change integrated the statistical Core Design (sCD) methodology into the reload process for protection frosa Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) for the first time for Cycle 15.
This method was described fully in topical report BAN-10187P-A and was referenced in the reload methodology topical BAN-10179P-A.
N use of the SCD methodology assures that the primary design bases criteria with respect to DME continues to be met.
This methodology statistically combines the uncertainties for several key thermal hydraulio inputs as opposed to adding the uncertainties to the respective input parameters individually.
h statistical ocebination of these uncertainties defines the statistical Design Limit. N Cycle 15 core has been designed to protect an even higher design limit called a h rmal Design f.4=4t for conservatism and to build in DME margin which can be used as necessary.
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the Core operating Limits Report limits and setpoints generated using SCD methodology ensure the assumptions of the DNB analyses are bounded and the core is protected frosa DNB occurrence.
No change to the required reponse of any equipment important to safety was necessary to accomplish the required protection; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since cores designed with the use of SCD methodology are predicted to behave similarly to the past cores and will not alter plant operation or the core's perfomance significantly as to increase the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the Core operating Limits Report limits and setpoints ensure the assumptions of the DNB analyses are bounded.
ANO-1 TS BASES: 2.3 High cnd Low Preccuro Trip Referenc33 This change provided consistency between the SAR and the Technical Specification bases for accidents that may credit the high and low pressure trips.
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an
)
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report sinoe this change did not ispact any components or systems credited with initiating or mitigating a previously analyzed accident; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a j
different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change was AAninistrative in nature and did not impact the operation of the plant or its hardware; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the % sis of any Technical Specification since this change was acainistrative in nature and did not affect the margin of safety as defined in the bases.
ANO-1 TS BASES: 4.1 On-lina Testing of the R:: actor Protection System and Emargency Feedwater Initiation Control This evaluation deleted the specific rotation schedule for testing the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Emergency Feedwater Initiation Control (EFIC) channels. This change did not affect the staggered test basis requirement, only j
the specified order for which the tests are performed so that rotation will coincide with the maintenance schedule red / green train philosophy.
1 This change affected TS Bases section 4.1.
1 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the RPS and EFIC systems were designed and licensed for 2 out of 3 logic with the fourth channel out of service for on-line testing.
System logic, channel independence, and tesing capability are not impacted by the rotational order of the on-line l
testing; or, J
(11} increase the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a j
different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since RPS and EFIC are designed with 2 out of 3 channel logic with a fourth channel in test such that i
no single failure will prevent the systems from fulfilling l
their safety response; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any
]
Technical Specification since the particular order of channel i
testing has no impact on the margin of safety as defined in I
the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 TS: 166 Froch Fual Storaga Rack Criticality Analysis
)
This change incorporated information that was previously reviewed and approved by the NRC in Technical Specification Amendment 166 regarding the Fresh Fuel Storage Rack criticality analysis.
The revised analysis was performed in response to NRC Generic Letter 96-04, "Boraflex Degradation in Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks."
The analysis modeled the Boraflex panels at 90% of the design udnimum Boron-10 areal density providing a 10% margin for potential boron loss due to water ingress.
In addition, width and end shrinkage of the panels was l
included in the analysis.
The codes used for this analysis differed from those used in the original analysis; however, these codes were used for the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool criticality analysis performed to increase the maximum fuel enrichment to 5.0%.
The revised analysis determined that with conservative boraflex degradation assumptions, the region 1 spent fuel racks continue to meet the acceptance criterion of k-eff less than or equal to 0.95 for normal operations.
Affected SAR Figures:
9-56, 9-57 Sections:
9.12, 9.6.1<2, 9.6.1.6, 9.6.2.3, 9.6.2.4.2, 9.6.2.4.3.1, 9.6.2.4.3.2 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the postulated accidents evaluated in the original analysis were addressed by the current analysis, the most credible being an inadvertent drop of an assembly between the outside periphery of the rack and pool wall.
The conclusion reached for all of the previously analyzed postulated accidents was that the original analysis remained unchanged; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the revised analysis demonstrated that the functional capability of the racks to preclude criticality was not changed with the addition of boraflex degradation.
The revised analysis demonstrated that the racks continue to meet the original design criteria for both normal operation and postulated accidents; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the Technical Specifications did not identify a specific margin of safety in relation to the Spent Fuel Pool criticality analysis.
The basis for Technical Specification 3.8.17 states that the minimum boron concentration is required to remain within the limits of the spent fuel pool accident and criticality analysis. The assumptions used in the revised analysis with respect to boron concentration in the pool were not changed.
ANO-1 WP: 1409.637 Emergency Coro Cooling Syctem Check Valvo Rsverce Clocure Test This workplan tested several Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) valves for reverse closure. This activity documented the close function on each valve to ensure that ANO-1 can maintain dual isolation while on sump recirculation post Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) to minimize potential offsite dose releases from the BWST.
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this test verified the system dual isolation capability and did not modify or replace any existing plant components; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this test did not modify or replace any plant equipment; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since neither spray train was taken out of service when either NaOH outlet valve was closed, allowing the minimum amount of iodine removal to remain available.
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ANO-1 WP: 1409.645 Grcup 1 Rod 3 Exsrcico cnd Toct with S0rvice Powar Supply This workplan allowed the use of the servios power supply to attempt to free Group 1, Rod 3, stuck at approximately 54 withdrawn. This activity involved disconnecting the stuck control rod power leads fross their normal power supply and connecting thess to a service power supply. The technical specification requirement to have direct -mication with the control roosa during this activity was ensured by the administrative controls in the workplan.
Following completion of the activity, the leads were reconnected to their normal power J
supply and an independent verification was performed.
i It was detsrained that these changes did not:
1 (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an socident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this was an electrical connection using source power evaluated in previous design assusptions. Therefore, there was no new means to affect other structures, systems, or components; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an socident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the power supply was only attached to a single control rod that had been declared inoperable; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the control rod attached to the service power supply had been declared inoperable and the boron concentration had been increased to accosemodate the inoperable control rod.
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ANO-1 WP: 1409.669 Chemistry Closcout of the Unit Ono Condansor This workplan provided instructions for cleaning, sample line verification, inleakeage checks, and air removal efficiency of the new Unit 1 condenser. This activity involved the injection of helium at several points not specifically addressed in the SAR.
Addition of helium at these points required the vacuum pumps to extract more non-condensable gases.
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since addition of a j
small amount of helium would not result in the failure of the i
condenser vacuum system to maintain condenser vacuum; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the condenser vacuum system had sufficient capacity to maintain vacuum with the additional helium; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the ability of the condenser to maintain proper vacuum was not changed.
The vacuum pumps had adequate capacity to overcome the small amount of helium injected.
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Rasolution of Rcgulatory Guida 1.97 Concarns This revision corrected discrepancies between the SAR and the as-built configuration of the plant.
Specifically, the SAR was changed to reflect that Letdown Flow and Makeup Tank Level indication are available on the Safety Parameter Display System.
Affected SAR Section:
9.1.2.1 Table:
7-llA It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since these changes corrected discrepancies between the SAR and the as-built configuration of the plant and did not physically alter the current plant configuration; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since these changes were editorial in nature; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since these changes were editorial in nature.
ANO-1 LDCR:
Funi Handling Systen This revision changed the minimum water depth over the active fuel line of a spent fuel assembly to 8.0 feet for assemblies carried in one of the fuel handling bridge masts that provide at least 1.75 inches of steel shielding and 9.0 feet water depth over the fuel when handled outside of the masts.
The exieting dose rate limit of 10 mrem / hour at the surface of the water is maintained by either of these configurations. This change reduced the conservatism established by the 9.5 feet of water cover.
The new values remain i
conservative due to the higher power level assumed for the source term, assumed shorter decay time than what is actually available before fuel will be moved, and conservative treatment of the metal shielding provided by the masts.
Affected SAR Section:
9.6.2.3 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this change to conservatively account for the amount of shielding necessary to maintain the current dose limits had no adverse impact on the initiation of any accident. The water level criteria change did not adversely affect equipment operation; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this water level criteria change did not impact equipment operation such that a different type of malfunction of equipment could occur; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the existing limits on water level over the core and spent fuel pool and the NRC assumptions used in setting the Technical Specification limiting condition for operation remained unchanged.
ANO-1 LDCR:
Survaillencs R:quirements for Hoso Stations and Sprinkler System Valves Inside Containment Surveillance requirements for fire hose stations and sprinkler systems required that hose stations be demonstrated operable at least once per 31 days by visual examination of the station to ensure that all required equipment is at the station.
Sprinkler systems were required to be demonstrated operable at least once per 31 days by verifying that each system is aligned to the fire pumps.
These surveillance requirements were not practical during power operations for those hose stations and sprinkler system valves inside the Containment Building due to ALARA concerns. A note was added to the SAR to exempt the Contkinment Building hose stations and sprinkler system valves except during cold shutdown.
Affected SAR Sections:
9D.3.4, 9D.5.4 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfuention of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the components and systems affected by this change were not credited with initiating or mitigating any previously evaluated accident and do not impact equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this change remained bounded by existing accident analyses; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-1 LDCR:
Control Room Ventilation Fan Flow Switches This revision clarified the function of the Control Room Ventilation flow switches and light indication. The wording was changed from, " Fan failure is monitored by a flow switch with an indicating light..." to " Fan flow is monitored by a flow switch with an indicating light...".
The wording was changed to better state the function of the flow switches since failure of the-flow switch could cause the indicating light to extinguish and not result in a fan failure.
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Affected SAR Section:
9.7 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this revision did not have any affect on the function or design of the Emergency Control Room Ventilation System and did not change any actions to be taken for the response of the system; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this change did not introduce any new modes of failure; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the flow switch and its indication light were not discussed in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 LDCR;.
Removal of Spscific Conting Manufacturor/Brend Namns l
Original coatings used in plant construction were specified by brand name or manufacturer in sections of the SAR.
Due to changing coating industry requirements (e.g. Environmental Protection Agency requirements on lead and volatile organic compounds) and coatings being updated or phased out by l
manufacturers, several of the original coatings listed are no longer available and new qualified coating materials exist which are more " user-friendly" and environmentally safe.
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Affected SAR Section:
6.6.1 1
It was determined that these changes did not:
l (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an l
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety l
evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since coating materials used in the containment building are evaluated l
to ensure their compliance with qualifications for Design Basis Accident (DBA) conditions per specification ANO-A-2437; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since qualified coatings have no adverse l
impact on the function of equipment important to safety. By l
maintaining the use of qualified coatings, the possibility of coating debris contributing to the sump screen blockage during a DBA is not considered credible; or, i
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 LDCR:
(
Rausa of Reactor Coolant This evaluation assessed the reuse of reactor coolant in instances where the water quality, activity levels, and boron concentration are compatible with the l
chemistry in the reactor coolant.
The reuse of the letdown will reduce radwaste l
generation.
Affected SAR Sections:
11.1.2.3, 11.1.3.6.1, 11.1.3.7.3, 11.1.3.8.C l
It was determined that these changes did not:
i (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this activity will maintain reactor coolant chemirtry and activity levels j
within the bounda previously specified in the SAR; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this change maintains the current l
controls related to primary side corrosion and does not introduce any type of failure mode not previously evaluated; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any l
Technical Specification since this change maintains operation of the Reactor Coolant System within previously j
established Technical Specification limits and does not j
increase primary side corrosion.
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1 ANO-1 LDCR:
l Raquired Panotration Room Ventilation Flow This revision changed the required penetration room ventilation flow ra*o to 1800 scfm +/- 10% to comply with the Technical Specification requirement that the fans operate within +/- 10% of design flow.
Affected SAR Section:
6.5.2.1 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety j
evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this correction did not affect pentration room ventilation system performance or reliability and did not affect any system interfaces; or,
)
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this change corrected a SAR value and did not make any changes to the penetration room ventilation system; or, I
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of araf j
Technical Specification since this change was made to more accurately reflect the design flow rate of the penetration room ventilation system and did not reduce the margin of safety for the system as defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 LDCR:
R:quircments to Accommmodato a Micaligned or Dropp d Rod This change added a new section to the SAR to describe new limitations and restrictions imposed on a reload design and the allowed dropped rod worth based on an evaluation performed to show that the peaking increase associated with a l
dropped or misaligned rod is acceptable. This change involved checks to ensure that ANO-1 does not exceed the assumptions inherent in the basis for Technical l
Specifications regarding misaligned control rods and the SAR analysis acceptablity of a dropped control rod.
These checks also ensure that an asymmetric rod does not result in exceeding the BAW-10179P-A Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limits.
Affected SAR Sections:
14.1.2.7.5, 14.4 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of ocevrrence or consequence of a accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the information added to the SAR to describo limitations in the analysis for allowed drop rod worth was more restrictive than the information already contained in the SAR; or, l
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a l
different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the limitations used in the evaluation were more restrictive than the allowances in the SAR; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no specific margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases l
regarding a dropped or misaligned rod.
However, this methodology ensured that the allowances of the Technical Specifications did not exceed defined safety limits.
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ANO-1 LDCR:
Revised Cyclo 14 Loso of Coolant Accidnnt and Maximum Hypothetical Accident Doses Framatome Technologies Incorporated issued a revision to the Cycle 14 Reload Report resulting in an increcse in the thyroid dose at the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) and Low Population Zone (LPZ) for the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), and an increase in the Whole Body and thyroid dose at the EAB and LPZ for the Maximum Hypothetical Accident (HHA).
This revision to the SAR incorporated the assumptions of Calculation 89-E-0164-06, Revision 1, concerning the sprayed and unsprayed volumes of containment and the consequences of the LOCA and NHA.
Affected SAR Table:
3A-6 1
It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an j
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since there were no input parameters or assumptions in the dose calculations for Cycle 14 which required any plant operational changes that could increase the probability of occurrence of any safety analysis event initiators. The revised HHA thyroid dose and whole body doses at the EAB and LPZ remained below 10CFR100 guidelines; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since there were no changes in the assumptions concerning equipment availability or failure modes.
The assumptions of the cycle 14 dose calculations did not require that the plant operate in any configuration outside that already analyzed and did not require that any new equipment be installed; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the revised results for the MHA and LOCA did not exceed the limits of 10CFR100.
ANO-1 LDCR:
Clarification of Fuol Handler Position This revision to the SAR clarified a statement so that it could no longer be construed that only personnel from the operations Department are trained to move nuclear fuel.
It was unforeseen, when the statement was originally written, that a general description containing the term " plant operations personnel" would imply personnel from a specific department within the plant rather than simply anyone employed by the plant.
This change was made to prevent such an inference, as specific personnel from departments oth u
<.la.n th: Operations Department are frequently utilized to operate fuel handling equipment and move nuclear fuel.
Affected SAR Section:
11.3.2 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the probability of a properly trained fuel handling operator initiating a fuel handling accident is not dependent on the department from which the fuel handling operator is employed; or, (11) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the fuel handling equipment and the method in which it is operated was not affected by this change; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since allowing trained personnel from other than the operations Department to operate fuel handling equipment and move nuclear fuel did not affect any margin of safety as defined in the bases of any Technical Specification.
ewan
ANO-1 LDCR:
Rostoration of Emergency Ibwnr This revision changed the time required to establish restoration with emergency power from 40 seconds to 70 seconds. The SAR previously stated that a test was performed every 18 months to demonstrate the overall automatic operation of the omergency power system and that restoration of power is accomplished within a limited time interval, approxiraately 40 seconds.
The 40 second time included the time to resequence loads and was correct at initial operation.
- However, Design Change Package 92-1003 added time delay relays in the control circuits of the reactor building cooler fans to delay restarting of the fans for 50 seconds when power is restored after a loss of power.
These timers were added to remove some of the load on the red train Emergency Diesel Generator prior to starting I
of the Emergency Feedwater pump.
The new timer setpoints were reviewed for impact to the accident analyses and were found to be acceptable.
Affected SAR Sections:
1.4.14.B, 0.3.1.*
1 It was determined that these changes din Lat:
1 (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunctf.on of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the changes to the load sequence were previously evaluated for any
{
effects on the cold leg and Main Steam Line Break accident i
analyses and were determined to be acceptable; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this change did not introduce any new modes of failure to equipment important to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any J
Technical Specification since the effects on accident analyses were previously analyzed and were found to be acceptable.
ANO-1 LDCR:
Nitrogen System Proscura Liotingo This revision made several changes to the description of the Nitrogen System.
Specific changes included the removal of pressure listings for the high pressure system, the low pressure system, and for nitrogen bottle storage.
Information was also added to note that the core flood tanks need to be repressurized periodically during operation in addition to following refueling. A statement regarding the performance of a five year hydrcstatic test was deleted.
Affected SAR Section:
9.10 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the nitrogen storage bottles were not credited with initiating any of the 1
previously analyzed accidents.
Systems, structures, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of an accident were not adversely impacted by these changes; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the potential for catastrophic failure of one or more of the nitrogen storage bottles was not increased by the removal of the five year hydrostatic testing requirement. No new modes of failure were introduced by this change; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 LDCR:
Frea Draintga Czpability i
This evaluation was based on the new fiberglass insulation installed per Limited Change Packages 92-5005 and 92-5005A to allow free drainage of moisture and j
condensate from within the trasulation unit.
The reflective metallic insulation originally installed on the reactor vessel, pressurizer, steam generators, primary coolant pumps, and primary coolant piping permitted free drainage of any condensate or moisture from within the insulation unit.
Subsequently, some of the original insulation was replaced with fiburglass insulation materials.
These additions were assessed with respect to fire protection concerns and free drainage and are considered acceptable.
1 Affected SAR Section:
4.2.2.7 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not adversely impact any components credited with initiating or raitigating any of the previously analyzed accidents or any equipment important to safety; or, j
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety 1
Analysis Report since the free drainage features of the new insulation did not change any of the design, construction, or 1
operating assumptions used to develop the types of postulated accidents previously evaluated in the SAR; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins
)
of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO-1 LDCR:
Electrical Panstration Qualification Data This revision to the SAR replaced specific qualification data on electrical penetrations with a reference to the documentation that contains the data.
The specific parameter numeric values removed from the !!AR were misleading in that the values were not consistent with those in current environmental qualification design documents.
Affected SAR Section:
5.2.2.1.1 It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an i
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this change l
replaced potentially confusing, incomplete information i
regarding the electrical penetration's environmental l
design capabilities with a reference to where the data is j
maintained.
This change did not affect any accidents
)
evaluated in the SAR; or, i
)
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change did not alter the i
equipment's ability to perform it's safety function; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases related to the environmental capabilities or qualifications of electrical penetrations.
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ANO-1 LDCR:
Raactor Coolent SystcIn Pressuro and Tcmparaturo Trip Limits This revision to the SAR refers the reader to the Technical Specifications for the actual trip settings for Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure.
Affected SAR Figure:
7-5 Section:
7.1.2.2.3.D It was determined that these changes did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this revision did not create any changes in the assumptions made in previously evaluated accidents; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this change reflects initial conditions already assumed in previously evaluated accidents; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since this change only made reference to setpoints already referenced by the Technical Specification bases.
ANO LDCR:
Baces for Compon nto of Intoroot During a quality assurance audit it was discovered that the U it 2 an alternate shutdown fire did not include n
response to outside isolation valves as components of interest. analysis of the containament sump the possibility exists that a spurious actuatica of one of thin a control fire scenario occur and allow the valve to be misaligned to its worst case position ese valves could Refueling Water Tank (RWT)
The could then drain to the sump and the RWT water not be available. As a result, Fire Hazards Analysis components of interest list for alternate shutdth Appendix R concerns.
own 10CFR50 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consisqeuence of an j
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since a fire is not a design bases accident that was evaluated in the SAR; or, I
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since there are no known accidents associated with the spurious operation of outboard containment aung i
I valves and there were no physical plant changes associated with this revision; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basta er say Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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I AND LDCR:
Baces for Componento of IntsrOct i
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During a quality assurance audit it was discovered that the Unit 2 response to
]
an alternate shutdown fire did not include analysis of the containment eump j
outside isolation valves as components of interest.
In a control fire scenario j
the possibility exists that a spurious actuation of one of these valves could i
occur and allow the valve to be misaligned to its worst case position. The Refueling Water Tank (RWT) could then drain to the sump and the RWT water not be
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available. As a result, the containment sump outboard valves were added to,the i
Fire Hazards Analysis components of interest list for alternate chutdown 10CFR50
- ~ d4x R concerns.
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It was determined that these changes did not j
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consingouence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since a fire is not a design bases accident that was evaluated in the SAR; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety
)
Analysis Report since there are no known accidents associated with the spurious operation of outboard containment sump valves and there were no physical plant changes associated with this revision; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification sinoe there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO-1 LDCR:
Cyclo 15 Roloed Report 1
The Cycle 15 Reload Report describes the cycle 15 oore and the impact this new
(
core design will have on the existing design and licensing analyses which l
qualify the AMO-1 core.
The changes to the core / fuel design includes n) a i
slightly higher batch 17 enrichment of 3.87 wtt, b) a slightly shorter cycle length but higher fuel batch burnup for batch 153, c) continued use of one recaged and two reconstituted fuel assemblies, d) a new fuel design change in the use of a downward movement grid restraint systesa, e) a new fuel design
]
change to the fuel rod upper plenusa spring, f) an increased use of optimized i
flow guide tubes, their affect on bypass flow and the bypass flow affect en
]
Departure frosa Nucleate Boiling and allowed fourth Reactor Coolant Pump startup temperature, and the affect of these guide tubes with respect to control rod l
operation, and g) operating history assumptions used in the design of the Cycle 15 core.
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Affected SAR Figures:
3A-1, 3A-10, 3A-11, 3A-12, 3A-13, 3A-14, IA-15, 3A-16, j
3A-17, 3A-18, 3A-19, 3A-2, 3A-20, 3A-3, 3A-4, 3A-5, 3A-6, 3A-7, 3A-8, 3A-9
)
Sections:
3A.1, 3A.10, 3A.2, 3A.3, 3A.4, 3A.5, 3A.6, 3A.7, 3A.8, j
3A.9 Tables:
3A-1, 3A-10, 3A-11, 3A-12, 3A-13, 3A-14, 3A-2, 3A-3, 3A-4, 3A-5, 3A-6, 3A-7, 3A-8, 3A-9 4
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It was determined that these changes did note i
(i) increase the proba'oility of occurrence or consequence of an j
accident or malfunction of equipament important to safety 1
evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the Cycle 1E o re fuel assessment in the areas of operating history, core
]
design, thermal hydraulic core design, non-Loss of Coolant j
Accident analysis, and operating limits and setpoints did not j
result in an increase in the probabability of a previously i
analzyed accident or in a malfunction of equipment important j
to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety j
Analysis Report since these changes to the cycle 15 core j
remained bounded by previously evaluated accident scenarios; j
or, (iii) reduos the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any j
Technical Specification since these changes to the cycle 15
{
core did not adversely impact any margins of safety as 1
defined in the Technical Specification bases.
1
~ - - - -
7 l
ANO-1 LDCR:
1 Qunlity Control Porconnol Qunlifications This chas4ge removed the title Quality Engineer to be consistent with the change 1
in staffing responsibilities.
Quality control personnel now perform the f
functions that were previously performed by Quality Engineers.
t j
Affected SAR sections:
5.2.3.2, 5.2.3.3.3.2.1.5, 8.3.1.3
)
It was determined that these changes did nots i
a j
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an j
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety
)
evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this change j
was only in the assignment of responsibilities. The Quality j
Engineering group has been eliminated and the work previoulay 3
performed by Quality Engineering personnel is now performed j
by Quality control personnel. These personnel have the 1
ability and qualifications to select items to be reviewed f
and inspected as required in the SAR and are familiar with j
the work areas, status of ongoing modifications, system j
changeouts, and code requirements; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a i
different type than any evaluated previously in the safety t
j Analysis Report since performance of plant equipment was not affected by this change; or, s
i 1
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any i
j Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
)
_