ML20198G554
| ML20198G554 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1997 |
| From: | ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198G528 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9801130062 | |
| Download: ML20198G554 (162) | |
Text
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4 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR'ONE - UNIT-2 DOCKET No. 50-368 LICENSE No. NPF-6 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR 1997 This report contains a brief description of changes in procedures and in the facility as described in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), tests and experiments conducted which were not described in the SAR, and other changes to the SAR for which a safety analysis was conducted. The report also contains a summary of the safety evaluation for each change. This report is applicable for the period from November 20,1995 through June 9, 1997.
The safety evaluations included in this report were performed in accordance with 10CFR50.59 and determined that none of the changes involved an unreviewed safety question.
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9001130062 970100 PDR ADOCK 05000368 R
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i CONTENTS SECTION I PROCEDURE CHANGES SECTION II-DESIGN CHANGES SECTION I!i TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS SECTION IV, MISCELLANEOUS EVALUATIONS I
O SECTION I PROCEDURE CHANGES
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ANO 2 PROC: 1601.20C POrconn01 Do0c Assignment This procedure revision provided for the use of off-site Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD) processing services including obtaining TLDs for issue, return, processing, and reporting of results. ANO will no longer process TLDs for personnel dose determination, handle the raw data, or calibrate the equipment required to do so.
The recording and reporting of personnel doses is solely administrative in nature and will continue to be performed using dosimetar processing res'21ts from an off-site facility.
Affested SAR section:
12.3 3.1 It was determined that these changes did nett (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since calibrstion and maintainance of TLD processing equipment and use of these to process 'ilLDs for determination of environmental and personnel radiation dose has no direct or indirect relation to the plant systems and pxocesses involved in previously analyzed accidents; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a differeat type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since TLD processing equipment does not perform a function related to plant safety and the resulting records of occupational radiation dose and environmental exposure do not contributi to the operation of equipment 1sportant to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the Technical Specifications do not contain limits or safety margins which reference the performance of TLD processing vr availability of thc results.
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ANO 2 PROC: 2102.010 Revision 30 Plcnt Cooldawn This procedure was revised to maintain the High Pressure safety Injection (HPSI) pusy recirculation valves closed while on shutdown Cooling (sDC) to help prevent the MDC systeen from overpressurising the Emergency Core Cooling system (ECCs) suction piping via ths ECCs pump recirculation header if the Low Pressure safety i
Injection puep recirculation is inadvertently opened while on SDC.
Affected SAR Table:
6.3-22 It was determined that these changes did not (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an i
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since closure of these valves reduced the probability of either loss of coolant through the ECCs suction header relief valve or i
overpressurization the ECCS suction pipng; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change remained bounded by previously evaluated a W %nt scenarios; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the Technical specifications do not require the HPs! pumps or 3CCS system to be operable in Modes 5 and 6.
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ANO-2 PROC: 2103.004 Revision 13, PC Reactor Coolcnt Pump-Operatieno This procedure change permits operations personnel to place the Reactor Coolant
- Pump (RCP) lif t pump control switch in the position that is amost desirable at the time, considering plant conditions. This change does not impact the
- operation of these' pumps.
Affected SAR sections-5.5.1.2 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to aafety
- I evaluated in the safety Analysis Report sinoe the failure j
of a RCP lift oil pump was not evaluated as an accident initiator, the absence of a 2if t pump does not alter plant operation such that the consequences of any safety analysis event is increased, and the RCP lift oil system does not affect the safety function of the RCP components; i
or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the RCP lift oil system, while important to the operation of the RCPs, does not affect j
1 the safety zunction of the RCP components. No equipment important to safety was affected by this change in lift pump operations or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the Technical specification bases do not require the lift pump to operate in an autosnatic mode to supply lube oil to the RCP once it has tripped, nor is any margin specified in the Technical specifications bases which is dependent upon the operation of the lift oil pump to automatically actuate upon a loss of its associated RCP.
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ANO 2 PROC: 2104.005 Ccntainment sprcy Syctem The Shutdown Cooling (sDC) heat exchanger outlet ' cross-connect to the Low Pressure safety Injection (LPSI) system was previonaly maintained open.
This
<nodification placed the valve in the closed position during normal operations.
Previously, to place 3DC in service, eight valves were regwired to be manually opened. The addition of one more manual valve to those already required to align 3DC did not cause a significant change in the probability of 3DC being unavailable.
Affected SAR Figures 6.2-17 It was deter 1 mined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the loss of 3DC was not evaluated as an accident initiator and the steam generators will rom. a available to remove residual heat in the event of failure of the low pressure portion of the SDC; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification remained bounded by previously evaluated SAR accidents and the addition of i
one more manual valve manipulation to the previous eight did not introduce a failure of a different type than previously evaluated; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the SDC system remained available for service with the affected valve closed.
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ANO 2 PROC: 2104.001 R; vision 24 sarcty Injecticn Tank c,peratieno.
n This procedure revision incorporated a new non-intrusive examination associated with the Safety Injection Tanks and the Emergency Core Cooling System combined outlet check valves per ASas. Title XI, IST code requirements.
Affected SAR Section:
6.3.2.20.6 It was determined that these changes did not:
1 (i) increase the probability of coeurrence or oorsequence of an j
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Anaysis Report since this activity can only ispact the equipment defined as important to safoty in Mode 6 by potential air / vapor binding.
Procedural steps are in place to facilitate the removal of the entrained air should that unlikely event occur. If the operating shutdown Cooling loop were to become inoperable, sufficient coolant inventory is available to permit flushing and filling of the affected components prior to significant heating, and is not (.nemed a credible scenaro based on this activity; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since during the mode of operation that this activity will take place, only the shutdown Cooling Loop, containment, and Reactivity Wonitors are deemed as equipment Leportant to safety.
Performance of this activity will not impact any of these identified components; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there will be no reduction in the baron concentration, the shutdown margin, or the bases for the suboritical condition for which the core was analyzed.
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ANO-2 P.IOC: 2104.006 Revision 38, PC-1 Containment Spray System This procedure revision changed the test smothods allowed for Spray Header Nossles'to include the use of thersnography equipment. The SAR uses sain4= =
- spray flows of 2,000 gpen and 2,200 gym and a maximum f3ow of 2,400 gpsa for various assusytions. The flow band for the new testing method of 2,200 to 2,200 gpen is within all these flow specifications.
Affected SAR Section:
6.2.2.4.1 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) in<tresse the probability of occurrence or consequence of an mooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Pafety Analysis Report sinoe this new test method uses the sans equipment and operations as the other test methods, except thermography equipment will be used to verify air flow instead of ribbons or balloons; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this test method is similar to previously used test methods a..d does not involve any new equipment or syntesa smanipulations; or, (iii) reduce the snargin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the operability of the containment spray systesa will still be ensured.
The spray nousle test method was not mentioned in the Technical specification bases.
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' ANC 2 PROC: 2104.008 R: vision 24 Circuloting Wator System Operations This change modified the position of two circulating Water (CW) valve.s, 2CW-86 and 2CW-87, from closed to open. Due to physical properties of the acid used to control CW pH, cooler tesperatures allowed the acid to coagulate resulting in
' clogging of tne acid lines. By maintaining these valves open, the lines will remain drained and no coagulation will occur.
Affected SAR Figure:
10.4 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence ou cansequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment imiportant to. safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report sinoe changing the position of these valves will minimize the probability of equipment malfunction by elivinating the potential for clogging of the acid gravity drain lines and will permit system operation in a manner that will minimize the probability of a condenser malfunction; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Naport since, due to system characteristics and limited inter-system contact, no other type of accident can be created by this change than those previously evaluated; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the Circulating Tatar components, Acid Feed System, and Main Condensers were not snentioned in the Technical Specification bases.
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l ANO 2, PROC: 2104.014 j
Local Lenk Rato Toot Connection Design Change 84-2077 provided a removable Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) connection. This removchle connection was to be used only during LLRT on
- 2CV-2060-1 and not during normal plant operations.
The connection was inadvertently incorporated on the Liquid Radioactive waste system Reactor Building piping and instrument diagram without the note that it was'a test connection for LLRT only.
Presently, the LLRT is performed ur - y a different flange connection with a fitting for the testing rig.
This as Asion to the SAR corrected the drawing by deleting the connection.
Affected sAR Figure 11.2-1 It was determined that these changea did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety j
evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since thi change did not make any physical changes to the plant, but reflects the as-built condition of the plants or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or m1 function of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the test connection was not connacted
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e,nd was not intended to be connected, therefore, removing it
~from the sAR did not create any new modes of failure for equipment important to safety; or,
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(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specifination since there'.rere no applicable raargins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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AN>2 PROC: 2104.014 Liquid Radwasto end Boron Mantgament System Operationc This change deleted a procedure step that is outside the scope of operator training and changed the position of the off-line holdup tank relief line inlet valves from open to closed. A step was added in the Holdup Tank Alignmen~c section of the procedure to ensure that the in-service holdup tank relief line inlet valve is open and the off-line tank valves are closed, thus providing positive control of tank usage and preventing the contents of one holdup tank from sluicing to another holdup tank through the relief line header. This change will ensure that tanks designated for storing clean water are not inadvertently contaminated by the contents of tanks not designated as such.
Affect 9d SAR Figures 11.2-2 It was determined that these changes did not 1
(i) increase the ptobability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this cha7ge did not affect the volume or quality of material discharged to the environment, but provided a more sure means of inventory control of holdup tanks located inside the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building; or, 1
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this c hange did not alter the construction, design, function, or intent of the affected j
system or components, but established more specific controls l
in processing methods; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases, l
c-ANO-2.. PROC: 2104.035 '
Fuci Handling'cnd Radwasta Area Ventilation This change increased the level of detail in describing the-flow path for the Auxiliary Building supply fans.
Affected SAR section:
9.4.3.2.1 It was determined that these changes did note 1
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an
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aoaident or malfunction of equipeant igertant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Repert since the equipment
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affected by this change was not analysed for accidents; or
_(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since these changes refleet actual system configuration.
The oosponents served by the affected equipment have been previously evaluated and no new modes of failure were irtroduced; or, (iii)' reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification sinoe there were no applicable 1
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margins of safety for the equipment operated by the l
affected procedure.
Since the changes made to the procedure did not significatly affect the operation of e
the support equipment, the impact on the safety margin associated with the equipment supported by this system j
remained equally unaffooted.
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ANO2 PROC: 2104.037 l
Altcrnato AC Diccci Gen 0 rotor Operationo This revision to Operating Procedure 2104.037 changes the normal position of the l
Alternate AC (AAC) Diesel Generator (DG) starting Air system outlet header eross-connect valve from "normally closed" to "normally open".
This change configured the syrton so that the two starting air receiver tanks are normally oross-connooted and only isolated when maintenance is regs A on one of the 6
tanks.
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8.3.3.2.?.2 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of couverence or consequence of an accident or malfunctior of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since no credit was taken for the W DG or any of its associated systems is *ny of tne previously analysed accident soerarios; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previc.usly in the safety Analysis Report since this modification had no appreciable affect on the performance and reliability of the AAC DG system; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the AAC DG and its associated i
auxiliary systems were not mentioned in the Technical spacification
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ANO 2 - PROC: 2105.014 R: vision 16, PC-2 l
Radiation Monitoring and Evacuation Merm System i
This procedure oh wge revised the high alarm setpoint for the steam Generator Blowdown _ radiation monitors. Previously, the high alarm setpoint was approximately-two times the background counts; however, when-very little activity was detected by the :nonitors, excessive adjustment to the setpoint was required. This change established a minimum of 100 opa and a maximum of 6400 opa for the high alam setpoint. This new setpoint will eliminate the
_ adjustments made when the renitors are reading in the lower ranges.
Affected-SAR Table:
11.4-1 i
It was determined that these changes did nott (i) increase the probability of ooourrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment importar.t to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the ability of the steam Generator Blowdown radiation monitors to provide a means of assessing changes in activity was not altered by establishing a new minianam high alarm setpoint; or, (ii) increase _the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Reporu sinoe establishing a minimum high alarm setpoint for these radiation monitors did not introduce any new modes of failure and the monitors will continue 3
I to operate as designed; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable matgins of safety defined in the Technical specification basse.
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ANO.2 PROC: 2105.016 R: vision 17 Radicticn Monitoring cnd Ev0cuntion Alorm Syotem This revision to Procedure 2105.013 changed the High Alarm setpoint for the service Water Radeonitors associated with the shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers to be 100 counts per adnute (opa) when background is less than 100 open or the smaller of 2 times backgroand or 100 opa.
The specific setpoint given in the SAR and in the tsargency Pian was SE-6 microcuries per oubio centlaster. The detectors display and alarm on a opa scale. The technical manual for this equipment listed the same setpoint and a conversion to opea (SE-6 microcuries per cubio centimeter corresponds to 50 opa).
This change had no effect on the function or operation of the radmonitors, but will significantly reduce sprulous alarms resulting from low background readings.
Affected sAR section:
11.4.2.1.3 Table:
11.4-1 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipsment important to safety evaluated it t.he safety Analysie Report since changing the range of operation provided better and more reliable indication of actual system conditions by reducing spurious alarms due to low background readings; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunciton of a different P;?e than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since tha function of these components remained unchanged and will continue to be operated in a manner previously evaluated and approved; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any l
Technical specifi:ation since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO 2 P7,0C: 2104.008 Steam Generator Operations This revision added several valves associated with the unused Unit 2 Regenerative Waste Transfer System to Procedure 2106.000 governing steam generator operations.
Plant Change 95-8066 installed the necessary piping and instrumentation for diverting steam generator blowdown to the Unit 1 circulating Water Flume. Use of this path required reestablishing administrative controls over these valves.
The normal position of several valves in the Regenerative Waste Transfer System. were changed providing additional isolation between the potentially contaminata4 Unit 1 Neutralizing Tank and the existing release path in the system.
Affected SAR Figure:
11.2-3 It was determined that these changes did nott (1) increase the probability of >ccurrence or co tsequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this change provided additional system isolation from the neutralising tank to the system's release point; on, (ii) increase ths possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since tlO anly change from existing plant configuration was the closure of seven valves in the system which were previously considered normally open.
The not effect of these changes was to procedurally isolate the ragenerative wasta transfer pumps, which havo not hen used since startup, and to provide additional isolation between the Unit i neutralizing tank and the system's existing release point; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basiak of any Technical specification since this change did not affect the operation of any component addressed by either unit's Technical specification.
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ANO 2 PROC: 2104.031 R: vision 5, PC-1 Makeup Water Degasification System Operations l
This revision allows the use of a temporary water treatment facility to fill the l
condensate storage tanks, bypassing the makeup water degasification system.
This revision also allows the transfer of water from the reactor makeup. eater tank to the condensate storage tank to be used for plant makeup. Bypassing the dogssifiwr will only affect oxygen lovsis, which will be monitored by chemistry personnel and controlled by hydrazine injection to the feedwater as required.
Affected SAR sections:
9.2.3.2.1, 9.2.6.2 It was determined that these changes did not (i) increase the probability cf occ,urrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluatea in the safety Analysis Report sinoe this revision created no new failure modes, the systems will continue to function as before, and this change did not adversely affect any safety-related equipment; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since oxyven levels will be monitored by chemistry personnel and controlled with hydr +zine injection to the feedwater as required; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as def$nM in the bt. sis of any Technical specificatien since this revision did not arfect any margins or limits as defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANo 2 PROC: 2203.012K Revision 27 -
j CondenOcto Ster 0g3 Tcnk Lev 01 Alorm Satpoint his change oorroeted the condensate Storage Tank - (CST) low level alarm setpoint from 80 percent to a more conservative actuation setpoint of 83.3 percent.
Affseted SAR sections:
9.2.6.2, 9.2.6.5 It was dete mined that 'these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of ooourrence. or consequence' of an moeident or malfunction of equipment imporytant to safety
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evausted in the safety Analysis Report sinoe the cst is a passive component and cannot fall to operate and the ac11a1 alarm setpoint of 33.36 is more conservative than the f
previous SAR requirement of 80t; or i
I (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident er malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety 4
Analysis Report since this change did not create any new modes of failure for equipment important to safety; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the Technical specification minianum level was 806, increasing the required level to 83.3% increased the margin of safety.
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I ANU-2 PROC: 2302.024 R: vision 11 Isothermal Temperoturo Coofficient Me surement This procedure revision changed the method used for snessuring the Isothermal Teeperature coefflaient (ITC) during startup physics testing. The method for sumsning reactivity during the ITC test will no longer be a strip chart recorder, instead the Reactivity Measuressent and Analysis systesa (RMAs) provided by Framatome will be used.
The RNAs os.lculation of reactivity is more accurate than manual calculations perfotned using a strip chart.
In addition, the RMAs systna will reduce the time necessary to perform the measurements, and will therefore, reduos the amount of time needed for low power physics testing.
Affected s..R section:
4.5.2.3 It was determined that these changes did not:
1 (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equirpment important to safety evaluated in the safety Anlayns Report since the method by which the data la recorded for the ITC test has no impact on any core operating parameter or on the testing results; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report sinoe the method and conclusions of the ITC test are not impacted and there was no change to the verification of proper core operation; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the results of the ITC test are independent of the method of recording data during the test.
As such the verification of proper core behavior is unchanged and the operating parameters verified by the test are not impacted.
ANO 2 PROC: 2305.014 R: vision 4, PC 1 Auxilicry Cuilding Wsoto Wator Identificatien This procedure revision modified the surveillance requirements for identification of waste water leakage into the Liquid Radwaste system as a result of the removal of the hot machine shop sink.
It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or conesquence of an socident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this change did not impact the function, cperation, or reliability of any equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change did not introduos any failures not provously considered in the SAR; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases of any Technical specification since this change did not alter the operation, function, or reliability of the Liquid Radwaste system.
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ANO 2 PROC: 2306.061 REV 0 PC 2 Operotiono-LinOr Pow 0r Adjuctment This change allowed calibration of Core Protection Calculator (CPC) powers with Delta T power when below sixty percent versus fif teen percent previously.
Calibration of CPC power indications previously used the Core Operating Limit Supervisory Systesa (COL 55) secondary calorimetric power indications at or above sixty percent and the coLss " raw" primary calorimetric power andication below sixty percent of rated power.
Thus, this change made instrume: tation more accurate and did not affect the ability of any equipment to operate differently 1.han designed.
It was deter 1ained that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment isportant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report air.ce this change resulted in the most accurate power indication to be used for calibration, which ensured that instrument response times were not jeopardized ar.1 that their response to an accident would be as originally designed; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since. the calibration of this instrumentation was considered a normal occurrence and only created a more accurate calibration; or, (iii) redace the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the margins that were stated in Technical Specification bases were met or increased due to the more accurate indication of reactor power.
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ANO-2 ' PROC: 2311.002 R; vision 10 SOrvic3 WatOr Syctem Flow Toot Revision 10 to Procedure 2311.002 added steps to determinate and re-terminate leads for the seal in contacts on valves 2CV-1541-1 and 2CV-1560-2 so that the valves can be throttled to simulate system back pressures when only testing one loop of Servioe Water at a time.
In Lddition, the flow requirement for 2WC-6A was reduced frosa 55 gpsn to 0 gpm as a result of Calculation 91-E-0139-01.
This calculation determined that the room containing 2P7A would not exceed the 150 degree tagerature qualificatien limit if no cooling was available during an accidents therefore, no flow is required through 2WC-6A during accidents.
Flows will conti.,ue to be monitored during testing and any significant reductions will be noted and corrected as required.
Affected SAR Table:
9.2-1 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report sinoe the valves that have wires lifted during the test will remain operable and capabla cf performing their safety functions during the test.
The reduction of flow requirements on 2WC 6A was evaluated by calculation 91-E-0125-01 and it was determined that there would be no adverse inpact to any of the components cooled by this cooler and that they would continue to perform their safsty functions; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the Service Water System will still perform as designed.
The reduction in flow requirements for 2WC-6A has ne, effect on any Lccidents and will not initiate any accidents since the components cooled by this cooler will still perform their functions without cooling; o.
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases for the Service Water System and the Emergency Cooling Pond were unaffected by this change.
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ANO.2 PROC: 2403.024 8tatien BattOty 2D12 80rvice Dicchargo Toot The charger for station battery 2D12 is normally connected to both the battery and the plant DC bus.
While the battery is inoperable, this evaluation allows the battery'to W rechargel using a temporary charger with the battery and charger disconnected from the plant DC bus.
It was deteratined that these changes did nots
( i ', increase the prob &bility of occurrence or consequence of an aoaident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report sine a the ba'.tery is inoperable while testing is in progress.
The SAR anticipates the load profile of the battery to change and directs the reader to the latest calculation for the most current data; or, (iA) increase the possibility for an nooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report ainoe the inoparable battary is disconnected from the plant during the time of the elevated voltage battery recharge; or, (iii) reduoe the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any
.t Technical specification since the remaining 2D11 safety channel battery will remain operable while testing of the 2D12 is in progress.
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AN042 PROC: 2409.562 l
CicOning tha Emerg ncy Cooling P:nd Return Lino This revision to the workplan 'for cleaning the Emergency Cooling Pond (ECP) return line allowed for the installation of a pusy between the pig launcher and the Auxiliary cooling Water (ACW). return line for 2E68A.
The puey aided in l
draining the return line after the pigs were sent through it.
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It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase 1.he probability of occurrence.or consequence of an
-accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the Auxiliary l
Cooling Water system was not adversely affected by this test and the. system was restored to normal after the werkplan was completed; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a l
different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the affected components were not j
required in modes 5 or 6 when this workplan was performed; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of s.ny l
Technical specification since one loop of service water was operable during the performance of this workolan. The i
ACM system and the service Water system were reatored to service upon completion of this activity.
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_-W ANO-1 P20C: 2505.007 Revision 6, TC-1 Upper Guid3 Structuro Instal 10 tion This tosporary change to Procedure 2505.007 allowed the use of the Upper Guide i
structure (UGS) lift rig without one of the two guida pin / bushing combinations.
The purpose of the guide post / bushing combination is to assist in proper
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alignment of the UGs lift rig.
In the absence of the guide post / bushing i
combination, proper alignment is still possible, but is likely to be more difficult. With the removal of one of the guide bushings, proper alignment of the UGs lift rig and UGs was ensured by use of multiple " spotters" and j
underwater cameras. While the procecs was less officiert, more time consuming, j
and manpower intensive, appropriate controls were impored to ensure that proper placement of the UGs was performed safely.
It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this change did not affect the fit and function of the UGs and Reactor vessel internals, only how the final placement was achieved.
Proper placement of the UGs was ensured and verified without i
increasirg the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety; or, I
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this change remained bounded by previously evaluated accident scenarios or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since this activity was beyond thz level of detail included in the bases of any Technical specification.
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ANO12 PROC: 2428.000 Revision 2 Operaticn of tho Icnico Cater Purificatien syotem This procedure revision incorporated instructions to provide make-up water to the Ionios trailer freen the Auxiliary Cooling Water (ACW) system.
A permanent
- lant valve with flange was previously installed with a plant change to provide access to the ACW system. This procedure provides control for the removal and replacement of the flange downstream of the valve.
The process involves attachi'.ig a hender with four connections for three inch reinforood hoses to reach the Ionios trailers to provide a maximum of 400 gpsa lake water.
Affected sAR sections:
10.4.10.2, 9.2.1.1, 9.2.3.2.1, 9.2.3.2.2 It was date. wined that these changes did not (1) itcrease the probability of occurrence or consequence of an socident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the ACW system does not provide any safety related function and is isolated from the servloe Water system upon initiation of a safety Injection Actuation signal or a Main steam Isolation signals or, (ii) increase the possibility for an socident or malfunction of a different type than any evalated previously in the safety l
Anslysis Report since this change did not create any connections or relationships between any safety related l
cosq.ucnts or systems; or, I
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification sinoe there were no applicable margina of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO 2 WP: 2409.647 W0sto G20 System Tcsting
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This evaluation supported the partial systess startup testing subsequent to a modification to the Waste Gas Systess.
The scope of activities covered by the work plan included testing the compressor skid asseebly and alarms, testing the analyser panel and alarms, performing leak checks on the system, and performing an overall partial functional test. A toeporary nitrogen auction source was supplied to the new ocepressors for completion of this work plan.
It was detereined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an soaident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report ainoe the only accident described for the Waste Gas system was the rupture or leakage of one of the waste gas decay tank 4.
The controls incorporat3d in the work plan reduced the variables assuswd in that accident, thereby reducing the probability of tank rupture or leakages or, (ii) ir.orease the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the anost limiting failure associated with this work plan would be the overpressurisation of the selected decay tank. This possible failure remained bounded by previously evaluated SAR accidents; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the three applicable Technical Specifications, Oas Storage Tanks, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation, and 1:rplosive cas Mixture, were evaluated for reduction in margin. None was identified.
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SECTION II DESIGN CHANGES o
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ANO 2 DCP: 49 2043 NEMA De0ign LettOr for Auxilicry FcedvatOr Pump Moter This change corrected the National Electric Manufacturers Association (NEMA) design letter designation for the electrio anotor driver for the non-safety auxiliary fedwater pusy frosa NEMA Class O to NEMA Class B.
Affected SAR section 10.4.9.2.1 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of ooourrence or consequence of an accident or inalfunction of equipement *.sportant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report ainoe this change i
was administrative in nature and did not snake any physical changes to the plant; or, (ii) Anorease the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report sinoe these text changes were only corrections and clarifications and did not introduce any new anodes of failures or, (iii) reduce the snargin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification ainoe there were no applicable snargins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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R ANO 2 DCP: 92 2001 Additien of Dry Puc1 Storoga f
This design ehange installed a Ventilated storege cask (VsC) system consisting of dry steel containers with welded cape to be contained in concrete casks for 4
shielding and tornado missile protection. The loaded concrete casks were plav /
on a concrete pad within the protected area in an Independent spent Fuel M Mc Installation (Isrs!) area designed to store up to 624 fuel assemblies i-21 g
osaks.
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Affected SAR sections:
- 1. 2. 2.10, 1. 2. 2. 6, 12.1. 2. 0, 12. 4.1.1, 15.1.1 &. L e
15.1.23.2.2, 4.2.1.1.12, 9.1, 9.1.2.2, 9.1.2.A, 9.1.4.1.1, 9.1.4.2.10 Table 1.2-1 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) inovesse the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipuunt important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the parameters that would increase the probability of an accident such as nrann mantenance, operator training, operating procedures, etc., are maintained during the additional lift by application of NUREO-0612 requirements; or, (11) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the load path of the orane and the fuel cask was well defined and was not changed and all safety-related equipment and structures in the path have been identified and evaluated for the cask drops or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since coupliance with the Technical specifier. tion bases was maintained.
ANO 2 DCP: 93 2007 Perman nt Re ctor C vity Saal Ploto his design change installed a new permanent reactor oavity seal plate for ANG-2 to replace the old reactor oavity seal p2ste. The old seal plate utilised a Vasketed desim. The gaskets had to be ir. stalled at each refueling outage before the seal plate was installed over the reactor vessel annulus.
When the seal plate was removed upon completion of refueling, personnel were required to remove the gaskets and clean the mating surfaces of the seal plate of sealant, which was used to aid in establishing a seal, since the ter.porary seal plate was stored on the head stand when not in use, it had to be moved numerous times each outage to sooomodate the head removal sequence.
The new permanent seal plate eliminates the unreliable sealing method and reduces critical path time and personnel exposure for seal plate installation during refuelings.
Affected SAR sections:
6.2.1.3.5, 9.1.4.2.17, 9.1.4.3.2 It was determined that these changes dio nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an aooident or malfunction of oquipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the permanent reactor oavity seal plate was designed to perform the same functien as the temporary seal plate with design enhancements and features which increase reliability; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the permanent reactor oavity seal plate has the same form, fit, and function as the old seal plate; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the only margin of safety which would be affeo%d would be the water le rel over the fuel during fuel movau nt.
The permanent reactor cavity seal plate provides the boun:iary to maintain water at an acequate level.
ANO 2 DCP $4-2004 Fcedwatcr Control Syctem This design change package inctalled an upgraded reedwater Con. trol system (rWCE) consisting of a digital system based on the Westinghouse Distributed Processing u
Family (WDFF) distributed control system. The WDPr is provided in a "siza pack" configuration which consists of three redundant pairs of microprocessors that can be used for three independent functions.
The new FWCs automatically controls the feedwater flow to each steam generator during steady state and design basis maneuveris.g transients from 26 to 1004 power.
The new system consists of e single elecent control lov power mode and a three element control high power mode and incorporates actual puep and valve curves into ths system control.
The new system consists of two identical control systems, one for each steam generator, and is single failure proof to the extent possible, employing redundancy and input signal validation methods. The remaining functions of the Reactor Regulating system (RRs) will Le incorporated into rwes cabinet 1C273 utilising a separate set of redundant microprocessors.
The kRs functions which i
are retained include the cciculation of the Pressuriser Level setpoint and the support of RCS temperature indications and alarms on the Wain Control Boards.
The functions which were eliminated in the new design were those that supported I
automatio control of the Control Element Assemblioc.
Affected 6An Figures 1.2-3, 10.2-3, 10.2-4, 10.4-2, 10.4-5, 12.1-14, 3.5-5, 3.6-3, 3.6-4, 3.0-28, 5.1-3, 7.2-2, 7.2-20, 7.2-22, i
7.2-30, 7.3-9, 8.3-19, 0.3-50, 0.3-57, 8.3-60, 8.3-62,
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8.3-66, 8.3-67, 3.3-71, 0.3-73, 8.3-75, 0.3-76, 0.3-77 i
sections:
1.2.2.3.1, 1.2.2.3.2, 10.4.7.2, 10.4.7.5, 15.1.3.2.1.1, i
15.1.4.1, 15.1.4.2.2.5, 4.2.3.3.2.4, 4.2.3.5, 4.3.1.6,
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4.3.2.6, 5.2.1.5, 5.3.5, 3.6.1.1, 5.6.3.1, 7.2.1.1.2.3, 7.2.1.1.2.5.1.0, 7.7.1.1.1, 7.7.1.1.4, 7.7.1.1.5, 7.7.1.1.6, 7.7.1.4, 7.7.1.5, 8.3.1.2 Tables:
15.1.10-2, 15.1.2-1, 15.1.3-1, 15.1.3-2, 15.1.3-3, 15.1.4-1, 3.7-5, 5.6-1, 7.7-1 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Ar.alysis Report since this modification did not alter the assumptions made in the previously evaluated accidents and this modification decreased the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety due to the increased fault tolerance and redundancy of the FWCs and Reactor Regulating system; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since these modifications were bounded by existing accident analyses and single failure analyses; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in thw Technical specifications bases.
ANO 2 DCP: M 2M3 Elcstrical Penotrcticn Modificatieno This design change package replaced the Asphenol-sans electrical penetration feedthrough snodule assemblies with new cor.ax suffalo feedthrough adapter snodule assemblics for containennt building electrical penetrations 2WR43-1 and 2WR43-4.
Grayboot connectors were used for the majority of splices including Q and non-Q splices inside and outside containment. Rayohess splices were used for all coaxial and unique cable splices inside and outside containsment.
The basic function of the feedthrough module assemblies is to maintair containment integrity during a design basis aooident, while maintaining electrical continuitv and separation through the modules <
The modules were designed and manufactured sooording to 1EEE Std. 317-1983, " Standard for Electrical Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating stations." The module design was subjected to applicable Design and Qualified-1.ife Tests as defined in IEEE Std. 317-1993, as modified by s4RC Rogs.1 story euide 1.63, Rev. 3, February'1987. Results of the testing demonstrated functionability as required under specific plant service conditions for 40 years installed life without loss of electrical function or containment integrity capabilities.
Affected SAR Figuret 3.2-5 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the electical penetration feedthrough snodules affected by this modification were not credited with initiating any of the previously analyzed accidents.
The replacement feedthrough modules by conax are of a superior mechanical design to the Anphenol-same snodules; therefore, the consequences of an sooident, such as a LOCA, should actually be reduced due to the greater probability of sustained containment integrity; or, (ii) increare the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the new modules are of equivalent i
form, fit, and function as the modules that were replaced f
and there were no new conditions or plant operating practices resulting from this modification which could cause a new or different type sooident than those already evaluated in the SAR; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of a.ny Technical specification since there were no snargins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases for the affected electrical penetration assembly modules and the snodules were designed and tested to meet or exceed all EQ requireaments for iaside containment.
ANO 2 DCP: M,2001 Elcatrical POnOtrotien Upgrcde This design change replaced the Asphenol-sans electrical penetration feedthrough sedule asseeablies with new conax surfalo feedthrough adapter module assemblies for containment building electrical penetrations 2WR25-5, 2WR40-2, 2WR42-1, and 2WR42-2 (module E only). Two cables were ts-located to penetration 2WR41-2 due to insufficient coax pigtails at penetration 2WR42-2.
The four affected penetrations contained approximately 1100 module pigtail splices. Most terminations were made using Grayboot connectors or conductor butt splices with Raychem sleeves or kits. After installation of the new asodules, all affected circuits were tested to ensure that all connections were made correctly. This snodification also re-connected nine electrical penetrations to the nitrogen supply system header.
Affected SAR Figures 3.2-5, 9.3-100 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an acciet.t or analfunction of equipment inportant to safety evalus t ed in the safety Analysis Report since the replacement feedthrough modules by Conax are of a superior mechanical design to the old Asphenol-same modules and resulted in improved containment building integrity; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since there were no new conditions or plant operatirg practices resulting from this modification which could cause a new or different type accident than those already evaluated in the SAR; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases and the modules were designed and tested to meet or exceed all EQ requirements for inside containment.
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ANO-2 DCP: M3269D201 H-9000 Re ctcr Coolcnt Pump Stol Inst 0llotien This design change replaced the four stage mechanical shaft seal cartridges installed in the Reactor Coo h nt Pumps (RCPs) with a newly designed mechanical seal.
The Byron Jackson model SU-8075 seals wors repinood with Byron Jackson N-9000 seal cartridges designed as a result of an industry effort to provide a more reliable seal design capable of operating for at least 50.000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> without excessive leakage or wear. The N-9000 seal was subjected to extensive operational testing and was judged to be a significant Leprovement over the existing sU design.
The N-9000 seal consists of four mechanical face type seals stacked in series and contained within a removable cartridge assembly.
The seal was a direct replaomeent for the SU seal and did not require any modification of the pusy casing, shaft, or motor stand.
The seals were designed and constructed to meet the requirements of ASME Section III and XI.
Affected SAR Tigures:
5.5-3, 5.5-3A Talle:
5.5-1 It was detersdned that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment isportant to safety evaluatow in the safety Analysis Report since the new seals have been demonstrated by analysis, testing, and operating experience to be a significant isprovement over the old seal design and the seal materials are compatible with the Resotor Coolant System (RCS) for radiation, tesperature, and pressure and will provide isproved sealing performance; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the new seal has the same fit and function as the old seal and will remain bounded by the loss of coolant accident or RCs leakage limitations; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the Technical specification bases did not specifically address RCP seals, but rather RCs leakage. The margin applicable to the seals is the 10 gpm identified leakage limitation.
The new seals will be more reliable and have inproved leakage control.
ANO.2 DCP: H3543D201 Backup DC Powar Snurce for Main Turbino Controls cnd EmergOncy Feedwater Alartn Modifications This design change was implemented in two parts, trip hardening of the main turbice controls and an alarm addition for Emergency Feedwater (EFW) outboard valve closures. The first part covers the addition of a backup DC power supply to the main turbine controls via a two pole double throw preferred seeking automatio transfer switch. The backup source will automatically switch to feed the turbine control circuit in case the primary DC source is lost.
The second part covers the Erw outboard valves alarm, one consnon alarm for all outboard valves will activate whenever any valve is closed and an Engineered safeguards signal is not present.
Affected SAh Figures 7.3-12, 8.3-18, 8.3-20 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipment inportant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the backup DC source for the main turbine electrohydrau!.io controls increases the reliability of the turbine.
These changes did not influence or impact the reactor coolant boundary, the espability to shut down the reactor and keep it in a safe conditon, or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of plant conditions that could result in potential offsite exposures; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since these changes ren.ained bounded by the Main Turbine Trip Accident described in the SAR; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases related to these changes.
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ANO 2 EAR: 943098A201 Addition cf Volva 2PHU-225 to P&ID j
This modification added valve 2PWU-225, located in the Plant Wakeup (PMU) system l
between tanks 2T-41A and 2T-41B, to the Wakeup Water Domineralisation systesa diagrass.
His change did not alter the function or performanoe of the affected systess or aosponents and did not reduos ainy eFisting cossaitments.
Affected sAR rigure 9.2-7 It was determined that these changes did nott (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident ur malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the PWU system is not safety-related and is not needed to perform any safety functions in an mooident sooncarios or, (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modifloation did not change the circumstances considered by previously analyzed sooidents and did not introduce any new *,ype of failure mechanism either in the PWU system or interfacing systems; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since PNU was not smentioned in the Technical specification bases.
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I ANO 2 EAR: 973723L201 POct Accident Sampling SyCtem Volva cnd Operotor Replccament This modification replaced the suction isolation motor operated valve to the Post Accident saseling a stesa saeple booster pusy. Wodification of this valve s
was required to ensus safe and reliable saepling through 2CCD-3-1/2" and to provide reliable isoir. tion of Reactor coolant system pressure from the sasple booster pump. The new valve is a stainless steel, Anchor Darling, 1.5",
17000 Class, double diso gate valve.
The pressure rating for this valve is 2616 pai at 650 degrees. The operator was proven unreliable and was replaced with a Limitorgue operator.
Affected SAR Figure 9.3-2 It was determined that these changes did nott (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report sineo the replacement valvw and associated reducers met the same oosponent pressure /taoperature specifications and codes as the old valve; or, (11) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated provinualy in the safety Analysis Report minoa the replacement valve will act the same as the old valve with the exception that it will provide better sealing espability.
The configuration of the system was not altered; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the replacement of this valve met or exceeded the functional capability of the old valve and system function was unaffected.
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l ANO2 LCP: 954009 Replacement of the Pressurizcr Manway C:, var Stud 3 This limited change replaced the pressuriser manway studs with longer studs that were compatible with a hydraulio stud tensioner. Use of e stut tensioner significantly reduces the time required to remove and reinstall the manway cover during outages by tensioning all twenty studs at the same tirme.
This effort reduoos dose and critical path time by approximately 75%.
Affected SAR Tables:
3.5-4, 3.5-7, 5.2-0 It was determit.ed that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report sinos the new studs, nuts, and manway cover were qualified to the applicable sections of the American society of Wechanical Engineers (:ods which includes margins of safety and inherently ensures thr e
equipment can perform its intended design function and net, j
affect the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety; or, (11) increase the possibility for an accident or malfune. tion of a dAfferent type than any evaluated previcualy in t'.no f afety Analysis Report since this modification did not alter the function of this or other systems and did not create any new modes of failure; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety a2 defined ir, the bacis of any Technical specification since the prear.oriser manway studs were not addressed in any Technical Fpecification bases.
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ANO,2 LCP: H2032L201 Relocaticn Cnd Repiccament of HOct*:r Droin Pump Step Check Valves This 21mited change relocated ti.. heater drain punp discharge piping stop check valves to a horisontal section of piping. New valves were installed due to reliability concerns and the oost of refurbishing the old valves.
The piping from the pump discharge flange so the first elbow downstream of the new valves was upgraded from cambon staal to low alloy steel to eliminate any flow mooelerated corrosion concerns in this area.
In addition, this modification also installed vent valves for 1.he steam Dump and typass system.
Affected SAR Firdres:
10.2-4, 10.4-2 It was determined that thead changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an socident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not alter any assumptions made in previously analysed socidents and did not impact any safety related components; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction cf a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety enalyais Report since the new piping configurations were evaluated and determined to meet the requirements for the applicable codes v.d this modification did not create any new connections or interrelations between safety related systems or equipments or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since these changes laproved the reliability of the affected systems.
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ANO 2 LCP: 963161L201 Containment Spray Valve Pressure Locking & ThOrmal Cinding This limited change installed a pressure bypass line between the bonnet area and the valve body upstream of the valve disk for containment spray valve 2CV-5612-1.
It has been determined that gate valves of the flexible wedge type are ausoeptible to pressure locking / thermal binding when the valves are in the closed position.
This condition occurs when pressure in the bonnet area of the valve builds up due to toeparature increases and the resultant expansion of water in the bonnet area.
The magnitude of the pressure build-up can exceed normal and accident design presstires.
The flexible wedge disce can be jammed into the valve seats with such force that the valve operators are incapable of opening the valves.
The bypass line installed by this modification will allow the pressure in the bonnet to essentially be equal to the pressure in the upstream process piping.
Affected SAR Figure s 6.2-17 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the new installation was designed to the required codes and standards for the Containment spray system and was bounded by previous accident analyses; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since installation of this mopdification did not create a credible new type of palfunction of these control valves or of the containment Spray system.
Even if the new bypass line should break, the quantity of water lost from the containment spray system would not prevent operation of the valve or passage of adequate water flow for maintaining containment spray requirements; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since this modification resulted in increased reliability of this valve to respond to a signal to open.
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ANO:2 LCP: M 3365 l
T-H3t Redu0tien, Stcam Gencrotor Tube Plugging, cnd High Prcssuro i
Turbine Optimization The reduction of Reactor coolant system (RCS) T-hot, plugging of steam ganerator tubes, and installation of the High Pressure Turbine Optimisation have resulted in changes in plant operating parameters that are inconsistent with, or appear to be inconsistent with, values refloated in the safety Analysis Report (SAR) and Technical specifloation (TS) bases. These changes corrected some of the information in the SAR and removed the appearance of inconsistencies between operating parametsrs and information in the SAR and Ts bases in other cases.
These changes reflect current operating pressures, pressure drops and tesuperatures in the primary and secondary systems, and current RCs volumes, Departure from Nucleate Rolling Ratio (DNRR), secondary st<aam flow, condenser performanoe, and high pressure feedwater heater enthalpy addition.
4 Affected SAR Figures:
5.3-1, 5.3-2 sections:
10.3.2.1, 15.1.10.1.1, 3.9.2.5, 4.4.2.7.2, 5.1, 5.1.1, 5.2.2.3.2, 7.2.1.1.1.7 Tables:
10.4-1, 15.1.10-1, 15.1.10-2, 15.1.18-1, 15.1.3-1, 15.1.4-1, 15.1.5-1, 15.1.5-2, 15.1.6-1, 15.1.5-1, 15.1.9-1, 3.6-1, 5.1-2, 5.2-19, 5.3-2, 5.5-2, 5.5-6, 7.2-2, 7.2-4, 7.2-6, 7.3-5, 7.3-6 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an aooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since a detailed evaluation of the plant changes and their effects on license basis documents with respect to potential impacts on previous analyses revealed no increases in the probability of these results. An,.Jees that were considered for potential 1spact included turbine trip (with and without ooincident failure of the turbine bypass valves to open), steam generator tube rupture, reactor trip on low RCS pressure, and major ruptures of steam or feedwater line breaks that could result in over-oooling events; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report minoe the detailed evaluation of changes to the plant and license basis documents concluded that some could not possibly create anoidents of any type, or caused postulated failures to be less likely because of the conservative direction of the change. Where a nossibility of socidents or malfunction not previously analysed (such as multiple steam generator tube ruptures, coinciden* failure of tubes in both steam generators or steam generator shell/
internals failure via chemical damage or environmental conditions) was considered, calculations and evaluations showed that these new sooidsnts/ malfunctions were no more probable due to the changes; or,
ANO 2 LCP: M-3365 T-H3t Reducticn, Stcam Gencrotor Tube Plugging, cnd High Proosuro Turbine Optimization il (iii) reduoe the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since these changes reenain within the margins of safety as defined in the Technical specification bases.
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F ANO.2 LCP: M3366L201 i
High pro Curo Turbino Meg w3tt Recov0ry Effort This limited change snedified the Unit 2 high pressure turbine and #3 stoman and drain line for the purpose of increasing the flow passing capacity of the main turbine.
This snodificatian restored a portion of the lost electrical generation capacity of Unit 2 due to T-hot reduction and steam generator tube plugging.
This change opened the steam path to allow for greater steam flow than the original design to g.4rmit the reactor to reach full power under the current steaan conditions, thereby increasing not electrical generation.
This J
modification was limited to the first two stages of the high pressure turbine-Affected SAR Figure.
10.2-4 seotiont 10.2.1 It was determined that these changse did nott (1) increase the probability of ooourrence or consequence of an socident or malfunction of equigenent important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report minee all turbine related systems will function the same as before.
This modifloation had a limited effect on secondary plant paraseters such at tosperature, pressure, and enthk3py; or, (11) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a j
different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the turbine's operational characteristics are functionally equivalent to the original design and no new modes of failure were introduced by this changes or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since this modification did not impact any margin of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO 2 LCP: H3601L201 Circulating Cater Pump Hotor Ropiccoment This limited change replaced Circulating Water pusy h tor 2P3A with a reconditioned 7000 My motor, base plate, and anotor side coupling supplied by southwest idlootrio cospany. The old pusy smotor failed at the 1>eginc.ing of operating cycis,12.
The motor was sent ta southwest Electric Comp ny for rewind and repair. The motor inspection and core loss test revealed some iron core damage which resulted in higher anotor winding tosperatures.
The reconditioned anotor was not a "like for like" replacement, with differences in motor weight, rated horsepower and voltage, shaf t length and dianneter, and motor base diameter.
southwest Electric Company overhauled the motor and designed and fabricated an adapter base plate and motor side coupling.
Affected sAR Figures 10.4-1, 10.4-4, 8.3-1, 8.3-3 Table:
10.4-2 It was determinut that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an y
socident or malfunction of equipment isnportant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not change the function or operation of the circulating hter system and did not involve any safety related equipment; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the recos.ditioned motor is funestionally equivalent to the old c sign and system and conponent failure snodes remained unchangods or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no Technical specification safety limits or bases defined for the Circulating Water system.
l ANO.2 LCP: 964002 Instrument Air ComprOs0cr ReplCcenent This limited change replaoed both Unit 2 Instrument Air (IA) oonpressors with i
new air oooled compressors.
The original compressors were water oeoled by ccaponent cooling Water (ccw).
The new ocepressors were installed in the saane location af ter removal of the original oospressors. All abandoned CCW systems branch piping and ooeyonents assoaisted with the original compressors were resnoved. However, since there were no root isolation valves near the connections to the Loop II ccW main header, a jusper pipe was installed downstream of the ocepressor loop supply regulator connecting to the return header. This piping was spared in pleoe with the capability of throttling water flow throuah the loop as necessary to maintain proper water chemistry to minimise corrosion through the og trod loop.
Affected SAR Figures:
9.2-6, 9.3-1 sections:
9.2.2, 9.3.1.1, 9.3.1.2, 9.3.1.3 Table:
9.2-10 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of ooourrence or consequence of an nooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report sinoe the function of the IA system was not changed by this modification and replacement of the air ooepressors increased the long term reliabilit/ of the system; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the replacement of the air compressors did not affect the operation of any safety related components and did not create any new failure mechnanisms for either the IA or ccW systems; or, (iii) reduoe the margin-of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since this modification did not reduce the margin of safety of any couponent or system important to safety or affect operability as defined by the Technical Specification bases.
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ANout LCP: 974098L201 l
l R fuoling Machino H31st Ov0ricOd Switch 00 l
l The Refueling Machine incorporates hoist overload cut-offs for the " fuel only"
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region and the ' fuel plus hoist box" region to prevent fuel and core internals dame.ge. These hoist overloads are set a maximum of 100 pounds above load weight as required by Technical specifications (Ts). Due to transient load increases (primarily roller drag) associated with engagement of the hoist box, they are bypassed during transition from the " fuel only' region to the ' fuel plus hoist box" region.
sinoe the existing setpoints cannot be increased due to TS requirements, Reactor Engineering and the vendor have recomunended additional hoist overload protection during the tsansition region.
This modification connected a spara setpoint module in the Refueling Machine Control Panel to provide a redundant hoist overload out-off, set above the current hoist overloads, that will be active throughout the entire range of hoist travel.
This hoist overload will provide protection during transition from the afuel only" region to the afuel plus hoie box" region, taking into account transient load increases associated with engagement of the hoist box.
The TS required overloads for the ' fuel only" region and the ' fuel plus hoist box" region will continue to operate as designed following this change.
Affected SAR section 9.1.4.5.1 It was determined that these charges did nots (i) incretSe the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the probability of a fuel handling accident was reduced by the redundant overload circuit since it provides additional protection against excessive lifting forces during fuel movement and the addition of the redundant overload did not alter the manner in which the unit is operated or the 1
assumptions concerning the availability or failure modes of equipment; or (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the redundant overload circuit is similar in design, function, operation, and failure modes and effects to the overload > which have already been evaluated; or, l
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the T5 required setpoints remained unchanged.
ANO 2 LCP: 944034 I.E. Culletin 80-11 Wall Modifications This modification evaluated three seismio, category 1 blockwalls and added structural support to one wall to upgrade it to a code qualified condition.
of the other two walls, one was determined to be code qualified and needed no further consideration and the other wall is scheduled to be removed per Design Change Package 95-2001.
This modification also added a note for clarification to the Domsstio Water (DW) system Piping and Instrument Diagram because a symbol indicating screwed pipe caps instead of welded pipe caps was used to show pipe caps on DW copper tubing.
Affected sAR Figuret 9.2-7 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequenca of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the podification restored the affected wall to code compliance with its design bases, the walls do not directly support safety-related equipment, the DW system does not serve any safety-related function nor is it required for the safe shutdown of the plant, and the DW system drawing change was a descriptive change, not a physical or functional changes or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the wall modification used passive components to upgrade the structures and restore the wall to code compliance with their design basis and the DW system drawing change was a descriptive change, not a physical or functional changes or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since this system was not covered by any of the Technical specification bases.
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l ANo.2 PC: 92 4043 Radwaste Vent Line to Ductwork t
1 This plant change insta11od a flexible stainless steel hose fross the waste i
Management systess high point vent to the Auxilia ry tuilding (AB) Radwaste Area Ventilation systess. The hose will route gases directly into the AB Ventilation.
systssa instead of letting the gases disperse throughout the elevation.
Affected sAR Figures 11.2-1, 9.4-2 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunction sf equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since neither the Waste Management systeen or the Auxiliary Building hadwaste Area Ventilation Oystem were addressed in socident scenarios and this modification did not affect the operation of either system; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this anodification did not change the design function of the affected systemas and did not ispect any oceponents or systems important to safety; or, (iii) reduoe the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the design 1.. sis and function of the affected systems were not changed by this modification.
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i ANO 2 PC: 644014 Additicn of Hitrog:n Bottlo to Instrument Air System This modification added a nitorgen bottle to the Instrument Air (IA) system in the spent fuel pool room for the purpose of providing a bac.'aup pressure supply to the Unit 2 spent fuel pool gate inflatable seals. The backup pressure supply will keep the gate seals inflated following a loss of the Instrument Air system.
This modification added a pressure reg'alator, isolation valve, check valve, relief valve, and approximately thirty feet of one inch copper pipe.
Affected SAR Figuret 9.3-1 It was determined that thes~ ohanges did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification conformed to the requirements for piping and ocoponents in the IA systen. Failure of the IA system will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant and will not allow the release of radioactivity to the environments or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since loss of the IA system would not prevent safe shutdown of the plant; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
ANO 1 PC: M4041 Relccaticn cf Th rmostat 2TC-8635-1 This anodification relocated thermostat 2TC-0635-1 fross the south wall of the "A" diesel roose to the north wall to enable the thermostat to better detoot rotun temperatures and operate the exhaust fan properly.
The previous location of the i
thermostat prevented it frosa properly detecting room temperatures. The function of the thermostat was not affected by the relocation.
Affected sAR Figure 8.3-66 It was determined that these changes dir! nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an socident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report sinoe this snodification enabled the therrastat to better detect roosa tosperatures and operate the exhaust fan properly and this change did not affect the function, operation, or reliability of the thermostat and ventilation systeen or any other systems or, (ii) ir.orease the possibility for an socident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the function and cyntion of the thermostat, ventilation, and any other systems were unaffected by this anodification and the snodification did not create any circumstances not bounded by any previous evaluations; or, (iii) reduce the snargin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since this snodification did not affect the asargins and limits of the Technical specification bases.
l ANO 2 PC: N4044 Overload Reicy Hootcr Elemento end Cr:Okcr Cottinga for Hoter Control Center Cubicles This modification changed the size of eighteen overload relay heater elements, one molded case breaker, and nine instantaneous overcurrent trip settings.
These changes were made to ensure that affected motors are not prevented from performing requized functions by premature tripping.
The new protective devices will continue to trip the associated motors when subjected to fault or overload conditions.
Affected SAR Figere 8.3-8 It was detetuined that these changes did nott (i) increase the probability of occurrence o consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipm;nt important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not affect any component s credited with initiating or mitigating any previously analyzed accidents, but sisply replaced existing components with similar egonents with higher trip points or changed tha set points of existing components to ensure premature tripping did not occurs or, (11) increase the po,ssibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since no new components were installed by this modification and the replacement of existing conponents was made using similar components possessing the same failure modes; or, (f.11) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since neither the overload relays nor the feeder breakers for the cubicles were addressed in the Technical specification bases.
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I ANO2 PC: H 4006 Fire Crig de Training Cuilding Firo H3co Stcticn Removal l
I yhis plant change ressoved two fire hose stations located in the Fire Brigade Training Suilding. These hose stations were inactive and were not connected to the Fire Water system m.ain loop.
The stations were installed for fire brigade training, bct were no longer required and were removed at the request of fire brigade training personnel.
Affected SAR Figure 9.5-1 It was doteamined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an aooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the affected home stations were in talled for training purposes only and were not connected to the main fire water system loop.
The inactive Fire systese oosponents located in the Training Building were not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously evaluated sowidents; or e
(ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the removal of inactive Fire systoa components located in the Training Building did not affect the Fire Protection system'd ability to protect. safety related equipment in the event of a fire; or (iii) rvf.soe the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Toshnical specifloation since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in any Technical specification bases.
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a AN3 2 PC: 95 7080 Inotal10 tion of Parmanent Lino from thn ROr:irculation Lino to tha Unit One Boric Acid Addition Tank This plant change provided a pennanent flow path to transfer Borated Water from Unit 2 to Unit 1 for early beration at the start of a refueling outsge.
This flow path was previously creat0d utilizing flexible rubber hoses and a portable pug. This modificatien instal.',ed a new 2a stainless steel line from the recirculation line to the Unit i boric acid addition tank and added a valve for isolation when not in use.
I4 addition, a new 2" valve was installed in the existing recirculation line to c'ivert flow from 2T-6A through the new line.
Affected SAR Figure:
9.3-4 It was determines that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment igortant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the piping added with this modification to the Chemical and Volume control system is not an accident initiator and this modification has no impact on safety-related equipment; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not change the normal lineup of the Chemical and Volume control system with the exception of the addition of a normally open valve in the recirculation line which will be operated only to provide a flow path to Unit 1 at the beginning of a plant shutdown when a large amount of borated water is required; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined iit the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable mnrgins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO t PC: 95 4024 Main 8tcam HOcder Prcocuro Indicator Repiccament l
This plant change replaced the Sigma pressure indicator in the four inch Main steam header to the turbine driven emergency feedwater pusy, 2P7A. with a Dixson indicator.- An alarm on low pressure will allow early opezator intervention to prevent a blowdown of both steam generators in the event of a loss of main feedwater and a break in this Kour inch line. This modific stion did not ohange the intended function of the pressure indicator.
Affected SAR Figure:
10.2-4 It was determined. that these changes did nott (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an socident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the new Dixson indicator is a non-safety related cosponent whose failure would not result in any condition adverse to plant operation; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Ana)ysis Report since replacement of the indicator did not change the indicator's design function and the indicator has no direct interaction with equipment isportant to safety; or, (iii) reduoe the margin s.f safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there was no margin of safety for this instrument defined in any Technical specification bases.
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l ANO 2 PC:984026 i
Motor Generator Cet Room Thermostat Catpoint Change This plant change altered the metpoint for the Motor Generator (MG) Set Room thermostat to 80 degen e.
The old thermostat could not be repaired and was replaced with a new model that did not have the same range as the old thermostat. The maximum position for the new thermostat was the same as.the setpoint of 85 degrees, and therefore did not allow the thermostat to cycle properly. The new setpoint did not affect the operatAon of the ventilation or chilled water systems.
Affected SAR Figure 9.4-1 It was determined that these changes did nott (i) increase the probability of occurrenoe or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since lowering the temperature in the MG set room from 85 to 80 degrees did not l
affect the function, operation, or reliability cf the MG set, the room cooler, or the chilled water system; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the setpoint change did not introduce any failure not presently considered in the SAR and did not create any circumstances not bounded by previous evaluations; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since changing the thermostat setpoint from 85 to 80 degrees did not affect any margins or limits.
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1 ANO-2 PC: 98-4033 Hydrazino Controllcro cnd Vcnt Lino This plant change installed a permanent vent line from the discharge of the hydrazine pumps back to the hydrazine addition tank. The vent line was constructed of 3/8 inch stainless steel tubing and will consist of an is lation valve, a flow sightglass, and several threaded pipe fittings at each pump.
This modification also replaced the hydrazine proportional controllers with Fischer-Porter type WC5000 process control stations.
These controllers will regulate the output of the positive displacement hydrazine injection pusps and allow for constant monitoring of hydrazine concentrations in the feedwater system at panel 2C-130.
Installation of the new controllers will allow the system to operate in automatio mode.
Affected CAR Figure 10.4-5 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification provided operations with a safe and reliable method for venting t*1e hydrazine injection pumps.
The components installed by this modification met all applicable design requirements for the system parameters they will be exposed to; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the chemical feed system is not considered equipment important to safety and the vent line does not interface with any other plant system; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no margins of safety defined in *.he Technical Specification bases for I
the chemical feed system, i
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ANO 2 PC: 95-4043 Startup and Blowdown Dernineralizere Inlot Samplo Lino Toot Equipment Rack This plant change installed a tubing co;tnection to the existing Startup and Blowdown Domineralisers (SUBD DI's) inlet sasple line, an altuninum plate to be used as a test equipment rack, and throa tubing drains to an existing floor drain. The sasple connection will be used to sample the SUBD DI inlet water 1
utilizing different types of test equipment.
The drains from the test equipment were routed to an existing floor drain feeding the Regenerative Waste Tanks.
Affected SAR Figure 10.4-7 It was determined that these changes did nott
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(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the Startup and Blowdown Domineralise*: System was not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed SAR accidents and is not considered to be equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification met existing design standards for piping, tubing, and supports so that no new malfunction of equipment was created; or, (iii) reduoe the margin of safety as def:eed in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no app 11 cabin margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO,2 PC: 96-4047 2SV-5934 cnd 2SV-5906 Remov01 This modification was developed to correct operational problems with the Process sagling system. This modification included the remaval of 2sV-5934 and 2sV-5935, which are pilot operated valves located in the steam Generator Blowdown sample stream on the outlet of its respective sasple cooler, and replacing them with tubing. Tae handswitches and wiring associated with these valves were also determinated and removed. Alarms and indications for this sanple system were not affected by this modification and the tubing was installed per the appropriate line class requirements and the pressure boundary will not be affected.
Affected SAR Figures:
8.3-65, 9.3-2 It was determined that these changes did nots i
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification was made ta non-safety related system piping and conponents and did not chage any of the design bases of the Primary Sampling System, Process Sampling System, Process Radiological Monitoring System, or the Turbine Building Systems; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not change or challenge any existing design criteria or accident analyses, the stainless steel tubing installed to replace these valves was installed per the appropriate line class requirements, and the system pressure boundaries were not degraded; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since this modification did not reduce the margin to safety of any surrounding component or system important to safety or affect their operability as defined by the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO 2 PC: 96-4062 C::ntainment D:proccurizatien This plant change added new sections of pipe and two new valves to permit operators to lower containment pressure and remain within the requirements of Technical specification 3.6-1.
The new piping connects to the discharge of the Containment Air Monitoring System (CANS) units and transports the CAMS discharge to the auction of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System. This modification allows the containment building to be depressurized at a rate of approximately 15 sofm.
The new piping was constructed to AsME section III, class 3, and was supported to seismic class 1 standards up to the newly installed isolation valves.
Affected GAR Figurest 11.3-1, 9.4-2, 9.4-4 It was determined thaP. these changes did nots (1) inctuase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the Containment Air Monitoring System was not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously evaluated accidents and all piping is located outside containment and will be automatically isolated when a safety Injection Actuation Signal or Containment Isolation Actuation Signal is received; or, (ii) increare the possibility for an accider.t or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report sinne the CAMS are used for Reactor Coolant
- !ystem leakage detection and are not used for accident mitigation; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined inthe basis of any Technical specification since the addition of the piping j
to the ciischarge of the CAMS did nut affect their ability to monitor and detect leakage from the reactor coolant system boundary.
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mem - m ANO 2 PC: 96-4068 Circulating Water System Troublo Alorm The annunciator for circulating water system potential failure at panel 2C14 had an input for gland flow low, which is an inappropriate input with respect to potential failure.
Since the gland flow low is a concern for operation of the circulating water pumps, it was determined that it was more logical to monitor it on circulating water system trouble. Convarsely, circulating water system trouble had an inspropriate input for circulating rster pusp discharge pressure high.
Since high discharge pressure could be indicative of a potential failure, it was detarsdned that this was a more appropriate input to the circulating water system potential failure annunciator.
Affected SAF. Figures t 10.4-1, 10.4-4 It was determined that these changes did not (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment inportant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not change the function of the Circulating Water system or the probability of a loss of circulating water; or, (ii) increase the possibility for ar. accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not affect the function or operating modes of the circulating Water system and did not inpact any equipment important to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO 2 PC: 95-404T
.C:ntoinment Coaling Coil and Shutdown Cooling HOct ExchnngOr Low l
Fit.w Alarm Setpoints l
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I This change reduced the service Water (sW) low flow level alaam setpoint for the shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanges and the Containment Cooling coils from 4800 gym j
to 4400 gym and from 2400 gpm to 1450 gpm respectively.
The change involved lowering the low flow setpoints to more meaningful values, since the previous i
settings could have resulted in control room alarms at flowrates that were not indicative of abnormal flow conditions.
Affected SAR Figure 7.4-2 l
It was determined that these changes did not (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not alter the safety-related requirements of the cenponents that were directly involved in the modification nor did it adversely affect the safety-related system in which these c.onponents were installed; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Repoct since this modification did not introduce the potential for new failures of components, systems, or structures important to safety not previously considered; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since lowering these aldtpoints did not inpact any margins of safety as defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-2 PC: 96 4 078-Removal of Firo Door This plant change removed the sliding fire door that provided separation between the_ train bay and area 2069 on elevation 354. The removed fire door had a long history of operability problems and was inoperable at the time of removal. The integrity of the fire barrier was maintained by upgrading the adjoining
-watertight door to a regulatory required fire door.
It was deter 1ained that these changes did nots -
l (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since there was no change in the level of protection provided to the redundant safe shutdown equipment in the affected area; or, (ii) increasm the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification remained bounded by previously evaluated accident soonerios and did not adversely affect safety-related equipment; or, (iii) zeduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the adjoining watertight door was upgraded to a regulatory required fire door resulting in no reduction in the margin of safety.
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ANO 2 PC: 964085 Control Ch0nnOl pro 30uricOr Lev 01 Circuito This plant change provided temperature compensated inputs to the backup charging pump start /stop logic switches, the low level cutout switch for the pressurizer heaters, and the annunciator alarms for pressurizer level. A relay was installed in the pressurizar level control circuit that, when manually actuated, will simulate low pressuriser level to allow the operators to start all three charging pt:mps when performing a borio acid system flow test and when drawing a pressuriser bubble.
Affected SAR Figures:
5.1-3, 7.4-1 section:
5.6.3.1 It was determined that these changes did not (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipeant important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the Pressurizer Level Control System was not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed accidents.
'1his modification did not affect the ability of these components to maintain the Reactor Coolant Systema pressure boundary or prevent the charging punps from starting on a safety Injection Ac;uation Signal; or, I
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since possible failure modes are adequately covered by plant abnormal operating procedures, availability of the redundant loop, and the operator's ability to shift control leops or take manual control of the pressuriser level controller; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there vere no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
I ANO 2 PC: 968091P201 Wat0rhamner/StCam Fleching en Feedwater H00tcr Droin Lino This plant change reconfigured the 3 inch bypass piping froom the 12 inch drain line directly to condenser 2E11A, and installed a baffle on the inside of the-oondenser for beta the bypass and the drain piping oosning froen feedwater heater 2E6A, in order to minimise waterhassner/st.eaan flashing probleens..
Affected SAR Figures 10.4-3 It was deterunined that these changes did nots (i) inormase the probability of ooourrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipsment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the equipsment affected by this snodification was not eMted with initiating or naitigating. any of the previously analysed accidents. None of tha oceponents altered by this change were considered equipament important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possiLility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since there were no new conditions created fross this modification that could cause a new or different type sooident then those already evaluated in the SAR; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specifloation bases.
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ANO 2 PC: M4M7 Corchsuco #1 Ovorh = d Door cnd Old Radwnoto Cuilding ElCctrical Upgrade This modification installed a 13'5" wide by 12' high roll up door in the south wall of Warehouse fl.
Several conduits were rerouted above the door opening at a height sufficient to eliminate interference with the door curtain, its opening, the operator, and the door hood.
The heat pump and humidifier were also relocated. This modification also installed a 480V, 3 phase electrical feed to the Old Radwaste Building and removed the smaller feeds. Additional light fixtures were installed and the old light fixtures were raised to prevent inadvertent contact with equipment and stored materials. A concrete slab was added to offer additional outside storage area with the slope being sufficient to allow proper drainage.
Affected SAR Figure 8.3-17 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since these t
modifications of the support buildings did not involve any safety-related equipment, systems, or radioactive material; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since these modifications remained bounded by existing analyses and did not adversely affect any safety-related equipment or systems; or, (iii) reduoe the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the warehouse and old radwaste buildings were not discussed in the Technical specification bases, a
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ANS-2 PC: 95-4103 Emergency Feedwater Volvo Modification This plant change installed a pressure bypass line between the bonnet areas and the valve body upstream of the valve disk, for Emergency Feedwater (ErW) valves 2CV-0711-2 and 2CV-071*-1, the service Water (SW) to Erli isolation motor operated valves. It has been determined that gate valves of the flexible wedge type are susceptible to pressure locking / thermal binding when the valves are in the closed position.
This condition occurs when pressure in the bonnet area of the valves builds due to tesperature increases and the resultant expansion of water in the bonnet area.
The magnitude of the pressure build-up can exceed normal and accident design presrures. The flexible wedge discs can be jansned into the valve seats with such force that the valve operators are incapable of opening the valves. The bypass line between the valve bonnets and the upstream process piping will allow the pressure in the bonnet to essentially be equal to the pressure in the upstream process piping.
Affected SAR Figure:
10.4-2 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since any break of the new piping / tubing remained bounded by previous accident analyses.
This modification was designed to the required codes and standards for the SW and ErW Systems; or (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfuaction of a different type than any evaluated provously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification resulted in an reliability of these valves to respond to a signal increaseca to open; therefore, the possibility of a malfunction of these valves will be decreased; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
ANO-2 PC: H 2001 Removal of tho 50GS Ground S noing Reicy from tn ld71 cnd 2C81 Feeder Breakers This plant change removed the 50G5 ground sensing relay from the MCC 2B71 and WCC 2BB1 feeder breakers.
Several trips of NCCs 2B71 and 2B81 have occurred due to a ground fault on loads fed from 2B71 and 2B81. On those trips, the molded case circuit breaker feeding the faulted load should have tripped first. The entire WCC should have tripped only as a backup in the event that the molded case breaker failed to trip. However, the WCC tripped due to a coordination problem between the 50G5 ground sensing relay and the downstreans molded case circuxt breakers.
The 5005 relay could not be adjusted to eliminate the coordination problem. Calculation 85-E-0310-01 documented that the WCC cables and the associated containment electrical penetrations are adequately protected from all electrical faults by the dual circuit breakers and did not credit the protection provided by the 50G5 relay.
Affected SAR Figures:
8.3-29, 8.3-47, 8.3-7 section:
0.3.1.2 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since removal of the 5003 ground sensing relays and the rewiring of the WCC status lights did not change, degrade, or prevent any actions described or assumed in any previously evaluated accident. This modification did not affect any equipment required to ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition; or, l
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since removal of the 5005 ground sensing j
relay removed the possibility of a malfunction of the relay.
The primary ground fault protection will continue to be provided by the molded case circuit breakers and the series load center breakers; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the Technical specification bases did not mention the 50GS ground sensing relay or the NCC status indicating lights.
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mese ANO-2 PC: H2030P201 S rvico CatOr Droin Down C nn ction This plant change installed two four inch butterfly valves off the fourteen inch service Water Return /DischarTo piping for each of the shutdown Cooling heat exchangers, 2E-35A and 2E-3bB.
The valves provide a means to drain either of the seavioe Water loops when required during an outage.
The piping affected by this modification has been code qualified to the requirements of the AsME code, section III, class 3 and seismic category 1, maintaining current piping classification.
Affaoted sAR Figure 9.2-1 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence of consequence of an accident or '+41 function of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis report sinoe this modification did not affect the operation, function, failure modes, or effects of any system or component; or, (ii) increase the possibility f an accident or malfunction of a different type than any es sted previously in the safety Analysis Report sinoe there were no new conditions created from this modification that would cause a new or different type accident than those already evaluated in the SAR; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since although the service Water return / discharge line is required for service water operability, this modification did not degrade the integrity of Service Water System.
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ANO 2 PC: H2031P202 COrvice Octor Pipe Repiccament This plant change replaced approximately twelve feet of carbon steel piping on the Loop I service Water (SW)- System with stainless steel piping due to leakage.
All weld examinations were oospleted in accordance with the applicable ANO Welding Manual and Inspection Standards. The change from carbon steel to stainless steel was evaluated.
It was determined that pipe stresses were within allowable stresses and no significant changes to support loads were required.
Affected SAR Figure 9.2-1 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the loss of SW System accident identified in the SAR was not affected by this piping change since the failure of carbon steel piping versus stainless steel piping is virtually identical; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Rzport since the new piping will function as previously designed and the only failure mechanism could be leakage, which is already covered under the Loss of sw system accident; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Teahnical specification since the changa of SW piping from carbon steel to stainless steel did not affect the ability of the SW system to provide adequate cooling.
ANO 2 PC:M-2043 j
Installation of Pig Launch St0 tion en tho S3rvico Motor Return Line This plant change installed a per nanent pipe spool piece or poly pig launching station to clean the service Watar Return Line from the Auxiliary Building
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Extension to the Emergency Cooling Pond on an as needed basis in the future.
l This piping spool piece is located in the basement of the Auxiliary Building Extension on elevation 335' and provides a means for launching pigs into the service Water return piping during an outage whenever the piping is in need of cleaning.
Affected SAR Figure 9.2-1 1
section:
9.2.5.2.1.2 It was determined that these changes did not 1
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an socident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification was code qualified to the requirements of ASME Code section III, Class 3 and seismic Category 1 and this modification did not affect the operation, function, failure modes, or effects of any system or component; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not affect the operation, function, failure modes, or effects of any system or component and did not introduce ar.y new modes of failure; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since this modification did not degrade the integrity of the service Water return line.
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ANo 2 PC: H2061P201 Radiction Alorm Setpoint Adjustment and Recorder Replacement This plant change replaced the high alarna histable card setpoint potentiosmeter in the Condensate and Feedwater Win Condenser Air Radiation Monitors to make I
the potentiometer more accessible to operations personnel.
The function of this device was unchanged. This modification also replaced the recorders for the main
- steam line radiation anonitors with a new Yokogawa progra-kle recorder. The new receeder will allow operations to change the high alarna setpoints as the background count changes without re-calibrating the recorders.
Affected SAR Figures 10.2-3, 9.3-2 It was determined that these changes did nott (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or smalfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the Radiation Monitoring system was not credited as an accident initiator and this modification did not affect any equipment required for accident mitigation; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an socident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report sinoe this modification did not affect the function of any equipment required for safe shutdown, mitigation of radioactive releases, or unintaining reactor co' ut pressure integrity; or, (iii) reduoe the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since these modifications did not affect or alter the Technical 3pecification requirements for the Radiation Monitoring system.
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l ANO 2 PC: H2054P201 Hanual Trcnofer Switches for Firo Dotection Circuito This plant change added two doublo-throw safety switches to be used as manual transfer switches, allowing operations to swap power sources for 2C341 during red sad green train bus outages. These switches provide the normal and alternate sources for 2C341, which providos supervisory and control power fot most or the Unit 2 Yt re Detection syc%sa. Normally, the power for the supervisory circuits la provided by braaker 2Y-304 and the power for the control circuits is provided by breaker 2Y-404.
During a ta ain irolated bus sutags, one-half of the fire detection circuits would be de. energized.
In the past, temporary modificatioas war, implemented to power tie de-oSergized half from the other power panel.
This odification will allow ope ratiota to swap to an alternate souroe for either fire detection circuit t henever needed, l
l Affecte,et SAR Figure:
0.3-19 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or smalfunction of equipement important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since no credit was taken for the Fire Detection system in the accident analyses.
This system does not contain any equipment that performs a safety-related control function, and does not contain any j
equipment that is credited for automatic action; or, l
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evalueted previously in the Safety i
Analysis Report since no credit was taken in the accident analyses for any autcoatic or manual action by the Fire Detection System.
Installation of this modification had no negative ispact on any safety-related system or component; i
or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any J
Technical specification since the Technical specification bases did not establish a margin of safety for the Fire Detection system or the non-vital instrument power systsa.
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ANO 2 PC: MSN2P241 Stator Cooling Alonn Pcnol Annunciotor i
This plant change regrouped seve.nal annuncintor inputs to reflash annunciator I
2K23 (stator cooling ~ Trouble) and 2K24 (stator Cooling Potential Failure) according to priority.
2K24 is designed to receive the higher priority annunciator input signale frosa the stator cooling system. operations determined that several alarms on 2K23 were of a higher priority than some alarms on 2K24.
Regrouping these alarms will allow operations to take appropriate action upon receipt of the reflashed alarm in the control room.
A.ffected SAR Figure s 3.2-5 It was deterimined that these changes did nott (i) increase the probability of ooourrence or ocusequence of an accident or malfunctio.4 of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not alter any assumptions made in '
previously evaluated accident scenarios; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a diffarent type than any evaluated previously in the fafety Analysis Report sinoe none of the equipment or wiring effected by this change interfaces with any equipment important to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO 2 PC: M3066P201 Installotion of Rosin samplo Tcp3 in Reg:noration Voccol Sight Glasses
,This plant change installed a prefabricated tapped sight glass on each of the startup and Blowdown Desdnaraliser regeneration vessels.
The sight glasses were selected so that the ansple tar would cause annimal interference to the norraal use of the sight glasses during regeneration and resin handling.
Affooted SAR Figures 10.4-7 It was determined that these changes did nott (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunctian of equipament 1sportant to esfety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification was installed using suitable materials and construction techniques; or, (ii) Anorcase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the installation of the resin taps on the regenenation vessels did not adversely impact any equipmant important to safety and did not introduce any new modes of failure; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification sinoe there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification
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l ANO-2 PC: H3108P201 C ndencato FeedwatOr Fced Pump D lta IntOrlock l
This plant change modified the Condensate Feedwater. (CFW) feed pump differontial tesperature indicating switches from Hi-Lo to Hi-Hi circuits internally due to the inadequate feed pusy protection provided by the switches.
This anodification also provided a Hi-Hi differential tesperacure trip interlock to the food pump turning gear circuits and revised the alarm setpoint from 25 degrees to an operator adjustable setpoint between 15 and 25 degrees delta tesperature.
Affected SAR Figures:
10.4-2, 3.2-1, 7.3-9 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment isportant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification was evaluated against previously evaluated accidents and was shown to have no impact.
This modification reduoed the possibility of failure by decreasing the chances that the pump would rotata prior to temperature equalisation between the pump casing and rotor; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or a.alfu.-etion of a I
different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification remained bounded by previously evaluated accident scenarios; or, (iii) reduos the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no defined snargins of safety associated with the CFW feed pump delta temperature interlocks.
ANO-2 PC: M3125P201 Removal of o Temperaturo Element from tho CEDM Cooling Duct This plant change removed an unused, broken Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) from the Control Element Drive Wochanism cooling duct on the east end of the missile shield.
This RTD had to be disconnected and reconnected each refueling outage to facilitate removal of the ductwork and the conduit routed to the R'tV had to be disconnected and relocated h fore the missile shield could be moved. The RTD was not used and had been bent and broken for several years.
The hole which was exposed in the duct by removal of the RTD was covered to ensure no loss of cooling flow.
Affected SAR Figures:
8.3-73, 9.4-4 It was determined that these changes did nott (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an aooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this RTD was not credited rith initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed accidents and removal of this component did not impact any plant systems; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification involved the removal of an unused, temperature element which was serving no function and was not connected to any other plant system; l
or,
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(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any l
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Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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i ANO-2 PC: MM7tP201 Reactor Coolont Pump Oil Collection Pano i
i This plant change modified several oil collection pans on the four Reactor Coolant Pump meters. The intent of the modification was to provide enclosures to more effectively capture and contain oil spray from leaks in the motor lube -
oil system. The function of the oil collection pans was not altered.
Affected SAR section:
5.5.1.2 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increare the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the improvements to this system reduced the probability of a fire caused by leakage of oil from the RCP motora and reduced the potential for any oil leakage from spraying out onto nearby equipment; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not change the function, operating modes, or failure modes of any couponent or systesa; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no Technical specification bases associated with the possibility of a fire related to this equipment.
ANO 2 PC: H3548P201 Chemical Injection into tho Servico Wator Forebay This plant change added new piping and valves to permit injection of biocide into the service water (sW) forebay.
Previously, the injection system was espable only of injecting biocide into each individual pusy bay near the suction of each pusy. The new configuration esploys four perforated pipe sections formed into "L"
shapes oriented to inject biocide around the periphery of both inlet channels to marimise the contact between the biocide and the undesirable growth.
Affected SAR Figure 9.2-1 Section 9.2.1.2.2.1 It was determined that these changes did nott (1) incrosse the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this change helps assure the viability of the system by reducing the biological growth in the forebay and reducing the possibility of fouling the sw strainers and the coolers that serve equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since addition of new upstream injection headers did not change the overall effect on the system and did not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than previously evaluated; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since installation of this modification did not increase the probability that either j
train will fail, and therefore, did not reduce the margin of safety.
ANO-2 PC: 44-4002 2SV-0386 Pcwcr Scurce Separation l
This modification separated the power sources for the Main reedwater Puup (MFWP) turning gest engagement solenoids and MFWP casing delta-T instr.tunent loops.
The engagement solenoids remained on their original 2Y1/2Y2 breaker and the transmitter loopr were re-powered from another 2Yl/2Y2 source.
This change j
reduoes the number of breaker trips related to the turning gear engagement solenoids.
Since the MFWP casing delta-T instrument loop was previously powered by the same breaker, it was de-energized when the solenoid breaker tripped, l
This modification prevents this loop from being de-energized when the solenoid breaker trips.
This modification also corrected minor drawing errors found during fisld =c1kdowns and in print reviews.
Affected SAR Figures:
8.3-19, 8.3-64 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety 9
evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification did not initiate, change, degrade, or prevent any actions described in previously evaluated acciden's and did not affect any equipe=ent that is required to ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition, or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of events that could result in potential offsite exposures in excesa, of the guideline of 10CTR100; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification removed one l
possibility of a malfunction of the MFWP casing delta-T instrument loop and all the remaining electrical protection devices for each circuit remained unchanged; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since neither the source of power for the MFWP turning gese :_ngagement solenoids nor the source of power for tt MFWP delta-T instrument loops was addressed in the 'Iechnical specification bases.
ANO 2 PC: 94-4013 Component Cooling Water Croso-ConnOct Volvo cnd Pump Circuitry Hodification This plant change modified the circuitry of the cross connect valves and the start circuits for Cosg,onent Cooling Water (CCW) pumps 2P-33B and 2P-33C.
This change allows 2P-338 to automatically start and supply Loop 2 CCW on a loss of pressure to Loop 2 only, to provide additional protection to the more vital Loop 2 components.
In addition, this change isolated the low pressure relay contacts for the "A" pusp from the cirmaits of the "B" and "C" pws and the cross connect valves. The changes of the "B" and "C" pump logic and cross connect valves removed any reason for the "A" pump to auto start on a low pres.sure condition of either the "B" or "C" pusps.
Affected SAR Figures:
7.3-6, 9.2-6 sections:
9.2.2.2, 9.2.2.5 Table:
9.2-10 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safeity evaluated in the Safuty Analysis Report since this modification did not degrade the performance or availiability of the CCW system or any of its components; or (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than e.ny evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since no new or unconsidered variables were introduced by this change which would pose a shange or increase in equipment malfunction; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO.2 PC: M4015 Cack Loading Pit Pwnp Diccharg3 Vcnt Volv3 This plant change comoved the vont valve located on the vertical supply / discharge line of the osak loading pit, which is part of the spent ruel Pool Purification system.
In addition, a note was added indicating that the pusp om be removed for storage and a blind flange installed.
Affected SAR Figuret 9.1-1 j
It was dete 1 mined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Repote, since there are no previously evaluated socidents involving the spent ruel Fool Purification system and this modification did not impact any other system; or, (11) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Rsport since deleting this vent valve had i
negligible affect on the spent Fuel Pool Purification system and this system is not safety-related; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no safety margins defined in the Technical specification bases involving the spent Fuel Pool Purification system
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ANO2 PC: M4016 8:rvice Catcr 8queezo Volva Modificatieno This plant ehange modified the pnewnatio control circuit of the servios water (SW) squeese valve to change the failure position of the valve frosa " fail-open*
to afail-as-is*.
This modification also added components to allow safe j
swap-over from pneumatto operation to handwheel operation.
Affected SAR rigure 9.2-1 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) Anoroase the probability of ooourrence er consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report ainoe this snodification i
was insta.11nd in a non-Q, non-seismic portion of the sw system, the affected valve was not evaluated as an socident initiator, and this modification decreased the probability of valve failure; or, (ii) Anottease the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety i
Analysis Report since this modification did not affect safety related portions of the sw system; or, I
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any j
Technical specification sinoa the Technioni specification bases i
did not define any safety snargins based upon the failure of the sw squeeze va.1ve.
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ANO.2 PC: M 4025 l
Lube oil Samplo P0ints This plant change was implemented to improve the sampling of the lube oil for i
both the main and feedwater pusy turbines, to provide additional filtration capacity for the food pump turbine lube oil, and to add new attachment points for the centrifuge. These changes included the addition of a sample valve to the oil drain back piping and a sidestream filter to remove particulate matter from +.he feed pump turbine oil while the unit is operating.
Affected SAR Figures 3.2-1 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an socident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the inatallation of the lube oil sasple points and a filtration system for the feed pump lube oil reservoir could only have a possible offect on the main or feed pung turbines, neither of which is considered equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated prevoitsly in the safety Analysis Report since this modification remained bounded by previously evaluated accident scenarios; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins cf safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO 2 PC: M4024 Repiccoment cf Ob0oloto RCP Control Cleedsff TrOnsmittOro This plant ohange replaced the obsolete F&P rotameters used for Reactar Coolant Puey (RCP) seal controlled bloodoff flow indication with JY smart transeitters.
The method of flow measurement changed from a rotameter to a flow orifice.
This modification also installed additional isolation valves downstream of the existing instrument root valves, allowing the instruments and all tubing downstream of the manifold to be downgraded from 's' to 'Non-Q'.
All cabling and instrumentati6n downstream of the transmitter was unchar.ged.
Affected sAR Figure 6.5-2 It was determined that these onanges did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an mooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not affect any equipment credited with initiating or mitigating any of the socidents previously evaluated in the sAR and this equipment was not considered equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the installation of this modification increased the reliability of the RCP seal controlled bloedoff flow loop and existing failure modes were unchanged; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO2 PC: H-4630 Modificaticno to tho Recotor Droin Tonk Droin Lino to Assist Draining the Refueling Canal During Refueling Outage, 2k11, an engineering evaluation was performed to allow draining the refueling canal deep ends to the Boron Managesment systess with a tsaporary hose connection. This modification allowed the tosporary hose antrol of the draindown to be conesotion to be made each outage and will allow 4
maintained with the reactor drain tank isolated.
Affected SAR Tiguret 11.2-2 It was determined that these changes did note i
(i) increase the proba.bility of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipement important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the tank and associated drain piping are isolated during an sooident and, therefore, do not perforan a function which is considered important to safety. The probability of failure of the valves due to piping overpressurization was not increased since the original design class was saintained; or, t
(ii) increase the possibility for an socident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since no new or unanalysed variables were introdoced by this change; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification i
i bases.
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ANCh2 PC: D64031 Vibroticn Cnd Loaco Porto Monitor Rapiccament l
The hardware of the Vibration and Loose Parts Monitoring system (VLPWS) was found to be in poor condition, sensor mounting magnets under the reactor vessel i
were found to have lost their magnetiam and the cabling under the reactor vessel was found to be very brittle and in poor condition. 7m attospt was made at pulling the defootive cables from the conduits and simultaneously pulling a new cable through to replace them.
Howevet, the cabling would not move due to blockage at the end of the conduit and new cable was not installed.
This plant change installed two new magnet mounted sensors and their associated cables at a lower level of the reactor vessel. A new hardline cable was pulled into the reactor cavity area and extended with a sof tline cable outside the D-ring wall.
This modification also abandoned the existing conduits in the reactor vessel cavity area due to blockage inside the conduits.
These conduits served as raceway for the old vibration monitor cables.
The new cables were pushed through existing cavity ventilation ducts and routed next to the abandoned portion of the conduits.
The new cables were attached to the abandoned conduits using metal tie-wraps.
Affected SAR rigures 0.3-68, 8.3-69, 8.3-70 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the VLPWS was not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the sooidents evaluated in the SAR and the VLPNS is a non safety-related system and is physically and electrically isolated from any safety related equipment; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an socident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the non safety-related VLPNS is physically separate and isolated from any safety related l
circuits.
The sensore on the Reactor Coolant system (RCS) were non-intrusively mounted and were not made part of the RCS pressure boundary; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the Technical specification bases did not define a margin of safety for the VLPHs.
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ANO 2 PC: H4038 Borlo Acid Batching 7:nk Leval Indicator This plant change installed a level indicator on the Borio Acid Batching Tank near the fill valve.
The forty-five inch long level indicator was purchased and installed non-o.
The stainless steel ruler located in the batching tank was removed and reattached to the support rods of the indicator for level measuring purposes.
Affected SAR rigures 9.3-4 l
It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an aooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not reduos the availability or reliability of the Borio Acid Batching Tank or the Borio Acid systenal or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accideet or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification did not introduce any new modes of failure for the Borio Acid system snd did not increase the possibility of a safety related equipsent malfunction; or, (iii) reduce the snargin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the Technical specification bases did not define a margin of safety for the Sorio Acid match Tank.
ANO2 PC: M4037 sigma Indicator Repiccament This plant change replaced four tigma indicators, two in sabinet 2C16 and two in cabinet 2C17, with one Diason dual indicator in each cabinet.
The Disson indicators are seismically qualified per a WTs test report documented in Calculation 91-E-0120-03, seismic Qualification of Disson Bargraph Indicators.
This indicator replacement did not affect any functional or operational characteristics of the indicatters.
Affected SAR Figure s 10.4-2 l
It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since instrument accuracy analysis and associated loop uncertainty values were maintained without challenging the instrument and system functionality. The new indicators will perform the same function as the old indicators and square root converters and installation of the new instrumentation did not introduce any new components which could alter the function of existing safety related equipment; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an socident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report sinoe the installation of this modification i
did not have an adverse impact on any safety related systems or components.
The criteria for electrical separation was maintained and conservative adherence to seismic requirements was observed to ensure oospliance; or, l
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since operability of the system was not affected or compromised.
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ANO 2 PC: M-4044 Additicn of Grcund rcuit 8:ncors This plant change installed six torroidat anagnetic sensors for ground fault detection in the 125 VDC dietribution panel, 2D01, and added provisions for portable instrueantation to aooess the DC system voltage and bus ground relay circuit.
This modification also removed the spare breaker to make room for storage of the sensor cables. The sensor cables w/11 be used to measure the circuit magnetto field imbalance in case of a ground fault in the distribution system.
Affected SAR rigure 8.3-16 It was determined that these changes did note (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunctio t of equipment isportant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report sinoe the equipment inpacted by this modification was not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previoulsy analysed accident scenarios; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the installation of this modification did not create any new sooident initiators; or,,
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any i
Technical specification since there were no applicable n.argins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
ANO,1 PC: 973855P201 P3 wor InOtollction for HOW Radw cto ProceOcing Equipment This plant change provided a permanent power source for a vendor supplied flitration skid for the radwaste processing system to be utilized by the chemistry department.
The power source was located on elevation 317 in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building.
This modification also installed a disconnect switch to provide a local disconnect for a spare breaker in Motor Control Center 2B41.
The power connection required the installation of four new cables and two new conduits in addition to the new disconnect switch.
Affected SAR Figure 9.3-55 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) Ancrease the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or um1 function of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report sinoe this modification did not affect any conponents or systems credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed accidents.
This modification was designed with proper electrical isolation and with seismio integrity to ensure that failure would not adversely affect any safety functions; or, (11) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the equipment affected by this modification is not required for shutdown of the unit, mitigating radioactive releases, or maintaining reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the Tcchnical specification bases did not establish a margin of safety for the switchgear, non-vital load center, motor control center, l
or spare breaker.
Installation of the disconnect and utilisation of the spare breaker did not affect or alter any existing Technical specification requirements and did not introduce any new requirements.
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ANoz2 PC: 973932P201 Relecaticn of OutOg3 Control COntOr to Controlled Acceco II This plant change provided the necessary electrical related changes to upgrade the office area north of controlled Access II (CA2) into an outage control center with power, network, and telephone capabilities. Telephone cable was installed for thirteen new smultiple line telephones and the radio base station.
Fiber cables were installed to provide network capability for twelve computer stations, four video monitors, the cathode ray tube for the Plant Monitoring system network, and the Entergy TV monitor.
Affected SAR Figures) 0.3-62, 0.3-67 It was detemined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of ooourrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report sinoe the new equipment installed to support the network / telephone / power connections to the new CA2 offit.e area did not introduce any components which could alter the function of accident initiators, mitigators, or existing safety related equipments or, (ii) increase the possibility for an acc. dent or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since all system designs for equipment important to safety remained unchanged.
The criteria for electrioni separation was maintained and conservative adherence to seismic requirements was observed to ensure compliance; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the new equipment installed to support the network / telephone / power connections to the new CA2 office area for the outage Control Center did not ac*versely affect or change the margin of safety or the operability of any systems or equipment inportant to safety.
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ANO 2 PC: 973938P201 Bulk Storage Warehou e #12 Cot Pipe Sprinklcr Syotem This plant change installed a wet pipe sprinkler system in the new bulk storage warehouse #12 located outside of the fenood area. This change consisted of toeing into the esisting sprinkler system located in warehouse 65 and then extending the system to provide protection to the new warehouse.
The system was designed and installed to meet the National Fire Protection Association standards.
Affected SAR Figures 9.5-1 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) Anorease the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report ninoe installation of a wet pipe oprinkler system in warehour, 512 did not degrade the performance or reliability of the system; or, (11) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the Fire Protection Eystem was designed such that it was not credited as an accident initiator and installation of a sprinkler system in warehouse $12 per NFPA Standards did not alter or introduce any new modes of failure; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there was no margin of safety specified for this portion of the Fire Protection System.
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P SECTION III TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS l
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ANO 2 TM: M 2-002 Auxiliary cooling Cator Supply for P1Cnt Makcup Watcr This Toeporary Wodification (W) installed a fire hose connection on the blind flange downstream of an Auxiliary cooling Water (ACW) valve located in the breezeway, routing the hoses to the tegorary domineraliser trailer and then to the desdneralised water system. This W provided an alternate supply of makeup water from the ACW system due to the decreased availability of the normal city water makeup source.
It was determined that these changes did not I
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipunent isportant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the ACW system does not provide any safety related functions and is isolated from the service water system upon initiation of a safety Injection Actuation signal or a Wain Stream Isolation Signal; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this W did not create any connections or interrelations with any safety-related cosponents; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no Technical specifications bases defined for the ACW system.
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ANO.2 TM: M 2 022 R**noval of Renator Coolent Pump 'A'o Axici Positicn Chnnn:1 l
This Temporary Modification (SW) defeated the indication and alarm function of
'A' to silence a the axial position channel on Reactor coolant Pump (RCP) nuisance alarm that was hindering the monitoring of other vibration monitoring channels of the RCPs.
It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an aooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this TW did not adversely affect any system associated with accident initiation mitigation and the RCP Vibration Monitoring system has or no direct rslationship to maintaining the condition of the RCPs; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this TW did Tot impact any current failure modos or create new oness or, (iii) reduse the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specifloation since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specifications bases.
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ANO 2 TM: M 2 012 I
Hodification of Reheat Steam Duct W3rk This Temporary Modification (W) installed a blank flanga in the eahaust duct I
between reheat steam valve 2Rs-30 and condenser 2E-11A.
This plate provided an I
isolation en the main feedwater turbine since the reheat steam valve would not seal properly.
W installed plate was qualified for vacuum or pressure to a 1evel equal to the design of the original duct.
i It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this W did not adversely affect any systems or components credited with initiating or mitigating any of the accidents previously analysed in the EAR and did not affect any safety-related systems; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification remained bounded by previously evsluated accident sooneries and did not affect any safety-related systems; or, (iii) reduos the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any i
Technical specifiestion since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specifications bases.
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ANO.2 TM: 94 2 423 Circulating Water Pump 011 Coolcr Cater Supply This Temporary Wodification (TW) installed e temporary hose between the acid dilution line off the discharge of the circulating water pumps and the inlet side of the motor bearing oooling water line. This W provided cooling water to the oil cooler for the circulating water pusy while the cooling water repairs were in progress.
It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probabillty of occurrence or consequence of an aooident or malfunction of equipsment leportant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report ainoe the tosperary cooling water supply was adequate to maintain puep oil tageratures and the equipsment associated with this TW was non safety-relatedt or, (ii) increase the possibility for an socident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previcuely in the safety Analysis Report sinoe this 2W resnained bounded by previously existing nooident analyses; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there are no Technical specifications bases associated with the circulating Water system.
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ANO 2 TM 42403 Tempor0ry Instrument Air ComprOcc0r This alteration made use of a permanently installed flange connection to the Instrement Air (!A) system by connecting a temporary trailer mounted electria air oospressor. The tsaporary compressor served only as a backup to increase system reliabilaty, with peraanent comprs.sscre remaining on-line er in standby.
connection and use of a toeporary compressor did not limit or affect the espacity or reliability of the non-safety IA system.
It was determined that tht.se changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunctior of equipment important to safety evt.itiated in the safety Analysis Report since the temporary compressor did not function as the single air source, but only served as a backup with the permanent compressors remaining on-line or in standby; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any svaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since any possible malfunctions or failures associated with these oosponents were still bos.nded by the previously evaluated sAR aooidents or, (iii) reduoe the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there was no defined margin for thm IA system in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO 2 TM: M 2 004 Sw;pping C:ntrol Elesnent Ascenbly calculotor Inputo to the Caro Protection Calculator This toeporary alteration swapped the Control Element Assembly calculator (CEAC)
Inputs to each of the four Core Protection calculator (CPC) channels to determine the source of a recurring probless which has been reported as a CEAC-2 sensor failure by each of the four CPC channels at various times. This modification had no functional effect on the operation of the CEACs or the CPC channels.
It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the existing failure modes and effects analyses for the CPC system reaained valid and this modifiestion did not increase the probability of a failure of the CPC to initiate a reactor trip when required; or, (11) Anormase the possibility for an socident or malfunction of a d4fferent type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the only possible event created by the installation of this modification was bounded by previous accident analyses; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the CPCs remained fully functional to meet all its original design specifications.
ANO 2 TM: 96 2 005 l
Feedwater Flow Sign 21 Input i
This temporary alteration de-terminated the cable to a spare transmitter that provided a feedwater flow signal to the Teodwater Control System (FWCS), the pAant Computer, and the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS).
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cable was re-terminated to an identical Rosemount transmitter with the same 3-way manifold and sensing lines, except that the sensing lines coes off of an opposite tap.
This change provided a feed flow signal from that top uo that data could be obtained to evaluate the venturi.
It was determined that these changes did nots (i) inorcase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evsluated in the safety Analysis Report since this temporary alteration changed the devioo that provided the feed flow signal to a device identical to the original. No functioral changes to the rWC8 or COLS8 resulted from this alteration; or, (11) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the fiafety Analysic Report since this change did not affect the instrument meaeurement loop configuration with the exception of replacing the transmitter w! th an identical model; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since this alteration did not affect the margins of safety for colas as defined in the Technical specification bases.
ANO 2 TM: M 2 0M Food Flcw Sign 31 to Plcnt ComputOr This tosporary alteration provided a plant computer point to trend the foodwater flow off of transmitter 2rT-1029. This sodification provided an indication loop through the use of a power supply and an existing computer point.
This new loop was used for indication only; therefore, no changes to the food water control l system and Core operating Limit supervisory systest (COLss) were introduced by this alteration.
i It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipamnt important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this feedwater flow signal was for indication only, thus no controls or input to colas were affected and this indication loop was non-Q and did not interfere with any safety equipment; or, (11) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysie Rerort since no safety related equipment was involved or affected by this temporary alterations or, (111) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical spaolfication since there were no margins reinted to this indication loop defined in the Technical j
specification bases.
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ANO 2 TM: M 2-004 Removal cf Hain Turbito 80tback cn Main read Pump Trip l
This toeporary alteration reseved the main turbine setback on a main feed water pusy trip and installed a smulti-point recorder to monitor the setback and alarm circuits. Manual operator action was available to reduoe turbine load within the capability of a single feedpump. Tha smulti-point recorder had high input resistance so there was no impact to the circuits being monitored. A ground isolating transformer was used to power the recorder.
It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence os consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipsesnt important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the current design with an automacio setback of the main turbine to Sol power relies on operator action to prevent a trip of the unit on low steam generator level, controle were put in place to ensure correct response to the loss of a single feedpumps or, (11) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Itapors since possible malfunctions such as inadvertent setback or failure to setback remained bounded by existing SAR evaluations; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specifications sinoe there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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l ANO 2 TM: 97 2404 Temporcry Firo Pump Instcllution This temporary alteration connected a temporary motor driven fire pump located on the lower grating at the east end of the Unit 2 Intake Structure to the test header located outside the Unit 1 Intake structure.
The connection was made via hoses routed outside these structures.
The pump provided a supplemental supply of lake water to the Fire System to allow use of Fire system water for alternate cooling water supply during the 2R12 r6 fueling outage.
Use of the temporary fire pump eliminated the need to operate the normal fire pumps, preventing undue 4
wear.
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It was determined that these changes did nott (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this temporary alteration did not affect system performance or reliability, did not cause the systen, to be operated outside of its design limits, and did not affect any system interface in any ways or, (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since supplemental water supplied by a temporary fire pump did not affect the Fire Protection system's capability to perform in accordance with the design requirements as evaluated in the SAR and did not create any new modes of failures or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
ANO 2 TC: 97 2 007 Temporary C oling Cator to tho Auxilicry Building ExtOncion Chiller This tarporary alteration provided a supplemental fire water supply to the Auxiliary Building Extension Chilled Water systesa to provide necessary area cooling to the Outage control Cantor and the Cheadstry Lab Radioisotope Count i
Room during Refueling Outage 2R12. A toeporary cooling connection was made to fire hose station 2HR-74 located at elevation 335' in the Auxiliary Building Extension outside of the chiller equipement room.
The normal Auxiliary cooling Water (ACW) piping was removed from the chiller condenser and temporary hoses were installed.
A temporary fire water pump was installed, under Temporary Alteration 97-2-006, to prevent unaue wear on the perinanent fire pu:.ps.
It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probasility of occurrence or consequcnce of an aooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since no safety related system piping was altered and no safety function was affected by the installation or use of this tosporary alteration. Connection of the Fire Water system to the Chilled Water system did not degrade safety system component capability or reliability; or, l
(11) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the temporary cooling water hoses connecting the Fire Water system to the chiller unit were located within the Auxiliary Building Extension structure which is in an area such that failure would not have affected any safety related equigments or, (Ali) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification
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ANO 2 TM: 97 2-004 Hoso Connosts tr. co Dicchargo of tho C ndencoto Stercgo T0nk Recycle Pumps This temporary alteration installed a temporary fire hose to the 18akeup Water and Domineralisation system. A three inch blind flange at a service connection was removed and a ninety degree pipe elbow wa.) installed to the existing pipe along with several other fittings and a fire hose.
Water was drawn from the "B" Condensate storage Tank (cst) and pumped to the final location via pumps 2P-195A and 2P-1955.
The water content of the "A" CST was completely isolated from the recycle system and the teuporary alteration.
It wa: determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of ooourrence or consequence of an socident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report sinoe the "A" Cs?
is normally aligned to the Erw system as the preferred water supply. Any other condensate water needs are normally supplied by the "B"
cst.
This temporary alteration used the "B" CST as a water source and the "A" CST was isolated from the "B" cst and the recycle portion of the Unit 2 Hakeup and Cominera11:ation systesa; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since a loss of CST inventory due to a break in the temporary water line was bounded by the accident analysis describing a couplete loss of CET inventory; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the operability of the CST was not inesoted or reduced by this temporary alteration.
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Temporcry Pow 2r P noio to Support Hoicturo Coparator Reh03 tor Hodifications This toeporary alteration provided power to tosporary power panels located beside each Unit 2 Wolsture ssparator Reheater (WSR) to support 2R12 work on the WSRs. This modification utilized spare breakers in Load Center 238.
r It was deterained that these changes did nott (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipment Asportar& to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report sinoe the affected load center was not used te power any equipment important to safety and sufficient breaker protection existed to isolate any fault conditions or, f
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previounay in the safety Analysis Peport since the breakers were tested prit,r to use to ensure correct operations or, (iii) reduoe the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification sinoe all equipeent was operated within normal operating limits.
ANOs2 TM? 97 2 014 2D33 TemporOry P:wcr 8:urce During 2C5 Buo OutOg3 This temporary alteration disconnected the 2D33 black battery charger normal power source cables from the battery charger and connected toeporary power cables fed frosa a non-1E load center. This modification was performed to keep 2D33 in servloe while the normal power supply was out of servloe for maintenanoe.
It was determined that these changes did nott (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequenoa nf an sooident or malfunction of equipement important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the temporary power source provided the same voltage and current as the permanent souroe.
Changing the pcwer source did not alter or invalidate any assumptions snade in previously evaluated SAR accidents; or, (ii) increase the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysts Report since the toeporary power source was evaluated with respect to voltage, current, and protective features and the soaroe breaker, cables, and installation emothod were determined to be consistent with norsnet equipment specifications and design standards; or, (iii) reduoe the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable snargins of safety defined in the Technical specification tsases.
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ANO 2 TM: 97 2 016 St am Supply Icelotien Volva Locked in tho Open Position This temporary alteration provided for steam supply isolation valve 2CV-4439 in the Regenerativw Waste Processing system to be mechanically looked in the open position with the cperator removed and the assoainted limit switch out of service. Manual isolation was available using 2Ms-40.
It was determined that these changes did natt (i) increase the probability of onourrence or consequence of an mooident or malfune*' '. of equi ament isportant to safety l
evaluated in the s #,y Analysis Report since (CV-4439 was not credited with anitiating or mitigating any previously analysed accident at.d does not provide isolation to equissment isportant to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this modification was bounded by existing socident analyses; or, (iii) reduce the margin u? safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification
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--,4 SECTION IV MISCELLANEOUS EVALUATIONS
ANO 2 CALC: 90E009707 Low Temperature Overprecsure ProtOction (LTOP) for 21 Effcetivo I
Full Power Years In this evaluation, the peak transient pressure in the design basis pressurization event was compared with the applicable LTOP P-T limits to verify that the existing Technical specification Reactor coolant system heatup and cooldown rate limitations remained conservative. The applicable LTOP P-T limits were developed using guidance provided in AsMF, Code Case N-514, for t'.no following rates c:asy rate of 80 degrees / hour for heatup, ramp rates of 100, 60, and 25 degrees / hour for cooldwn, and step change rates of 50, 30, and 12.5 degrees / hour in any half hour persed,.dso for cooldown.
Affected SAR sections:
5.2.1.4, 5 2.2.4, C 5.13.2 It was determined that these chang"as did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to nafety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the analysis of the LTOP event did net require any changes te the assumptions concerning equipment availability or failure modes; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since no changes in the failure modes of equipment important to safety were assumed in this analysis; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the LTOP anaylsis was performed consistent with the Technical specification requirements und using the same methodology listed in the bases of Technical specification 3/4.4.12.
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ANO 2 CALC; 91E011701 Control R.oom Habitability COncid0 ring Contoinment Lenkogo end Engineered Safety Features Leakage An error was discovered in the portion of the engineering calculation which evaluates contrel Room (cm) doses due to an Engineered safety Features passive component failure (a postulated pusy seal failure occurring 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the Waxianna Hypothetical Accident). A more recent calculation has shown that the drea due to the seal failure should be four tiens higher than that previously determined, so that the total CR thyroid dose incre,ased from 20.6 Rom to 27.2 Pom.
An additional 0.1 Reen dra to containment shine was added, so the total thyroid dose increased from 2 L'i' to 27.3 Rom.
This dose remained within the licensed limit of 30 Ram defined in General Design Criteria (GDC) 19.
Affected SAR Table:
15.1.13-2 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the paobability of occurrence or consequence of an l
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this change was sisply a modtfication of calculation assumptions and no physical modifications to the plant were made.
This increase in dose was considered acceptable since the original design criteria that control room operator doses be within the GDC 19 guidelines was not exceeded; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the increase in dose values did not affect or create any possible accident initiators and did not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Tochical Specification since this increase in dose remained within the requirements of GDC 19.
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ANO-2 CALC: 92E009102 Motor operated Volva Logic calculation This revision was generated in order to provide a central d~nument for all limit switch setting information for Motor operated Valves (Wohl.
This revision removed all information regarding limit switch settings from she electrical schesnatio drawings as part of the calculation revision process since this information is now redundant to the contents of the calculation.
Affected SAR Figure 8.b100 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of ooederence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this revision transferred the setpoint information for limit switches on all WOVs from the drawings to one central document, did not change operating parameters or functions of components required to mitigate the event, and did not physically change components or systems in the plant; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety l
Analysis Report sinos this revision did not modify or change any equipment i e rtant to safety and no new failure modes were introduced; or, j
l (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical spevifloation since the margins of safety that could have been impacted by these drawing changus were reviewed and determined not to be affected.
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ANO 2 CALC: HE001801 Cyclo 13 Coro As00:!Cment Report This revision reflects the results of the Cycle 13 reload analysis. The Cycle 13 Core Assessanent Report describes the overall fuel cycle, core design, and operation. The Cycle 13 core consists of 7( fresh Batch R assemblins and 101 previt,usly irradiated assemblies from Fuel Batches K, N, and P.
The cycle 13 core has been configured to provide longer cycle burnup capability.
In addition, Batch R fuel esploys gadolinia as an integral burnable poison.
The Batch R integral poison pellets contain 6.0 weight percent gadolinia and 94.0 weight percent urania. Dadolinia poisoned cores are characterized by higher intra-assmebly power peaking and more pronounced core average axial power peaks.
Affected SAR Figures t 4.2-3, 4.2-3A, 4.2-4, 4.3-10, 4.3-1A, 4.3-15, 4.3-1C, 4.3-1D, 4.3-1E, 4.3-1F, 4.3-1G, 4.3-2, 4.3-29, 4.3-29A, 4.3-3, 4.3-4, 4.3-5, 4.3-6, 4.3-7, 4.3-0, 4.3-9, 4.5-1 Sections:
4.1, 4.2.1.1.4, 4.2.1.1.5, 4.2.1.2.1, 4.2.1.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2.3, 4.2.1.2.4, 4.2.1.4.3.B, 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2.1, 4.3.2.2.3, 4.3.2.3.2, 4.3.2.5.5, 4.3.3.1.1, 4.4.3.6 Tables:
4.2-1, 4.3-1, 4.3-3, 4.3-4, 4.3-5, 4.3-6, 4.3-6A, 4.3-7, 4.4-2 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the Cycle 13 core design has been evaluated and compared to the revised chapter 15 accident analyses assunctions and remains bounded. All equipment important to safety will function in the same manner with the Cycle 13 reload core as with the previous reload configuration; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since no new intiators or accidents were introduced by the Cycle 13 reload. There were no new system interactions or connections associated with the Cycle 13 core reload; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases of any Technical specification since the core design has been evaluated consistent with the margins as prescribed in the bases of the Technical Specifications.
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ANO-2 CALC: ME003101 ReanSlycio of Subcritical CEAW with CorrCction for Log Pow 0r Channel Decalibration This calculation revised the description and inpats to the Control Element Assembly withdrawal (CEAW) from suberitical Conditions event to address the decalibration of the logarithmic power channels.
Affected SAR Figures 15.1.1-1, 15.1.1-1A, 15.1.1-13, 15.1.1-2, 15.1.1-2A, 15.1.1-25, 15.1.1-3, 15.1.1-3A, 15.1.1-33, 15.1.1-4, 15.1.1-4A, 15.1.1-43 sections:
15.1.1.1, 15.1.1.2.1, 15.1.1.2.2, 15.1.1.2.3 Tables:
15.1.0-1, 15.1.1-1A, 15.1.1-13, 15.1.1-2A, 15.1.1-23 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the remnalysis of the Uncontrolled CEAW from suboritical Condition event due to the higher analytical setpoint did not require any changes to the assusptions concerning equipment availability or failure modes; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfanction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the reanalysis of the Uncontrolled CEAW from subcritical conditions with the revised analytical trip setpoint did not require new equipment or alter the way in which the plant is operated. The analysis of this event did not assume an additional failure mode other than what had already been analysed; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases explicitly associated with the Boron Dilution event er the high log power trip setpoint.
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ANO-2 CALC: ME003102 l
l H3t ZOro P wor /Subcritical Control Element Ascambly Uithdrawal Analysis This revision to the SAR incorporated the Hot Eero Power a.nd subcritical Control l
Element Assembly (CEA) Withdrawal analyses.
These analyses were assessed for Cycle 13 including up to 304 steam generator tube plugging and a 10% reduction i
in Reactor coolant system flow using the NRC approved CENTS methodology. All input assusptions and methods were consistent with or conservative with respect to the current Technical specifications.
Affected SAR sections:
15.1.1.4, 15.1.1.4.1, 15.1.1.4.2, 15.1.2.4, 15.1.2.4.1, 15.1.2.4.1.1 Tables:
15.1.1-4, 15.1.1-5, 15.1.1-6, 15.1.2-5, 15.1.2-7 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of eqaipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since these analyses did not require any revisions to either plant operations or plant equipment; or (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the changes to these analyses did not require any changes to the assumptions concerning equipment availability or failure modes; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases..
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ANO 2 CALC: HR201502 Cyclo 13-Coro Operating Limito Report This evaluation revised the maximum Linear Heat Rate to consider the effects of moderator voiding do. ring the Loss of coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis as described in the large break LOCA evaluation model topical report. The initial calculation which produoea the current Energy Redistribution Factors (ERFs) did not properly consider the effects of moderator voiding. When voiding was considered, the energy deposition in the hot rod was underpredicted by 1.5%.
Therafore, with the higher ERF and the desire not to change the peak clad t age rature, the linear neat rate limit needed to be lowered.
1 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment i g ortant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this change did not involve any changes in equipment and did not alter any assumptions concerning the availability or failure modes of any equipment; or, 1
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change was in an operating limit and will ensure the unit is operated in a manner consistent with assumptions used in the safety analysis; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any l
Technical specification sinos. this reduction to the maximum l
linear heat rate limit ' shen the core operating Limits i
supervisory system is out of service was necessary due to an error found in the ERFs.
With the higher ERF, the linear heat rate limit was lowered to ensure the peak tageratures of the fuel cladding stays below 2200 degrees.
This change did not ig aot eithee the uncertainty or penalty factors, therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases for ary Technical specification was not reduced.
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ANO 2 CR: C 96-0048 Hydrog n Gen 0rction Analycio The revised hydrogen generation analysis desmonstrates the acceptable sizing of the hydrogen recombiner equipment. The changes address the higher corros!.on rates of hydrogen producing materials as a result of higher assumed pH values of post Loss of coolant Accident (IbcA) spray and sump solutions. Additionally, changes to the assumed quantities of hydrogen producing materials have also been incorporated.
Affected SAR Figures:
6.2-25, 6.2-25A, 6. 2.'5B Section:
6.2.5.3.1 Tables:
6.2-20, 6.2-29 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since these changes in the assumed values for material corrosion rates and quantities of. hydrogen producing materials in containment had no effect on the accident initiating mechanisms for any analyzed event, did not require any changes to the plant equipment or produce any new or different operating conditions, and continued to demonstrate that the hydrogen recombiner equipment is adequately sized; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since these changes in the assumed values for material corrosion rates and quantities of hydrogen producing materials in containment did not require any changes to existing plant equipment, did not require any new plant equipenent, and did not produce any new or different operating conditions; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the results of the new analysis continued to demonstrate that the hydrogen recombiner equipment is adequately sized.
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I ANO2 CR: C-66-0227 l
Control Room Halon Concentration l
This change corrected the Halon concentrations in the combined Unit 1 and Unit 2 control Room area atmospheres. The stated Halon percentage of 0.216 was based on a total discharge of the Halon system with subfloor covers resnoved, falso oeiling tiles removed, and no ventilation or leakage existing.
Fire Protection engineering has evaluated this situation with calculation 95-E-0085-01 and concluded that the actual concentration under the same circumstances will be 1.966.
The higher coamentration number reflects the worst possible case.
Even though the new concentration is higher than the number previously stated in the SAR, it is still well below what is considered to be a safe level.
Affected SAR section:
9.4.1.1.2 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the Halon i
System was not evaluated as an accident initiator, this change did not alter the configuration, operation, or capability of the Halon system, and this change did not impact any equipment important to safety; or, l
l (11) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a l
different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change did not ispact the capability of the Halon system to perform its intended function and did not introduce any new failure modes; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification sir.co there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification baseu.
ANO-2 CR: 2 M-0122 Emerg:ncy DiccOl GenOrctor Concumption RatOc This change reflects the current fuel oil consumption and fuel oil limits calculation for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). This change states that the capacity of one Emergency storage Tank plus one EDG Day Tank would provide a sufficient supply of fuel oil for one EDG for at least three and one half days at its maximum continuous rating and that the total emergency fuel oil supply is sufficient to operate one EDG at least seven days at its maximum continuous rating.
This change also corrected the storage capacity of the day tanks to state that each day tank will have a low level alarm capacity sufficient to power an EDG at 110% of its maximum continuous rated load for a period of at least 60 minutes, ruel oil st.pply requirements under a 50% load rating were also changed to state that the fuel oil supply from one Emergency Storage Tank and one Day Tank will be sufficient to run one EDG for at least 7 days.
Affected SAR Section:
9.5.4.1 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since these fuel oil limits remained within the limits set forth by ANSI 59.51 and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.137.
This change in fuel oil consunption and fuel oil limits did rot impact the operability of the EDGs; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since these changes did not impact the function of the system or introduce the possibility of any new malfunctions of equipment important to safety, ruel oil limits remained within the limits set forth by ANSI (9.51 and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.137; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
ANO-2 CR: 2-96 0176 Auxilicry Sprcy Lino Volvo A review of design criteria determined that this Auxiliary spray Line Valve was not required to be locked closed.
The valve's administrative designation was changed frees a " locked closed" valve to a " closed" valve in 1985.
The valve's handswitch was subsequently snodified from a keyswitch to a modulating type handswitch with no looking capability in 1988. The asodulating handswitch reduced the potential for thermal shock of the spray nossle. The valve was not required to meet GDC 55 criteria for this penetration.
This revision changed the valve description in order to reflect the current plant configuration.
J Affected SAR section:
5.2.1.8.2 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this auxiliary spray line was not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the accidents previously analysed in the SAR and the charging system still functioned as designed with an enhanced pressure control function when required? or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification to the auxiliary spray l
valve actuator enhanced the function of the auxilaary spray valve and did not create any new modes of failures or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
e ANO-2 CR: 2-944188 StSrtup Cnd Clowdown Demincroliz0r Syctem Volvoc I
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- This revision added two startup and 31owdown Domineraliser system valves to the l
' appropriate drawing to reflect plant configuration. These valves, a drain valve l
and a vent valve, were shown on the isomstria drawings, but were inadvertently left off of the P&ID.
Affected SAR Figure 10.4-7 It was determined that these changes did not (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accidant or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since these valves were not cradited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analysed accidents and are not relied upon by equipment important to saf6.ty; or, (ii) increase the poss.bility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since there were no new conditions or plant operating practices resulting from this change that could cause a new or different type accident than those already evaluated in the sAR; or,
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(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in Technical specification bases.
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ANO-2 CR: 2 96 0198 Steam Generator 31cwdown to tho Reg 0norctivo Wocto Man 0getaent System l
This change describes additional systesa capabilities affecting the steaa Generator Blowdown and Regenerative Waste systems installed by Plant changes (PCs) 95-8023 and 95-0056.
Pc 95-8023 installed two valves and the necessary piping for cross-oonnecting the steam Generator Blowdown systeen with the inactive Regenerative Waste Transfer system.
This installatior. provided a direct means of diverting blowdown to the regenerative waste holdup tanks without having to transfer the blowdown water to the tanks via the startup and Riowdown Denninwralizers.
Thir. modification allowed for storage and processing of steam generator water in the event pH and/or activity was outside established limits for discharge without having to prematurely expend one or both blowdown desmineralisers. Pc 95-8066 installed two valves, piping, and instrumentaton connections in the inactive Regenerative Waste Transfer system in order to allow the stesan Generator Blowdown water to be discharged to the Unit 1 circulating Water flums while being continuously monitored via existing pH, radioactivity, and flow instrumentation.
Affected SAR sections:
10.3.5, 10.4.10.2, 10.4.9.1, 10.4.8.2.2, 11.2.2.3, 11.2.3, 11.2.7 It was determined that these changes did nott l
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an socident er malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since neither of the afCseted systems was credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analyzed accident scenarios and neither system is considered isportant to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Rs wrt sinoe possible line breaks in tha piping affected by this modification have only operational significance and can be isolated without a*fecting the safety of the plant; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases for either of the af*ected systems.
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- ANO-2 CR: 2-97 00M
-U o of H:ndwheelo i-This revision to the sAR clarified t14 use of handwheels on the spent ruel Pool l
Bridge and Refueling Bridge.- Manual operation of the bridge, trolley, and hoist for both the Refueling Bridge and the spent ruel Pool Bridge has been a gone.lal prat;tioe and procedurally directed for many refueling outages. -
Affected SAR Sections
. 9.1.4.2.1, 9.1.4.2.9 It was determined that these changes did nott (i) _ increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an j
accident or malfunction of equipment'important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since administrative restrictions provide adequate ocaspensatory i
measures. This change will not allow the assemblias to be put in any configuration that would lead to accident consequences in excess of what is analysed in the SAR, and
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manual operation of the refueling equipment did not change the operating characteristics of any safety related equipment or systems; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report sinoe taking zianual control of the bridge, trolley, or hoist within the limits defined in the SAR will not put any equipment outside the boundary analyzed in the SAR; or, (iii) reduos the margin of safety as defined f.n the basis of any Technical Specification since manual outward motion by use of the winch handwheels in the core region will be administratively prohibited, i
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ANO 2 CR: 2 H4330 Prcssurizor PrCasuro TrancmittOrc This revision te the safety Analysis Report and the Fire Hazards Analysis was made to resolve discrepancies concerning the as-found condition of conduit dJ2010 and to include two unscheduled connected pull bones.
The Safe Shutdowa Capability Assessment (8scA) was also revised concerning certain p::essuriser transmitters to ensure that the SSCA agreed with the NRC granted exenption to the requirements of Appendix R and the Fire Jazards Analysis. The exasption (OCNA038328) was based on a partial radiant energy shield, spatial separation, and no intatvening combustibles. While the level transmitters were not covered by the exemption, the technical basis was comunensurable.
Affected SAR Fi;;ure 9.3-70 2t was determined that these changes did nots
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(i) increase the probability of coonrrence or consequence of an j
aooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety i
evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this correction did not change, degrado, or prevent any actions assumed in the previously analysed accident scenarios and did not change the function of any systems or couponents; or, (ii) increase the possiblity for an accident or malfunction of a difforent type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since no mechanisms were created that would onuse an sooident of a different type than those previously evaluated; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since these changes were not physical j
in nature and did not alter any equipment.
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- 40 2' CR: 2 07 4070 Compon:nt_ Cooling Wator Supply Droin Volvo t
This drawing revision corrected the actual position of the component cooling Water (CCW) supply drain valve in relation. to the supply isolation and the:
Safety Injection and shutdown Cooling sasple'oooler, i
Affected SAR Figure 9.2-6 It was determined that these changes did nets (1) increase the probability of ooourrence er consequence of an aoaldent or malfunction of equipment important to safety l
evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the oorrection of the valve position did not reduce the performanoe or availability of the CCW system and did not increase the probability of equipment malfunction; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an socident or malfunction of a j
different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the function of the CCW system as it relates to the safety Injection and shutdown Cooling masp3e cooler was not changed from that originally designed and no new or unanalysed variables were introduced by this configuration correction which would pose a change or increase in equipment malfunction; or, (iii) - reouco the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable j
margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO 2 CR: 247 0140 Refu0 ling Proceso D0ccription This revision to the SAR modified a basio desoription of the refueling process in the soution en erroneous placement or orientation of fuel assemblies to more acourately correspond with esisting procedures and practices.
Affected SAR section:
15.1.15.1.2 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of ooourrence or consequence of an socident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Deport since these sanges were primarily editorial and intended to preclude misinterpretation; or.
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any avauated previously in the safety Analy. sis steport since all equipment important to safety which is associated with fuel handling and fuel movement was praviously considered in the analysed socident scenarios; or, (iii) reduos the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification sinca there were no applicable
' margins of safety defined in the Technical specification baces.
ANO 2 DRN: M 02536 Control Room VCntilOtien Exhtust Fcn This drawing revision depicts the as-built configuration of the control Rooae ventilation eahaust fan flow switch across the fan and its outlet danper.
The original drawing showed the flow swf tch across the fan only.
This switch provides an alaria and automatically starts the redundant exhaust fan on loss of flow..
Affected AAR Figure 9.4-1 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment Laportant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since tLe. difference in routing of the sense lines did not affect the operation of the flow switches, the Control Room Ventilation System can not initiate a design basis accident, and this system was not credited with mitigating any previously evaluated accident; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this system does not inpact any safety-related equipment; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as d3 fined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO 2 DRN: H 04410
. Solenoid Volvo Equivalency An equivalency evaluation for solenoid valves in the Turbine Building Heating Ventilation & Air Conditioning (HVAC) control systems was performed. The P&ID for that system listed the manufacturer and model numbers of the pneumatio components used in the system. This change removed a note, the references to Powers Regulator Company, and the associated model numbers in the adapter tables. The note indicated that the instrument numbers in the tables were for reference only; however, over the last few years several different models have been installed making the inforination inaccurate and possibly confusing.
Affected SAR Figuret 9.4-3 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the changes to pneumatio components in the Turbine Building NVAC system were evaluated as being equivalent to the components originally installed. Removal of the model number details from the SAR figure did not change the system function, configuration, or operation; or, j
(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since replacement of pneumatic couponents in the Turbine Building HVAC fystem, as evaluated, and removal of model number details from the sAR figure did not change
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the characteristics of the system and did not produce any new accident initiators; or (iii) reduce the margin of rafety as defined in the bacis of any Technical specification since the Technical specifications did not contain any margin of safety criteria associated with the Turbine Building HVAC system operation.
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ANO-2 DRN: M-06002 Pict Plcn Grounding & Und0rgrOund L ycut This revision added an underground conduit to allow electrical power to be run from a power distribution pad to a disconnect +. hat will provide power to a mobile air oospressor located in tho yard area, other existing underground conduits from the distribution pad were added te the appropriate drawing to show approximate locations. The feed for the distribution pad comes from an offsite 13.SkV feed via switchboard P28.
Affected SAR Figuret 8.3-53 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipsment isgorsant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report sinoe installation of the buried conduit and cable did not impact any equipment or systems credited with initiating or mitigating any of the accident scenarios analyzed in the SAR; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfur.atian of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the installation of this conduit was from an offsite power source and had no ties to any plant safety related or non safety related cosponents, systems, I
or structures; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable j
s.argins of safety defined in the Technical specification l
bases.
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ANO 2 LDCR:
Componcnt Cooling WatOr, Loop II Londo This SAR revision added Loop II component Cooling water (CCW) loads that have been in existence since the initial design of the plant. Also, a statement was deleted indicating the periodio sonfirmation of the heat transfer capabilities of the CCW heat exchangers. While the ability of the heat exchangers to perform their function is confirmed by system Engineering using various monitored parameters, the direct measurement of heat transfer as implied by the SAR has not been performed.
Affected SAR sections:
9.2.2, 9.2.2.4 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this change did not reduce the performance or availability of the CCW system and associated equipment and the CCW heat exchangers do not contribute to functions which are considered important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for en accident or malfunction of a differont type than any enluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since no new or unconsidered variables were introduced by this change that could increase the probability of equipment malfunctions or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification 1
bases.
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Containment PcnOtration Barricro This sAR revision corrected inconsistencies between similar penetrations and systems that led to confucion regarding containment penetration barriers. This revision changed the designation of 21A-08 and 2IA-89 for penetration 2P61 as being isolation boundaries located outside containment instead of the previous designe. tion as closed system boundaries.
In addition, this change deleted the type "C"
test for 2rF-35 to reflect the actual testing credited under the current program.
Affected SAR Table:
6.2-26 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment importar?, to safety evaluated in the safety Analysir Report since the change of the designated barriers for containment had no relationship to the initiation of accidents and the change of the teste:1 boundary indentification or the specified testing did not increase the dose consequences or a malfunction of equipment important to si.foty; or (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change had no effect on the physical containment barriers themselves, no new testing methods were proposed, and the possibility of a malfunction i
of equipment important to safety of a different type than that already evaluated in the SAR was not created; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since nothing in the Technical specification bases stated any specific margins of safety associated with these containment isolation barriers that were reduced by the designation of boundaries or testing performed.
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ANO 2 LDCR:
Asynenetric Steam Gencrotor Tronoicnt Analycio with Cyclo 13 Physics and 10% Reactor Coolant System Flo's Reduction This SAR change incorporated the Asysunctric Steam Generator Transient analysis assessed for cycle 13 performed with the new CENTS methodology. This analysis was essentially consistent with the analysis previously documented in the SAR exoept for the new bounding physica data, 106 reduction in Reactor Coolant System (RCS) flow, Main Steam safety Valve tolerance, 306 tube plugging, initial power rating, initial RCS pressure, and other variations in the trip setpoint.
Affected SAR sections:
15.1.36-3, 15.1.36.3.1 Tables:
15.1.36-3, 15.1.36-4 It was determined that these changes dH nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an socident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since all assumptions used were consistent or conservative with respect to the current Technical specifications.
There were no new systems, components, substructures, design changes, physical alterations, or operating procedure changes resulting from this change; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malivnetion of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since there were no physical changes to the plant and the methods used were approved methods utilized in a manner consistent with their approval; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the results of this analysis, which utilized specific Technical Specifications or core operating Limit Report limits, were considered acceptable with respect to the bases for these specifications.
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ANO 2 LDCR:
l Generic ' Letter 92-01, Revision 1, Supplement 1 Re::ponco
'the purpose of Generic Idstter 92-01, Revision 1, supplement 1 was to require licensees to identify, collect, and report any new data pertinent to the i
analysis of the structural integrity of their reactor pressure vessels and to assess the impact of that data on thJ integrity analyses relative to the requirements of 10crR50.60, 10CrR50.61, Appendioes G and H of 10CTR50, and any potential impact on low tosperature overpressure (LTOP) limits er pressure /tesperature limits. This report compiled all the required information to address the aquirements of the generic letter for ANO-2.
As part of the effort to fulfill the requirements of the generic letter, additional information related to the chemistry of the beltline vessel plates was identified.
The results of this new data led to the declaration of a different plate being the limiting material for the ANO-2 vessel. Because of this declaration, additional evaluations related to the integrity of the vessel were performed.
These evaluations include revising the fluence estimates, PTM, UfE, and past operability.
Affected SAR sections:
5.2.3.1, 5.2.4.3, 5.2.4.4.2 Table:
5.2-20 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of o, urrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of eq c nsnt important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report sinoa these changes i
did not require any changes to plant equipment or plant 1
-operations and the evaluations were performed to confirm the integrity of the reactor vessel in accordance with regulations; or, (ii) increase the psreibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the evaluation of the vessel integrity did not require any changes to the assumptions concerning equipment availability or failure modes; or, (iii) reduce the raargin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the evaluations that were performed due to the chemistry values changing demonstrate that the new ARTS and fluence values are less than the values listed in the bases of Technical Specification 3/4.4.9.
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ANO 2 LDCR:
Main Steam Line Break Analysis, Cycle 13 This revision to the SAR incorporated the new Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) aralysis for cycle 13.
The Cycle 13 analysis is essentially consistent with the previous analysis except for the new bounding physics data, consideration of up to 304 steam generatoe tube plugging, niscellaneous input changes, 3-D ROCS and MrJerITE orodit for reactivity feedback, 3-D ROCS estientes for Fq, credit for Reactor Coolant System pressure predicted by CEWTS, HRISE calc.ulations of thermal margin, and the use of CENTS.
A sensitivity study was perform d in the analysis effort to determine whether fast reactor trips or slow reactor trips were conservative.
The results of this sensitivity study indicated that the current approach of using slow reactor trips was conservative, therefore, the slow trip analysis results were presented as the limiting cases.
Affected SAR Figures:
15.1.14-111, 15.1.14-112 sections:
15.1.14.1.4.3, 15.2 Tablem:
15.1.*.4-32, 15.1.14-33, 1%.1.14-34, 15.1.14-35, 15.1.14-36 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of oco trrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equapment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analyske Report since all assusqptions used were consistent or conservative with respect to the current Technical Specifications and there were no new systems, cosponents, sulstructures, design changes, physical alterations, or operating procedures proposed by this change; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since there were no physical char.ges to the plant and the analysis methods used.were approved methods utilised in a manner consistent with their approval; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical sper.ification since the analysis assumptions utilised were conservitive with respect to the current Technical specificaton and Core operating Limits Report limits.
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Control Element Assembly EjcctiCn An31y010 This revision to the SAR incorporated the new Control Elesment Assembly (CEA)
Ejection analysis. The CEA Ejection analysis was assessed for Cycle 13 including up to 30% steam generator tube plugging and a 10% reduction in Reactor Coolant system (RCs) flow.
This assessment was performed in accordance with the NRC approved CENPD-190-A, which uses the STRIKIN-II code.
The use of RCS flow at a value 206 lower than the current Technical specification limit was a conservative input assumption.
Affected SAR Sections:
15.1.20.2.2.2, 15.1.20.3, 15.1.20.4, 15.1.20.4.1, 15.1.20.4.2, 15.1.20,4.3, 15.1.20.4.4 Tables:
15.1.20-10, 15.1.20-11, 15.1.20-12, 15.1.20-13, 15.1.20-14, 15.1.20-15, 15.1.20-16, 15.1.20-17 It was determined that these chaages did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment impottant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the purpose cf this change was to implement the bounding CEA Ejection analysis assumptions and results.
This analysis did not require any changes to plant equipment or operations; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the analysis of the CEA Ejection event did not require new equipment or alter the way in which the pinnt is operated. This analysis did not assume failure modes different than those previously analysed; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the CIA Ejection analysis was performed consistent with Technical specification requirements, NRC epproved methods as listed in the Core Operating Limits Report reference list, and in a manner consistent with their approval.
e ANO LDCR:
Conductor Replocement' 2
-This modification replaced a grounded conductor in a cable between 2351F2 and 2CV-5003-1 with a spare conductor in the same cable. The replacement conductor functions eaaotly as;the original and only the color of the conductor was l
ohanged.
Affected SAR Figure 0.3-100 It was detetsmined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of ooourrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report ainoe the replacement conductor functions exactly as the original and only the color of the conductor was changed; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a i
different type than any evaluated previously in the safety l
Analysis Report since'the fonction of the conductor was not l
degraded as a result of this modification; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the replacement of the shorted j
conductor with a spare conductor did not degrade the original l
design basis of the' electrical connectice.
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ANO 2 LDC2:
Loss of Feedwat0r Analysis This revision updated the SAR with the new 1.oss of Teodwater analysis.
This cycle 13 analysis, which is aise bounding for cycle 12, is con de**nt with the analysis previously docusesnted in the SAR emoept for the new k e acng physica data, tot reduction in Reactor Coolant systeen flow, Esmorgency Foodwater flow and response time, Main steism Safety Valve toleranoe, and other small variations in initial conditions, yhe assosament was perforu d with the new CENTS j
methodology.
Affected SAR Figures 1r 1.0-1D, 15.1.0-4 sections:
15.1.0.2.1, 15.1.0.2.2, 15.1.0.2.3, 15.1.0.3, 15.1.0.4, 15.1.0.6.10, 15.1.k.2.2, 15.1.9.3, 15.1.0.4, 15.1.8.4.1, 15.2 l
Tables:
15.1.0-1, 15.1.0-3, 15.1.0-4 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) incrosse the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipement important to safety l
evaluated in the safety Analysis Eeport since there were no new systems, components, substructures, design changes, physical alterations, or operating procedure changes resulting fross this changer or, (11) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change did not result in any physical changes to the plant. The analysin methods used were approved methods utilised in a manner ornaistent with their approval; or, (iii) reduoe the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the analg ais aesturptions l
utilised were conservative with respect to the current Technical specifications and Core Operating Limit Reports limi ts.
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ANO2 LDCM:
Loco of Coolcnt vecuum Analycis with Cyclo 13 Physics This change to the SAR incorporated the new Loss of Condenser Vacuum analysis i
assessed for Cycle 13 including up to 304 steam Generator (80) tube plugging and a 100 reduction in Reactor Coolant system flow.
This analysis is essentially consistent with the analysis previously documented in th sAR except for the new bounding physlos data and consideration of up to 306 so tube plugging.
The analysis was performed with CENTS, an NRC approved method. The use of the CINTs method resulted in some of the current input parunater assumptions being slightly non-conservative. Those input assumptions were changed in the Cycle 13 analysis to provide conservative results.
Affected sAR sections:
15.1.7.4, 15.1.7.4.1 Tables:
15.1.7-3, 15.1.7-4 It was determined that these changea did nots (1) increase the probability oc occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipsont important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since all assumptions used were consistent or conservative with respect to the current Technical specifications. There were no new systems, co sponen ts, substructures, design changes, physical alterations, or operatang procedure changes resulting from this analysis; or, (11) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since there were no physical changes to the plant and the snethods used were apprcreed niethods s tilized in a manner consistent with their approval; or, (iii) reduce ^he margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the results of this analysis, which utilized specific Technical specifications or Core operating Limits Report limitt were considered acceptable with respect to the bases for w.eae specifications.
ANO2 LDCRt i
Feedw3 tor Lino Crook An31yois This change updated the SAR with the new Foodwater Line Break (rMLB) analysis assessed for Cycle 13.
The Cycle 13 analysis, which is also bounding for Cycle 12, is consistent with the analysis previously documented in the sAR except for, i
the new bounding physics data and consideration of up to 306 steam generator tube plugging and a 10% reduntion in Reactor Coolant system (RCs) flew.
The assessment was peri ermed with the new CI:NTS enthodology. A sensitivity study waJ performed in the analysis effort which determined that the peak RCs pressure was determined based on nominal RCs flow and no plugged steam generator tubes.
The impact of RCs flow showed no effect on the peak pressure.
Affected SAR rigures 15.1.14-50, 15.1.14-81, 15.1.14-82, 15.1.14-83, 1C.1.14-04 section:
15.1.14.2.4.2 Tables:
15.1.14-24, 15.1.14-25 It was determined that these changes did nott (i) increase the probability of occurrences or consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety l
evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since all assumptions used were consistent or conservative with respect to the current Technical specifications.
There were no new systems, components, substructures, design changes, physical alterations, or operating procedure changes introduced by this analysis; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the analysis methods used were approved methods utilised in a manner consistent with their approval.
This analysis did not introduce any new modes of failure for equipment important to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the analysis assunptions utilized were conservative with respect to the currant Technical specification and Core operating Limits Report limits.
AN012
(.DCR:
Large Croak Loss cf coolcnt Accident Analyois with 304 Stcam Generator Tube Plugging and 10% Reactor Coolant System Flow Reduction This revision updated the SAR with the new Large Break Loss of coolant Accident (La1DCA) calculation. The limiting LBIhCA break sina was reassessed for Cycle 13 including 304 stessa generator tube plugging and a lot reduction in Reactor Coolant systeen (RCS) flow.
All of the analysis methods used were consistent with those identified in the SAR which are the latest NRC approved AEB-CE LEIOCA methods. The results of the input assusptions into this analysis have resultoC in a sixteen degree Fahrenheit increase in the Peak Cladding Tesperature (PCT) and an increase of 0.1474 in the maximum core-wide oxidation value.
The new PCT 215s degree and the manianaan core-wide oxidation 0.996 are both within the acceptance criteria of 2200 degrees and 14.
Affected SAR Figures:
6.3-17I, 6.3-17J, 6.3-17K, 6.3-17L, 6.3-17H, 6.3-17N, 6.3-170, 6.3-17P, 6.3-17Q, 6.3-17R, 6.3-178, 6.3-17T, 6.3-17U, 6.3-27A, 6.3-27s, 6.3-27C, 6.3-27D.1, 6.3-27D.2, 6.3-27E, 6.3-27T, 6.3-270, 6.3-27H, 6.3-271, 6.3-27J, 6.3-27K, 6.3-27L, 6.3-2'N, 6.3-27N, 6.3-270, 6.3-27P, 6.3-27Q, 6..-27R sections:
1.2.2.2, 6.2.1.6.4, 6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.2.1, 6.3.3.2.2.1, 6.3.3.2.2.2, 6.3.3.2.2.3, 6.3.3.2.2.7, 6.3.3.2.5, 6.6 Tables:
4.3-3, 6.3-10, 6.3-14, 6.3-15, 6.3-21, 6.3-24 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipa.snt important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since all assumptions used were consistent or conservative with respect to the current Technical specifications.
Thorn were no ne.t systems, components, substructures, design changes, physical alterations, or operating procedure changes introduced by this change; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an acoident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Ar.alysis Report since this change only affected the sAR LRLOCA analysis assusptions and results. As there were no physical changes to the plant and the sothods used were approved methods utilized in a manner consistent with their approval, the possibility of a malfunction of equipawnt important to safety of a different type than any previously evaluted in the SAR was not created; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the analysis assumptions ut111:ed were conservative with respect to the current Technical specifications and Core operating Limits Report.
ANO.2 LDCR:
15% Stcam Gencrotor Tube Plugging This revision to the SAR incorporated the results from various safety analyses.
The main emphasis of these analyses was to address 15t steam generator tube plugging effects.
All of these analyses were performed with input assumptions consistent with or conservative with respect to the current Technical specification limits.
Affected SAR Figures 15.1.0-1A, 15.1.0-1D, 15.1.0-1c, 15.1.0-3, 15.1.1-1, 15.1.1-1A, 15.1.1-1B, 15.1.1-2, 16.1.1-2A, 15.1.1-28, 15.1.1-3, 15.1.1-3A, 15.1.1-33, 15.1.1-4, 15.1.1-4A, 15.1.1-45, 15.1.14-1, 15.1.14-10, 15.1.14-100, 15.1.14-101, 46.1.14-102, 15.1.14-103, 15.1.14-104, 15.1.14-105, 15.1.14-106, 15.1.14-107, 15.1.14-108, 15.1.14-109, 15.1.14-11, 15.1.14-110, 15.1.14-12, 15.1.14-13, 15.1.14-14, 15.1.14-15, 15.1.14-16, 15.1.14-17, 15.1.14-18, 15.1.14-19, 15.1.14-2, 15.1.14-20, 15.1.14-21, 15.1.14-22, 15.1.14-23, 15.1.14-24, 15.1.14-25, 15.1.14-26, 15.1.14-27, 15.1.14-28, 15.1.14-3, 15.1.14-38, 15.1.14-4, 15.1.14-41, 15.1.14-5, 15.1.14-56, 15.1.14-6, 15.1.%4-68, 15.1.14-65, 15.1.14-7, 15.1.14-70, 15.1.14-71, 15.1.14-72, 15.1.14-73, 15.1.14-74, 15.1.14-75, 15.1.14-76, 15.1.14-77, 15.1.14-78, 15.1.14-79, 15.1.14-0, 15.1.14-80, 15.1.14-01, 15.1.14-82, 15.1.14-03, 15.1.14-84, 15.1.14-85, 15.1.14-86, 15.1.14-87, 15.1.14-88, 15.1.14-89, 15.1.14-9, 15.1.14-90, 15.1.14-91, 15.1.14-92, 15.1.14-93, 15.1.14-94, 15.1.14-95, 15.1.14-96, 15.1.14-97, 15.1.14-98, 15.1.14-99, 15.1.2-1, 15.1.2-10, 15.1.2-2, 15.1.2-3, 15.1.2-4, 15.1.20-7, I
15.1.7-1, 15.1.7-2, 15.1.7-3, 15.1.7-4, 15.1.7-5 sections:
15.1, 15.1.0.1, 15.1.0.2, 15.1.0.2.1, 15.1.0.2.2, 15.1.0.3, 15.1 0.4, 15.1.0.6.1, 15.1.0.6.10, 15.1.0.6.4, 15.1.0.6.7, 15.1.0.6.8, 15.1.0.6.9, 15.1.1, 15.1.1.2.1, 15 1.1.2.2, 15.1.1.3, 15.1.1.4.1, 15.1.1.4.2, 15.1.14, 15.1.14.1, 15.1.14.1.1, 15.1.14.1.2, 15.1.14.1.2.1, 15.1.14.1.2.2.1, 15.1.14.1.2.2.2, 15.1.14.1.2.2.3, 15.1.14.1.3, 15.1.14.1.4, 15.1.14.1.4.1, 15.1.14.1.4.2, 15.1.14.1.4.3, 15.1.14.2, 15.1.14.2.1, lo.1.14.2.2, 15.1.14.2.2.1, 15.1.14.2.2.2, 15.1.14.2.4.2, 15.1.2.1, 15.1.2.2.1, 15.1.2.2.2.1, 15.1.2.2.2.2, 15.1.2.4, 15.1.2.4.1, 15.1.2.4.1.1, 15.1.2.4.2, 15.1.2.4.2.1, 15.1.20.1, 15.1.20.2.2, 15.1.20.4, 15.1.20.4.1, 15.1.20.4.2, 15.1.20.4.3, 15.1.20.4.4, 15.1.36.3, 15.1.36.3.1, 15.1.7.1, 15.1.7.2.1, 15.1.7.2.2, 15.1.7.4, 15.1.7.4.1, 15.1.8.2.2, 15.1.8.3, 15.1.8.4, 15.2, 6.2.1.1.2.6
i ANO.2 LDCR:
I 15% 5tcam Gen 0roter Tube Plugging Tables:
15.1.0-1, 15.1.0-6, 15.1.1-1, 15.1.1-1A, 15.1.1-15, 15.1.1-2, 15.1.1-2A, 15.1.1-25, 15.1.1-3, 15.1.14-10, 15.1.14-14, 15.1.14-17, 15.1.14-18, 15.1.14-19, 15.1.14-2, 15.1.14-20, 15.1.14-23, 15.1.14-24, 15.1.14-25, 15.1.14-26, 15.1.14-27, 15.1.14-28, 15.1.14-29, 15.1.14-3, 15.1.14-30, 15.1.14-31, 15.1.14-4, 15.1.14-5, 15.1.14-6, 15.1.14-7, 15.1.14-8, 15.1.14-9, 15.1.2-1, 15.1.2-2, 15.1.2 3, 15.1.2-5, 15.1.2-6, 15.1.20-10, 15.1.20-11, 15.1.20-12, 15.1.20.13, 15.1.20.14, 15.1.7-1, 15.1.7-2, 4.2-3A, 4.3-3 It was determined that these changes did not I
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or smalfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since there were no new systemas, components, substructures, design changes, physical alteratione, or operating procedure changes as a result of these analyses; or, (ii) i nt/%S the possibility for an accident or smalfunction of a ys Wpp: type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analva.4u Report since all the anaylsis methods used in this effort were approved methods. The application of these methods was consistent with the current approach defined in the SAR, therefore, no new aooidents were created and no currently non-limiting event was made more limiting; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specifloation since the analysis assumptions utilized were conservative with respect to the current Technical specifications and Core operating Limits Report limita.
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ANO.2 LOCRs Lockcg3 Qu ntitico to Auxiliory Building Enginnering Report 97-2002-01 was developed to doCJanent the Emergency Core cooling system oosponents, based on the current plant design, that could provide f
a release path to the Auxiliary Building.
Affocted SAR Table 15.1.13-5 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an socident er malfatnotion of.quipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this revision did not change the quantity of totti leakage to the Auaillary Building, but provided the amount of leakage from the Nigh Pressure safety injection, Low Pressure safety 2njection, and Containment spray systems as doouemented in the engineering calculation; or, (11) Anorense the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change was made to accurately refloat the current plant condition. No changes were made to the plant condition that would introduce new accident sequences; or, (iii) 'eduos the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any
' Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in say Technical specification bases.
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ANO2 LOCR Maxi Bolt D: sign Critoric Standard l
The Maxi molt undercut anchor bolt testing program, a joint venture between Entergy operations and Drilloo Devices, Inc., was performed at ANo and the results S ace documented in a series of engineering reports.
The reports documented all aspects of the testing program, evaluation of the results, establishment of minimum safety factors to sneet oossaitments/ industry methodologies, and the calculation bases for establishment of the allowables for load, spacing, and edge distanoe. The results of the testing program were surumarised in Structural Engineering Standard 10, concrete Anchor Bolt Design criteria. This standard controls the design of all anchor bolts on site, both historical and new, including concrete expansion bolts, undercut, wedge, grouted, and sleeve types for both units.
Affected SAR sections:
3.9.1.2, 3.9.3.3 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of coeurrence or consequence of an aooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since these changes were clerical in nature and did not affect any operating requirements, controls, pressure retaining requirements or boundaries, or safety functions assumed in the cause, occurrence, or mitigation of the accidents postulated in the SAR; or (ii) increase the possibility for an socident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since anchor bolts by nature utilise passive techniques to attach couponents to structures without creating a secondary type failure, thereby allowing the supported equipment to perform its design functions or, (iii) reduoe the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the use of undercut anchor bolts is not mentioned in the bases for may Technical specification.
_._...__--..__m._.-__,
ANO 2 LDC3 Gaceoua Efflu:nt Sampling Calculations have detersnined that the effluent stream of highest average flow (the lowest average nuolide concentration for a given release rata) for radiolodine in gaseous effluents is the Turbine Building vent exhaust.
The SAR assumes a roloase rate of 2.3 curies per year resulting in a child thyroid dose of 5 mress at the nearest dairy farse.
The SAR states that a 6 CTH portable air sagle will be taken periodically in the Turbine Building in the event of a stoam generator tube 3eak. ANO does 3.ot have instrumentation capable of performing portable air sagles at 6 cm.
This change olisainated the specific requ',ressent for a 6 cm air sagle to be drawn in the event of steam generator tu'oe leakage.
Counting equipement currently in use at ANO has a Minimum Detectable concentration (MDC) of 0.7E-11 micro curies per cubic centimeter for a volume of 375 liters and 6.7E-12 micro curies per cubio centimeter for a volume of 7200 liters. Both these concentrations are below the HDC required to detect activities that would result in 2.3 curies.
Affected SAR Section:
11.6.6 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment imortant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the equipment affected by this change was not credited with initiating or mitigating any of the previously analysed accident scenarios / or, (ii) incrosse the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since portable air sag ling in the Turbine Building does not igaot any safety related equipment or systens.
Detection capabilities a n a fraction of the concentration of radiciodine that, continually released, would result in a child thyroid dose equivalent of 5 mroms or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases.
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ANO 2 LDCR:
Dry Sipping Syotem This revision to the SAR added a note stating that the Dry sipping system was removed from servios per Plant Change 92-0048.
Affected SAR sections:
9.1.4.2.15, 9.1.4.3.2 Tables:
14.1-1, 6.2-25 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this change was administrative in nature. The system was evaluated for removal under Irlant Change 92-3048; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the Dry sipping system was removed per Plant Change 92-0040 and this was an administrative change to clarify references to the systems or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification sinoe there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO.2 LOCR:
Qunlity Control P0rConn31 QuS11ficatiCn3 This change reeeved the title Quality Engineer to be consistent with the change in staffing responsibiities requiring Quality control Personnel to perform the functions that were previously pettormed by Quality Engineces.
This change refloots the elimination of the position and title Quality Engineer wFich included the Quality control Engineer, the Quality Assurance Engineer, and the Quality Engineering functions.
Affected SAR section:
13.1.2 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an socident or malfunction of equipment important to safety I
evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the work previously perforeed by Quality Engineers will be performed by Quality control Personnel. The quality of equipment and inspection of equipment will not be civersely ispacted by this change in responsibility; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis soport since Quality control Personnel have the ability and qualifications to select items to be reviewed and inspected as required in the sAR and are familiar with the work areas, status of ongoing modifications, system changeouts, and code requirements; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specifications.
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ANO 2 LDC2:
Boric Acid Makcup Tcnk A11cwablo C:ncentratien j
'fhe allowable boron concentrations for the Borio Acid Makeup Tank and the Borio Acid Batch Tank were incorrectly changed to 3.5 w/o and 8.1 w/o, respectively, 1
in a previous sAR change. The design of the tanks was not changed and each could support a 12 w/o borio anid conoontration with proper adjustment of the heater setpoint.
This revision to the SAR corrected the original tank design numbers and heater descriptions.
Affected SAR section:
9.3.4.3.15 Tables:
9.3-15, 9.3-16 It was determined that these changes did nots (A) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this change only corrected the design verbiage for original tank design numbers and heater descriptions; or, (ii) increese the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a diffarent type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change had no impact on equigament important to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specificwtion since this change onAy corrected original tank design number and heater descriptions and did not impact any margins of safety defined in the
]
Technical specification bases, l
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/.NO 2 LDCR:
Reacter Coolcnt Pump Seals This change corrected the length of time the Reactor Coolant puey (ACP) Seals can operate without cooling enter. Rased on a review of the RCP original design specifications, the seals were designed and are capable of operating for up to ten minutes without incurring seal dasmage.
The original value of five minutes was amost likely due to the more limiting condition of the motor in lieu of the seal.
Affected SAR Sections:
5.5.1.1, 5.5.1.2 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipenent important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this change was consistent with the original design specifloation for the seals and their evaluated capabilities for withstanding loss of cooling events; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report sinoa this change, refloating the original seal design specifloation of ten minutes of operation without cooling water, is bounded by the forty minute analysis provided in SAR section 5.5.1.3; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Techniaal specification since there was no margin of safety defined in the Technical Spooification bases regarding RCP seal cooling.
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ANO2 LDCR:
5 fcty Injection Volva Tcoting This revision to the SAR replaced the description of specific valve tests with a reference to the Edition and Addenda of section XI of the AsWE Boilrr and Pressure vessel code specified by 10CrR50.55a(g), except where specifio written relief has been granted by the NRC.
Affected SAR sections:
6.3.2.13, 6.3.4.2, 9.3.6.4 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipsont important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis hport since this change refers to a valve testing program which meets or encompasses the testing previously spoolfied in the SAR and is consistent with the codes and standards testing requirements specified in 10CrR50.55a; or (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the purpose of testing is to ensure that the safety Injection system will function as designed during sooident conditions; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since valve testing of AsWE Code Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves shall be performed in accordance with a periodically updated version of section XI of the AkWE Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and Addrada as required by 10CTR50.55a, except when relief has been approved in writing by the NRC.
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ANO 3 LOCR System Flewroto D0tOrmin3ticn
'this sAR revision deleted stateenents referring to the use of shutdown Heat Emohanger Inlet pressure, Low Pressure safety Injection (LPs!) header pressure, and Nigh Pressure safety Injection (MPs!) header pressure indications in eenjunction with pump performance characteristic curves as an alternate means of determining systeen flow rate.
Affected SAR ssotiones 6.3.8.2.1, 9.3.6.5 It was dete miaod that these changes did nots (1) Anorease the probability of occurrence or consequence of an i
aseident er smalfunction of equipsment important to safety 1
evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the LPs!,
NPs!, and shutdown Cooling system flow rates were not orodited with initiating any of the previously a.nalysed sooidents and alternate system flow sensurenant snethods do not f.apact the ability of the safety Injection system to fulfill its intended safety function; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or analfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report minoe it is not possible to cause an sooident by either reading or not reading a pressure instrument and applying that reading to a pump perforsmanoe curve; or, (iii) reduoe the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no appliesble margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
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ANO 2 LDCRI Refuoling Wat.cr Tcnk
'this change to the SAR was incorporated to improve accuracy by removing meaningless values for minismus Refueling Water Tank (RWT) volume and for volume available for injection based on different initial RWT conditions, clarifying that 500,500 gallons is the nominal h T capacity.
This change also removed a meaningless value for RWT volume remaining after transfer to the recirculation mode.
The required volume of RWT available for injection is controlled by Technical specifications and has not been changed.
i Affected sAR sectional 6.2.3.1.2.3, 6.2.3.3.1.1, 6.3.2.2.1 Table 6.3-1 It was determined that these changes did nott (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an 4
sooident or malfunction of equipseent important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since Technical specification limits ensure adequate RWT inventory to support Emergency Core Cooling system (ECCs) operation; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report sinoe states.ents in the sAR concerning RWT volumes have no impact on the probability of a malfunction of equipsment important to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since no physical changes to the plant configuration were made or allowed as a result of this change.
Technical specifications will continue to ensure adequate RWT inventory to support ECCs operation.
l ANO 2 LOCR:
i Letdown Ion Exch ngers in the Chemical & Valume Control Syctem This revision to the SAR serrected a reference to the three ion emohangers in the chemical & Volume control system. The ion exchangers were listed as two purification ion emohangers and a deborating ion exchanger. All three ion exchangers contain mixed bed resin and are used interchangeably to clean up the primary, delithiate, and deborate.
Affected SAR sections:
15.1.4.1, 9.3.4.2.5, 9.3.4.3.4 Tables 9.3-21 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an aooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this change did not increase the probab. 41ty of a Boron Dilution Event since the usage of the dominera11:ers remains the same; or, (ii) Anorease the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report sinoe the ion exenangers were not modified and the letdown system is isolated during most accidents; or, (iii) reduoe the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
ANO 2 LDCR:
l Offoito D300 C31culotien Manual This revision to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (OOCM) incorporated the Radiological Effluent Technical specifications which were removed fra.a the Unit 1 and 2 operating Technical specifications and also incorporated requirements fross Generio Letter 89-01.
In addition, this revision changed the acror.ym used for the National Bureau of standards (NSS) to the organisation's new soronym N!sT (National Institute bf science and Technology.)
Affected SAR sections:
11.4.4.1, 12.1.4.4, 7.2.1.1.9.2, 7.3.1.1.9.2 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since an organisational name change is not a contributing factor to any initiating conditions and does not alter the consequenoes for any socidents previously analyzed in the SAR or,
]
(ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a f
different type than any evaluated provously in the safety Analysis Report since an organisational name change is not a contributing factor to any accident initiating plant condition; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specifloation since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
l ANOF LDCM:
1 Oft' site Dose Calculation Manual This revision refloots the transfer of the Radiological Effluent Technical specifications fresa esoh unit's operating Technical specifications to the Offsite Dese calculation Manual and incorporated the new specifications from I
Generio Letter 89-01.
Affected SAR sootions 11.8.5 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an moeident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report sinoe these changes were administrative in nature and did not impact any accident initiators, mitigators, or equipseent important to safety; or, (ii) incrosse the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change was administrative in nature and did not affect any equipment i m ortant to plant safety; or, (iii) reduce the snargin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specification bases.
ANO 2 LIR: LMC109 Shutdown Cooling Heat Exch;ngOr Dato
'this change corrected an erroneous value for the shell sioe design fouling factor listed on the original heat exchanger data sheet. referring ts the cooling water as " inhibited water".
This referred to a closed loop system for which a fouling factor of 0.0005 would be appropriate. ANO-2 has never had a closed loop cooling system for shutdown cooling and since lake or river water has always been the cooling water on the shell side of the heat exchanger, the value listed in the Tubular Exchanger Manufacturers Association (TENA) guide is the appropriate value to use.
The manufacturer's Heat Exchanger specification sheet from 1981 indicated the correct shell fouling factor of 0.002 in agreement with TEMA.
Affected SAR Table 6.2-21 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) Anorease the probability of occurrence or consequence of an socident or malfunction of equipment inportant to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the correct fouling factor was already in use in safety related calculations making the revision of the SAR table an improvement of the table as a reference source, but did not affect the operation evaluation of equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for un accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this change corrected a reference in the sAR, but did not affect the operation of any physical plant equipment or any accidents associatad with plant equipment; or, (iii) reduoe the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specifloation since, although this change corrected a reference in the SAR, the correct value was used in the appropriate safety related calculations.
mm
- ~ _. -
ANO 2 LIR: LM4110 High Prc0Curo Cafoty InjOcticn cnd Low Proccuro S "oty InjOcticn Pump Lag Times This change deleted misleading statements concerning the time required for the High Pressure safety Injection (HPSI) and Low Pressure safety Injection (LPs!)
pumps to attain full speed af ter 75 percent of the full power is applied. Based on Design Engineering knowledge, the words "75 percent of the full power
- were used inappropriately and have no valid meaning. The design bases of the HPs!
and LPs! pumps is that they attain full speed five seconds af ter being started.
j footed SAR Sections:
6.3.2.2.3, 6.3.2.2.4, 6.3.3.12 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrance or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the stfety Analysis Report since thiu change was a clarificatio, of the SAR text and did not impact any sooident initiators or mitigatorst or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report ainoe this clarification did not create any mechanisms that would cause an socident of a different type than previously evaluated; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since this clarification did not alter any margins of safety defined in the Technical specification
- bases, i
ANO 2 PEAR 904019 PASS Building Exhaust Fan Differentici Proocuro Equipment This ehange refinets the *as built
- eonfiguration of the differential pressure sensing instrueentation across the Post Accident saspling system (Pass) filter sys tems.
Affected SAR Figure 9.4=1 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) Anorease the probability of occurrence or consequence of an mooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the differential pressure instrumentation was installed correctly and this change only revised the drawing to reflect the *as built
- configuration; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an sooident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysia Report since there was no impact to the equipment that was correctly installed and no possibility of a different type of malfunction to safety related equipment than that previously evaluated in the SAR; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since the fan unit was not mentioned in any Technical specification bases and the instrumentation is maintained in its correctly installed configuration.
ANO.2 PEAR: 96 0218 Sol.4d Radwaste System Valve Identification solid Radweste system vent valve on 277s was found without a tag number and was not identified on the appropriate sAR figure.
This valve did exist on the Isometrio drawing, but was not labeled with a valve number.
This drawing revision added the valve and valve number to the affected drawings to reflect the ae-built condition of the plant.
Affected SAR Figures 11.5-1 It was deterinined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurLence or consequence of an socident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since no physical change was made to the system; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since this valve does not Aspaat safety related equipment and no changes were made to the system; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since there were no applicable margins of safety defined in the Technical specifloation bases.
ANO 2 TS: W4J.4 Shock SupprOcc0ro (Snubbero)
This change to the Toohnical specification (Ts) bases concerning shock suppressoas was made to clarify the frequency of required functional testing.
The words ' plant shutdowns" refer to the refueling interval "R" as described in the Ts Frequency Notation Table and not an operational anode.
It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an sooident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report ainoe the tosporary removal of snubbers for up to seventy-two hours does not affect the structural integrity of the system.
runctional testing of snubbers on Leergency Core cooling systems prior to the system's use for shutdown Decay Heat Removal increases the statistical bases for snubber reliability during that activity; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the removal of snubbers for on-line tecting does not represent a new aooident initiator and is bounded by the accident evaluations discussed in the SAR; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since this condition does not change the limiting conditions for operations, applicability, or surveillance requirements as defined in the Technical specification bases.
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