ML20072J020

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1993 Annual 10CFR50.59 Rept for ANO Unit 1
ML20072J020
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/31/1993
From:
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
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ML20072H979 List:
References
NUDOCS 9408260181
Download: ML20072J020 (107)


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$l s l 1993 ANNUAL 10 CFR 50.59 REPORT

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4 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNIT-1 DOCKET No. 50-313 LICENSE No. DPR-51 ANNUAL 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR 1993 This report contains a brief description of reportable procedure and design changes made at Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit-1. These summaries describe changes made to the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), including the Quality Assurance Manual Operations, the Fire Hazards Analysis, and the Emergency Plan, for which an evaluation was determined to be necessary. It also contains evaluations for tests which were conducted which are not described in the SAR. This report is applicable to the period from January 23,1993 through January 22,1994.

The safety evaluations included in this report were performed in accordance with 10CFR50.59 and determined that none of the changes involved a change to the plant's Technical Specifications or an unreviewed safety question.

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CONTENTS SECTION I PROCEDURE CHANGES SECTION II DESIGN CHANGES SECTION III TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS SECTION IV MISCELLANEOUS EVALUATIONS

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ANO-1 Procedures 1010.002, Revision 4

" Transient cycle Logging and Reporting" This procedure revision added two transient types (one for each unit) and decreased the cycle limits for certain transients due to engineering evaluation.

Affected SAR Table 4-8 It was determined that these changes did nots {

l (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the imposition of decreased transient design cycles serves to maintain the present accident analysis, sustain a level of conservatism, and prevent equipment malfunction; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since all possible accidents and malfunctions have been previously analyzed; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the revisions were for clarification and tracking purposes only.

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l ANO-1 Procedure 1012.022, Revision 1

" Control /Use of Portable HP Instrumentation" i

This revision upgraded the procedure to facilitate calibration of portable HP

} instruments by a corporate facilty and to establish controls necessary to ensure proper calibration and control of portable HP instruments.

It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since changing the location at which Health Physics instruments are calibrated will have no affect on overall plant operation; or, j l

(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since changing the location at which Health Physics instruments are calibrated will have no affect on overall plant operation: or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the location at which Health Physics instruments are calibrated is not discussed in the bases of either units Technical Specifications.

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ANO-C PROC: 1025.027, Revision 2 Preparation, Review, and Approval of Repetitive Tasks This procedure revision made administrative changes to enhance processing revisions to preventive maintenance (PM) tasks. A change in responsibility for the PM program within the site organization affected the Quality Assurance Manual-Operations (QAMO).

The procedure revision required a revision to QAMO section 14.3.2.

It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the procedure changes were not related to any evaluated accidents, did not modify plant facilities in any way, or change any settings or safety limits specified in Technical Specifications; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since no physical plant equipment changes were made and only administrative precedures and responsibilities were involved; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the procedure revision made no change to any safety margin specified in Technical Specifications.

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ANO-1 Procedure 1052.007, Revision 13

" secondary Chemistry Monitoring" This procedural revision changes the frequency at which Bromine biocide is added to the Service Water System. This procedure is common to both units.

It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the continuous addition of biocide will only further ensure availability of accident mitigating equipment and it was shown in an evaluation that addition of biocide on a continuous basis will not have detrimental affects on the systems or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since there are no changes in the method by by which biocide is injected into the system; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the bases which discuss biocide addition do not pertain to the specific application and the continuous addition will result in greater biological control.

S ANO-1 PROC 31062.003A

" Licensing Document Change Request" This change deleted obsolete text from the Unit 1 SAR. The description of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) Abnormal Transient Operating Guidelines (ATOG) screen referred to two boxes showing expected Teold and Thot if no forced RCS flow is indicated. The function was removed by a software change in 1985. This text was deleted.

Affected SAR Section: 7.3.4.2.3 It was determined that these changes did not:

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the function being removed by this change is duplicated and enhanced by a different SPDS display; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report. The function being removed from the ATOG screen on SPDS is retained and enhanced on another screen. The available indications and the way the plant is operated will not change. This change does not alter the physical ties between SPDS and any equipment; or, J

{ (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since SPDS is not a consideration in any of the Technical Specification bases.

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ANO-1 Procedure 31064.051, Revision 5

" Training Effectiveness Evaluation" This procedure revision incorporated the following changes: 1) the responsibility for the Training Supervisor to arrange quarterly work group meetings to obtain training feedback; 2) reassigning the duties of the Supervisor, Training Standards to the Training Supervisor; and, 3) deleted reference to Training Superintendent title.

This modification caused a revision to QAMO Section 1.0, Organization.

It was determined that these changes did not:

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to cafety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since there are no physical char.ges made to the facilities due to this organizational restructuring; or, l

(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report. There are no physical changes associated with this restructuring and the plant operating and

emergency procedures are unaffected. The design and design basis l of ANO will remain the same and the LCOs, Limiting Safety System l Settings, and Safety Limits are not affected by this realignment of the training management; or, 1

(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there will be no changes to the physical design or operation of the facility.

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ANO-1 Procedure 1102.001, Revision 52 PC-4

" Plant Preheatup and Precritical Checklist" This procedure revision made several administrative changes in addition to correcting the normal positions of reactor vessel inter-gasket leakoff isolation valves RBS-1 and RBS-2, adding several valves to the Category E lineup table, and adding a check of reactor building basement floor drain screens.

Affected SAR Figures: 4-1, 7-20 It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the valves will be maintained in a closed position should the reactor vessel inner gasket fail, insuring the the reactor coolant pressure boundary is not breached; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since allowance is made to operate with the inner gasket failed and the leakoff path isolated and no circumstances which are not bounded by previous accident evaluations are changed or created; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since inter-gasket leakoff is not addressed in the basis of any Technical Specification.

ANO-1 Procedure 1104.001, Revision 23, Permanent Change 1

" Core Flood System Operating" This procedure revision included: 1) lowering the initial test CFT pressure from 110 to 120 peig for CFT A and 80 to 90 peig for CFT B to 60 to 70 psig for CFT A and B; and, 2) performing the test with DHR operation momentarily secured to minimize the expected flow rate in the core.

This modification involved a test not described in the SAR.

It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since evaluations have demonstrated that the fuel assemblies, CRAs and APSRe, remain in place during testing. Securing of the DHR system is an allowed plant evolution and therefore considered acceptable; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since evaluations have demonstrated that the fuel assemblies, CRAs and APSRs, remain in place during testing.

Securing of the DHR system is an allowed plant evolution and therefore considered acceptable; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any j Technical Specification. The ANO-1 Technical Specification l bases do not address the margins associated with the forces applied to the core or its components from a flow test.

Additionally, the ANO-1 Technical Specification allows the DHR system to be secured for up to one hour which is ample time to conduct the subject test. Since the evaluations in ANO calculation 93-E-0026-02, revision 0, and its associated references have demonstrated that the fuel assemblies, CRAs and APSRs, will remain in place during the proposed testing, the margins to safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specifications will not be reduced.

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ANO-1 Procedure 1104.002, Revision 44, PC-3

" Makeup & Purification System" I This procedure revision changed the normal operating positions of Reactor Coolant Pump intergasket leakoff isolation valves to the Reactor Building Sump (RBS-11A-D AND RBS-12A-D) to normally closed.

Affected SAR Figure: 7-21 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the Reactor Coolant Pump intergasket leakoff is not used for the mitigation of any evaluated accident and the procedural changes left the valves in a safe position providing additional barriers for the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since allowance has previously been made to operate with one Reactor Coolant Pump gasket failed and the leakoff path isolated; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the Reactor Coolant Pump intergasket leakoff is not addressed in the basis of any Technical Specification.

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ANO-1 PROCEDURE 31104.007, Revision 10, Permanent Change 1

" Screen Wash System" This procedure revision deleted TS-1001 and TS-1002, drain isolation valves for screen wash piping to spray nozzles, from the valve lineup.

Affected SAR Figure: 9-10 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the valves that were deleted from the lineup were not physically installed in the plant; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the valves that were deleted from the lineup were not physically installed in the plant; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no margin of safety concerning the screen wash system is addressed in the Technical Specifications.

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" Dirty Liquid Wasts and Drain Processing" This procedure revision allowed operations personnel to open a manually operated valve (DWD-4411) which forms part of the Reactor Building boundary.

Affected SAR Section: 5.2.2.4.1 Table 5-1 f

It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since having an open, non-automatic containment isolation valve is not a precursor to any of the accidente evaluated in the LBD and dose calculations are not affected; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since single failure criteria is maintained; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification cince no margins of safety have been altered in any way.

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1 ANO-1 Procedure: 1104.017, Revision 6

" PASS Sampling" This procedural revision changed the title Shift Supervisor to Shift Superintendent, added a section concerning operability of the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) with shielding removed, added a note which clarified the opening permissive for Hot Lab / PASS Sample to PASS valve SV-1844, added Reactor Coolant Sample Inlet Pressure Transmitter Isolation Valves to the Sample Booster Pump valve lineup table, and changed the position of Sample Booster Pump Cooler Isolation Valve SS-537 from open to throttled. Changing the normal operating position of SS-537 caused a revision to the Safety Analysis Report.

Affected SAR Figure: 9-5 It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the PASS is not used to mitigate the consequences of any accident and the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary was not affected by throttling SS-537,; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since no circumstances not already bounded by previous evaluations were changed or created; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the PASS Sample Pumps are not addressed in the basis of any Technical Specification.

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ANO-1 Procedure 1104.022, Revision 28 j l

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" Gaseous Radwate Systas" j The revsion to the Gaseous Radwaste System Procedure made several changes.

Among these were the updating of references used in conjunction with the procedure, adding Waste Gas Decay Tanks high pressure setpoint por a modification, changing the normal operating pressure of the tanks, updating the names of several valves, adding instructions for closing Gas Collection Header valve GZ-15 and recognizing it as normally closed in Attachment C ,

adding instructions for purging the Waste Gas Surge Tank before realigning the system to normal system exhaust, adding several valves to Attachment B changing the normal position of valve GCH-36 (Spent Resin Storage Tank vent to gas collection header) to closed, and moving information pertaining to several valves to other procedures. Several other administrative, non-technical changes were also made.

Affected SAR Figures: 11-1, 11-3 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the Gas Collection Header is not used to mitigate the consequences of any analyzed accident, changing the normal operating position of valve GZ-15 does not affect the Waste Gas System in post accident operation, and no safety related components were affected; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since neither the Gas collection Header nor the Waste Gas System were functionally changed and maintaining GCH-36 and GZ-15 in the closed position cannot initiate any new accident; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the Gas Collection Header is not addressed in the basis of any Technical Specification and the Waste Gas System remains as described in the Technical Specification bases.

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ANO-1 Procedure s1104.024, Revision 19

" Instrument Air System" This procedure revision closed four instrument air valves (IA-496, IA-499, IA-502, and IA-526). This change permanently isolates the air supply to control valves CV-6860, CV-6861, CV-6862, and CV-6863.

1 Affected SAR Figure: 9-14 1

It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the changes are not accident initiators and the IA system is not used for the mitigation of any accident. IA system reliability is improved and no safety-related equipment is affected; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report. Due to the nature of the changes and the nature of the IA system, there can not be an initiation of any new type of accident and no malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type is created; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the IA system is not mentioned in the basis of any Technical Specification.

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ANO-1 Procedure: 1104.024, Revision 20 PC-2

" Instrument Air System" This procedure revision deleted IA-5417, IA-5418, and IA-5419, changed the description of IA-28, and changed the position of IA-727 from normally open to normally closed and added "not used" to the description.

Affected SAR Figures 9-14 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since current plant configuration has been reflected in that IA-5417, 5418, and 5419 are not physically installed and the emergency escape hatch connection lines in which these valves were installed have been capped, which serves the same function as the valves being maintained in a closed position; or, (ii) :ncrease the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the function of the emergency escape hatch connection lines in which IA-5417, 5418, and 5419 oerved was not changed by the capping of the lines following removal of the talves and deletion of the valves from the procedure reflected current plant configurations or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no margins of safety are defined for the Instrument Air System in any basis of the Technical Specifications. ,

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ANO-1 Procedures 1104.025, Revision 8, PC-1

" service Air system" This procedural change deleted Service Air valve SA-37, changed the names of valves SA-203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 200, 201, 197, 159, and 179, and changed the normal operating position of valve SA-179 to closed.

l Affected SAR Figure: 9-14 l

It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an '

accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the Service Air System is not used for the mitigation of any evaluated accident and the changes did not affect any safety related equipment or system; or, (11) increase t' e possibility f or an accident or malfunction of a .

dirterent type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the procedural revisioni did not change the system functionally; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the Service Air System is not addressed in the bases of any Technical Specification.

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1 ANO-1 Procedure : 1104.029, Revision 42 PC-1

" Service Water and Auxiliary Cooling System" Procedural corrections and enhancements were made by this revision. More specifically, several notes were added, valve positions were changed, valves ACW-4040 and ACW-1063 (pressure point and drain isolation for ACW piping to the hydrogen seal oil cooler) were deleted, and a new section concerning inaccessible valves was added at the end of the valve lineup.

Deletion of valves ACW-4040 and ACW-1063 caused the revision of ANO-1 SAR Figure 9-9.

Affected SAR Figure 9-9 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since ACW-4040 and ACW-1063 are not physically installed in the plant. The lines in which they were installed are plugged, which serves same function as the valves being closed; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the procedure change reflected current plant configuration in that ACW-4040 and ACW-1063 are not physically installed in the plant; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no margin of safety is defined for the Auxiliary Cooling Water system in any basis of the Technical Specifications. l l

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ANO-1 Procedure : 1104.029, Revision 42 PC-4

" Service Water and Auxiliary Cooling System" This procedure revision me.de miscellaneous changes such as changing page numbers, adding notes and statements, and changing valve descriptions. A specific example is changing the description of valve ACW-1062 from a vent valve to a drain valve, which caused the revision of ANO-1 SAR Figure 9-9.

Affected SAR Figure: 9-9 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since changing the normally closed ACW-1062 from a vent valve to a drain valve reflected current plant configuration and the normal position of the valve was not altered; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the normally closed position of ACW-1062 was not altered; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no margin of safety is defined i for the Auxiliary Cooling Water system in any basis of the Technical Specifications.

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ANO-1 Procedure 31107.004, Revision 6

" Battery and 125V DC Distribution" ,

1 This procedure revision deleted the requirement for continuous operation of ANO-1 battery ventilation exhaust fans to allow securing ventilation for short periods. j l

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It was determined that these changes did not:

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety )

evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the procedure change does not change, degrade, or prevent actions described or assumed in an accident discussed in the SAR. Removing the battery room exhaust fan, a non-Q assembly, from service for a short duration is of no consequence to a dose release in an ,

accident and it can not impede actions to mitigate the j consequences of malfunction of the Q battery. The battery i remains operational and is not degraded during this period; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a l different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety 1 Analysis Report since the battery remains operational and its ability to perform its intended function is not impaired by the stopping of the non-Q exhaust fan for a short duration; or, j (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no safety margin could be found in the bases for any Technical Specification.

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ANO-1 Procedure 1302.013, Revision 13 I l

" Sequence for Physics Testing Following Refueling" This procedure revision updated physics testing sequence for cycle 12 initial criticality physics testing to correspond with the requirements of the cycle 12 Reload Report.

The modification caused a revision to the bases of Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.5.2.

It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification does not change any plant equipment or the way the plant is operated. This change does not make any changes in assumptions concerning equipment availability or failure modes, does not affect the Reactor Protection System's (RPS) capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition, and does not affect the RPS's capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of plant conditions that could result in potential offsite exposures. No nsw equipment or operational changes are required; or, (ii) increase the possibility for 2n accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification does not change any plant equipment or alter the way in which the plant operates.

There are no circumstances created with this change that are different from those considered by previous analyses. No new systems or substructures are involved; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.

ANO-1 Procedure 31304.020, Revision 9

" Unit 1 Reactor Building Access and Ventilation Leak Rate Testing" l

This procedure revision added instructions and acceptance criteria for the rotameter (flow) method of leak rate testing.

Affected SAR Section: 5.2.2.1.3 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an  !

accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety i evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report. Since none of the i 10CFR50, Appendix J required leak rate tests are initiators of any  ;

previously evaluated accident, changing the test method does not increase the probability of an accident. The leak teste j do not impose any damage to components; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than aty evaluated previously in the Safety  ;

Analysis Report since changing the acceptable test methods does I not have the potential to initiate an accident and does not create any new failure mechanisms; or, j (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the required 10CFR50, Appendix J )

leak rate testing will continue to enforce the containment l leakage specifications as defined in the Technical Specifications. 1 l

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r ANO-1 Procedure 1604.017, Revision 15

" Analysis of Liquid Waste" This procedural revision changed the frequency at which tritium analysis is performed on liquid effluents. In the past, the analysis was performed once per month on a quantity of liquid which was proportional to the quantity of liquid effluents released. This method could have led to erroneously high l tritium levels for high volume turbine building releases. Therefore, procedures now call for the analysis of each batch release.

Affected SAR Sections 11.1.3.8 It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the amount of tritium discharged was not altered and a more accurate method of measuring tritium releases was provided; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the method of analyzing tritium releases affects no plant equipment and the amount of tritium released was not altered; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the only Technical Specification basis which addresses radioactive releases ensures that the concentration of the radioactive materials released is less than the levels specified in 10CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II and Section II A design objectives of 10CFR Part 50, Appendix I.

The amount of tritium released was noither increased nor decreased. Only the frequency at which tritium releases are measured was affected.

ANO-1 Procedure 1607.015, Revision 3, PC-1

" Sampling the Core Flood Tanks" This procedure revision allows the sampling of a non-recirculated Core Flood Tank when no additions have been made to the tank or the results of the sample lie within a +/- 3% deviation range from the previous sample. Under these conditions it has been concluded that the results produce an accurate boron concentration measure to within +/- 1%.

Affected SAR Section: 6.1.2.1 It was determined that these changes did not:

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the boron concentration was not altered, no alteration was made to Core Flood Tanks, and it was determined that the alternate sampling method would produce accurate boron concentration readings; or, i

(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since neither the Core Flood Tanks nor any related equipment was af f ected, boron concentration limits were not altered, and the alternate sample method was determined to produce accurate results; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the boron concentration limits as specified in the Technical Specifications were not changed and the concentration in the tanks was not altered.

ANO-1 Procedure 1903.062 , Revision 12

" Communications System Operating Procedure" This revision reflects the deletion of the corporate staff channel and the installation of a new base radio station by the Arkansas department of Health for the activation of the Early Warning System which no longer required the disabling of the Mt. Nebo repeater by ANO. It also included administrative changes such as reformatting sections and changing AP&L to ANO.

The procedural change necessitated the revision to the ANO Emergency Plan Section J.2.3.7.

It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the use of the Mt. Nebo repeater has no direct or indirect means of affecting the overall performance or reliability of equipment important to safety; or, ,

(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since there is no possible interaction between the Mt. Nebo repeater and onsite equipment in.portant to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there are no Technical Specification bases related to the use of the Mt. Nebo repeater.

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ANO-1 DCP 392-2021 and DCP 393-1003

" Installation of Voltage Regulators for Offsite Power Sources" This evaluation was associated with both Design Change Package (DCP) 93-1003 and DCP 92-2021. Together, these two design changes installed voltage regulators on Startup Transformers 1,2, and 3 to insure operability of offsite power sources.

These design changes required the revision of Unit 1 SAR Sections 8.2.1.3 and 8.2.1.4 and Figure 8-1 along with Unit 2 SAR Sections 8.2.1.3 and 8.2.1.4 and Figures 8.2-2, 8.3-1, 8.3-3, 8.3-21, 8.3-23, and 8.3-36.

Affected SAR Sections: 8.2.1.3, 8.2.1.4 Figure: 8-1 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety l evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the likelihood j of a failure of a GDC-17 source is only slightly increased  !

and is far outweighed by the regulators' ability to prevent a j degraded voltage condition and since none of the evaluated failure modes would, by iteelf, lead to an increased probability of Loss of offsite Power; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the only possible accident, Loss of Offsite Power, and all possible malfunctions associated with this modification have already been evaluated and; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no margins of safety can be related to the addition of voltage regulators.

ANO-1 LCP 893-5027

" Installation of Isolation Valve for P-41" This LCP added an additional manual gate valve (N2-47) just outside of containment penetration P-41 between the inboard check valve (N2-32) and the j outboard air operated valve (CV-1667).

Affected SAR Figure 9-4 Table: 5-1 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the system design and function of the low pressure nitrogen system remain unchanged. Containment integrity through penetration P-41 was improved through the addition of this valve. The low pressure nitrogen system is nonsafety-related; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a dif ferent type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the system design and function were unchanged by this modification and containment integrity was improved; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification. Since the low pressure nitrogen system is not required for accident mitigation, it affects no margins of safety.

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i ANO-1 LCP 393-5029

" Decay Heat Pump Cooler Service Water Tubing Replacement" l

l This LCP changed the tubing to decay heat pumps' (P34A and P34B) cooling I jackets (E50A and E50B). The tubing was 1/2" diameter with a series routing i between the pump bearing and seal at each end. The tubing was changed to 3/4" tubing with a parallel routing between all seals and bearings with a common supply and drain header on opposite sides of the decay heat pumps.

Affected SAR Figure: 9-12 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the piping change does not degrade the associated pumps or affect the mechanical seals when used for mitigation of postulated accidents and enhances critical bearing cooling while maintaining adequate conditions for the impeller coolers. Equipment reliability is increased with no changes in postulated failure mechanisms; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the design, construction, and operation of the pumps remain the same and no new failure modes are introduced; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical specification since these pump heat exchangers are not specifically addressed in the bases to the Technical Specifications.

ANO-1 LCP 393-5030

" Installation of Manual Valve RBD-25 for HSD-5-4" Line" This LCP installed a new valve RBD-25 in the existing line HSD-5-4" of the Reactor Building drain system. This valve was added to allow for isolation of the line for LLRT of RBD-23.

Affected SAR Figure 11-1 It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since RBD-25 is used as an isolation for LLRT of RBD-23 during outages and will not have any safety functions. The addition of this valve does not affect any equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since adding this valve does not change the function or failure modes of any component, system, or structure; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.

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ANO-1 LCP 893-5033

" Removal of RC-1051 and RC-1052" This LCP removed vent isolation valves RC-1051 and RC-1052 and the associated piping support SP-LW-227-H12. The valves and the 1" pipe were removed from the 1" tee to which they were connected and a pipe plug was welded into the tee to seal the system.

l Affected SAR Figures: 4-1, 7-20 I It was determined that these changes did not: l l

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an I accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the removed valves had no function except for the passive function of sealing the reactor coolent system. Since the valves cannot seal the system more reliably than the pipe plug with which they were replaced, neither system reliability nor system safety were adversely affected. Appropriate piping and support analyses and modifications were included in the LCP. Neither the function nor the operation of the system were changed; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the modification did not change the function or mode of operation of any components in the system. The new pipe plug is a passive component which was procured in accordance with applicable codes and standards and does not affect the function, operation, or reliability of any equipment; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification. The new piping arrangement has the same function and meets the same quality requirements as the removed valves and pipe cap.

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ANO-1 LCP 893-5034 1 l

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" Install Spectacle Flange in Line ECB-3-8"" l 1

This modification installed two welding neck flanges and a blind-spectacle flange to the Fuel Transfer Canal fill line at penetration P-19 inside containment to improve containment isolation.

Affected SAR Figure: 9-11 Table: 5-1 It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment Omportant to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the spectacle flange serves the same purpose as two manual valves already in place at the penetration and will lower the probability of leakage at the penetration; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the spectacle flange serves the same function, with increased reliability, as the two valves which previously provided containment isolation; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no bases address any margin of safety related to reactor building isolation valves.

i ANO-1 LCP 393-5039 "Kodifications to Various Reactor Building Drain Lines" This LCP involved the cutting of three vertical drain lines that feed the Reactor Building Sump from various equipment and floor drains. This moditication removed a section of pipe, installed a pipe cap on the sump side of the cut pipe to act as a dust cover, and structurally connected the pieces of pipe that had been previously connected.

Affected SAR Figure: 11-2 l

It was determined that these changes did nots i

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since any water travelling in the drain pipe will still end up in the Reactor i Building Sump and the new configuration of piping will be as equally effective as the previous configuration at mitigating the consequences of equipment malfunctions; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report. During all modes of operation, the piping will serve the same purpose and function it was previously designed for; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since Technical Specification bases do not address margin of safety related to these drain lines.

ANO-1 LCP #94-5008

" Decay Heat Room Cooler (VUC-1A, B, C, D) Replacement" This modification replaces the Service Water coils in the Decay Heat Room Cooling Unita VUC-1A through VUC-lD. Due to leaks, the coolers are being replaced with an equivalent design. The heat transfer characteristics for the new coils remains the same as the original design.

Affected SAR Figures: 9-18, 9-20, 9-6 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the units maintain the ability to remove heat generated in the decay heat vaults, the units are not related to the initiation of any accidents, and the potential for Service Water leaks has been decreased; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the design, capacity, and operation of the units was not affected, no new failure modes were introduced, and the potential for a Service Water leak was reduced; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no margin of safety exists which applies to this modification.

ANO-1 PC 388-3012 "CRD ICW Vent Valve Relocation, Valve ICW-1101B and ICW-6230."

This plant change relocated control rod drive Intermediate Cooling Water System vent valves ICW-1101B and ICW-6230 from above the refueling canal to a location over the refueling deck grating above the fuel transfer machine control unit.

Affected SAR Figure: 9-7 It was determined that these changes did notz i (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the ICW system is not required to mitigate the consequences of any evaluated accident and cooling water flow to the control rod drive )

mechanisms was not affected ; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the function of the ICW system was not altered, no piping was removed or relocated, and no new equipment was added; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since this change had no effect upon any Technical Specification basis.

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l ANO-1 PC 388-3653 "RBS-1009 Installation" This Plant Change installed a flush valve, RBS-1009, in the fuel transfer canal drain line to the reactor building sump. It also changed fuel transfer canal drain isolation valves RBS-6 and RBS-7 from globe valves to gate Valves.

Affected SAR Figure: 11-2 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety  :

evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the flush l valve was installed downstream of the refueling canal drain l I

isolation valves and failure of these valves would have consequences identical to those existing previously; or (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since no new failure modes were created; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.

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ANO-1 PC 192-7016

" Modification of screen Wash system" This plant change replaced pumps P-55A and P-55B with new, improved design model pumps and replaced basket strainers F-5A and F-5B with duplex strainers.

Affected SAR Figure: 9-10 It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since no piping design limitations will be exceeded and no equipment malfunction mitigators are adversely affected. The systems involved and their associated equipment will not be degraded in any way that could increase the probability of their malfunction; or, (11) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since no new accident scenarios are created and existing failure modes remain the same. No equipment important to safety is adversely impacted nor is any equipment important to safety installed; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification. There are no margins of safety defined in the basis for any Technical Specification which deal specifically with the screen wash system. As no adverse impact is made to the travelling screens' abilities to perform their designed function, there is no reduction made to the service water, fire water, or any other lake water systems margins of safety. No other margins of safety are involved.

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1 ANO-1 PC 392-7064 I

" Addition of Interlocks for Automatic Shutoff of Pump P46 on Tank Til Low Level" This plant change installed a 120 VAC Interlock Relay (LSX-4603) in the Clean l Liquid Radwaste Control Panel (C112) to allow automatic shutoff of the l Auxiliary Building Equipment Drain Transfer Pump (P46) in the event of a low level in the Auxiliary Building Equipment Drain Tank (T11). The interlock circuit will use the existing Auxiliary Building Equipment Drain Tank Low Level Alarm Switch (LS-4603) to provide the automatic shutoff signal for P46.

This change also installed a Bypass Control Switch (HS-4602A) on Panel C112 to allow for operator bypassing of the automatic shutoff feature. The Til Hi-Low Level Alarm Annunciator Window was changed to "Til Level Hi-Lo/P46 Pump Trip". In addition, this PC corrected several drawing discrepancies for C112 and installed Terminal Boards El and E2.

Affected SAR Section: 11.1.3.1.1 Figure: 11-1 It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an l accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety  !

evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since only the Auxiliary Building Equipment Drain Transfer Pump Control System is involved 1 and this system is not an accident initiator as discussed in the LBD. This modification resulted in no change in the operating or failure modes for this system; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the involved system is used for the collection and transfer of liquid waste and could not serve as an accident initiator. This modification resulted in no change in the operating or failure modes for this system; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the Technical Specifications contain no margins of safety related to the Auxiliary Building Equipment Drain Transfer Pump Control System.

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ANO-1 PC 392-7086 "ICW Coupon Rack Assembly" This plant change installed two corrosion monitoring racks and associated piping in the Intermediate Cooling Water (ICW) system. The racks' inlets and outlets tap into the ICW system at the auction and discharge of the "A" and "C" ICW pumps.

Affected SAR Figures: 9-7, 9-8 It was determined that these changes did not:

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment Lmportant to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since all new equipment is installed according to the existing piping code and the corrosion monitoring racks are isolatable at the existing piping. No new failure modes are introduced into the ICW system; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the new equipment is installed to existing i I

codes, is isolatable in case of a leak, and will not create any new failure modes; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any  !

Technical Specification since there is no margin of safety in the l Technical Specification bases affected by the addition of the racks.

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ANO-1 PC 392-7103

" Corrosion Product Konitors" This plant change installed two corrosion product monitors downstream of feedwater heater E-1A and heater drain pump P-8A. Sample lines and cooling water lines to the monitors were also installed.

Affected SAR Figures: 10-2, 7-22 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since no safety related i equipment was affected, there was no effect on the operation and l reliability of any system or component, and no new failure modes l were created; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a l

different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety l Analysis Report since no safety related equipment was involved and l all conceivable f ailures of the egripment and tubing which was I added are bounded by existing anal i.es; or, l l

(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification cince no Technical Specification bases address any equipment or components within the scope of the plant change.

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ANO-1 PC 392-7103, DCPR 1  ;

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" Corrosion Product Monitors" This modification revision changed the source of cooling water to the two corrosion product monitors from the Service Water (SW) and Auxiliary Cooling Water (ACW) systems to the Domestic Water system.

Affected SAR Figures: 9-6, 9-9 It was determined that these changes did not:

1 (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since neither operation nor reliablity of any component or system was affected, the connection to the SW system supported no safety related equipment and neither the monitors, ACW system, nor Domestic Water system are credited with post-accident functions, and no safety related equipment was involved in the change of cooling water source; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since all conceivable failure modes of tubing and connections which were added are bounded by existing analyses and no safety related equipment was involved or impacted; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no defined margins of safety exist in the bases which were impacted by the change of cooling water to the corrosion product monitors.

ANO-1 PC 392-7105

" Bypass Line for E-32 Outlet Valva (ACW-40)"

This plant change installed a 1.5" bypass line and bypass valve around the ACW-40 outlet valve for the hydrogen seal oil cooler E-32. This installation provides the means to better control the seal oil outlet temperature when the lake temperatures are low and the required ACW flow is reduced.

Affected SAR Figure: 9-9 It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the installation conforms to applicable piping design codes and remains within the design basis of the system. The Acw system is not credited with accident initiation or accident mitigation and is isolated during accident situations. No equipment important to safety is supplied cooling water by the ACW system; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the bypass line and valve are installed to be in compliance with the design requirements of the ACW system and do not change the function of the ACW system. The ACW system supplies cooling water to non-Q equipment only and is isolated in an accident condition; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there is no margin of safety as defined in the basis of Technical Specifications for the ACW system.

. l ANO-1 PC 193-7024 "Dreathing Air Compressor Pressure Switch Documentation"

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l This plant change documented the existence of two pressure switches on the l breathing air compressors. )

Affected SAR Figure 9-14 i

i It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since overall system function, performance, and reliability were not changed and the pressure switches which were added to the drawing are not 4 safety related, have no interface with safety related equipment, I and do not mitigate the consequences of any accident or malfunction; or,  :

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(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a 1 different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety l Analysis Report since no physical change to the plant was i mader or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there'are no Technical specifications margins affected by these non-safety related switches.

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l ANO-1 PC 193-7035 1

" Removal of CZ-80 Internals a

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l This plant change removed the internals of check valve CZ-80, located between j the Unit 2 dewater pump and the spent resin storage tank, since the design purpose of this valve has been eliminated. l Affected SAR Figures 11-1 l

l It was determined that these changes did nott l

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an I accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety )

evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the existing configuration of the non-safety related Clean Liquid Radioactive ;

Waste system is no longer utilized and the check valve, which l is also non-safety related, no longer performs its design j function; or, l 1

(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the function of the non-safety related check valve, CZ-80, has been eliminated; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no margin of safety is defined for check valve CZ-80 in any basis of the Technical Specifications.

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l ANO-1 PC 393-7049

" Removal of CZ-56 Internals" This plant change removed the internals of check valve CZ-56 in the Liquid Radwaste System (LRW). This was done to allow processing of liquid waste by ANO-2 during outages of ANO-1 processing equipment.

Affected SAR Figure: 11-1 It was determined that these changes did not>

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipsva important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis R port since CZ-56 was never considered in any accident evaluation, neither the valve no-LRW system are safety related, and existing system configuration will allow for proper isolation to prevent inadvertant release of liquid radwaste to the discharge flume; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since CZ-56 is not safety related and sufficient isolation capability exists in the current ,

configuration to prevent inadvertant release to the l discharge; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no margin of safety is defined in cny Technical Specification basis for check valve cz-56.

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l ANO-1 PC 393-7052 l

" Provide Sprinkler Coverage Below Wozzanine in Hot Wechanic Shop Room #122" This plant change added two intermediate level sprinkler heads to the existing sprinkler system. In order to do this, the size of piping and valves had to be increased from 1.25" to 1.5" to meet the requirments of an ordinary hazard pipe schedule system.

Affected SAR Figure 9-16 It was determined that these changes did not: l i

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since no safety related equipment which could be damaged by water impingement is installed in the area of the new sprinkler heads and piping, the Fire Protection System can still operate in the event of a single failure, and the additional piping can be isolated; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since a single failure of Fire Water Piping has been previously analyzed 3 or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since adequate ability to extinguish or control fire propagation in the area will be provided by plant change.

ANO-1 PC 393-7082

" Remove Diesel Running Interlock with Exhaust Fans" This Plant Change removed the engine running permissives from the starting circuit of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) room exhaust fans in order to allow the fans to start when the temperature ewitch reaches its setpoint.

Affected SAR Figure: 8-3 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the removing the interlocks made the EDG exhaust fan control systems independent which eliminates the possibility of a single failure resulting in unavailability of both fans; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the reliability of the EDGs will be improved; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no margin of safety concerning EDG exhaust f ans is defined in the Technical Specification-bases. l 1

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SECTION III TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

ANO-1 TM 293-1-004 "RCP "D" Lower Rotor Vibration Monitor" This temporary modification disconnected the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) P32D lower motor velocity transducer and replaced the associated monitoring module in the Bently Nevada (BN) rack on control room panel C15. Two BN vibration probes were bracketed off the motor shaft jacking bolts to monitor motor coupling vibration.

This modification caused ANO-1 SAR Figure 7-21 to be inaccurate for the duration of this temporary change.

It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety '

evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the bracket design per existing RCP design requirements ensures the probability of reduction in coolant flow by mechanical failure of RCP "D" has not changed and no accident action, assumption, or mitigation is associated with the vibration monitoring system changes. The consequences of RCP "D" malfunction are not changed by the vibration monitoring system; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysie Report since the vibration system performs no control function, has no process connections, and has no functional failures other than loss of RCP vibration information; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no Technical Specification bases are identified as utilizing RCP vibration in a margin of safety.

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ANO-1 TM 393-1-007

This temporary modification installed and removed the seal top hat (s) during refueling operations. This modification allowed the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary to be maintained for refueling operations and allowed operations to fill, vent, and drain through the seal top hat design.

This modification caused ANO-1 SAR Section 4.2.2.5 to be inaccurate for the duration of this temporary change.

It was determined that these changes did nots (L) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the seal top hat has been designed, certified, and tested to 3X the static pressure for refueling operations. Neither the RCS pressure boundary nor the function of the RC pump are affected by this TM for the refueling operations conditions. The RC pump and seal affected by this TM are not relied upon to mitigate any design basis event or provide anything but a passive RCS pressure boundary; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the seal top hat installation does not impact the function of the RC pump and does not affect the ability to isolate the RCS pressure boundary; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no reference to the RC pump or mechanical seals is located in any Technical Specification or their bases.

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ANO-1 TM 393-1-011

" Transfer of Borated Water from 2T-6B to T-6" This temporary modification permitted transfer of borated water between Unit 1 and 2 Boric Acid Addition Tanks (BAAT). 2T-6B and T-6 were connected with flexible hoses to transfer borated water between the tanks.

This modification caused ANO-1 SAR Figure 9-4 and ANO-2 SAR Figure 9.3-4 to be inaccurate for the duration of this temporary change.

It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the equipment j associated with this TM is not an accident initiator and the j normal system function is not affected by the modification; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this TM does not incorporate or involve any component important to safety and the offsite dose will not be increased; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the margin of safety for this TM is not defined in the basis in any Technical Specifications.

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l ANO-1 TM 393-1-013 l

" Temporary Power to Battery Exhaust Fan VEF-33" l l

This temporary modification provided temporary 480V power to breaker B5146 to ;

allow Battery Exhaust Fan VEF-33 to function while MCC B51 is deenergized for maintenance.

This modification caused ANO-1 SAR Section 8.3.2.1.7 and Table 8-1 to be inaccurate for the duration of this temporary change.

It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malf unction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the battery room i exhaust fan is independent of any system required for mitigating l the consequences of a fire in the battery room and this TM does  ;

not affect any barriers which mitigate dose to the public; or, '

(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a j different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since any potential failure modes associated with this TM are clearly bounded by the loss of battery due to a fire or explosion and accidents of a different type than those described in the Unit 1 SAR will not be created; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the battery room exhaust fans and their power supplies are not addressed in the bases of the Unit 1 Technical Specifications.

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ANO-1 TH 393-1-017

" Temporary cooling f rom Fire Water system Ps-1030 to control Room Chillers ,

VCH-2A/2B" This temporary modification provided cooling water source for Unit 1 control l room chillers while the Auxiliary Cooling Water (ACW) system is out of service. A hose was installed from the fire water system FS-1030 to control l 1

room chiller VCH-2A or 2B.

This modification caused ANO-1 SAR Figure 9-16 to be inaccurate for the duration of this temporary change.  ;

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(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the ACW system is a non-Q, nonsafety-related system which is isolated on ESAS actuation and is not used to mitigate accidents and this modification does not degrade the fire water system's ability to perform its function as designed. No aquipment important to safety is affected or degraded by this TM; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety j Analysis Report since the fire water system is functioning as  !

designed and no new failure modes or accidents are created by the TH; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the fire water system is not covered in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications.

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ANO-1 TN 393-1-018, Revision 1 l l

" Installation of Tamporary Fire Pump" This temporary modification installed a fire pump on the lower grating at the east side of the Unit 2 intake structure. The pump was used to supply cooling water to various heat loads while the Auxiliary Cooling Water (ACW) and Service Water (SW) systems are secured.

This modification caused ANO-1 SAR Figure 9-16 to be inaccurate for the duration of this temporary change.

It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification does not degrade the fire water system's ability to perform its function as designed and does not affect or degrade equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety '

Analysis Report since the fire water system continues to function within design requirements and no new failure modes or accidents will be created; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the ACW and fire water systems are not described in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications.

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l ANO-1 TH 393-1-026 l

"Teeporary cooling Water for VCH-3 Administration Building Chiller" This temporary modification provided fire water system cooling water to VCH ,

-3 ( Administration Building Chiller) while auxiliary cooling water was l secured during 1R11.

This modification caused ANO-1 SAR Figures 9-9 and 9-16 to be inaccurate for the duration of this temporary change.

It was determined that these changes did not:

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the VCH-3 Administration Building Chiller has no affect on plant operations, the proper functioning of the fire water system is not impaired; or, l

(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report. In the event of a hose break, the fire water system will continue to be operable. The capability of the I turbine building drains / trench to absorb the leakage flow ensures )

that no new accident will be created; or, 1

(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any l Technical Specification since the chiller and fire water systems I are not covered by the Unit 1 Technical Specifications or the bases.

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ANO-1 TM 393-1-028

" Secondary Side Steam Generator Sample Cooler Temporary Bypass" This temporary modification installed tubing / fittings to bypass the steam generator sample cooler E31A and installed a temporary cooler with condensate as cooling water.

This modification caused ANO-1 SAR Section 9.2 and 9.3 and Figure 9-5 to be inaccurate for the duration of this temporary change.

It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since equivalent rated components are used. This equipment is nonsafety-related, is not required to function during an emergency condition, is not required for accident mitigation, and does not affect equipment important to safety; or, l

(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a l different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report. Since equivalent pressure rated components are used and this installation is downstream of the manual isolation valve SS-146, the capability to maintain pressure boundary or isolate the equipment is available. This equipment is nonsafety-related, does not affect any safety-related equipment, and is not required for use during accident conditions; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the SAR does not define a margin of safety for the equipment affected by this TM.

ANO-1 TM 393-1-040

" Instrument Air Jumper to Startup Boiler Instrument Air" This temporary modification installed an air hose from the instrument air header in Unit 1 to the instrument air header in the startup boiler. This was accomplished by connecting the air hose from instrument air valves IA-177 to IA-749. The purpose of this TM was to allow for the continued operation of the startup boiler during plant heatup and hot standby.

This modification caused ANO-1 SAR Figure 9-14 to be inaccurate for the duration of this temporary change.

It was determined that these changes did not:

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the equipment affected by this TH is not credited with initiating any of the evaluated accidents in the SAR. The af fected equipment is not safety-related, is not relied upon for accident mitigation, and will not hinder equipment which is relied upon for accident mitigation. No new scenarios such as seismic II/I are created by this TM which could impact equipment important to safety and existing accident analysis and plant operating parameters will not be challenged or changed; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since there are no new conditions or plant operating practices resulting from this TM which could cause a new or different type accident than those already evaluated in the SAR. This TM does not modify or change any equipment important to safety and there are no new failure modes for equipment important to safety created; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there are no margins of safety defined in the Technical Specifications bases for the startup boiler or instrument air systems. The margins of safety defined in the Technical Specification bases for other systems will not be changed or affected.

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ANO-1 TH 893-1-042

" Bypass of L5-1601" This temporary modification cross-connected contacts X and 21 on Level Switch LS-1601 to enable heater M-33 to be activated with bypassing of input from LT-1600. A tygon tube was installed on the discharge of CA-1600A valve for T-7 level monitoring.

This modification caused ANO-1 SAR Figure 9-4 to be inaccurate for the duration of this temporary change.  !

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It was determined that these changes did not:

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an j accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety I evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the temperature control has not been altered, the off-site dose will not be increased, and the system and components are not related to safe shutdown; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since all components involved in this TM are not safety-related. The Boric Acid Mixing Tank (BAMT) is non-Q and is not evaluated for an accident scenario in the LBD; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the margin of safety for the BAMT level transmitter and level switch is not defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.

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ANO-1 TM 893-1-044

" Replacement of Generator Hydrogen Temperature Recorder TR-9001" This temporary modification replaced the Main Generator Gas Temperature Recorder, TR-9001, Alarm Processor, TR-9001A, and Annunciator Panel, K-1644, with a temporary recorder. The new recorder provided all the functions of the previous equipment with additional functions available.

.is modification caused ANO-1 SAR Figure 9-9 to be inaccurate for the

.uration of this temporary modification.

It was determined that these changes did not:

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since none of the equipment involved in this modification are initiators of any accident evaluated in the SAR. The new recorder provides the same level of indication to the operators, does not result in any increase in the probability of any other existing equipment causing an accident, and does not mitigate any accidents. The installation of this new recorder does not affect any safety-related equipment or any equipment required for the safe shutdown of the unit; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the new recorder does not result in any new accidents and does not change the possibility of any other equipment in the plant initiating an accident of any type. The modifications do not change the failure modes of any equipment and are bounded by the existing SAR; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the monitoring of the main generator hydrogen gas temperatures is not included in the Technical Specification bases.

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. 1 ANO-1 Temporary Modification 93-1-049

" Low Pressure Nitrogen Supply to Unit 1 and Unit 2 Condensers" This modification provided low pressure nitrogen supply to both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 condensers in order to reduce oxygen concentration in the j l

Condensate and Feedwater Systems.This modification temporarily invalidated l l ANO-1 SAR Figures 9-4 and 10-2 and ANO-2 SAR Figures 10.2-4 and 10.4-3.

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I It was determined that these changes did not: '

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an l accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety I evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the Nitrogen System, which is not used to mitigate any analyzed accident, j has sufficient capacity to supply the additional loads to the I condensers. Also, the modification has no direct interface with any safety related equipment, does not alter the safe shutdown j capability of either unit, and creates no new release paths; or, j 1

(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the Core Flood and Safety Injection Tanks are isolated during normal operation after nitrogen feed, j all other critical systems are equiped with nitrogen accumulators, and no new failure modes are created; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since neither the ability of the l condenser to maintain proper vacuum nor the ability of the I

of the Nitrogen System to supply the Core Flood and Safety Injection Tanks was not changed or degraded.

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ANO-1 WP 1409.512

" Evaluation of Decay Heat Pump Bearing Temperatures" This Workplan (WP) collected test data to evaluate the effect of a loss of Service Water supply to the Decay Heat Bearing / Seal Coolers.

This modification caused Unit 1 SAR Section 9.3.2.1 to be invalid for the duration of the test.

It was determined that these changes did not:

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment importsat to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the procedure incorporates contingency measures for reestablishing cooling water for emergency operations and incorporates requirements to ensure the tempereture limitations are not exceeded; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysia Report since the pump remains operable and the cooling water is restorable at any time; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification. The Decay Heat pump and the availability of LPI has not been compromised by this test procedure, therefore the margin to safety has not been reduced.

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SECTION IV MISCELLANEOUS EVALUATIONS i

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ANO-1 Plant Ops Organizational Chart j

" Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Organizational Chart" Changes to the ANO Organizational Chart included the addition of Special Projects and Manager in Ops Certification Training as reporting to the General Manager Plant Operations and the removal of Manager Industrial Support.

This modification caused a revision to QAMO Sections 1.3.1, 1.3.1.2, and 1.3.1.3, Appendix B, and Figure F-2.

It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this is an organizational change and only involves the reporting chain of the General Manager Plant Operations. No equipment is involved; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this is an organizational change, is administrative in nature, and does not involve equipment; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since this is an organizational change only and is administrative in nature.

ANO-1 Central Support Organisation

" Central Support Reorganization" This reorganization deleted the positions of Superintendent, Maintenance Engineering and Supervisor, Maint3 nance Engineering. The responsibilities assigned to these two positions were transferred to the Unit 1 Maintenance Manager and the Unit 1 and Unit 2 System Engineering Managers.

This modification caused a revision to QAMO Section 1.3.1.1.2, Unit 1 SER

  1. 124, and Unit 2 SER #98.

It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the organization changes do not modify the plant facilities in any way and the settings and safety limits specified in the Technical Specifications remain unchanged; or, I

(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a J different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the organization changes involve procedural and responsibility changes only and there is no impact on the plant equipment or f acilities that would change the settings or safety limits; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the organization changes do not modify the plant facilities in any way and the settings, safety limits, and margins of safety specified in the basis for any Technical Specifications remain unchanged.

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ANO-1 QAMO 1

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" Organization Changes to Licensing Department" l

l This reorganization changed the reporting requirements of the Safety Assessment Section from the Manager, Standards to the Director, Licensing and the reporting requirements of the In-House Events Analysis Section from the Director, Quality to the Director, Licensing. A revision to the evaluation addressed the transferral of Safety Assessment Section functions to the Supervisor, In-House Events Analysis.

This modification caused a revision to QAMO Sections 1.3.1.3, 1.3.1.3.1, i 1.3.2, 1.3.4, 1.3.4.4, 1.3.4.5, and Figures 5 and 7.

l It was determined that these changes did not:

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an l accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this administrative change does not affect any plant equipment or its operation. The changes do not modify any plant system used to mitigate the consequences of an accident or change its method of operation and do not modify and equipment important to safety or system which could affect safety-related equipment; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since no physical change is being made to any equipment important to safety and no functions of the affected sections are changed by this reorganization which could create an accident of a different type than previously evaluated; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no physical changes to the plant or its operation are being made by this reorganization that would affect any Technical Specification bases.

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ANO-1 QAMO, Revision 16

" Quality Assurance Manual-Operations" This is an organizational change which moved the reporting line for Supplier Quality Assurance from the Director, Licensing & Quality Assurance to the Vice President, operations Support.

It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this administrative change does not affect any plant equipment or its operation. No equipment important to safety or systems which would affect safety-related equipment are affected. The design and operation of all safety-related equipment remains unaffected by this reorganization and therefore any radiological consequences are unchanged; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety ,

Analysis Report. Since this is an administrative change that affects reporting requirements only, no physical change is being made to any equipment important to safety or its operation; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any )

Technical Specification since no physical changes to the plant or its operation are being made by this reorganization that would affect any Technical Specification bases. f I

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e ANO-1 CR 11-89-0266

" Condition Report Action Item #5" This change deleted the engineered safeguards (ES) containment isolation closure signal from the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal injection isolation valves (CV-1206) prior to plant startup. This signal deletion eliminated unnecessary interruptions of seal injection flow to the RCP seals.

This modification caused a revision to ANO-1 SAR Table 5-1 and Figure 5-6.

It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the failure of CV-1206 to automatically close on an ES signal is not a precursor to any analyzed accident. This change does not adversely affect the overall containment isolation safety function and does not contribute to the mitigation of consequences of a malfunction of any equipment important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility fdr an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this change does not create any piping configurations or any new operating modes and has no negative impact on the operation of equipment important to safety; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the automatic closure of CV-1206 is not specifically credited in the calculation of any margin of safety.

ANO-1 CR 31-93-0173-01

" Manual Pre-Trip ERV Usage" This package addressed references which state or imply that the ERV is used to control pressure transients in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS).

It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malf unction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since manual operation of the ERV in pre-trip RCS conditions to mitigate the consequences of an overpressure transient that could lead to a reactor trip does not utilize the valve in any condition for which it was not designed; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report. The only difference between the way the ERV was evaluated in the original licensing documents /SAR and the way being evaluated now is that it will be manually operated vice automatically operated. The mode of operation of the valve does not circumvent the failure of the valve that has already been evaluated and therefore the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR is not created; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no change to the design or operability of the ERV is being introduced in operations of the valve for which this evaluation is being performed.

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l ANO-1 CALC 86-1224514-01 "ANO-1 Cycle 11 Extension" This change revised the Cycle 11 Reload Analysis Report in expectation of surpassing the analyzed cycle length of 466 Effective Full Power Days. Based upon extensive analyses by Babcock & Wilcox, a coastdown to 70% power in order to extend the life of Cycle 11 to 490 EFPD has been found to satisfy safety and operating limits, safety analyses, and all other licensing basic requirements.

Affected SAR Section: 3A It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since no physical or operational core change was involved, fuel cladding stress, strain, and fatigue usage factor were all within established limits and therefore fuel integrity would not be challenged, and off-site dose will remain well within 10CFR100 requirements; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since no physical or operational core change was involved, fuel integrity was maintained, no change in plant operation was made, and the slight reactivity changes which resulted did not place the plant in a configuration which had not been previously analyzed; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since fuel integr<ty was maintained, the slight changes in reactivity characteristics did not affect the Technical Specifications, and the assumptions and results of the analysis did not conflict with or invalidate any information in the Technical Specifications.

ANO-1 CRs 1-89-0283

" Core Flood Tank Fill and Makeup / Nitrogen supply" Revision 1 to the IOCFR50.59 Review for this Condition Report addressed the addition of exceptions of the Core Flood Tank Fill and Makeup / Nitrogen Supply penetrations to General Design Criterion 56.

i Affected SAR Section: 5.2.2.4.1 j I

l It was determined that these changes did nots i

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the system is used inf requently and administrative controls exist to ensure that the three leak tested valves which serve to maintain containment isolation are closed in a timely fashion after the system is used; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a i different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety l Analysis Report since no alterations to any system or equipment important to safety have been made; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the required 10CFR50 Appendix J leak rate testing will continue to ensure compliance with the containment leakage specifications in the Technical Specifications.

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ANO-1 CR 31-91-0338 l

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" Penetration Room Ventilation System" This change permanently locked closed idle filter cooling valves CV-2126 and CV-2136. i Affected SAR Section: 6.5.2.1 Figures 6-10 It was determined that these changes did not:

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since this system is strictly for accident mitigation and no accident initiators involve this system in any way. For failures of equipment, the system responde in precisely the same manner as before; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a  !

different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety l Analysis Report. This change only causes an increase in the temperature of an idled burdened filter whose function has already been completed. Nothing else is affected; or, )

(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any j Technical Specification since no Technical Specification bases deal with the filter cooling flow or its function in any way.

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ANO-1 CR 81-92-0302 "8AR Chapter 5, structures" This change allowed operations to use the steam generator (SG) drain lines to blowdown to the condenser during startup and shutdown. Corrections to the description of GDC classifications for main steam, feedwater, emergency feedwater, SG drains, and sample lines were made.

Affected SAR Sections: 5.2.2.4, 5.2.2.4.1 Table 5-1 It was determined that these th0ngas did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the majority of the changes were clarifications of GDC applicability and no design changes were involved. No functional changes were made. Allowing the SG drain header manual isolation valves to be cycled during startup and shutdown will not increase the probability of their failure; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report. All the changes made to the SAR relate to containment isolation criteria. Failure of a containment boundary can not result in an accident. Changing the GDC classification of an existing penetration without any resulting modifications can not result in any new malfunctions; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any i Technical Specification. No margins of safety defined in the basis for any Technical Specification have been altered in any I way. The ANO-1 design basis for containment isolation remains j valid.

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ANO-1 DRN 394-00419 "P&ID M-204 sheet 2 Changes" Plant Engineering Action Request 94-0080 evaluated discrepencies between

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design drawings and plant configuration. This Drawing Revision Notice i corrected discrepencies dealing with feedwater pump and turbine trip signals.

l Affected SAR Figure: 10-2  !

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(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence oi an i accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the affected equipment is not credited with causing any accidents and is not safety related, no plant operating conditions, parameters, j or responses were chsnged, and no physical changes were made l to plant configuration; or, l l

(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the af fected equipment is not safety related or credited with causing any evaluated accident and no physical changes were made to plant configuration; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since feedwater pump and main turbine trip inputs are not addressed in the Technical Specification bases.

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ANO-1 DRN 394-03193 "P&ID - Instrument and Service Air" This DRN deletes an instrument air valve, IA-87, on air receiver tank T-86 from its respective P&ID since the valve is no longer installed in the plant.

Affected SAR Figure: 9-14 It was determined that these changes did not:

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since since no safety related equipment or systems were affected and redundant isolation existed; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since no safety related equipment or systems were affected and redundant isolation was provided; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no margin of safety is defined for insturment air isolation to air receiver tank T-86 in any Technical Specification bases.

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ANO-1 DRN 94-03194 "P&ID Instrument and Service Air" This DRN deletes Emergency Escape Hatch Local Leak Rate Testing connection instrument air valves IA-5417, IA-5418, and IA-5419 from the proper P&ID.

Affected SAR Figure 9-14 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysio Report since procedures are in place which provide for verification of isolation Local Leak Rate Testing connections, redundant isolation was provided, the integrity of the test connections was not affected, and the function of the escape hatch remains unchanged; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evalu=ted previously in the Safety Analysis Report since deletion of the valves had no adverse affect on any safety related equipment; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the only reference to the Emergency Escape Hatch states that pressure testing is required every 6 months or whenever the hatch is opened and reactor building integrity is required and procedures exist which insure isolation of the hatch test connections.

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ANO-1 DRN 393-04293

  • P&ID Instrument and Service Air" This change reflects the cutting and capping of a service air supply line to Startup Boiler M-2, which has been removed, on a Piping and Instrument Diagram.

Affected SAR Figure: 9-14 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since no accidents address incidents involving the Service Air System or the Startup Boiler and since no safety related equipment was served by service air line to the boiler; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the startup boiler did not support or supply service to any safety related equipment; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no margins of safety address the service air line to the startup boiler.

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ANO-1 LDCR

" Evaluation of Health Physics Changes Required for Revised 10CFR20 Ieplementation" This evaluation brought ANO documents into compliance with new terminology, format, and requirements contained in the revised 10CFR20.

Revisions to the ANO-1 SAR Sections 1.4.55, 9.2.2, 9.6.2.3, 9.7.2.1, 11.1.3.3.6, 11.2.1.1, 11.2.3, 11.2.4.3, and 11.2.6.3.1; and Table 1-2; ANO-2 SAR Sections 3.1.6, 3.2.1.1, 5.2.8.1.3, 5.5.1.3, 9.1.4.3.3, 9.3.2.2.4, 9.4.1.3, 11.2.9, 11.5.1, 11.5.6, 11.6.2, 11.7, 12.1, 12.1.1, 12.1.1.1, 12.1.1.3, 12.1.2.2, 12.1.2.4, 12.1.2.9, 12.1.5, 12.1.6, 12.2.6, 12.3.3.1, 12.5, and 15.1.13.4; and Tables 3.2-1 and 3.2-6; ANO-1 Technical Specifications section 6.12.2.2 and Bases Sections 3.25.1.1 and 4.29.1.1; ANO-2 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.5 and Bases Sections 3/4.11.1.1; and the ANO Emergency Plan Introduction; Sections I, J, K, and M; and Tables D-1, D-2, and K-1 were required as a result of this evaluation.

Affected SAR Sections: 1.4.55, 11.1.3.3.8, 11.2.1.1, 11.2.3, 11.2.4.3,

11. 2 . 6. 3 . *. , 11.4, 9.2.2, 9.6.2.3, 9.7.2.1 Table: 1-2 It was determined that these changes did not:

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the administrative changes associated with 10CFR2O implementation can be neither the cause nor the mitigator of any accident and do not affect the operation of safety related equipments or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since these changes, which are administrative in nature, are not related to the cause of any accident and do not impact any safety related equipment; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any ,

Technical Specification since the changes do not alter the meaning or intent of the Technical Specification bases.

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ANO-1 SAR Figura Updates Disabling and Abandonment of Old Start-up Boiler Design Change Package 83-1167 installed a new start-up boiler and disabled and abandoned in place the old boiler. To administratively disposition drawings that affected Safety Analysis Report figures, a 50.59 evaluation was performed.

Affected SAR Figures 1-10, 1-3, 1-5, 1-8, 10-2, 8-1, 9-9, A-2, A-4, A-6 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since no evaluated accidents were affected by activities associated with abandoning the start-up boiler and none of the equipment was safety-related; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the old start-up boiler did not support or provide services to any safety-related equipment and the i changes made to the SAR figures neither created nor affected ,

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(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there are no margins of safety defined in any Technical Specification basis related to the changes that were made.

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ANO-1 LDCR ,

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" Emergency Plan" Numerour Jhanges to the Emergency Plan were referenced by the 10CFR50.59 Review.

Revisions to the QAMO, as well as SARs, were required as a result of these changes. A reference in the SAR to Petit Jean Airport was deleted since it is no longer operational.

Affected SAR Section: 2.2.6 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the Petit Jean Airport had no impact on the malfunction of plant equipment or the consequences of a malfunction; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the airport had nothing to do with plant equipment; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no Technical Specification bases address the Petit Jean Airport.

ANO-1 LDCR "ANO-1 Cycle 12 Reload Report" The ANO-1 Cycle 12 Reload Analysis Report was incorporated in the SAR as Chapter 3A. It describes changes in core design, fuel batch design, and the effects of the new fuel design on existing design and safety analysis.

Affected SAR Section: 3A It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since no initiators of any evaluated accident were changed and neither plant equipment nor operations were affected as a result of changes in core design, fuel, and methodology used in analyses; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since changes in core design, fuel, and methodology used in the safety analyses did not affect any accident initiators, did not alter plant equipment or configuration, and created no new failure modes; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the only margins of safety which address the Cycle 12 changes to core design, fuel design, and safety analysis are bounded by generic calculations and current core parameters.

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ANO-1 LDCR

" Software Change Request #SPDS.126" This revision to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) displays changed the arrangement of menus to provide the operator with quicker access to information.

Affected SAR Section: 7.3.4.2.3 It was determined that these changes did nets (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification increases the probability of operator detection of degrading conditions and taking action to prevent accidents. The probability of detecting conditions which could cause equipment malfunction is increased and the probability and consequences of equipment malfunctioning is decreased; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the way the plant is operated and physical equipment condition is not changed. Available SPDS indications and the physical ties between the SPDS and equipment are not altered; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since SPDS display menu layout is not a consideration in any Technical Specification bases.

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ANO-1 SSCA/ FHA CLARIFICATION

" Fire Protection Program Description Clarifications" This modification deleted the Safe Shutdown Capability Assessment (SSCA) from the Safety Analyis Reports (SAR) and revised the description of the Fire Hazards Analysis (FRA) to eliminate reference to its engineering calculation number.

This modification caused a revision to QAMO Appendix B, Section 2.4 and every page of the FHA.

Affected SAR Sections: 9A.7, 9B, 9C It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since no plant equipment or method of operation of plant squipment was modified by these changes, no safety-related equipment was af fected, and the method of review of the SSCA and FRA when developing modifications was not affected; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since these administrative changes did not cause enanges to any plant system or its method of operation. No plant processes or equipment were modified; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification. Since no physical changes were made, the Technical Specification bases related to any shutdown equipment remain unaffected.

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ANO-1 LDCR

" Unit 1 SAR 9.6" These changes involved movement of spent fuel from the spent fuel pool to outside of the Auxiliary Building through the train bay. Specifically, the changes addressed: 1) removal of the limitations that any fuel movement in a  ;

shipping cask is to ship fuel off-site, 2) removal of the requirement to use a safety sling whenever moving a fuel cask in the spent fuel pool area, and

3) removal of the 9 inch cask lift height restriction as the only lift height l consideration.

i Affected SAR Sections: 9.6.1.1, 9.6.2.2, 9.6.2.3, 9.6.2.6 l

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It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report. The SAR recognizes that fuel will be shipped from the fuel pool at some point in the future. Since fuel that is shipped from the pool to on-site is not anticipated to return to the spent fuel pools prior to off-site shipment, the probability of the analyzed accident

" spent fuel cask drop" is not increased. Margins that might be j gained by use of slings are replaced by use of cask height restrictions and use of energy absorbing material. Not using a sling for spent fuel cask movement does not introduce new aspects to cask use or movement. The cask uses the same load path, is still assumed to drop for analysis purposes, and damage from that drop is not increased or decreased; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since on-site storage casks are subject to the same design criteria as a shipping cask within the scope of their use while on-site. Changes are made to ensure that the margin of safety is maintained or enhanced by mandating additional analysis if a different spent fuel cask is utilized than the cask analyzed for the SAR; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.

ANO-1 QAMO, Revision 15

  • Quality Assurance Manual operations" The position of Fire Protection Supervisor no longer exists. Therefore, "ANO Fire Protection Supervisor" has been replaced with " Manager, Engineering Programs".

Affected SAR Section: 9.8.3.1 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the organization and title changes affecting ANO do not directly relate to any accidente evaluated in the LBDs. All significant functions have been maintained, dose consequences are unaffected, and the design basis will remain the same; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since reorganization does not introduce new equipment, modifications to existing equipment, or operating procedures; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since reorganization does not affect margin to safety.

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ANO-1 LDCR i

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l "ANO-1 SAR Revisions" Due to changes in the ANO-1 Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) analysis, a higher return to power was predicted. This j modification reflected the results of this re-analysis in the SAR.

Affected SAR Sections: 10.3, 14.2.2.1.3.1, 14.2.2.1.3.2, 14.2.2.1.3.4 Table: 14-19A It was determined that these changes did r.ots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the MSLB analysis relates to accident mitigation and progression, not to accident initiation. There is no change in off-site dose consequences and none of the changes affect the way in which equipment important to safety is operated or the conditions under which equipment important to safety is operated; or, (11; increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since the changes are analytical only and have no accident initiation potential. None of the changes af fect the way in which equipment important to safety is operated or the conditions under which equipment important to safety is operated; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since there are no margins of safety defined in any Technical Specification bases that relate to I any of the changes.

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ANO-1 LDCR "ANO-1 Safety Analysis Report" This modification added information on the Uncompensated Operating Reactivity Changes (UORC) analysis in ANO-1 SAR Chapter 14.

Affected SAR Sections: 14.1.2.1, 14.1.2.1.1 s

It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the UORC analysis has not been altered and the analysin has no effect on any plant equipment at ANO-1; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this change is limited to discussion of the UORC analysis and this analysis has no effect on any plant equipment at ANO-1; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no Technical Specification is based on the UORC analysis.

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SECTION II l

DESIGN CHANGES

ANO-1 DCP 386-1069

" Fuel Bandling Equipment Modification" This design change replaced and/or modified equipment located on the refueling bridge. The main bridge grapple control was changed to pneumatic operation.

Affected SAR Sections: 9.6.1.6, 9.6.2.2 It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment Lmportant to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the equipment is mounted seismically per seismic Class I specifications and the fuel handing equipment is in no way used to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The changes per this DCP result in equipment with the same form, fit, and function as the replaced equipment; or, (11) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report. This DCP consists of replacing equipment with upgraded, similar equipment and will not create the possibility of a different type accident or malfunction of safety-related equipment; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.

l ANO-1 DCP 389-1022

" Alternate AC Power Source (IR11 Outage Work)"

This design change installed a portion of the Station Blackout Project as required by 10CFR50.63 during refuelling outage IR11. This portion of the project mounted the 4160 Volt switchgear in ANO-2, installed electrical raceways in both units, and completed electrical tie-ins in ANO-1 in preparation for completion of the project.

This design change required the revision of ANO-1 SAR figure 8-1 and ANO-2 SAR figuree 8.3-1, 8.3-59, and 8.3-66. - - - - - -

Affected SAR Figuret 8-1 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence an accident or malfunction of equipment important to sat _.2 evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the new cables, trays, conduits, and switchgear were installed in either the non-safety related Turbine Building or in existing raceways in the safety related Auxiliary Building. Connections to safety q related equipment were isolated by circuit breakers or coil-to-contact isolation and therefore considered non-safety related.

1 Failures which involve this isolation will cause the loss of only one safety bus, which is bounded by the " Loss of All AC l Power" accident and the estimated off-site dose due to this I

accident was not affected; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since none of equipment which was added is safety related and all connections with safety related equiment was isolated by qualified devices. Failures which involve this isolation can only result in the loss of one safety bus for which there is a redundant bus; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the only Technical Specification bases which are applicable define a margin of safety as maintaining one channel of the redundant safety related power system available during accident conditions and failures involving the isolation between the safety related and non-safety related equipment can only result in the loss of one safety bus.

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ANO-1 DCP 389-1060

" Appendix A Fire Barrier Upgrados - ANO-1" This design change replaced fire dampers and added or replaced fire doors to bring ANO-1 into compliance with Branch Technical Position 9.5-1, Appendix A.

This change required a change to FRA Section 10.1 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the changes made will only enhance protection of safety related equipment and systems; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since all fire dampers which were replaced met the design criteria of the affected systems and were seismically supported and all fire doors which were added or replaced were located in a non-safety related portion of the plant; or, (iii) reduce the margin of oafety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the changes did not affect any  ;

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u ANO-1 DCP 190-1041, DCPR 10 "ANO-1 Neutralizing Tank (T-50) Filtration system" Revision 10 to this Design Change Package removed Service Water Sample Tubing from Intermediate Cooling Water Heat Exchangers E-28B and E-28C and sections of Condenser Hotwell Heating Steam piping. These removals were made in order to allow the installatin of a filter skid for the Neutralizing Tank Filtration System.

A revision to ANO-1 SAR Figure 9-6 was necessary as a result of the removal of the sample piping.

Affected SAR Figures: 9-6 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment Lmportant to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the non-safety related Neutralizing Tank Filtration System is not used in the mitigation of any evaluated accident, insures that j liquid ef fluent is within the National Pollutants Discharge Elimination System specified allowable range, was designed and installed in accordance with ANSI B31.1 Power Piping Code, and does not affect the unit's safe shutdown capability ; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the filtration system is non-safety related, has no interconnections with any safety related systems or equipment, and is not required to shut the reactor down, maintain the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary, or mitigate the consequences of an accident; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the installation of the Neutralizing Tank Filtration System did not affect any bases of the Technical Specifications.

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ANO-2 DCP 390-1051

" ANO-1 Black Lattery" This design change installed a non-safety 125 VDC distribution system to supply power for most of the non-safety loads on the red and green train buses.

This change required a revision to ANO-1 SAR Sections 1.4.13, 8.1.2, 8.2.1.3, 8.2.1.4, 8.3.1.1.6, 8.3.2.1, 8.3.2.1.1, 8.3.2.1.2, 8.3.2.1.3, 8.3.2.1.4, 8.3.2.1.5, 8.3.2.1.6, 8.3.2.1.7, 8.3.2.1.8, 9.7.2.1, 9.7.2.2, and 9.11, Figures 1-3, 1-4, A-2, A-3, 8-1, 8-9, 9-13, and 9-14; ANO-2 SAR Section 8.2.1.3 and Figure 8.2-3; and FRA Sections 6.4.4, 10.0, and Figure A-2.

Affected SAR Section: 8.2.1.3 Figure 8.2-3 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the new 125 VDC system and its associated loads are not safety related and will help the station cope with a loss of electric power other than station batteries; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety Analysis Report since no new failure modes which have not been previously evaluated were introduced; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the non-safety 125 VDC bus and associated loads have no impact on any margin of safety.

l ANO-1 DCP 390-2053, DCPR 5

" Control Room Expansion Facility"  ;

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This modification erected a 2-story structure on the Turbine Deck which encloses both units' Control Room Shift Superintendent's offices and installed all necessary fire protection equipment. This structure, designated the Control Room Expansion Facility, allowed administrative functions to be moved out of the Control Room.

The construction of this facility necessitated the revision of ANO-1 SAR figures 1-3, 1-8, 1-9, 9-16, A-1, and A-2; ANO-2 SAR figures 1.2-3, 1.2-8, 3.5-5, 9.4-1, 9.4-3, and 12.1-5; Fire Hazards Analysis figures 5-21 and 5-28; I and Industrial Safety Plan figure 15.

Affected SAR Figures: 1-2, 1-3, 1-8, 1-9, 9-16, A-1, A-2 It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety Analysis Report since the facility houses non-vital functions; no changes to any operating requirements, controls, pressure-retaining requirements, or safety functions were made; the Control Room remained capable of being properly isolated during all phases of the modification; no ignition sources were used in the Control Room; no safety-related equipment was directly or indirectly affected; and no Control Room design bases were violated; or, I

(ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a j different type than any evaluated previously in the safety {

Analysis Report since the Expansion Facility is not associated l with any Nuclear or Non-Nuclear piping or electrical system, no l facility equipment was placed on emergency diesel loading or connected to safety-related equipment,and the new curtain wall and fire doors were previously evaluated and will perform the original intended function; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any l Technical Specification since the non-Q, non-safety-related Turbine Deck equipment affected is not addressed in any basis of the Technical Specifications and no Control Room design bases were violated.

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l ANO-1 DCP 391-1010 "12 VDC Emergency Ligating Enhancements" This design change relocated existing and installed new 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> emergency lighting fixtures in the ANO-1 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump Room and the non-Q Switchgear Area.

This modification caused a revision to tne FRA Pages 118 and 159 and Figures 5-18 and 5-20.

It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since these lighting 1 fixtures do not af f ect the operation of safety-related equipment.

The fixtures are seismically installed to prevent II/I safety concerne; or,  ;

l (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety l Analysis Report since the fixtures enhanced the existing lighting system. The new lighting fixtures are the same as the existing fixtures and meet applicable codes, standards, and quality assurance requirements; or, I

(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification. Emergency lighting testing intervals are called out in the ANO-1 Technical Specifications. The testing interval is not being changed by this DCP. Therefore, there will not be any reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases of the Technical Specifications.

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ANO-1 DCP 891-1013

" Decay Heat Removal (DER) Vortex Monitoring" f This design change installed DHR pump motor current monitoring instrument loops with Control Room indication on the plant computer and Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). Additionally, a new Decay Heat annunciator was l installed to provide the operator with warning of potential system vortexing.

f Affected SAR Section: 9.5.2.7 Figure: 9-12 l It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the additional DHR pump instrumentation and indication / annunciation added by this DCP have no impact upon the initiation of any accident.

No new failure modes were created and safety functions were not affected; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since no new failure modes were created and any f ailures of the equipment installed by this DCP will be either the same f ailures as presented by existing safety-related equipment or will be bounded by existing single failure analyses; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the additional DHR pump instrumentation and indication / annunciation had no impact on any of the margins of safety.

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ANO-1 DCP 893-1007

" Refueling Machina Upgrade" This design change replaced and modified refueling equipment. On the spent fuel bridge, the hydraulic control system was replaced with a pneumatic system.

Affected SAR Section: 9.6.2.3 It was determined that theso changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since none of the mechanical or electrical constraints have been changed by this DCP and the equipment is mounted seismically per Seismic Class I specifications. The fuel handling equipment is not used to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The changes result in equipment with the same form, fit, and function as the replaced equipment; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this DCP consists of replacing equipment with upgraded equipment of the same form, fit, and function; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any .

Technical Specification.

ANO-1 LCP 390-5052

" Installation of Drain Valves for Boundary Leak Testing" This LCP installed additional vents and drains to the Service Water (SW) and Auxiliary Cooling Water (ACW) systems to support leak testing of SW boundary valves. g Affected SAR Figures 9-10, 9-6 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the modifications do not alter any functional, operational, or failure modes. The drains are installed in accordance with the existing piping design requirements and no equipment important to safety is affected; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the ACW and SW system design standards are maintained and no new failure modes are being introduced. No equipment important to safety is affected; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification sicce the ACW system is not referenced in the Technical Specifications and the function of the SW system will not be changed. No new failure modes are introduced and operational margins are not changed by the addition of drains.

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ANO-1 LCP 891-5011 1

1 "CV-1206 and CV-1234 Replacement" This LCP replaced Velan gate valves CV-1206 and CV-1234 with Anchor / Darling gate valves of the same size. The new valves are capable of withstanding higher thrust loads generated by the motor operators than the previous valves and will allow the setpoints of the actuators to be adjusted ao required by

) setpoint calculations (V-CV-1206-10 and V-CV-1234-10). The valves received new motor pinions, worm shaft gearing, and new spring packs. As a result, l the valves have new stroke times (19.5 seconds for CV-1206 and 17 seconds for CV-1234).

Affected SAR Table: 4-23 It was determined that these changes did not:

(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an I

accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the new stroke times have no effect on the injection flow into the Reactor Coolant System or the system's ability to mitigate accidents.

The modifications made by this LCP do not change the function or performance of the system and appropriate piping and support analyses are included; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the modifications being made do not add any additional pressure boundary components or change the function or mode of any components in the system; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.

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  • ANO-1 LCP 392-5027

" Addition of B2-B7 Cross-Connect Breaker" This LCP permanently installed a means of quickly cross-connecting load centers B2 and B7. A new cross-tie breaker which will only be operated during cold or refueling shutdown was added between B2 and B7.

Affected SAR Section: 8.3.1.1.4 Figure 8-1 It was determined that these changes did nots

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(1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report. Both B2 and B7 are non-Q components as are all the loads supplied by these load centers. The new cross-tie breaker is also non-Q and is installed in a Seismic Class II location. Cross-tying load centers B2 and B7 has no effect on the normal operation of the components supplied by these load centers; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a l different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety l Analysis Report. The installation of a new cross-tie breaker between B2 and B7 will have no adverse effects on any equipment important to safety because it is installed in a non-Q application and there is no Q equipment in the vicinity. The use of the new breaker to cross-tie the load centers B2 and B7 will have no adverse ef fects on any Q equipment because all of the components supplied by B2 and B7 will operate as originally designed; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since none of the Technical Specification bases address non-Q load centers or their operation while in cold or refueling shutdown.

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ANO-1 LCP 393-5005

" Emergency Lighting Modification - EL2, EL6, EL8" This modification restored EL2, EL6, and EL8 emergency light units to their proper configuration to ensure that adeqaute illumination could be provided for the performance of safe shutdown duties.

It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or .t.alfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the emergency lighting system is self contained and has no interface with safety related equipment; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since no additional loads were created nor any components added that affected the operation or control of the plant and the emergency lighting system has no interface with safety related equipment; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since no components were affected that provide for a margin of safety as defined in any Technical Specification bases.

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ANO-1 LCP 393-5012 "PDT-1238 Upgrade" This LCP relocated and upgraded the makeup flow instrument loop from pneumatics to electronics. A signal was added to the plant computer for monitoring and alarm initiation and a local flow gage wae included at the transmitter.

Affected SAR Figure: 9-3 Table: 7-11A It was determined that these changes did nots (i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment ireportant to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the probability of a pressure bout 4ary failure due to this installation was no+,

increased. No SAR accidents were affected and offsite dose implications were not changed; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the instrumentation and installation performs the same function as the original equipment; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of ghy Technical Specification.

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ANO 'l LCP 193-5016 l

" Limit Switch Change for CV-2625 and CV-2675" ,

l This modification dealt with changing the limit switch settings for two valves in the Feedwater System. The valves were identified as marginal and this modification increased their capabilities. The changes involved the motor operated actuators only; no changes were made to the valves or the piping system.

Affected SAR Sections: 14.2.2.1.3.5, 14.2.2.1.5 It was determined that these changes did nots (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification will only affect the operation of the valves on a post-trip

" rapid feedwater reduction" signal and eince the lo. ,er closure time was justified by a RELAP analysis and was also bounded by conservative assumptions made in a previous analysis; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since this modification will improve the performance of the valves and only affects their operation on a post-trip signal and; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the main feedwater control valve limit switch setpoints were not mentioned in any margin of safety.

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ANO-1 LCP 193-5023

" Installation of Digital Quench Tank Indications" This LCP replaced the analog indicators for Quench Tank level, temperature, and pressure with Dixson, Inc. digital bargraph indicators. The new indicators contain alarm switches and specialized input boards which allow the elimination of electronic switches and a temperature transmitter. In addition, Quench Tank level was routed to the plant computer for incorporation into the on-line RCS leak rate calculation.

Affected SAR Figures: 4-1, 7-20 Table: 7-11A It was determined that these changes did notr (1) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the new indicators are functionally identical and are more reliable than the replaced instruments. The indicators are for indication / alarm only and are not used for accident mitigation. The indicators have no direct electrical interface with components which are important to safety; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the replacement of the Quench Tank indicators does not change their function; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the bases for the Technical Specifications do not address the Quench Tank or any instrumentation related to monitoring of Quench Tank parameters.

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ANO-1 PEAR :93-0166 l

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" Condensate Pump suction Strainers" This PEAR revised SAR Figure 10-2 (P&ID H-204, sh 1) to reflect the active status of the condensate pump suction strainers. Line class, component number, and sample system valve errors were also corrected.

Affected SAR Figure: 10-2 I

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It was determined that these changes did not: {

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since the affected equipment is not safety-related, is not relied upon for accident mitigation, and will not hinder equipment which is relied upon for accident mitigation. Fc new risks or hazards to equipment important to safety resv!t from the changes being made to the condensate system. Existing accident analysis and plant operating parameters w1J1 not be challenged or changed; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the changes will not affect any equipment important to safety, no new f ailure modes are created, and there are no new conditions or plant operating practices resulting from {

this change which could cause a new or different accident than those previously evaluated in the SAR; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.

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! ANO-1 DCP 892-1030

" ANO-1 Permanent Reactor Cavity Seal Plate Installation" A new reactor cavity scal plate was added by this design change. The new seal plate will be permanent and will eliminate unreliable sealing features of the removable seal plate. Critical path time and personnel exposure will be reduced also.

Revision 1 to the design change incorporated a revised Reactor Cavity Subcompartment Pressurizer Analysis. Revisions 2 and 3 called for the removal '

of small pieces of the refueling canal liner plate for metallurgical evaluation, which temporarily invalidated 3AR Section 9.6.2.3. The liner was returned to operable condition prior to refueling flood-up.

Affected SAR Sections: 14.2.2.5.5.2, 9.6.2.2 It was determined that these changes did not:

(i) increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report since it has been concluded through analysis that the seal plate cannot become a missile during a core flood line break or a dropped fuel assembly accident. Permanent installation of the seal plate will lower the probability of gasket leakage. The liner plate is a passive component and is not credited for mitigation of any accident; or, (ii) increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report since the seal plate becoming a missile source which could eventually cause Control Rod Drive Mechanism damage during a core flood line break has been analyzed and concluded to be improbable and since the liner plate is a passive component and the structural integrity of the transfer canal was not degraded; or, (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification since the seal plate provides the boundary which maintains the water level required during fuel movement and no Technical Specification bases address the refueling canal liner integrity.

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