0CAN078901, 10CFR50.59 Rept for 1988
| ML20247J691 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1988 |
| From: | Turk C ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 0CAN078901, CAN78901, NUDOCS 8907310294 | |
| Download: ML20247J691 (37) | |
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Arkansas Pcwer & Light Compiny.
O 425 West Capitol P. O, Box 551
' L:1tle Pock A4 72203 Tel 501377 4000 July 21, 1989 BCAN078951 1 1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
SUBJECT:
Arkansas Nuclear One - Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6 10CFR50.59 Report, 1988 Gentlemen:
In accordance with 10CFR50.59(b), attached is our report containing a brief description of changes in procedures and in the' facility as described in the safety analysis report together with tests and. experiments conducted which were not described in the safety analysis report, .along with a summary of the safety evaluation of each. i Very truly yours, l b Charles TurkL Acting Manager,.f Licensing CHT:RBT Attachment =
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COL' TENTS PAGE AN0 COMMON 10CFR50.59 PROCFDURE CHANGES 1 ANO-1 10CFR50.59 PROCEDURE CHANGES 2 ANO-2 10CFR50.59 PROCEDURE CHANGES 4 ANO-1 10CFR50.59 DESIGN CHANGES 7 ANO-2 10CFR50.59 DESIGN CHANGES 20 l
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ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKETS NOS. 50-313 AND 50-368 LICENSE N05. DPR-51 AND NPF-6 ANNUAL 10CFR50.59 REPORT FOR 1988 This report, in accordance with 10CFR50.59, contains a brief description of reportable procedure and design changes made.at Arkansas Nuclear One - Units 1 and 2 (ANO-1 and ANO-2) together' with tests and experiments conducted which are not described in the safety analysis report.' In order that this report will be consistent with past AND Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) annual updates and previous 10CFR50.59 reports for the stations, only those procedure changes which-involved procedures described in the SARs and approved by the Plant Safety Committee (PSC) and reviewed by the Safety Review Committee (SRC).
in 1988 are contained'in this submittal. Also, design changes (DCP) which affected the safety analysis report and were not included in prior 10CFR50.59 reports and'for which installation was completed during or before December 1988 are contained in this submittal.
Safety evaluations were performed for these changes, in accordance with 10CFR50.59, by which it was determined that.none of these changes involved a change in the Technical Specifications or an unreviewed safety question.-
An unreviewed safety question is involved (i) if the probability of. occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased; or-(ii) if a possibility for an accident or malfunction of. a different type than .
any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be' created; or '
(iii) if the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is reduced.
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AND Procedure: 6030.109, Revision 0
" Installation of Electrical Cable and Wire" This new procedure was implemented to establish the guidelines and instructions for the installation of electrical cable and wire at ANO, and is intended to be used in conjunction with applicable engineering design drawings.
Implementation of this procedure required revisions to Section 8.3 of the ANO-1 and 2 SARs to reflect current installation and inspection practices.
Because this change did not affect the quality of required cable separation or verification of safety-related cable routing, it was determined that this procedure change did not:-(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
AN0 Procedure: 6030.110, Revision 0
" Termination & Soldering of Cable and Wire" This procedure was implemented to establish the guidelines and instructions for connecting electrical cable and wire to devices / equipment, and is intended to be used in conjunction with applicable engineering design drawings or vendor manuals.
Implementation of this procedure required revisions to Section 8.3 of the ANO-2 SAR to reflect current installation and inspection practices.
Because this change did not affect the quality of required cable separation for safety-related cable routing, it was determined that this procedure change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-1 Procedure: 1102.001, Revision 40
" Plant Preheatup and Precritical Checklist" This procedure provides a checklist that, when used in conjunction with the plant startup procedure, satisfies the requirements imposed upon the reactor and secondary plant for heatup and criticality. .It also provides certain test supplements, performed in conjunction with plant startup, which are not contained in system-specific procedures; and provides appendices which document interdepartmental concurrence to conduct plant heatup and criticality.
This revision reflected numerous changes due to: conformance with the ANO-Procedure Writers Guide, incorporation of additional valves and description L changes to associated valve lineups, movement of certain equipment checks to and from other associated procedures where more appropriate, reflection of changes to the test flow chart, plant changes, and other miscellaneous changes.
One change associated with this revision reflected the change in normal position (from open to closed) of a manual isolation valve associated with a reactor building penetration and resulted in a change.to ANO-1 SAR Figure 4-1.
The changes associated with this revision were largely administrative in nature and did not change the technical content or' adequacy of the procedure. These changes represent enhancements to the performance of actions necessary to verify that pre-heatup and pre-criticality requirements are satisfied. The-change which was reflected in a SAR drawing change reduced-the amount of piping integrity associated with a normally isolated reactor building penetration by minimizing the piping boundary, and therefore reduced the probability of leakage. This change did not affect the function of, or create new failure modes for the valve, which is not mentioned in the Technical Specifications. Therefore, it was determined that this procedure change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or-malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a'.
different type than any evaluated previou' sly in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-1 Procedure: 1104.28, Revision 11 "ICW System Operating Procedure" This procedure provides instructions for o'peration of the Intermediate Cooling Water (ICW) System. This revision to this procedure was implemented to reflect system operating configuration changes (normal valve positions), to change certain valve name descriptions, to upgrade the procedure in accordance with the AN0 Procedure Writers Guide, and to reflect'the required biennial-procedure review.
The normal positions of certain valves, such as. inlets and outlets to the chemical additional tank, were changed from normally open to normally closed in order to minimize system inventory loss. Also, the normal position of certain filter isolation valves was changed to have both filters in service, instead of just one of the pair. These changes were reflected in the revision to the associated system drawing, ANO-1 SAR Figure 9-7.
The normal configuration and procedure changes associated with this procedure revision do not affect the supply of cooling water to any safety-related systems. The revision does not reflect any unevaluated ICW flow paths, and there are no applicable Technical Specifications associated with the ICW System.
Therefore, it was determined that-this procedure change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for.any Technical Specification.
ANO-1 Procedure: 1402.090, Revision 1
" Unit 1 Reactor Building Tendon Surveillance" This procedure provides the instructions and documentation requirements to assess the continuing quality and structural performance of the Unit 1 Containment post-tensioning system. This revision reflects the revised ANO-1 Technical Specification for tendon surveillance, corrects errors in the-normalizing force calculation formulas, reflects changes in grease sampling and testing and maximum grease temperature for regreasing, and reflects compliance with the AND Procedure Writers Guide. This revision resulted in a change to ANO-1 SAR Section 5.2.
Because the tests specified in the procedure after the revision are still equivalent to the tests specified in the SAR, it was determined that this procedure change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of' safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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1 ANO-2 Procedure: 1092.031, Revision 0
" Integrated Leak Rate Test" This procedure provides instruction for conducting an Integrated Leakage Rate i Test (ILRT) of the ANO-2 Containment Building. The revision deleted the !
old ILRT procedure and created this new ILRT procedure, under the AND Engineering Services department, that will conform to the current industry practices and standards, and to the AND Procedure Writers Guide.
The acceptance criteria (maximum leakage) has not changed from the original ILRT procedure. This revision incorporated recommendations from a dedicated team review of containment penetration testing. Valve alignments associated with several of the penetrations have been specified to assure that the ILRT effectively and conservatively simulates postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA) containment isolation conditions. Minor discrepancies were identified and corrected in AND-2 SAR Tables 6.2-26 and 6.2-33. The ILRT's purpose of verifying the containment integrity function has been maintained, and in fact, j enhanced. Therefore, it was determined that this procedure change did not: '
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. [
i ANO-2 Procedure: 2106.27, Revision 7
" Neutralizing Tank Dump Procedure" This procedure provides instructions for transferring liquid from the Neutralizing Tank (2T-87) to the "B" or "C" Regenerative Waste Tank (2T-928 l or 2T-92C). This revision was performed to meet the requirements of the AND Procedure Writers Guide, correct a duplicate valve number, and to conduct the required biennial procedure review. The procedure revision also reflects the changes made by a previous DCP, also reflected in ANO-2 SAR Section 9.2, such ,
that the Neutralizing Tank is no longer pumped directly to the discharge flume. )
This procedure revision does not affect any safety-related equipment or i equipment which is addressed by the Technical Specifications. Therefore, j It was determined that this procedure change did not: (i) increase the l probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction j of equipment important ',o safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or l (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type !
than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-2 Procedure: 2302.002, Revision 18
" Filling and Venting the RCS" This procedure provides instructions for filling and venting the Reactor Coolant l System (RCS) following drain-down for refueling or maintenance, and provides instructions for pressurizer steam nubble formation. This revision reflects installation of pressurizer spray valve isolation valves, pressurizer level temperature compensation, and refueling level indication, and reflects the addition of certain figures depicting piping and instrument arrangement.
The modifications reflected by this revision have been specifically evaluated per 10CFR50.59 and are addressed elsewhere in this report. This revision does not impact equipment necessary for safe shutdown, and does not change the overall system operating philosophy. This revision reflects enhancements to the ability to monitor RCS level during filling and venting operations.
Therefore, it was determined that this procedure change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accidenc or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 Procedure: 2305.03, Temporary Change 1 (TC-1)
" Engineered Safety Features System Response Time Test" This procedure provides instructions for performance of, and acceptance criteria for, response time testing of the ANO-2 Engineered Safety Features (ESF) System. This temporary procedure change reflects the replacement of a hold "pushbutton" with a hold " switch" used during conduct of the test, which enhances the ability to perform the test. The modification which installed the switch was specifically evaluated per 10CFR50.59. The switch performs the same function as the pushbutton it replaced, is electrically equivalent, and is less prone to failure. Therefore, it was determined that this procedure change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-2 Procedure: 2406.006, Revision 0
" Unit 2 MSSV Setup for the 10 Year Hydrostatic Test" This procedure provides instructions and documentation requirements for resetting the ANO-2 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSV) to support the 10 year ASME required inservice inspection (ISI) hydrostatic test of the Main Steam System. The temporary MSSV setup for conduct of the test was reviewed and approved by the NRC with issuance of ANO-2 Technical Specification change Amendment No. 83,. dated April 6, 1988 (2CAN048802). The temporary MSSV setup was evaluated with respect to the potential for impact on the SAR Chapter 15 accident analyses, potential new accidents, and the margin of safety, all with acceptable results. The associated procedure (for actual performance of the test) is within the bounds of this evaluation. Therefore, )
it was determined that this procedure change did not: (i) increase the I probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type l than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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AND-1 DCP: 80-1174
" Control Circuit Modification to C9A & C9B Compressors" This' design change modified the control circuitry for the Gaseous Radwaste Compressors, C9A and C98. .The automatic start feature was deleted when-the control handswitches are in the "stop" and "after stop" positions. The .'
automatic trip remains effective whenever the compressors are ready for- '
operation in manual or automatic. Also, a 30 second time delay was installed in the start of the ." standby" compressor after a high surge tank pressure l signal starts the other compressor.
This change required a revision to ANO-1 SAR Section 11.1.3.2 and Figure 11-3.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any:
evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the-margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, j ANO-1 DCP: 83-1106 "High Pressure Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray" This modification package provided a high pressure source of auxiliary i pressurizer spray and a means for low pressure auxiliary spray to come from i either Decay Heat System header. A crossconnect between the makeup _ pump :
discharge header and the existing auxiliary spray piping was added, and a j throttling control valve, CV-1416, was installed downstream of the junction' j of the high and. low pressure piping systems to allow remote manual (control room) flow control for use in RCS cooldowns.- This change will be' helpful in the event of an extended loss of offsite power or a steam generator (OTSG) tube rupture when the reactor coolant pumps (RCP), the normal source of pressurizer spray, are not available.
This modification required revisions to ANO-1 SAR Sections 4.2.2.3, 9.1.1, 9.1.2.1, Table 5-1, and Figures 5-6, 9-3, 9-12 and 9-46.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment.
important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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AND-1 DCP: 83-1128
" Turbine Building Drain Line Radiation Monitor" This change package added a liquid (process) radiation monitor to the Turbine Building Drain Line, with a display module and hi-rad alarm annunciator located in the Control Room. The associated sample pump is controlled by a local handswitch in conjunction with flow switches in the drain and sample lines.
This change required a revision to ANO-1 SAR Table 11-7.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report, because the addition of the monitor will not in any way impact any previously evaluated accidents; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report, because the new monitor does not involve or interface with any safety related equipment; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, as this monitor is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.
ANO-1 DCP: 83-1136
" Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Cartridge Replacement" This change involved the replacement of the' existing three-stage mechanical shaft seal cartridges installed on the four ANO-l' reactor coolant pumps (RCP) with seals of a new design. The existing Byron Jackson model SU-8875 seals were replaced with Byron Jackson N-9000 seal cartridges which were developed as a result of a major design effort to produce a more reliable seal capable of-extended life without excessive leakage or wear. The new seal provides the same fit and function (direct replacement) as the old seal model', but'is a better performer under normal and transient conditions, and offers improved reliability. The new seal design successfully completed an extensive testing program carried out to verify its capabilities.
This change required revisions to ANO-1 SAR Figures 7-21'and 9-3 as a result of instrumentation changes associated with the new N-9000 seals.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. The ANO-1 SAR loss of coolant accident (LOCA) evaluations do not specifically address RCP ,
seal leakage. The increased performance of the new RCP seal design will actually reduce the likelihood that the seals would contribute to'RCS leakage during postulated accidents. (ii) create the possibility for.an accident or-malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety -
analysis report, because the new seal is functionally equivalent to the previous design, and is considered a direct' replacement. (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. .The RCP seals are not addressed in the Technical Specifications and;the new design offers improved performance and therefore enhanced safety.
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ANO-1 DCP: 83-1144
" Diesel Generator Closing Circuit Mod" This modification installed electrical phase synchronization check (sync check) relays in the normal and emergency supply breaker circuitry for the A3 and A4 (ESF) electrical buses. The relays will prevent inadvertent remote manual breaker closure if there is no synchronization between an incoming line and energized bus. Breaker closure is unaffected in dead bus and auto-close situations. This change required a revision to ANO-1 SAR Section 8.3. .
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment .
important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. The change only impacts the manual feeder breaker closure circuits. The ability of the emergency power source (EDGs) to supply power to ESF loads as credited in the safety analysis report is not affected. The additional interlock is for additional protection of this vital equipment. (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report. The additional interlock in the breakers' manual close circuitry does not introduce new failure modes which would impact the emergency power source's function as credited in the safety analysis report. j (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical !
Specification. Reducing the exposure of breaker control to human error should 4 actually increase the margin of safety. j j
ANO-1 DCP: 84-1014B Hot Leg Level Portion of ICC Instrumentation This DCP covered installation of the Hot Leg Level Instrumentation portion of ;
the Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC) Instrumentation project, which was required !
by NUREG-0737, Item II.F.2. Descriptions of other parts of the system have been provided in correspondence to the NRC, including previous 10CFR50.59 reports. AP&L recently received NRC approval of the ANO-1 ICC System by Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated March 23, 1989 (0CNA038925). This change required a revision to ANO-1 Figures 4-1 and 7-20, and Table 7-11.
It was determined that this design change did net: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. This portion of the ICC equipment is for monitoring purposes only and does not serve any protection function. It is not credited in the mitigation of any accident as evaluated in the safety analysis report. The ICC system is designed to Class 1E standards and does not interact with any protection systems in a way which creates the potential for malfunction. (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report. The level instrumentation taps (RCS penetrations) are well within the size of postulated breaks evaluated in the. safety analysis report for acceptability of emergency core cooling system capabilities.
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The ICC instrumentation provides edditional information which can provide enhanced the operator's ability to corroborate approach to ICC conditions, and therefore increases the margin of safety.
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ANO-1 DCP: 85-1022 "ANO-1 Containment Sump Drain Valve and Operator Replacement" This change replaced the containment' sump drain valve with a different type of valve to allow the relocation of the valve motor operator above the sump water level to avoid continuous submergence, and replaced the existing motor operator with a larger sized unit as a result of AP&L's MOVATS program.
These modifications will improve reliability and provide better access'for maintenance of the motor operator with reduced radiation exposure. The design function of the system was not changed. Additionally, this change deleted.a pipe section with a flange at the inlet of.the sump drain valve, previously used for local leak rate testing (LLRT), because the characteristics of the new valve allow an existing pressure tap to be used.for the-required isolation testing. This change required a revision to ANO-1 SAR Figure 11-2.
The modifications did not change the design function of the system. Using a different tap for the LLRT of the valve was evaluated and determined to provide the same level of verification of isolation capability. Relocating a motor operator above the sump water level also reduces normal operating stresses and potential failure mechanisms. Therefore, it was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences .
of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety. evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or i malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The change will result in improved access and therefore reduced radiation exposure during maintenance.
ANO-1 DCP: 86-1006
" Safety Systems Diagnostic Instrumentation" This change provided additional instrumentation for monitoring (via the SPDS) several systems: High Pressure Injection (HPI), Low Pressure Injection-(LPI),
Reactor Building Spray (RBS), Emergency Feedwater (EFW), Auxiliary Cooling Water (ACW) and Service Water (SW). The parameters involved are pump suction and discharge pressures, ACW and SW flows, and SW bay levels. These modifications are a result of a human engineering discrepancy (HED) identified during the ANO-1 Control Room Design Review.(CRDR) effort, and previous requests from Operations and Maintenance for additional instrumentation to enhance monitoring and testing of the systems. This change included new instrument isolation valves, guages and transmitters, and associated power supply modifications. The modifications will require revisions to ANO-1~SAR Table 6-11, and Figures 6-3, 9-3, 9-6, 9-9, 9-10, 9-12 and 10-2. '
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment ,
important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. The additional instruments added by this change do not have an active safety function, and have been designed and constructed to applicable standards and codes to maintain the passive safety function of system boundary integrity. (ii) create the
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possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report. These new instruments have no accident mitigating function, so their functional' failure does not create any new accident. (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. This new instrumentation will be available to the operator to monitor the performance of safety systems and will thus enhance safety.
ANO-1 DCP: 86-1009 "S. W. Flow Element'for Decay Heat Cooler (E35A & E35B)"
This change added more accurate Service Water (SW) flow measuring capability to the Decay Heat Coolers by the installation of-isolable taps for attaching temporary flow measuring elements (annubars). The annubar is inserted into the SW flow during the periodic flow test and retracted during normal operations. This change required a revision to ANO-1 SAR Figure 9-6.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment.
important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. The addition of the annubar connections will not affect the operation of the SW System. The temporary use of the annubars to verify proper SW flow through the Decay Heat -
Coolers will not significantly affect the actual flow rate when inserted.
(ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report. The operation and function of the SW System are not changed and the annubar connections are designed to withstand both normal and accident conditions. (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The use of the annubars is periodic and temporary, and the function of the SW system is unchanged. The change will help verify more accurately that the design SW flow rates are maintained, and will thus enhance safety.
AND-1 DCP: 86-1068
" Breathing Air C0 Monitors" This change installed a carbon monoxide (CO) monitor on each of the two trains-of the Breathing Air System, with high C0 concentration alarm horns located in the AND Train Bay near the Breathing Air System equipment room. This change required revisions to ANO-1 SAR Section 9.9.2.2 and Figure 9-14, and to ANO-2 SAR Section 9.3.
The Breathing Air System is non-safety.related, and does not impact the safety analysis report accident analyses; the failure of equipment associated with this change or the failure of any Breathing Air System equipment of does not impact any safety-related equipment. Therefore, it was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a'different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-1 DCP: 86-1070 "RCP Controlled Bleedoff Check Valve Addition" This change added a check valve (MU-65) and a low point drain valve (MU-1298) to the RCP seal controlled bleedoff line. The new check valve will prevent backflow from the makeup pump recirculation line to the quench tank-via;the RCP seal bleedoff lines and alternate flow path bleedoff solenoid valves.
This change required revision of ANO-1 SAR Figure 9-3.
This modification did not alter the design bases, function or performance of the RCP seal system, and was verified by single failure. analysis and a failure modes and effects evaluation. This change did not alter the performance.of-any safety system. .The seal leakoff systems are not addressed in the safety' analysis report accident analyses. Therefore, it was determined that this-design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii)' create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. This change maintained the existing seal leakoff function but improved.the design to eliminate backflow, and will therefore enhance safety.
AN0-1 DCP: 86-1088
" Pressurizer Heater Cable Replacement" This change replaced the pressurizer high temperature heater cables and connectors for the lower heater bundle, and transferred and reconnected 42 kW' of heater capacity to a vital electrical bus from a non-vital bus.
This change required revision of ANO-1 SAR Section 4.2.4.4 and Table 8-1 to reflect the additional vital powered heater capacity.
The replacement pressurizer heater cables and pressurizer.' system operation will continue to operate as designed'and will be functionally unchanged.
ThereforE, it was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an. accident or malfunction of equipmert important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for.an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The change will provide additional margin to maintain the required ' vital powered L heater capability as described in the basis of Technical Specification 3.1.3.6.
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i ANO-1 DCP: 86-1091 "EFW Pump Recirculation Line Flow Indicators" This change adds flow indicators to the existing flow restricting orifices in the EFW pump recirculation lines for use during the routine surveillance testing.
This change required a revision to an ANO-1 SAR figure.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (iii create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-1 DCP: 86-1103 "ANO-1 Alarm System Upgrade, Phase I" This change implemented the first of three phases of a comprehensive alarm (annunciator) upgrade project. This project is the combination of the previously initiated upgrade and the results of the CRDR effort. This effort has been described in detail in AP&L's various CRDR submittals. AP&L's overall CRDR program was approved by the NRC with issuance of SERs dated February 3, 1989 (0CNA028904).
This change addresses some of the annunciator related HEDs identified in the CRDR effort and provides human factors improvements in the alarm system by improving alarm presentation, i.e., prioritizaion of alarms, grouping alarms by system affiliation and reduction of nuisance alarms. This phase primarily impacted alarms related to vital and non-vital electrical systems, EFW, SW, and related auxiliary systems.
This change will require a revision to ANO-1 SAR Section 8.3 to reflect the annunciator window numbers and legends associated with EDG alarms.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i.) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment 1 important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. The non-Class 1E alarm system remains appropriately isolated from Class 1E circuits, so that no safety-related components or systems will be impacted by failures in the alarm i i
ci rcuitry. The annunciator system is not credited with mitigation of any !
accident evaluated in the safety analysis report. (ii) create the possibility I i for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously l in the safety analysis report. Existing information available to the operator through the annunciator system has been retained and/or improved through this change. (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any I Technical Specification. The margin of safety is being enhanced due to the reduction in potential for operator error due to the human factors improvements i associated with this change. I 13 ,
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., . I ANO-1 DCP: 87-1014 "E.D.G. Cooler Service Water Piping" l This change replaced certain piping and valves in the SW system, specifically the supply and return lines to the EDG heat exchangers, as well as associated-vent and drain piping, and small portions of other connected small branch lines.
The existing piping and valves were of carbon steel, and were replaced with.
stainless steel components due to internal corrosion damage. This change also replaced flexible hose with pipe, and installed temporary flow annubars and break-out flanges to enhance the ability for periodic testing and maintenance of the system. .)
This change resulted in a revision of ANO-1 SAR Figure 9-6.
I Because the replacement with better quality piping did not change the basic configuration and function of the system, it was-determined that this design .
change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences 1 of an accident or malfunction'of equipment.important to safety evaluated in the I safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety I analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. Stress analysis, vibration: evaluations and 'i assessments of the piping support designs were performed for this change and a found to meet the required design criteria for the applicable plant conditions. I q
ANO-1 DCP: 87-1070 l "ICS Simplification" This change added an ICS monitoring system, made minor-ICS control enhancements, and removed several unnecessary ICS modules. This change addressed several recommendations included in the Babcock & Wilcox Owners Group Safety and 2 Performance Improvement Program.
This change resulted in revisions to ANO-1 SAR Section 7.2 and Figures 7-11, 7-12 and 7-13.
The ICS is a non-safety related plant control system, and is appropriately isolated from interaction with plant protection systems. This change will not cause the ICS to react to transients any differently in theory of operation.
The ICS will continue to react as evaluated in ANO-1 SAR Chapter 14. No safety l functions of any equipment are degraded by this change. Therefore, it was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create ;
the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduc'e the margin ;
of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. By simplifying the ICS circuitry, the potential for ICS module failure is reduced, and the margin of safety is enhanced. i 14 ;
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ANO-1 DCP: 87-1086
" Standardization of Fire Pump Pressure Switch Setpoints" This change was initiated to assure consistency between the various licensing basis documents and plant procedures which specify setpoints for the fire water pumps. The setpoints chosen assure compliance with Technical Specification requirements. The ANO-2 SAR description of the jockey fire pump (used to maintain header pressure in the fire water piping systems) is being revised to reflect the start and stop pressure setpoint range, rather than a single value (ANO-2 SAR Sections 9.5.1.2.2 and 9.8.2). j i
The revision of setpoints specified in the ANO-2 SAR does not impact the system function, or the ANO-2 SAR evaluaHon of potential fire system malfunctions. 3 Therefore, it was determined tha this design change did not: (i) increase the !
probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-1 DCP: 87-1090 !
"LP '1' Low Pressure Turbine Rotor Replacement" j This change replaced the "1" low pressure turbine rotor with a new rotor that I incorporates an integral disc type shaft, as opposed to the previous built- ;
up design, which used shrunk-on discs. The new design significantly reduces !
the probability of disc burst and subsequent missle generation, and offers the potential for performance (MWe) increase.
The turbine overspeed failure accident scenario is evaluated in the ANO-1 SAR Section 14.1.2.9. This section was revised to reflect the reduced probability for missile genesis due to the new rotor design.
The rotor replacement does not change the effect of a turbine trip on the RCS or any safety related system and replacing the LP turbine type with a stronger, forged disk reduces the probability of missiles being generated in the incredible event of turbine overspeed. The rotor replacement does not change the turbine function, but does improve the design. Therefore, it was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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.. o ANO-1 DCP: 87-1108
" Boric Acid Batch Controller Replacement" This change provided a modern replacement for the Boric Acid Batch Controller, which is used to make adjustments to the concentration of boric acid in the RCS.
The previous batch controller was an obsolete design which had been experiencing an increasing failure rate, and was difficult to maintain and repair due to the increasing difficulty of obtaining spare parts. The new controller is made by the same manufacturer, and offers considerable flexibility. Installation of the new controller required some associated interface modifications, but the function is the same. This change required a revision to ANO-1 SAR Figure 9-3.
The new equipment performs the same function as the equipment it is replacing and is not safety related. The new controller is expected to be more reliable than the old unit, and offers better human factors characteristics, both of which should reduce the probability for accidents and errors. Therefore, it was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-1 DCP: 88-1011 "H2 Sample Valve Modification" This change removed and re-installed SV-7467 with the flow direction reversed.
This valve is an outside containment isolation valve in the H2 sampling system and is located on the return line from sampler C178. The valve is designed to be installed with a particular orientation to normal flow, which-in this case {
is toward the containment building. However, in its function as a containment isolation valve, it is required to prevent leakage in the opposite direction, i.e., from containment. This change resulted from the discovery that the valve was incorrectly oriented for purposes of containment isolation. A new valve was also installed to allow for LLRT of the associated penetration. This change requried a revision to ANO-1 SAR Figure 5-7 and Table 5-1.
1 Reversing the flow orientation of the valve will not impact the ability of '
the hydrogen sampler / analyzer to perform its function, and will enhance the containment isolatior capability of the valve. Addition of the new tap and valve for LLRT purposes will enhance the ability to verify the isolation capability of the valve. The function and operating mode of the system remains unchanged. This system is not specifically addressed in the Technical Specifications. Therefore, it was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-1 DCP: 88-1035 "R4C PI for Group 8" This change replaced the reed switch position indicator (PI) tubes on the Group 8 control rod assemblies (the 8 axial power shaping rods) with the new model R4C PI and PI amplifier modules. This change.is similar to that made previously on the 12 regulating rod drives of Group 7 under DCP 86-1030. The Redundant Four Channel (R4C) PI is a direct replacement upgrade for the Type B
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PI presently.being used.on ANO-1. The associated amplifier module is,also a .
direct replacement,' but offers an additional feature (channel isolation) i associated with the dual position indication channel capabilities of the R4C PI. {
This change resulted in a revision to ANO-1 SAR Sections 3.2 and 7.2.
This change did not affect control rod insertion capability, and therefore has- i no potential for impacting the ANO-1 SAR accident analyses. The Group 8 rod j position indicating system is not credited with accident mitigation. The new equipment performs the same function, and offers improved' reliability, with an insignificant change in position indication resolution. Therefore,'it was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of-occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any
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evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin I of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.- The replacement. equipment has been evaluated for continuing to allow rod position and movement verification as required by Technical Specification 4.7, and determined to be acceptable.
ANO-1 DCP: 88-1084
" Gear Replacement for CV-1300 and CV-1301" This change replaced the motor pinion and worm gear set inside the motor operator of each valve (in-line makeup /HPI recirc line_ isolation valves).
The new gearing allows the correct torque range and thrust, determined by MOVATS calculations and evaluations, to be delivered from the operators to the valves. This change resulted in an increase in stroke time of the valves, which was evaluated as acceptable in allowing proper performance of the HPI system es designed. This change required revision to ANO-1 SAR Section 6.1.3.
The previous ANO-1 SAR language regarding "... full operation within 25 seconds."
was clarified to reflect the longer closing times of tne recirc isolation valves.
The minimum required HPI flow is maintained even should the valves fail.to close at all. The function and operation of this system is unchanged, nor did the change affect any other system. Therefore, it was determined that this' design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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AN0-1 DCPi 88-1103 I "CV-1820 Valve Replacement and Actuator Modification" This change replaced the inboard containment isolation valve on the 1/2" "A" Steam Generator sample.line. It is normally closed, remote manually actuated, and does not receive an automatic containment isolation signal.
Associated piping supports were also modified accordingly. This change required revision of ANO-1 SAR Figure 9-5 and Table 5-1.
Replacement of this valve did not change the system function (sampling capability), containment isolation capability, or component; function and mode of operation. This component is not credited with mitigation of any -
accident evaluated in the ANO-1 SAR, nor is it specifically addressed in the 'l <
ANO-1 Technical Specifications. Therefore, it was' determined that this design' !
change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated.in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the. safety I analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as' defined in the basis -
for any Technical Specification.
ANO-1 Plant Change: 87-3220
" Failed Pressurizer Heater" This plant change was initiated to spare a cable to a pressurizer heater which had been discovered to be failed to ground. A " jumper & lifted lead" entry was intiated in accordance with ANO procedures in conjunction with this change.
The removal of the failed heater's capacity from the group will ' require a revision to ANO-1 SAR Table 4-5, which denotes total heater capacity.'
It was determined that this plant change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated'in the safety analysis report. The failed heater I is not required to mitigate the' consequences of accidents evaluated in the safety analysis report. Sufficient heater capacity remains to provide the
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design operating capability. (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety q
]
analysis report. No new equipment, function or-system requirement was added i by this change. The spared cable will not create any new failure mechanism.
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The failed heater is not one of the emergency powered heaters
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which are required to have a minimum capacity per the-Technical Specifications.
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ANO-1 Plant Change: 88-2551
" Flexible Hose Installation on Diesel Generator Air Starting Tanks Drain" This change installed a flexible hose between the drain isolation (root) valves on each EDG starting air tank and the connection piping. The hose will provide better separation between the Seismic Class I drain valves and and the non-Q piping downstream. The function and operation of the EDG starting air tanks is not changed. This change required a revision to ANO-1 SAR Figure 8-3.
It was determined that this plant change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. The flexible hoses provide additional assurance that the Seismic Class I valves are not {
affected by loads from the non-seismic piping. The design and operation of the existing drain valves is not changed. (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report. The hose addition will not change the previously evaluated failures. (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The margin of safety is maintained by the required separation of non-safety equipment from seismically qualified safety j equipment. '
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ANO-2 DCP: 82-2072
" Addition of Pressurizer Spray Isolation Valves" This change installed motor operated isolation va'1ves upstream and downstream of pressurizer spray valves 2CV-4651 and 2CV-4652. Isolation capability will allow continued operation'in the event one of the spray valves fails open or develops a leak. . Isolation valve installation required the relocation of the spray valves and associated piping and support configuration modifications.
All piping and support work was performed to Seismic Class 1 criteria.
This change required revisions to several ANO .2 SAR figures.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DCP: 82-2086C "Q CST Project" This portion of the "Q" Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Project provided the necessary modifications to allow use of the safety grade CST (T-41B) by the ANO-2 EFW System. Changes associated with installation of the new CST were described in several previous NRC submittals, as well as prior 10CFR50.59 reports. The existing low level alarm setpoint was based on the required CST inventory for ANO-1 use only (11.1 feet minimum level specified by AND-1 Technical Specification 3.4.1.3). Therefcre, an increased inventory will be required to be maintained for ANO-2, which will requira appropriate ]
Technical Specification revisions before implementation of the connection to ANO-2. The valves between the CST and ANO-2 EFW System are presently closed and maintained isolated until such changes are submitted and approved by NRC.
This change also increased the size of.the CST heaters, and provided additional flow and level instrument modifications needed for connection to ANO-2.
This change required revisions to several ANO-2 SAR figures.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment ;
important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create ]
l the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any j evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin i of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. As mentioned ;
above, the connection to ANO-2 can not be valved in until a Technical Specification change is approved. ,
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ANO-2 DCP: 84-2083 "2VE-1A,B Reliability Modifications" This change involves modifications to enhance the reliability, maintainability, and capacity of the common control room emergency air conditioning system.
The modifications include replacement of associated carbon steel SW piping with stainless steel and installation of connections for temporary annubars.
for periodic flow testing, changes to the refrigerant piping, and associated control and instrument changes. The overall design function of the system will remain the same, however. This change will require revision to several
' figures in the ANO-1 and 2 SARs.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or. malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report. The modifications associated with this change involved replacing components with improved materials and configurations, and do not change the function of the components or equipment. The failure modes previously evaluated and the ability of the system to perform its design function while meeting single failure criteria remain unchanged. (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The margin of safety with respect to ANO-1 and 2 Technical Specifications related to the ambient temperature and atmospheric habitability in the control rooms is in fact improved by this change, due to the improved materials which will improve system operation and' maintenance capabilities.
ANO-2 DCP: 86-2036
" Meteorological System Upgrade" This change replaced the ANO meteorological system (tower, primary sensors, signal conditioners, and control room recorders). The new tower is located at about the same location as the old one, and offers improved lightning protection, a backup power supply, and more easily maintainable equipment.
ANO-2 SAR Section 2.3 has been revised to reflect the equipment and capabilities of the new instruments, and to remove the historical information describing the capabilities of the previous meteorc'ogical system.
I It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability ;
of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create j the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. .
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'l ANO-2 DCP: 85-2070 j 1
" Turbine Building Drain Line Radiation Monitor" This change package added a liquid (process) radiation monitor to the Turbine Building Drain Line, with a display module and hi-rad alarm annunciator located in the Control Room. The associated sample pump is controlled by a local I handswitch in conjunction with flow switches in the drain and sample lines.
This change required a revision to figures in ANO-2 SAR Chapters'8 and 9.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment-important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report, because the addition of the monitor will not in any way impact any previously evaluated accidents; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously'in the safety analysis report, because the new monitor does not involve or interface with any safety-related-equipment; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as ' defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, as this monitor is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.
AND-2 DCP: 85-2075A "CPC Room Amendment - HVAC, Fire Protection, Wall" This change is a portion of the project to replace the ANO-2 Core Protection Calculators (CPC). This change provided a new fire wall and fire door, the HVAC equipment, and the Halon fire suppression system for the new CPC room, which is now located adjacent to the cable spreading room. Subsequent portions of the project will actually make the new CPC operational; this change only ,
provided a room and support systems. This change required revision of ANO-2 SAR Section 9.4 and Figures 8.3-77, 8.3-79, 9.2-7, and 9.4-1 to reflect the l
new HVAC system; Section 9.5.1 and Figure 9.5-4 to reflect the new fire suppression system; and changes to other figures in Section 8.3 to reflect the changes to the onsite electrical power system.
1 This change did not impact the existing CPCs, therefore their protection system '
function remained unchanged. The structural work for the new room was performed l in accordance with applicable seismic criteria, and the level of fire protection was maintained by the change. The addition of Halon fire suppression to the new CPC room will not impact control room ubitability, because the new room is 1 located below the control room (Halon is heavier than air). Therefore, it was deterniined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability 1 i of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment
! important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create l the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any.
evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. !
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ANO-2 DCP: 85-2132 "Fischer & Porter Transmitter Replacement" This change replaced 38 F&P transmitters with like Rosemount transmitters. The existing transmitters were obsolete and required replacement. The transmitters are in the Safety Injection Tank, Chemical and Volume Control, Steam Dump and Bypass Control and other miscellaneous systems, and are used to measure level, pressure, or flow. The change required revision to ANO-2 SAR Figure 6.3-2 and Table'7.5-2.
The transmitters are "QP" and are being replaced with qualified transmitters; they serve no other safety related function than to maintain pressure boundary for seismic purposes. The location of the instruments, tubing orientation, conduit and cabling remains the.same. There is no potential for unnaccepable interaction with other safety systems, and no increased probability for pressure boundary failure. Therefore, it was determined that this design
. change did not: (1) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident'or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated ~previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce-the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DCP: 85-2162 "Incore Detector Assembly" This change provided the installation of a new B&W incore detector assembly for testino purposes. The location was chosen so as to not impact the existing core performance monitoring programs. The new detector was compared to adjacent existing < detector signals during startup physics. testing. A revision to ANO-2 SAR Section 7.7 was made to reflect this test detector.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase.the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment' important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii). create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any. Technical Specification.
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ANO-2 DCP: 85-2173
" Service Water Flow Elements for EDG Coolers" This change provided permanent flow measuring elements (orifice plates) and local flow indicators to each of the SW return line branches from the emergency diesel generator jacket cooling water heat exchangers. Each orifice flange has a small isolation valve to provide the pressure and piping class bandary between the SW piping and the new instrumentation. The flow indicatois will be isolated during normal operation and are only used to perform be periodic required flow verification surveillance test. The existing flow restricting orifices were deleted. This change required revision to ANO-2 SAR Section 9.5.5.5 and Figure 9.2-1.
The function of the system (SW cooling of the EDG) remains unchanged by this modification. The instrumentation added will provide additional assurance, by facilitating more accurate periodic design flow verification, that the coolers are able to perform their design function. This change was performed to applicable design criteria and Code pressure boundary requirements. Therefore, it was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DCP: 85-2174
" Flow Elements for Service Water Pump Tests' This change pre dded installation of venturi flow meters, and associated piping and support modifications, for each of the two SW pipe headers and the ACW header. This change is being made to allow flow verification capability to the accuracy requirements of ASME Section XI. This change required revisions to ANO-2 SAR Figures 9.2-1 and 9.2-5, and will require a revision to Section 9.2.1 to reflect the new flow indication capabilities.
Appropriate hydraulic evaluations determined that the required SW flow would not be affected by the installation of the venturi elements and associated ,
instrumentation. Installation of the new components was performed in accordance l with applicable seismic and piping codes and criteria, providing assurance that the pressure boundary will be maintained, and the single failure criterion '
is maintained. Therefore, it was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-2 DCP: 86-2017
" Atmospheric Dump Controls" This change added motor operators on each of the two main steam atmospheric dump valve (ADV) isolation valves, replaced and modified the ADV operators to fail open on loss of air operator supply, and modified the associated .
ESFAS MSIS logic. This change allows the operator to override the MSIS signal holding the normally closed isolations closed, to allow plant cooldown using the ADVs controlled from the control room. This change also resolves two Category 1 CRDR HEDs related to ADV control. The associated design bases are maintained by this change, with an improvement in certain transient mitigation capabilities due to the new remote operation capability for the ADV isolation valves. This change resulted in numerous revisions to the ANO-2 SAR: Sections 7.7, 10.3, 10.4, and 15.1; Tables 6.2-26, 9.5-2, and 10.3-4; and several Figures in Chapters 3, 7, 8, and 10.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. The ADV block valves are normally closed, and powered from vital electrica; buses. The seismic qualification of the associated piping is maintained. The change was evaluated to have no effect on the assumptions or results of the applicable i ANO-2 SAR Chapter 15 events. The modified ADV equipment remains single failure I proof. (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report.
This change did not impact any other safety systems. (iii) reduce the margin !
of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The ADV system is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.
l ANO-2 DCP: 86-2030
" Pressurizer Level Temperature Compensated - Red Channel" This change added temperature compensation to the red channel of pressurizer I level, in accordance with AP&L's commitment to RG 1.97. This change involves j non-safety related instrumentation only used for operator information. This l change involved appropriate evaluations of isolation, single failure and HELB l criteria for the modified instrumentation, which determined that the modified ;
instrumentation would have no impact on any safety systems. This modified instrumentation will provide the operator with a more accurate display of true ,
pressurizer level. This change required revision to AND-2 SAR Figures 5.1-3, i 8.3-71 and 8.3-72, and Sections 3.6 and 5.6. ,
1 It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability
, of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment l important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. The instrumentation j modified is used for indication only, and does not impact any safety-related '
equipment. (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report.
The modified instrumentation is not involved in the pressurizer level control circuitry. (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any
- Technical Specification. This level instrumentation is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.
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AND-2 DCP: 86-2034 "RCS Refueling Le' vel Indication System" This change installed a new RCS refueling level indication system and removed the existing Megawatt Demand Setter (MDS) control room' panel The new.RCS refueling level. indication system is based on a wide ~r.ange differential pressure transmitter, connected to modified existing RCS instrument taps, with control room indication. The existing RCS taps are still used by-the tygon tubing level system, which remains available as a backup. The MOS was never.used and was removed to allow control room panel space to be available for.the new RCS level indicator. The MDS was an optional' system and its use is not required in any way. This change required revisions-to ANO-2.SAR Section.7.7 and Figures 5.1-3, 7.7-1'and 8.3-69, 8.3-70 and 8.3-79.
It was determined that this, design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment-important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis reprot. The new RCS-level equipment did require a reconfiguration of the RCS pressure boundary associated with the existing tygon tubing connection, but the new isolation valve' meets the same design criteria and offers the. added benefit of isolation capability for the tygon tubing. (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously'in the safety analysis raport.
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The connections for the new RCS level instrumentation are of improved material and configuration, and designed to appropriate seismic and separation criteria.
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DCP: 86-2100 "LPSI System Overpressure Protection" This change added a safety relief valve to the piping. connecting the LPSI (Shutdown Cooling, SDC) purification loop to the RCS/SDC drop line in accordance with the ASME Code. The purification loop piping is used infrequently, and is normally isolated by locked closed manual valve 2SI-35. ~Because of'the strict procedural controls on placing purification'in service, the relief' valve sizing and setpoint are therefore based on a calculation of postulated leakage through the manual isolation valve. This change required a revision to the associated ANO-2 SAR figure.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment i important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create I
the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than'any. 1 Ovaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin- )
of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. ,
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ANO-2 DCP: 86-2101
" Service Water Valves 25W-12A & 25W-12B" This change replaced, in the same configuration as previously existed, two carbon steel swing check valves with' stainless steel, spring loaded, dual disc check valves plus a small amount of stainless steel piping due'to the i differences in the face-to-face dimension of the two types of check valves. 1' This change required revision to ANO-2-SAR Figure 9.2-1.
l Replacement of the piping and valves in the same configuration, with improved l l materials, does not add, delete, or change SW pressure boundary equipment q l or components, nor do the modifications change the function of equipment, )
components, or the SW' System. Single failure criteria are maintained. Spring I failure'has been evaluated as not affecting valve function, and other failure i modes remain the same as the existing swing check. valves. .Therefore, it was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an-accident or malfunction of a different~ type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. Sufficient cooling capacity of the SW System, as required by the Technical Specifications, is not reduced by this change.
ANO-2 DCP: 86-2106B "2032 Battery Charger Replacement" This change provided replacement of the existing 2D32 batter charger which was obsolete and for which spare parts cannot be obtained. The larger physical size of the new charger required relocation of the battery. disconnect switch (2D52),
and its higher current rating required replacement of the existing DC load center incoming breaker, and the associated AC feeder breaker. The change also replaced associated cables to handle the increased rating of the new charger..
This change completes the effort which replaced both battery chargers. The previous replacement of 2031 was described in the 10CFR50.59 r'eport for 1987.
This change required revision to the ANO-2 SAR Section 3.10.2.2.7 and 8.3.2.1.2, Tables 8.3-1 and 8.3-2, and several figures associated with Section 8.3.
It was determined that this design change. did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment I important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report._ The equipment and system protective coordination were determined to be adequate for the new charger modifications. This change maintained the. independence, redundancy, and separation required for the two DC systems. This change did not affect the. .
redundant DC system. (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report.
The functional design of the new charger'and breakers remain the same, and this change did not modify the configuration of the existing DC-system in'a manner which could create a new type of accident or malfunction. (iii) reduce-the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The new charger capacity is greater than the. Technical Specification minimum required charger capacity, and provides adequate capacity to recharge the
, battery in a shorter time.
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ANO-2 DCP: 86-2110 "2R6 Service Water Piping Replacement" This change replaced carbon steel piping and valves in the ANO-2 SW System with stainless steel due to internal corrosion damage. The components replaced are in the HPSI pump heat exchanger supply and return lines and the shutdown cooling heat-exchanger return lines. This change included associated pipe support modifications. This change will require revisions to ANO-2 SAR Section 9.2 and Table 9.5-2, as well as several figures in Chapter 8.3.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. Replacing the piping and valves in the same configuration, with improved materials, does not add, delete, or change the SW System pressurc boundary equipment or components, nor do the modifications change the function or failure modes of equipment, components, or the SW System. Single failure criteria are maintained.
(ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report. The configuration, function and failure modes are unchanged by this modification. (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The function of the SW System, sufficient cooling capacity, may be enhanced due to the improved materials, which are more corrosion resistant, installed by this change.
ANO-2 DCP: 86-2116A
" Motor Operator Modifications to 2CV-1023-2, 2CV-1073-2, 2CV-1024-1 and 2CV-1074-1" This change modified or replaced the motor operators or internal gearing on four j valves to allow the actuators to produce the thrust required with adequate margin for M0 VATS testing criteria. This change also included associated piping support modifications. This change will require a revision to ANO-2 SAR Table 3.6-4 to reflect the change in HELB stress levels at chosen break _ points, ;
due to the modified or replaced motor operators, and to Figure 8.3-109 to i reflect the addition of motor overload heater bypasses for the actuators.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. Piping analysis has been performed to meet ASME Code compliance. (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report. The HELB analysis was performed to verify that any newly identified break locations and equipment targets were properly addressed. (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-2 DCP: 86-2116D
" Actuator Replacement for 2CV-4821-1" This change replaced the motor operator on the inside containment CVCS letdown isolation valve. This replacement will allow the actuator to provide the valve thrust required for the design differential pressure (as determined by the M0 VATS effort) with adequate margin. This change also provided for the associated piping analysis and support modifications associated with the larger motor operator. This change will require a revision to ANO-2 SAR Table 3.9-6 to reflect the replaced motor operator.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. This change did not charge the function of the component or system, and did not affect any other components important to safety. (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report. This change did not introduce new equipment for which possible malfunctions have not been evaluated. (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. This valve is not specifically addressed in the Technical Specifications.
ANO-2 DCP: 86-2116E
" Motor Operator Replacement for 2CV-4824-2" This change replaced the motor operator on the pressurizer auxiliary spray control valve. This replacement will allow the actuator to provide the valve thrust required for the design differential pressure (as determined by the M0 VATS effort) with adequate margin. This change also provided for the associated piping analysis and support modifications associated with the larger motor operator. This change will require a revision to ANO-2 SAR Table 3.6-23 to reflect the reanalyzed line stresses associated with the replaced motor operator.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. This change did not change the function of the component or system, and did not affect any other components important to safety. The new piping stress levels were evaluated and determined to not involve any unacceptable stresses on any equipment important to safety. (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report.
This change did not introduce new equipment for which possible malfunctions have not been evaluated. (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. This valve is not specifically addressed in the Technical Specifications.
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ANO-2 DCP: 86-2123
" Core Exit Thermocouple In-Containment Cable Assembly Upgrade" i
This change upgraded 41 incore instrument (ICI) cable assemblies, each composed i of three cable subassemblies, to the qualifications requried by NUREG-0737 {
Item II.F.2 and R.G. 1.97. Each cable assembly provides connection from the reactor ICI nozzle, through the platform disconnect and the reactor bulkhead, to the reactor building penetration. This change also replaced the 42 incore instrument assemblies. The new assemblies have several design differences )
which will be reflected in a revision to ANO-2 SAR Sections 4.2 and 7.7. j 1
Replacement of the cable assemblies did not impact any information in the ANO-2 l SAR. The design differences of the new ICI did require evaluation. It was )
determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of i occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment {
important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. The ICI is !
important tr safety primarily from the RCS pressure boundary standpoint. The (
design bases and construction methods for the new ICI have not changed. The ICI is indirectly credited with mitigating the consequences of an inadvertent fuel assembly mispositioning as evaluated in the ANO-2 SAR. The new ICI enhance the reliability of the information provided to the operator to determine if this has occurred. (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction i of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report.
No new accident becomes possible due to installation of the new ICI.
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The required number of ICI is maintained, with additional margin due to increased reliability.
ANO-2 DCP: 86-2129 I
" Containment Recirc Fan Low Flow Switches" This change rewired the containment recirculation low flow switches so that I they do not trip the recirculation fans on low air flow. An evaluation determined that the fan trip function is nonessential, however, the low flow alarm function is retained. This change provides the benefit that a i postulated short at the flow switch will not cause the fans to trip )
unnecessarily. This change required a revision to AND-2 SAR Figure 9.4-4 !
to reflect the change in quality designation for the flow switches. !
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of. equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. Removing the flow switch trip function will reduce the probability of tripping the fans due to a malfunction of the nonessential circuit. (ii) create the possibility for an i accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the I safety analysis report. The nonessential circuit is appropriately isolated from the safety-related circuit. The safety function of the containment recirc fans is post-LOCA. (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The basis for the associated Technical Specification states that the fans assure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA to prevent flammable localized accumulations of hydrogen. This )
change will enhance the margin of safety by removing a potential failure mode. '
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n~ r ANO-2 DCP: 86-2143
" Battery 2D12 Replacement" This change replaced .the 'fgreen channel" station battery, 2012. The existing 60 cell battery was replaced with a 58 cell battery of significantly greater capacity. The new cells are larger, and required appropriate structural and electrical connection (conduit and cable) modifications. This change also provided a metering system accurate enough to be used for measuring the small charging current for a fully charged battery. This installation will allow use of measurement of charging current in lieu of cell specific gravity for the required routine surveillance upon approval of a pending Technical Specification change request. This change required revisions to various parts of the ANO-2 SAR (Chapters 5, 8, and 9) to reflect the replacement battery's configuration and rating, hydrogen concentration analysis, and associated load chart and emergency duty cycle calculation.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. The battery replacement maintains the system configuration and the seismic qualification, independence, and redundancy of the two DC systems. The equipment and system protective coordination were determined to be acceptable for. the higher short circuit and bus fault current due to the greater battery capacity. (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety ane',ysis report. The modifications associated with the battery replaceme..t do not change the configuration of the existing DC system. (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The battery has been sized in accordance with appropriate standards for the actual emergency loads, with significant additional margin.
ANO-2 DCP: 87-2027 "In-core Instrument Flange Upgrade" This change removed the existing incore instrument (ICI) flanges on the reactor vessel ha d and replaced them with a new design, which is less likely to leak at the primary seal and is easier to remove and replace due to reduced weight and simplified bolting requirements. No changes to the ICI (which were replaced by another DCP) were required by the new flange design. This change will require revision to ANO-2 SAR Figures 4.1-1, 4.2-13 and 4.2-14.
Appropriate seismic, missle generation, and functional qualification evalwitions were performed to verify the acceptability of the new flange design. The new flange design performs the same function in providing a RCS pressure boundary.as the old design. Therefore, it was determined that this design change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or !
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-2 DCP: 87-2041
" Pressurizer Relief Valve Piping Reanalysis and Modification Design" This change was performed to qualify the piping system for its as-built configuration based on a field walkdown, to ince porate the MOVATS program changes involving two valves, and to modify the support system to relieve existing high thermal and deadweight loads on one pressurizer l code safety valve.
Several new piping supports were added, and numerous existing supports and hangers were modified. This change will require revisions to ANO-2 SAR Section 5.2 and Figure 5.1-3.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or. the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. The piping and support modifications' reduce the possibility of a breach in RCS pressure boundary integrity, which is assured by design in accordance with ASME Code.
(ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report. .The specific piping and support modifications will not affect the function or operation of any equipment important to safety. (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
ANO-2 DCP: 87-2047
" Pressurizer Heaters Removal / Replacement and Reconnection" This change installed 44 new GE pressurizer heaters, added current metering for each proportional heater bank, and added ground fault detection to all heater banks. Provisions were also made for backup heaters to the proportional banks, and new SCR controllers of like-kind (direct replacement) with greater {
capacity were added to each proportion'al bank. This change required revision .j to ANO-2 SAR Section 5.5, Tables 5.3-2, 5.5-6 and 8.3-1, and several Figures i associated with Section 5.5 and 8.3.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. The design of and method for permanent replacement of pressurizer heaters was selected to maintain uniform heat distribution and pressure vessel wall integN ty such that the RCS pressure boundary is not degraded. Proportional heaters are not credited in the safety analyses, but are used to provide an adequate pressurizer heatup rate.
during normal plant startup. (ii) create the possibility for an accideqt or l malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the sefety' i analysis report. The backup heaters are not important to safety, and the- ;
pressurizer pressure boundary is not being degraded. (iii)-reduce the margin of i safety as defined in the basis.for any Technical Specification. Tne upgraded i heater capacity is more than twice that' required by. Technical Specifications.
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ANO-2 DCP: 87-2051-
" Refueling Equipment - Reactor Side" This change deleted the CEA Change Machine from the Fuel Handling System, and refurbished other system components, such as the Refueling Machine,.
Transfer Machine.HPU and Hoist Motor. The CEA Change Machine is not designed to handle fuel assemblies, has not been used since the.first refueling outage and has been used for spare parts. The ANO-2 SAR is being revised to delete references to.the CEA Change Machine. No safety-related equipment is affected by this change.
The modifications associated with this change do not change the overall function-of the Fuel Handling System. The refurbished equipment will improve the-operation of the system, and will not in any way adversely impact the dropped fuel assembly accident evaluated in the ANO-2 SAR. Therefore, it was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of' occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for:an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously:in the safety analysis ~ report; or (iii) reduce the margin 'of. safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. This equipment is not address'ed in the Technical Specifications. .i ANO-2 DCP: 87-2060 .
"ANO-2 Surface Enhancement Switch Relocations" This change relocated handswitches and indicators in panels 2002, 2C11, 2C33, 2C16 and 2C17 to allow surface enhancements to be made to these panels. This change addressed and resolved several HEDs in accordance with AP&L's commitments'_ ']
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as a result of the CRDR effort. These human factors improvements will enhance I the operators' ability for accident mitigation by improving.the-organization j of controls and instruments on the control room panels. This change will result in changes to numerous ANO-2 SAR figures.
This change did not affect the operation or function of any of the associated systems. This change maintained applicable seismic and.. separation design j criteria. Therefore, it was determined that this . design change did not: i (i) increase the probability of occurrence'or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; or (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
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ANO-2 DCP: 87-2062 "LP 'B' Low Pressure Turbine Rotor Installation" This change replaced the "B" Low Pressure Turbine with a new rotor of the General Electric monoblock (one piece forging) design. The " A" rotor remabi; of the previous built up design, with shrunk on wheels. The new design has significantly lower probability of missile generation due to overspeed es cr.t .
as the centrifugal stresses must exceed the material strength. The discussh of this event in ANO-2 SAR Section 3.5.2.2.2 has been revised accordingly.
It was determined that this design change did not: (i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report. The turbine generator assembly is not safety grade equipment. This change does not affect the configuration, operation or function of the turbine. (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report. There are no postulated accidents that are a result of turbine rotor failure. The new rotor design will in fact reduce the possibility of rotor disc rupture. (iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
Turbine rotor failure is not considered in the definitions of margin to safety.
ANO-2 Plant Change: 87-0350 +
" Revise Secondary Sampling System Alarm Setpoints" This change revised a variety of setondary sampling system alarm setpoints to more closely reflect currently established limits outlined in the AND Steam Generator Water Chemistry procedure. Change in one specific alarm function will require a revision to ANO-2 SAR Figure 9.3-3. Tables 10.3-2 and 10.3-3 are also being revised to reflect current chemistry practices.
The setpoints affected are for alarm functions only and serve no safety related function. Therefore, it was determined that this plant change did not:
(i) increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the safety analysis report; or (ii) create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report.
The alarms are part of equipment use to alert operations and/or chemistry personnel to investigate water chemistry through quantitative or qualitative analysis. This impacts only the control of impurities and corrosion, and relates to the long-term life of non-safety related secondary plant equipment.
(iii) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The secondary chemistry limit margins or alarms are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.
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