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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000324/20240032024-11-13013 November 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000324/2024003 and 05000325/2024003 IR 05000324/20253012024-10-17017 October 2024 Notification of Licensed Operator Initial Examination 05000325/2025301 and 05000324/2025301 IR 05000324/20244012024-10-15015 October 2024 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000324/2024401 and 05000325/2024401 ML24297A6262024-10-11011 October 2024 PCA Letter to NRC Brunswick Potential Tropical Storm Eight IR 05000324/20240102024-09-10010 September 2024 Focused Engineering Inspection Commercial Grade Dedication Report 05000324-2024010 and 05000325-2024010 ML24218A0862024-09-0909 September 2024 NRC to NMFS, Designation of Duke Energy Progress LLC as the Non-Federal Representative for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 ML24249A1362024-09-0404 September 2024 EN 57304 - Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC, Final Report - No Embedded Files. Notification of the Potential Existence of Defects Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21 ML24242A0322024-08-29029 August 2024 Submittal of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Revision 29, 10 CFR 54.37 Update, Technical Requirements Manuals, Technical Specification Bases, 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation Summaries, and Commitment Change IR 05000324/20240052024-08-23023 August 2024 Updated Inspection Plan for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Report 05000324/2024005 and 05000325/2024005) IR 05000324/20240022024-08-0505 August 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000324/2024002 and 05000325/2024002 and 07200006/2024001 ML24206A1062024-07-30030 July 2024 2024 Brunswick Requal Inspection Corporate Notification Letter ML24183A0972024-07-12012 July 2024 ISFSI; Catawba 1, 2 & ISFSI; McGuire 1, 2 & ISFSI; Oconee 1, 2, 3 & ISFSI; Shearon Harris 1; H. B. Robinson 2 & ISFSI; and Radioactive Package Shipping Under 10 CFR 71 (71-266 & 71-345) – Review of QA Program Changes EPID L-2024-LLQ-0002 IR 05000324/20244202024-07-0202 July 2024 – Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000324/2024420 and 05000325/2024420 ML24108A0702024-06-0505 June 2024 – Issuance of License Amendments to Revise the 10 CFR 50.69 Categorization Process to Reflect an Alternative Seismic Approach IR 05000324/20244022024-05-17017 May 2024 Plan Material Control and Accounting Program Inspection Report 05000324/2024402 and 05000325/2024402 - Cover Letter IR 05000324/20240012024-05-0909 May 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000324/2024001 and 05000325/2024001 05000325/LER-2024-001, Primary Containment Penetration Local Leak Rate Testing Failure2024-04-10010 April 2024 Primary Containment Penetration Local Leak Rate Testing Failure 05000325/LER-2024-002, Re Automatic Start of Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Emergency Bus De-energization2024-04-10010 April 2024 Re Automatic Start of Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Emergency Bus De-energization IR 05000324/20243012024-04-0303 April 2024 NRC Operator License Examination Report 05000325/2024301 and 05000324/2024301 ML24066A0132024-03-0505 March 2024 Bru 2024-002 Radiation Safety Baseline Inspection Information Request ML24026A0982024-03-0101 March 2024 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L-2023-LLE-0057 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting)) IR 05000324/20230062024-02-28028 February 2024 Annual Assessment Letter for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 – NRC Inspection Reports 05000324/2023006 and 05000325/2023006 IR 05000324/20244032024-02-14014 February 2024 Information Request for the Cybersecurity Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perm Inspection 05000325/2024403; 05000324/2024403 ML24032A1392024-02-12012 February 2024 Correction of Errors within Authorized Alternative Request RA-22-0308 IR 05000324/20230042024-02-0606 February 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000324/2023004 and 05000325/2023004 ML24036A0962024-02-0202 February 2024 Operator Licensing Examination Approval 050003242024301 and 050003252024301 IR 05000324/20230112023-12-26026 December 2023 NRC Fire Protection Team Inspection - FPTI Report 05000324/2023011 and 05000325/2023011 IR 05000324/20234022023-12-14014 December 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000324-2023402 and 05000325-2023402 ML23297A0262023-11-27027 November 2023 – Proposed Alternatives to ASME Code Section XI Subsection IWE Requirements for Torus Metallic Liner Inspections ML23317A3462023-11-14014 November 2023 Duke Fleet - Correction Letter to License Amendment Nos. 312 & 340 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-554, Revision 1 IR 05000324/20230032023-11-0101 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000324/2023003 and 05000325/2023003 IR 05000324/20230102023-10-17017 October 2023 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000324/2023010 and 05000325/2023010 IR 05000325/20234012023-10-16016 October 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000324 and 05000325 2023401 ML23346A1322023-10-0606 October 2023 Communication from C-10 Research & Education Foundation Regarding NextEra Common Emergency Fleet Plan License Amendment Request and Related Documents Subsequently Published ML23256A0882023-09-25025 September 2023 Issuance of Alternative to Steam Generator Welds ML23195A0782023-08-29029 August 2023 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-554, Revision 1 IR 05000324/20230052023-08-23023 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Report 05000324/2023005 and 05000325/2023005) IR 05000324/20230022023-08-0404 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000324/2023002 and 05000325/2023002 ML23201A2042023-07-28028 July 2023 Summary of Regulatory Audit in Support of Alternative Request RA-22-0308 for Inservice Inspection of the Torus Metallic Liner ML23212B2682023-07-25025 July 2023 – Notification of Licensed Operator Initial Examination 05000325/2024301 and 05000324/2024301 05000324/LER-2023-001, Two Main Steam Line Safety Relief Valves Inoperable2023-07-17017 July 2023 Two Main Steam Line Safety Relief Valves Inoperable 05000325/LER-2023-001, Loss of Redundant Power Supply Operation Causes Turbine Trip and Subsequent Reactor Scram2023-06-15015 June 2023 Loss of Redundant Power Supply Operation Causes Turbine Trip and Subsequent Reactor Scram ML23146A0012023-05-24024 May 2023 EN 56538 - Engine Systems Inc and Brunswick ML23212A9502023-05-24024 May 2023 Engine Systems, Inc., Part 21 Report Re Woodward EGB-35P Governor/Actuator with Foreign Material ML23130A3902023-05-12012 May 2023 – Regulatory Audit Plan in Support of Alternative Request RA 22-0308 for Inservice Inspection of the Torus Metallic Liner IR 05000324/20230012023-05-10010 May 2023 – Integrated Inspection Report 05000324 2023001 and 05000325 2023001 ML23118A0762023-05-0101 May 2023 Approval for Use of Specific Provision of a Later Edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI IR 05000324/20220042023-04-0404 April 2023 Reissue - Brunswick Steam Electric Plant - Integrated Inspection Report 05000324/2022004 and 05000325/022004 ML22332A4932023-03-10010 March 2023 William States Lee III 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Relocation of the Emergency Operations Facility IR 05000324/20220062023-03-0101 March 2023 Annual Assessment Letter for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 – NRC Inspection Reports 05000324/2022006 and 05000325/2022006 2024-09-09
[Table view] Category:Licensee Event Report (LER)
MONTHYEAR05000325/LER-2024-002, Re Automatic Start of Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Emergency Bus De-energization2024-04-10010 April 2024 Re Automatic Start of Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Emergency Bus De-energization 05000325/LER-2024-001, Primary Containment Penetration Local Leak Rate Testing Failure2024-04-10010 April 2024 Primary Containment Penetration Local Leak Rate Testing Failure 05000324/LER-2023-001, Two Main Steam Line Safety Relief Valves Inoperable2023-07-17017 July 2023 Two Main Steam Line Safety Relief Valves Inoperable 05000325/LER-2023-001, Loss of Redundant Power Supply Operation Causes Turbine Trip and Subsequent Reactor Scram2023-06-15015 June 2023 Loss of Redundant Power Supply Operation Causes Turbine Trip and Subsequent Reactor Scram 05000325/LER-2022-001, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Inoperable2022-09-12012 September 2022 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Inoperable 05000325/LER-2021-001, Automatic Specified System Actuation Due to Loss of Power to Emergency Bus E32022-01-20020 January 2022 Automatic Specified System Actuation Due to Loss of Power to Emergency Bus E3 05000324/LER-2020-005, (Bsep), Unit 1 Re Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Ventilation Charcoal Sample Lab Results2021-01-21021 January 2021 (Bsep), Unit 1 Re Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Ventilation Charcoal Sample Lab Results 05000325/LER-2020-002-01, Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Unidentified Leakage2020-11-17017 November 2020 Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Unidentified Leakage 05000325/LER-2020-004, (Bsep), Unit 1, Setpoint Drift in Main Steam Line Safety Relief Valves Results in Three Valves Inoperable2020-09-29029 September 2020 (Bsep), Unit 1, Setpoint Drift in Main Steam Line Safety Relief Valves Results in Three Valves Inoperable 05000325/LER-2020-003, Automatic Specified System Actuations Due to Loss of Offsite Power2020-09-21021 September 2020 Automatic Specified System Actuations Due to Loss of Offsite Power 05000325/LER-2020-001, Manual Reactor Scram During Startup Due to All Bypass Valves Fully Opening2020-05-20020 May 2020 Manual Reactor Scram During Startup Due to All Bypass Valves Fully Opening 05000324/LER-2019-003, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Inoperable2019-07-31031 July 2019 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Inoperable RA-19-0263, False High Reactor Water Level Results in Automatic Specified System Actuations2019-06-19019 June 2019 False High Reactor Water Level Results in Automatic Specified System Actuations 05000324/LER-2019-002, Manual Reactor Protection System Actuation and Specified System Actuation2019-05-28028 May 2019 Manual Reactor Protection System Actuation and Specified System Actuation 05000324/LER-2019-001, Automatic Actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System2019-04-30030 April 2019 Automatic Actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System 05000325/LER-2018-003, Setpoint Drift in Main Steam Line Safety/Relief Valves Results in Two Valves Inoperable2018-08-0909 August 2018 Setpoint Drift in Main Steam Line Safety/Relief Valves Results in Two Valves Inoperable 05000325/LER-2018-002, Automatic Reactor Trip During Stator Coolant System Realignment2018-06-0505 June 2018 Automatic Reactor Trip During Stator Coolant System Realignment 05000325/LER-2018-001, Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (Egm) 11-003, Revision 32018-05-0707 May 2018 Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (Egm) 11-003, Revision 3 05000324/LER-1917-004, Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator and Primary Containment Isolation System Actuations2017-11-15015 November 2017 Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator and Primary Containment Isolation System Actuations 05000324/LER-1917-003, Regarding Setpoint Drift in Main Steam Line Safety/Relief Valves Results in Three Valves Inoperable,2017-08-0303 August 2017 Regarding Setpoint Drift in Main Steam Line Safety/Relief Valves Results in Three Valves Inoperable, 05000325/LER-1917-003, Regarding Control Room Air Conditioning and Emergency Ventilation Systems Rendered Inoperable2017-08-0202 August 2017 Regarding Control Room Air Conditioning and Emergency Ventilation Systems Rendered Inoperable 05000324/LER-1916-006-01, Regarding Control Room Air Conditioning Units Inoperable Due to Corroded Supports2017-05-0303 May 2017 Regarding Control Room Air Conditioning Units Inoperable Due to Corroded Supports 05000324/LER-2017-001, Regarding Speed and Frequency Oscillations Result in Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator2017-03-22022 March 2017 Regarding Speed and Frequency Oscillations Result in Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator 05000324/LER-2016-005, Regarding Drywell High Range Radiation Monitors Inoperable Due to Thermally Induced Current Phenomenon2016-12-0505 December 2016 Regarding Drywell High Range Radiation Monitors Inoperable Due to Thermally Induced Current Phenomenon 05000324/LER-2016-004, Regarding Tornado Missile Vulnerability Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications2016-09-0606 September 2016 Regarding Tornado Missile Vulnerability Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications 05000324/LER-2016-002-01, For Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 1 Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator 3 Inoperable Due to Failure to Auto-Start2016-08-0808 August 2016 For Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 1 Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator 3 Inoperable Due to Failure to Auto-Start 05000324/LER-2016-001, Regarding Mispositioned Valves Result in Residual Heat Removal Service Water System Lnoperability2016-08-0808 August 2016 Regarding Mispositioned Valves Result in Residual Heat Removal Service Water System Lnoperability 05000325/LER-2016-003, Regarding Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 32016-05-0202 May 2016 Regarding Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 3 05000325/LER-2016-001, Regarding Electrical Bus Fault Results in Lockout of Startup Auxiliary Transformer and Loss of Offsite Power2016-04-0606 April 2016 Regarding Electrical Bus Fault Results in Lockout of Startup Auxiliary Transformer and Loss of Offsite Power BSEP 15-0088, Special Report, Technical Specification 5.6.6, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation Report2015-10-22022 October 2015 Special Report, Technical Specification 5.6.6, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation Report 05000324/LER-2015-003, Regarding Oil Leak Renders Residual Heat Removal Service Water System Pump Inoperable2015-06-0808 June 2015 Regarding Oil Leak Renders Residual Heat Removal Service Water System Pump Inoperable 05000324/LER-2015-002, Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator Loss of Safety Function2015-05-20020 May 2015 Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator Loss of Safety Function 05000324/LER-2015-001, Regarding Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 22015-04-24024 April 2015 Regarding Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 2 05000325/LER-2015-001, (Bsep), Unit 1, Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Inoperable Due to Auxiliary Oil Pump Failure2015-04-10010 April 2015 (Bsep), Unit 1, Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Inoperable Due to Auxiliary Oil Pump Failure 05000325/LER-2014-005, Regarding Setpoint Drift in Main Steam Line Safety/Relief Valves Results in Two Valves Inoperable2014-07-21021 July 2014 Regarding Setpoint Drift in Main Steam Line Safety/Relief Valves Results in Two Valves Inoperable 05000324/LER-2014-002, Regarding Secondary Containment Loss of Safety Function Due to Opening in Reactor Building Roof Drain Piping2014-06-19019 June 2014 Regarding Secondary Containment Loss of Safety Function Due to Opening in Reactor Building Roof Drain Piping 05000324/LER-2014-004, Regarding Fire Related Unanalyzed Condition That Could Impact Equipment Credited in Safe Shutdown Analysis2014-05-16016 May 2014 Regarding Fire Related Unanalyzed Condition That Could Impact Equipment Credited in Safe Shutdown Analysis 05000325/LER-2014-003, Regarding Secondary Containment Loss of Safety Function Due to Airlock Door Interlock Design2014-05-0909 May 2014 Regarding Secondary Containment Loss of Safety Function Due to Airlock Door Interlock Design 05000325/LER-2014-002, Regarding Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers Inoperable During Operations with Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel2014-05-0505 May 2014 Regarding Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers Inoperable During Operations with Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel 05000324/LER-2014-001, Regarding Secondary Containment Loss of Safety Function Due to Airlock Door Interlock Design2014-05-0202 May 2014 Regarding Secondary Containment Loss of Safety Function Due to Airlock Door Interlock Design 05000325/LER-2014-001, Regarding Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 22014-05-0101 May 2014 Regarding Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 2 05000324/LER-2013-002, From Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 1, Fire Related Unanalyzed Condition That Could Impact Equipment Credited in Safe Shutdown Analysis2013-09-27027 September 2013 From Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 1, Fire Related Unanalyzed Condition That Could Impact Equipment Credited in Safe Shutdown Analysis 05000324/LER-2013-004, Regarding Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications - Recirculation Loop Flow Mismatch2013-08-19019 August 2013 Regarding Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications - Recirculation Loop Flow Mismatch 05000324/LER-2013-001, Regarding Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 12013-05-0606 May 2013 Regarding Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 1 05000324/LER-2012-007-01, Regarding Loss of Control Room Emergency Ventilation2013-04-11011 April 2013 Regarding Loss of Control Room Emergency Ventilation 05000324/LER-2012-007, (Bsep), Unit 1, Loss of Control Room Emergency Ventilation2013-02-12012 February 2013 (Bsep), Unit 1, Loss of Control Room Emergency Ventilation 05000324/LER-2011-001-02, Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to RWCU Instrumentation Inoperable2013-01-20020 January 2013 Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to RWCU Instrumentation Inoperable 05000325/LER-2012-006, (Bsep), Unit 1, Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Operation with a Potential for Draining the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV)2012-11-19019 November 2012 (Bsep), Unit 1, Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Operation with a Potential for Draining the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) 05000324/LER-2012-005, Regarding Local Control Capability of Emergency Diesel Generator No. 2 Not Available2012-10-29029 October 2012 Regarding Local Control Capability of Emergency Diesel Generator No. 2 Not Available 05000325/LER-2012-004, Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Inoperable Due to Erratic Governor Operation2012-06-29029 June 2012 Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Inoperable Due to Erratic Governor Operation 2024-04-10
[Table view] |
LER-2016-001, Regarding Electrical Bus Fault Results in Lockout of Startup Auxiliary Transformer and Loss of Offsite Power |
Event date: |
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Report date: |
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Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER, Invalid Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B), System Actuation |
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3252016001R00 - NRC Website |
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text
ef-..DUKE
~'ENERGY APR 0 6 2016 Serial: BSEP 16-0021 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-71 Docket No. 50-325 Licensee Event Report 1-2016-001 William R. Gideon Vice President Brunswick Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461 o: 910.457.3698 10 CFR 50.73 In accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73, Duke Energy Progress, Inc., submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LEA). This report fulfills the requirement of 1 O CFR 50.73(a)(1) for a written report within sixty (60) days of a reportable occurrence.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Lee Grzeck, Manager - Regulatory Affairs, at (910) 457-2487.
William R. Gideon SWR/swr Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 1-2016-001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 2 cc (with enclosure):
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II ATTN: Ms. Catherine Haney, Regional Administrator 245 Peachtree Center Ave, NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Ms. Michelle P. Catts, NRC Senior Resident Inspector 8470 River Road Southport, NC 28461-8869 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Andrew Hon (Mail Stop OWFN 8G9A) (Electronic Copy Only) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Chair - North Carolina Utilities Commission P.O. Box 29510 Raleigh, NC 27626-0510
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY"COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150*0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (11-2015)
, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) Unit 1 05000325 1 OF 5
- 4. TITLE Electrical Bus Fault Results in Lockout of Startup Auxiliary Transformer and Loss of Offsite Power
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LEA NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 02 07 2016 2016 - 001
- - 00 04 06 2016 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: {Check all that apply)
D 20.2201 (b)
D 20.22os(a)(s)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 1 D 20.2201 (d)
D 20.22os(a)(s)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D 20.22os(a)(1)
D 20.22os(a)(4)
D so.1s(a)(2J(iii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
D 20.22os(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
~
50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- 10. POWER LEVEL D 20.22os(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 1s.11(a)(4l D 20.22os(a)(2)(iiil D so.ss(c)(2J D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 1s.11(a)(s)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D so.4s(a)(s)(iil D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 1s.11(a)(1J 088 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 1s.11(a)(2J(i)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
D 1s.11(a)(2)(ii)
I.'.
'~"' '*
t;,.*..
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in 05000-325 YEAR 2016 -
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 001 REV NO.
000 opened per design and deenergized the UAT. This interrupted power to emergency busses E1 and E2.
Since the SAT was already locked out, the power source for busses E1 and E2 could not transfer to the SAT. Therefore, a LOOP condition existed on emergency electrical busses E1 and E2. EDG1 and EDG2 were already running and automatically tied to their respective busses, E1 and E2. On Unit 2, EDG3 and EDG4 started per design, but did not connect to their busses because the LOOP condition did not exist on Unit 2.
Following shutdown of the main turbine, reactor pressure was initially controlled by opening safety/relief valves [SB]. When pressure was stable, licensed personnel manually started the HPCI system and maintained control of reactor pressure, and they started the RCIC system for the purpose of maintaining reactor water level. After the manual scram, reactor water level decreased below Low Level 1 per the normal, expected water level shrinkage that follows a reactor scram. The low water level resulted in additional, redundant RPS actuation signals being received, and Group 2 and Group 6 PCIVs received an auto closure signal. The momentary loss of power that occurred between the LOOP and energizing the busses via the EDGs also resulted in Group 1, Group 3, and Group 1 O PCIVs receiving a closure signal.
All affected PCIVs closed per design.
Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGT) [BH] fans started due to the LOOP condition. However, associated Secondary Containment dampers [VA] did not reposition because the relays in the damper control logic are not designed to seal in, and the duration of the transient when the bus was depowered was too brief for the dampers to physically complete their movement before the EDGs repowered the busses and the signal cleared.
Operations personnel promptly performed a walkdown of plant equipment and noted evidence that an arc flash had occurred in a balance of plant 4160-volt circuit breaker cubicle which supplies the 18 Reactor Recirculation Pump Variable Frequency Drive (VFD) unit. The breaker cubicle showed evidence of an electrical* explosion; that is, the cubicle door was deformed. Per Emergency Action Level HA2.1, evidence of an explosion in an area affecting safe shutdown equipment requires entry into an Alert. Thus, the Alert was declared at 1326 EST.
At 1628 EST on February 7, 2016, offsite power was restored to electrical busses E1 and E2 by connecting the UAT to the grid and supplying power to the busses from the UAT, which is their normal source. At 1751 EST, the emergency classification was downgraded to an Unusual Event (UE) because the plant no longer met the criteria for an Alert, since the source of the explosion was determined not to have affected safe shutdown equipment. The UE emergency declaration was terminated at 1814 EST.
Event Causes The initiating event was two arc flashes that occurred in a non-segregated bus (i.e., a bus in which all three phases lie within a single housing) and in a circuit breaker cubicle which powers the 18 VFD for a Reactor Recirculation system pump. The first arc flash occurred in an area of the bus housing outdoors where water had accumulated. The fault created a voltage imbalance which led to the second arc flash which occurred in the breaker cubicle where cable insulation was found to be degraded.
05000-325 YEAR 2016 -
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 001 REV NO.
000 Water entered the non-segregated bus housing through a degraded seal and an area that had previously been repaired. The water created the conditions conducive to an arc flash.
In the breaker cubicle for the 1 B VFD, it was found that during installation in 201 O of electrical stress-relieving insulation (i.e., "stress cones"), the dielectric insulation on a cable jacket had been damaged when a piece of semiconducting material was being removed. The arc flash occurred at the point where the cable insulation had been damaged.
The root cause of the moisture intrusion into the non-segregated bus was inspection procedures did not contain sufficient specific detail based on highest risk locations (i.e., specifically, horizontal surfaces through which bars penetrate) to ensure that deficiencies that can lead to water intrusion are identified and corrected during its implementation. A contributing cause was that the design of the bus housing is not optimum for the application because it is susceptible to corrosion leading to water intrusion.
The root cause of the damaged cable insulation was failure to specify and use a depth-limiting cutting tool for removing semiconducting material from cable insulation. When workers removed semiconducting material from the cable during initial installation of the cable termination stress cone, the underlying cable dielectric insulation was scored, reducing its insulating effectiveness. This contributed to conditions which led to an arc fault in the affected 4160-volt cable. A contributing cause was lack of a post-installation test method which would be adequate to detect insulation deficiencies.
Safety Assessment
In this event, a LOOP occurred on Unit 1 emergency busses E1 and E2 due to lockout of the SAT and interruption of power to the UAT. The reactor was immediately and safely shut down by manual scram in accordance with station operating procedures. The RCIC system and HPCI system operated as designed and controlled reactor water level and pressure, respectively. All four station EDGs started as expected, and EDGs 1 and 2 supplied power to affected emergency busses E1 and E2. Unit 2 busses E3 and E4 were not affected by the event, and they remained powered by their normal, offsite sources. In addition, the site's supplemental diesel generator was available and could have been used if necessary to mitigate the event. The SAT was not damaged by the event. The UAT remained available for backfeed, and backfeed was implemented per procedure during the event. All safety systems operated per design in response to the event.
Based on the foregoing analysis, it's concluded that this event had no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public.
Corrective Actions
05000-325 YEAR 2016 -
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 001 Any changes to the corrective actions and schedules noted below will be made in accordance with the site's corrective action program.
REV NO.
000
- Affected equipment related to the event has been repaired, including the affected non-segregated bus housing, conductors and stress cones, and circuit breaker. These actions are completed.
- The procedure for splicing and terminating wires and cables will be revised to include lessons learned from this event, including the use of depth-limiting cutting tools and inspections for damage after cutting operations are performed. This action is expected to be completed by June 30, 2016.
- The procedure and work instructions for inspecting and cleaning the non-segregated busses will be revised to eliminate the root causes of the water intrusion. This action is expected to be completed by August 25, 2016.
- An improved cable testing methodology will be specified in appropriate maintenance procedures.
This action is expected to be completed by June 30, 2016.
- The non-segregated bus housing design will be presented for action by the site's Modification Review and Prioritization Team (MRPT) for scheduling and design work. This action is expected to be completed by June 30, 2016.
Previous Similar Events
A review of LERs and the site's corrective action program for the past three years did not identify any previous similar occurrences involving significant electrical faults or LOOP conditions.
Commitments
No regulatory commitments are contained in this report.
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER YEAR 05000-325 2016 -
Energy Industry Identification System (EllS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].
Background
Initial conditions
- 3. LER NUMBER SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 001 REV NO.
000 On February 7, 2016, at 1312 Eastern Standard Time (EST), Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (i.e., Run) at a power level of 88 percent of rated thermal power in end-of-cycle coastdown. No out-of-service equipment contributed to, or affected the course of, this event.
Reportability Criteria This event is being reported in accordance with 1 O CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) because it involved actuations of systems listed in 1 O CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). Specific actuations included:
- Several Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) [JM] automatically closed per design in response to either loss of control logic power or reactor water level changes that resulted from the reactor scram.
The NRC was notified of the event, including the emergency declaration, per 1 o CFR 50.72(a)(1 )(i),
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) via Event Notification 51715 at 13:46 EST on February 7, 2016.
Event Description
On February 7, 2016, at 1312 EST, BSEP Unit 1 was in Mode 1 during end-of-cycle coastdown. Two arc flashes occurred in a 4160-volt electrical system which resulted in two phases of the system faulting to ground, which also constituted a phase-to-phase fault. The high differential current actuated the lockout on the Unit 1 Startup Auxiliary Transformer (SAT) [EA], which started all four emergency diesel generators. The loss of power to equipment fed from the SAT resulted in shutdown of both Reactor Recirculation system pumps. With both pumps not operating, station procedures require licensed personnel to insert a manual scram. This was performed immediately, and all control rods,[AA] fully inserted into the core per design.
The manual scram automatically shut down the main turbine [TA] and main generator [EL] per design.
With the main generator offline, the power circuit breakers for the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) [EA]
05000-325 YEAR 2016 -
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 001 REV NO.
000 opened per design and deenergized the UAT. This interrupted power to emergency busses E1 and E2.
Since the SAT was already locked out, the power source for busses E1 and E2 could not transfer to the SAT. Therefore, a LOOP condition existed on emergency electrical busses E1 and E2. EDG1 and EDG2 were already running and automatically tied to their respective busses, E1 and E2. On Unit 2, EDG3 and EDG4 started per design, but did not connect to their busses because the LOOP condition did not exist on Unit 2.
Following shutdown of the main turbine, reactor pressure was initially controlled by opening safety/relief valves [SB]. When pressure was stable, licensed personnel manually started the HPCI system and maintained control of reactor pressure, and they started the RCIC system for the purpose of maintaining reactor water level. After the manual scram, reactor water level decreased below Low Level 1 per the normal, expected water level shrinkage that follows a reactor scram. The low water level resulted in additional, redundant RPS actuation signals being received, and Group 2 and Group 6 PCIVs received an auto closure signal. The momentary loss of power that occurred between the LOOP and energizing the busses via the EDGs also resulted in Group 1, Group 3, and Group 1 O PCIVs receiving a closure signal.
All affected PCIVs closed per design.
Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGT) [BH] fans started due to the LOOP condition. However, associated Secondary Containment dampers [VA] did not reposition because the relays in the damper control logic are not designed to seal in, and the duration of the transient when the bus was depowered was too brief for the dampers to physically complete their movement before the EDGs repowered the busses and the signal cleared.
Operations personnel promptly performed a walkdown of plant equipment and noted evidence that an arc flash had occurred in a balance of plant 4160-volt circuit breaker cubicle which supplies the 18 Reactor Recirculation Pump Variable Frequency Drive (VFD) unit. The breaker cubicle showed evidence of an electrical* explosion; that is, the cubicle door was deformed. Per Emergency Action Level HA2.1, evidence of an explosion in an area affecting safe shutdown equipment requires entry into an Alert. Thus, the Alert was declared at 1326 EST.
At 1628 EST on February 7, 2016, offsite power was restored to electrical busses E1 and E2 by connecting the UAT to the grid and supplying power to the busses from the UAT, which is their normal source. At 1751 EST, the emergency classification was downgraded to an Unusual Event (UE) because the plant no longer met the criteria for an Alert, since the source of the explosion was determined not to have affected safe shutdown equipment. The UE emergency declaration was terminated at 1814 EST.
Event Causes The initiating event was two arc flashes that occurred in a non-segregated bus (i.e., a bus in which all three phases lie within a single housing) and in a circuit breaker cubicle which powers the 18 VFD for a Reactor Recirculation system pump. The first arc flash occurred in an area of the bus housing outdoors where water had accumulated. The fault created a voltage imbalance which led to the second arc flash which occurred in the breaker cubicle where cable insulation was found to be degraded.
05000-325 YEAR 2016 -
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 001 REV NO.
000 Water entered the non-segregated bus housing through a degraded seal and an area that had previously been repaired. The water created the conditions conducive to an arc flash.
In the breaker cubicle for the 1 B VFD, it was found that during installation in 201 O of electrical stress-relieving insulation (i.e., "stress cones"), the dielectric insulation on a cable jacket had been damaged when a piece of semiconducting material was being removed. The arc flash occurred at the point where the cable insulation had been damaged.
The root cause of the moisture intrusion into the non-segregated bus was inspection procedures did not contain sufficient specific detail based on highest risk locations (i.e., specifically, horizontal surfaces through which bars penetrate) to ensure that deficiencies that can lead to water intrusion are identified and corrected during its implementation. A contributing cause was that the design of the bus housing is not optimum for the application because it is susceptible to corrosion leading to water intrusion.
The root cause of the damaged cable insulation was failure to specify and use a depth-limiting cutting tool for removing semiconducting material from cable insulation. When workers removed semiconducting material from the cable during initial installation of the cable termination stress cone, the underlying cable dielectric insulation was scored, reducing its insulating effectiveness. This contributed to conditions which led to an arc fault in the affected 4160-volt cable. A contributing cause was lack of a post-installation test method which would be adequate to detect insulation deficiencies.
Safety Assessment
In this event, a LOOP occurred on Unit 1 emergency busses E1 and E2 due to lockout of the SAT and interruption of power to the UAT. The reactor was immediately and safely shut down by manual scram in accordance with station operating procedures. The RCIC system and HPCI system operated as designed and controlled reactor water level and pressure, respectively. All four station EDGs started as expected, and EDGs 1 and 2 supplied power to affected emergency busses E1 and E2. Unit 2 busses E3 and E4 were not affected by the event, and they remained powered by their normal, offsite sources. In addition, the site's supplemental diesel generator was available and could have been used if necessary to mitigate the event. The SAT was not damaged by the event. The UAT remained available for backfeed, and backfeed was implemented per procedure during the event. All safety systems operated per design in response to the event.
Based on the foregoing analysis, it's concluded that this event had no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public.
Corrective Actions
05000-325 YEAR 2016 -
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 001 Any changes to the corrective actions and schedules noted below will be made in accordance with the site's corrective action program.
REV NO.
000
- Affected equipment related to the event has been repaired, including the affected non-segregated bus housing, conductors and stress cones, and circuit breaker. These actions are completed.
- The procedure for splicing and terminating wires and cables will be revised to include lessons learned from this event, including the use of depth-limiting cutting tools and inspections for damage after cutting operations are performed. This action is expected to be completed by June 30, 2016.
- The procedure and work instructions for inspecting and cleaning the non-segregated busses will be revised to eliminate the root causes of the water intrusion. This action is expected to be completed by August 25, 2016.
- An improved cable testing methodology will be specified in appropriate maintenance procedures.
This action is expected to be completed by June 30, 2016.
- The non-segregated bus housing design will be presented for action by the site's Modification Review and Prioritization Team (MRPT) for scheduling and design work. This action is expected to be completed by June 30, 2016.
Previous Similar Events
A review of LERs and the site's corrective action program for the past three years did not identify any previous similar occurrences involving significant electrical faults or LOOP conditions.
Commitments
No regulatory commitments are contained in this report.
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05000324/LER-2016-001, Regarding Mispositioned Valves Result in Residual Heat Removal Service Water System Lnoperability | Regarding Mispositioned Valves Result in Residual Heat Removal Service Water System Lnoperability | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System | 05000325/LER-2016-001, Regarding Electrical Bus Fault Results in Lockout of Startup Auxiliary Transformer and Loss of Offsite Power | Regarding Electrical Bus Fault Results in Lockout of Startup Auxiliary Transformer and Loss of Offsite Power | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | 05000325/LER-2016-002 | Emergency Diesel Generator 3 Inoperable Due to Failure to Auto-Start | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000324/LER-2016-002-01, For Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 1 Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator 3 Inoperable Due to Failure to Auto-Start | For Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 1 Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator 3 Inoperable Due to Failure to Auto-Start | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | 05000325/LER-2016-003, Regarding Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 3 | Regarding Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 3 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | 05000325/LER-2016-004 | Tornado Missile Vulnerability Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000324/LER-2016-004, Regarding Tornado Missile Vulnerability Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | Regarding Tornado Missile Vulnerability Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | 05000325/LER-2016-005 | Drywell High Range Radiation Monitors Inoperable due to Thermally Induced Current Phenomenon | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000324/LER-2016-005, Regarding Drywell High Range Radiation Monitors Inoperable Due to Thermally Induced Current Phenomenon | Regarding Drywell High Range Radiation Monitors Inoperable Due to Thermally Induced Current Phenomenon | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | 05000325/LER-2016-006 | Control Room Air Conditioning Units Inoperable due to Corroded Supports | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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