05000325/LER-2015-001, (Bsep), Unit 1, Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Inoperable Due to Auxiliary Oil Pump Failure

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(Bsep), Unit 1, Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Inoperable Due to Auxiliary Oil Pump Failure
ML15113A347
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/10/2015
From: William Gideon
Duke Energy Corp
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
BSEP 15-0029 LER 15-001-00
Download: ML15113A347 (5)


LER-2015-001, (Bsep), Unit 1, Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Inoperable Due to Auxiliary Oil Pump Failure
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3252015001R00 - NRC Website

text

DUKE William R. Gideon Vice President Brunswick Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461 o: 910.457.3698 APR 1 C 201f 10 CFR 50.73 Serial: BSEP 15-0029 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-71 Docket No. 50-325 Licensee Event Report 1-2015-001 In accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73, Duke Energy Progress, Inc., submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER). This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within sixty (60) days of a reportable occurrence.

This document contains no regulatory commitments.

Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Lee Grzeck, Manager - Regulatory Affairs, at (910) 457-2487.

Sincerely, William R. Gideon MAT/mat

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 2 cc (with enclosure):

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II ATTN: Mr. Victor M. McCree, Regional Administrator 245 Peachtree Center Ave, NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Ms. Michelle P. Catts, NRC Senior Resident Inspector 8470 River Road Southport, NC 28461-8869 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Andrew Hon (Mail Stop OWFN 8G9A) (Electronic Copy Only) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Chair - North Carolina Utilities Commission P.O. Box 29510 Raleigh, NC 27626-0510

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Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.

S,*

,Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections

/ LICENSEE E NBranch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by LICE EEVENT RT L

)

intemet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and (See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB digits/characters for each block) control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. PAGE Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit 1 05000325 1 OF 3
4. TITLE High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Inoperable due to Auxiliary Oil Pump Failure
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAYJ YEAR FAITYNMDOKTUBE NUMBER NO.

05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 02 12 2015 2015-001

- 00 04 10 2015 05000
9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

[-

20.2201(b)

[

20.2203(a)(3)(i)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

L 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

E] 20.2201(d)

[

20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

L 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 1 20.2203(a)(1)

L] 20.2203(a)(4)

E 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

L 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

[] 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

F1 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

F1 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(x)

E 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

[1 50.36(c)(2)

[E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

F1 73.71 (a)(4)

L 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

[I 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

F1 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

El 73.71 (a)(5) 100 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

[1 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

[

OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

IZ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

Background

Initial Conditions At the time of this event, Unit 1 was in Mode 1, at approximately 100 percent of rated thermal power (RTP). The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system [BN], Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) system [BO], and Core Spray (CS) system [BM] were operable at the time of the event.

Reportability Criteria This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC was initially notified of this event on February 12, 2015 (i.e.,

Event Number 50816).

Event Description

At 1336 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on February 12, 2015, the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System [B1J] was declared inoperable due to a failure of the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump. The pump tripped after running for approximately 18 minutes and then restarted approximately 18 minutes later. The HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump provides hydraulic pressure required to open the HPCI Turbine Stop Valve and the HPCI Turbine Control Valve during initial HPCI startup. Failure of the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump prevents the HPCI system from performing its design safety function.

The HPCI system was returned to operable status on February 20, 2015.

Event Cause

The direct cause of the pump's intermittent failure was a poor electrical connection within the magnetic motor contactor coil (i.e., M-coil, General Electric Model 22D154G3A); part of the HPCI turbine auxiliary oil pump motor contactor 1-1 XDA-B1 1 -M.

Subsequent laboratory testing confirmed that the old M-coil intermittently failed after approximately 18 minutes of operation at an ambient temperature of 71 degrees F. Initial static electrical testing of the failed M-coil found no fault, but the coil did periodically present an open circuit (i.e., 180 MOhms) when exposed to temperature stresses, due to an apparent weak electrical connection at the terminal.

The failure of the coil is considered a random equipment failure. The motor contactor coil is qualified for 60 years. Additionally, the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump is started weekly per 1(2)OP-1 9, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Operating Procedure; quarterly per OPT-09.2, HPCI System Operability Test, and once per 24 months per OPT-09.3, HPCI System - 165 psig Flow Test. This testing has demonstrated a history of high reliability.

Safety Assessment

The safety significance of this event was minimal. The RCIC system, ADS, LPCI system, and CS system were operable at the time of the event. The HPCI system was restored to operable status within the 14 day Technical Specification Completion Time.

Corrective Actions

Any changes to the corrective actions and schedules noted below will be made in accordance with the site's corrective action program.

The following corrective actions have been completed.

The coil was replaced and the HPCI system was returned to operable status on February 20, 2015.

Previous Similar Events

A review of LERs for the past five years identified the following previous similar occurrence.

LER 1-2012-004, dated June 29, 2012, reported HPCI system inoperability due to the erratic HPCI governor operation caused by a failed Ramp Generator Signal Converter (RGSC) operational amplifier. The root cause of the RGSC failure is the lack of a replacement preventive maintenance (PM) task for the RGSC. The corrective action to prevent recurrence for this event is to establish the appropriate PM for periodic replacement of the RGSC on both units' HPCI systems. Since the causes of the events were different, the actions from LER 1-2012-004 could not have reasonably been expected to prevent the condition reported in LER 1-2015-001.

Commitments

No regulatory commitments are contained in this report.