05000325/LER-2010-001

LER-2010-001, APR 2 7 2010

SERIAL: BSEP 10-0047 10 CFR 50.73
U. S: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington; DC 20555-0001
Subject: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No 1
Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-71
Docket No. 50-325
Licensee Event Report 1-2010-001
Ladies and Gentlemen:
In accordance with the Code of Federal RegulatiOns, Title 10, Part 50.73, Carolina Power
& Light Company, now doing business as Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc:, submits the
enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER). This report fulfills'the requirernent for a written
report within sixty (60) days of a reportable occurrence.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Ms. Annette Pope,-Supervisor -
Licensing/Regulatory Programs, at (910) 457-2184.
Sincerely,
Edward L. Wills, Jr.
Plant General Manager
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
LJG/lj g
Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report
Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.
Brunswick Nuclear Plant
PO Box 10429
Southport, NC 28461
Document Control Desk
BSEP 10-0047 / Page 2
cc (with enclosure):
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Marquis One Tower
245 Peachtree Center Ave. N.E., Suite 1200
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Mr. Philip B. O'Bryan, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
8470 River Road
Southport, NC 28461-8869
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Chair - North Carolina Utilities Commission
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NRC FORM 366_U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See reverse for required number Of
digits/characters for each block)
1. FACILITY NAME
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit 1
4. TITLE
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2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE
05000325 1 of 4
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Manually Started to Maintain RPV Level Following Pre-planned Scram.

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (Bsep), Unit 1
Event date:	02-27-2010
Report date:	04-27-2010
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Initial Reporting
ENS 45732	10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
3252010001R00 - NRC Website

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX Introduction Initial Conditions At the time of the event, Unit 1 was in Mode 3 (i.e., Hot Shutdown) with all rods inserted, at zero percent of rated thermal power (RTP). In addition to the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system (RCIC) [BN], the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS), along with the Automatic Depressurization, (ADS) system, were operable and available to provide adequate core cooling if needed.

Reportability Criteria This event resulted in manual actuation of the RCIC system. As such, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), as an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC was initially notified of this event on February 27, 2010 (i.e., Event Number 45732).

Event Description

On February 26, 2010, at 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> with Unit 1 at approximately 95 percent of RTP, Control Room Operators commenced activities to shut down Unit 1 as part of a pre-planned sequence of events to begin the B118R1 refuel outage. At 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br />, with RTP at approximately 61 percent, the 1B Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) [SK] was secured from service in accordance with plant procedures to begin maintenance activities. Current operating practice at the start of a refuel outage is to remove one of the RFPs from service as soon as only one RFP is required, to begin scheduled maintenance activities.

In addition, at 1703 hours0.0197 days <br />0.473 hours <br />0.00282 weeks <br />6.479915e-4 months <br />, Operators removed the Condenser Hotwell A-South Waterbox [SG] from service to aid in troubleshooting a potential tube leak in the Waterbox. With the A-South Waterbox isolated, level increased in the Waterbox when the 1A RFP minimum flow valve (i.e., FW-FV-V46) was opened, diverting flow away from the reactor vessel and into the "A" Hotwells. This is a normal occurrence during shutdown, in accordance with plant operating procedure OGP-05, "Unit Shutdown.

On February 27, 2010, at 0116 hours0.00134 days <br />0.0322 hours <br />1.917989e-4 weeks <br />4.4138e-5 months <br />, Unit 1 Control Room Operators manually inserted a Reactor Protection System (RPS) [JC] trip to shutdown the reactor from approximately 21 percent of rated thermal power. All control rods fully inserted. An expected reactor pressure vessel (RPV) coolant level shrink resulted in the coolant level decreasing below the Low Level 1 setpoint, which resulted in a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) [JM] isolation signal to Group 2 primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Traversing In-core Probe, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 6 PCIVs (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling System), and Group 8 PCIVs (i.e., RHR Shutdown Cooling Suction and RHR Inboard Injection). The isolation Event Description (continued) signal closed all of the PCIVs that were open at the time of the expected actuation. All other affected plant equipment and systems responded as designed.

After the expected coolant level shrink, reactor coolant level increased, as expected, above the RFP high level trip setpoint, and the lA RFP tripped at 0118 hours0.00137 days <br />0.0328 hours <br />1.951058e-4 weeks <br />4.4899e-5 months <br /> on high reactor water level of 208 inches. At approximately 0143 hours0.00166 days <br />0.0397 hours <br />2.364418e-4 weeks <br />5.44115e-5 months <br />, with RPV level restored to normal, the lA RFP was restarted and began injecting into the RPV. The combined flows from the RFP, Condensate Booster Pumps (CBP) [SD], and Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) [CE] reject resulted in the Hotwell level increasing above normal. This resulted in the RFP high turbine casing drain level alarm (i.e., 1-UA-04 1-5, RFP A Turb Drains Level Hi).

With the lA RFP turbine casing drain level reaching 8 inches and rising, the lA RFP was manually tripped due to high turbine casing drain level.

At this point, with the 1B RFP not immediately available due to being out of service for maintenance, the RPV level continued to lower. Operators raised Control Rod Drive [AA] flow to try to maintain normal RPV level, and established a RPV level of 180 inches for injecting with RCIC. At 0159 hours0.00184 days <br />0.0442 hours <br />2.628968e-4 weeks <br />6.04995e-5 months <br />, with RPV level at 180 inches and lowering, Operators manually started the RCIC system to maintain RPV coolant level. The RCIC system maintained RPV coolant level until the 1B RFP could be returned to service. At 0220 hours0.00255 days <br />0.0611 hours <br />3.637566e-4 weeks <br />8.371e-5 months <br />, the 1B RFP was started, and the RCIC system was subsequently shutdown at 0306 hours0.00354 days <br />0.085 hours <br />5.059524e-4 weeks <br />1.16433e-4 months <br />.

Event Cause When the reactor pressure is above 350 psig, a RFP should be available for RPV level control. The root cause of this event is that the Operators made the redundant RFP unavailable while the RPV pressure was still above 350 psig. When the lA RFP had to be secured due to the high turbine casing drain level, Operators had to start the RCIC system to control vessel level since the redundant 1B RFP was unavailable due to maintenance. A contributing cause to this event was that licensed operator training did not provide sufficient detail for the interrelations between the condenser hotwells and the components that input to them on a shutdown unit.

Safety Assessment The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. In addition to RCIC, the Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Automatic Depressurization System were operable and available to provide adequate core cooling if needed. Operators maintained RPV level within the normal band while RCIC was used for level control. All systems functioned as designed.

Corrective Actions

The following corrective action to prevent recurrence will be taken.

• Revise 1(2)0P-32, "Condensate and Feedwater System Operating Procedure," to add a Caution that, during a reactor shutdown, a RFP should not be made unavailable before Reactor Pressure is less than 350 psig, except in case of an emergency, or if removing a RFP from service to conduct required maintenance while at power. This action is scheduled to be completed by May 27, 2010.

Additional corrective actions include the following.

• Revise 1(2)0P-29, "Circulating Water System," to include a note with information about the inputs to the hotwells, including RWCU reject, Condensate Pump minimum flow, CBP minimum flow, and RFP minimum flow. This action is scheduled to be completed by May 27, 2010.

• Identify the performance gaps in Licensed Operator training in relation to this event, and include a case study of this event, to improve Operator training. This action is scheduled to be completed by May 27, 2010.

Previous Similar Events

A review of LERs and corrective action program condition reports for the past three years identified the following similar previous occurrences.

of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) while Operators were placing the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system in service for reactor pressure control. The root cause was determined to be an inadequate procedure, and the corrective action was to revise the procedure to include plant conditions with low decay heat and low RPV pressure when using HPCI in pressure control mode. Thus, the corrective actions associated with LER 1-2009-005 could not have reasonably been expected to prevent the condition reported in this LER.

Commitments No regulatory commitments are contained in this report.