05000311/LER-1982-103, Forwards LER 82-103/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 82-103/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20063P181
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 09/29/1982
From: Midura H
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20063P182 List:
References
NUDOCS 8210130164
Download: ML20063P181 (3)


LER-1982-103, Forwards LER 82-103/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3111982103R00 - NRC Website

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3D PSEG Public Sen. ice Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station September 29, 1982 Mr.

R.

C.

Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue

~

King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75

' DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-103/03L I

]

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No.

2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.5.1.9.b, 1

we are submitting Licensee Event Report'for Reportable

. Occurrence 82-103/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, l

H.

J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ks /f CC:

Distribution I

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PDR ADOCK 05000311 l

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PDR The Energy People gE,@

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Report Number:

82-103/03L Report Date:

09-29 Occurrence Date:

09-04-82 Facility:

Salem Generating Station,-Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas. Company

- Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

I No. 21 Containment Spray Pump - Inoperable.

This-report was initiated by Incident Report 82-255.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 82% - Unit Load 900 MWe.

7 l

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

{

At 0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br />, September 4, 1982, while running the auxiliary alarm summary, the Control Room Operator noticed the 125VDC Control Power Breaker alarm for No. 21 Containment Spray Pump j

was indicated on the summary.

An attempt to clear the alarm by cycling the control power breaker failed.

Further in'resti-i gation showed No. 21 Containment-Spray Pump would not start and the pump was declared inoperable.

Since No. 23 Containment Fan Coil Unit (CFCU) was inoperable at the time of the occurrence (see LER 82-099/03L), Action Statement 3.6.2.3.a was in effect.

With No. 21 Containment Spray Pump inoperable, Action Statement 3.6.2.3.c was entered.

Containment cooling capability was main-tained throughout the occurrence by redundant CFCU's and the other spray system.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation of the problem revealed the HL switch in the 4kV I

supply breaker for No. 21 Containment Spray Pump was not closed; 125VDC control power was available, however.

The breaker was racked out and an inspection of the relay'and actuator showed no abnormalities.

Several tests of HL switch operation by racking the breaker in and out were satisfactory.

The breaker was returned to service; no further problems were noted.

A possible explanation for the open HL switch could be that the breaker had not been fully racked in the last time it was returned to service.

No evidence was found that the breaker had been racked out recently, however.

Furthermore, No. 21 Containment Spray Pump had been successfully started earlier that day' indicating control power was available at that time.

l 1

LER 82-103/03L : ;

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' ANALYSIS-OF OCCURRENCE:

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- The CFCU's operate in conjunction with the containment spray

[

systems.to remove heat and' radioactive. contamination from thel L

containment _ atmosphere in the event of.a design basis accident.

l Operability of. fan coil' groups and containment' spray systems i

is:necessary to ensure offsite radiation dose is maintained i

within the. limits of 10CFR100.

l

~l As noted,~containmen't cooling ~ capability was provided by redundant i

i' equipment.. The occurrence,-therefore, involved no risk to the j

[

health or safety of the public.; Due to the loss.~of redundancy i

in engineered safety features,.the event constituted operation in i

a degraded mode permitted by.the limiting conditions for operation, j

and is reportable-in accordance with Technical Specification

~

6.9.1.9.b.

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Action Statement 3.6.2.3.a requires:

l With one group of CFCU's inoperable and'both contain--

l

- ment spray systems' operable, restore.the inoperable 4

j group of cooling fans to operable status within 7

- j i

days, or be in'at least hot ~ standby within the next

[

'6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />'and-in cold. shutdown within the following 30 l

hours.

jl -

Action Statement 3.6.2.3.c requires:-

- l i

.With one group of containment cooling fans inoperable and one containment spray system inoperable, restore the= inoperable sprayfsystem to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.or be in at least hot standby within the next 6-hours and-in cold shutdown within'the'following 30 l

hours.

i CORRECTIVE ~ ACTION:

}

With. the breaker back in service, No. 21 Containment Spray Pump i

was satisfactorily tested.

The pump was declared operable and

- Action Statement 3.6.1.3.c was terminated at 1017. hours, September

[

4,.1982.

A survey of operator training revealed that-4kv breaker 1

operation is adequately addressed in the training program.

Dis-j cussion of.the' occurrence will be covered over the next training i

l cyclo..

FAILURE DATA:

i

}

l A failure of the 125VDC control power breaker for the No. 21 i

. Containment Spray Pump supply breaker had occurred December 9, 1981 t

(see.LER 81-125/03L) and was apparently not related.

{'

1 l

Prepared By R. Frahm General Mhnager -

l Salem Operations

[

SORC Meeting No.

82-87 I

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