05000293/LER-1993-016
| ML20056E945 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1993 |
| From: | Boulette E, Ellis D BOSTON EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| BECO-LTR-93-103, LER-93-016, LER-93-16, NUDOCS 9308250322 | |
| Download: ML20056E945 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 2932093016R00 - NRC Website | |
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If 10 CFR 50.73 BOSTON EDISON Pilgnm Nuclear Pcwer Staton Rocky Hill Road Phnouth, Massachusens 02360 August 18 , 1993 ,
BECo Ltr. 93- 103
- E. T. Boulette, PhD Senor Vee President- Nuclear i
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35 i
The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) 93-016-00, "High Pressure Coolant Injection System Pump Low Discharge Pressure Alarm Inoperable", is submitted in accordance ,
with 10 CFR Part 50.73.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if there are any questions regarding this repo rt>.
j f (N r E. T. Boulette, PhD DWE/bal
Enclosure:
LER 93-016-00 cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin i Regional Administrator, Region I ,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,
475 Allendale Rd.
King of Prussia, PA 19406 ,
Mr. R. B. Eaton Div. of Reactor Projects I/II Office of NRR - USNRC One White Flint North - Mail Stop 14DI 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Sr. NRC Resident inspector - Pilgrim Station l Standard BECo LER Distribution PDR
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NRC FORM* 366 U.S. MUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOM APPROVED BY OMB NO,3150-0104 I nan EXPIRES 5/31/95 )
ESTIMA"ED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COf.1 PLY WTTH THIS
. 3NFORMATION COLLECTION RE QUEST: 50_0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDNG BunDEN Es1, MARE 10 THE ,NFORMATiO~
AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT B9ANCH (MNBB 7714, U.S NUCLEAR 2
REGULATORY COMM;SSION, WASHiN3 TON. DC 20555 0001, AND ,
TO THE FAPERWORK REOUCTION PROJECT "3t53-0100. OFFICE 2 (See rowse tw numte o' aigw6n acters fo' ech taoue OF MANAGEMENT AND DUDGET, % ASHINGTON, DC 2W3.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION 05000- 293 1 of 5
) TITLE (4)
High Pressure Coolant injection System Pump Low Discharge Pressure Alarm Inoperable EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) l n ,
SEQUEN'iAL REV:StDN F ACluTY NAME OCCKET NUMBER !
uoNTs tAY W AA YEAR NUVBER NUMBER MONTH DAY VEAR N/A 05000 !
F ACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER .
07 19 93 93 016 00 08 18 9: N/A 05000 l OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 6: (Check one or more)(11) i N 20 402(b) 20 405(c) 50.73fa)(2)fiv) 73 71(b) l PO 20.405 fa)M)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)fv) 73.71(c)
LE E 0) 100 ,
20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2iMi) OTHER g 20 405(a)(1)fiii) X 50.73(a)(2)fi) (B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20 405fa)(1)fiv) 50 73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(i)(viii)(B) ItEnIt
, 20 405(a)(1)(v) 50.73fa)(2)(iii) 50.73ta)(2)fx) Io i LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) i NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER pnduoe Area Cooe!
- Douglas W. Ellis - Senior Compliance Engineer (508) 747-8160 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE SYSTEV COMPONENT MANUF ACTURER DS CAUSE $YSTEV COMPONENT MANUFACTURER D B Fl PA P055 Y SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) "" D#* "
EXPECTED .
YES NO SUBMISSION ?
pe yci. com,+. ExrtC'ED SUBM SSION DATE) y DATE (15)
I j ABSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, te , approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)(16) i 3 On July 19, 1993, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was declared !
) inoperable because the system's pump discharge low pressure alarm was discovered to be j inoperable during a monthly surveillance test of the pressure switch alarm circuit. The HPCI System was maintained in the normal standby mode. Subsequent assessment concluded the system was capable of providing its design function while the alarm circuit was inoperable, j The root cause of the inoperable alarm circuit was the depiction and description including l a note on a Panalarm Company drawing incorporated into a modification that involved the ;
alarm circuit. The modification inadvertently but effectively eliminated the field common ;
connection that is part of the HPCI pump discharge low pressure alarm circuit. Corrective i action taken was to re-establish the field common connection and satisfactory completion ;
of the surveillance test on July 20, 1993. Additional action taken included a functional !
re-check with satisfactory results of other alarm circuits previously modified. Action i being taken to preclude recurrence includes daily testing of alarm panels that are being {
modified.
i The condition was discovered while at 100 percent reactor power. The reactor mode l selector switch in the RUN position. The Reactor Vessel (RV) was pressure was 1020 psig ;
with the RV water temperature at 533 degrees Fahrenheit. This report is submitted in '
accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). The condition posed no threat to the public -
health and safety.
NRC FOFmt 304A f5 92)
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l NRC FORid 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROtfED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
<s n EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTMATED BU9 DEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) %003EGTA~%R2~%A1 MOO 00 AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BFANCN MNBB 7714n U S. NLICLLAR TEXT CONTINUATION ReGouTom couussoN. WAs4NGTON. oc 20s56-0301, AND TO THE FAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (315two104h OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, W ASHINGTON. DC 20503 ,
i FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) l VEAR d NM R PILGRIM NUCt. EAR POWER STATION 05000-293 U 93 --016-- 00 TEXT Cf more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)
BACKGROUND The Panalarm System includes alarm panels, power supplies, and sensors (e.g., pressure switch, temperature switch) or other devices (e.g., a relay). Typically, a sensor is ;
connected to the alarm panel by cabling that ultimately terminates at two connections on a ;
terminal board at the rear of the alarm panel. One connection provides a current path to the positive portion of the alarm circuit while the other connection provides a current path to the negative portion of the alarm circuit. By design the alarm occurs when a 1 change in the state of the sensor occurs and thereby completes the current path. The '
terminal boards are equipped with connection points. Some of the points are electrically connected by metal links or wires. These connections are referred to as field common connections and can, in turn, be connected to other connection points via a wire / wires.
The field common connections can be connected in a daisy-chain type manner. The field common connections function to reduce the bulk of wiring in the vicinity of the terminal +
board.
EVENT DESCRIPTION On July 19,1993, at 2115 hours0.0245 days <br />0.588 hours <br />0.0035 weeks <br />8.047575e-4 months <br />, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was declared inoperable and a seven day Technical Specification 3.5.C.2 Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered. The system was declared inoperable because the HPCI pump low discharge pressure alarm was discovered inoperable during a monthly surveillance test.
The HPCI System was maintained in the normal standby mode. The HPCI pump discharge pressure was verified by Control Room and local pressure indicators.
The inoperable alarm was discovered during the performance of step [66] of Procedure 8.M.2-2.7 (Rev.13) Attachment 1, " Instrument Functional Test for CSCS Dump Discharge r Header Monitors". At this step the HPCI pump low discharge header pressure alarm did not !
occur as expected even though the discharge header pressure switch PS-9090 tripped as expected at step [65]. '
Problem Report 93.9331 was written to document the discovery. The NRC Operations Center !
was notified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 at 2243 hours0.026 days <br />0.623 hours <br />0.00371 weeks <br />8.534615e-4 months <br /> on July 19, 1993. Subsequent -
assessment concluded the capability of the HPCI System to perform its design function was not affected by the inoperable alarm. ,
The discovery of the inoperable alarm occurred while at 100 percent reactor power. The i reactor mode selector switch was in the RUN position. The Reactor Vessel (RV) pressure ;
was approximately 1020 psig with the RV water temperature at approximately 533 degrees
~
Fahrenheit. ,
CAUSE The root cause of the inoperable alarm was the depiction and description of field common ,
connections on a Panalarm Company drawing. The description (i.e., a note) was '
incorporated into a modification (PDC 92-29) of alarm panels on C-903, C-904, and C-905. ;
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l NRC FORfd 366A U.S. MUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 a-w EXPIRES 5/31/95 EsTWLATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMMY W'TH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 1"J R'"#M"#$EJbMO^2 AND RECOROS MANAGEMENT BRANCH fMNBB MSA U.S. NUCLE AR TEXT CONTINUATION REauuTOm couu:ssoN. wAsHwou. De maam, mD TO THE FAPERWDRK REDUCTION PRGKCT [3150-0104 Or FICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON, DC M03 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) v0AR EE U2ES" PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION 05000-293 93 -016-- 00 i
TEXT Ut more space is requeed, use add;tional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)
A field common connection wire that is part of the alarm circuit was effectively disconnected during the modification of a separate alarm circuit on June 25, 1993, or June 29, 1993, as part of PDC 92-29. The modification is part of Control Room design improvements. The modification of the alarm circuit (C-904R window E3) involved relocating the HPCI pump discharge pressure switch PS-9090 cable at Alarm Panel C-904R on June 23, 1993. For the relocation, the cable was disconnected from Alarm Panel C-904R l
terminal board 3 and connected to Panel C-904 terminal strip HH points 12 and 13. From point HH13, a wire was connected to C-904R terminal board 3. From point HH12, a wire was connected to Panel C-904 terminal strip HH point 6. From point HH6, a wire was connected to a field common connection at Alarm Panel C-904L terminal board 1. The wiring was l
correct and the circuit was post work tested in accordance with Procedure TP93-026 (Rev.1), " Pre-operational Test of Field Cabling Modification In Annunciator Panel 904R (PDC 92-29)", with satisfactory results on June 23, 1993.
The modification of the circuits of Alarm Panel C-904L windows A4 and B4 were implemented on June 25, 1993, and were post work tested in accordance with Procedure TP93-026 with satisfactory results on June 25, 1993. The modification of the circuit of Alarm Panel C-904L window C4 was implemented on June 29, 1993, and was post work tested in accordance with Procedure TP93-026 with satisfactory results on June 29, 1993. The modifications were similar to the modification of the alarm circuit of Alarm Panel C-904R window E3 and included the relocation of field common connections at Alarm Panel C-904L terminal board
- 1. The relocation of one or more of these field common connections for Alarm Panel C-904L windows A4/B4/C4 caused the field common connection for alarm Panel C-904R window E3 to become effectively disconnected even though the field common connection from Panel C-904 terminal strip point HH6 to Alarm Panel C-904L terminal board I was not disconnected. The consequence was an inoperable circuit for the HPCI pump low discharge pressure alarm and was not recognized during the modification activities for the alarm panels on C-904. The Panalarm drawing (BEco number E27-33-2) did not depict connection of field common connections and contained a note indicating all "FC" terminals are jumpered internally in the chassis. At a terminal board, the FC connections and jumpers are visible (i.e.,
external ) . The note was understood to mean the FC connections were jumpered internally and, therefore, the FC connections were not visible. This note was incorporated into the
- sections of PDC 92-29 involving the modifications of alarm panels on C-903, C-904, and C-905.
The date when the alarm circuit became ine mrable could not be established with certainty because of the changing nature of the confi urations of the field common connections at alarm panel C-904L terminal board 1 for the slarm circuits of windows A4/B4/C4. The date, however, was either June 25. 1993, or June 23, 1993. The inoperable HPCI pump low discharge pressure alarm circuit was not detected until July 19, 1993, because the post work testing of Alarm Panel C-904L circuits did not involve Alarm Panel C-904R window E3.
The HPCI pump discharge pressure is indicated in the Main Control Room at Panel C-904 and at local Panel C-2250. These pressure indicators, however, are not specified to be checked as part of Procedure 2.1.15, (currently Rev. 96)," Daily Surveillance Log", or 2.1.16, (currently Rev. 88)," Nuclear Power Plant Operator Tour", or 2.1.35, (currently Rev.1), " Control Room Readings". Procedure 8.M.2-2.7 is the only procedure currently credited for meeting the surveillance requirements of Tednical Specification 4.5.H.4.
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"fdRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-o104 a.m EEPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THlS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 0'f M *"nEf d f e"R 2 $ $ d M "LNriS M TEXT CONTINUATION ^$u70RvC:*"EfNAEsEErisNMN$
R TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PRCUECT p1540104. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR U B N PILGRIM NsLEAR POWER STATION 05000-293 '
93 --016-- 00 TEXT (if more space it <equired, use additonal copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)
CORRECTIVE ACTION
, 'he field common for the alarm circuit was re-established on July 20, 1993, and the alarm
) .ircuit was tested in accordance with Procedures TP 93-026 and 8.M.2-2.7 Attachment I with satisfactory results. The HPCI System LCO was terminated at approximately 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> on j July 20, 1993.
Applicable construction and test engineers were fully briefed regarding the inoperable alarm circuit and understan' the need for additional precautions.
All alarm circuit: of Arm panels on C-903, C-904, and C-905 previously modified were functionally re-ckcLed for discrepancies with acceptable results. All of the alarm circuits of alum panels on C-905 previously modified and being modified are being functionally tested each day that alarm circuit modifications are being implemented. This action is independent of surveillance procedures that include verification of applicable al arms . This additional action will be terminated upca completion of modification activities involving the alarm circuits of alarm panels on C-905.
SAFETY CONSE0VENCES The inoperable alarm circuit posed no threat to the public health and safety.
The HPCI System was maintained in normal standby and capable of providing its design l function during the perio;' it was declared inoperable due to the inoperable alarm. The HPCI pump discharge pressure switch and alarm circuit provides an al m function only and does not provide a turbine / pump trip function or HPCI System control . unction. If the discharge piping of the HPCI, RCIC, Core Spray, and RHR/LPCI Systems are not filled, a !
water hammer can develop in the discharge piping when the system's pump / pumps is started.
Based on analysis, the system would still perform its design function if a water hammer were to occur when the system was required.
7 is report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) because the alarm was
. operable for greater than seven days (i.e., the LC0 period specified by Technical l ecification 3.5.C.2 for the HPCI System).
SIMILARITY TO PREVIOUS EVENTS A review was conducted of Pilgrim Station LERs submitted since January 1984. The review focused on LERs involving an incorrectly connected or mis-wired electrical connection.
The review identified LERs 50-293/89-001-00, 89-026-01, and 93-007-01.
For LER 89-001-00, a wiring error associated with one rod block circuit of the Reactor Manual Control System was discovered on January 9,1989, as a result of a functional test of the Source Range Monitors performed as part of the incremental power ascension program following the 1986-1938 outage. The cause of the wiring error was original plant construction personnel error (reversed wire installation). Corrective action taken included correcting the wiring after verifying the error, woRu =A na k ...
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- NRC FORUI 366A u.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 l a-m cXPIRES S/31/95 l ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) E272"EL"i R 'O "'#sTMJioOd%%"2 TEXT CONTINUATION I$u"Io"EcSE"EEsE"oToIE2Nb"[ INS TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTUN PROJECT (3150451041, orF!CE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHiNSTON, DC 20503.
1 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR 8 JtA R PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION 05000-293 93 --016-- 00 TEXT (if more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)
For LER 89-026-01, an automatic scram signal and scram occurred while at 65 percent reactor power on August 30, 1989. The cause of the scram signal was high RV/ Main Steam i pressure that occurred as a result of an automatic runback of the Main Turbine. The -
runback was caused by the failure of a nonsafety-related 24 KV potential transformer in conjunction with a nonsafety-related voltage balance relay (260) wired in accordance with an approved architect-engineer drawing that contained an error since original construction. The drawing error was not previously detected because the procedure used to functionally check the related alarm function did not include a step to identify the ,
specific auxiliary relay (260X1 or 260X2) that actuated and resulted in the alarms during '
the test. Corrective action taken was to correct the drawing and wiring and revising the procedure to identify the specific auxiliary relay that actuate during the test. ,
for LER 93-007-01, an automatic closing of the RCIC System turbine steam supply isolation ;
valves occurred during a plant startup on March 17, 1993. The isolation resulted from high steam flow while attempting to jog open the inuoard steam supply isolation valve i MD-1301-16 while th in-series valve M0-1301-17 was open. After several attempts, valve M0-1301-16 was jogged open. The opening of valve M0-1301-16 resulted in a rapid RCIC ,
1 turbine steam line pressurization and actuation of the steam line flow sensors. The inability to open valve M0-1301-16 in4'.ially was caused by a missing jumper that bypasses ;
the torque switch in the valve's opening circuit. Valve MD-1301-16 had been previously overhauled and the vPic': l'. wit switch internals were lost / misplaced during the overhaul.
Replacement parts were to be installed in accordance with a valve drawing. The torque switch bypass jumper was inadvertently omitted by utility Electrical Maintenance personnel when the rewiring was performed becau he drawing did not show the presence of a jumper in the manner the personnel were acct -
Corrective action taken was to install a jumper to bypass the torque switch wh , ,r:ng the valve.
ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (Ells) CODES _
The ElIS codes for this report are as follows:
COMPONENTS CODES C+rm, Pressure PA switch, Pressure (PS-9090) 63 SYSTEMS Communications (Panalarni) System fl High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPC. em BJ i
NHC FORM 36tA (*> 921