05000311/LER-1983-005, Forwards LER 83-005/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 83-005/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML18087A680
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	02/22/1983
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML18087A681	List: 05000311/LER-1983-005, Forwards LER 83-005/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8303030009
Download: ML18087A680 (4)

LER-1983-005, Forwards LER 83-005/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3111983005R00 - NRC Website

text

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PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Companv P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge. New Jersev qf.Q.38 Salem Generating Station'-.

February 2 2, 19 8 3 Mr. R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator USN RC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83~005/03L 19406 Pursuant to the requirements of Salem.Generating Station Unit No.. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for_~eportable Occ,urrence 83-005/03L.

This* report is. required within.

thirty (30) days of the ocriurrence.

CC:

Pistribution

• sincerely yours, H. J. Midura General !1anager Salem Operations

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Repor:t Number:

Report Date:

83'-005/03L 02-17-83 Occurren~e Date:

01-22-8~

Facility:

Salem Generating *station Unit 2 Publiq S~rvice Electric & Gaa Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jerse¥ 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF QCCURR~:

Reactor Coolant System -

Pressuriz~r Overpressure Protection System -

Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-b20.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 4 -

RX Power 0 % - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCRIPTION QF QC-CURRENCE:

January a1, 1983, during the planned shutdown for refu~ling Df-Salem Unit 2, a cooldown *or the Reactor CooLant System (RCS) was initiated.

Due to leakage problems with the power operated relief valves (PORVs),

Block Valves 2PR6 and 2FR7 had been closed since prior to unit startup in October, 19~1 (See LER 81-59/03X-1);

• Isol-atf-oh of *the relief 'line-s*

had rendered Pressurizer Ovetpressurization Protection System (POPS)

Val v es 2 PR 4 7 and 2 PR 4 8 in operable.

• In accordance with established ~roceduie, the POPS would first b~ -

demonst~ated operable then would.be placed in operation when RCS tempera t_ure reached 312°F.:. A. bubqle would be* mai ntai ne*d, and*..

• foll~wing degasifi-cation and fUrt~er cooldown*to i8o°F, -~ cleanup ot

.the RGS would be conductetj utilizing Reactor Coolant Pumps and

• .hyd.rogen peroxide addition.. *"After co'mpletion of the cleanup',* "the pressuriz*er would be cooled down, the RCS taken sblid and a vent establisped.

Attempts to demonstrate the operability ~f_the POPS valves failed due to excessive leakage in the pressurizer relief lines.

In view of the recurrent problems with the relief valves, and the resultant questionable status of the POPS, the cooldown was continued to place the plant in a vented, safe condition.

At 1130 hours0.0131 days <br />0.314 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.29965e-4 months <br />, January 22, 1983, when the RCS ~emperature reached 3 1 2 o F, Ac ti on St a t em en t f. 4. 1 0

• 3 b w a s enter e d.

The pr e-s s u r i z e r relief line valves were cycled and reseated in at'temp.t.s to reduce 1 ea k a g e and re store at 1 ea s t one. P 0 P s*- ch an n e 1 to an <JP er ab 1 e status.

The attempts failed, however, and at 1930 hour0.0223 days <br />0.536 hours <br />0.00319 weeks <br />7.34365e-4 months <br />s~ Ja~uary 22, 1983, Action Statement 3.0.3 came into effect~

_,,. /

The cooldown was continued in orderly fasfif0n,~uritil 0423 hours0.0049 days <br />0.118 hours <br />6.994048e-4 weeks <br />1.609515e-4 months <br />, January 23, when the leakage on Valve 2PR47 was reduced to an acceptable level.

The valve was declared operable, and with only one

. \\

LER 83-005/03L.-*-

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont I q)

POPS channel.fnop:erabl.e, Action_Statem...e.p,t 3.4.10.3a awied.

_Tpe cool down was subsequently completed, and'-at. 1242 hours0.0144 days <br />0.345 hours <br />0.00205 weeks <br />4.72581e-4 months <br />;--January-24, 1983, an RCS vent was established.

A bubbi~~in the pressurizer was maintained until one POPS valve was operable,'~nd no RC~ pressure transients were involv~d.

The integrity of multiple fission product barriers was ma._:Ln-t-rlffe{:r_ th_roughout the occurrence.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

POPS Valves 2PR47 and 2PR48 had been reworked.due to excessive leakage during initial fueling of the unit in 1980 (See LER 80-05/03L).

Valve 2PR47 had exhibited similar problems during shuydown operatiori in 1981 (See LER 81-43/03L).

As noted, in October 1981 1

during the plant startup, the pressurizer relief lines had been isolated to stop leakage from the PORVs; Unit 2 was then operat~d at power until the current shutdown for refueling, when the problems with the POPS valves were re-encountered.

Further investigation of the problems is pending disassembly of the valves, which is scheduled for the current refueling.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of two POPS valves or _9n RCS vent opening of greater than 3.14 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of 10 CFR 50 Appendix G when one or more RGS cold.legs are l"Ef*ss* than.or equal to 312°F.

• Either P6PS has adequate relieving capability to p~otect the RCS from overpressurization resulting from e.vents~--postulated. to occur including.starting. an idle reactor. coolant pump or a. safety injection pump with a solid RCS.

- *Action S~atem~nt. 3.4.l0.3b requ~res~

With both POPs in6perable, depressuriie and vent the. RCS thfoug~.

• a*3.1.4-squ*are(-in-ch*_.vent(s) w*ithin; 8 hour*s.

As noted, due to plant conditions, the RCS vent could not be established within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> as required, and Action ~tatement 3.0.3 applied.

Th*e action statement requires:

When a.limiting condition ~or operation is not met except as provided in the associated action statements, within one hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in a mode in which the specification does not apply, by placing it; as applicable, in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, hot sh~tdown within the following* 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, -and cord shutctown wtthin-the subsequent 2 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Where corrective m-ea s ~t._es _ia:re completed that permit operation under the ~etion retjuirem~nts, the action may be taken in accordance with th~ speciri ed... time limits as measured from the time of the fai~ure to mee~ the limiting.

condition for operation.

As mentioned, a plant cooldown was already in progress, and thus action was being taken to e~tablish the required RCS vent within 24

LER 83-005/03L hours, in compliance with the limiting condftion for*- opera ti on-~

With the restoratlon of one POPS channel to an* ~perable status, Action Statement 3.4.10~3a came into effect requiring:

With one POPS inoperable, restore the inoperable POPS to operable status within 7 days or depressurize and.. vent the ~CS through a 3.14 square inch vent(s) within the next B hours.

The POPS is designed t"o.. protect the integrity of the RCS Pressure Boundary, one of the multiple fission product* boundaries required by 10 CFR 50 (others includ~ the containment and cladding).

As noted, the integrity of all fission product boundaries was maintained.

For this reason, and since one operable channel was obtained and the vent was established within the intervals specified, nc risk to the health and safety of the public ~as involved.

The event constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting. condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

FAILURE DATA; Marotta Scientific Controls Relief Valve Model. MV-225-c Prepared By R. Frahm SORC~-Meeting No.83-019'*

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Gene anager -

Salem Operations