ML17174A124

LER 79-033/03X-1:on 790428,while Performing Primary Containment Isolation Valve surveillance,2CTIP Machine Did Not Retract During Group 2 Isolation Test.Caused by Ball Valve Limit Switches Not Making Up When Ball Valve Opened

ML17174A124
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	10/22/1979
From:	Badran S COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML17174A125	List: ML17174A124 ML19254F482
References
LER-79-033-03X, LER-79-33-3X, NUDOCS 7911090518
Download: ML17174A124 (3)

Text

Common9.lth Edison Dresden Nuclear Power Station R.R. #1 Morris, Illinois 60450 Telephone 815/?42-2920 October 22, 1979 BBS Ltr 1179-83 7 Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director Directorate of Regulatory *operations - Region III U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Reportable Occurrence "Update Report" /179-033/03X-l, Docket 1/050-237 is hereby submitted to your office to supplement Licensee Event Report 79-033/03L-0 concerning the failure of 2C TIP machine to restart. It addresses the fact that the primary containment in-tegrity was not violate'd 'because the reactor water temp. was below 212° F and the reactor mode switch was locked in shutdown for re-fueling. This event was reported to you under Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(b).

1. ~

• St?tion Superintendent Dresden Nuclear Power Station BBS:lcg Enclosure cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement r Director of Management Information & P.rogram Control File/NRC 61979

.;IRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION J7:111

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• CONTROL fl.LOCK: !-I e.

_..__--L.._*._l_l.___,l..._-!10 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

~

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

~~::~~u!e~~;~~t* Date:

5125179 m, . *8 9 I , r.,, D , R , s , 2 LICENSEE CODE 1

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LICENSE NUMBER

-1 25 o, o101 41 26 i 1i 1i LICENSE TYPE 1 i 101 JO 57 CAT 58

• 10 i:ON'T m B

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ll:J©IO IS 10 10 10 12 13 17101

.60 ' 51* . '* . .DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 ol 4(21a-I 11.91@!11 012 i-2-11 19 10 EVENT DATE . . 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION ANO PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@ .

~I While perfoming DOS 1600-7 primary containment isolation valve surveillance, 2C TIP_J*

~ I machine failed to retra*ct during Group 2 Isolation test. Since the reactor water

~I temp* was.below 212 degrees fahrenheit and the Rx mode switch was locked in shutdown*

IIIJ I for refuelingt Primary containment integrity was not violated and the safe_ty sig-

IBJ I nificance was. minimal. The failure of the TIP system was the first of its kind.

m CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE .

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19 20 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION REPORT NO. CODE .TYPE NO.

I I JOJ3J3J 1......-1 10131 ~ L:=:I . L!J 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN r:;:::,.* ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 . PRIME COMP. COMPONENT TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS-~* SUBMITTED. FORM SUB. *SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER L!J@l..U@

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CAU.SE DESCRIPTION _ANO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS @

I Io I I When 2C TIP was. inserted and the ball valve opened, one of the ball valve 1 limit I , 11 I . switches . did not. make-up, thereby deenergizing the 2C TIP machine control circuitrX. I

~r t,

I 1 j 2 t .1 The TIP detecto-r was handcranked into its shield. The failure could not be dupli- . . *-  !

l l:IJ]J. I cated on several attempts and the surveillance was successfully completed. . I*

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~30 FACILITY STATUS  % POWER OTHER STATUS ~

. METHOD OF DISCOVERY o

DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION .I I 7"J5l W@ I 01 01 dl@)_I__N_/A_ __ . ~@/Containment Isolation Surveillance I

~ 9 10 12 1'3 44 I

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE .AMOUNT OF ACTiVITY t::';;\

45 46 LOCATION OF RELEASE @

80

, II

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~ µ_J@) !o zl(§)J._ 11

___ NA_______,

44 45 NA 80 I  : !

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PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER A TYPE DESCRIPTION~

*.. *. *-i

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~ 9 11 12 13 80 .

I PERSONNEL INJURIES . (;;:;\ ,'.;.

NUMBER DESCRIPTION~ '.f

~*I 0 I0 I0 I@...___._____NA_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.

~ 9 11 12 . 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY f4:i\

TYPE DESCRIPTION ~ *:.... \,*;.

~ µ_J@ 10

. NA 80

.

• PUBLICITY ~

ISSUEDQ DESCRIPTION~ .*, .- . NRC USE ONL y . .,

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'.:;S*':~,~~/*.;:;~,i;*_~NAME OF PREPARER _ _ S_h_a_f..;.i_c_B_a_d_r_a_n_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Dresden X-265/421 0

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l ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 79-33/03X-l COMHONWE..Al.TI{ EDISON cmtPANY (CHE) . ~ ..

DRESDEN UNIT (ILDRS 2)

DOCKET fl 050-237 *. _*,*.*

• • • • While p~rfonitlng DOS 1600-i, Primary Containment Isolation

.Valve Procedure, 2 C TIP Machine failed to retract during the

.group 2. Isolation portion of the test ... As is required 'during a Group II isolation, any TIP not in the chamber shield is

. automatically transferred to Manual Reverse mod.e of operation.

when the detector is In-Shield. as indicated by the ball.limit switch, the ball valve will close. The primacy* containment

' integrity was not violated because .. the reactor water temp. was .*

below- 212 degrees fahrenheit with the reactor mode switch locked in shutdoWn.. The safety implications to this event were considered minimal beca:use the unit was shutdown for .refueling and in the shutdown mode of operation. *....

All TIP detectors had been inserted a small amount past.the

. shield for the test. The ball valves.~op~ned as designed. However,

, * * * .one of the two ball valve limit switches for "C" TIP detector did

. not make-up and this de-energized the drive logic, as designed,

• *SO that the TIP detector could not be automatically or remote

• • manually *driven either forward or. reverse, from the control room.

The .detector remained in its position and failed to withdraw when required via DOS 1600-7.

The* TIP detector wa$ handcranked back to the chamber shield to provide the required primary containment isolation. The ball val:ve limit*switch was tested *several times after this event, but the same incident could not be . re-created! ....

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