ML20236Q585
| ML20236Q585 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1998 |
| From: | Heffley J COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| JMHLTR:#98-0200, JMHLTR:#98-200, NUDOCS 9807200353 | |
| Download: ML20236Q585 (22) | |
Text
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'F 1)resden (.cncrattng $tation B00 North l>rcsden P.oad
',torns,11. (eH 6 M 6 T el M 159 4 2 l'J24 July 15,1998 JMHLTR: #98-0200 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
1998 Second Quarter 10 CFR 50.59 Report Dresden Nuclear Power Station NRC Docket Nos.50-010. 50-237. and 50-249 Enclosed is the second quarter Report of completed Changes, Tests, and Experiments per 10 CFR 50.59 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station. These evaluations correspond to the conditions identified in 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2) for determining whether a proposed change, test, or experiment shall be determined to involve an unreviewed safety question.
If there are any questions regarding this report, please contact Mr. Frank Spangenberg, Dresden Station Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (815) 942-2920, ext. 3800.
Sincerely, r
r
- 1. Hefilty S'
Vice Presid nt Dresden Station JMH/RWC:ais jj Enclosure 1
cc:
Regional Administrator, Region Ill M. A. Ring, Branch Chief, DRP, Region 111 L
L.W. Rossbach, Project Manager, NRR Senior Resident Inspector Dresden L
Office of Nuclear Facility Safety - IDNS r ?,
,Jo v-u 9007200353 990630 l
PDR ADOCK 05000010 >
R PM i
A rnioun company L
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i 10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02 1
Safety E! valuation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number: 1997-03-195 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Miscellaneous Evaluation Reference Number: DATR 3/4 4 I
Tale:
Included DEOP Systems in Standby Coolant Supply Section
==
Description:==
Revised DATR 3/4.4, Standby Coolant Supply and reorganized the section to include DEOP support systems and components. The revised section includes eight subsections. Each of the new subsections includes equipment that is taken credit for by the DEOPs but is not adequately controlled by the Technical Specifications or DATRs. Each of the subsections provides and administrative LCO for the equipment to allow for maintenance activities. The Standby Coolant Supply requirerasnts were revised to include the Condensate Demin Bypass valve and the LCO was extended to 14 days.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
i Safety Evaluation Number: 1997-04-225 Type of Safety Evaluation:
FSAR Change l
Evaluation Reference Number: DFL 97-025, M12-2/3-80-006
Title:
Tech Support Center (TSC) HVAC
==
Description:==
Add new UFSAR section to describe the Technical Support Center HVAC.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1997-04-228 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Exempt Change Evaluation Reference Number: E12-2-97-220
Title:
Main Turbine Generator EHC System
==
Description:==
This exempt change will install two manual isolation valves, in senes, a new pressure indicator, relocate two supply lines, one drain line, and the senLing kne connections to four pressure switches on the HPU for the Main Turbine Generator EHC System. The four pressure switches are PS-102, PS-103, PS-30, & PS 101. The installation of the isolation valves will allow isolation of the EHC fluid to the Turbine Main Stop Valves, Control Valves, l
Combined intermediate Valves and front standard components while EHC fluid to the Bypass i
VE!ves remains unisolated. This will allow operation of the BPVs while other EHC supplied
[
components are out of service. This exempt change will enhance the current system by allowing a means for system isolation during normal operation to repair or perform preventative maintenance on components.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-01-002 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: SPI 97-10-10, Rev. O j
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Title:
U1 Fuel Pool Corrosion Sample Desenption: This Unit i Special Procedure will remove a corroded section of the Dresden Unit 1 Fuel Storage Rack for Argonne National Laboratories to perform corrosion samphng analysis.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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10 CFR'50.59 Quarter: 1998-02 Safety $ valuation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-01-003 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Exempt Change Evaluation Reference Number: E12-197-206
Title:
Unit i Fuel Storage Rack
==
Description:==
The proposed activity will remove parts of two upper support pieces (spacer fins) from the Unit i fuel storage racks. These metal pieces (samples) will be used for corrosion analysis.
l Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 199"01-008 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: SPI 98-01-013
Title:
U1 Fuel Transfer Basket Ciecning & Inspection Desenption: The Fuel Transfer Baskets located in the Unit i Fuel Transfer Poot will be cleaned utilizing a Tri Nuclear Corporation FilterNacuum Unit and an underwater pump with velocity flush I
hoses. These fuel baskets are partially filled with spent fuel with 11 assemblies in the North Basket and 12 in the South Basket. The exposed portions of the spent fuel will be cleaned and the fuel velocity flushed down through the 'ength of the fuel assembly. An inspection will then be performed of the empty Fuel Basket ce;is using an underwater Camera and Video equipment. The Unit 1 Dummy Fuel Assembly will then be inserted and withdrawn into a selected empty fuel cell to ensure that the cell will accept a fuel assembly.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-01-012 Tyi e of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: SPI-98-01-015 Title.
U3 Hydrogen Addition Mod Pre-Startup Mod Test
==
Description:==
This modification test will perform the following for the newly installed Hydrogen Addition System (HAS).
- 1. Functionally check all power, instrumentation and control circuits prior to filling the system.
- 2. Line-up the instrument air system and leak check.
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- 3. Line-up the Oxygen Analyzers, leak check and place in service.
- 4. Line-up the Hydrogen Area Leak Detection System leak check and place in-service.
5 Purge the hydrogen piping with nitrogen.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-01-025H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Miscellaneous Evaluation Reference Number: DATR 3/4.18
Title:
DATR Table 3/418 2 (E12-2 95-229)
==
Description:==
Revise DATR to incorporate the reconfiguration of the primary containment isolation valves.
)
l Original Safety Evaluation 1997-04-230 Result.
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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l 10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02 Safety 8 valuation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-01-057 Type of Safety Evaluation.
Exemp' Change Evaluation Reference Number: E12-2-97-216 l
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Title:
Install Relief Valve on CRD Hydraulic System Line Desenption: This activity was previously evaluated via Safety Evaluation Tracking No. 1997 03-214. That evaluation stated that the new relief valve was a Primary Containment isolation Valve and revisions to UFSAR Table 6 2-9 and DATR Table 3/4.18.1 were required as a result of that designation. The addition of valve 2-0399-587 per Exempt Change E12-2-95-229 has relocated the isolation boundary. RV 2-0399-600 is no longer designated as a PCIV, and the l
relief valve has been relocated from its original location due to an interference detected in the l
drywell walkdown. This safety evaluation will supersede the previous safety evaluation
(
tracked by 1997-03-214. All references to the new RV being a PCIV are therefore j
eliminated The proposed change is to install a relief valve on CROHS line 2-0390-3/4"-A. This line connects CRDHS to the Reactor Recirculation System. The location of the relief valve will be inside the drywell between penetration X-139B and isolation valve 2-220-112A. In support of this new relief valve, an additional pipe support will be added to the piping system inside the drywell.
i Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewe'd safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-01-06GH Type of Safety Evaluation Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DOP 3200-05, Rev.14
Title:
Feedwater System - Zine injection i
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==
Description:==
The Reactor Feed Pump Shutdown procedure was revised to incorporate ModiGcations M12 I
2-97-003 and M12-2-97-006. A step was added to venfy the Zinc injection Process (ZIP) j system is secured after last feed pump it, shutdown, and to properly align the ZIP system for the new feed pump alignment.
i Validation of Previous Safety Evaluation: 1997-03-177 l
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-01-078H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DSSP 0200-L, Rev. 9 I
Titt LPCl/CCSW Cold Shutdown Method
==
Description:==
Modification M12-2-97-007 added a line from the Containment Cooling Service Water header to the ECCS room cooler supply header. This piping will allow river water from the CCSW l
system to flow to the HPCI and LPCI room coolers if the CCSW pumps are running This will ensure the coolers will receive cooling water even if the Service Water pumps are lost due to a Loss of Offsite Power. This procedure change deleted procedure steps that are no longer applicable following system modification.
I Validation of Previous Safety Evalusion: 1997-04-233
]
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02 Safety 8 valuation Summary Report _
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-01-079H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DAP 14-07. Rev. 4
Title:
Room Coolers Modification
==
Description:==
Step F.5 a (3) was revised to change "The coolers fans and motors are" to read "(Unit 3 only)
The room cooler unit is". Step F.5 a (4) was revised to change "The Coolers themselves are" to read "(Unit 3 only) The room cooler unit is". These changes were necessary to distinguish between Unit 2 and 3 differences with the room coolers following modification to Unit 2.
Validation of Previous Safety Evaluation: 1997-04-233 Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-01-082H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DAN 923-5 H-1, Rev. 09
Title:
Change in System Supplying Water to Coolers Desenption: Operator Action B 4. was revised to change "a Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump" to read "the Containment Cooling Service Water System" This change was necessary due to change in the system supplying water to the coolers.
Validation of Previously Performed Safety Evaluation 1997-04 233.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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Safety Evaluation Number. 1998-01-083H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure i
Evaluation Reference Number DAN 902(3)-6 F-7, Rev.12
Title:
Zinc injection Process, Mod M12-2-97-003
==
Description:==
Revise procedure to incorporate the modification. This modification installs a tap off the B l
Feedwater Pump discharge and routes 2-1/2" piping from the tap to the inlet header of the Zinc skid.
l Validation of Previous Safety Evaluation: 1997-03-177 l
l Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number. 1998-01-084H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure L
Evaluation Reference Number: DOP 3200-09, Rev.1
Title:
Zinc injection System
==
Description:==
Modification M12-2-97-003 installs a line from the B feedwater pump discharge header to the l
Zinc skid inlet header. This modification allows the ZIP system operation as long as the A or l
the 3 feedwater pump is running without instrument adjustment. Steo E 4 Deleted step that l
was " Unit 2 only" because the ZIP system's impact on CTP will no longer depend on which feedwater pump es in service. Step G 1.b - Deleted 2-3299-226 and 2-3299-227 from a list of valves to venfy open since it is not necessary to verify valves are open due the the addition of new steps G.1.c or G.1.d. Step G.1.c.d e -Inserted new steps and preceding note, Added new conditional steps to ensure the zine injection system is aligned to A or B RFP depending on running pump configuration.
Validation of Previous Safety Evaluation: 1997-03-177 Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02 S'afety Evaluation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-01-087H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: SPI 98-03 021
Title:
U1 Fuel Cleaning Pnor to Phaso ll Characterization Desenption: This Special Procedure will perform cleaning and velocity flushing on Unit 1 spent fuelin the Fuel Storage Pool. The cleaning and velocity flushing will help to reduce the clouding effect t
on the Storage Pool visibihty resulting from any disturbances of the fuel assembly with the corrosion products on the fuel pins and channel surfaces. This should result in less down time during the Phase 11 Fuel Characterization which could be caused by the clouding effect from moving fuel dunng the inspection process No fuel will be specifically grappled or moved by this procedure.
Validation of Previous Safety Evaluation 1997-03-184 l
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-01088H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure l
l Evaluation Reference Number DOS 1500-2, Rev. 26 i
Title:
CCSW Pump Test and inservice Test Procedure i
Desenption: The Containment Cooling Service Water Pump Test and inservice Test (IST) procedure was revised to incorporate Mod M12-2-97-007. This modification added a line from the I
Containment Cookng Service Water header to the ECCS room cooler supply header. This piping will allow river water from the CCSW system to flow to the HPCI and LPCI room coolers d the CCSW pumps are running. This will ensure the cc olers will receive cooling water even if SW pumps are lost due to a Loss of Offsite Power.
l Vahdation of Previous Safety Evaluation 1997-04-233 l
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
I Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-01-090H Type 4 Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evt!vation Reference Number: DOS 1500-12, Rev. 5
Title:
Incorporate Mod in CCSW Flow Venfication Procedure
==
Description:==
Modification M12-2-97-007 added a line from the Containment Cooling Service Water header to the ECCS room cooler supply header, This piping will allow river water from the CCSW system to flow to the HPCI and LPCI room coolers if the CCSW pumps are running. This will ensure the coolers will receive Cooling water even if SW pumps are lost due to a LOOP.
Vahdation of Previous Safety Evaluation 1997-04-233 Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02 Safety Evaluation Summary Report t
l Safety Evaluation Number 1998-01-094H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: SPI 98-02-017. Rev.1 l
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Title:
Completion of Unit i Radwaste Cleanup 1
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==
Description:==
This activity involves the removal, processing and packaging for disposal of residual wastes and spent resins currently contained within the Dresden Unit 1 Radwaste Facility's below ground tanks, sumps, and tank vaults. This will be accomplished by pumping, slurrying, filtenng and dewatenng through disposal liners. All process liquid wastes will be stored in the Radwaste Tanks untilit can be transferred to Unit 2/3 for additional processing. An additional l
drying step may be performed in order to concentrate the remaining waste into a smaller
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disposal volume. The project will be performed by a Processor Vendor (NUKEM) utilizing i
Station approved Vendor Procedures and equipment.
Validation of Previous Safety Evaluation 1997-03-161 Result.
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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Safety Evaluation Number. 1998-01-0 %
Type of Safety Evaluation:
Miscellaneous Evaluation Reference Number: DCR D-95-113
Title:
Unit 1 Chimney SPING
==
Description:==
This evaluation was wntten to support drawing changes supporting a power cable which connects to a spare 30A circuit breaker on the Unit 3 Instrument Bus and to the Unit 1 Chimney SPING (Solid Particulate lodine and Noble Gas) monitor. The new cable is routed l
in conduit from the SPING to the Unit 3 instrument Bus. This will provide a reliable power fed to the Unit 1 Chimney SP!NG.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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t 10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02 l
Safety Evaluation Summary Report l
Safety Evaluation Number. 1998-01-097 Type of Safety Evaluation:
FSAR Change j
I Evaluation Reference Number. DFL 98-012
Title:
Dam Failure issues I
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==
Description:==
- 1. Revise UFSAR Section 9 2.5.2 " System Description" to indicate that levelin the discharge canal will equalize its level with the intake canal at elevation 495' following a dam failure.
- 2. Revise UFSAR Section 9 2.5.3 " Safety Evaluation" to indicate the coping scenanos are l
based on a question and answer on the original FSAR. The dam failure scenario is consdered beyond the design basis of Dresden Station Units 2 & 3 and design b& sis calculations are not needed for the coping scenario.
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- 3. Revise UFSAR Section 9.2.5.3.1 " Dam Failure Dunng Normal Operation" to indicate that a portable engine-driven pump could be used to draw a suction from the intake canal and discharge to the fire protection system.
- 4. Revise UFSAR Section 9.2.5.3.1 " Dam Failure Dunng Normal Operation" to replace i
" diesel fire pump of Units 2 & 3" with " diesel fire pump of Unit 1".
- 5. Revise UFSAR Section 9 2.5.3.1 " Dam Failure During Normal Operation" to indicate that I
the diesel fire pump of the Units 2 & 3 has its suction above elevation 495* and that installing stop logs in the fire pump suction bay and using the travelling screen refuse pumps are actions needed to utilize the Unit 2 & 3 fire pump as a make-up source for the isolation condenser fo'iowing a dam failure.
elevation of the CCSW intake lines.
" Unit 2/3" desel fire pump draws a suction from the same compartment as CCSW.
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- 8. Revise UFSAR Section 9.2.5.3.2 " Dam Failure Coincident With a LOCA" to indicate the previously bolted spool piece from the refuse pump discharge to the fire pump suction bay was permanently welded in place.
- 9. Revise procedure DOA 0010-01 to reflect UFSAR changes and provide instructions for monitoring and operating the Unit 2/3 fire pump and CCSW pumps.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02
$afety Evaluation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-099H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DOP 5750-09, Rev. 9 l
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Title:
Aux Electncal Equipment (A EER) / Aux Computer Room (ACR) A/C Units Desenption: Modification M12-0-97-001C separated the electrical feed to AEER/ACR A/C Units from the TB and RB lighting.
The following changes were made to Procedure DOP 5750-09:
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- 1) Prerequisite D 2 deleted preceeding note and revised step to indicate that Bus 25 Cub. 7D l
is the feed to AEER/ACR A/C Unit.
- 4) Revised note preceding G 3.d to correct the cubicle to "7D" and nomenclature for the l
AEER Units, Validation of Previous Safety Evaluation 1997-03-204.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-102H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DGA-12, Rev. 33
Title:
Partial or Complete Loss of AC Power
==
Description:==
This revision deleted Step D.3.d. This step isolated 2-0301-1a. 2-0301-1b and 2-0301-173 within 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after the LOCA. During refueling outage D2R15, Modification E12-2-96 231 installed safety related check valves in the Unit 2 CRD piping. This will prevent primary system fluid from bypassing secondary containment in the event of a LOCA with loss of the CRD pumps.
Validation of Previous Safety Evaluation for E12-2-96-231 & E12-3-96-221 i
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02 103 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: SPI-98-02-01
Title:
Feedwater Control System Startup / Tuning Test
==
Description:==
This modification test will perform testing and system performance tuning for the updated feedwater control system installed under modification M12-2-97 006. This testing is similar to testing performed on Unit 3 in SPI-97-03-003. This test will conduct tuning of the new feedwater control system by inducing step changes in reactor vessel level and steam flow signals under controlled conditions. The step changes are within the normal capabilities of the feedwater control system. This test is similar to the testing performed after initial fuel load, as well as testing performed in 1996 on Unit 2 following feedwater control system modification in D2R14, and in 1997 on Unit 3 following feedwater control system modification in 03R14. The changes in feedwater flow that will result from these changes are no more severe than those encountered during normal reactor operation, and their effect is also within the normal expected behavior of the system. Also, Condensate Booster pump and Feedwater Pump swaps are performed at various power leve!s to demonstrate control system response.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02 Safety Evaluation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-104H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DOA 3700-01, Rev.15 Title.
Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water
==
Description:==
Section F Discussion: Deleted " Unit 3" and "(Unit 2 relief vanes to be installed D2R15)" from the first line of the fifth paragraph due to the installation of modification E12-2-97-214. Relief valve RV 2 3799-277 was installed between Penetration X-124 and containment isolation valve 2-3706 Relief valve RV 2-3799-276 was installed upstream of containment isolation valve 2-3706 and will provide overpressure protection for Penetration X-123. This modification will prevent the thermal overpressunzation as required by NRC Genenc Letter 96-06.
Validation of Previous Safety Evaluation 1997-03-202 Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-107H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DOS 6600-11, Rev. 20
Title:
Backup Water Supply from CCSW to HPCI and LPCI Room Coolers Desenption: Modification M12-2-97-007 installed a backup water supply from the CCSW to the HPCI and LPCI Room Coolers Procedure DOS 6600-11 was revised to direct the testing of valves 2-1599-131 A and 2-1599-131B which were installed as part of the modif! cation.
Validation of Previous Safety Evaluation 1997-04-233 Result.
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number. 1998-02108H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DTS 1500-06, Rev.1
Title:
Backup Water Supply from CCSW to HPCI and LPCI Room Coolers Desenption. Modification M12-2-97-007 connected a backup water supply from the CCSW to the HPCI and LPCI Room Coolers Added to Precaution F.3 stating that flow is being diverted to the HPCI and LPCI toom coolers that is not indicated on the control room indication and to ensure additional care is taken at high pump flows to prevent a possible overload condition.
Vahdation of Previous Safety Evaluation 1997-04-233 Result.
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-109H Type of Safety Evaluation-Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DTS 1500-05, Rev. 2
Title:
Backup Water Supply from CCSW to HPCI and LPCI Room Coolers
==
Description:==
Modification M12-2-97-007 connected a backup water supply from the CCSW to the HPCI and LPCI Room Coolers Added to Precaution F.3 stating that flow is being diverted to the HPCI and LPCI room coolers that is not indicated on the control room indication and to ensure additional care is taken at high pump flows to prevent a possible overload condition.
Vahdation of Previous Safety Evaluation 1998-04-233 Result.
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02
_ Safety Evaluation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02110H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DOP 4300-21 Rev.1
Title:
Demin Water Makeup System Desenption: DOP 4300 21, Rev. 01, DRAIN UNIT 2 DRYWELL PENETRATION X.119 PIPING, has been deleted. Relief valve RV 2-4399-915 (E12-2-97-208) was installed on the kne at Penetration i
X-119. This modification will prevent thermal overpressunzation as required by NRC Genenc Letter 96-06.
Vahdation of Previous Safety Evaluation 1997-03-216 Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number 1998-02-111H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DOP 0300-23, Rev.1
Title:
Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System
==
Description:==
DOP 0300-23, Rev. 01, DRAIN UNIT 2 DRYWELL PENETRATION X-139B AND X-144 PIPING, has been deleted Relief Valve RV 2-0399-600 (E12 2-97 216) was installed on tbt hne at Penetratg>n X-1398. A blank flange was installed (E12-2-97-215) on the CRD return kne which was previously abandoned in place at Penetration X-144. These modifications will prevent the thermal overpressurization as required by NRC Generic Letter 96-06.
Validation of Previous Safety Evaluation 1998-01-057 Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number; 1998-02-112H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DTP 48, Rev. 2
Title:
Check Valve inspection. Scope and Optimization i
Desenption: Added 2-1599-131A and 2-1599-131B to the " Check Valve Program Level A and B Valves" hst. Added "lST Group: 21"in the comments for 2-3999-252 due to the change in valve classification as the risult of the modification These changes were made as the result of Mod M12-2-97-007 which added a new kne from CCSW to the LPCI and HPCI room cooler supply header.
Validation of Previous Safety Evaluation 1997-04-233 Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
j Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-113H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DOS 0201-01, Rev. 21
Title:
Reactor Recire, Control Rod Drive, & Rx Water Cleanup System Desenption: This evaluation supports the changes to procedure DOS 0201-01 to incorporate the addition of new valves installed under the following Exempt changes; E12-2 97-211, E12-2-97-212, &
E12-2-95-229 Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02
$afety Evaluation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-115 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Miscellaneous Evaluation Reference Number: Tool Lost in Dresden Unit 2
Title:
"U" Shaped Shackle Assembly l
Desenption: This Safety Evaluation is to evaluate the potential effects the "U" shaped shackle assembly from the CSI 2000 tool (mini-submanne) may have on the Unit 2 fuel assemblies and inter-connected systems. The "U" shaped shackle assembly from the CSI 2000 tool was found to be missing while performing a tool inspechon on 3/14/98. The "U" shaped shackle assembly is approximately two inches long. 0.250 inches in diameter with a 1.000 inch long pin. The CSI 2000 tool traveled from the 110 degree side of the vessel to the 290 degree side over l
l fuel after performing examinations. An evaluation is necessary because of the potential for I
the part to have fallen into the reactor during the time of travel over the vessel.
l Result:
1 hts evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
l Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-116H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure i
Evaluation Reference Number: DAN 902(3)-8 A-12, Rev. 6
Title:
U2(3) Generator Trip Descnption: Modification M12-2-96-003 will upgrade the ground differential relay scheme of the UAT 21 protection system by utilizing CO-2 relays. CO-2 relays increase the sensitivity of the fault detection scheme for the UAT. This increased sensitivity will result in faster detection and l
interruption of the fault conditions and improved detection system reliability.
i Validation of Previous Safety Evaluation 1997-03-207 1
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-117H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure 1
Evaluation Reference Number. DOA 6000-01, Rev. 8 j
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Title:
Main Generator Trip Desenption: Modification M12-2-96-003 will upgrade the ground differential relay scheme of the UAT 21 protection system by utilizing CO-2 relays. CO-2 relays increase the sens*vity of the fault detection scheme for the UAT. This increased sensitivity will result in faster detechon and interruption of the fault conditions and improved detection system reliability.
Validation of Previous Safety Evaluation 1997-03-207 Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist-j.
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10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02
{
l Safety Evaluation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number 199842-119 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: SPI 98-04-023
Title:
Unit i Fuel Charactenzation Phase 11 Unit 2/3 Fuel Pool Desmptico: The Unit 1 Characterization Plan - Phase il Special Procedure will perform a remote underwater inspection of all Unit i Fuel stored in the Unit 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pools. There 4
are 102 Unit i fuel assemblies stored in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool and 104 Unit 1 fuel assemblies (and one rod basket) stored in Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool. All of these fuel assemblies are dechanneled. Each Unit 1 spent fuel assembly will be removed from its storage location and transported to a video inspection area where cameras will be set up to perform the underwater inspection, This inspection will be performed by Siemens f:ower Corporation Vendor Personnel with station approved Siemens procedures using underwater 4
color cameras and a video recording system. The fuel will then be taken back to its original i
storage location in the Spent Fuel Storage racks.
j The Unit 2(3) Fuel Handling Equipment will be used to handle the fuel in conjunction with the g
l Unit 1 Grapple Tool. The Unit 1 grapple tool will be attached to the Unit 2(3) refueling platform frame mounted auxihary hoist to provide a secure method for handling the Unit 1 fuel assemotes.
i The load cell setpoint on the frame mounted auxiliary hoist will be reduced for this inspection.
This is to provide protection for the Unit 1 grapple tool. Upon completion of the inspection, this setpoint value will be returned to its original value.
i Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
j Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-122H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Miscellaneous Evaluation Reference Number: Letter NFS.BSS:98-035
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Title:
Operation with 2A Feedwater Reg Valve Parts Lost in Unit 2 l
Desenption: This Safety Evaluation vahdation was completed to evaluate the potential effects of two messing piston nngs from the 2A FWRV (onginal dimensions: 12.0" ID,12.5" OD, 0.125" thick graphite material) on Dresden Unit 2.
Vahdation of previous safety evaluation 1998-02-115.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
l Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-123H Type of Safety Evaluation:
FSAR Change Evaluation Reference Number: DFL 98-016
Title:
Reload of Atrium-9B Fuelinto D2C16
==
Description:==
The proposed change is a reload of ATRIUM-98 fuel into D2C16. The apphcable documents (e g., D2C16 COLR, proposed UFSAR changes and supporting 50.59 Safety Evaluation) are provided in NFS.BSS:98-014, "On-Site and Off-Site Review of the Dresden Unit 2 Cycle 16 (D2C16) Reload Licensing Package?
Vahdation of previous safety evaluation NFS.BS98-014 Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02 Safety Evaluation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number-1998-02 124 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DFPS 4123-06 & 4123-07 Title.
Unit i and Unit 2/3 Diesel Fire Pumps
==
Description:==
The proposed activity associated with this evaluation involves changes to Dresden Procedures DFPS 4123-06 and DFPS 4123-07 (Unit 2/3 Diesel Fire Pump Capacity Check and Unit 1 Fire Pump Capacity Check). The changes to DFPS 4123-06 and -07 revise the l'
acceptance criteria to reflect new limiting values of diesel fire pump performance. The limiting values of discharge pressure vs. flow rate have been determined in calculation DRE98-0023 Rev. O and are based on pump performance used in the new design basis hydraulic evaluation of the FP water supply system, calculation DRE97-0256.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-126 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: SPI 98-04-024
Title:
Post Mod Test of Unit Auxil;ary Transformer (UAT) 21
==
Description:==
The subject special procedure will be a post modification test of UAT 21 protective relaying l
modification M12 2 96-003 to ensure that the existing and modified relay protection systems are capable of performing as designed without spurious operation. Modification M12-2 003 installed CO-2 relays and reconfigure the Current Transformers (cts) which provide input to the subject relays. The protective relays provide a fault detection and protection scheme for the UAT. The testing will be performed in the AEER at Panels 902-29 and 902-
- 74. The testing will be performed with the UAT supplying sufficient Icad to the respective 4kV Switchgear bus in order to adequately excite the cts feeding the protective relays.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
t Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-128 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Temporay Alteration Evaluation Reference Number: WR 980044103,980042462
Title:
RPS Monitonng i
==
Description:==
This Temporary Alteration attaches temporary recoiders to the ATS panel 2203-73A and the RPS panel 903-17 to facilitate troubleshooting, as part of a Root Cause investigation for determining the reason for spurious half-scram signals in the RPS system from an unidentified source Each recorder is designed to monitor the inplant circuitry while maintaining the recorder circuitry electronically isolated frem the monitored circuit by use of opticalisolators. These recorders were installed under WR 980044103 which has been prepared in accordance with DAP 5-8, Temp Alt Control, and DAP 15-12, Work Request
- Control, Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02 Safety Evaluation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number. 1998-02 135 Type of Safety Evaluation:
fAodification Evaluation Reference Number: M12-3-98-002
Title:
Unit 3 Feedwater Level Control System (FLCS) l Desenption: The purpose of this modification is to modify the Unit 3 Feedwater Level Control System (FLCS) to be similar to the Unit 2 System. This modification consists of software (logic) changes, major improvements include:
- 1) Improvements to the SCRAM response on setpoint setdown. Operating experience with Unit 3 has shown that dunng SCHAMs from full power the system fesponse has been too slow tJ prevent overfilling the reactor vessel without manual operator intervention. This modification contains a logic change for setpoint setdown to maintain the pre-scram feedwater flow for 15 seconds, then reduce the demand before releasing the system to control to the setdown setpoint.
Retaining Automatic operation on a main Feedwater Regulating Valve with a good position signal when a bad position signal on the other occurs. This changed the existing logic which would place the valve in the manual mode on reciept of a bad position signal on the other valve.
Reduction of the filtering of the nirrow range level signals at medium and low power and dunng transients so the Medium range and Narrow range indications are consistent.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-137 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Nuclear Work Request Evaluation Reference Number: NWR 980014794 j
Title.
RPS Scram Contactors Desenption: The proposed test will determine the RPS scram contactor current draw and test capability.
The test corsists of hooking up a test box across the RPS scram contactor initiating relay contact circuit in addition to contactor current draw measurements. The test box will essentially act as a jumper across the initiating relay contacts (reference drawing 12E-2465 Sht.1) of the RPS subchannel being tested. This wik prevent the scram contactors from de-energizing (de-energi:es on half scram) during an RPS trip condition. The test box is designed to allow adjustments in the jumper resistance in an attempt to match the impedance of the relay contact string. During the test, the relay contact circuit will be opened and closed allowing the collection of data at different test box configurations. The purpose of this testing
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is to determine if a test box can be designed using resistors and lights that will provide visual indication that the relay contact string has opened without allowing the RPS scram contactors 1
to drop out. Based on the results obtained, the data will later be used to help justify on-line testing of RPS half scram actuating dCvices without placing the unit in a half scram condition.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02 Safety Evaluation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-139 Type of Safety Evaluation.
FSAR Change Evaluation Reference Number: DFL 98-019 i
Title:
FSAR Change for ASME Section XIIWE
==
Description:==
Revise Primary Containment sections of the UFSAR to reflect the amended NRC regulations for repair and inspection of Metal Containments. The amended replations incorporate the requirements of ASME Section Xt. Subsection IWE,1992 Edition with 1992 Addenda,
" Requirements for class MC and Metallic Liners of class CC Components of Light Water Cooled Reactors." Also, this evaluation will support DAP 11-18 and DAP 11-08 procedure revisions.
l Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-142 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Temporay Alteration i
Evaluation Reference Number TALT 111-08-98 l
Title:
Capping TIP Tube Desenption: Remove the Traversing incore Probe (TIP) tubing for TIP C-9 between the first connection on the LPRM assembly and the C indexing machine. Install caps on TIP tubing. The reason for
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this is that a leak has occurred in the TIP tube above the pressure seal in the wet guide tube.
Water was leaking from TIP tubing into indexing mechanism.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-143 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Temporay Alteration Evaluation Reference Number: TALT lil-09-98
Title:
Circulating Water (CW) Pump Discharge Valve l
Desenption: Change the configuration of the 3-4401 A, CW Pump Discharge Valve to facilitate gagging the valve by way of a through-pipe-wallinsert. A device will be mounted to the CW piping which will breach the CW pressure boundary and facilitate inserting a rod into the valve down to the valve disc, while maintaining the integnty of the pressure boundary. Engaging the device to j
the disc of the 3-4401 A, CW Pump Discharge Valve will be performed after the pump has been started, the valve is at normal operating position, and the valve motor is de-energized.
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Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-154 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure i
Evaluation Reference Number: DlS 1600-02
Title:
Drywell High Pressure SCRAM and Containment isolation Pressure Switches Calibration
==
Description:==
Revise DIS 1600-2 to include the addition of an indicating jumper across the HFA relay contacts in the scram logic subchannel for the instrument under test during the performance of the surveillance testing of the Drywell high Pressure Scram and Containment Isolation Pressure Isolation pressure switches calibration. This will prevent a half scram from being received when the instrument under test is actuated.
Insta!!ation of the jumpers will be performed in a timeframe when the associated instrument is considered inoperable for the purposes of performing surveillance testing as described in Technical Specification 3.1.A.1 and administratively controlled such that the allowable outage i
time specifed in this Technical Specification is not exceeded.
i Administrative controls and independent venfication dunng the performance of DIS 1600-02 f
will prevent the simultaneous bypassing of two channels Result:
This evaluation determined that an unrevewed safety question did not exist.
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10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02 Safety Evaluation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-155 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure l
Evaluation Reference Number: NSP-AP-1002 & NSP-AP-3001 I
Title:
Change Onsite Review Funtion to PORC Reviews j
Descnption: Comed has submitted Revision 66 of the QA iopical Report to the NRC which desenbes the new Comed independent Review processes. The Independent Review processes are being I
revised to provide a more consistent review across allitems requiring independent review. It i
l also provides the requirement for a collegial review by senior station rnanagement for items of j
t safety significance. The requirement for a collegial review by the Plant Operations Review
}
Committee will assue that a diverse population of senior managers review items of safety significance and items of mutual concern are discussed in an open forum. This format for independent review has been successfully applied by other NRC licensees.
Result.
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-156H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DES 8300-48, Rev. O
Title:
Unit 3 24/48 Volt System
==
Description:==
Provide quarterly maintenance surveillance inspection instructions for Unit 3 24/48 Volt battery.
Validation of previous Safety Evaluation 1996-02-115 Result This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number 1998-02-157H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DIS 2500-03, Rev.10 Title.
Revise Procedure due to Modifications
==
Description:==
This evaluation supports the revision to DIS 2500-03 which eliminates the neeo to check the calibration of Pressure transmitters and pressure switches that are no longer required or in use per M12-2-97-001 and M12-3-97-001.
Validation of Previous Safety Evaluation 1997-02-081 & 1997-02-082.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist-Safety Evaluation Number 1998-02-158 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DES 4153-02,4153-03,4153-04
Title:
DCR 970429, DATR 3/4.2
==
Description:==
Emergency Light Battery Pack Unit 490C (formerly identtfied as EMERG-LTS-N1)) which illuminates the lower elevation of the isolation Condenser Makeup Pump area will be changed from non-safety related to regulatory related. This light will also be designated as safe shutdown emergency lighting instead of BOP emergency lighting. The surveillance for this emergency light will be under DES 4153-02, " Safe Shutdown Emergency Lighting Routine Inspection"instead of DES 4153-03. " Balance of Plant Emergency Lighting Routine Inspection". This activity is associated with the incorporation of the isolation Condenser i
Makeup Pumps into the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis.
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Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02 Safety Evaluation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-160 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure 1
Evaluation Reference Number: DOS 5600-02
Title:
Turbine Generator and Auriliary Systems
==
Description:==
This 50.59 evaluates the acceptability of extending the currant non-Technical Specification j
related CIV and MSV testing per DOS 5600-02 for both Unit 2 and Unit 3 from weekly up to quarterly. The current weekly testing frequency was based on the previous GE TIL-969 recommendation. The purpose of such testing is to ensure that these valves will function property when called upon to do so in order to prevent the turbine from reaching any destructive overspeed condition.
NUREG-1366 recommended that, where the turbine manufacturer agrees, turbine valve testing should be changed to quarterly. GE TIL-969-3R1 permits quarterly testing for units with monoblock rotors. An evaluation was performed that determined BBC welded-on rotors are equivalent to GE monoblock rotors. Therefore the GE recommendation is applicable to Dresden.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-161 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: SPil 98-05-06
Title:
Portable Cooling Tower Installation and initial Test
==
Description:==
The proposed activity is the installation & operation of 80 portable cooling towers. The portable cooling towers are being installed in between the " hot" and " cold" canals about 1/2 mile south of the Dresden Training Building.
i Currently, based on air temperature, humidity, river inlet temperature and other environmental considerations, a projection is made as to what the Circulation Water temperature will be in the cold canal after it has circulated through the cooling lake. Based on that projection, the amount of power produced is adjusted so that the Circulating Water will not exceed the equipment /environmentallimitations. By providing the supplemental cooling, the amount of power that can be produced without exceeding the equipment / environmental limitations will l
be increased.
The cooling towers will draw approximately 160,000 gpm from the " cold" canal (16% of the total canal flow) and reduce the temperature of this water by 10 to 15 degrees. This cooled water is then returned to the " cold" canal reducing the overall canal temperature betwe3n i to 3 degrees depending on wet bulb conditions.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02 Safety Evaluation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-162 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure l
Evaluation Reference Number: SPil 98-05-07 l
Title:
Portable Cooling Tower Operation i
==
Description:==
The proposed activity is the installation & operation of 80 portable cooling towers. The portable cooling towers are being installed in between the " hot" and " cold" canals about 1/2 mile south of the Dresden Training Building.
Currently, based on air temperature, humidity, river inlet temperature and other environmental considerations, a projection is made as to what the Circulation Water temperature will be in the cold canal after it has circulated through the cooling lake. Based on that projection, the amount of power produced is adjusted so that the Circulating Water will not exceed the equipment /environmentallimitations. By providing the supplemental cooling, the amount of power that can be produced without exceeding the equipment / environmental limitations wi!!
l be increased.
The cooling towe s will draw approximately 160,000 gpm from the " cold" canal (16% of the total canal flow) and reduce the temperature of this water by 10 to 15 degrees. This cooled j
water is then returnied to the " cold" canal reducing the overall canal temperature between 1 to 3 degrees depending on wet bulb conditions.
j Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-163 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: SPl 98-06-029
Title:
Processing Unit 1 T 102A & B Tanks Desenption: This Specia! Procedure will process the Dresden Unit 1 Chemical Cleaning Radwaste Receiving liquid storage tanks T-102NB contents through a Vendor Water Processing System so that the water car: be transferred to Unit 2/3 Radwaste for disoosal. Processing of liquid radioactive water is no longer performed on Unit 1 due to the shutdown and decommissioning of the Unit i radioactive waste processing facilities. The Tanks will be processed one at a time by recirculating the tanks' contents through a skid mounted backflushable filter and demineralized processing system. The processing will be performed by a Processor Vendor (NUKEM) utilizing Vendor Procedures and equipment. When the chernistry parameters are within discharge specifications, then the water will be transferred to Unit 2/3 Radwaste for discharge.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02 Safety evaluation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-164 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Exempt Change Evaluation Reference Number: E12-0-98-201 l
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Title:
Secunty Installations Directed by Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation Desenption The proposed activity for this Exempt Change is to provide for secunty installations directed by the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE). The OSRE installations and associated electrical requirements are being added to provide an additional line of defense for the Station Secunty Group. This additional defense is being directed by NRC Inspection Manual, inspection Procedure 81110, which provides for the following inspection objectives:
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- 1. To evaluate a licensee's ability to respond to the external design basis threat by focusing on (1) the interaction between a licensee's operations and secunty departments in estabrshing prionties for protecting equipment and (2) the protective strategies used.
'2. To review the impact of security measures on safe plant operations.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-167 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number DlS 0500-02 i
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Title:
Rx Vessel Low Water Level Scram and Low Water Level isolation Channel Functional Test
==
Description:==
Revise DIS 0500-02 to include provisions for jumpering the HFA Relay Trip System contacts with an indicating jumper (RPS test box) during performance of this procedure which will prevent the initiation of a half scram condition. The RPS test box provides a current path around the trip device contacts being tested which includes a lamp that indicates when the contacts open and close Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-168 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure Evaluation Reference Number: DIS 0500-01
Title:
Rx Vessel High Pressure Scram Pressure Switch Calibration
==
Description:==
Pevise DIS 0500-01 to include provisions for jumpering the HFA Relay Trip System contacts with an indicating jumper (RPS test box) during performance of this procedure which will prevent the initiation of a half scram condition. The RPS test box povides a current path around the inp device contacts being tested which includes a lamp that indicates when the contacts open and close.
Result:
This evaluation determhed that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-169H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Miscellaneous Evaluation Reference Number: DCR 980286
Title:
Piping & Instrument Diagram Code Class Flags Desenption This DCR is being performed to add code break flags on the system Piping and
. Instrumentation Diagram (P&lD) as a result of the subject modification' The flags will clearly j
identify where the ASME Section XI, Class 3 code boundary ends.
Validation of previous safety evaluation 1997-04-233.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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10 CFR 50.59 Quarter: 1998-02 Safety Evaluation Summary Report Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-172H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Exempt Change Evaluation Reference Number: E12-3-95-216, E12-3-97-225
Title:
Modify Check Valve Internals
==
Description:==
Safety evaluation validation wntten to support the modification of the Reactor Feedwater Containment isolation check valve internals by installing upgraded internals. The EPN of the valves included under this validation are 3-220-62A,3-220-62B, and 3-220-59.
Validate Addendum #1 to E12-3-95-206.
Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-174 Type of Safety Evaluation:
Modification Evaluation Reference Number: M12-2/3-87-002B
Title:
UFSAR Sect. 9.2 - Reactor Bldg. Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW)
==
Description:==
Change UFSAR section 9 2.3.2, System Desenption, section 9.2.3.1 Design Basis, table 9.2-3 Major RBCCW System loads to properly reflect plant configuration after the completion of 1
Radwaste Upgrade Modification M12-2/3-87-002B.
Result.
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
f Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-179H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Procedure t
Evaluation Reference Number: SPil 98-05-07, Rev. 2 l
Title:
Operation of Poitable Cooling Towers l
l Desenption: The Special Procedure operates 80 cooling towers from the cold canal versus 50 towers, and 8 cooling towers from the hot canal.
t I
Validation of previous safety evaluation 1998-02-162.
1 Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
i Safety Evaluation Number: 1998-02-180H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Exempt Change Evaluation Reference Number: E12-0-97-209, DOS 5740-04, DO
Title:
Pressure Gauges on Test Connections f
i Desenption-Add permanent pressure gauges to test connection <, on the inlet and outlet lines of the Control Room HVAC Train B Refngeration Conde.ising Unit,2/3-9400-102. The test connections were added dunng implementation of Exempt Change E12-0-97-203.
Validation of previous safety evaluation 1997-02-098 Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
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j 10 CFR 50.59 -
Quarter: 1998-02 Safety' Evaluation Summary Report i
l Sa 'ety Evaluation Number: 1098-02181H Type of Safety Evaluation:
Exempt Change Evaluation Reference Number: E12 2-97 202 l
Title:
U2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Start Pressure Switch
==
Description:==
This design change replaces the Unit 2 EDG air start pressure switch PS 2-464121 with a switch better suited for the system operating pressure. The new design adds a solenoid i
l valve to vent the compressor when it is not operating.
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i Result:
This evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
End of Report 1
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