ML20136C758

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Insp Rept 50-455/85-27 on 850819-30 & 0909-20.Major Areas Inspected:Detailed Exam of Selected Hardware Subsequent to QC Insps,Procedures & Records & Limited Observation of in-process Work
ML20136C758
Person / Time
Site: Byron Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/31/1985
From: Georgiev G, Gower G, Heishman R, Malloy J, Nemoto J, Phillips H, Wong H
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:
Shared Package
ML20136C727 List:
References
50-455-85-27, NUDOCS 8511210144
Download: ML20136C758 (117)


See also: IR 05000455/1985027

Text

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

DIVISION OF INSPECTION PROGRAMS

REACTOR CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS BRANCH

Report No.: 50-455/85-27

Docket No.: 50-455

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

Facility Name: Byron Station, Unit 2

Inspection At: Byron, Illinois

Inspection Conducted: August 19-30 and September 9-20, 1985

Inspectors: tw /o/ r/r5'

H.J.Wong,$r.ReactyConstructionEngineer Date Signed

Team Leader

~Akwr

, G. B. Q rgieV, Sr/ Reactor \gonstruction Engineer

isieur

Date' Sighed

he. Lu

G. C. Gower, Sr. Reactor Construction Engineer

tohehr

Date Signed

cla7 mad % io//e/er

Dats Si'gned

Jf A. Ma91oy, R ctor Inspector (Region III)

'Afi9 lDf/WW

I. Remoto, Reactor Construction Engineer Date S1gned

sHJ $1 M-/f SV

H. W. Pt/illips, Reactof Construction Engineer Date Signed

Consultants: R. M. Compton, D. C. Ford, J. B. McCormack,

0. P. Mallon, W. S. Marini, E. Y. Martindale,

R. E. Serb, W. J. Sperko, Jr. , and D. G. Whatley

Approved By: U /#/3'/h

R~obert F. Heishman, Chief Da'te Signed

Reactor Construction Programs Branch

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TOPIC SECTION

INSPECTION SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES...................................... I

ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTATION CONSTRUCTION.......................... II

MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTION.............................................. III

WELDING AND NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION............................... IV

CIVIL AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRUCTION.................................... V

MATERIAL TRACEABILITY AND CONTR0L.................................... VI

DESIGN CHANGE CONTR0L................................................ VII

CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEMS............................................ VIII

ATTACHMENT A - PERSONS CONTACTED AND DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

ATTACHMENT B - GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

e

I. INSPECTION SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

The objective of this inspection was to evaluate the adequacy of construc- '

tion at the Byron Unit 2 Station. This objective was accomplished through

review of the construction program, evaluation of project construction

controls, and review of selected portions of the Quality Assurance

Program, with emphasis on the installed hardware in the field. The scope

and significance of identified problems were also determined.

Within the areas examined, the inspection consisted of a detailed examina-

tion of selected hardware subsequent to quality control inspections, a

selective examination of procedures and representative records, and

limited observation of in-process work.

For each of the areas inspected, the following was determined:

.Were project construction controls adequate to assure quality

construction?

Was the hardware or product fabricated or installed as designed?

Were quality verifications performed during the work process with

applicable hold points?

Was there adequate documentation to determine the acceptability of

installed hardware or product?

Are systems turned over to the startup organization in operable

condition and are they being properly maintained?

I-1

II. . ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTATION CONSTRUCTION

' '

A. Objective

The primary objective of the appraisal of electrical and instrumentation

construction was to determine whether Class 1E components and systems

were installed in accordance with regulatory-requirements, Safety

Analysis Report (SAR) commitments and approved vendor and construction

specifications and drawings. Additional objectives were to determine

whether procedures, instructions and drawings used to accomplish

construction activities were adequate and whether quality related

records accurately reflect the completed work.

B. Discussion

Within the broad categories of electrical and instrumentation construc-

tion, attention was given to several specific areas. These included

electrical cable, raceways and raceway supports, electrical equipment,

and instrumentation cable and components. Additionally, an examination

of components which comprise a selected process system was accomplished.

A number of documents were generated by the licensee to record

individual observations of the NRC Construction Appraisal Team.(CAT)

inspectors, thgse are referenced directly in the discussions that

follow.

1. Electrical Raceway Installation

a. Inspection Scope

Fifty-seven segments of installed Class IE cable tray representing

a total length of about 1,100 feet, were selected from various

plant areas for detailed examination by the NRC CAT inspectors.

These segments were inspected for compliance to requirements

relative to routing, location, separation, support spacing and-

configuration, identification, protection and physical ~1oading.

Additionally, 24 runs of installed conduit, with an aggregate length

of about 850 feet, were inspected for compliance to specified

requirements such as routing, location, separation, bend radii,

support spacing and associated fittings.

Over 25 raceway supports were examined in detail for such items as

location, material, anchor spacing, weld quality, bolt torque and

installed configuration. Also examined were over 120 concrete

expansion anchors.

'

See Table II-1 for a listing of cable tray, conduit and raceway

support samples.

The following documents provided the basic acceptance criteria for

the inspection:

Sargent & Lundy (S&L) Specification F-2790, " Electrical Installa-

tion Work Byron Station - Units 1 and 2," Amendment 46.

II-1

,,

4

Hatfield Electric Company (HECo) Quality Control Procedure 9A,

" Class I Cable Pan Hanger Installation," Revision 13.

HECo Quality Control Procedure 9B, " Class I Cable Pan Installa-

tion," Revision 15.

HECo Quality Control Procedure 20, " Class I Exposed Conduit

System Installation," Revision 14.

S&L " Standard Specification for Concrete Expansion Anchor Work,"

Revision 6.

b. Inspection Findings

In the area of electrical raceway, the NRC CAT inspectors observed

that, in general, Class IE raceway installations were in accordance

with applicable design criteria. Quality attributes such

as material type, location, identification and installed configura-

tion were found to be as shown on approved construction drawings.

However, several design and/or construction deficiencies were

identified and are discussed below.

(1) Raceway Separation

The Byron Station Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section

8.3.1.4.2 " Physical Separation Criteria" provides the basic

criteria for acceptable raceway and cable installations. This

FSAR section describes commitments for physical arrangement of

raceways pertaining to the requirements of Regulatory Guide

(RG) 1.75 for independence of redundant systems.

In general, these FSAR criteria specify the physical separation

that must be maintained between components of redundant

electrical divisions. Additionally, separation is required

between components performing Class 1E and non-Class 1E

functions.

The NRC CAT examination of electrical raceways indicates that a

number of installations are not in accordance with the FSAR

requirements. See Table II-2 for a listing of specific raceway

separation deficiencies.

Many of the deficiencies identified involve the spatial

relationship between Class 1E and non-Class IE components,

and are the result of a failure to translate relevant FSAR

requirements into contractor inspection procedures. The NRC

CAT inspectors reviewed HECo Quality Control Procedure 98,

" Class I Cable Pan Installation," and noted that a requirement

of only 1 inch separation had been specified between cable tray

and conduit installations. This distance is not in accordance

with FSAR requirements which specify 12 inches vertical and 3

inches horizontal separation. Consequently, many raceways

which exhibit less than the FSAR required physical separation

had not been identified by inspection personnel.

.

II-2

_ _-______- _ __

As a result of this observation the licensee has indicated

that a walkdown will be performed to ensure that deficiencies

are identified. Procedure PI-88-53 will be implemented on a

sampling basis to identify conduit to tray separation deficien-

cies. Additional 13, during the inspection Sargent & Lundy

prepared the calculation 4391/19Q-15 " Justification of

Electrical Separation Distance Between Safety-Related and

Non-Safety-Related Raceways." This calculation was prepared to

justify separation distances of less than 12 inches vertical

and 3 inches horizontal between Class IE conduits and non-Class

IE cable trays or between Class IE cable trays and non-Class 1E

conduits. This analysis will be presented to NRR for evalua-

tion.

Additional deficiencies were identified between raceway compo-

nents which exhibited less than 1 inch of physical separa- ,

tion. Several of these raceways contain cables required for

Unit 1 operation and as such, were installed in the early

stages of Unit 2 construction. A review of more recent

construction activities indicate that separation deficiencies

had been identified and documented by inspection personnel.

As a result of these observations the licensee issued Conduit

Separation Notification Reports CSNF-78 through CSNF-86 to

identify and evaluate these conditions.

In suntnary, the review of construction activities indicates

that quality verification programs have not been adequate to

assure that FSAR commitments relative to electrical separation

have been met. Additionally, recently completed analysis which

provides technical justification for existing separation

deficiencies will require additional evaluation by the NRC.

(2) Electrical Conduit

. With the exception of the specific deficiencies listed below

the conduit sample inspected conformed to applicable design and

installation requirements relative to such attributes as size,

routing, identification and supports. Conformance to separa-

tion requirements are discussed in Section II.B.I.b.(1),

Raceway Separation, above.

Conduit C2R3452 was found to be missing the required segrega-

tion code marker at its entrance to junction box 2JB417R.

Several damaged flexible conduits were observed which terminate

at cubicle coolers 2VA035A and 2VA02SB. The damage to conduit

2VA035A had been previously identified by the licensee on

DR-7261. However, damage to conduit 2VA02SB had not been

documented. As a result of this observation Rework Request

6970 and 6971 were issued to correct both deficiencies.

Damaged flexible conduit C2R1187 was observed at flow trans-

mitter 2FT-415. The licensee subsequently issued Deficiency

Report (DR)-8015 to document this condition.

l II-3

'

' No other deficiencies were identified in this area.

~(3) Raceway Supports

The examination of raceway supports was accomplished.for both

conduit and cable tray applications. Attributes such as

location, material type and size, anchor spacing, welds

.(location,. size and general quality), and installed configura-

tion were found to be in accordance with design requirements.

During the examination of cable tray supports, NRC CAT inspec-

tors identified a loose attachment bolt on a horizontal member

of support H060. As a result of this observation CECO has

initiated DR-7810 to document and correct this condition.

Cable tray support H011 contained one spring nut which had

been improperly. installed. The licensee has issued Rework

Request 07202 to document and correct this condition.

Concrete expansion anchor deficiencies were identified on

several raceway supports. These included items such as missing

washers on supports WS-32 and WCA-1 and anchors which failed

-to exhibit the required torque on support WCA-1 and junction

box 2JB126R.

Although several deficiencies were identified in this area, '

NRC CAT inspectors consider them to be isolated and.in

general, the installation of raceway supports was in accordance

-with requirements. ,

c. Conclusions

Except as noted, raceway systems have been installed in accordance

with applicable design and installation requirements. Physical

e separation criteria detailed in the licensee's FSAR have not been

maintained in a number of raceway installations. Many of the-

deficiencies identified involve the spatial relationship between

Class 1E and non-Class IE components, and are the result of a

failure to translate relevant FSAR commitments into contractor

inspection procedures.

7

However, preliminary discussions with NRR and the results of i

recently completed tests and analysis by the licensee indicate that

lesser separation may be acceptable. This matter remains apen

pending NRC final review and evaluation.

!

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II-4

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2. Electrical Cable Installation

a. Inspection Scope

The NRC CAT inspectors selected a sample of installed Class 1E

cable runs that had been previously accepted by Quality Control (QC)

inspectors. The sample included high voltage, power, control and

instrumentation cabling. For each of the cable runs, physical

.

inspection was made to ascertain compliance with applicable design

criteria relative to size, type, location / routing, bend radii,

protection, separation, identification and support.

Additionally, the NRC CAT inspectors selected approximately 300

cable ends for examination. These were inspected to applicable

design and installation documents for items such as lug size and

type, proper terminal point configuration, correct identification

of cable and conductors, proper crimping of lugs or connectors and

absance of insulation or jacket damage. See Table II-3 for a

listing of cable terminations examined.

The following high voltage and power cable, totaling about 1,500

feet, were selected from different systems, electrical trains and

locations:

Cable Tray

2RH001-PIE 3/C #2 SKV

2RH008-P2E 3/C #2 SKV

2SI001-P1E 3/C #2 5KV

2AP288-P1E 3/C 500 MCM

2RC085-P1E 3/C #6 600V

The following control cables totaling approximately 1,050 feet were

selected from different systems, electrical trains and locations:

Cable Tray

2RH010-C2E 9/C'#14 600V

2MS284-C1E 1/C #4 600V

2MS315-C1E 9/C #14 600V

2RC092-CIE 12/C #14 600V

2RH037-C2E 12/C #14 600V

2SI398-C2E 1/C #14 600V

The following instrument cable totaling approximately 1,050 feet

were selected from different systems, electrical trains and

locations:

l

II-5

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, _ _ - . . - _ .

Cable Tray

2RC224-K4R 1 TW PR #16 600V

2RC428-K3R 1 TW PR #16 600V

2RY203-K2R 1 TW PR #16 600V

2RY210-K4R 1 TW PR #16 600V

2RC337-K1R 2 TW PR #16 600V

2RC376-K2R 1 TW PR #16 600V

The following documents provided the basic acceptance critetia for

the inspection:

S&L Specification F-2790, " Electrical Installation Work Byron

Station - Units 1 and 2," Amendment 46.

HECo Quality Control Procedure 11, " Class 1 Cable Termination and

Splicing," Revision 21.

HECo Quality Control Procedure 10, " Class I Cable Inst?llation,"

Revision 23.

b. Inspection Findings

(1) Routing

In general, the routing of Class 1E cables thro 9gh design

designated raceway systems was found to be in accordance with

specified criteria. Each of the Class 1E cables examined by

NRC CAT inspectors had been instelled in acicNance with toe

routing detailed on the pull ticket.

(2) Separation

In general, separation of Class 1E cables was found to be in

accordance with requirements. Several separction deficiencies

were observed in cables and' vendor wiring installed inside of

electrical equipment. However, for each of the deficiencies

identified the licensee had previously initiated the appro-

priate documentation to assure that the condition was subse-

quently evaluated or corrected.

The NRC CAT inspectors reviewed the separation of " Quasi-

safety-related" cables. These are described by Sargent & Lundy

as Class 1E cables which have been identified with non-Class 1E

! segregation codes and in some instances have been routed in

l non-Class 1E raceways. (Classification and use of " Quasi-

l safety-related" cables is discussed in Section II.B.2.b.(5) of

this report).

4

Based upon discussions with the licensee, Interface Review

Reports (IRR) are prepared to assure proper separation of

" Quasi-safety-related" cables when they share an equipment

'.

enclosure with Class 1E cables. Cable Separation Criteria

Violations (CSCV) are prepared for " Quasi-safety-related"

cables which share a raceway with Class 1E cables. However,

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_

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, .- . _ . . - . - .

.

j. NRC CAT inspectors noted that non-Class IE raceway does not

receive Quality Control inspection, and as such, electrical

separation would not have been verified for the routing of

these " Quasi-safety-related" circuits when routed in non-Class

IE conduits.

NRC CAT inspectors concluded that, additional licensee

attention is required to assure that these cables maintain the

degree of physical separation specified by the FSAR.

See Table II-4 for a listing of " Quasi-safety-related"

cables.

Section II.B.2.b.(5) " Cable Identification" of this report

details additional concerns regarding " Quasi-safety-related"

cables.

(3) Power Cable Spacing and Derating

Byron Station power cable installations have been designed in

accordance with Insulated Power Cable Engineers Association

(IPCEA) publications P-46-426, 1962 " Power Cable Ampacities -

Volume I - Cooper Conductors" and P-54-400, 1972 "Ampacities -

Cables in Open Top Cable Trays." Power cables have been

derated in accordance with the IPCEA standards such that cables

sharing raceways may be in contact.

!

No deficiencies were identified in this area.

(4) Cable Damage

L No specific instances of Class 1E cable damage were identified

l during the NRC CAT inspection. However, several Class IE

l cables were observed whose ends had not been taped or sealed

i

'

after installation thus exposing conductor ends to the environ-

ment and construction activities. While not a procedural

requirement, NRC CAT inspectors consider this to be a workman-

ship weakness in that the potential for cable damage is y

increased when cable ends remain unsealed.

(5) Cable Identification

l

l The identification of Class 1E cable generally conformed to the

l applicable requirements and for most of the samples examined

l was found to be in accordance with applicable design criteria.

l However, one area of deficiency was identified and is discussed

in the following section.

The Byron Station FSAR section 8.3.1.3.4 describes

requirements for cable identification as follows "...All power

control and instrumentation cables are identified by a unique

number of permanent color coded tags.. The tags shall be

color coded as in Table 8.3.4, allowing positive

,

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i

identification of safety-related cables." Section 8.3.1.4.3 ,

describes cable segregation codes and specifies that cables l

will be segregated based on the following categories:

E = Engineered Safety Features

B = Non-Safety-Related

R = Reactor Trip

N = Neutron Monitoring

A = Associated

Section 8.3.1.4.3 states, in part..."Each non-Class 1E cable

which has any part of it's length in a Division 11 (21) or 12

(22) tray, connects to a Class IE power system, shares an

enclosure with a Class 1E circuit, or is not physically

separated from Class 1E cables by acceptable distance or

barriers, is a division associated cable (Category A)."

During the examination of Class 1E cables NRC CAT inspectors

identified a number of "B" non-safety-related cables which had

been installed in Class 1E raceways. Subsequent discussions

with the licensee and Sargent & Lundy personnel disclosed that

these were " Quasi-safety-related" cables and were installed in

accordance with design requirements. NRC CAT inspectors were

not able to determine the function of these cables because they

are not defined in the Byron Station FSAR or on approved design

documents. However, based upon discussion with Sargent & Lundy

personnel " Quasi-safety related" cables are described as cables

which are part of a Class 1E circuit, (serving a safety-related

function) and have a portion of their routing in the Turbine

building. Thus, safety-related cables have been identified as

non-safety-related, because they are routed in a Category II

structure.

NRC CAT inspectors concluded that this method of identification

was not in accordance with the licensee's FSAR commitments

which state that non-safety-related cables sharing an enclosure

with safety-related cables become and are identified as

division associated cable (Category A).

Additional concerns regarding separation of " Quasi-safety-

related" cables are discussed in Section II.B.2.b.2 of this

report. See Table II-4 for a listing of " Quasi-safety-related"

cables.

As a result of this observation the licensee has proposed an

amendment to the FSAR which would define the function and

handling of these cables. ,

(6) Terminations

In general, cable termination activities performed by

construction personnel conformed to requirements. However,

several construction deficiencies were identified and are

discussed in the sections which follow.

II-8

_

Termination of-internal wires at terminal point TBR-24 of

panel 2PA02J are improperly installed, due to spooning of

terminal lugs. Subsequent to this observation the licensee has

issued DR-7856 to document and correct this condition.

The terminal lug on the "Wht" conductor of cable 2IP023 in

panel 2AP02J was observed to be excessively bent at terminal

point TPT-2. As a result of this observation the licensee has

issued DR-7855 to correct this condition.

Insulation on the "B1k" and "Wht" conductors of cable 2FW876

was found cut to the bare conductor at terminal points TBR-1

and TBR-2 of panel 2PA02J. The licensee has issued DR-7854 to

correct this condition.

The "Bik" and "Wht" conductors of cable 2WO203 are landed on

terminal points 32-3 and 32-7 instead of terminal points 33-2

and 33-7 as required on the approved design drawing 2-4054G,

Revision F. Subsequent to this observation the licensee has

issued DR-7857 to document and correct this condition.

Several violations of conductor minimum bend radius require-

ments were observed. These occurred predominantly in panel

wireways, where there was congestion of field installed cable.

Bend radius deficiencies were observed in several Class 1E

panels but occurred frequently in sections of the Main Control

Boards and the Diesel Generator Control panels. As a result of

this observation the licensee issued the following Discrepancy

Reports 7852, 7853, 7858 and 7860.

NRC CAT inspectors concluded, based upon the quantity and

frequency of deficiencies identified that additional licensee

attention will be required in this area to assure that Class 1E

wiring configurations conform to requirements and general

workmanship standards.

During the examination of internal wiring in panel 2PA13J, one

wire with a blue outer jacket was observed. This wire was

physically bundled with other Class 1E wires within the

panel. Further investigation disclosed that this wire is

'

General Electric type SI58101,:which is not qualified for

Class 1E service. As a result of this observation the

. licensee initiated the following actions:

~

- Rework Request 6937 was initiated to replace the

subject wire with a qualified length of wire.

- Analysis IRR-2EF088-1 was presented which justifies the

bundling of this non-1E wire with the 1E wiring within

this panel.

II-9

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- Correspondence was produced which instructs field forces

.to use only two types of switchboard wire at the Byron

site. These are: Vulkene E-11352-1 (with yellow outer t

jacket) which may be used for drain wire extentions; and

Rockbestos Firewall SIS, which shall be used for all

I

.other applications.

During the course of this inspection, NRC CAT inspectors

found no additional instances of unqualified switchboard wire,

and as such, have determined the above wiring to be an

. isolated case.

During the examination of Class 1E cable terminations NRC CAT

inspectors identified numerous conductors which contained

in-line butt splices. The use of in-line butt splices is not

consistent with the licensee's FSAR commitment to IEEE 420,

which prohibits the use of wiring splices in panels.

As a result of this observation the licensee has proposed an

FSAR. amendment to resolve this condition.

The NRC CAT inspectors examined the installation and use of

Raychem heat shrink in Class 1E terminations. During the

inspection several deficiencies were observed and are

discussed below.

NRC CAT inspectors' reviewed drawing (6E-2-3503) which

, specifies the use of Raychem heat shrink jacket tubing in

'

Class 1E terminations. The drawing stipulates that use of

this material is qualified by the following note:

"To obtain the required qualified version of this tubing

the purchase order must state the following:

Raychem type WCSF-U shrinkable sleeve, documentation

to include certification of compliance, (Raychem No.

ENGC-154) certifying that material has been tested to

l the requirements of IEEE 323-1974 and IEEE 383-1974 for-

,

aging, radiation, and local environment, as indicated

l on Raychem reports EDR 2001 and EDR 5019."

l .

NRC CAT inspectors observed that Raychem report EDR 5019 had

tested type WCSF-N heat shrinkable tubing. However, the

WCSF-U tubing specified on drawing (6E-2-3503) had not been

tested by this report.

L Discussions with the manufacturer (Raychem) indicates that the

l chemical / physical makeup of both WCSF-N and WCSF-U are

i identical. However, WCSF-N tubing contains an additional

adhesive which is used to meet the requirements of Section

+

2.4.3 of IEEE 383 for environmental seal during LOCA

'

simulation.

1

l

II-10

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Based upon these discussions and review of the applicable

portions of IEEE 383 NRC CAT inspectors concluded that Raychem

type WCSF-U tubing was not qualified for LOCA conditions and

as such could not meet the requirements specified on the

licensee's design drawirg.

In connection with this issue NRC CAT inspectors reviewed the

Certificate of Compliance provided with WCSF-U type material

and observed that the vendor (Raychem) had certified

qualification per the instructions of the design drawing

mentioned above. Based upon the information and discussions

presented above, NRC CAT inspectors concluded that the

Certificate of Compliance was in error in that, WCSF-U

material does not meet the requirements of section 2.4.3 of

IEEE 383.

As a result of this observation the licensee has initiated a

design change to correct the wording of the note on drawing

6E-2-3503 and to assure that WCSF-U heat shrinkable sleeve

will be used only as an outer jacket on nuclear qualified

Class 1E terminations.

Additional deficiencies were observed in activities associated

with wiring of Class 1E valve operators. This subject is

discussed in detail isSection II.B.3.b.(8) of this report.

c. Conclusions

The identification and routing of some Class 1E cabling (" Quasi-

safety-related) is not in accordance with FSAR commitments to

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.75 for " Physical Independence of Redundant

Systems."

Increased licensee attention is necessary in the workmanship of

cabling and terminations in that some terminal lugs were improperly

installed, insulation cut, improper termination points, and minimum

bend radius violations. Although each instance was not individually

significant, additional attention is warranted.

The use of in-line butt splices on wiring in electrical panels is

not in accordance with FSAR commitments.

3. Electrical Equipment Installation

a. Inspection Scope

Approximately 40 pieces of installed or partially installed electri-

cal equipment and associated hardware items were inspected. Samples

were selected tased on system function and safety classification.

The following specific electrical components were inspected in

detail:

II-11

(1) Motors

The installation of five motors and associated hardware was

inspected for such items as location, anchoring, grounding,

identification and protection. The motors inspected were:

Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor 2RH01PA

Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor 2RH01PB

Safety Injection Pump Motor 2SIO1PA

Aux Feedwater Pump Motor 2AF01PA

Component Cooling Pump Motor 2CC01PB

(2) Electrical Penetration Assemblies

The location, type, mounting and identification of these

penetrations were compared with the installation drawings and

vendor manual.

The following containment penetration assemblies were

inspected:

2SIO2E-2P2E Misc. Power

2NR01E-2KN Neutron Monitoring

2SIO4E-2C2E Control

2SIO3E-2C1E Misc. Control

2LV10E-2K2E ESF Instrumentation

(3)' Circuit Breakers

Circuit breakers for the following Class 1E motors were

examined to determine compliance with design and installation

documents for size, type, system interface and maintenance.

Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor (Bus 241 Cub. 19)

Safety Injection Pump Motor (Bus 242 Cub. 19)

The use of circuit breakers with integral undervoltage trip

attachments at this facility was also investigated.

(4) Switchgear and Motor Control Centers

The following switchgear and motor control centers were

inspected:

Motor Control Center 2AP2SE - MCC231X2

Motor Control Center 2AP26E - MCC231X4

Motor Control Center 2AP28E - MCC232X4

4160V Switchgear 2AP05E

4160V Switchgear 2AP06E

(5) Station Batteries and Racks

The 125V battery rooms including the installed batteries,

battery racks and associated equipment were inspected. The

location, mounting, maintenance and environmental control for

II-12

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installation of the batteries were compared with the

applicable requirements and quality records.

125V DC Battery 2DC01EA, 2DC01EB

125V DC Battery- 2DC02EA, 2DC02EB

(6) 125V DC System Equipment

The following equipment comprising portions of the 125V DC

systems were inspected for compliance to design documents for

such items as location, mounting (welds, concrete anchors and

bolting) and proper configuration.

Battery Charger 2DC03E

Battery Charger 2DC04E

DC Distribution Panel 2]C05E

DC Distribution Panel 20C06E

DC Fuse Panel 2DC11J

NSSS Static Inverter 2IP06E

(7) Control Panels

A number of Class 1E electrical control panels were inspected

for compliance to design requirements for items such as loca-

tion, mounting and type. The panels inspected were:

Main Control Board 2PM06J

Main Control Board 2PM01J

Diesel Generator Control Panel 2PLO8J

Aux Relay Cabinet 2PA31J

Aux Relay Cabinet 2PA27J

Remote Shutdown Panel 2PLO4J

(8) Motor Operated Valves (MOVs)

,

Five motor operated valves were examined in detail.

!

2RH8702-A

2RC8001-B

2SI8808-D

i 2SI8809-B

l 2CS019-8

l

i As the result of deficiencies identified in this area addi-

l tional MOVs were inspected and are discussed in the body of the

report.

The following documents provided the basic acceptance criteria for

the inspections:

  • S&L Specification F-2790, " Electrical Installation Work Byron

Station - Units 1 and 2," Amendment 46.

  • HECo Quality Control Proccdure 12, " Installation of Class 1E

Equipment," Revision 8.

II-13

1

-

,.n -

- - , . --e -

, a

,

HEco Quality Control Procedure 12A, "Modificaticn of Class 1E

Equipment," Revision 10.

  • S&L " Standard Specification for Concrete Expansion Anchor

Work" Revision 6.

b. Inspection Findings

(1) Motors

In general, the installation of Class IE motors was found to

be in accordance with applicable design documents. Motors

examined were of the size, type and configuration specified

and construction maintenance activities had been performed in

accordance with approved procedures. However, deficiencies in

the areas of motor mounting and post-construction maintenance

activities were identified.

Reference Section VI " Material Traceability and Control," for a

detailed discussion of these deficiencies.

(2) Penetrations

Penetrations examined were found to have been installed in

accordance with applicable design documents. Installation

requirements including performance of required maintenance

activities had been accomplished in accordance with approved

construction procedures.

No construction or maintenance deficiencies were observed in

this area.

(3) Circuit Breakers

The examination of the Westinghouse type 50DHP350 circuit

breakers indicated that they had been purchased, installed and

maintained in accordance with the applicable design

documents. Important installation attributes such as proper

alignment, main contact penetration and safety interlocks were

verified by physical inspection and review of construction

test records. Maintenance records were also reviewed and

indicate that lubrication and set point verification had been

performed.

NRC CAT inspectors also evaluated licensee initiated actions

and review of NRC Information Notice 83-18 " Failures of the

Undervoltage Trip Function of Reactor Trip System Breakers"

and NRC Generic Letter 83-28 " Required Actions Based on

Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events." Byron Station

Units 1 & 2 will utilize the Westinghouse type D5-416 breakers

in the Reactor Trip System. Review of supplemental actions to

Generic Letter 83-28 indicates that the licensee will

implement Westinghouse proposed corrective actions and will

ensure that all DS-416 reactor switchgear undervoltage

attachments are replaced with a new design and tested prior to

II-14

-

the fuel load. This work will be controlled by Westinghouse

Field Change Notice (FCN) CBEM 10685.

(4) Switchgear and Motor Control Centers

In general, the installation of Class 1E Motor Control Centers

was found to be in accordance with applicable requirements.

However, examination of the Class IE 4160V switchgear units

indicates that several construction deficiencies exist.

During the examination of switchgear units 2AP05E and 2AP06E

NRC CAT inspectors observed that hold down welds do not match

the configuration detailed on approved design draw'ngs. Detail

47 on drawing 0-3391C specifies a four sided weld at each of

six locations per cubicle. Actual field configurations were

found to have welds on only two sides. Additionally, a

detailed examination of these welds indicates in some cases

insufficient weld metal due to gaps between the embed plate and

the equipment sheet metal.

NRC CAT inspectors reviewed the associated QC inspection

records for this equipment and observed that these deficiencies

had not been identified by inspection personnel.

Similar deficiencies were previously identified by the licensee

on Unit 1 equipment. However, they had not been reviewed for

impact on relevant Unit 2 equipment.

As a result of this observation the licensee has initiated

CECO Nonconformance Report (NCR) 1669 to document and correct

this condition.

(5) Station Batteries and Racks

The condition of the battery rooms was found to be in good

order, clean and free of debris. Ventilation systems were

installed and in operation. Access to these areas was

controlled by keyed entry, and the appropriate danger signs

had been posted to prohibit smoking or open flames.

The 125V batteries were examined and found to be in good

condition. Maintenance activities were reviewed and, in

l general, had been performed in accordance with requirements.

! During the review of battery maintenance records, NRC CAT

'

inspectors noted that intercell resistance data had exceeded

the acceptance level of 150 micro-ohms between cells 46 and 47

of battery bank 212. The review of associated surveillance

records indicates that this deficiency had been properly

documented and the condition had been corrected in accordance

with the requirements of Deviation Report 06-02-84 and Nuclear

Work Request B11357.

II-15

The inspection of the 125V battery racks disclosed that

indeterminate bolting materials had been used in the assembly

process. This issue is discussed in detail in Section VI,

" Material Traceability and Control," of this report.

NRC CAT inspectors also identified two anchor bolts which did

not nave the required embedment length. Sargent & Lundy

specification for concrete expansion anchors requires a minimum

embedded length (Le) of four inches for a 1/2 inch nominal bolt

diameter. Two of the bolts examined exhibited (Le) of only 3

1/2 inches. Discussions with the licensee indicate that

original inspection requirements did not include verification

of (Le), consequently, these deficiencies had not been identi-

fied.

As a result of this observation the licensee initiated a

Deficiency Report to document and evaluate this condition.

Based upon this evaluation it was determined that the anchors

-

are structurally sound and will perform their intended

function in the existing configuration.

No other deficiencies were identified in this area.

(6) 125V DC System

i

With the exception of the mounting deficiency discussed below,

inspection of components which comprise portions of the 125V

DC system disclosed no deficiencies relative to the installed

configuration of the equipment.

During examination of 125V DC fuse panel 2DC11J NRC CAT

inspectors observed that the mounting weld configuration did

i

'

not match the details shown on approved design drawings.

Detail 158 of drawing 0-3391K specifies a maximum spacing of

l 10 1/2 inches between weld edges. Actual field measurements

i indicate that seven of ten weld to weld dimensions exceed this

spacing requirements, some by as much as seven inches.

, Discussions with the licensee indicates that these deficiencies

i may be the result of inadequate contractor interface and

inspection responsibility changes.

i As a result of this observation the licensee has issued

l Deficiency Report 7373 to document and correct this condition.

!

(7) Control Panels

The control panels examined were installed in accordance with

applicable design documents. No deficiencies were identified

in this area.

II-16

_.

._

i

l

(8) Motor Operated Valves

'

In general motor operated valve termination activities

performed by construction personnel conformed to

requirements. However, several wiring deficiencies were

observed and are discussed below.

The NRC CAT :nspectors examined seven motor operated valves

and found five which contained wiring not terminated at the

correct termination points.

The internal jumpers from termination points 3C to 17C and

,-

internal jumpers on termination points 3L to 13C were

installed on MOVs 2RL 8001D, 2RL 80020 and 2RC 8002D.

These terminations were in conflict with wiring diagrams

6E-42308, 6E-4230C and 6E-42300.

Motor operated valvc 2RC 8002D had termination points 11

(black / white) and llc (blue / black) reversed on cable 2RC

171 (wiring diagram 6E-42300).

Motor operated valve 2CC-9438 had internal jumper termina-

'

tion points 17 and 17C reversed and 18 and 18C reversed

(wiring diagram 6E-2-4861, speed memo between Steve

Bindernagel and Tom Lamb dated 1-23-84).

NRC CAT inspectors reviewed relevant inspection reports and

'

observed that Hatfield Quality Control inspectors had accepted

the installation of these MOVs. During discussions with the

NRC CAT, Hatfield inspection personnel indicated that this

condition exists on numerous motor operated valves through the

,

Byron site.

Discussions with the assistant supervisor of 0AD indicated

that the MOV wiring configurations had not been modified since

construction turnover to 0AD. As a result, NRC CAT inspectors

concluded that inspection activities had not been adequate to

assure the MOV wiring was in accordance with applicable design

documents.

In connection with this issue NRC CAT inspectors determined

that inspection ov MOV wiring to terminal points 17, 17C,

18 and 18C could not be accomplished without the aid of a

speed memo dated January 23, 1984, from Steve Bindernagel

to Tom Lamb. This memo provides wiring details which supple-

ment design details shown on approved wiring diagrams.

However, further investigation disclosed that the speed memo

was uncontrolled and not incorporated into design documents or

procedures.

Consequently, this area and associated inspection activities

merit additional attention by the licensee.

II-17

. _ _.

J

~(9)'~ Equipment Idenficiation

The Byron' Station FSAR section 8.3.1.3 " Physical Identification

of Safety-Related Equipment" states, in part..." Color coded

nameplates or labels are used to distinguish between Class 1E

and non-Class 1E components and between components of different

. division, as shown in Table 8.3-4." Divisional color coding

and identification of Class 1E equipment is required so that

plant. maintenance and operations personnel may readily identify

components which serve Class IE functions.

During the examination of Class 1E-electrical equipment NRC CAT ~

inspectors identified several components which had not bee.'

labeled in accordance with FSAR requirements. The Unit 2

Diesel Generator. Control panels and certain Class 1E devices

mounted.on the Unit 2 Fire Hazards panel have been identified

with' black and white labeling which would indicate a non-Class

IE classification.

As a-result of this observation the licensee has issued Design

Information Transmittal (DIT) BB-EPED-0051 which proposes to

revise FSAR section 8.3.1.3 to read " Nameplates with engraved

characters identify each item of safety-related equipment.

Each nameplate is either color coded as in Table 8.3-4 or has

black characters on a white background."

This item will remain open pending further NRC evaluation.

'c. Conclusions

The mounting of'several pieces of Class 1E electrical equipment are

not in accordance with-design requirements. Components such as, the

4160V switchgear divisions 1 & 2 and the 125V DC fuse panel have

been installed with hold down weld configurations which do not match

the details shown on approved design drawings.

A number of deficiencies were observed in QC accepted wiring for

Class JE valve operators. In this area over 50% of the sample

examined exhibited wiring configurations which were not in

accordance with approved wiring diagrams. Consequently, this area

and associated inspection activities will require additional atten-

tion by the licensee.

The. identification labeling of several pieces of Class 1E electrical

equipment is not in accordance with FSAR requirements.

4. Instrumentation Installation

a. Inspection Scope

The NRC CAT inspectors selected a sample of 13 completed runs of

instrument piping, comprising about 940 feet, for a detailed

examination in accordance with specification requirements and

isometric drawings.

11-18

. , -

-Three instrument racks and 18 piping supports were examined for

conformance with requirements including installed configuration,

mounting details, material conformance, identification, and

location. Additionally, a process system was elected for a

detailed inspection of signal path routing and associated equipment.

Thirteen instruments were examined for conformance with requirements

for location, mounting details, and instrument type and range. The

signal path of three instrument loops were traced from their process

connections to their final output devices. Loops examined were

' Pressurizer Pressure Division I and II and Pressurizer Level Divi-

sion II. Components inspected for each loop included sensing lines,

pressure and level transmitters, signal conditioning and isolating

devices, indicating and controlling instruments and the various

connecting cable, electrical penetrations, panel wiring and terminal

points along the signal path. Most instrument components were

examined for such attributes as type, range, output, identification,

qualification, location, mounting and physical separation of

redundant components.

See Table II-5 for listing of piping runs, supports, racks, and

instruments included in the sample.

The following documents provided the acceptance criteria for the

inspection:

S&L Specification F-2739/L2739, " Piping System Installation,"

Amendment 8.

  • Powers-Asco-Pope (PAP) Procedure QC-9, " Quality Verification

Procedure," Revision 3.

PAP Procedure FP-9, " Design Change / Field Routing Control,"

Revision 10.

PAP Procedure FP-13, " Hanger Installation and Control,"

Revision 14.

PAP Procedure FP-16, " Identification and Marking of Pipe

and Components," Revision 12.

PAP Procedure FP-19, "As-Built Drawings and Documentation,"

Revision 3.

Applicable design drawings and change documents.

b. Inspection Findings

No deficiencies were identified by the NRC CAT inspectors in the

sample of instruments, racks, piping runs, and supports inspected.

II-19

_ . __ _ _ _- _ .__ . _. ._ _ _ .

+

.

<

'

c. Conclusions

i

The NRC CAT inspectors determined that, based on the above selected

-

sample,. instrumentation, piping, and support installations conform

<

to applica'fle design requirements.

.

I

?

.

+

f

4

4

4

g.-

1

&

h

,

I

r

.

a

i

!

II-20

, .- - . - - , . - _ , . . . . . . ~ . - . - - - . . _ . . . . . - . _ . . . . _ , , . . . . . . . . _ _ . - . , , , . . _ . . , . . - . - . . . . . . , . . - . . , . , . .- - ~ . . . , . . - . . - . , - . . _ . - - - -

TABLE II-1

RACEWAY INSPECTION SAMPLE

Cable Tray:

21415A-P1E 2416CA-P1E 21424C-P1E 21327C-PIE

21326C-P1E 21334C-P1E 21333C-P1E 21330C-P1E

21329C-P1E 21328C-P1E 2R214-PIE 2R213-P1E

2525L-P1E 2513L-PIE 2761L-P1E 2511L-P1E

2R402-K1E 21891G-K1E 21890G-K1E 21889G-K1E

21884G-K1E 2R223-k1E 2SIO2E-P2E 21462N-P2E

21461MN-P7E 21460M-P2E 21458M-P2E 2914M-P2E

2912M-P2E 2910M-P2E 2908M-P2E 2906M-P2E

2905M-P2E 2904M-P2E 2898M-P2E 21536M-P2E

21537M-P2E 21539M-P2E 21540M-P2E 2R257K-C2E

2952K-C2E 2954K-C2E 2955K-C2E 2956K-C2E

2945K-C2E 2946K-C2E 2950K-C2E 2951K-C2E

k 2926K-C2E 2927K-C2E 2930K-C2E 2931K-C2E

2932K-C2E 2R301-C2E 21369K-C2E 21363K-C2E

Cable Tray Supports:

Support No. Drawing No.

l

305H1 3032H (W)

,

\

H037 3052H (S)

l H022 3053H (L)

i

H178 3062H (L)

H010 3241H (H)

.

H012 3254H (S)

H001 3041H (K)

II-21

--

TABLE II-1 (Continued)

RACEWAY INSPECTION SAMPLE

Conduit Supports:

2-3304-CC-32 2-3531A-WS-32

2-3321A-CC-24 2-3532A-WV-13

2-3321A-CC-25D 2-3533A-TS5-1

2-3322A-CC-35 2-3534-CC-13

2-3511-TS2-1 2-3534-CP-3

2-3513A-WCP-6 2-3534A-FC-15

2-3521-CC-15 2-3543-FC-5

2-3521A-CC-60 2-3544A-CC-19

2-3521A-CS-32 2-3544A-FC-9

Conduits: ,

C2A21A5 (P1E) 78' C2A21H0 (P2E) 45'

C2A2182 (P2E) 10' C2A0401 (P2E) 45'

C2A14B1 (K2R) 37' C2A2202 (C1E) 16'

C2R2170 (PIE) 30' C2R2490 (C2E) 23'

2C2R3443 (C2E) 79' C2R3463 (C1E) 31'

C2R2181 (CIE) 19' C2R2152 (C1E) 14'

C2R1172 (P2E) 29' C2R3365 (C2E) 32'

C2R3366 (P2E) 32' C2R4326 (KIR) 56'

C2R434'i (P2E) 54' C2R4479 (C1E) 32'

i C2R4484 (P1E) 66' C2R3452 (CIE) 20'

C2R1334 (PIE) 25' C2R2316 (P2E) 21'

2CR2225 (C2E) 12' C2R3202 (C2E) 6'

II-22

TABLE II-2

SEPARATION FINDINGS

Raceway segments listed in the A colums do not maintain required separation

from the corresponding raceway segments in B columns. The (*) indicates

physical separation of less than one inch between the two raceway segments.

-Column A Column B Column A Column B

2955L-C2E C0A32L3-2C1B 2955L-C2E C0A32L6-2C1B

l

29700-C2B 2955L-C2E C0A3328-2K1R 2956L-C2E

29448-P2E * C0A3215-IP1B 29448-P2E * C0A3215

2924B-P2E * C0A33C6 29268-P2E * C0A33B4

29268-P2E * C0A33D2 29228-P2E * C0A3317-1C1B

299228-P2E * C0A3318-1CIB 29218-P2E * 33JJ-1C1B

2921B-P2E * C0A33JK-1CIB 21363K-C2E * C2A-51D3-2C1B

21363K-C2E C2A-5102-2K1B 2954K-C2E * C0A3322-1C1B

2926L-C2E * C0A3302 2926L-C2E * C0A3384

2944A-P2E * C0A3307

II-23

--.

TABLE II-3

CABLE TERMINATION INSPECTION SAMPLE

Fire Hazards Panel (2PL10J)

Cables: 2MS668, 2FW920, 2FW921, 2MS666, 2RY431, 2RY433,

2FW918, 2FW919, 2RY430, 2RY432.

Process I & C Rack (2PA01J)

Cables: 2FW705, 2FW704, 2RC350, 2RC355, 2RC360, 2RC365,

2FW874, 2FW875, 2MS104, 2MS108, 2FW304, 2FWO38,

2SI653, 2CC288, 2IP007, 2LV079, 2RC342, 2RC336,

2MSO96, 2MS666, 2MS100, 2RC345, 2RC339, 2RY433,

2SI467, 2AB030, 1FW919, 1RC353, IRC538, 2RC363,

2RC368, 2RY432.

Process I & C Rack (2PA02J)

Cables: 2FW707, 2FW706, 2RC372, 2RC391, 2RC396, 2RC401,

2FW876, 2FW877, 2MS116, 2MS668, 2MS122, 2FWO43,

2FWO48, 2SI654, 2CC290, 2IP023, 2LV080, 2RC383,

2RC377, 2MS113, 2MS119, 2RC386, 2RC380, 2RY202,

2FW921, 2RC375, 2RC394, 2RC399, 2RC404, 2RY204,

2RC406, 2FWO26.

E.S.F. Seq. & Act. Cabinet (2PA13J)

Cables: 2EF027, 2EF029, 2EF086, 2EF028, 2EF031, 2EF026,

2SX313, 2EF023, 2EF083, 2EF037, 2EF034, 2EF036,

2EF035, 2EF038, 2EF033, 2EF096, 2EF025.

E.S.F. Seq. & Act. Cabinet (2PA14J)

Cables: 2EF043, 2EF045, 2EF087, 2EF064, 2EF044, 2SX314,

2EF041, 1EF040, 2EF085, 2EF052, 2EF049, 2EF051,

2EF050, 2EF053, 2EF048, 2EF097, 2EF042.

Main Control Board (2PM06J)

Cables: 2MS529, 2DC117, 2MS532, 2MS318, 2FW215, 2FW842,

2FW226, 2EF018, 2MS527, 20C126, 2MS524, 2FW227,

2MS519, 2MS356, 2MS531, 2SX008, 2SX010, 2SX465,

2SX312, 2SX232, 2SX033, 2SX009, 2MS275, 2MS288,

2FW570, 2FW279, 2FW775, 2AF008, 2AF011, 2AF009,

2AF248, 2AF147, 2AF019, 2SX065, 2WO203, 2CC023,

2CC241, ICC007, 2CC026, 2CC004, 2CC239, 2CC002,

2CC008, 2CC150, 2SX041, 2CC174, 2W0176, 2W0177,

2AF121, 2PS479, 2CC127, 2AF097, 2SX004, 2CC005,

2CC021, 2CS005, 2VP013, 2VP012, 2VP057, 2VP056,

2AF010, 2CC064, 2VP040, 2C5034, 2EF014, 2SI654.

.

II-24

.

, - 4-

]

n

.

i

l

TABLE II-3 (Continued)

CABLE TERMINATION INSPECTION SAMPLE

Diesel Generator Control Panel 2A (2PLO7J)

Cables: 2DG194, 2DG031, 2DG028, 2DG147, 2DG030, 2DG027,

2DG154, 2DG155, 2DG018, 2DG200,' 2DG022, 2DG115,

20G165, 2DG034, 2DG169, 2DG083,. 200062 200064,

2DG074, 2DG167, 2DG023, 200003, 2DG024, 2DG216,

2DG204, 2DG020, 2DG126, 2DG120, 2DG219, 2DG218,-

2DG113, 2DG085, 20G084, 2DF114, 2DG026, 2DG029,

2DG011, 2DG010, 2DG009, 2DG012, 2DG013, 2DG014,

2DG162, 2DG112, -2DG086, 2DG161,. 1DG033, - 2DG032,

2DG025, 20G073, 2DG071, 2DG070, - 2DG173, 2DG082,

2DG168, 200058, 2DG117, 2DG111, 200002, 2DG094,

20G119, '2DG118, 2DG206, 2DG207, 2SX294, 2SX290,

2SX295, 2D0005, 2VD004.

Diesel Generator Control Panel 2B (2PL008J)

Cables: 2DG066, 2DG195, 2DG063, 2DG038, 2DG065, 2DG062,

2DG166, 2DG151, 2DG156, 2DG053, 20G201, 2DG057,

2DG104, 2DG051, 2DG172, 2DG089, 200063, 200065,

2DG080, 2DG077, 2DG058, 200008, 2DG059, 2DG217,

2DG205, 2DG055, 2DG141, 2DG135, 2DG221 2DG220,

2DG102, 2DG091, 2DG090, 2DG103, 2DG061, 2DG064,

2DG043, 2DG044, 2DG045, 2DG046, 2DG047, 2DG048,

2DG101, 1DG164, 20G092, 20G163, 2DG068, 2DG067,

2DG060, 2DG079, 2DG170, 2DG076, 2DG176, 2DG088,

2DG171, 200059, 2DG109, 2DG100, 2D0007, 2DG096,

,

'

2DG134, 2DG133, 2DG208, 2DG209, 2SX300, 2SX296,

2SX301, 2D0010, 2VD010, 2DG040, 2DG334, 2DG042,

2DG106, 2DG150, 2DG052, 2DG054, 2DG041, 2DG050,

! 2DG225, 2DG177.

I

..

r

!

'

II-25

4

y._ . -....,.m,, -

, ,., , . , ,m.-,._,,,.. v._ ,,--. .y...,, y,,

O

TABLE II-4

" QUASI-SAFETY-RELATED" CABLES

Turbine Stop Valves 2EF065 2EF069

2EF066 2EF070

2EF067 2EF071

2EF068 2EF072

Turbine Pressure Switches 2EF073 2EF076

2EF074 2EF077

2EF075 2EF078

Feedwater Regulating and 2FW771 2FW269 2FW111

Bypass Regulating Valves 2FW777 2FW270 2FW123

2FW807 2FW271 2FW116

2FW773 2FW272 2FW137

2FW779 2FW110 2FW186

2FW808 2FW121 2FW145

2FW774 2FW115 2FW191

2FW780 2FW135 2FW153

2FW809~ 2FW185 2FW775

2FW722 2FW143 2FW776

2FW728 2FW190

2FW810 2FW151

Turbine Impulse Pressure 2MS095

2M5112

Condenser Steam Dump Valves 2MS14B 2MS142 2MS174 2MS179

2MS153 2MS158- 2MS177 2MS182

2MS155 2MS161 2MS180 2MS183

2MS156 2MS164 2MS183 2MS188

2MS159 2MS167 2MS186

2MS162 2MS170 2MS141

2MS165 2MS147 2MS173

2MS168 2MS171 2MS176

Steam Generator 2AS118 2AS127

2AS119 2AS128

2AS120 2AS129

2AS122 2AS131

2AS123 2AS132

II-26

cr -

TABLE II-5

INSTRUMENTATION INSPECTION SAMPLE

Instrument Racks:

'

2PL81JA

2PL81JB

2PL67J

Instrument Piping Supports:

,

2FT-0651-H143-6 2FIS-CC064-H237-

2FT-0651-H215 2FT-CS-15-H153-1

2FT-660-H143-3 2FT-CS015-H153-2

2FT-660-H237 2FIS-611-H134-1

-

2LT-548-H234A 2LT-930-H244

2FT-445-H223 2FT-0657-H89E-13

2FT-415-H29A-6 2FT-0657-H234

2FT-415-H119A-23 2LT-528-H223

2FIS-CC064-H49-3 2FT-0654-H133-1

.

Instrument Piping Runs:

T537-2FT-CS013 T992-2FT-0654

T548-2FIS-611 T995-2FT-0657

T538-2FT-CS015 T971-2FIS-CC064

T564-2LT-930 T988-2FT-415

T982-2FT-0651 T1008-2LT-0460

T990-2FT-660 T1053-2LT-548

T1015-2LT-556

Instruments: 2FT-CS013 2FT-0654

2FIS-611 2FT-0657

2FT-CS015 2FIS-CC064

2LT-930 2FT-415

2FT-0651 2LT-0460

2FT-660 2LT-548

2LT-556

II-27

, -- -

_ _ __

l

III. MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTION

A. Objective

i

The objective of the appraisal of mechanical construction was to

determine if installed and Quality Control (QC) accepted mechanical

items conformed to engineering design, regulatory requirements and

licensee commitments.

B. Dice"ssion

The specific areas of mechanical construction evaluated were piping,

pipe supports / restraints, concrete expansion anchors, heating, ventilat-

ing and air conditioning (HVAC) systems and mechanical equipment. To

accomplish the above objective, a field inspection of a sample of QC

accepted hardware was performed in each area. In addition, certain

programs, procedures and documentation were reviewed and responsible

personnel were interviewed as required to support or clarify hardware

inspection findings.

1. Piping

a. Inspection Scope

Piping depicted on the 15 Hunter Corporation (Hunter) drawings

listed in Table III-1 was inspected by the NRC Construction

Appraisal Tean (CAT). Approximately 900 feet of large bore piping

(greater than or equal to 2 inch diameter) was inspected. The

piping was located in the Unit 2 Reactor Building, including the

Steam Tunnel, and the Auxiliary Building. Component Cooling,

Chemical and Volume Control, Feedwater, Main Steam and Reactor

. Coolant Systems piping were included. Pipe sizes ranged from 1/2

inch to 60 inches and classifications were ASME 1, 2 and 3. The

piping was inspected for configuration (i.e., layout geometry,

orientation and dimensions), component type and location, valve

operator orientation, and support location, type and orientation.

Additionally, site construction practices with regard to protection

of installed hardware and maintenance of inservice inspection

clearance criteria were observed on a random basis. Design change

documents, including Engineering Change Notices (ECNs) and Field

Change Requests (FCRs), were reviewed and compared to inspection

data gathered in the field. The extent of this design change review

is identified in Table III-1. All of the piping samples had been

previously inspected and accepted by Hunter QC.

Thirteen hydrostatic / pneumatic pressure test packages were reviewed

for compliance with procedural and code requirements and 1 pneumatic

test was witnessed. Items reviewed consisted of applied pressure,

duration, pressure adjustment calculations, type of gauges used,

test boundaries,' Discrepancy Reports, Field Change Requests and

dc.cumented instances of overpressurization. All nonconformance

reports (NCRs) involving overpressurization at the site were

reviewed. The training program for personnel engaged in the

performance, supervision and review of hydrostatic / pneumatic testing

.

III-1

-  : .-. - _ .

. - - . . -- .- . _ . - - - -

_.

was reviewed. Table III-2 provides a listing of the test packages

reviewed.

Twenty-nine locations in Class 1 and 2 piping systems were selected

as part of the NRC CAT sample to determine whether ASME requirements

for pipe wall thickness were met. Seven different plant systems and

12 manufacturing firm's products were selected for the sample. The

pipe wall thickness measurements were taken by ultrasonic methods

with equipment and personnel provided by the licensee. The values

obtained were compared against the minimum wall thickness require-

ments specified by ASME (12.5 percent below nominal thickness).

Several measurements were taken at each location. Seven of the

locations were on elbows. See Table III-3 for details and observa-

, tions.

The following documents provided the acceptance criteria and

background information for the NRC CAT inspection:

Hunter Corp. Site Implementation Procedure No. 4.201,

" Installation Verification," Rev. 11.

Hunter Corp. Site Implementation Procedure No. 2.201,

" Design Control," Rev. 13.

Nuclear Power Services, Inc. Work Procedure No. 3.09,

"As-Built Piping Subsystem Preparation," Rev. F.

Sargent & Lundy (S&L) Instruction PI-BB-26, " Procedure

for Preparation and Submittal of Piping 'As-Built' Information,"

Rev. 4.

S&L Instruction PI-BB-27, " Receipt Review, Reanalysis (Where

Applicable), Redesign (Where Applicable) and 'As-Built' Piping

Reconciliation," Rev. 4.

S&L Drawing No. M-535, " Piping General Notes, Byron Sta. Units

1 & 2," Rev. AJ.

S&L Drawing No. M-679, " Single System General Notes, Byron Unit

1 & 2," Rev. D.

S&L Drawing No. M-919, " Component Support Installation Guidelines

and Tolerances" Sheet 4, Rev. L and Sheet 4A, Rev. D.

Hunter Corp. Site Implementation Procedure No. 4.405, " Pressure

Testing," Rev. 3.

Hunter Corp. Site Implementation Procedure No. 4.406, " Piping

Freeze Seals," Rev. 1.

j b. Inspection Findings

l In the review of piping, the NRC CAT inspectors found that in

! general piping met the design requirements; however, 3 minor

[ discrepancies were found. The observations associated with specific

III-2

.

l

.. -

, _ - ,

.

_

piping drawings are listed in Table III-1 and described in the

following paragraphs.

The "as-built" dimension from a branch connection center line to the

attached high point vent valve, Valve 2CC153, noted on the isometric

drawing (Isometric Spool No. CC-52) was 1.25 inches. This dimension

in the field measured 4.25 inches. This 3 inch discrepancy exceeds

the inspection tolerance of 1 inch specified by S&L Drawing M-679

and the dimensional accuracy requirements of 1 inch specified by the

S&L as-building procedure, PI-BB-26. The dimension as depicted is

not' physically possible and was determined to be a drafting error.

This error would probably have been detected during the as-built

reconciliation effort since the distance shown obviously requires

more than the specified 1.25 inches to accomodate the fittings

included. All other design and as-built dimensions checked during

the NRC CAT inspection were found to be within 1/8 inch of

acceptance criteria.

Isometric drawing for Spool No. S-CC-001-243 specifies a 2 inch, 45

degree socket elbow to be a 3000 psi rated fitting. The NRC CAT

inspection found this elbow to be a 6000 psi fitting. Subsequent

review by Hunter determined that the 6000 psi rating corresponded to

design requirements and the traveler package installation records.

Therefore, this discrepancy is attributable to drafting error. The

The NRC CAT considers this discrepancy isolated and not safety

significant.

The NRC CAT observed that one of four support points for a wood

construction platform measuring approximately 4.0 ft. by 5.0 ft.

was mounted on the operator for valve 2CV8106 (Ref. Isometric Spool

No. CV-20). No damage was observed and because of the small size of

the platform, damage wo' iot likely. However, construction

-practices should prevent the potential damage of installed hardware.

Hunter has on at least two previous occasions issued directives to

its employees prohibiting the attachment of scaffolding to various

types of hardware, including 2.0 inch and smaller pipe. The

licensee should evaluate the need for additional precautions in

this area and take appropriate action.

Hydrostatic / pneumatic testing was found to meet the requirements of

SIP-4.405 and code requirements. Of the hydrostatic / pneumatic test

packages reviewed three NCRs were identified to have been issued as

a result of overpressurizations during testing on Unit 2. In the

review of NCR-860 it was observed that the list of pipe and com-

ponents that had been subjected to overpressurization was incomplete

in that Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2AF01PB had not been included. The

effect of this oversight is that S&L did not evaluate overpressuri-

zation of this pump and consequently disposition of NCR-860 was

incomplete. NCR-1136 was initiated to address this matter.

Similar instances of testing overpressurizations on Unit 1, a total

of 10 NCRs, were also reviewed by the NRC CAT inspectors. It was

found by the NRC CAT inspectors that the pipe and component list in

III-3

NCR 1022 was also incomplete in that 3 line segments and 8 valves

had been left off the list. In this case however, S&L's evaluation

of the NCR had included a review of the details.and drawings perti-

nent to the overpressurization and had developed a complete list

that included the 3 line segments and 8 valves.

Review of S&L's methods and calculations to resolve the overpres-

surizations appeared to be reasonable and technically adequate.

However, the NRC CAT inspectors are concerned that procedures were

not in place that would require that S&L perform an independent

review, as was done in the one overpressurization case, to ensure

that affected piping and components are included in the engineering

evaluation.

Regarding the 29 piping locations where ultrasonic thickness

measurements were taken to verify minimum wall thickness values,

the measurements were acceptable in that they exceeded the minimum

wall values specified for the size and schedule of pipe involved.

c. Conclusions

Piping was found to generally conform to design documents. Engi-

neering and inspection personnel were knowledgeable of procedures,

requirements and responsibilities.

With respect to hydrostatic / pneumatic testing, the overall program

was found to be functioning in accordance with the procedural and

code requirements. The noted failures to include pipe segments,

valves and a pump on the NCR description of the overpressurization

event are considered isolated cases. However, steps should be taken

to ensure that any future overpressurizations receive an independent

review so as to reduce the likelihood of the type of oversights

identified by the NRC CAT inspectors.

2. Pipe Supports / Restraints

a. Inspection Scope

Twenty-five ASME Class 1, 2 and 3 and eight Class D pipe supports /

restraints were selected for detailed inspection. These supports /

restraints represented various types, sizes, systems and locations.

All had been inspected and accepted by the mechnical contractor,

Hunter Corp. These supports / restraints were inipected by the NRC

CAT for proper configuration, clearances, membe. sizes, location,

damage, weld size and proper fasteners. See Table III-4 for a

listing of the inspection sample.

In addition, approximately 60 other supports / restraints were

observed at random in the field for obvious deficiencies such as

loose or missing fasteners, improper clearances or angularity,

improper locking devices, disassembled items, damage and improper

concrete expansion anchor spacing.

III-4

,

u

o

Documentation packages for the supports /retraints in the primary

sample were examined for completeness, accuracy and conformance to

procedural requirements. Drawing revisions and ECNs used in the

inspection were verified to be the latest design documents with

vendor drawing / design change master lists.

Acceptance criteria for these inspections were contained in the

following documents:

Hunter Corp. Site Implementation Procedure (SIP) 4.201,

" Installation Verification," Rev. 11.

Hunter Corp. Site Work Instruction (SWI) 2, " Installation

of Hanger Speciality Items," Rev. 9.

i

S&L Drawing M-919, " Component Suppport Installation Guidelines

and Tolerances."

ITT Grinnell and Elcen Metal Products catalogues and engineering

specification sheets.

Applicable design drawings and change documents

b. Inspection Findings

At the time of this inspection, approximately 95 percent of the

approximately 11,000 large bore supports / restraints had been

installed and QC accepted. Approximately 70 percent of the

approximately 10,000 small bore supports / restraints had been

installed and QC accepted.

No significant hardware discrepancies were identified in the NRC

CAT inspection sample of supports / restraints.

Support material and configuration generally conformed to design

requirements. Workmanship was good and QC inspections appeared to

have been thorough. See Table III-5 for a summary of inspection

observations.

Five instances of loose strut locknuts were noted indicating a

possible lack of attention to detail for this feature. Discussions

with responsible personnel and review of procedures governing future

support / restraint inspections (Type 4 and 79-14 walkdowns) indicate

that these discrepancies should be identified and corrected.

However, because of the number of these discrepancies noted, the NRC

CAT inspectors considered that additional emphasis needs to be

placed on proper installation and inspection of fasteners,

especially during the final walkdown inspections.

The NRC CAT inspectors had a concern with regard to pipe stress due

to point contact between a pipe saddle and pipe on a particular

restraint. It was determined that no specific inspection criteria

existed for this feature. Westinghouse engineering evaluated this

specific installation as acceptable and developed and issued

III-5

o

criteria to be used for installation and inspection of this type of

support / restraint detail.

No disc.repancies were noted in the review of documentation packages.

The drawing revisions and design change documents used in the NRC

CAT inspections were the latest design documents as evidenced in the

current S&L and Westinghouse master lists. Twenty-three of the

supports / restraints in the primary sample had open ECNs that had not

yet been incorporated onto the drawing. There were no discrepancies

noted by the NRC CAT inspectors that would indicate inadequacies in

implementation of the design change process with respect to

supports / restraints.

Discussions were held with responsible engineers relating to

seismic interaction programs, design and inspection of Class D

support / restraints and the piping thermal expansion test and

inspection programs. No concerns were identified.

c. Conclusions

"

Pipe supports / restraints were found in general to be in conformance

with drawing, design change and procedural requirements. Site

engineering, construction and inspection personnel were knowledge-

able of procedures, requirements and responsibilities.

3. Concrete Expansion Anchors

a. Inspection' Scope

One hundred and six concrete expansion anchor bolts on 23 pipe

supports /retraints were examined for proper length, marking,

embedment depth, spacing, residual torque (an indication of anchor

preload), damage and bolt hole to plate edge distance. Various

systems, sizes and locations were included in the anchor sample.

Table III-6 provides a listing of the anchors inspected. Anchors

were torqued to the 15 day-3 month test torque specified in site

procedures. This represented approximately 50-60 percent of

installation torques.

Acceptance criteria for these field inspections were contained in

the following documents:

  • Form BY/CEA, " Standard Specification for Concrete Expansion Anchor

Work," Rev. 22.

Hunter Corp. SIP 20.513, " Installation of Concrete Expansion-

Anchors," Rev. 16. ,

Detail drawings for pipe supports / restraints,

b. Inspection Findings

Only three of the 106 anchor bolts required rotation to reach the

-test torque. Only one of these three required significant rotation

to reach the full installation torqu.e (2 turns). Even considering

III-6

. _ ._ . _.

that the test torques were relatively low, no significant installa-

tion deficiency is indicated.

All other characteristics examined were either within tolerance or

had been previously identified and evaluated.

c. Coralusions

The concrete expansion anchors installed in pipe supports / restraints

were installed in accordance with design and procedural require-

ments.

4. Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC)

a. Inspection Scope

Twelve safety-related seismic HVAC duct supports and two fan sup-

ports were inspected for configuration, dimensions, location,

damage, weld size and member size. Due to the application of

fire protection coating many of the auxiliary steel connections in

the sample was not readily accessible for clip angle and weld size

inspection. However, as a result of welding discrepancies noted on

the accessable joints in this sample, the auxiliary steel connection

details for an additional eight duct supports were examined for the

specified weld size.2' Approximately 15 duct segments were also

inspected for size, stiffener and support location, fasteners and

joint makeup, damage and weld size. Five fire dampers were

inspected for fusible links, specified location and type per drawing

and damper list, sleeve to damper welding and damage or corrosion to

blade operating mechanisms. The inspection of HVAC equipment is

discussed in section III.B.5 of this report. See Table III-7 for

observations and listing of supports and fire dampers inspected.

The following documents provided the acceptance criteria for HVAC

hardware installations:

S&L Drawing M-1261, " Safety-Related HVAC Haager Details."

S&L Safety-Related HVAC Hanger Lists.

l Reliable Sheet Metal (RSM) Works, Inc. Procedure 23, "Installa-

l tion Verification," Rev. 2.

t

RSM Procedure 30A, " Bolted Connections," Rev. 4.

!-

i

RSM SWI 2, " Inspection and Acceptance Criteria for Fire Damper

Assemblies (FDA)," Rev. 1.

S&L Specification F-2782.

S&L Fire Damper List. .

15ee Section IV-8.6 for further details. . .

..

III-7 .,

.

RSM Duct Construction Manual and Construction Details.

HVAC duct design location drawings. .

b. Inspection Findings

Several minor dimensional, orientation and drawing discrepancies

were noted during the duct and fan support inspections. None of

these were considered significant. Several undersize welds were

identified on clip angle to tube steel and clip angle to in place

steel welds for three duct supports. As a result of these observa-

tions, the connection joints for eight additional duct supports were

inspected. Five of these were also found to be undersize. Some of

these welds were shop welds made off-site and may not have been

inspected by site personnel; some were field welds that had been

inspected by site personnel. Typically, welds specified to be

1/4 or 5/16 inch fillets were 1/16 to 1/8 undersize for one or more

of the eight welds on each auxiliary steel installation. As a

result of these findings nonconformance report NCR-118 was issued.2

From an overall standpoint the discrepancies noted were not

considered to be major structural concerns. However, the number of

discrepancies noted in QC accepted hardware, most of which have

already been through a complete reinspection program, is a concern.

This indicates a need for additional management review and attention

to detail by QC inspectors.

The inspection of fire dampers identified one damper that was

installed with a standard fusible link instead of the electro-

thermal link required by the specification damper list. Licensee

personnel indicated that the electro-thermal link was not yet

installed by the electrical contractor but was scheduled to be. A

check of the companion Unit 1 damper revealed that the electro-

thermal link there had been installed. Other damper features

conformed to design requirements.

With regard to duct inspections, one 73 inch long duct segment did

not have stiffeners installed as required by the Duct Brochure and

Specification. Other attributes examined on duct work conformed to

design requirements,

c. Conclusions

The QC program failed to identify support auxiliary steel connection

welds that did not meet design size requirements on eight of 20

supports inspected by the NRC CAT.2

zSee Section IV-B.6 for a list of specific findings and disposition

of NCR-118.

III-8

L

i

5. Mechanical Equipment

a. Inspection Sccpe

Seventeen pieces of equipment located in seven systems were

inspected for ASME class, capacity, temperature, pressure rating and

for compliance with foundation details such as bolting arrangement,

number and size of bolts. Installation documentation was checked

for compliance with Quality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC)

requirements. The inspection sample included pumps, tanks, heat

exchangers and HVAC cubicle coolers that were reported to be

completely installed and QC accepted. Table III-8 provides a

listing of inspected items.

Listed below are the major documents that provided the acceptance

criteria for inspection.

Applicable vendor drawings and foundation details

Vendor manuals

Hunter Corp., SIP-4.000, " Control of Construction Processes,"

Rev. 14.

Hunter Corp., SIP-4.001, " Bolted Connections," Rev. 2.

Hunter Corp., SIP-4.201, " Installation Verification," Rev. 11.

Heater Corp. , SIP-6.001, " Visual Examination & Verification,"

Rev. 4.

b. Inspection Findings

Generally, the mechanical equipment inspected by the NRC CAT was

procured and installed in accordance with vendor and design require-

ments. However, a discrepancy was identified with four heat

exchangers supplied by Westinghouse. It was observed that the

installation procedures used by the installation contractor for

tightening foundation bolts at the sliding end of these four heat

exchangers was not in agreement with the Westinghouse equipment

manual. The Westinghouse manual states that these specific bolts

should be backed off to allow for expansion, but the installation

contractor's procedure states they are to be snug tight.

To investigate this concern the licensee performed torque checks on

the equipment foundation bolts and found some of the bolts to have

been tightened to 250 to 280 ft-lbs; values considerably in excess

of the 100 ft-lbs assumed for a snugtight installation. The

licensee subsequently issued ECN 27982 to eliminate bolt torquing

requirements on specified sliding connections. Westinghouse

correspondence (CAW-9141) states that these bolts should be backed

off on Unit 2 shortly and on Unit I during the first refueling.

Westinghouse has evaluated the present condition on Unit 1 and

determined that it is acceptable to wait until fuel loading for

corrective action.

III-9

_ _ _ . _ ____-_ -______________ -

-

c .- Conclusion -

Mechanical equipment installations, except certain heat exchanger

sliding connections, generally conformed to design and installation

requirements. Installation documentation reviewed was in accordance

with requirments.

.

.

!

'

4

!

i

j. III-10

._ _

,

TABLE III-1

PIPING INSPECTION SAMPLE

Pipe

DrawinD Class' Diameter

. Number Revision (ASME) (Inches) Notes Observation

large Bore:

CC-52- 4H 2 3 1 1%" as-built dim

measures 4%"

CC-57 4G 3 3 1

CC-61 4G 2 3 1, 2

CV-19 7N 2 4, 3 1

CV-20 6C 2 4, 3 Scaffolding supported

by operator for Valve

2CV8106

FW-70 8G 2 6,4,3

FW-72 4D 2 3

Small Bore:

S-CC-001-243 6 3 2, 3/4 3000# socket elbow

specified is 6000#

S-CC-001-253 1B 3 2

S-CV-001-212 2B 1, 2 3/4

S-CV-001-233 1B 2 2

S-CV-001-292 1C 7 2

S-MS-001-224 78 2 1/2

S-RC-001-221 2C 1 2

S-RC-001-234 3A 1 3/4

NOTES:

1. Design changes specified by Engineering Change Notices and/or Field

Change Requests identified at the revision block of this drawing were

reviewed. The changes were compared to field data compiled during the

NRC CAT inspection.

2. Piping located inside the heat exchanger cavity was not inspected by the

NRC CAT.

III-11

l

TABLE III-2

HYDROSTATIC / PNEUMATIC TEST PACKAGE SAMPLE

lest Package ID System

SG-21 Retest Main Steam - Feedwater

CS-37 Containment Spray

BR-6 Boron Therm.-Gen.

SX-102 Retest Essential Service Water

PS-8 Process Sampling

SI-26 Safety Injection

CS-38 Containment Spray

NT-3 Nitrogen

D0-93 Diesel Oil

IA-4 Instrument Air

0G-11 Off-Gas

RY-17 Reactor Coolant Pressurizer

WM-4 Makeup Demin.

.

III-12

.

TABLE III-3

PIPE WALL THICKNESS MEASUREMENTS

Nominal /

Minimal Wall

1 Manufacturer / Pipe Size / ASME Thickness 2 Measured Wall

(Heat No.) Schedule Class (Inches) Thickness (Inches)

SW (MRR 10264) 29" 1 2.425/2.330 2.5

Sandvik (750557) 2"/160 1 .344/.301 .35

B&W (M1629) 8"/160 1 .906/.792 .91

.

B&W (M1656) 8"/160 1 .906/.792 .99

CE (BZE260) 3" 1 .438/.383 .43

C-W (3109-8-2) 10"/140 1 1.00/.875 1.03

C-W (3109-8-2) 10"/140 1 1.00/.875 1.01

C-W (3109-12-2) 6"/160 1 .719/.629 .74

B&W (M-2417) 6"/160 1 .719/.629 .74

Cameron (L4328) 12"/140 3 .1.125/.984 1.14

C-E (5835) 3"/160 1 .438/.383 .45

T-T (94584) 6" 2 3 1.59

T-F (EICL) 28" 2 1 3/16 1.30

USS (N15150) 8"/160 1 .906/.792 .94

USS (N15150) 8"/160 2 .906/.792 .91

USS (L45353) 16"/120 2 1.219/1.066 1.24

USS (L62803) 6"/120 2 .562/.491 .56

C-W (2799-4-2) 12"/40 2 .375/.328 .43

C-W (1210-3-2) 12"/40 2 .375/.328 .48

SWEPC0 (8034857) 8"/40 2 .322/.281 .35

Armco (781055) 24"/40 2 .687/.601 .77

Armco (61266) 16"/STD.WT. 2 .375/.328 .43

,

,.

III-13

. - - . . __ , ._- -.. - .. -

TABLE III-3 (Continued)

PIPE WALL THICKNESS MEASUREMENTS

Nominal /

Minimal Wall

1 Manufacturer / Pipe Size / ASME Thickness 2 Measured Wall

(Heat No.) Schedule Class (Inches) Thickness (Inches)

ASP (83540) 2"/160 1 .344/.301 .35

Elbow

T-F (7297) 8"/160 1 .906/.792 1.03

Elbow

T-F (ERPC) 12"/140 1 1.125/.984 1.27

Elbow

T-F (JHZH) 12"/40 2 .375/.328 .40

Elbow

T-F (JIFM) 8"/40 2 .322/.281 .35

Elbow

T-T (713894) 24"/40 2 .687/.601 .88

Elbow

G-W (624063) 16"/STD.WT. 2 .375/.328 .42

Elbow

NOTES:

1 B&W - Babcock & Wilcox Tubular Products Division

C-W - Curtis-Wright Corp.

C-E - Combustion Engineering

T-T - Tube Turns

T-F - Taylor Forge

USS - United States Steel

SW - Southwest

ASP - Alloy Stainless Products

2 Thickness measurements were made by Krautkramer UT Instrument, Model USK6

SR. No. 27593-3926 using 3/8" and 1/2" diameter transducers. Couplant:

Ultrajel; Operator: Ebasco level II.

3 Nonstandard part - bought to specified dimensions

.

III-14

- . . . . . . .

TABLE III-4

PIPE SUPPORT / RESTRAINT INSPECTION SAMPLE

Pipe Size

S/R Number Tyge Class (Inches) location

2SIO1004X Box 1 10 Reactor

2SIl0003S Snubber 1 2 Reactor

2SIO4035X Strut 2 8 Reactor

2RY20011X U-bolt 2 3 Reactor

2RH02006X Strut 1 12 Reactor

2RC10008X Strut 1 3 Reactor

2SIO3025V Spring 2 8 Reactor

2SIO4019X Strut 2 10 Reactor

2RH06004V Spring 2 3 Aux.

2RH098005A Anchor 2 2 Aux.

2RH04010X Strut 2 8 Aux.

2RH098012X U-bolt 2 2 Aux.

2SIO5035X Box 2 4 Aux.

2RY09089S Snubber D 6 Reactor

2RY20013X Box D 3 Reactor

2RY09020C Spring D 12 Reactor

2RY09013S Snubber D 6 Reactor

'

2RY08034X Strut U 4 Reactor

2RY08011X Strut 0 4 Reactor

2RY08008X Strut D 4 Reactor

2CC22004X Strut 3 6 Reactor

2CC22009X Strut 3 6 Reactor

( 2RH07019V Spring 2 8 Aux.

2AP238013X U-bolt D 3 Aux,

i

[

III-15

. _ _ . - _ _ - _ . _ . _ _ . _ . . _ _.._. _ .. - _ . _

. . - ._. _ . _ _ - -

TABLE III-4 (Centinu:d)

' PIPE SUPPORT / RESTRAINT INSPECTION SAMPLE

Pipe Size

S/R Number h Class (Inches) Location

2SIO6239V Spring 2 24 Aux.

2RH07013S Snubber 2 8 Aux.

,

2RC11009X Strut 1 3 Reactor

2CC23015X Strut 3 4 Reactor

2RC10009X Strut l' 3 Reactor

2RC10016X Strut 1 3 Reactor

2RC10020X Strut 1 2 Reactor

2RC11010X Strut 1 3 Reactor

2CC10001R Rod 3 8 Aux.

Reactor - Reactor Building

"

Aux. - Auxiliary Building

I

f

i

1

85

J

III-16

- . . . . . . . .- ..- -. .- . . . - ... .-.

_

i

TABLE III-5

PIPE SUPPORT / RESTRAINT INSPECTION OBSERVATIONS

.

, Support / Restraint Observations

,

Primary Sample

2SIl0003X Weld length of rear bracket

to embed was 4 5/8 inches long ,

vs. 5 1/2 specified

'

2RY08011X Loose strut locknut

t

,

2RC11009X Unspread cotter pins

2RC23015X Loose locknut

i 2RC10016X Loose locknut

2RC20020X Piece 2 oriented 90 degrees

from specified position

.

2RC11010X Backed off locknut

f Adjacent Sample

f'

2CV65015, 2CV66017, Loose locknuts

2CC28010X, 2CV63019

,

2RC11011X, 2CCV15011 Unspread/ missing cotter pins

-

2FW1900312, 2FW19009R Gaps between lubrite plate and

1- restraining bars not per design

tolerance +

i

N

}

l

i

i

.

,

1

i

i

i I

i

i

III-17

.

i

4

_ . _ _ _ _ _

. . - . . - - - - . _ .. . . . .- - . . - _ . .-. - ...

-TABLE III-6

CONCRETE EXPANSION ANCHOR INSPECTION SAMPLE

.

Support / Number-Diameter (Inches)

i Restraint of Anchors Inspected Observations

2RH02007X 12-3/4 One turned at 6 ft-lbs.

2FW93E010X 4-5/8

2MS918008A 4-1/2

2SI30A002X 12-3/8

2CV15013S 4-3/4

2CV15041S 4-1/2

2RC23034X 4-1/2

2RC90B024X 4-1/2 One turned at 35 ft-lbs

2CV13034S 4-3/4

2CV09025X 4-1

2RC29002X 4-1/2

2MS948001 4-3/4

21YO94H4G20933 2-1/2

21YO94H4G20911 2-1/4 One turned at 30 ft-lbs

2SI938024 4-3/4

2 WOO 9A033X 4-1/2

2CS03B77X 4-3/4

2SIO6223 4-1

2SX50009X 4-1

25I06259 4-1 One turned at 180 ft-lbs

2AB62005R 4-3/4

2SIO6263X 8-5/8

l 2CS06010X 4-3/4

y

i

!

III-18

f

I

r

TABLE III-7

HVAC INSPECTION SAMPLES.AND OBSERVATIONS

Item Inspected Observations

Duct Supports:

H3856 Undersize auxiliary steel welds.

H3837

H3854 Duct spacer to horizontal member

missing one of two welds.

H3855

H3853

H922

d2174

H3749 Undersize auxiliary steel welds.

H3822

H3652 Undersize auxiliary stecl welds.

H1395 Discrepancy as to hanger type

affecting horizontal member attachment.

H8624 Minor dimensional / tolerance discrepancy.

1

Fan Supports:

2VD03CA Incorrect brace orientation. '

2VD01CA Missing washers on foundation bolts and

foundation bolt spacing not per vendor

drawing.

Fire Dampers:

2VX03Y

2VD17YB

2VD17YA

. 2VD63Y

2VD53Y

1See Section IV-B.6 for additional supports inspected

III-19

TABLE III-7 (Continu:d)

HVAC INSPECTION SAMPLES AND OBSERVATIONS

Item Inspected Observations

Duct Segments:

Fifteen segments shown on Segment M-1283-2-18 does not

portions of drawings M-1281 have required stiffener.

and M-1283.

.

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III-20

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4 . - , ---- . .,.,.__,, .._-_ ..-,_ , ...._ _ ,,, ,,,_ . . .~---..- -,--,,_., ,..._,~

--

TABLE III-8

MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT SAMPLE

Boric Acid Transfer Pump 2AB03P

Boric Acid Tank 2AB03T

Diesel Generator Oil Transfer Pump 20001PA

Diesel Generator Day Tank 20002TA

Residual Heat Exchanger 2RH02AA

Residual Heat Removal Pump 2RH01PA

Letdown Reheat Heat Exchanger 2BR03A

Letdown Heat Exchanger 2CV05A

Volume Control Tank 2CV01T

Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger 2CV01AA

Seal Water Heat Exchanger 2CV02A

Containment Spray Additive Tank 2CS0lT

Safety Injection Pump 2SIO1PA

Safety Injection Pump Room Cubicle Cooler 2VA04SA

Centrifugal Charging Pump 28 Cubicle Cooler 2VA06SB

'

Safety Injection Pump Room Cubicle Cooler 2VA04SA

Centrifugal Charging Pump 2A Cubicle Cooler 2VA06SA

III-21

IV. WELDING AND N0NDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION

A. Objective

The objective of the appraisal of welding and nondestructive examination

(NDE) was to determine if Quality Control accepted work related to

welding and NDE activities was controlled and performed in accordance

with design requirements, Safety Analysis Report commitments, and

applicable codes and specifications.

An additional objective was to determine if personnel involved in

welding and NDE activities were trained and qualified in accordance

with established performance standards and applicable code requirements.

B. Discussion

To accomplish the above objectives, welds and welding details for

piping; pipe supports / restraints; field and shop fabricated tanks;

structural steel installations; heating, ventilating, and air condi-

tioning (HVAC) installations; electrical supports; and instrumentation

and control tubing and supports were inspected. The inspected welds

were selected to provide a representative sample of the licensee's

contractor welding activities in terms of welding processes used,

materials welded and existing weld-joint configurations. Considera-

tions such as physical location, difficulty of welding and limited

accessibility were also used in the sample selection. Design changes

related to welding such as increase or decrease of weld sizes and

changes in the welding process or procedure were also reviewed for

technical adequacy.

NDE activities were appraised through the review of radiographs for

both field and vendor fabricated welds, the review of NDE procedures

and personnel qualifications, the inspection of the calibration status

of NDE equipment and the witnessing of in-process NDE activities. The

NRC Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) inspectors reviewed a sample of

radiographic film in final storage in the vault of the licensee's

facility. In addition, a sample of film for Westinghouse supplied

components was requested for review which were stored in the

Westinghouse storage facility.

During the inspection of structural welds in the pipe whip restraint,

structural and HVAC areas, the NRC CAT inspectors identified welds

which did not meet some of the requirements specified by the AE

Sargent 8 Lundy Engineers (S&L). S&L has evaluated most of these

welds and determined that the welds are adequate for their intended

application. Undersized weld reinforcements were also found in nozzle

to shell joints (ASME Code Category 0 Joints) on tanks and heat

exchangers. A detailed discussion concerning these welds is included

later in this section.

In the area of NDE, the NRC CAT inspectors requested to review a sample

of radiographs which were stored at the Westinghouse storage facility.

Two items were requested for review. Initially, the radiographs for

the Boric Acid Transfer Pump (2AB03P) and the Let Down Chiller Heat

Exchanger (2BR03A) were requested. Westinghouse, however, provided

.

IV-1

_

. radiographs for the Let Down Heat Exchanger and the Moderating Heat

Exchanger which were fabricated by Atlas Industrial Manufacturing.

A further review of the items requested established tnat the Boric Acid

Transfer Pump and the let Down Chiller were exempt from radiography

because their wall thickness was less than the thickness requiring

radiographic examination under the rules of the ASME Code for Class 3

components. As a result of this, the NRC CAT requested the radiographs

for the Component Cooling Surge Tank (2CC01T) and Volume Control Tank

(2CV01T). The film for the Component Surge Tank and Volume Control Tank

were not received during the NRC CAT inspection period. The licensee

stated that radiographs for these Westinghouse supplied components

would be reviewed and further reviews performed to ensure that code

requirements were met.

The NRC CAT inspectors also identified some radiographs which showed

that some welds did not have the required weld quality or the film or

other documentation did not accurately identify the proper hardware.

A detailed discussion concerning the welds and their associated

deficiencies are provided later in this section.

The welding and NDE activities were examined in order to ascertain

compliance with the governing construction codes and specifications.

This effort involved the review and inspection of the following

contractors:

Field Activities

1. Sargent & Lundy Engineers: Architect-Engineer.

2. Hunter Corporation: piping installation and piping

supports / restraints, fire protection fabrication and installation.

3. Chicago Bridge and Iron Company (CB&I): containment liner and

containment penetration fabrication and installation, pipe whip

restraints.

4. Pittsburgh Des Moines Corporation (PDM): reactor pool fabrication

and installation.

5. Reliable Sheet Metal (RSM): heating, ventilating and air

conditioning.

6. Nuclear Installation Service Co. (NISCo): reactor internals

modification and installation.

7. Powers-Azco-Pope (PAP): instrumentation installation and

instrumentation supports.

8. Hatfield Electric Company (HECo): electrical installation and

supports.

9. BlountBrothers(BBC): structural steel modification and erection.

10. Ebasco Services Inc.: preservice inspection and examination.

IV-2

_ . - . . _ _ _ - _. _ _ ._

Shop Fabrication

1. Southwest Fabricating & Welding Company, Inc.: shop fabricated

piping spools.

2. Harnischfeger Corporation
crane manufacturer.

3. Westinghouse: nuclear steam supply system.

4. Anchor / Darling Valve Company: valve manufacturer.

5. Teledyne Brown: NSSS supports fabricator.

6. Carrier Corporation: chillers and coolers manufacturer.

7. Phillips Steel Company: liquid radwaste evaporators supplier.

8. Graver Corporation: tank fabricator.

9. Jamesbury Corporation: valve body supplier.

10. Dresser Industries: valve manufacturer.

11. G8W Energy Product Corporation: spray eductors supplier.

12. TRW Mission Manufacturing Co.: containment spray system supplier.

13. Farr Company: reaction chamber filter supplier.

14. Continental Boiler: return air riser supplier.

15. Yuba Heat Transfer Corporation: high pressure heater manufacturer.

16. McQuay Perfex Inc.: condenser shell and hot well tank shell

supplier.

17. Pall Trinity Micro Corporation: cartridge filters supplier.

18. ACF Industries: valve body supplier.

19. Cleaver Brooks: steam boilers fabricator.

20. Mannings Lewis: miscellaneous heat exchangers shell supplier.

21. Cooper-Bessemer: air receiver tanks supplier.

22. Greer Hydraulics: pulsation damper suppliers.

23. ITT Grinnell: snubber support assembly fabricator.

24. Rockwell International: hydrogen recombiner manufacturer.

25. Atlas Industrial Manufacturing: heat exchanger manufacturer.

IV-3

-

o

26. W. J. Wooley Company: containment vessel hatches fabricator and

supplier.

27. Bingham-Willamette: pump manufacturer.

28. Plant Management Corp.: surface condenser tanks supplier

29. Borg Warner: valve manufacturer

30. Aerojet Energy: expansion joints supplier

The results of the inspection activities involving each of these areas

and contractors are documented as follows:

1. Pipe and Pipe Support Fabrication

a. Inspection Scope

(1) Welding Activities

The NRC CAT inspectors reviewed activities relating to fabri-

cation in the areas of piping system welds, support / restraint

welds, welding procedures, welder qualifications, NDE proce-

dures, personnel qualifications, and the review of radiographic

film for shop and field fabricated welds. Field welding

involving pipe fabrication was performed by Hunter. Southwest

Fabricating and Welding supplied the shop fabricated piping

spools.

The NRC CAT inspected 47 pipe supports / restraints involving

approximately 450 welds in order to verify conformance of

welding to drawing requirements and confirm the visual

acceptability of the welds. See Table IV-1 for a listing of

supports subjected to detailed inspection. Additionally,

another 22 supports / restraints involving 600 we ds were

visually inspected to verify the quality of the completed

welds (See Table IV-2). The NRC CAT inspectors also inspected

the welds on the lateral supports for Steam Generator #7.

The NRC CAT inspection of piping welds consisted of visual

inspection during walkdown of piping systems and inspection of

pipe welds located near the supports / restraints being inspec-

ted. Approximately 51 piping spools involving 1700 ASME Class

I, 2 and 3 welds were inspected. Twenty-four of those piping

spools were subjected to detailed inspection which included the

review of pertinent QC documentation while the remaining 27

spools were only visually inspected. Both field and shop

welds were inspected in order to assure compliance with the

requirements of the ASME Code. See Tables IV-3 and IV-4 for

listings of piping spools inspected. In addition, 50 welding

filler metal test reports, 45 welder qualification test records

and 4 welding procedures were reviewed for compliance with

applicable specifications, procedures and the ASME Code

requirements.

IV-4

(2) Nondestructive Examination Activities

The NRC CAT inspection of NDE activities for the pipe fabri-

cation area included the review of 89 shop and 63 field

fabricated welds which involved 1953 film. Field NDE activi-

ties are performed by an independent third party, Pittsburgh

Testing Laboratory. In addition, 5 NDE procedures and 6 NDE

personnel qualification records were reviewed in order to

verify compliance with the governing codes and specifications.

Four NDE technicians were observed while performing in-process

inspections and were evaluated for their ability to follow the

applicable inspection procedures. Fifteen pieces of NDE

equipment were inspected for calibration and one quality

assurance NDE procedure was reviewed for adequacy.

b. Inspection Findings

(1) Welding Activities

In general, the ir.spected pipe and pipe supports / restraints

welding activities were found to comply with the governing

codes and specifications. However, minor discrepancies were

identified involving undersized welds in pipe whip restraints.

Twenty-nine of 1050 structural welds inspected, involving 69

pipe supports / restraints, were found to be deficient with

respect to the specified acceptance criteria. Tn.enty-six of

the inspected welds were undersized, two welds were short in

length and one pipe did not have full contact with the

contoured tube steel saddle. As a result of this finding the

applicant issued Nonconformance Reports (NCRs) and the welds

were subsequently determined to be adequate for the intended

application. See Table IV-1 for details. The inspection of

the Steam Generator lateral support welds showed areas which

were overground by 1/16 to 1/8 inch. Discrepancy Report

QA-MISC-083 was written to document this condition.

No deficient pipe welds were identified during this inspection.

However, during the review of piping documentation, it was

observed that the actual width of weld buildup on the inside

surface of MS-56A, field weld 334, had not been documented

adequately to confirm that all buildup was actually included in

the radiograph of the adjacent butt weld. The review of the

radiographs revealed an acceptable weld buildup condition.

During the review of 50 Material Test Reports for welding

filler metal, it was observed that the purchasing specifica-

tions did not specifically address the requirements of ASME

Section III pertaining to heat treated tensile strength and

the minimum required impact test values. As a result, the

test reports had not been reviewed against the applicable

code requirements. Discrepancy Report QA-Misc-081 was issued

and the welding filler metal test reports were reviewed against

the applicable Code requirements. Subsequent reviews by

Hunter and the NRC CAT inspectors did not reveal any

unacceptable material.

IV-5

(2) Nondestructive Examination Activities

e In general, the inspected NDE activities were found to comply

with the applicable codes and specifications. However, during

the review of the radiographic film some minor irregularities

were identified which involved the following five welds:

Three Field Welds, P-1A-275FW14, CU-28FW2846 and 0G-60-1

FW563 had one set of film and each film had artifacts in

the area of interest. These conditions were not identified

on the reader sheet by the interpreter or the S&L reviewer.

The welds were re-radiographed and the weld quality was

determined to be acceptable.

Field Weld RH-13FW135 station 30 had a linear indication.

This was not recorded on the reader sheet. The weld was

re-radiographed and the indication was determined to be an

acceptable root surface condition.

Shop Weld SI-43-2 Weld 4, contained some views which were

identified as being Weld 6. In other cases Weld 6 was

crossed out and Weld 4 written instead. The dates on the

weld 6 views did not correspond with the reader sheet dates

and there was no explanation on the reader sheet to identify

the correct status of the weld. After careful comparison

of indications and film marks on a film-by-film basis, it

was determined that the correct weld was radiographed in

its entirety and there were no rejectable indications in the

area of interest.

One ultrasonic (UT) procedure QC-UT-1 did not state how the

inspector was to perform UT thickness calibrations.Section V

of the ASME Code paragraph T-561 states that "The instrument

shall be calibrated on a block of the same material and product

form as the material to be measured." The procedure did not

incorporate this Code requirement. However, the NDE manager

stated that they do verify the calibration using the same

material and product form as the material to be measured. The

manager also stated that the procedure will be revised to

incorporate this requirement.

c. Conclusions

(1) Welding Activities

In general, the inspected welding activities were found to

comply with the requirements of the applicable codes and

specifications. However, the NRC CAT found structural welds

on pipe supports and pipe whip restraints which did not meet

the weld specifications. The conditions were evaluated by

S&L and determined to be adequate for the intended appli-

cation.

IV-6

(2) Nondestructive Examination

In general, the inspected NDE activities were found to comply

with the requirements of the governing codes and specifica-

tions. However, the NRC CAT inspectors found some film (1

weld) which was misidentified. Other film (3 welds) had

artifacts in the area of interest and the readers sheets did

not record these conditions. One weld has a linear indication

not noted on the reader sheet.

2. Reactor Internals Modification and Installation

a. Inspection Scope

Approximately 25 welds on the improved rod cluster control guide

tubes were visually inspected. The welds and documentation

packages for the lower internals storage rack modifications were

also reviewed. In addition, one welding procedure and the

qualification test records for two welders were also reviewed for

adequacy. The modification work was performed by NISCo.

b. Inspection Findings and Conclusions

No problems were identified in the area of inspected welding

activities. Activities were found to meet the specified acceptance

criteria.

3. Preservice Inspection (PSI)

a. Inspection Scope

Approximately 20 welds requiring preservice and inservice inspec-

tions were visually inspected (VT) in order to verify compliance

with the requirements of Section XI of the ASME Code. Four of those

welds were also ultrasonically (UT) and liquid penetrant (LP)

examined using the applicable project NDE procedures. Two closure

plates and 2 welds were LP and VT examined in accordance with the

original preservice requirements. In addition, the qualification

test records for four NDE technicians were reviewed and 4 techni-

cians were observed while performing UT and PT inspections. Three

NDE procedures and 15 equipment calibration records were reviewed

for adequacy. The NRC CAT inspectors also examined 30 thickness

check reports and witnessed the performance of thickness measure-

ments. The calibration of UT equipment for thickness measurements

was also reviewed and witnessed. The preservice inspections were

performed by Ebasco.

! b. Inspection Findings

!

During the review of the Ebasco's UT thickness verification proce-

dure, it was noted that the equipment is calibrated using a IIW

Block. The IIW block (standard industry block) did not have any

identification, therefore, it was not possible to determine the

material and product form of the block.Section V of the ASME

,

Code requirement T-561 states that: "The instrument shall be

l

l IV-7

_

calibrated on a block of the same material and product form as the

material to be measured." As a result of this finding Ebasco

inspected the block by applying a magnet and determined that the

block is made from an austenetic stainless steel material.

I Twenty ~(20) thickness reports were also reviewed. The review

revealed that the tested pipes had 20 to 30 percent thicker pipe

wall thickness that the minimum required design thickness. The

thickness examinations are not an ASME Section XI requirement and

the project performs these thickness checks as an additional

verification of the minimum design thickness.

'

c. Conclusions

No problems were identified in the inspected preservice inspection

'

activities. Activities were found to comply with the requirements

of the governing codes and specifications.

4. Electrical Installation and Electrical Supports

'

a. Inspection Scope

The NRC CAT inspectors reviewed approximately 180 field and 50 shop

welds in the area of electrical installation. Three welding pro-

cedures and the qualification test records for seven welders were

reviewed. In addition, the personnel qualification test records for

four welding inspectors were also reviewed and two inspectors were

, observed and evaluated for their ability to follow the visual

!

inspection procedures. The welding activities in the electrical

l area were performed by Hatfield Electric Company,

b. Inspection Findings

During the inspection of hanger H543 no weld detail drawing was

found for the installed type of weld attachment. In addition, the

weld joining the angle iron to the Tee shape section was found to

have lack of fusion and insufficient throat. As a result of this

finding NCR 1687 was issued and the weld detail was found to be

'

acceptable.

The review of radiographic film for welder qualification testing

revealed that the film for welder stamp #LG did not meet the

requirements of the AWS 01.1, Structural Welding Code. Further

examination of QC records established that this welder has welded a

total of 18 hangers. The NRC CAT inspectors reinspected seven of

these hangers and the licensee reinspected all 18 hangers. The ,

'

inspected welds were found to be of acceptable quality.

c. Conclusions

With the exception of the minor discrepancies of one hanger and

one welder qualification radiograph the inspected activities

l were found to comply with the applicable construction codes and

'

specifications.

,

IV-8

l

L

5. Instrumentation Tubing Installation and Instrumentation Supports

a. Inspection Scope

Approximately 120 welds involving 18 instrumentation supports, 2

panels, and 30 tubing welds were visually inspected to ascertain

compliance with the specified acceptance criteria. Seven welding

procedures and qualification test records for seven welders were

reviewed. NDE procedures and qualification records for five NDE

inspectors were also reviewed. Two visual welding inspectors and

one liquid penetrant inspector were observed and evaluated for

their ability to follow the applicable inspection procedures.

The welding in the instrumentation area was performed by

Powers-Azco-Pope (PAP).

b. Inspection Findings and Conclusions

No deficiencies were identified in the area of instrumentation

welding and NDE activities. Activities were found to comply with

the applicable construction codes and specifications.

6. Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning

Installation and Supports

a. Inspection Scope

Approximately 140 welds involving 16 supports were inspected for

compliance with the specified acceptance criteria. Three welding

procedures and the qualification test records for six welders were

reviewed. In addition, four personnel qualification test records

were also reviewed and two welding inspectors were observed and

evaluated for their ability to follow the visual inspection proce-

dures. The welds on eight duct pieces, two air blowers, one air

filter and four dampers were also included in this inspection.

The welding in the HVAC area was performed by Reliable Sheet Metal

(RSM).

b. Inspection Findings

During the inspection of duct piece M1285-4-44 a burn-through the

duct was observed near the welded joint between the duct and the

duct companion flange. As a result of this finding, RSM issued

Discrepancy Report (DR) #M1285-4-7689 and the duct was repaired. On

duct piece M1287-4-C-10 a three sided stiffener was found to be

installed with staggered stitch welds 1 inch long on 11 inch centers

instead of the required 1 inch long on 9 inch centers as specified

on design drawings. As a result, DR #M1287-4-T690 was written and

a four sided stiffener was added to correct the deficiency. It

should be noted that both of these items had not been subjected

to the Type 2 inspection which is performed by RSM after the first

line QC inspection is completed.

The NRC CAT inspectors identified auxiliary tube steel welded

connections on eight hangers to be deficient with respect to the

IV-9

specified acceptance criteria. The eight hangers and their

associated welding deficiencies are listed below:

  • Hanger H3824 - Undersized weld was found on the section end

of the east clip to the tube steel connection.

Hanger H3827 - Clip to tube steel weld was found to be undersized.

  • Hanger H3749 - The return welds were found to be undersized.
  • Hanger H3820 - The return welds and the top east weld to clip were

found to be undersized.

Hanger H3856 - East side of the auxiliary steel to clip weld

was found to be undersized.

  • Hanger H3652 - Top weld on east end clip to tube steel and the

top return weld on the north clip were found to

be undersized.

Hanger H3754 - Vertical weld and top and bottom welds on tube

steel were found to be undersized.

l

Hanger H3753 - Clip to tube steel welds and north auxiliary steel

return were found to be undersized.

As a result of these findings, RSM issued NCR 118. The deficiencies

were reviewed by S&L and found to be adequate for the intended

application. See Section III of this report for additional details,

c. Conclusions

With the exception of the findings (burn-through duct in one

! isolated case, deficient stitch welds and undersized welds in

auxiliarysteelconnections)theinspectedweldingactivities

were found to comply with the applicable codes and specifications.

The undersized welds on auxiliary steel has been reviewed and

been found acceptable by S&L.

7. Structural Steel Fabrication, Erection and Modification

a. Inspection Scope

!

Approximately 120 welds comprising 70 field and 50 shop welds

involving 21 structural beams were visually inspected in order to

'

ascertain compliance with the specified acceptance criteria.

Five welding procedures and the qualification test records for six

1

welders were reviewed. Visual inspection procedures and the

qualification test records for four inspectors were also reviewed.

,

Two welding inspectors were observed and evaluated for their ability

! to follow the visual inspection procedures. The structural steel

field welding was performed by Blount Brothers. American Bridge and

Inland Steel Company supplied the structural steel to the project.

l

l

!

! IV-10

b. Inspection Findings

No problems were identified in the area of inspected welding activi-

ties involving the modification of structural steel. However,

several original welds involving clip to beam web connection welds

were found to be deficient. Specifically, the design drawings

required fillet welds all around, while the connection was seal

welded on the top and bottom of the clip angle due to coping of the

beam web. The deficient connections are identified as follows:

North end of beam A45788; West end of beam A45785; South end of beam

, 49982; and West end of Beam B482. The connection on the left end of

beam 43501 was found to be undersized with respect to the specified

sizes on the design drawings. These welds were completed by

American Bridge.

'

As a result of these findings Discrepancy Reports Q3-946 and Q3-947

were issued. The deficiencies were reviewed by S&L and determined

to be adequate for the intended application.

c. Conclusions

With the exception of the undersized clip angle to web welds the

inspected welding activities were found to comply with the speci-

fled requirements. The undersized welds were reviewed by S&L and

determined to be adequate for the intended application.

8. Refueling Cavity Liner Fabrication

a. Inspection Scope

f

The NRC CAT inspectors visually inspected approximately 60 feet of

welded seam and 12 slot welds on the Reactor Pool Liner. The

attachment welds for six brackets and the welds on the reactor

vessel head guide pin rack drive shaft tool brackets were also

inspected in order to ascertain compliance with the specified

acceptance criteria. Two welding procedures and 3 welder qualiff-

cation test records were reviewed for adequacy. In the area of NDE

i

the NRC CAT reviewed the radiographs for 27 spot welds involving 54

film. The Refueling Cavity Liner fabrication was completed by

PittsburghDesMoinesCorporation(PDM).

b. Inspection Findings and Conclusions

No discrepancies were identified in the areas of inspected welding

and NDE activities. Activities were found to comply with the

applicable construction codes and specifications.

9. Fire Protection System Fabrication and Installation

a. Inspection Scope

Approximately 60 welds involving 10 pipe supports and 15 pipe welds

involving 2 pipe spools were visually inspected. One welding

IV-11

E

l-

l

l

l

procedure and the qualification test records for two welders were

also reviewed for adequacy. One Engineering Change Notice (ECN

247916) was reviewed for adequacy. This ECN pertained to increase

of weld sizes on support 2FP2045X. The fire protection installation

l was completed by Hunter.

b. Inspection Findings and Conclusions

No deficiencies were identified in the area of inspected welding and

NDE activities. Activities were found to comply with the governing

construction codes and specifications.

10. Containment Liner and Containment Penetration Installation

a. Inspection Scope

The NRC CAT inspectors visually inspected approximately 40 feet of

liner seam, welds on two pad plates, the attachment welds for one

EmergencyAiqLock,theweldsonanconstructionopening,andthe

attachment welds for two mechanical and two electrical penetrations.

Two welding procedures and the qualification test records for two

welders were also reviewed. In the area of NDE, the NRC CAT

reviewed the radiographs for 197 feet of welded seam which involved

349 film. One radiographic examination procedure was also reviewed

as a part of this inspection. The containment liner and penetra-

tions were installed by Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I).

b. Inspection Findings

No problems were identified in the area of inspected welding

activities. However, during the review of radiographs the NRC CAT

inspectors identified welds which did not meet the required

weld quality. The welds and their associated deficiencies are

listed as follows:

Weld (92-A)-(92-1)hadacrackattheendoftheweldnear

station 0. This was not noted on the reader sheet.

Weld 46-4-11 to 46-12-1 had a rejectable linear indication.

The indication appeared on film RS3 and was not recorded

on the reader sheet. The reader sheet recorded RS2 as being the

final repair shot for the weld,

c. Conclusions

In general, the inspected welding and NDE activities were found to

comply with the governing codes and specifications. However, two

welds were found to contain unacceptable indications. As a result

of this finding, the applicant has committed to review and

evaluate this item.

IV-12

~ . - . -- .- .- _-- . _

11. Vendors and Shop Fabricators Other Than Those Previously Addressed

a. Inspection Scope

The NRC CAT inspectors visually inspected six vendor supplied tanks

i and heat exchangers (See Table IV-5). In addition to the welds

inspected and listed in Table IV-5, the NRC CAT inspectors reviewed

, radiographs related to work performed by 28 vendors which have

! supplied various equipment and hardware to the Byron Power

Station project. A total of 350 feet of welded seam involving

889 radiographs and 28 welds involving 245 film were reviewed.

The radiographs for 19 valves and pumps involving 304 film, and

the radiographs for 60 spot welds involving 93 film were also

reviewed for compliance with the governing codes and specifica-

tions (See Table IV-6).

b. Inspection Findings

During the inspection of tanks and heat exchangers supplied by the

vendors listed in Table IV-5, the NRC CAT inspectors found that the

size of the nozzle and manway weld reinforcement did not meet the

l requirements stated in the vendor drawings. In addition, the welds

I

'

on some of the inspected supports were also found to be undersized.

A total of six tanks and heat exchangers were found to deviate from

the required drawing sizes. See Table IV-5 for details. The NRC

has issued Information Notice 85-33 on the subject of undersized

weld reinforcement in ASME Code nozzle to shell joints. As a result

l of the Information Notice, the licensee had inspected the nozzle

l welds on ten pressure vessels and tanks prior to this inspection.

Undersized weld reinforcement on the nozzle to shell welds were

'

iden*.Ified on the ten tanks. The licensee issued NCRs on this

,

issue. It was identified that some of these welds violate ASME Code t

l requirements for minimum size of welds.

In the area of NDE, the NRC CAT inspectors identified deficiencies

,

relating to NDE documentation and radiographs supplied by vendors.

! Specifically, unacceptable indications were found in radiographs

supplied by ITT Grinnell (one weld), Graver (one weld), Phillips

l

Steel (two welds), and Teledyne Brown (one weld). Irregularities

l with the NDE documentation were noted in the documentation

! supplied by G&W Energy, Continental Boiler, Cleaver Brooks and

l Harnischfeger Corporation. See Table IV-6 for details. In

l addition, the film for the Component Cooling Surge Tank (2CC01T) ,

j and the Volume Control tank (2CV01T) which were stored by

l Westinghouse were not available to the NRC CAT inspectors for review

during the inspection period. This indicates a lack of retriev-

'

ability for ASME documentation,

c. Conclusions

t

In general, the inspected welding and NDE activities were found to

l comply with the requirements of the governing codes and specifica- i

tions. However, six tanks and heat exchangers were found to deviate

from the requirements stated in the applicable drawings and specifi-

cations. In addition, the radiographs and NDE documentation

IV-13

I

l

B

l'

I' supplied by vendors weie found to be deficient with respect to

l the required quality. The film for two components supplied by

Westinghouse were not provided during the inspection period.

t

!

'

l

.

O

!

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IV-14

TABLE IV-1

LIST OF SUPPORTS WHICH WERE INSPECTED AGAINST DRAWING REQUIREMENTS

2SIO3001X 2SI13020X 2CC22004X

2SI42001X 2SI23003X 2RH02073X

2CC19018X 2CV03009S 2SIO3025V

2RYO6015S 2SIO9006X 2RH02050X (6)

2SIO3041X 2CC23009X 2RH02069X

2SI26010X 2CC19013X (1) 2W002014X

2FWO5018X 2RYO9086S 2FWO3012S

2SI16020X 2FWO3008X 2RH02027X

'

2 WOO 3003X 2MS03079S 2SX08037X

2SIO6261X 2SIO6258X 2CS06033A

2SIO6263X 2SIO6262X 2CS03A099X ,

,- 2CS104014A 2SIO6238X 2CS08020X

2SIO6241X 2SIO6236X 2CS01200X

2CV47044A 2CV74004X 2SIO3011X (6)

2SI9R5558 (2) (a) MS-P16(a) RC-4-4(3)(a)

s RY-7(4)(a) 2SI13R-6558(5)(a)

NOTES:

(1) Two fillet welds 1/2" short on length along web of W-section.

Discrepancy Report DR-QC-2CC19003. See Section II of this report for

> P# additional discussion.

(2) Ten welds undersized by more then 1/8". Whip restraint deleted prior

to CAT inspection by Westinghouse.

(3) Four welds 1/16" undersized one leg. NCR 1131.

(4) Three 3/8" fillet welds undersized by 1/16" and short 3/8" on length.

NCR 1133.

(5) Nine welds undersized on one leg by as much as 3/8". NCR 1132.

(6) Pipe not in full contact with contoured tube steel saddle.

(a) Pipe Whip Restraints - shop welds only.

IV-15

TABLE IV-2

SUPPORTS WHICH WERE VISUALLY INSPECTED

2CV74005 2CV7400X 2CV16034V

CV28003X CV16033S 2SI30A029X

2SI30A003X 2FP02055X FW93E010A

2SIO3042X 2CV47079R 2RH20011X

2RH20010X 2RH10000G 2FWO8022X

2MS01079S 2MS01074S 2MS01205X

2MS01206X 2MS05002C 2MS05001X

2MS05006R

IV-16

TABLE IV-3

LIST OF PIPING WHICH WAS VISUALLY INSPECTED

ITEM DESCRIPTION PIPE SIZE (IN.) MATERIAL

2CV-44-2 Chemical Volume Control 3 Stainless Steel

2RC-16-2 Reactor Coolant 3 Stainless Steel

2FC-24-2 Fuel Pool Cooling 4 Stainless Steel

2RC-19-2 Reactor Coolant 4 Stainless Steel

2RC-0010231-1A Reactor Coolant 2 Stainless Steel

2RC-51-1 Reactor Coolant 3 Stainless Steel

2SI-37-3 Safety Injection 18, 24 Stainless Steel

2RH-9-4 Residual Heat Removal 14 Stainless Steel

2CS-18-3 Containment Spray 12, 16 Stainless Steel

2CS-17-2 Containment Spray 18 Stainless Steel

2CS-17-4 Containment Spray 14, 16, 18 Stainless Steel

2RH-14-4 Residual Heat Removal 8 Stainless Steel

2CV-17-4 Chemical Volume Control 8 Stainless Steel

S-CV-100-241 Chemical Volume Control 2 Stainless Steel

S-CV-100-242 Chemical Volume Control 2 Stainless Steel

S-CV-100-243 Chemical Volume Control 2 Stainless Steel

2SX-20-5 Essential Service Water 6 Carbon Steel

2SI-56-4 Safety Injection 3 Stainless Steel

2SI-37-2 Safety Injection 24 Stainless Steel

2SI-40-1 Safety Injection 8 Stainless Steel

2RC-13-3 Reactor Coolant 4 Stainless Steel

2FC-21-2 Fuel Pool Cooling 4 Stainless Steel

2RE-13-7 Containment Equipment Drain 4 Stainless Steel

2SI-32-3 Safety Injection 12 Stainless Steel

2RH-10-8 Residual Heat Removal 4 Stainless Steel

2RH-10-7 Residual Heat Removal 8 Stainless Steel

2RH-10-5 Residual Heat Removal 8 Stainless Steel

l

IV-17

.

TABLE IV-4

PORTIONS OF PIPING SYSTEMS VISUALLY EXAMINED AND

FOR WHICH DOCUMENTATION WAS REVIEWED

ITEM DESCRIPTION PIPE SIZE (IN.) MATERIAL

2MS-60-1 Main Steam 30 Carbon Steel

2MS-60-2 Main Steam 30 Carbon Steel

2MS-60-3 Main Steam 30 Carbon Steel

2MS-60-4 Main Steam 30 Carbon Steel

2MS-60-5 Main Steam 30, 12, 4 Carbon Steel

2MS-60-6 Main Steam 28 Carbon Steel

2MS-60-7 Main Steam 28, 6 Carbon Steel

2MS-60-8 Main Steam 8 Carbon Steel

'2MS-60-9 Main Steam 8 Carbon Steel

2PC-78 Main Steam Penetration 30, 42 Carbon Steel

2FW-25-7 Feedwater 16 Carbon Steel

2FW-25-6 Feedwater 16 Carbon Steel

2FW-25-5 Feedwater 16 Carbon Steel

2FW-25-4 Feedwater 16 Carbon Steel

2CS-17-1 Containment Spray 16 Stainless Steel

2CS-17-2 Containment Spray 16 Stainless Steel

2CS-17-3 Containment Spray 16 Stainless Steel

2CS-17-4 Containment Spray 6, 14, 16 Stainless Steel

2CS-17-5 Containment Spray 14 Stainless Steel

2CS-16-1 Containment Spray 10, 8 Stainless Steel

2CS-16-2 Containment Spray 10 Stainless Stool

2CS-16-3 Containment Spray 10 Stainless Steel

2CS-16-4 Containment Spray 10 Stainless Steel

2CS-16-5 Containment Spray 10 Stainless Steel

,

IV-18

_

TABLE IV-5

TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS WHICH WERE VISUALLY INSPECTED

ITEM MANUFACTURER

Accumulator Tank 2SIO4TA (1) Southwest Fabricating and Welding

Letdown Heat Exchanger 2CV01AA (2) Atlas Industrial Manufacturing

Volume Control Tank 2CV01T (3) Lamco Industries, Inc.

ComponentCoolingSurgeTank2CC01T(4) Westinghouse Corporation

Spray Additive Tank 2CS01T (5) Graver Tank Company

Fuel Oil Day Storage Tank 20001TA (6) Chicago Bridge and Iron Company

(1) Bolting ring fillet weld 1/16" undersized on one leg. NCR-1148

(2) One nozzle reinforcing fillet weld 1/8" undersized. NCR-1148

(3) One nozzle reinforcing fillet weld size 1/16", 1/4" required. NCR-994.

(4) Manway fillet welds undersized, nozzle welds undersized, saddle and

stiffening ring fillet welds undersized. NCR-994.

(5) Support leg fillet welds undersized. NCR-996.

(6) Bolting ring to tank fillet weld 1/16" undersized, stiffener fillets

intermittently undersized, and two nozzle reinforcing fillets

undersized. NCP-1148

IV-19

F-

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l

TABLE IV-6

VENDOR RADIOGRAPHS REVIEWED

Valve Spot Feet of

Contractor Welds Pumps Welds Welds Film Notes

G8W Energy 5 56 (1)

Products

'

TRW Mission 8 48

Manufacturing

Anchor Darling 2 55

Far r Company 7 94

Continental Boiler 8 8 (2)

McQual Perfex 5 12

i Pall Trinity 2 28

ACF Industries 1 20

Jamesbury Corp. 2 19

Cleaver Brooks 42 36 (3)

Graver Corp. 75 180 (4)

Yuba 59 120

Harnischfeger 19 63 (5)

Dresser Industries 11 44

Bingham Willamette 1 62

Manning Lewis 1 1

Cooper-Bessemer 4 4

Carrier Corp. 9 9

Greer liydraulics 8 32

ITT Grinnell 5 8 (6)

W. J. Wooley 13 48

Atlas Industrial 28 108

Plant Mangement Corp. 5 5

IV-20

. ._. _ _ _ _ _

l'

l

TABLE IV-6 - (Continued)

l VENDOR RADIOGRAPHS REVIEWED

i

l

Valve Spot Feet of

Contractor Welds Pumps Welds Welds Film Notes

Phillips Steel 27 54 (7)

l Borg Warner 5 100

Teledyne Brown 96 204 (8)

'

Rockwell Inter- 5 71

national

i

' Aerojet Energy 3 42

NOTES:

(1) The flim packet for one of the welds which should have contained film

for five intervals, contained film for only two intervals. The missing

flim for the other three intervals was later found and was reviewed with

no problems identified.

(2) The reader sheets with the film indicated that this film was for

Braidwood components. Further investigation of documentation indicated

that the items had originally been scheduled for Braidwood but had later

been transferred to Byron.

(3) Reader sheets for weld WT 8549-64 were not in that packet but were found

in flim packet for weld WT 2158-64.

(4) Circumferential seam 1Al-6 showed added weld metal on interval A-B dated

June 20, 1977, however the added metal does not show in interval M-A

dated June 23, 1977. CECO reviewed the film and returned it supposedly

in proper order. However due to two different identifications on the

film, it was impossible to tell whether one or two welds were represented

by these film. Subsequently, Ceco determined that the film actually were

from only one weld, and that further repair in the M-A interval accounted

for the difference in appearance of the two weld intervals.

On weld 1Al-1 (Job 2) interval 11-12 a linear indication, possibly a

crack, was noted. CECO then did an ultrasonic examination of the area.

However, the performed examination was a longitudinal examination and is

not acceptable for this type and location of indication. An NCR is being

written. ThisindicationisinvesselIC80!T(Byron 1).

In vessel H1 tank 2 weld 3Al-1 interval F-G at the end of the seam in the

transverse weld, an indication was noted. However, when the film of the

transverse weld were located they showed no indication of a problem in

the area mentioned.

IV-21

E

i

!

TABLE IV-6 - (Continued)

VENDOR RADIOGRAPHS REVIEWED

,

NOTES:

l (5) When the film was submitted, the reader sheets were so faint that it was

l impossible to read them. Subsequently, the original sheets in the QA file ,

'

were produced and the film was read. No problems were noted.

(6) A 3/8 inch slag line was noted in the 2-3 interval. After reviewing the

receiving and issuing documents, it was determined that the item had

never been issued to the job for installation.

(7) Area 3255-A OWX10D had a linear indication on each of the junction welds.

Area 3244-A-2V2 OWX07 TV2 had the penetrameter shim into the area of

interest.

,

(8) 4901-9, weld 147 A-B, had an unacceptable slag line at station A and the

l belt numbers appears to be inside the area of interest. Six welds did

not have full coverage. The welds were identified as: 4901-9, - weld

103 G-H, weld 116 A-B, weld 160 G-H; 4901-10 - welds 147 A-B and 160 G-H;

and 4902, weld 75 B-C. Item 4901-1D, weld 103 G-H, also did not have

full coverage and there was a linear indication extending into the

uncovered area,

l

l

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l

IV-22

<

I

V. CIVIL AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRUCTION

A. Objective

The objective of the appraisal of civil and structural construction was

to determine by evaluation and review of Quality Control (QC) accepted

work and documentation whether civil and structural construction areas

were completed in accordance with regulatory requirements, Safety

Analysis Report commitments, and project specifications, drawings and

procedures.

B. Discussion

The specific areas of civil and structural construction evaluated were

structural steel installation, high strength bolting for structural

steel connections and Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) support con-

nections, general concrete surfa.e quality, cadwelds, concrete

placements, concrete expansion anchor (CEA) qualification report,

masonry and containment prestressed, post-tensioned tendons.

A physical or hardware inspection and a review of QC documentation and

field procedures were conducted for the following activities:

structural steel installation, high strength bolting for structural

steel connections and NSSS support connections, general concrete surface

quality, masonry and containment prestressed post-tensioned tendons.

For concrete expansion anchors, cadwelds, and concrete placement, this

portion of the NRC Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) review was limited

to a review of QC documentation and field procedures. The qualification

report for CEAs was also reviewed. The installation of concrete

expansion anchors was also reviewed in the mechanical and electrical

construction areas (see Sections II and III).

1. Structural Steel Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

Installed and QC accepted structural steel were inspected by the

NRC CAT. Attributes inspected were member size, configuration,

and bolted connections. For bolted connections, both

friction and sliding connections were tested by using a calibrated

torque wrench to determine whether the bolts had proper pretension.

The sample used in the structural steel verification for correct

member size and configuration is described in Table V-1. A total

of 85 structural steel members and 38 connections were inspected.

High strength bolting for structural steel connections and NSSS

support connections which were checked for pretension are shown in

Tables V-2 and V-3a, respectively. A total of 699 high strength

bolts were tested for proper pretension. These included 7/8 inch

diameter A325 and 1 inch and 1 1/8 inch diameter A490 bolts. As a

result of NRC CAT inspection findings, the licensee inspected

additional A490 bolts for structural steel connections and NSSS

support connections (See Table V-3b). The A325 bolts were sampled

from structural steel connections. Test torque values were obtained

V-1

by using a Skidmore Wilhelm tension tester to establish the proper

torque-tension relationship. In addition, a total of 62 bolts

sampled from 17 sliding connections were checked for installation

torque.

The requirements and acceptance criteria for structural steel

installation are included in the drawings listed in Table V-4 and

in the following specifications and procedures:

Blount Brothers QA/QC Work Procedures #21, " Structural Steel

Fabrication, Repair, Modification and Erection," Rev. 16,

May 8, 1984.

Powers-Azco-Pope Procedure No. FP-21, " Bolted Connections,"

Rev. 2, June 17, 1983.

Hunter Corporation Site Implementation Procedure #4.001,

" Bolted Connections," Rev. #2, May 26, 1983.

Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory Procedure No. QC-SR-1,

' Structural Steel Inspection," Rev. #2, July 24, 1984.

b. Inspection Findings

For the 85 structural steel members and 38 connections, no signifi-

cant hardware deficiencies were identified. There were seven minor

design drawing or hardware discrepancies. However, none of these

resulted in a significant hardware deficiency and were evaluated

to be acceptable in the installed condition. These findings are

described below.

The seven minor design drawing or hardware discrepancies were:

1. Design drawing (S-1015, Rev. AJ) showed a W14x90 was to be used

for the radial beam (Modification No.94204) at radial line R42

of the Containment Unit 2 Building. However, a W14x78 was

actually installed. Apparently, the original design drawing

specified a W14x78 which was not available at the time of

installation. Field Change Request (FCR) 696 was issued to

allow the use of a W14x90 (which was readily available) instead

of the W14x78 originally specified. A change to the design

drawing to reflect the FCR was done. Following this, a W14x78

became available and was subsequently installed as originally

intended. FCR 696 was voided, but followup was not done to

revise the design drawing to show the installed W14x78. There

was no hardware deficiency.

2. Design drawings incorrectly showed the left connection of Beam

No. 94203 as Detail 2329-17 only. Based on comments from the

NRC CAT inspectors, FCR 44354 was issued to correctly describe

the actual connection as Detail 3 and Detail X on Drawing

S-2228 and Detail 2329-17. There was no hardware deficiency.

V-2

3. Beam No. 3.6AB1012N-2 had four abandoned flame-cut holes in

the bottom flange at about mid-span. These four holes had not

been identified previously. Deviation Report (DR) 949 was

issued to correct this deficiency. The resolution was to

plug weld the holes.

4. The top connection of the double angle brace to Beam No.

5AB1026N was to be a 10 bolt connection, but only 8 bolts were

installed. The missing two bolts had not been identified

previously. DR #Q3-951 was subsequently issued. Sargent and

Lundy Engineers (S&L) evaluated the existing condition to be

acceptable as-is; however, the 2 bolts missing would be

installed.

5. The brace to column connection directly below Beam 8.6AB235 at

elevation 467 was installed with four bolts in a six bolt

connection and welded where the bolts had not been installed.

Previously, FCR F-41049 had identified the as-built condition

and was acceptable as-is. However, the FCR was not clearly

incorporated onto the design drawing. The as-built condition

(correctly shown on the FCR) was welded across the top 1 inch

on both corners of the plate. However, on the design drawing

it appears that the weld is to be across the entire top side

of the plate.

6. The right end connection of Beam 8.6A8218R had been welded in

lieu of bolted. However, the design drawings showed the

connection as bolted. This condition was not identified

previously. FCR F-44359 was issued to document the as-built

condition on the design drawing. There was no hardware

deficiency.

7. Beam 3.6AB1102N had a cope in the bottom side of the flange

which did not meet the American Institute of Steel Construction

(AISC) requirements for minimum 1/2 inch radius. Deviation

Report for Correctable Items (DRC) No. 2C-374-23 was then

issued to repair this condition to meet the AISC requirements.

It was noted that the licensee had previously identified similar

deficiencies as described above in the Quality Control Structural

Steel Review (QCSSR) Program and in the resolution of NCR F-743

(reportable deficiency 82-08).

For the installed torque inspection of 7/8 inch diameter A325 bolts,

294 and 185 bolts were sampled from the Containment Unit 2 and

Auxiliary Building, respectively. Of these, 15 had been installed

at torques significantly below the inspection torque values. Six

(5-Containment and 1-Auxiliary Building) were installed with zero

torque. In addition, two 7/8 inch diameter A307 bolts were used in

a connection which should have been A325 bolts. See Table V-2.

For the inspection of 1 1/8 inch diameter A490 bolts. 112 bolts

in the Containment Unit 2 were inspected. Of these, 36 (approxi-

mately 32%) were determined to be at torque levels significantly

below the inspection torque value. It was determined by S&L that

V-3

there are 29 connections requiring tension in the bolts to transfer

axial loads. The licensee field tested the bolts on 25 of the 29

connections. The remaining four connections were determined to be

inaccessible. It was determined that 95 out of 228 (approximately

42%) bolts tested were significantly below the inspection torque.

The lowest average torque value in a connection was 67% less than

the average inspection torque. See Table V-2.

For the 1 inch diameter A490 bolt inspection, 208 bolts were sampled

from NSSS support connections. Of these, 49 (approximately 23%)

were at torque levels significantly below the inspection tcrque

value. The licensee field tested 56 additional bolts of the NSSS

support connections. It was determined that 20 (approximately 36%)

were at torque levels significantly below the inspection torque.

See Table V-3a, b.

S&L design drawings allow the substitution of M4x13 structural

steel sections for W4x13 structural steel sections for pipe sup-

ports. The resulting vertical weld configuration shown on the

design documents for the M section is shorter than that for the

original W section. The licensee indicated that a review would be

conducted to show that this substitution would not cause an over-

stress condition.

The sliding connections were generally found to be acceptable. A few

bolts were found to be installed at torque values below 50 ft-lbs.

Installation requirements at the time of inspection specified the

bolts be installed between 50 and 100 ft-lbs.

c. Conclusion

In general, structural steel installation was found acceptable.

Although several design drawing and hardware discrepancies were

identified, they were considered isolated cases and did not signi-

ficantly affect the installed hardware. A significant number of

bolted connections were found by the NRC CAT inspectors to be below

inspection torque levels indicating less tension in the bolts than

specified by the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC).

The sliding connections were found to be acceptable.

l

2. Reinforced Concrete Construction

a. Inspection Scope

Reinforced concrete construction areas inspected were general

surface quality, cadweld documentation, concrete pour packages

and the qualification report for the wedge type concrete expansion

anchors (CEAs). General concrete quality was examined from

surrounding areas of completed concreto construction for

conformance to site specifications.

Cadweld documentation covering the initial site cadweld splicing

production performed by Delta-Delta Midstates were reviewed.

Cadweld documentation was also Feviewed for the period covering June

V-4

m

, -

- .. .. - - - . - .- - - _ .

4

11,,1980 thru July 31, 1980, performed by Blount Brothers Corpora-

' tion.

, The qualification records for eight cadwelders of Delta-Delta

Midstates were. reviewed. The records showed proper qualification of

.

cadwelders by visual and tensiT,e testing in each position and bar

i size.

-The following cadweld records or QC' documentation were reviewed:

" Sample Selection Log"

,

" Requests for Sister Splices T-Vertical"

" Tensile and Visual Reports for Samples U-I"

'

"Cadweld History T-Horizontal," thru December 31, 1977.

"Cadwelding Cadweld History."

Nine concrete pour packages were reviewed. A list of those

reviewed is provided in Table V-5. Records reviewed and associated

with the concrete placements were field concrete control log sheets,

.

Econcrete placement checkout sheets, quality control report pre-

placement checklists, quality control report surveillance of con-

crete placement and compression tests of 6x12 inch concrete

cylinders. The records were checked for adequate completion by the ,

QC inspectors, the existence of senior QC inspectors' signature for-

evaluation of completed forms, and acceptable coverage of attributes

,

by the documentation.

s' The following qualification test report for the wedge type CEAs was

reviewed:

Summary Report-Static, Dynamic and Relaxation Testing of

Expansion Anchors in Response to Bulletin 79-02, July 20, 1981.

The requirements and acceptance criteria for reinforced concrete

construction are contained in the following drawing, specifications,

and procedures:

  • ~ Drawing S-693, Rev. AF, " Auxiliary Building Floor Framing

,

Plan E1. 383 ft-0 inches Area 6."

BY/BR/MCS, " Specification for Making and Inspecting Mechanical

(Cadweld) Splices," Rev. 7, July 5, 1978."

4

y

BY/BR/CEA, "BY/BR Standard Specification for Concrete Expansion

Anchor Work Byron Units.1 and 2 and Braidwood Units 1 and 2."

CECO Specification F/L-2722, " General Structures Work," Rev. 41,

June 21, 1985.

L

!-

f

V-5

i

_ - - _ . _ - - , - - . - . - - ~ . . -.

_ . , , . _ - - _ - - - . - . - - - , , - _ , -

b. Inspection Findings

General concrete surface quality was found to be acceptable.

Concrete openings were being recorded on a Miscellaneous Opening

Identification Walkdown computer log. No concrete opening or chip

out was identified by the NRC CAT that was not either recorded on

the miscellaneous opening computer log or field repaired with backup

engineering evaluation by S&L.

QC documentation kept for cadweld splicing production by Delta-Delta

Midstates did not clearly show that Part B.2.3.4 of the FSAR was

met for tensile testing frequency. As a result, the licensee

committed to reconstruct the tensile testing sequence of each

cadweld operator to verify that the FSAR commitments were met.

Cadweld records provided for cadweld splices perfonned by Blount

Brothers Corporation from June 11, 1980 to July 31, 1980 indicated

that the tensile testing requirements were met.

The concrete pour packages reviewed were found to meet FSAR, speci-

fication and procedure requirements. Proper QC inspection attri-

butes were listed in the documentation.

The NRC CAT identified that in some cases for oversized holes in

pipe support base plates, washers were not required by procedures

to be welded to the base plate. These support assemblies rely on

the induced friction between the mounted plates and concrete surface

to prevent lateral movement of the pipe support. Tensile preload in

the CEAs is critical for these supports. Neither the CEA qualifi-

cation test report nor other documents provided by S&L provided a

correlation between tensile preload in the CEAs and installed torque

or the amount of residual tension in the CEA with time.

The torque to preload relationship was determined using the Marks

Engineering Handbook formula using a coefficient of friction of 0.3

and a correlation was made with test results from another site.

However, this does not adequately demonstrate that the residual

tension in the CEAs installed at Byron is sufficient to prevent

excessive pipe support movement. Using the formulas in the Marks

Engineering Handbook with a low coefficient of friction will yield

results that may not be conservative. The coefficient of friction

for steel on steel can be as high as 0.8. The preloads calculated

using this coefficient would not be conservative.

In the CEA qualifications test report the embedment depth of the

concrete expansion bolts was measured from the bottom of the wedge

to the face of the concrete. Site QC inspectors, however, measure

the embedment depth from the bottom of the anchor to the face of

the concrete. The difference between these measurements is approxi-

mately one anchor bolt diameter. As a result, for all size CEAs

except the 1/4 inch diameter ones, the embedmant depth could be

seven diameters instead of the eight diameters required by the

qualification report. For the 1/4 inch diameter CEAs the embedment

depth could be 2.25 diameters instead of the six diameters required

V-6

. . _ _

by the qualification report. It appears that design requirements

were not properly translated into installation and inspection

procedures.

c. Conclusions

General concrete surface quality and concrete pour packages were

found to be acceptable. The licensee has committed to reconstruct

the cadweld records to verify conformance to FSAR, specification and

procedure requirements for those performed by Delta-Delta Midstates.

The licensee has not demonstrated that the installation torque for

CEAs will produce adequate preload in the bolt when installed in

materials similar to those used on site.

It appears that the CEA embedment depth was not measured conserva-

tively especially with the smaller anchors (i.e., 1/4 inch dia-

meter). An evaluation of site practice and inspection methods

should be made to ensure that the embedment depths are consistent

with the qualification report.

3. Masonry Wall Construction

a. Inspection Scope

Masonry wall construction activities reviewed included controlling

procedures, specifications, and inspection of installed masonry

walls. For the installed masonry walls, the inspection concentrated

on exterior column modifications. The masonry work reviewed was in

the Auxiliary Building and included 4 column modifications and the

inspection records for 3 masonry walls.

The requirements and acceptance criteria for masonry construction

- and inspection are listed in Table V-6 and the following

specification:

J CECO Specification F/L-2722 " General Structures Work,"

Rev. 41, June 21, 1985.

b. Inspection Findings and Conclusions

,

Examination of inspection records and completed work showed that

masonry wall installations generally conformed with design drawings

and specifications.

c. Conclusions

In general, masonry walls inspected were found to be acceptable.

4. Prestressed Tendon Installation

a. Inspection Scope

The installation records of 15 prestressed tendons of the Contain-

ment Unit 2 were reviewed for conformance to the project specifica-

V-7

_

-- - .

_ - - - -

--.

_ - _- - . __

l

l

tion. The tendons reviewed were five vertical, five horizontal and

l five dome. The vertical, dome and three of the six horizontal

tendon galleries were inspected for evidence of leaking grease..

I The requirements and acceptance criteria used for inspection of

l prestressed, post-tensioned tendon installation were included in

the following specification:

'

! CECO Specification F/L-2722 " General Structures Work,"

Rev. 41, June 21, 1985.

I b. Inspection Findings

One horizontal grease cap was found to be leaking grease. The

grease was collected, measured and found to be one-tenth of a

gallon. This is within specification limits. In order to more

accurately monitor the grease loss in any tendon, the licensee

plans to revise procedures and keep a running log of grease loss

in each tendon.

c. Conclusions

In general, the prestressed, post-tensioned system was found to be

acceptable.

!

(

V-8

_ --

._. _ . . _ _ _ _ _

-

-. .. . . - - .. - _. .. . - - _ - - - _ - - . _ ,

TABLE V-1 '

STRUCTURAL STEEL INSTALLATION SAMPLE

i

Approximate

Elevation

Building and Area Beam Brace Column Connection *

Containment Elev. 450 ft. 26 -

3 14

Unit 2 Area 5 and 8

Auxiliary Elev. 374 ft. 15 -

1 8

to 376 ft.

Area 7

Elev. 383 ft. 11 3 3 8

to 401 ft. -

Area 7

f

Elev. 451 ft. 5 2 4 3

to 459 ft.

Area 7

Elev. 467 ft. 6 - -

3

Area 7

Elev. 477 ft. 4 1 1 2

Area 7

<

'

TOTALS 67 6 12 38

.

l

  • This sample is separate from the high strength bolt torque sample.

.

t

4

.

.

V-9

-, . .- .-- .-._. - - ,- - - - - , . _ . - ... - - , .. - , . . . _ - _ - . - - - . - . - , . . --

TABLE V-2

HIGH STRENGTH BOLTING 0F STRUCTURAL STEEL CONNECTIONS

7/8 inch diameter A325 bolts 1;

No. of Bolts Number of Bolts

Building Elevation Checked Found Unacceptable Comments

Containment 401 ft. 52 None Sample taken from

Unit 2 connections along

radial lines R29,

R31, R38 and R40.

407 ft. 24 6 - 1 each @ 0,250, Sample taken along

350 and 400 lines R39 and R40.

ft-lbs; 2 @

300 ft-lbs.

412 ft. 99 3 - 1 each @ 250 Sample taken along

and 300 ft-lbs; lines R22, R38, R39

1 @ 400 ft-lbs. and R40.

426 ft. 119 4 - All four @ 0 Sample taken along

ft-lbs. radial lines R22 thru

R26 and R32 thru R34.

Auxiliary 451 ft. 73 None Sample taken from

column lines U21, V21

523 to S25.

459 ft. 85 1 - One @ 175 ft-lbs Sample taken from

column lines U21, V21

and S7-23.

two 7/8 inch

dia. A307 bolts were

installed where A325

bolts should have been.

461 ft. 27 1 - One 0 0 ft-lbs Sample taken from

column lines U21

and V21.

TOTAL 479 15 3% found

unacceptable

V-10

- = - - .- - . . - = - - _ _ _ . . . - - . . - _ ,

TABLE V-2- (Continued)

l HIGH STRENGTH BOLTING OF STRUCTURAL STEEL CONNECTIONS

' 1 1/8 inch diameter A490 bolts 2;

No. of Bolts Number of Bolts

Building Elevation Checked Found Unacceptable Comments

Containment 401 ft. 66 25 - One each @ 200, 38% found

Unit 2 425, 550, 600, unacceptable.

625, 700, 825, Sample taken

850, 900, 1025, from connections

i 1050, 1125, along radial lines

1150 ft-lbs. R23, R25, R29, R31,

Two each @ 300, R38 and R40.

525, 800 ft-lbs.

i

Three @ 500 and

1200 ft-lbs.

407 ft. 14 8 - One each @ 250, 57% found

300, 600, 800, unacceptable.

1150 and 1200 Sample taken

along radial

'

ft-lbs. Two @

i 1175 ft-lbs. lines R23, R25,

4

R31, R38 and

>

R40.

412 ft. 32 3 - One @ 600 ft-lbs. Sample taken

, Two @ 750 ft-lbs. along radial

i lines R23, R25,

R33, R38 and

R40.

TOTAL 112 36 32% found

unacceptable.

NOTE:

1. Inspection torque value used was 425 ft-lbs.

2. Inspection torque value used was 1250 ft-lbs.

,

!

,

5

I

i

.

V-11

!

. _ . _ , _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ . . _ - . _. , _ _____ ____ ._ . ._ __ _,- _

- . _ _ _ . .. . _ .

.

TABLE V-3a

HIGH STRENGTH BOLT INSTALLED TORQUE INSPECTION

FOR CONNECTIONS OF NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM SUPPORTS

1 inch diameter A490 bolts:1

No. of Number Found

Building Location Bolts Checked Unacceptable Comments

Containment Steam 24 12 - 200 to 600

Unit 2 Generator ft-lbs.

No. 5 Lower

Lateral

Support

Steam 32 10 - 300 to 600

Generator ft-lbs.

No. 6 Lower

Lateral

Support

Steam 24 24 - 100 to 700

Generator ft-lbs.

No. 8 Lower

Lateral

Support

Tower 28 2 - One each @

Restraint 650 and 700

ft-lbs.

TOTAL 108 48 44% found

unacceptable.

NOTE:

1. Inspection torque value used was 750 ft-lbs.

.

V-12

_- -

l TABLE V-3b

LICENSEE'S RESULTS OF INDEPENDENT INSPECTION OF HIGH

STRENGTH BOLTS OF NSSS SUPPORT CONNECTIONS i

(

)

Number of Bolts

Not Accepted -

Torque Value

Bolt Size Number of Bolts Range for Bolts

Location and Type Inspected Not Accepted 1 Comments

l

Containment:

Pressurizer 1 1/4 inch 8 4 - 1050 to 1300

Column diameter ft-lbs.

Support A490

No. 1

Pressurizer 1 1/4 inch 8 2 - 800 and 1200

Column diameter ft-lbs.

l Support A490

No. 2

Pressurizer 1 1/4 inch 8 3 - 1400 to 1425

l Column- diameter ft-lbs.

Support A490

No. 3

Pressurizer 1 1/4 inch 8 1 - 800 ft-lbs

Column diameter

Support A490

No. 4

Pressurizer 1 1/2 inch 4 0 - Not Appli- Hydraulic torque

Column diameter cable. wrench utilized.

Support A490

No. 1

. Pressurizer 1 1/2 inch 4 1 - 2353 ft-lbs. Hydraulic torque

I Column diameter wrench utilized.

Support A490

No. 2

!

Pressurizer 1 1/2 inch 4 0 - Not Appli- Hydraulic torque

Column diameter cable. wrench utilized.

Support A490

No. 3

Pressurizer 1 1/2 inch 4 1 - 2157 ft-lbs. Hydraulic torque

Column diameter wrench utilized.

Support A490

No. 4

V-13

_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.. . _ - . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . ._ _ _ . .. ___ _ . .

TABLE V-3b - (Continued)

i

'

LICENSEE'S RESULTS OF INDEPENDENT INSPECTION OF HIGH

STRENGTH BOLTS OF NSSS SUPPORT CONNECTIONS

'.

Number of Bolts

[l

Not Accepted - ,

.

_

Torque Value

Bolt Size Number of Bolts Range for Bolty

] Lecation and Type Inspected Not Accepted Comments

l

Reactor 2 1/2 inch 8 8 - 3937 to 5118 Hydraulic torque

Coolant diameter ft-lbs. wrench utilized.

Pump A490

Loop No. 7

, TOTAL 56- 20 36% found

.

unacceptable. ,

4

. NOTE:

1 Inspection torque values used were for 1-1/4, 1-1/2 and 2-1/2 inch diameter

balts 1450, 4745 and 5570 ft-lbs, respectively.

E

^

t

!

4

, r

s

'

i

i

4

V-14

.

v-e .,c. . . , , , , , - , _ . _ _ , - . . . _ - < - . , _ . , ,-.,_m-# , _ , , - , - ._-_-._,p.. y.-,,,--,___, -,_,,,_wy ,..,--_,mmm, -- ,-,y. , , --

-

TABLE V-4

DRAWINGS USED FOR STRUCTURAL STEEL INSPECTION

American Bridge

Drawing No. Rev. Order No.

A251 B K6776

A252 D K6776

A281 D K6776

A410 A K6777

A419 A K6777

A423 A K6777

A424 A K6777

A528 0 K67777-X14

E216 D K6776

FWA503 C K6777-X14

585 E K6777

586 A K6777

588 0 K6777

589 A K6777

593 A K6777

1002 A K6777

1004 0 K6777

l

l

.

o

i.

V-15

l-

[

r-

TABLE V-4 - (Continued)

DRAWINGS USED FOR STRUCTURAL STEEL INSPECTION

Sargent and Lundy Engineers

Drawing No. Rev. Title

M-913 Sheet 35 Containment Building Pressure Sensor Galleries '

S-482 E Auxiliary Building Standard Connection Details

Sheet 2

S-686 AG Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan E1.

374'-0" Area 7

S-687 W Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan El.

374'-0" Area 5 and 7

S-701 BT Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan El.

401'-0" Area 7

S-719 T Auxiliary Building Anchor Plate Schedule

and Details

S-764 R Auxiliary Building Foundation Sections and Details

S-798 M Auxiliary Building Steel Column Schedule

S-1015 AJ Containment Building Plan El. 461'-10"

Areas 5 & 8

S-1322 AH Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan E1.

467'-0" Area 7

S-1330 Y Auxiliary Building Roof Framing Plan Area 7

S-1344 W Auxiliary Building Sections and Details

S-1645 H Auxiliary Building Sections and Details

S-2135 AF Typical Modification Details

S-2138 S Typical Modification Details

S-2143 W Typical Modification Details

S-2146-BY R Auxiliary Building Framing Modification Plan

El. 374'-0" Area 7

S-2147-BY Y ' Auxiliary Building Framing Modification Plan

El. 374'-0"

V-16

. -

TABLE V-4 - (Continued)

DRAWINGS USED FOR STRUCTURAL STEEL INSPECTION

Sargent and Lundy Engineers

Drawing No. Rev. Title

S-2152 AJ Auxiliary Building Framing Modification

Schedule for El. 374'

S-2160 AC Auxiliary Building Framing Modification

Schedule for E1. 374'

S-2161 U Auxiliary Building Framing Modification

Schedule El. 374'-0"

S-2171 Y Auxiliary Typical Modification Details

S-2173-BY AC Auxiliary Building Framing Cover Plate Schedule

S-2175-BY AC Auxiliary Building Framing Cover Plate Schedule

S-2180 AW Auxiliary Building Framing Modification

Schedule for E1. 375'-6"; 376'-0"; 391'-6";

392'-0"; 394'-6"; 401'-0"; 409'-6"; 414'-0";

415'-0"; 417'-0"

S-2190 M Framing Modification Sections and Details

S-2228 Z Containment Building Framing Modification

Schedule for E1. 461'-10"

S-2305 C Framing Modification Sections and Details

S-2311 C Framing Modification Sections and Details

S-2316 E Framing Modification Sections and Details

S-2321 D Framing Modification Sections and Details

S-2329 E Framing Modification Sections and Details

S-2343 D Framing Modification Sections and Details

,

l S-2346 C Framing Modification Sections and Details

l

l S-2348 E Framing Modification Sections and Details

,

S-2359 C Framing Modification Sections and Details

S-2396 B Framing Modification Sections and Details

.

S-2397 D Framing Modification Sections and Details

l

V-17

!

, _ , . ,. _

_ _ _ . - , _ . . . .. ._.. .- ,,. - -.. . - - , - _ , . . - .-~. - _ . . ,-

TABLE V-5

CONCRETE POUR PACKAGES REVIEWED

Document Record No. Pour No. Description of Pour

5.02.01.01 2-A-353'-9"-7-F-1 1/3 Tendon Tunnel Slab

5.02.01.02 2-A-353'-9"-6-F-4 1/3 Tendon Tunnel Slab

5.02.01.03 2-A-353'-9"-5-F-4 1/3 Tendon Tunnel Slab

5.03.01.02 1-C-329'-4"-3-F-12 2/3 Auxiliary Building

1-C-329'-4"-2-F-11 Slab and Sumps @ 330 ft. elev.

1-C-324'-5"-4-F-22

1-C-324'-5"-3-F-22

5.04.01.04 1-D-401-0-1-F Part of Fuel Handling Building

2-0-401-0-2-F Foundation

V-18

TABLE V-6

DRAWINGS USED FOR MASONRY WALL INSPECTION

Dwg No. Rev./Date Titic

A220 BJ Auxiliary Building Upper Basement Floor Plan El.

8/4/85 364'-0" Area 3

A223 BE Auxiliary Building Upper Basement Floor Plan El.

5/10/85 364'-0" Area 6

A224 K Auxiliary Building Upper Basement Floor Plan El.

3/1/79 364'-0" Area 7

S680 BF Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan E1. 364'-0"

. 8/9/85 Area 3

5682 BH Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan El. 364'-0"

6/21/85 Area 6

5683 AU Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan El. 364'-0"

8/9/85 Area 7

S1141 AH Column Bracing Rows 6" and 30"

8/7/85

S1727 AD Auxiliary Building Block Wall Steel Column Sections

1/19/84 and Details

S1728 AG Auxiliary Building Block Wall Steel Column Sections

11/8/84 and Details

S1730 AV Auxiliary Building Block Wall Steel Column Schedule

5/31/85

S1738 G Auxiliary Building Block Wall Steel Column Sections

4/26/85 and Details

V-19

VI. MATERIAL TRACEABILITY AND CONTROL

A. Objective

The objective of this portion of the NRC Construction Appraisal Team

(CAT) inspection was to examine traceability and control of material

and equipment, and to determine the adequacy of the licensee's program

relative to these activities.

B. Discussion

The method utilized to perform the inspection included selecting samples

of various types of material and equipment for examination. Most of

the samples were selected and identification markings were noted from

installations in the plant. Some samples of installed material, such as

cadweld sleeves, that were not accessible were selected from records.

Also, some samples of delivered material, such as protective coating

materials, not yet installed, were inspected in warehouses or shops.

A total of 271 samples were examined to varying extents. Table VI-1,

" Summary of Samples," indicates the major contractors involved and the

types of samples examined.

Selected procedures from on-site organizations were reviewed, including

the following:

Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)

BSI-101, Purchase Request, Rev. 4.

BSI-102, Material and Equipment Receiving, Receiving Inspection,

Storage and Removal from Storage, Rev. 7.

BSI-102a, Supplement A - Hatfield Receiving & Inspection of Site

Requisitioned Material, Rev. 2.

  • BSI-113, Storage Requirements and Surveillance Plan, Rev. O.

Hatfield Electric Company (HECo)

Procedure No. 5, Class I Material and Equipment and Receiving

and Inspection, Rev. 14.

Procedure No. 14, Handling and Storage of Safety Related Material

and Equipment, Rev. 8.

Hunter Corporation (Hunter)

  • SIP 3.102, Material and Services Procurement, Rev. 2.
  • SIP 3.602, Material Receiving Inspection, Rev. 3.

SIP 3.801, Storage of Mechanical Components and Materials, Rev. 5.

  • SIP 3.802, Material Requisitions, Rev. 2.

.

VI-1

.

SIP 4.000, Control of Construction Processes, Rev. 14.

Powers-Azco-Pope (PAP)

FP-2, Control of Procurement and Requisition of Materials and

Services, Rev. 4.

FP-3, Material Receiving Inspection Control, Rev. 13.

FP-4, Material Storage, Rev. 9.

FP-16, Identification and Marking of Pipe and Components, Rev.12.

Reliable Sheet Metal (RSM)

Procedure No. 4, Field Material Receiving and Inspection, Rev. 7.

Procedure No. 8, Storage of Components and Materials, Rev. 7.

Procedure No. 30, Control of Construction Processes, Rev. 1.

Midway Industrial (MIC)

QCP-4, Container Marking and Material Control, Rev. 4.

Blount Brothers Company (BBC)

Procedure No. 2, Procurement Control, Rev. 7.

Procedure No.10, " Receiving, Storage and Handling, Rev. 9.

A total of 271 samples were selected to verify traceability to: (1)

the design drawings and specifications, and (2) the supply source.

Verification was performed by review of drawings and procurement

specifications, and by matching material and equipment markings with

vendor certifications, other documentation and heat numbers. Table

VI-2, " Sample Breakdown by Contractors," indicates the types and

quantities of samples applicable to each contractor. Table VI-3,

" Weld Filler Material Compliance," contains a list of weld filler

material samples.

The following sections describe the inspection results.

1. Material Traceability and Control

a. Inspection Scope

In addition to review of in-place procedures, the 271 samples of

material and equipment were examined for traceability to drawings,

,

specifications, procurement records, Certified Material Test

'

Reports (CMTRs), Certificates of Conformance (C of Cs), heat

l numbers or other required documentation. Samples included

equipment (electrical, mechanical and instruments), pipe,

structural steel, weld joints, electrical cables, fasteners,

and other materials as indicated in Table VI-2.

VI-2

b. Inspection Findings

In general, it was found that satisfactory procedures were in place

for material traceability and for control of material at the site.

Except for the lack of traceability for certain fastener materials,

the material treceability program was found to be generally

acceptable. The following observations were made by the NRC

CAT inspector:

(1) Sixteen samples of weld filler material listed in Table VI-3

were examined for traceability and compliance with specifica-

tions and codes, and were found to be acceptable. Also, 11

weld filler material holding ovens in 8 issue stations were -

examined and found to meet requirements for temperature control

and thermometer calibration records. In addition, 8 portable

ovens were examined and found to be operating satisfactorily.

(2) Some deficiencies were found regarding the traceability and

control of equipment mounting bolts for large vendor-supplied

ASME pump-motor assemblies, various electrical equipment, and

HVAC equipment as follows: '

(a) Equipment assembly / mounting bolts for each of the 10

large vendor supplied pump-motor installations examined

were found to have unmarked bolts or bolts with markings

indicating incorrect or indeterminate materials. The

discrepancies are as follows:

Chemical Volume Positive Displacement Pump (2CV02P) -

Motor mounting bolts required to be A325;

no markings found.

Chemical Volume Centifugal Charging Pump (2CV01PA) -

Motor mounting bolts required to be SAE Grade 5;

SAE Grade 8 found.

Chemical Volume Centifugal Charging Pump (2CV01PB) -

Motor mounting bolts required to be SAE Grade 5;

unmarked bolts found.

Residual Heat Removal Pumps (2RH01PA & PB) -

Pump casing studs required to be SA 453, Grade

660; untraceable marking "TP" found.

Pump casing stud nuts required to be SA 194,

Grade B6X; untraceable markings "78" and "MR 5178"

found.

Motor base to motor casing bolts required to be A449,

Grade 5; A325 bolts found.

Containment Spray Pumps (2CS01PA & PB) -

Casing stud nuts required to be SA 194, Grade 2H,

Trace N-20; untraceable markings found.

VI-3

Motor mounting bolts to attachment required to be SA

193, Grade B7; markings found indicate A325 or SA 325.

Bolts from motor attachment to adaptor required to be

SA 193, Grade B7; found A307 markings.

Anchor bolts, per seismic report, should be A325;

records indicate A36 installed. Records included a

prior Sargent & Lundy analysis indicating that A36

is acceptable, but no design change was made.

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2AF01PB) (diesel motor) -

Bolts from gear box to skid required to be SAE Grade 5;

markings found for A325. Requirement for anchor bolts

not known; no markings found, records indicate A36

installed.

Safety Injection Pumps (2SIO1PA & PB) -

Pump mounting bolts indicated by Westinghouse Pump and

Valve Engineering (memorandum revised 9/12/85) required

to be SA 307; markings found indicated SAE Grade 5

installed.

As a result of these CAT findings, the licensee issued

Nonconformance Report (NCR) No. F-1014 to initiate further

examination of the discrepancies and corrective action.

The numerous discrepancies between drawings, manuals,

seismic qualification reports and markings on installed

fasteners indicate a generic lack of attention to fastener

details by the licensee and vendors. This matter requires

management attention.

(b) Equipment assembly / mounting bolts for certain electrical

equipment were found to have unmarked bolts indicating

indeterminate materials. The cor.ditions are as follows:

Battery rack assembly bolts in battery rooms 211 and

212 were inspected. It was found that of 460 bolts

inspected, 69 were marked to indicate SAE Grade 5

material, and the rest were unmarked and thus were

of indetert!nate material. The licensee indicated

that ASTM A307 bolts were required, although docu-

mentation specifying the material required was not

provided.

Interconnection bolts for 4KV Switchgear cabinets

(2AP06E) were inspected and some bolts were found

marked to indicate A307 material, but others were

unmarked and thus of indeterminate material.

Assembly bolts for Fire Hazards Panel (2PL10J) were

inspected and five were found to be properly marked

for A307 material, but five of the ten bolts were

unmarked and thus of indeterminate material.

VI-4

i

.

As a result of these CAT findings, the licensee issued

NRC No. F-1012 to initiate further review of the trace-

ability of fasteners of various vendor supplied equip-

ment and to provide for corrective action.

It was noted that the licensee recently issued NCR No.

F-1001 (August 16, 1985) to initiate review of site

procured and contractor installed bolts which do not

conform to ASTM A307 requirements and to initiate

corrective action.

(c) Nuts for studs in the trapeze assembly portion of pipe

hanger 2RY05009 were specified to be of SA194, Grade 2H

material. Markings found by the NRC CAT inspectors were

not traceable. Records indicated that A307 nuts were

installed. Four additional hangers: 2RY28002, 2RY28003,

2CV25021 and 2CV15016 were found to have nuts installed

with proper 2H markings. The incorrect nuts on hanger

2RY050G9 is considered an isolated case.

As a result of this CAT finding, the contractor (Hunter)

issued NCR No. 1141 to initiate corrective action to

replace the nuts on hanger 2RY05009.

(d) Bolts for attaching HVAC Diesel Generator Service Room

Vent Fans 2VD02CA & B to adjacent duct sections were

inspected. It was found that A307 bolts were required,

but approximately 50% of the bolts were unmarked and

thus material was indeterminate. The licensee stated

that NCR No. F-1001 mentioned under VI.B.1.b(2)(b) above

was also applicable to this finding.

b. Conclusions

In general, except for certain fastener hardware, the material

traceability and control program was considered to be satisfactory.

Significant lack of traceability was found for fastener materials,

including assembly and mounting bolts for large vendor supplied

pumps with motors mounted on skids; bolts for battery racks,

switchgear cabinets and other electrical equipment; and bolts for

HVAC equipment as noted above.

,

l

l VI-5

i

_ _ _

_ __. , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , ,

_ _ __ __

TABLE VI-1

SUMMARY OF SAMPLES

Contractors Activities No. of Samples

Hatfield(HECo) Electrical 37

Hunter (Hunter) Piping / Mechanical 136

Powers-Azco-Pope (PAP) Instrumentation 43

Reliable Sheet Metal (RSM) HVAC 14

BlountBrothers(BBC) Structural 22

ChicagoBridge& Iron (CB&I) Containment Liner 8

Midway Industrial (MIC) Coatings 11

TOTAL 271

i

VI-6

.-

TABLE VI-2

SAMPLE BREAKOOWN BY CONTRACTORS

ITEM HECo HC* PAP RSM BBC CB&I MIC TOTAL

Equipment 14 19 10 3 - - -

46

Pipe -

21 8 - - - -

29(L)**

Tubing - - 4 - - - -

4(L)

Steel-Structural - - - 2 2 - -

4(L) i

Steel-Rebar - - - - 5 - -

5(L)

Steel-Plate - - - -

2 3 -

5(L)

Steel-Tube - 5 - -

1 - -

6(L)

Hangers / Supports - 4 -

2 - - -

6

Embedments - - - - 3 - -

3

Weld Filler Material 2 9 2 - -

3 -

16(L)

Weld Joints -

31 19 4 - 2 - 56

ElectricalCables(Reels) 5 - - - - - - 5

Fasteners (SetsInstalled) 6 44 - 3 - - - 53

Fasteners (LotsinStorage) - 3 - - 5 - -

8(L)

Cadweld Sleeves - - - - 4 - -

4(L)

Coatings - - - - - -

11 11(L)

Conduit 5 - - - - - -

5(L)

Cable Raceway 5 - - - - - -

5(L)

TOTALS 37 Tf6 TJ T4 T T TF F

  • Hunter Corp.
    • (L) = Lots

l

l

i

.

VI-7

-

TABLE VI-3

WELD FILLER MATERIAL COMPLIANCE

Material Heat No./ Compliance

Designation & Size Material ID Comments

E308-16 3/32" 74882 Acceptable

E308-16 3/32" 11343 Acceptable

E308-16 1/8" J1711 Acceptable

E308L-16 5/32" 64901 Acceptable

E309-16 3/32" 10440 Acceptable

E309-16 3/32" Lot 90075-3 Acceptable

E309-16 1/8" Lot 90069-1 Acceptable

E502-16 3/32" 431C4621 Acceptable

E502-16 1/8" 01P124 Acceptable

E6010 3/16" 645S481 Acceptable

E6010 5/32" LO2103 Acceptable

E6010 5/32" 11270 Acceptable

E7018 3/32" 34422 Acceptable

E7018 1/8" 33641 Acceptable

E7018 1/8" 40157441 Acceptable

i E7018 5/32" 402X9551 Acceptable

,

i

VI-8

VII. DESIGN CHANGE CONTROL

A. Objective

The primary objective of the appraisal of design change control was

to determine whether design change activities were conducted in com-

pliance with regulatory requirements, Safety Analysis Report (SAR)

commitments and approved licensee, architect-engineer and constructor

procedures. An additional objective was to determine that hardware

modifications described in a sample of design change documents were

properly implemented in the field.

B. Discussion

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III " Design Control" and Criterion

VI " Document Control" establish the overall regulatory requirements

for design change control. These requirements are elaborated in

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.64, Rev. 2, June 1976, " Quality Assurance

Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants" which endorses

American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N45.2.11-1974

" Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants."

The licensee's commitment to comply with RG 1.64 is stated in Appendix

A of the Byron /Braidwood Stations Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

The areas of design change control evaluated by the NRC Construction

Appraisal Team (CAT) inspectors were control of changes to design

documents and control of design changes. In each of these areas,

interviews were conducted with personnel responsible for the control

of activities, procedures were reviewed, and a sample of the controlled

documents was reviewed. In addition, a sample of the design changes

which had been inspected and accepted by onsite contractor quality

control personnel was verified in the field by the NRC CAT inspectors.

1. Control of Design Documents

The specific aspects of the control of design documents inspected

were the availability to the users of the latest approved design

documents and design change documents and the methods of assuring

that approved changes not yet incorporated into design documents

are provided to the users prior to work being performed.

a. Inspection Scope

(1) The following procedures related to distribution and control

of design documents and design change documents were reviewed:

  • Commonwealth Edison Company (Ceco) Quality Requirement

(QR) 3.0 " Design Control," Rev. 15, August 15, 1984.

  • Ceco QR 6.0, " Document Control," Rev. 9, August 15, 1984.
  • Ceco Quality Procedure (QP) 6-1, " Distribution of Design

Documents," Rev. 7, October 10, 1983.

VII-1

  • Ceco QP 6-2, " Procedure for Station Construction Department

Design Document Control," Rev. 3, May 12, 1983.

CECO Braidwood Nuclear Station Project Procedure PCD-03,

" Field Change Request," Rev. O, June 15, 1984.

  • Sargent & Lundy Engineers (S&L) General Quality Assurance

Procedure (GQ) 3.07, "Sargent & Lundy Drawings," Rev. 6,

October 21, 1981.

  • S&L GQ-3.13, " Engineering Change Notices," Rev. 6,

October 21, 1981.

  • S&L GQ-6.01, " Project Distribution List and Project File

Indexes," Rev. 5, October 21, 1981.

  • S&L Project Instruction for Byron /Braidwood (PI-BB) 29,

" Distribution and Control of Design Documents for S&L

Field Personnel at the Byron /Braidwood Stations," Rev. 2,

August 2, 1985.

  • Hatfield Electric Company (HECo) Procedure No. 4, " Drawing

Control," Rev. 13, April 10, 1985.

Reliable Sheet Metal Works, Inc. (RSM) Procedure No. 7A,

" Document Control," Rev. 1, March 20, 1984.

  • RSM Procedure No. 7, " Design Drawing and Design Change

Control," Rev. 7, March 20, 1984.

Powers-Azco-Pope (PAP) Field Operating Procedure FP-1,

" Document and Drawing Control," Rev. 6, August 29, 1984.

  • Hunter Corporation Site Implementation Procedure 2.101,

" Document Control," Rev. 5, December 12, 1984.

(2) Ceco and contractor Quality Assurance (QA) audit and sur-

veillance reports concerning design document control were

reviewed for findings, trends and corrective actions.

(3) CECO, S&L and contractor document control, engineering,

construction and QA personnel were interviewed concerning

distribution, control and use of design documents and design

change documents,

b. Inspection Findings

S&L design documents and Engineering Change Notices (ECNs) are

distributed by S&L to CECO, contractor and S&L organizations and

personnel in accordance with PI-BB-29 and the S&L distribution

lists. Field Change Requests (FCRs), which are Ceco design change

documents, are distributed by the CECO Project Construction

l Department (PCD) to S&L, contractor and CECO organizations and

personnel.

l

VII-2

Ceco, S&L and the contractors each control the redistribution and

use of design documents and design change documents within their

organizations in accordance with their separate and individual

document control procedures. In general, receipt of design docu-

ments is recorded on control cards or log sheets, the latest

revisions of design documents and design change documents are issued

to the (satellite) document control stations and the superseded

revisions destroyed or stamped. All four contractors' (HEco, RSM,

PAP and Hunter) document control systems reviewed by the NRC CAT

inspectors control the use of approved, unincorporated design change

documents by annotating the design change identification numbers on

the controlled copies of the affected design documents.

The CECO PCD document control station is the " master" against which

other document control station records were evaluated. Typically,

possible contractor discrepancies concerning the latest approved and

issued revision of a design document and the correct annotated

design change documents are resolved by comparison to the design

documents and document receipt logs in the CECO PCD Document Control

Station. The document control list (s), ECN status list and FCR

status list are updated every 30 days in accordance with procedures;

however, the PCD document control clerk maintains a more current

master list by manually entering new issuances as they occur.

(1) The NRC CAT inspectors reviewed approximately 200 S&L drawings

at the CECO PCD document control station for legibility and

correct indication of controlled status (no stamping). Sixty

drawings were reviewed for correct revision and correct

annotation of FCRs/ECNs against the S&L status list of

'

drawings.

Noincorrectdesigndocumentrevisionswereidlntified.

However, a large number of FCRs and ECNs were listed on

controlled drawings. The NRC CAT inspectors selected 6

structural drawings which had 39 FCRs listed as open. Review

of the FCR master log indicated that 35 of the 39 FCRs had

been incorporated . As a result,,the inspectors identified a

,'

concern that PCD was not deleting FCRs/ECNs from construction

drawings in a timely manner after the FCR or ECN was

'

incorporated into the drawing. Further review indicated that

QA Surveillance Report No.' 5872.~had previously identified a

similar concern. Ceco QA had commited to reauditing PCD's

document control program during QA Audit No. 6-84-212. ,

However, a review of this audit by the NRC CAT inspectors

indicated that the concern of not deleting FCRs/ECNs from

construction drawings in a timely manner had not been

addressed. Ceco QA conducted audit No. 6-85-204 during the

inspection period to address this concern. This audit revealed

that over 60 percent of the FCRs and ECNs listed on the

drawings had already been incorporated. PCD has committed to

remove all closed design changes posted on drawings by November

1, 1985.

VII-3

L_

(2) The NRC CAT inspectors reviewed about 75 S&L design documents

at five Hatfield Electric Company (HECo) document control

stations in the Auxiliary Building, Containment Building and QC

trailer for legibility and appropriate stamping (i.e. ,

" controlled"). The revision numbers and FCRs/ECNs annotated

were recorded for about 20 design documents and checked against

the HECo master files. No incorrect design documents were

identified, although several cases were identified where field

personnel had not deleted FCRs or ECNs, from their controlled

drawings. Inspection and installation records were reviewed by

HECo and no outdated FCRs or ECNs were recorded as having been

used in construction or inspection activities.

The NRC CAT inspectors also reviewed document control audit

and surveillances for procedure requirements and adequate

corrective actions. The following deficiences were noted:

-

HEco Procedure No. 4 drawing " Drawing Control", states

"Hatfield QA will perform a monthly surveillance of this

procedure using Form HP-47". The surveillance reports

for April and May 1985 could not be located. HECo

performed three surveillances during the month of

September to verify adequate document control.

-

HECo special surveillance dated July 26, 1985, identified

that HECo was not maintaining current mechanical drawings.

Installation reports had not been reviewed to assure that

installation was in accordance with the current drawings.

HEco performed this review during the inspection period

and determined that installations had been completed in

accordance with current design documents.

(3) The NRC CAT inspectors reviewed about 50 S&L design drawings

!

at three Powers-Azco-Pope (PAP) document control stations,

l

for legibility and correct stamping (i.e., " controlled"). The

i

revision numbers and FCRs/ECNs annotated were recorded for

about 15 design documents and checked against the PAP master

l files.

l

l No incorrect design document revisions were identified. During

i the inspection a controlled copy of S&L Drawing No.

l GE-2-3543604, Rev. C had been mairitained on the engineering

l stick file, however, the drafting controlled copy could not be

l located. Further review by PAP indicated that this drawing was

l voided. PAP stated that S&L electrical drawings were used for

i reference purposes and had not affected installation. PAP was

subsequently removed from distribution of S&L electrical

drawings.

c. Conclusion

For the sample inspected, the control of design documents is

considered adequate.

VII-4

--

N

,

2. Control of Design Change

'

The specific aspects of the control of changes to design inspected

by the NRC CAT were the change control systems for ECNc'and FCRs,

and the implementation and verification of the changes.

.s

a. Inspection Scope

(1) The following proceldures relating to the control of design

changes were reviewed:

CECO QR 3.0, " Design Control," Rev. 15, August 15, 1984.

  • CECO QP 3-1, " Design Control," Rev. 5, October 5, 1984.
  • CECO QP 3-2, " Design Change Control," Rev. 13, October 5,

1984.

'

CECO PCD-02, " Engineering Change Notices," Rev. O, May 24,

1984.

  • Ceco PCD-03, " Field Change Request," Rev. O, June 15, 1984.
  • S&L GQ 3.07, "Sargent & Lundy Drawings," Rev. 6,

October 21, 1981.

S&L GQ 3.08, " Design Calculations," Rev. 5, January 31,

1985.

S&L GQ 3.13, " Engineering Change Notices," Rev. 6,

October 21, 1981.

S&L PI-BB-13, " Procedure for Processing Commonwealth

Edison Company Fiel'd Change Requests (FCRs)," Rev. 12,

September 27, 1984.

S&L PI-BB-18, " Procedure for Handling Commonwealth

Edison Company Field Change Requests Transmitting

'As-Built' Information," Rev. 1, May 7, 1984.

  • S&L PI-BB-23, " Byron /Braidwood Electrical Field Personnel,"

Rev. 7, October.25, 1983.

  • S&L PI-BB-25, " Activities of the On-Site Structural Design

Group," Rev. O, August 29, 1983.

  • S&L PI-BB-28, " Activities of the Byron /Braidwood Station

Mechanical Engineering, Piping Design, Support Design and

Analysis Field Personnel," Rev. 3, August 4, 1983.

Westinghouse Electric Corporation (W) Instruction

PED-B-1.2, " Byron Unit 1 and Unit 2 Engineering Change

Notices," Rev. O, April 1, 1985.

VII-5

-

-

  • W Instruction PED-B-1.3, " Byron Unit 1 and Unit 2 Field

Change Requests," Rev. O, April 1, 1985.

  • Nuclear Power Services, Inc. (NPS) Procedure 3.0.5,

" Design Control - Revisions and Holds," Rev. D, July 23,

1985.

  • HECo Procedure #29, " Field Initiated Requests for Design

Changes," Rev. 8, January 30, 1985.

RSM Procedure No. 7, " Design Drawing and Design Change

Control," Rev. 7, March 20, 1984.

PA.P Field Operating Procedure FP-9, " Design Change / Field

Routing Control," Rev. 10, April 17, 1984.

Hunter Site Implementation Procedure 2.201, " Design Control,"

Rev. 13, June 11, 1984.

(2) CECO and contractor QA audit and surveillance reports con-

cerning design change were reviewed for findings, trends and

corrective actions.

(3) Interviews were conducted with personnel from CECO, S&L,

W, NPS, HECo, RSM, PAP and Hunter concerning initiation

(origination), review, approval and implementation of

design changes.

b. Inspection Findings

S&L has approximately 166 people in their Byron site organization,

of whom about 145 are assigned in engineering and design groups.

The majority of the engineering and design personnel are engaged

in resolving field problems by clarifying design documents and

making design changes.

The contractors perform no engineering or design function; however,

RSM, PAP and Hunter prepare supplementary drawings / sketches from

S&L approved design drawings for use as aids in fabrication and

construction. Generally, such aids are prepared by the contractor

field engineers and both contractor engineering and QC personnel

review them for conformance with the S&L approved drawings.

Design changes are accomplished through design change documents

such as FCRs, ECNs, Field Change Notices (FCNs) and through

revision of design documents without an intermediate design

change document. FCRs are a CECO design change document generally

originated in the field by Ceco or contractor personnel and

approved by both CECO and S&L. ECNs are an S&L design change

document originated in the field or S&L's Chicago office and

approved by S&L. FCNs are a Westinghouse Electric Corporation

(the nuclear steam supply system vendor) change document originated

and approved by offsite Westinghouse personnel. Roughly 42,000

VII-6

m

,-

FCRs/ECNs have been issued for both units. Presently, an average

of about 100 FCRs and 50 ECNs are being issued each month and the

trend is decreasing.

Problems, conflicts and items requiring clarification of the

approved design documents identified by the contractors are

forwarded to S&L for resolution. HECo uses Field Problem Sheets,

RSM uses Ventilation Field Problem Sheets, PAP uses Field Work

Requests, and Hunter uses Piping and Support Field Problem Fonns.

These contractor documents are generally not controlled or

considered QA documents. When resolution requires a design change,

a FCR, ECN, or drawing revision is prepared and issued to the

contractor.

(1) Approximately 46 ECNs and FCRs were selected and reviewed

for procedural compliance, adequacy of problem description

and resolution. These ECNs and FCRs are listed in Table VII-1.

One minor procedural deficiency was identified. The " Request

Class" blocks for " Limited Construction" or " Plant Modifica-

tion" and " Major" or " Minor" changes were not checked on a

number of FCRs. Examples are:

FCR-70113, January 22, 1985

FCR-35607, April 30, 1985

FCR-35608, April 30, 1985

This appears to be inconsistent with the requirements of

Attachment B to CECO QR 3-2.

(2) Six FCRs/ECNs for which the work had been completed and

accepted by contractor QC were selected for verification.

Prior to inspection of physical changes, the base design

drawings, applicable change notices and backup calculations and

QC inspection reports were reviewed by the NRC CAT inspectors.

The physical changes were then inspected in the field to verify

that the changes were implemented as described. Each design

change was found to have been properly completed.

- FCR-35607 and 35608, April 30,1985 - The change

required additional mounting holes to support

instrumentation.

-

FCR 21637, August 11, 1983 - The change required the

addition of a shuttle pan to support cables.

- ECN 22400, July 25, 1984 - The change required the

addition of a flex hose to the Component Cooling System

piping. Snubbers were eliminated and piping was rerouted.

- FCR 33510, September 20, 1984 - That change required

screen stiffeners to be cut to facilitate installation

of security bars.

VII-7

-

-

FCR-25855, March 18, 1985 - The change provided

location and mounting of isolation transformers.

(3) The calculations for about 28 ECNs/FCRs were reviewed for

conformance with applicable requirements. These ECNs and FCRs

are denoted in Table VII-1 by an asterisk.

All the calculations were changes to previously approved

designs, and thus were in effect partial revisions to previous

calculations. They consisted of both hand and computer

calculations, involving mostly structural attachments, core

drilling and pipe supports / restraints. Examples are:

FCR 35607, April 30, 1985

ECN 22400, July 25, 1984

FCR 33510, September 20, 1984

The calculations were reviewed for technical adequacy,

compliance with regulations and commitments and meeting

procedure requirements. The calculations in the sample

inspected were found to be prepared, checked and reviewed

in conformance with procedural requirements. They had been

reviewed and approved prior to the approval date on the

ECNs/FCRs. No calculation errors were observed in the

sample inspected.

(4) In addition, the NRC CAT inspectors in the technical discipline

areas reviewed approximately 50 design change documents

(ECNs/FCRs). The design changes verified were selected after

work had been completed and accepted by contractor QC. Each

design change was reviewed for technical adequacy and the

installation was verified in the field.

c. Conclusions

For the sample inspected, the control of the design change process

is adequate.

VII-8

,

TABLE VII-1

Design Change Document Da+e Issued Responsible Contractor

  • ECN 22400 07/25/84 Hunter
  • ECN 244686 10/14/84 Hunter
  • ECN 245144 12/13/84 Hunter

FCR 21637 08/11/82 HECo

FCR 22915 06/07/83 HECo

FCR 24976 06/11/84 HECo

FCR 24979 06/12/84 HECo

  • FCR 25115 07/13/84 HECo
  • FCR 25761 01/03/84 HECo

FCR 25762 01/03/84 HEco

FCR 25855 03/18/85 HECo

  • FCR 25949 02/11/85 HECo
  • FCR 25993 03/07/85 HEco

FCR 26081 03/25/85 HECo

FCR 30546 01/05/84 Hunter

FCR 31994 04/20/84 Hunter

  • FCR 33137 10/09/84 PAP
  • FCR 33510 09/20/84 RSM

FCR 33706 09/20/84 RSM

FCR 33771 10/25/84 RSM

  • FCR 34005 10/11/84 PAP

FCR 34712 02/11/85 RSM

FCR 34986 06/10/85 Hunter

  • FCR 35081 02/21/85 RSM

FCR 35377 04/05/85 RSM

  • FCR 35378 04/29/85 RSM

FCR 35383 04/09/85 RSM

  • FCR 35601 04/29/85 PAP
  • FCR 35602 04/29/85 PAP
  • FCR 35607 04/30/85 PAP
  • FCR 35608 04/30/85 PAP
  • FCR 35706 05/23/85 RSM
  • FCR 35732 06/26/85 RSM
  • FCR 35827 05/17/85 PAP
  • FCR 35833 05/29/85 PAP
  • FCR 35834 05/29/85 PAP
  • FCR 35835 05/31/85 PAP
  • FCR 35914 07/30/85 RSM
  • FCR 35935 08/13/85 RSM
  • FCR 35970 06/12/85 PAP
  • FCR 36017 08/12/85 PAP
  • FCR 36018 08/12/85 PAP

FCR 70111 01/21/85 Hunter

  • FCR 70113 01/22/85 Hunter

FCR 70114 01/23/85 Hunter

FCR 70123 02/21/85 Hunter

NOTES:

Hunter - Hunter Corporation

HECO - Hatfield Electric Company

PAP - Powers-Azco-Pope

RSM - Reliable Sheet Metal Works, Inc.

  • Indicates that calculations were reviewed.

VII-9

- - - . . _ . _ _

-

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEMS

A. Objective

The objective of this portion of the NRC CAT inspection was to verify,

through selected samples, whether measures were established and

implemented to assure that nonconformances and other conditions adverse

to quality were promptly identified and corrected.

B. Discussion

An examination was made of the licensee's program for identification

and control of nonconformances and corrective actions, including review

of documents and inspection of some material / equipment for verification <

of actual corrective actions in the plant. Items such as the following

were reviewed:

Procedures and organizational interfaces

Trend analyses

Audit and surveillance reports

Nonconformance reports

Deviation reports

Inspection reports

Control of actual material and equipment corrections in the plant

Control of open nonconformances at turnover for testing or operation

Table VIII-1, " Corrective Action Samples," contains a list of samples

that were randomly selected.

The following procedures of on-site _ organizations were found in place, .

and applicable portions pertaining to corrective action were reviewed:

"

. Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)

  • SQI-6, On Site Contractor Nonconformance Reports, Rev. O.
  • SQI-7, QA Handling of CECO Nonconformance Reports, Rev.1.

l * S01-12, Byron Site QA Audits, Rev. 2.

!

i * SQI-31, Byron QA Training Program, Rev. 1.

!

  • SQI-38, Performance and Reporting of Deficiency Trending Analysis

by Site QA, Rev. 1.

Sargent and Lundy (S&L)

[

  • GQ-16.01, Corrective Action Reports, Rev. 6.

l

! VIII-1 l

,

1 --. i - , . , . - - - - -- ,. .- , _ , - . , , , _ , _ , . _ . . _ , _ . - - - _ - . _ - - - , - . - -

,_ . - - .-.,_ ,._,.---.--., - , n,-- - , - , _ , ,

y

  • MAS-30, Technical Monitoring of Quality Related Design Activities,

Rev. A.

Hatfield Electric Company (HECo)

  • Quality Assurance Manual, Rev.16.
  • Procedure No. 1, Method of Preparing Procedures, Rev. 13.
  • Procedure No. 6. Reporting Damaged or Nonconforming Material or

Equipment, Rev. 14.

  • Procedure No. 8, Audits, Rev. 5.
  • Procedure No. 12 Installation of Class IE Equipment, Rev. 8.

Hunter Corporation (Hunter)

  • Quality Assurance Manual, Rev. 7.
  • SIP-3.801, Storage of Mechanical Components and Materials, Rev. 5.

SIP-4.201, Installation Verification, Rev.11.

SIP-11.101, Nonconformance Processing, Rev. 4.

_P_owers-Azco-Pope (PAP)

  • Quality Assurance Manual, Rev. 3.
  • QC-4, Nonconformance Control, Rev. 11.

QC-5, Site Audit, Rev. 11.

R_eliable Sheet Metal (RSM)

  • Quality Assurance Manual, Rev. O.

Procedure No. 5, Site Quality Assurance Audits, Rev. 5.

  • Procedure No. 10, Nonconformance and Corrective Action, Rev. 4.
  • Procedure No. 23 Installation Verification, Rev. 2.

Blount Brothers Company (BBC)

  • Quality Assurance Manual, Rev. 1.

Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories (PTL)

  • QC-1A-1, Internal Audits, Rev. 8.
  • QC-CRN-1, Control and Reporting of Nonconformances, Rev. 2.

VIII-2

1. Corrective Action

a. Inspection Scope

A review was performed of applicable portions of project

procedures. In addition to QA manuals and procedures, a total

of 218 samples of corrective action documents were reviewed, and

six material / equipment samples were inspected for verification

of corrective actions in the plant. Table VIII-1, " Corrective

Action Samples," contains a list of documents and material / equip-

ment samples that were randomly selected and inspected.

b. Inspection Findings

In general, it was found that satisfactory procedures were in

place for corrective action systems to identify and control the

correction of conditions adverse to quality at the site. Except

for concerns discussed below, the corrective action systems and

implementing measures were found to be acceptable. The six

material / equipment samples requiring rework in the plant were

inspected, and corrective action control was verified.

(1) Numerous problems with fastener material discrepancies on

large vendor-supplied ASME pump / motor assemblies and other

vendor equipment were found by the NRC CAT for which

effective corrective actions were not performed. See

Section VI.B.1.b(2) for details. These problems indicate

a lack of effective quality control at vendors' plants,

and also a lack of vendor surveillance with attention to

verification of proper fasteners prior to shipment.

(2) Radiographs for certain ASME equipment were not provided by

the vendor, Westinghouse Electric Company. Radiographs

requested by NRC CAT inspectors had not been located during

the inspection period. See Section IV.B.11.b for details.

A review of audits performed by both Commonwealth Edison

Company and Westinghouse Electric Company indicated that

the retrievability of radiograph records had not been

addressed during the audits.

(3) A review of four Preoperational Test Release (turnover)

packages revealed that the turnover procedure and release

forms did not include a record of preventive maintenance

status or any related deficiencies. In a limited review

of the licensee's preventive maintenance program, it was

found that the preventive maintenance program was fragmented

among CECO and contractor organizations, and that effective

coordinated control was lacking.

The preventive maintenance program for mechanical equipment

was discussed with Hunter Quality Assurance (QA) personnel

and CECO project construction, startup and operations personnel.

VIII-3

Shaft rotation records for the following five pumps were

reviewed: 2CC01PA, 2CC01PB, 2CS01PA, 2CS01PB, 2AF01PA.

Hunter Procedure SIP-3.801, Storage of Mechanical Components

and Materials, addresses maintenance of mechanical equipment

prior to establishment of the full surveillance program at

turnover to CECO operations. This procedure does not clearly

define programmatic requirements or responsibilities during

periods in which equipment is undergoing flushing or testing

by the CECO staff. Although the equipment has not yet been

' formally turned over to CECO at these stages, there is some

confusion as to maintenance responsibility during this time

frame. For example, Hunter apparently terminates periodic

pump / motor shaft rotations at the time of final coupling and

alignment of pumps to motors. Normally this equipment would

then be flushed by CECO startup personnel and then turned

over to CECO startup/ testing personnel. During these periods,

regular pump operations and monitoring of basic parameters

is conducted by test personnel.

The NRC CAT inspectors identified that for the Containment

Spray Pumps (2CS01PA and 2CS01PB) the scheduled shaft

rotation stopped in March and April of 1985, and due to

flushing delays these pumps had not yet been flushed, run

or otherwise monitored as of September 20, 1985. The

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2AF01PA) was coupled and last

rotated by Hunter in January 1985 and was flushed in May

1985 but has not been turned over to startup or run since

then. The potential long term effects of this lack of

maintenance has not been addressed, and it does not appear

that measures were in place to provide for an evaluation

of this condition.

The overall requirements and responsibilities of the

preventive maintenance program need to be better defined

for the interface period between construction and operation.

c. Conclusions

The licensee's corrective action program was found to be generally

acceptable, except for the following concerns:

,

a. Failure to assure that fasteners of required materials were

! furnished with vendor supplied equipment. ,

b. Failure to assure that radiographs for certain vendor supplied

equipment were properly stored and retrievable as required.

c. Failure to provide for effective specification and performance

of preventive maintenance, particularly from the time of

turnover for testing until turnover for operation.

VIII-4

__

TABLE VIII-1

CORRECTIVE ACTION SAMPLES

ITEMS QUANTITY EXAMINED

CECO S&L W HEC 0 HC PAP RSM BBC PTL TOTAL

Trend Reports 3 - -

1 3 3 3 2 1 16 j

Audit Reports 18 2 16 3 7 7 5 7 1 66

Nonconformance Reports 10 - -

16 10 12 9 10 10 77

Deviation Reports . - - -

10 10 - - 1 -

21

Inspection Reports - - -

10 3 -

4 5 -

22

Surveillance Reports - - - - -

10 - - -

10

Samples for Field - - -

2 2 -

1 1 -

6

Verification of

Corrective Action ,

Turnover Packages 4 - - - - - - - - 4

Unit Concept Report - - - - - - - -

1 1

l Over Inspection - - - - - - - -

1 1

Report

TOTAL 35 2 16 42 35 32 22 26 14 218

CECO = Commonwealth Edison Comapny

l

l S&L = Sargent and Lundy

W = Westinghouse Electric Company

l

'

HECo = Hatfield Electric Company

HC = Hunter Corporation

PAP = Pope-Azco-Pope

RSM = Reliable Sheet Metal

BBC = Blount Brothers Corporation

PTL = Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories

VIII-5

,

L

_ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . __ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _

_

ATTACHMENT A

A. Persons Contacted

The following list identifies licensee discipline coordinators and key

individuals contacted during the inspection for each area.

1. Licensee Coordinators and Contacts

Area Names

Team Leader K. Ainger

D. Tuetken

Electrical and J. Binder

Instrumentation S. Vovos

L. Stern

Mechanical B. Moravec, J. Porter,

B. Somsag, R. Irish

D. Geddings

Welding and NDE D. McCarty, E. Wolber

J. Porter

Civil and Structural J. Mihovilovich, R. Guse

R. Hardison

Material Traceability B. Klinger

E. Briette

Corrective Action Systems E. Martin

D. Felz

Design Change Controls B. Klinger, P. Donavin

B. Byrne

'

In addition to the above personnel, numerous other inspectors, engineers

and supervisors were also contacted.

B. Documents Reviewed

The types of documents listed below were reviewed by the NRC CAT members

to the extent necessary to satisfy the inspection objectives stated in

Section I of this report. There are additional references within the

body of the report to specific procedures, instructions, specifications

and drawings.

1. Final Safety Analysis Report

2. Quality assurance manual

3. Quality assurance procedures and instructions

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- 4. Quality control procedures

5. Administrative procedures

6. General electrical installation procedures and specifications

7. General instrumentation installation procedures

8. General piping and pipe support installation procedures and

specifications

9. General mechanical equipment installation procedures and

specifications

10. General concrete specifications

11. As-built drawings

12. Welding and NDE procedures

13. Personnel qualification records

14. Material traceability procedeires

15. Procedures for processing design changes

i 16. Procedures for document control

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17. Procedures for controlling as-built drawings

18. Procedures for processing nonconformances,, l

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ATTACHMENT B

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AISC - American Institute of Steel Construction  :

ANSI - American National Standards Institute

ASME - American Society of Mechanical Engineers

ASTM - American Society for Testing and Materials

AWS - American Welding Society

ATWS - Anticipated Transient Without Scram '

BBC - Blount Brothers Company

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BY/BR - Byron /Braidwood ,

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CAT - Construction Appraisal Team (NRC)

CB&I - Chicago Bridge and Iron Company

C of C - Certificate of Conformance

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CEA - Concrete Expansion Anchor

CECO - Commonwealth Edison Company ,

CMTR - Certified Material Test Report

l CSCV - Cable Separation Criteria Violation

CSNF - Conduct Separation Notification Report

l DIT - Design Information Transmittal ,

l DR - Deviation Report

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DRC - Deviation Report for Correctable Items

ECN - Engineering Change Notice

l FCN - Field Change Notice

l FCR - Field Change Request

r GQ - General Quality

! HECo - Hatfield Electric Co.

Hunter - Hunter Corp. ,

HVAC - Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning

( IE -OfficeofInspectionandEnforcement(NRC)

i IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers

l IPCEA - Insulated Power Cable Engineers Association i

IRR - Interface Review Report '

LP - Liquid Penetrant Inspection  !

LOCA - Loss-of-Coolant Accident

MIC - Midway Industrial Company

M0V - Motor Operated Valve  :

NCR - Nonconformance Report

l NDE - Nondestructive Examination

NISCo - Nuclear Installation Service Co.

NPS - Nuclear Power Service, Inc.

NRR -OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation(NRC)

NRC - U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission

l NSSS - Nuclear Steam System Supplier

l OAD - Operations Analysis Department

! PAP - Powers-Azco-Pope

PCD - Project Construction Department

PDM - Pittsburgh Des Moines Corp. t

PI-BB - Project Instruction - Byron /Braidwood

PSAR - Preliminary Safety Evaluation Report

PSI - Preservice Inspection i

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PTL - Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories

QA - Quality Assurance

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QAM - Quality Assurance Manual

l QC - Quality Control

QCSSR - Quality Control Structural Steel Review

l QP - Quality Procedure

- Quality Requirement

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QR

RG - Re

RSM -Rd'ulatoryGuide(NRC)

iable Sheet Metal Works, Inc.

SAR - iafety Analysis Report

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SIP - Si*.e Implementation Procedure

, S&L - Saigent and Lundy Engineers

l SWI - Site Work Instruction

l UT - Ultrasonic Inspection

l V - Volt

VT - Visual Inspection

W - Westinghouse Electric Corp.

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