ML20136C758
| ML20136C758 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1985 |
| From: | Georgiev G, Gower G, Heishman R, Malloy J, Nemoto J, Phillips H, Wong H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20136C727 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-455-85-27, NUDOCS 8511210144 | |
| Download: ML20136C758 (117) | |
See also: IR 05000455/1985027
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
DIVISION OF INSPECTION PROGRAMS
REACTOR CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS BRANCH
Report No.: 50-455/85-27
Docket No.: 50-455
Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
Facility Name: Byron Station, Unit 2
Inspection At: Byron, Illinois
Inspection Conducted: August 19-30 and September 9-20, 1985
Inspectors: tw /o/ r/r5'
H.J.Wong,$r.ReactyConstructionEngineer Date Signed
Team Leader
~Akwr
, G. B. Q rgieV, Sr/ Reactor \gonstruction Engineer
isieur
Date' Sighed
he. Lu
G. C. Gower, Sr. Reactor Construction Engineer
tohehr
Date Signed
cla7 mad % io//e/er
Dats Si'gned
Jf A. Ma91oy, R ctor Inspector (Region III)
'Afi9 lDf/WW
I. Remoto, Reactor Construction Engineer Date S1gned
sHJ $1 M-/f SV
H. W. Pt/illips, Reactof Construction Engineer Date Signed
Consultants: R. M. Compton, D. C. Ford, J. B. McCormack,
0. P. Mallon, W. S. Marini, E. Y. Martindale,
R. E. Serb, W. J. Sperko, Jr. , and D. G. Whatley
Approved By: U /#/3'/h
R~obert F. Heishman, Chief Da'te Signed
Reactor Construction Programs Branch
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TOPIC SECTION
INSPECTION SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES...................................... I
ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTATION CONSTRUCTION.......................... II
MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTION.............................................. III
WELDING AND NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION............................... IV
CIVIL AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRUCTION.................................... V
MATERIAL TRACEABILITY AND CONTR0L.................................... VI
DESIGN CHANGE CONTR0L................................................ VII
CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEMS............................................ VIII
ATTACHMENT A - PERSONS CONTACTED AND DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
ATTACHMENT B - GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
e
I. INSPECTION SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
The objective of this inspection was to evaluate the adequacy of construc- '
tion at the Byron Unit 2 Station. This objective was accomplished through
review of the construction program, evaluation of project construction
controls, and review of selected portions of the Quality Assurance
Program, with emphasis on the installed hardware in the field. The scope
and significance of identified problems were also determined.
Within the areas examined, the inspection consisted of a detailed examina-
tion of selected hardware subsequent to quality control inspections, a
selective examination of procedures and representative records, and
limited observation of in-process work.
For each of the areas inspected, the following was determined:
.Were project construction controls adequate to assure quality
construction?
Was the hardware or product fabricated or installed as designed?
Were quality verifications performed during the work process with
applicable hold points?
Was there adequate documentation to determine the acceptability of
installed hardware or product?
Are systems turned over to the startup organization in operable
condition and are they being properly maintained?
I-1
II. . ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTATION CONSTRUCTION
' '
A. Objective
The primary objective of the appraisal of electrical and instrumentation
construction was to determine whether Class 1E components and systems
were installed in accordance with regulatory-requirements, Safety
Analysis Report (SAR) commitments and approved vendor and construction
specifications and drawings. Additional objectives were to determine
whether procedures, instructions and drawings used to accomplish
construction activities were adequate and whether quality related
records accurately reflect the completed work.
B. Discussion
Within the broad categories of electrical and instrumentation construc-
tion, attention was given to several specific areas. These included
electrical cable, raceways and raceway supports, electrical equipment,
and instrumentation cable and components. Additionally, an examination
of components which comprise a selected process system was accomplished.
A number of documents were generated by the licensee to record
individual observations of the NRC Construction Appraisal Team.(CAT)
inspectors, thgse are referenced directly in the discussions that
follow.
1. Electrical Raceway Installation
a. Inspection Scope
Fifty-seven segments of installed Class IE cable tray representing
a total length of about 1,100 feet, were selected from various
plant areas for detailed examination by the NRC CAT inspectors.
These segments were inspected for compliance to requirements
relative to routing, location, separation, support spacing and-
configuration, identification, protection and physical ~1oading.
Additionally, 24 runs of installed conduit, with an aggregate length
of about 850 feet, were inspected for compliance to specified
requirements such as routing, location, separation, bend radii,
support spacing and associated fittings.
Over 25 raceway supports were examined in detail for such items as
location, material, anchor spacing, weld quality, bolt torque and
installed configuration. Also examined were over 120 concrete
expansion anchors.
'
See Table II-1 for a listing of cable tray, conduit and raceway
support samples.
The following documents provided the basic acceptance criteria for
the inspection:
Sargent & Lundy (S&L) Specification F-2790, " Electrical Installa-
tion Work Byron Station - Units 1 and 2," Amendment 46.
II-1
,,
4
Hatfield Electric Company (HECo) Quality Control Procedure 9A,
" Class I Cable Pan Hanger Installation," Revision 13.
HECo Quality Control Procedure 9B, " Class I Cable Pan Installa-
tion," Revision 15.
HECo Quality Control Procedure 20, " Class I Exposed Conduit
System Installation," Revision 14.
S&L " Standard Specification for Concrete Expansion Anchor Work,"
Revision 6.
b. Inspection Findings
In the area of electrical raceway, the NRC CAT inspectors observed
that, in general, Class IE raceway installations were in accordance
with applicable design criteria. Quality attributes such
as material type, location, identification and installed configura-
tion were found to be as shown on approved construction drawings.
However, several design and/or construction deficiencies were
identified and are discussed below.
(1) Raceway Separation
The Byron Station Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section
8.3.1.4.2 " Physical Separation Criteria" provides the basic
criteria for acceptable raceway and cable installations. This
FSAR section describes commitments for physical arrangement of
raceways pertaining to the requirements of Regulatory Guide
(RG) 1.75 for independence of redundant systems.
In general, these FSAR criteria specify the physical separation
that must be maintained between components of redundant
electrical divisions. Additionally, separation is required
between components performing Class 1E and non-Class 1E
functions.
The NRC CAT examination of electrical raceways indicates that a
number of installations are not in accordance with the FSAR
requirements. See Table II-2 for a listing of specific raceway
separation deficiencies.
Many of the deficiencies identified involve the spatial
relationship between Class 1E and non-Class IE components,
and are the result of a failure to translate relevant FSAR
requirements into contractor inspection procedures. The NRC
CAT inspectors reviewed HECo Quality Control Procedure 98,
" Class I Cable Pan Installation," and noted that a requirement
of only 1 inch separation had been specified between cable tray
and conduit installations. This distance is not in accordance
with FSAR requirements which specify 12 inches vertical and 3
inches horizontal separation. Consequently, many raceways
which exhibit less than the FSAR required physical separation
had not been identified by inspection personnel.
.
II-2
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As a result of this observation the licensee has indicated
that a walkdown will be performed to ensure that deficiencies
are identified. Procedure PI-88-53 will be implemented on a
sampling basis to identify conduit to tray separation deficien-
cies. Additional 13, during the inspection Sargent & Lundy
prepared the calculation 4391/19Q-15 " Justification of
Electrical Separation Distance Between Safety-Related and
Non-Safety-Related Raceways." This calculation was prepared to
justify separation distances of less than 12 inches vertical
and 3 inches horizontal between Class IE conduits and non-Class
IE cable trays or between Class IE cable trays and non-Class 1E
conduits. This analysis will be presented to NRR for evalua-
tion.
Additional deficiencies were identified between raceway compo-
nents which exhibited less than 1 inch of physical separa- ,
tion. Several of these raceways contain cables required for
Unit 1 operation and as such, were installed in the early
stages of Unit 2 construction. A review of more recent
construction activities indicate that separation deficiencies
had been identified and documented by inspection personnel.
As a result of these observations the licensee issued Conduit
Separation Notification Reports CSNF-78 through CSNF-86 to
identify and evaluate these conditions.
In suntnary, the review of construction activities indicates
that quality verification programs have not been adequate to
assure that FSAR commitments relative to electrical separation
have been met. Additionally, recently completed analysis which
provides technical justification for existing separation
deficiencies will require additional evaluation by the NRC.
(2) Electrical Conduit
. With the exception of the specific deficiencies listed below
the conduit sample inspected conformed to applicable design and
installation requirements relative to such attributes as size,
routing, identification and supports. Conformance to separa-
tion requirements are discussed in Section II.B.I.b.(1),
Raceway Separation, above.
Conduit C2R3452 was found to be missing the required segrega-
tion code marker at its entrance to junction box 2JB417R.
Several damaged flexible conduits were observed which terminate
at cubicle coolers 2VA035A and 2VA02SB. The damage to conduit
2VA035A had been previously identified by the licensee on
DR-7261. However, damage to conduit 2VA02SB had not been
documented. As a result of this observation Rework Request
6970 and 6971 were issued to correct both deficiencies.
Damaged flexible conduit C2R1187 was observed at flow trans-
mitter 2FT-415. The licensee subsequently issued Deficiency
Report (DR)-8015 to document this condition.
l II-3
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' No other deficiencies were identified in this area.
~(3) Raceway Supports
The examination of raceway supports was accomplished.for both
conduit and cable tray applications. Attributes such as
location, material type and size, anchor spacing, welds
.(location,. size and general quality), and installed configura-
tion were found to be in accordance with design requirements.
During the examination of cable tray supports, NRC CAT inspec-
tors identified a loose attachment bolt on a horizontal member
of support H060. As a result of this observation CECO has
initiated DR-7810 to document and correct this condition.
Cable tray support H011 contained one spring nut which had
been improperly. installed. The licensee has issued Rework
Request 07202 to document and correct this condition.
Concrete expansion anchor deficiencies were identified on
several raceway supports. These included items such as missing
washers on supports WS-32 and WCA-1 and anchors which failed
-to exhibit the required torque on support WCA-1 and junction
box 2JB126R.
Although several deficiencies were identified in this area, '
NRC CAT inspectors consider them to be isolated and.in
general, the installation of raceway supports was in accordance
-with requirements. ,
c. Conclusions
Except as noted, raceway systems have been installed in accordance
with applicable design and installation requirements. Physical
e separation criteria detailed in the licensee's FSAR have not been
maintained in a number of raceway installations. Many of the-
deficiencies identified involve the spatial relationship between
Class 1E and non-Class IE components, and are the result of a
failure to translate relevant FSAR commitments into contractor
inspection procedures.
7
However, preliminary discussions with NRR and the results of i
recently completed tests and analysis by the licensee indicate that
lesser separation may be acceptable. This matter remains apen
pending NRC final review and evaluation.
!
,
II-4
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2. Electrical Cable Installation
a. Inspection Scope
The NRC CAT inspectors selected a sample of installed Class 1E
cable runs that had been previously accepted by Quality Control (QC)
inspectors. The sample included high voltage, power, control and
instrumentation cabling. For each of the cable runs, physical
.
inspection was made to ascertain compliance with applicable design
criteria relative to size, type, location / routing, bend radii,
protection, separation, identification and support.
Additionally, the NRC CAT inspectors selected approximately 300
cable ends for examination. These were inspected to applicable
design and installation documents for items such as lug size and
type, proper terminal point configuration, correct identification
of cable and conductors, proper crimping of lugs or connectors and
absance of insulation or jacket damage. See Table II-3 for a
listing of cable terminations examined.
The following high voltage and power cable, totaling about 1,500
feet, were selected from different systems, electrical trains and
locations:
Cable Tray
2RH001-PIE 3/C #2 SKV
2RH008-P2E 3/C #2 SKV
2SI001-P1E 3/C #2 5KV
2AP288-P1E 3/C 500 MCM
2RC085-P1E 3/C #6 600V
The following control cables totaling approximately 1,050 feet were
selected from different systems, electrical trains and locations:
Cable Tray
2RH010-C2E 9/C'#14 600V
2MS284-C1E 1/C #4 600V
2MS315-C1E 9/C #14 600V
2RC092-CIE 12/C #14 600V
2RH037-C2E 12/C #14 600V
2SI398-C2E 1/C #14 600V
The following instrument cable totaling approximately 1,050 feet
were selected from different systems, electrical trains and
locations:
l
II-5
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, _ _ - . . - _ .
Cable Tray
2RC224-K4R 1 TW PR #16 600V
2RC428-K3R 1 TW PR #16 600V
2RY203-K2R 1 TW PR #16 600V
2RY210-K4R 1 TW PR #16 600V
2RC337-K1R 2 TW PR #16 600V
2RC376-K2R 1 TW PR #16 600V
The following documents provided the basic acceptance critetia for
the inspection:
S&L Specification F-2790, " Electrical Installation Work Byron
Station - Units 1 and 2," Amendment 46.
HECo Quality Control Procedure 11, " Class 1 Cable Termination and
Splicing," Revision 21.
HECo Quality Control Procedure 10, " Class I Cable Inst?llation,"
Revision 23.
b. Inspection Findings
(1) Routing
In general, the routing of Class 1E cables thro 9gh design
designated raceway systems was found to be in accordance with
specified criteria. Each of the Class 1E cables examined by
NRC CAT inspectors had been instelled in acicNance with toe
routing detailed on the pull ticket.
(2) Separation
In general, separation of Class 1E cables was found to be in
accordance with requirements. Several separction deficiencies
were observed in cables and' vendor wiring installed inside of
electrical equipment. However, for each of the deficiencies
identified the licensee had previously initiated the appro-
priate documentation to assure that the condition was subse-
quently evaluated or corrected.
The NRC CAT inspectors reviewed the separation of " Quasi-
safety-related" cables. These are described by Sargent & Lundy
as Class 1E cables which have been identified with non-Class 1E
! segregation codes and in some instances have been routed in
l non-Class 1E raceways. (Classification and use of " Quasi-
l safety-related" cables is discussed in Section II.B.2.b.(5) of
this report).
4
Based upon discussions with the licensee, Interface Review
Reports (IRR) are prepared to assure proper separation of
" Quasi-safety-related" cables when they share an equipment
'.
enclosure with Class 1E cables. Cable Separation Criteria
Violations (CSCV) are prepared for " Quasi-safety-related"
cables which share a raceway with Class 1E cables. However,
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_
, ..
, .- . _ . . - . - .
.
j. NRC CAT inspectors noted that non-Class IE raceway does not
receive Quality Control inspection, and as such, electrical
separation would not have been verified for the routing of
these " Quasi-safety-related" circuits when routed in non-Class
IE conduits.
NRC CAT inspectors concluded that, additional licensee
attention is required to assure that these cables maintain the
degree of physical separation specified by the FSAR.
See Table II-4 for a listing of " Quasi-safety-related"
cables.
Section II.B.2.b.(5) " Cable Identification" of this report
details additional concerns regarding " Quasi-safety-related"
cables.
(3) Power Cable Spacing and Derating
Byron Station power cable installations have been designed in
accordance with Insulated Power Cable Engineers Association
(IPCEA) publications P-46-426, 1962 " Power Cable Ampacities -
Volume I - Cooper Conductors" and P-54-400, 1972 "Ampacities -
Cables in Open Top Cable Trays." Power cables have been
derated in accordance with the IPCEA standards such that cables
sharing raceways may be in contact.
!
No deficiencies were identified in this area.
(4) Cable Damage
L No specific instances of Class 1E cable damage were identified
l during the NRC CAT inspection. However, several Class IE
l cables were observed whose ends had not been taped or sealed
i
'
after installation thus exposing conductor ends to the environ-
ment and construction activities. While not a procedural
requirement, NRC CAT inspectors consider this to be a workman-
ship weakness in that the potential for cable damage is y
increased when cable ends remain unsealed.
(5) Cable Identification
l
l The identification of Class 1E cable generally conformed to the
l applicable requirements and for most of the samples examined
l was found to be in accordance with applicable design criteria.
l However, one area of deficiency was identified and is discussed
in the following section.
The Byron Station FSAR section 8.3.1.3.4 describes
requirements for cable identification as follows "...All power
control and instrumentation cables are identified by a unique
number of permanent color coded tags.. The tags shall be
color coded as in Table 8.3.4, allowing positive
,
II-7
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i
identification of safety-related cables." Section 8.3.1.4.3 ,
describes cable segregation codes and specifies that cables l
will be segregated based on the following categories:
E = Engineered Safety Features
B = Non-Safety-Related
R = Reactor Trip
N = Neutron Monitoring
A = Associated
Section 8.3.1.4.3 states, in part..."Each non-Class 1E cable
which has any part of it's length in a Division 11 (21) or 12
(22) tray, connects to a Class IE power system, shares an
enclosure with a Class 1E circuit, or is not physically
separated from Class 1E cables by acceptable distance or
barriers, is a division associated cable (Category A)."
During the examination of Class 1E cables NRC CAT inspectors
identified a number of "B" non-safety-related cables which had
been installed in Class 1E raceways. Subsequent discussions
with the licensee and Sargent & Lundy personnel disclosed that
these were " Quasi-safety-related" cables and were installed in
accordance with design requirements. NRC CAT inspectors were
not able to determine the function of these cables because they
are not defined in the Byron Station FSAR or on approved design
documents. However, based upon discussion with Sargent & Lundy
personnel " Quasi-safety related" cables are described as cables
which are part of a Class 1E circuit, (serving a safety-related
function) and have a portion of their routing in the Turbine
building. Thus, safety-related cables have been identified as
non-safety-related, because they are routed in a Category II
structure.
NRC CAT inspectors concluded that this method of identification
was not in accordance with the licensee's FSAR commitments
which state that non-safety-related cables sharing an enclosure
with safety-related cables become and are identified as
division associated cable (Category A).
Additional concerns regarding separation of " Quasi-safety-
related" cables are discussed in Section II.B.2.b.2 of this
report. See Table II-4 for a listing of " Quasi-safety-related"
cables.
As a result of this observation the licensee has proposed an
amendment to the FSAR which would define the function and
handling of these cables. ,
(6) Terminations
In general, cable termination activities performed by
construction personnel conformed to requirements. However,
several construction deficiencies were identified and are
discussed in the sections which follow.
II-8
_
Termination of-internal wires at terminal point TBR-24 of
panel 2PA02J are improperly installed, due to spooning of
terminal lugs. Subsequent to this observation the licensee has
issued DR-7856 to document and correct this condition.
The terminal lug on the "Wht" conductor of cable 2IP023 in
panel 2AP02J was observed to be excessively bent at terminal
point TPT-2. As a result of this observation the licensee has
issued DR-7855 to correct this condition.
Insulation on the "B1k" and "Wht" conductors of cable 2FW876
was found cut to the bare conductor at terminal points TBR-1
and TBR-2 of panel 2PA02J. The licensee has issued DR-7854 to
correct this condition.
The "Bik" and "Wht" conductors of cable 2WO203 are landed on
terminal points 32-3 and 32-7 instead of terminal points 33-2
and 33-7 as required on the approved design drawing 2-4054G,
Revision F. Subsequent to this observation the licensee has
issued DR-7857 to document and correct this condition.
Several violations of conductor minimum bend radius require-
ments were observed. These occurred predominantly in panel
wireways, where there was congestion of field installed cable.
Bend radius deficiencies were observed in several Class 1E
panels but occurred frequently in sections of the Main Control
Boards and the Diesel Generator Control panels. As a result of
this observation the licensee issued the following Discrepancy
Reports 7852, 7853, 7858 and 7860.
NRC CAT inspectors concluded, based upon the quantity and
frequency of deficiencies identified that additional licensee
attention will be required in this area to assure that Class 1E
wiring configurations conform to requirements and general
workmanship standards.
During the examination of internal wiring in panel 2PA13J, one
wire with a blue outer jacket was observed. This wire was
physically bundled with other Class 1E wires within the
panel. Further investigation disclosed that this wire is
'
General Electric type SI58101,:which is not qualified for
Class 1E service. As a result of this observation the
. licensee initiated the following actions:
- ~
- Rework Request 6937 was initiated to replace the
subject wire with a qualified length of wire.
- Analysis IRR-2EF088-1 was presented which justifies the
bundling of this non-1E wire with the 1E wiring within
this panel.
II-9
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- Correspondence was produced which instructs field forces
.to use only two types of switchboard wire at the Byron
site. These are: Vulkene E-11352-1 (with yellow outer t
jacket) which may be used for drain wire extentions; and
Rockbestos Firewall SIS, which shall be used for all
I
.other applications.
During the course of this inspection, NRC CAT inspectors
found no additional instances of unqualified switchboard wire,
and as such, have determined the above wiring to be an
. isolated case.
During the examination of Class 1E cable terminations NRC CAT
inspectors identified numerous conductors which contained
in-line butt splices. The use of in-line butt splices is not
consistent with the licensee's FSAR commitment to IEEE 420,
which prohibits the use of wiring splices in panels.
As a result of this observation the licensee has proposed an
FSAR. amendment to resolve this condition.
The NRC CAT inspectors examined the installation and use of
Raychem heat shrink in Class 1E terminations. During the
inspection several deficiencies were observed and are
discussed below.
NRC CAT inspectors' reviewed drawing (6E-2-3503) which
, specifies the use of Raychem heat shrink jacket tubing in
'
Class 1E terminations. The drawing stipulates that use of
this material is qualified by the following note:
"To obtain the required qualified version of this tubing
the purchase order must state the following:
Raychem type WCSF-U shrinkable sleeve, documentation
to include certification of compliance, (Raychem No.
ENGC-154) certifying that material has been tested to
l the requirements of IEEE 323-1974 and IEEE 383-1974 for-
,
aging, radiation, and local environment, as indicated
l on Raychem reports EDR 2001 and EDR 5019."
l .
NRC CAT inspectors observed that Raychem report EDR 5019 had
tested type WCSF-N heat shrinkable tubing. However, the
WCSF-U tubing specified on drawing (6E-2-3503) had not been
tested by this report.
L Discussions with the manufacturer (Raychem) indicates that the
l chemical / physical makeup of both WCSF-N and WCSF-U are
i identical. However, WCSF-N tubing contains an additional
adhesive which is used to meet the requirements of Section
+
2.4.3 of IEEE 383 for environmental seal during LOCA
'
simulation.
1
l
II-10
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-e- .. w r g+-+--, em.-,,,~e.,.,- .,,_,-m,-..,,-w.. . . , - , - - , - . . - - - - - - -,e,-,,. -,. -_- ..---n.- --~---,,--n,.-n n,, ..n- --,-.mq ,e--, g,
Based upon these discussions and review of the applicable
portions of IEEE 383 NRC CAT inspectors concluded that Raychem
type WCSF-U tubing was not qualified for LOCA conditions and
as such could not meet the requirements specified on the
licensee's design drawirg.
In connection with this issue NRC CAT inspectors reviewed the
Certificate of Compliance provided with WCSF-U type material
and observed that the vendor (Raychem) had certified
qualification per the instructions of the design drawing
mentioned above. Based upon the information and discussions
presented above, NRC CAT inspectors concluded that the
Certificate of Compliance was in error in that, WCSF-U
material does not meet the requirements of section 2.4.3 of
As a result of this observation the licensee has initiated a
design change to correct the wording of the note on drawing
6E-2-3503 and to assure that WCSF-U heat shrinkable sleeve
will be used only as an outer jacket on nuclear qualified
Class 1E terminations.
Additional deficiencies were observed in activities associated
with wiring of Class 1E valve operators. This subject is
discussed in detail isSection II.B.3.b.(8) of this report.
c. Conclusions
The identification and routing of some Class 1E cabling (" Quasi-
safety-related) is not in accordance with FSAR commitments to
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.75 for " Physical Independence of Redundant
Systems."
Increased licensee attention is necessary in the workmanship of
cabling and terminations in that some terminal lugs were improperly
installed, insulation cut, improper termination points, and minimum
bend radius violations. Although each instance was not individually
significant, additional attention is warranted.
The use of in-line butt splices on wiring in electrical panels is
not in accordance with FSAR commitments.
3. Electrical Equipment Installation
a. Inspection Scope
Approximately 40 pieces of installed or partially installed electri-
cal equipment and associated hardware items were inspected. Samples
were selected tased on system function and safety classification.
The following specific electrical components were inspected in
detail:
II-11
(1) Motors
The installation of five motors and associated hardware was
inspected for such items as location, anchoring, grounding,
identification and protection. The motors inspected were:
Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor 2RH01PA
Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor 2RH01PB
Safety Injection Pump Motor 2SIO1PA
Aux Feedwater Pump Motor 2AF01PA
Component Cooling Pump Motor 2CC01PB
(2) Electrical Penetration Assemblies
The location, type, mounting and identification of these
penetrations were compared with the installation drawings and
vendor manual.
The following containment penetration assemblies were
inspected:
2SIO2E-2P2E Misc. Power
2NR01E-2KN Neutron Monitoring
2SIO4E-2C2E Control
2SIO3E-2C1E Misc. Control
2LV10E-2K2E ESF Instrumentation
(3)' Circuit Breakers
Circuit breakers for the following Class 1E motors were
examined to determine compliance with design and installation
documents for size, type, system interface and maintenance.
Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor (Bus 241 Cub. 19)
Safety Injection Pump Motor (Bus 242 Cub. 19)
The use of circuit breakers with integral undervoltage trip
attachments at this facility was also investigated.
(4) Switchgear and Motor Control Centers
The following switchgear and motor control centers were
inspected:
Motor Control Center 2AP2SE - MCC231X2
Motor Control Center 2AP26E - MCC231X4
Motor Control Center 2AP28E - MCC232X4
4160V Switchgear 2AP05E
4160V Switchgear 2AP06E
(5) Station Batteries and Racks
The 125V battery rooms including the installed batteries,
battery racks and associated equipment were inspected. The
location, mounting, maintenance and environmental control for
II-12
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installation of the batteries were compared with the
applicable requirements and quality records.
125V DC Battery 2DC01EA, 2DC01EB
125V DC Battery- 2DC02EA, 2DC02EB
(6) 125V DC System Equipment
The following equipment comprising portions of the 125V DC
systems were inspected for compliance to design documents for
such items as location, mounting (welds, concrete anchors and
bolting) and proper configuration.
Battery Charger 2DC03E
Battery Charger 2DC04E
DC Distribution Panel 2]C05E
DC Distribution Panel 20C06E
DC Fuse Panel 2DC11J
NSSS Static Inverter 2IP06E
(7) Control Panels
A number of Class 1E electrical control panels were inspected
for compliance to design requirements for items such as loca-
tion, mounting and type. The panels inspected were:
Main Control Board 2PM06J
Main Control Board 2PM01J
Diesel Generator Control Panel 2PLO8J
Aux Relay Cabinet 2PA31J
Aux Relay Cabinet 2PA27J
Remote Shutdown Panel 2PLO4J
(8) Motor Operated Valves (MOVs)
,
Five motor operated valves were examined in detail.
!
2RH8702-A
2RC8001-B
2SI8808-D
i 2SI8809-B
l 2CS019-8
l
i As the result of deficiencies identified in this area addi-
l tional MOVs were inspected and are discussed in the body of the
report.
The following documents provided the basic acceptance criteria for
the inspections:
- S&L Specification F-2790, " Electrical Installation Work Byron
Station - Units 1 and 2," Amendment 46.
- HECo Quality Control Proccdure 12, " Installation of Class 1E
Equipment," Revision 8.
II-13
1
-
,.n -
- - , . --e -
, a
,
HEco Quality Control Procedure 12A, "Modificaticn of Class 1E
Equipment," Revision 10.
- S&L " Standard Specification for Concrete Expansion Anchor
Work" Revision 6.
b. Inspection Findings
(1) Motors
In general, the installation of Class IE motors was found to
be in accordance with applicable design documents. Motors
examined were of the size, type and configuration specified
and construction maintenance activities had been performed in
accordance with approved procedures. However, deficiencies in
the areas of motor mounting and post-construction maintenance
activities were identified.
Reference Section VI " Material Traceability and Control," for a
detailed discussion of these deficiencies.
(2) Penetrations
Penetrations examined were found to have been installed in
accordance with applicable design documents. Installation
requirements including performance of required maintenance
activities had been accomplished in accordance with approved
construction procedures.
No construction or maintenance deficiencies were observed in
this area.
(3) Circuit Breakers
The examination of the Westinghouse type 50DHP350 circuit
breakers indicated that they had been purchased, installed and
maintained in accordance with the applicable design
documents. Important installation attributes such as proper
alignment, main contact penetration and safety interlocks were
verified by physical inspection and review of construction
test records. Maintenance records were also reviewed and
indicate that lubrication and set point verification had been
performed.
NRC CAT inspectors also evaluated licensee initiated actions
and review of NRC Information Notice 83-18 " Failures of the
Undervoltage Trip Function of Reactor Trip System Breakers"
and NRC Generic Letter 83-28 " Required Actions Based on
Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events." Byron Station
Units 1 & 2 will utilize the Westinghouse type D5-416 breakers
in the Reactor Trip System. Review of supplemental actions to
Generic Letter 83-28 indicates that the licensee will
implement Westinghouse proposed corrective actions and will
ensure that all DS-416 reactor switchgear undervoltage
attachments are replaced with a new design and tested prior to
II-14
-
the fuel load. This work will be controlled by Westinghouse
Field Change Notice (FCN) CBEM 10685.
(4) Switchgear and Motor Control Centers
In general, the installation of Class 1E Motor Control Centers
was found to be in accordance with applicable requirements.
However, examination of the Class IE 4160V switchgear units
indicates that several construction deficiencies exist.
During the examination of switchgear units 2AP05E and 2AP06E
NRC CAT inspectors observed that hold down welds do not match
the configuration detailed on approved design draw'ngs. Detail
47 on drawing 0-3391C specifies a four sided weld at each of
six locations per cubicle. Actual field configurations were
found to have welds on only two sides. Additionally, a
detailed examination of these welds indicates in some cases
insufficient weld metal due to gaps between the embed plate and
the equipment sheet metal.
NRC CAT inspectors reviewed the associated QC inspection
records for this equipment and observed that these deficiencies
had not been identified by inspection personnel.
Similar deficiencies were previously identified by the licensee
on Unit 1 equipment. However, they had not been reviewed for
impact on relevant Unit 2 equipment.
As a result of this observation the licensee has initiated
CECO Nonconformance Report (NCR) 1669 to document and correct
this condition.
(5) Station Batteries and Racks
The condition of the battery rooms was found to be in good
order, clean and free of debris. Ventilation systems were
installed and in operation. Access to these areas was
controlled by keyed entry, and the appropriate danger signs
had been posted to prohibit smoking or open flames.
The 125V batteries were examined and found to be in good
condition. Maintenance activities were reviewed and, in
l general, had been performed in accordance with requirements.
! During the review of battery maintenance records, NRC CAT
'
inspectors noted that intercell resistance data had exceeded
the acceptance level of 150 micro-ohms between cells 46 and 47
of battery bank 212. The review of associated surveillance
records indicates that this deficiency had been properly
documented and the condition had been corrected in accordance
with the requirements of Deviation Report 06-02-84 and Nuclear
Work Request B11357.
II-15
The inspection of the 125V battery racks disclosed that
indeterminate bolting materials had been used in the assembly
process. This issue is discussed in detail in Section VI,
" Material Traceability and Control," of this report.
NRC CAT inspectors also identified two anchor bolts which did
not nave the required embedment length. Sargent & Lundy
specification for concrete expansion anchors requires a minimum
embedded length (Le) of four inches for a 1/2 inch nominal bolt
diameter. Two of the bolts examined exhibited (Le) of only 3
1/2 inches. Discussions with the licensee indicate that
original inspection requirements did not include verification
of (Le), consequently, these deficiencies had not been identi-
fied.
As a result of this observation the licensee initiated a
Deficiency Report to document and evaluate this condition.
Based upon this evaluation it was determined that the anchors
-
are structurally sound and will perform their intended
function in the existing configuration.
No other deficiencies were identified in this area.
(6) 125V DC System
i
With the exception of the mounting deficiency discussed below,
inspection of components which comprise portions of the 125V
DC system disclosed no deficiencies relative to the installed
- configuration of the equipment.
During examination of 125V DC fuse panel 2DC11J NRC CAT
inspectors observed that the mounting weld configuration did
i
'
not match the details shown on approved design drawings.
Detail 158 of drawing 0-3391K specifies a maximum spacing of
l 10 1/2 inches between weld edges. Actual field measurements
i indicate that seven of ten weld to weld dimensions exceed this
spacing requirements, some by as much as seven inches.
, Discussions with the licensee indicates that these deficiencies
i may be the result of inadequate contractor interface and
inspection responsibility changes.
i As a result of this observation the licensee has issued
l Deficiency Report 7373 to document and correct this condition.
!
(7) Control Panels
The control panels examined were installed in accordance with
applicable design documents. No deficiencies were identified
in this area.
II-16
_.
._
i
l
(8) Motor Operated Valves
'
In general motor operated valve termination activities
performed by construction personnel conformed to
requirements. However, several wiring deficiencies were
observed and are discussed below.
The NRC CAT :nspectors examined seven motor operated valves
and found five which contained wiring not terminated at the
correct termination points.
The internal jumpers from termination points 3C to 17C and
,-
internal jumpers on termination points 3L to 13C were
installed on MOVs 2RL 8001D, 2RL 80020 and 2RC 8002D.
These terminations were in conflict with wiring diagrams
6E-42308, 6E-4230C and 6E-42300.
Motor operated valvc 2RC 8002D had termination points 11
(black / white) and llc (blue / black) reversed on cable 2RC
171 (wiring diagram 6E-42300).
Motor operated valve 2CC-9438 had internal jumper termina-
'
tion points 17 and 17C reversed and 18 and 18C reversed
(wiring diagram 6E-2-4861, speed memo between Steve
Bindernagel and Tom Lamb dated 1-23-84).
NRC CAT inspectors reviewed relevant inspection reports and
'
observed that Hatfield Quality Control inspectors had accepted
the installation of these MOVs. During discussions with the
NRC CAT, Hatfield inspection personnel indicated that this
condition exists on numerous motor operated valves through the
,
Byron site.
Discussions with the assistant supervisor of 0AD indicated
that the MOV wiring configurations had not been modified since
construction turnover to 0AD. As a result, NRC CAT inspectors
concluded that inspection activities had not been adequate to
assure the MOV wiring was in accordance with applicable design
documents.
In connection with this issue NRC CAT inspectors determined
that inspection ov MOV wiring to terminal points 17, 17C,
18 and 18C could not be accomplished without the aid of a
speed memo dated January 23, 1984, from Steve Bindernagel
to Tom Lamb. This memo provides wiring details which supple-
ment design details shown on approved wiring diagrams.
However, further investigation disclosed that the speed memo
was uncontrolled and not incorporated into design documents or
procedures.
Consequently, this area and associated inspection activities
merit additional attention by the licensee.
II-17
. _ _.
J
~(9)'~ Equipment Idenficiation
The Byron' Station FSAR section 8.3.1.3 " Physical Identification
of Safety-Related Equipment" states, in part..." Color coded
nameplates or labels are used to distinguish between Class 1E
and non-Class 1E components and between components of different
. division, as shown in Table 8.3-4." Divisional color coding
and identification of Class 1E equipment is required so that
plant. maintenance and operations personnel may readily identify
components which serve Class IE functions.
During the examination of Class 1E-electrical equipment NRC CAT ~
inspectors identified several components which had not bee.'
labeled in accordance with FSAR requirements. The Unit 2
Diesel Generator. Control panels and certain Class 1E devices
mounted.on the Unit 2 Fire Hazards panel have been identified
with' black and white labeling which would indicate a non-Class
IE classification.
As a-result of this observation the licensee has issued Design
Information Transmittal (DIT) BB-EPED-0051 which proposes to
revise FSAR section 8.3.1.3 to read " Nameplates with engraved
characters identify each item of safety-related equipment.
Each nameplate is either color coded as in Table 8.3-4 or has
black characters on a white background."
This item will remain open pending further NRC evaluation.
'c. Conclusions
The mounting of'several pieces of Class 1E electrical equipment are
not in accordance with-design requirements. Components such as, the
4160V switchgear divisions 1 & 2 and the 125V DC fuse panel have
been installed with hold down weld configurations which do not match
the details shown on approved design drawings.
A number of deficiencies were observed in QC accepted wiring for
Class JE valve operators. In this area over 50% of the sample
examined exhibited wiring configurations which were not in
accordance with approved wiring diagrams. Consequently, this area
and associated inspection activities will require additional atten-
tion by the licensee.
The. identification labeling of several pieces of Class 1E electrical
equipment is not in accordance with FSAR requirements.
4. Instrumentation Installation
a. Inspection Scope
The NRC CAT inspectors selected a sample of 13 completed runs of
instrument piping, comprising about 940 feet, for a detailed
examination in accordance with specification requirements and
isometric drawings.
11-18
. , -
-Three instrument racks and 18 piping supports were examined for
conformance with requirements including installed configuration,
mounting details, material conformance, identification, and
location. Additionally, a process system was elected for a
detailed inspection of signal path routing and associated equipment.
Thirteen instruments were examined for conformance with requirements
for location, mounting details, and instrument type and range. The
signal path of three instrument loops were traced from their process
connections to their final output devices. Loops examined were
' Pressurizer Pressure Division I and II and Pressurizer Level Divi-
sion II. Components inspected for each loop included sensing lines,
pressure and level transmitters, signal conditioning and isolating
devices, indicating and controlling instruments and the various
connecting cable, electrical penetrations, panel wiring and terminal
points along the signal path. Most instrument components were
examined for such attributes as type, range, output, identification,
qualification, location, mounting and physical separation of
redundant components.
See Table II-5 for listing of piping runs, supports, racks, and
instruments included in the sample.
The following documents provided the acceptance criteria for the
inspection:
S&L Specification F-2739/L2739, " Piping System Installation,"
Amendment 8.
- Powers-Asco-Pope (PAP) Procedure QC-9, " Quality Verification
Procedure," Revision 3.
PAP Procedure FP-9, " Design Change / Field Routing Control,"
Revision 10.
PAP Procedure FP-13, " Hanger Installation and Control,"
Revision 14.
PAP Procedure FP-16, " Identification and Marking of Pipe
and Components," Revision 12.
PAP Procedure FP-19, "As-Built Drawings and Documentation,"
Revision 3.
Applicable design drawings and change documents.
b. Inspection Findings
No deficiencies were identified by the NRC CAT inspectors in the
sample of instruments, racks, piping runs, and supports inspected.
II-19
_ . __ _ _ _- _ .__ . _. ._ _ _ .
+
.
<
'
c. Conclusions
i
The NRC CAT inspectors determined that, based on the above selected
-
sample,. instrumentation, piping, and support installations conform
<
to applica'fle design requirements.
.
I
?
.
+
f
4
4
4
g.-
1
&
h
,
I
r
.
a
i
!
II-20
, .- - . - - , . - _ , . . . . . . ~ . - . - - - . . _ . . . . . - . _ . . . . _ , , . . . . . . . . _ _ . - . , , , . . _ . . , . . - . - . . . . . . , . . - . . , . , . .- - ~ . . . , . . - . . - . , - . . _ . - - - -
TABLE II-1
RACEWAY INSPECTION SAMPLE
Cable Tray:
21415A-P1E 2416CA-P1E 21424C-P1E 21327C-PIE
21326C-P1E 21334C-P1E 21333C-P1E 21330C-P1E
21329C-P1E 21328C-P1E 2R214-PIE 2R213-P1E
2525L-P1E 2513L-PIE 2761L-P1E 2511L-P1E
2R402-K1E 21891G-K1E 21890G-K1E 21889G-K1E
21884G-K1E 2R223-k1E 2SIO2E-P2E 21462N-P2E
21461MN-P7E 21460M-P2E 21458M-P2E 2914M-P2E
2912M-P2E 2910M-P2E 2908M-P2E 2906M-P2E
2905M-P2E 2904M-P2E 2898M-P2E 21536M-P2E
21537M-P2E 21539M-P2E 21540M-P2E 2R257K-C2E
2952K-C2E 2954K-C2E 2955K-C2E 2956K-C2E
2945K-C2E 2946K-C2E 2950K-C2E 2951K-C2E
k 2926K-C2E 2927K-C2E 2930K-C2E 2931K-C2E
2932K-C2E 2R301-C2E 21369K-C2E 21363K-C2E
Cable Tray Supports:
Support No. Drawing No.
l
305H1 3032H (W)
,
\
H037 3052H (S)
l H022 3053H (L)
i
H178 3062H (L)
H010 3241H (H)
.
H012 3254H (S)
H001 3041H (K)
II-21
--
TABLE II-1 (Continued)
RACEWAY INSPECTION SAMPLE
Conduit Supports:
2-3304-CC-32 2-3531A-WS-32
2-3321A-CC-24 2-3532A-WV-13
2-3321A-CC-25D 2-3533A-TS5-1
2-3322A-CC-35 2-3534-CC-13
2-3511-TS2-1 2-3534-CP-3
2-3513A-WCP-6 2-3534A-FC-15
2-3521-CC-15 2-3543-FC-5
2-3521A-CC-60 2-3544A-CC-19
2-3521A-CS-32 2-3544A-FC-9
Conduits: ,
C2A21A5 (P1E) 78' C2A21H0 (P2E) 45'
C2A2182 (P2E) 10' C2A0401 (P2E) 45'
C2A14B1 (K2R) 37' C2A2202 (C1E) 16'
C2R2170 (PIE) 30' C2R2490 (C2E) 23'
2C2R3443 (C2E) 79' C2R3463 (C1E) 31'
C2R2181 (CIE) 19' C2R2152 (C1E) 14'
C2R1172 (P2E) 29' C2R3365 (C2E) 32'
C2R3366 (P2E) 32' C2R4326 (KIR) 56'
- C2R434'i (P2E) 54' C2R4479 (C1E) 32'
i C2R4484 (P1E) 66' C2R3452 (CIE) 20'
C2R1334 (PIE) 25' C2R2316 (P2E) 21'
2CR2225 (C2E) 12' C2R3202 (C2E) 6'
II-22
TABLE II-2
SEPARATION FINDINGS
Raceway segments listed in the A colums do not maintain required separation
from the corresponding raceway segments in B columns. The (*) indicates
physical separation of less than one inch between the two raceway segments.
-Column A Column B Column A Column B
2955L-C2E C0A32L3-2C1B 2955L-C2E C0A32L6-2C1B
l
29700-C2B 2955L-C2E C0A3328-2K1R 2956L-C2E
29448-P2E * C0A3215-IP1B 29448-P2E * C0A3215
2924B-P2E * C0A33C6 29268-P2E * C0A33B4
29268-P2E * C0A33D2 29228-P2E * C0A3317-1C1B
299228-P2E * C0A3318-1CIB 29218-P2E * 33JJ-1C1B
2921B-P2E * C0A33JK-1CIB 21363K-C2E * C2A-51D3-2C1B
21363K-C2E C2A-5102-2K1B 2954K-C2E * C0A3322-1C1B
2926L-C2E * C0A3302 2926L-C2E * C0A3384
2944A-P2E * C0A3307
II-23
--.
TABLE II-3
CABLE TERMINATION INSPECTION SAMPLE
Fire Hazards Panel (2PL10J)
Cables: 2MS668, 2FW920, 2FW921, 2MS666, 2RY431, 2RY433,
2FW918, 2FW919, 2RY430, 2RY432.
Process I & C Rack (2PA01J)
Cables: 2FW705, 2FW704, 2RC350, 2RC355, 2RC360, 2RC365,
2FW874, 2FW875, 2MS104, 2MS108, 2FW304, 2FWO38,
2SI653, 2CC288, 2IP007, 2LV079, 2RC342, 2RC336,
2MSO96, 2MS666, 2MS100, 2RC345, 2RC339, 2RY433,
2SI467, 2AB030, 1FW919, 1RC353, IRC538, 2RC363,
2RC368, 2RY432.
Process I & C Rack (2PA02J)
Cables: 2FW707, 2FW706, 2RC372, 2RC391, 2RC396, 2RC401,
2FW876, 2FW877, 2MS116, 2MS668, 2MS122, 2FWO43,
2FWO48, 2SI654, 2CC290, 2IP023, 2LV080, 2RC383,
2RC377, 2MS113, 2MS119, 2RC386, 2RC380, 2RY202,
2FW921, 2RC375, 2RC394, 2RC399, 2RC404, 2RY204,
2RC406, 2FWO26.
E.S.F. Seq. & Act. Cabinet (2PA13J)
Cables: 2EF027, 2EF029, 2EF086, 2EF028, 2EF031, 2EF026,
2SX313, 2EF023, 2EF083, 2EF037, 2EF034, 2EF036,
2EF035, 2EF038, 2EF033, 2EF096, 2EF025.
E.S.F. Seq. & Act. Cabinet (2PA14J)
Cables: 2EF043, 2EF045, 2EF087, 2EF064, 2EF044, 2SX314,
2EF041, 1EF040, 2EF085, 2EF052, 2EF049, 2EF051,
2EF050, 2EF053, 2EF048, 2EF097, 2EF042.
Main Control Board (2PM06J)
Cables: 2MS529, 2DC117, 2MS532, 2MS318, 2FW215, 2FW842,
2FW226, 2EF018, 2MS527, 20C126, 2MS524, 2FW227,
2MS519, 2MS356, 2MS531, 2SX008, 2SX010, 2SX465,
2SX312, 2SX232, 2SX033, 2SX009, 2MS275, 2MS288,
2FW570, 2FW279, 2FW775, 2AF008, 2AF011, 2AF009,
2AF248, 2AF147, 2AF019, 2SX065, 2WO203, 2CC023,
2CC241, ICC007, 2CC026, 2CC004, 2CC239, 2CC002,
2CC008, 2CC150, 2SX041, 2CC174, 2W0176, 2W0177,
2AF121, 2PS479, 2CC127, 2AF097, 2SX004, 2CC005,
2CC021, 2CS005, 2VP013, 2VP012, 2VP057, 2VP056,
2AF010, 2CC064, 2VP040, 2C5034, 2EF014, 2SI654.
.
II-24
.
, - 4-
]
n
.
i
l
- TABLE II-3 (Continued)
CABLE TERMINATION INSPECTION SAMPLE
Diesel Generator Control Panel 2A (2PLO7J)
Cables: 2DG194, 2DG031, 2DG028, 2DG147, 2DG030, 2DG027,
2DG154, 2DG155, 2DG018, 2DG200,' 2DG022, 2DG115,
20G165, 2DG034, 2DG169, 2DG083,. 200062 200064,
2DG074, 2DG167, 2DG023, 200003, 2DG024, 2DG216,
2DG204, 2DG020, 2DG126, 2DG120, 2DG219, 2DG218,-
2DG113, 2DG085, 20G084, 2DF114, 2DG026, 2DG029,
2DG011, 2DG010, 2DG009, 2DG012, 2DG013, 2DG014,
2DG162, 2DG112, -2DG086, 2DG161,. 1DG033, - 2DG032,
2DG025, 20G073, 2DG071, 2DG070, - 2DG173, 2DG082,
2DG168, 200058, 2DG117, 2DG111, 200002, 2DG094,
20G119, '2DG118, 2DG206, 2DG207, 2SX294, 2SX290,
2SX295, 2D0005, 2VD004.
Diesel Generator Control Panel 2B (2PL008J)
Cables: 2DG066, 2DG195, 2DG063, 2DG038, 2DG065, 2DG062,
2DG166, 2DG151, 2DG156, 2DG053, 20G201, 2DG057,
2DG104, 2DG051, 2DG172, 2DG089, 200063, 200065,
2DG080, 2DG077, 2DG058, 200008, 2DG059, 2DG217,
2DG205, 2DG055, 2DG141, 2DG135, 2DG221 2DG220,
2DG102, 2DG091, 2DG090, 2DG103, 2DG061, 2DG064,
2DG043, 2DG044, 2DG045, 2DG046, 2DG047, 2DG048,
2DG101, 1DG164, 20G092, 20G163, 2DG068, 2DG067,
2DG060, 2DG079, 2DG170, 2DG076, 2DG176, 2DG088,
2DG171, 200059, 2DG109, 2DG100, 2D0007, 2DG096,
,
'
2DG134, 2DG133, 2DG208, 2DG209, 2SX300, 2SX296,
2SX301, 2D0010, 2VD010, 2DG040, 2DG334, 2DG042,
2DG106, 2DG150, 2DG052, 2DG054, 2DG041, 2DG050,
! 2DG225, 2DG177.
I
..
r
!
'
II-25
4
y._ . -....,.m,, -
, ,., , . , ,m.-,._,,,.. v._ ,,--. .y...,, y,,
O
TABLE II-4
" QUASI-SAFETY-RELATED" CABLES
Turbine Stop Valves 2EF065 2EF069
2EF066 2EF070
2EF067 2EF071
2EF068 2EF072
Turbine Pressure Switches 2EF073 2EF076
2EF074 2EF077
2EF075 2EF078
Feedwater Regulating and 2FW771 2FW269 2FW111
Bypass Regulating Valves 2FW777 2FW270 2FW123
2FW807 2FW271 2FW116
2FW773 2FW272 2FW137
2FW779 2FW110 2FW186
2FW808 2FW121 2FW145
2FW774 2FW115 2FW191
2FW780 2FW135 2FW153
2FW809~ 2FW185 2FW775
2FW722 2FW143 2FW776
2FW728 2FW190
2FW810 2FW151
Turbine Impulse Pressure 2MS095
2M5112
Condenser Steam Dump Valves 2MS14B 2MS142 2MS174 2MS179
2MS153 2MS158- 2MS177 2MS182
2MS155 2MS161 2MS180 2MS183
2MS156 2MS164 2MS183 2MS188
2MS159 2MS167 2MS186
2MS162 2MS170 2MS141
2MS165 2MS147 2MS173
2MS168 2MS171 2MS176
Steam Generator 2AS118 2AS127
2AS119 2AS128
2AS120 2AS129
2AS122 2AS131
2AS123 2AS132
II-26
cr -
TABLE II-5
INSTRUMENTATION INSPECTION SAMPLE
Instrument Racks:
'
2PL81JA
2PL81JB
2PL67J
Instrument Piping Supports:
,
2FT-0651-H143-6 2FIS-CC064-H237-
2FT-0651-H215 2FT-CS-15-H153-1
2FT-660-H143-3 2FT-CS015-H153-2
-
2FIS-CC064-H49-3 2FT-0654-H133-1
.
Instrument Piping Runs:
T537-2FT-CS013 T992-2FT-0654
T548-2FIS-611 T995-2FT-0657
T538-2FT-CS015 T971-2FIS-CC064
T564-2LT-930 T988-2FT-415
T982-2FT-0651 T1008-2LT-0460
T990-2FT-660 T1053-2LT-548
T1015-2LT-556
Instruments: 2FT-CS013 2FT-0654
II-27
, -- -
_ _ __
l
III. MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTION
A. Objective
i
The objective of the appraisal of mechanical construction was to
determine if installed and Quality Control (QC) accepted mechanical
items conformed to engineering design, regulatory requirements and
licensee commitments.
B. Dice"ssion
The specific areas of mechanical construction evaluated were piping,
pipe supports / restraints, concrete expansion anchors, heating, ventilat-
ing and air conditioning (HVAC) systems and mechanical equipment. To
accomplish the above objective, a field inspection of a sample of QC
accepted hardware was performed in each area. In addition, certain
programs, procedures and documentation were reviewed and responsible
personnel were interviewed as required to support or clarify hardware
inspection findings.
1. Piping
a. Inspection Scope
Piping depicted on the 15 Hunter Corporation (Hunter) drawings
listed in Table III-1 was inspected by the NRC Construction
Appraisal Tean (CAT). Approximately 900 feet of large bore piping
(greater than or equal to 2 inch diameter) was inspected. The
piping was located in the Unit 2 Reactor Building, including the
Steam Tunnel, and the Auxiliary Building. Component Cooling,
Chemical and Volume Control, Feedwater, Main Steam and Reactor
. Coolant Systems piping were included. Pipe sizes ranged from 1/2
inch to 60 inches and classifications were ASME 1, 2 and 3. The
piping was inspected for configuration (i.e., layout geometry,
orientation and dimensions), component type and location, valve
operator orientation, and support location, type and orientation.
Additionally, site construction practices with regard to protection
of installed hardware and maintenance of inservice inspection
clearance criteria were observed on a random basis. Design change
documents, including Engineering Change Notices (ECNs) and Field
Change Requests (FCRs), were reviewed and compared to inspection
data gathered in the field. The extent of this design change review
is identified in Table III-1. All of the piping samples had been
previously inspected and accepted by Hunter QC.
Thirteen hydrostatic / pneumatic pressure test packages were reviewed
for compliance with procedural and code requirements and 1 pneumatic
test was witnessed. Items reviewed consisted of applied pressure,
duration, pressure adjustment calculations, type of gauges used,
test boundaries,' Discrepancy Reports, Field Change Requests and
dc.cumented instances of overpressurization. All nonconformance
reports (NCRs) involving overpressurization at the site were
reviewed. The training program for personnel engaged in the
performance, supervision and review of hydrostatic / pneumatic testing
.
III-1
- : .-. - _ .
. - - . . -- .- . _ . - - - -
_.
was reviewed. Table III-2 provides a listing of the test packages
reviewed.
Twenty-nine locations in Class 1 and 2 piping systems were selected
as part of the NRC CAT sample to determine whether ASME requirements
for pipe wall thickness were met. Seven different plant systems and
12 manufacturing firm's products were selected for the sample. The
pipe wall thickness measurements were taken by ultrasonic methods
with equipment and personnel provided by the licensee. The values
obtained were compared against the minimum wall thickness require-
ments specified by ASME (12.5 percent below nominal thickness).
Several measurements were taken at each location. Seven of the
locations were on elbows. See Table III-3 for details and observa-
, tions.
The following documents provided the acceptance criteria and
background information for the NRC CAT inspection:
Hunter Corp. Site Implementation Procedure No. 4.201,
" Installation Verification," Rev. 11.
Hunter Corp. Site Implementation Procedure No. 2.201,
" Design Control," Rev. 13.
Nuclear Power Services, Inc. Work Procedure No. 3.09,
"As-Built Piping Subsystem Preparation," Rev. F.
Sargent & Lundy (S&L) Instruction PI-BB-26, " Procedure
for Preparation and Submittal of Piping 'As-Built' Information,"
Rev. 4.
S&L Instruction PI-BB-27, " Receipt Review, Reanalysis (Where
Applicable), Redesign (Where Applicable) and 'As-Built' Piping
Reconciliation," Rev. 4.
S&L Drawing No. M-535, " Piping General Notes, Byron Sta. Units
1 & 2," Rev. AJ.
S&L Drawing No. M-679, " Single System General Notes, Byron Unit
1 & 2," Rev. D.
S&L Drawing No. M-919, " Component Support Installation Guidelines
and Tolerances" Sheet 4, Rev. L and Sheet 4A, Rev. D.
Hunter Corp. Site Implementation Procedure No. 4.405, " Pressure
Testing," Rev. 3.
Hunter Corp. Site Implementation Procedure No. 4.406, " Piping
Freeze Seals," Rev. 1.
j b. Inspection Findings
l In the review of piping, the NRC CAT inspectors found that in
! general piping met the design requirements; however, 3 minor
[ discrepancies were found. The observations associated with specific
III-2
.
l
.. -
, _ - ,
.
_
piping drawings are listed in Table III-1 and described in the
following paragraphs.
The "as-built" dimension from a branch connection center line to the
attached high point vent valve, Valve 2CC153, noted on the isometric
drawing (Isometric Spool No. CC-52) was 1.25 inches. This dimension
in the field measured 4.25 inches. This 3 inch discrepancy exceeds
the inspection tolerance of 1 inch specified by S&L Drawing M-679
and the dimensional accuracy requirements of 1 inch specified by the
S&L as-building procedure, PI-BB-26. The dimension as depicted is
not' physically possible and was determined to be a drafting error.
This error would probably have been detected during the as-built
reconciliation effort since the distance shown obviously requires
more than the specified 1.25 inches to accomodate the fittings
included. All other design and as-built dimensions checked during
the NRC CAT inspection were found to be within 1/8 inch of
acceptance criteria.
Isometric drawing for Spool No. S-CC-001-243 specifies a 2 inch, 45
degree socket elbow to be a 3000 psi rated fitting. The NRC CAT
inspection found this elbow to be a 6000 psi fitting. Subsequent
review by Hunter determined that the 6000 psi rating corresponded to
design requirements and the traveler package installation records.
Therefore, this discrepancy is attributable to drafting error. The
The NRC CAT considers this discrepancy isolated and not safety
significant.
The NRC CAT observed that one of four support points for a wood
construction platform measuring approximately 4.0 ft. by 5.0 ft.
was mounted on the operator for valve 2CV8106 (Ref. Isometric Spool
No. CV-20). No damage was observed and because of the small size of
the platform, damage wo' iot likely. However, construction
-practices should prevent the potential damage of installed hardware.
Hunter has on at least two previous occasions issued directives to
its employees prohibiting the attachment of scaffolding to various
types of hardware, including 2.0 inch and smaller pipe. The
licensee should evaluate the need for additional precautions in
this area and take appropriate action.
Hydrostatic / pneumatic testing was found to meet the requirements of
SIP-4.405 and code requirements. Of the hydrostatic / pneumatic test
packages reviewed three NCRs were identified to have been issued as
a result of overpressurizations during testing on Unit 2. In the
review of NCR-860 it was observed that the list of pipe and com-
ponents that had been subjected to overpressurization was incomplete
in that Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2AF01PB had not been included. The
effect of this oversight is that S&L did not evaluate overpressuri-
zation of this pump and consequently disposition of NCR-860 was
incomplete. NCR-1136 was initiated to address this matter.
Similar instances of testing overpressurizations on Unit 1, a total
of 10 NCRs, were also reviewed by the NRC CAT inspectors. It was
found by the NRC CAT inspectors that the pipe and component list in
III-3
NCR 1022 was also incomplete in that 3 line segments and 8 valves
had been left off the list. In this case however, S&L's evaluation
of the NCR had included a review of the details.and drawings perti-
nent to the overpressurization and had developed a complete list
that included the 3 line segments and 8 valves.
Review of S&L's methods and calculations to resolve the overpres-
surizations appeared to be reasonable and technically adequate.
However, the NRC CAT inspectors are concerned that procedures were
not in place that would require that S&L perform an independent
review, as was done in the one overpressurization case, to ensure
that affected piping and components are included in the engineering
evaluation.
Regarding the 29 piping locations where ultrasonic thickness
measurements were taken to verify minimum wall thickness values,
the measurements were acceptable in that they exceeded the minimum
wall values specified for the size and schedule of pipe involved.
c. Conclusions
Piping was found to generally conform to design documents. Engi-
neering and inspection personnel were knowledgeable of procedures,
requirements and responsibilities.
With respect to hydrostatic / pneumatic testing, the overall program
was found to be functioning in accordance with the procedural and
code requirements. The noted failures to include pipe segments,
valves and a pump on the NCR description of the overpressurization
event are considered isolated cases. However, steps should be taken
to ensure that any future overpressurizations receive an independent
review so as to reduce the likelihood of the type of oversights
identified by the NRC CAT inspectors.
2. Pipe Supports / Restraints
a. Inspection Scope
Twenty-five ASME Class 1, 2 and 3 and eight Class D pipe supports /
restraints were selected for detailed inspection. These supports /
restraints represented various types, sizes, systems and locations.
All had been inspected and accepted by the mechnical contractor,
Hunter Corp. These supports / restraints were inipected by the NRC
CAT for proper configuration, clearances, membe. sizes, location,
damage, weld size and proper fasteners. See Table III-4 for a
listing of the inspection sample.
In addition, approximately 60 other supports / restraints were
observed at random in the field for obvious deficiencies such as
loose or missing fasteners, improper clearances or angularity,
improper locking devices, disassembled items, damage and improper
concrete expansion anchor spacing.
III-4
,
u
o
Documentation packages for the supports /retraints in the primary
sample were examined for completeness, accuracy and conformance to
procedural requirements. Drawing revisions and ECNs used in the
inspection were verified to be the latest design documents with
vendor drawing / design change master lists.
Acceptance criteria for these inspections were contained in the
following documents:
Hunter Corp. Site Implementation Procedure (SIP) 4.201,
" Installation Verification," Rev. 11.
Hunter Corp. Site Work Instruction (SWI) 2, " Installation
of Hanger Speciality Items," Rev. 9.
i
S&L Drawing M-919, " Component Suppport Installation Guidelines
and Tolerances."
ITT Grinnell and Elcen Metal Products catalogues and engineering
specification sheets.
Applicable design drawings and change documents
b. Inspection Findings
At the time of this inspection, approximately 95 percent of the
approximately 11,000 large bore supports / restraints had been
installed and QC accepted. Approximately 70 percent of the
approximately 10,000 small bore supports / restraints had been
installed and QC accepted.
No significant hardware discrepancies were identified in the NRC
CAT inspection sample of supports / restraints.
Support material and configuration generally conformed to design
requirements. Workmanship was good and QC inspections appeared to
have been thorough. See Table III-5 for a summary of inspection
observations.
Five instances of loose strut locknuts were noted indicating a
possible lack of attention to detail for this feature. Discussions
with responsible personnel and review of procedures governing future
support / restraint inspections (Type 4 and 79-14 walkdowns) indicate
that these discrepancies should be identified and corrected.
However, because of the number of these discrepancies noted, the NRC
CAT inspectors considered that additional emphasis needs to be
placed on proper installation and inspection of fasteners,
especially during the final walkdown inspections.
The NRC CAT inspectors had a concern with regard to pipe stress due
to point contact between a pipe saddle and pipe on a particular
restraint. It was determined that no specific inspection criteria
existed for this feature. Westinghouse engineering evaluated this
specific installation as acceptable and developed and issued
III-5
o
criteria to be used for installation and inspection of this type of
support / restraint detail.
No disc.repancies were noted in the review of documentation packages.
The drawing revisions and design change documents used in the NRC
CAT inspections were the latest design documents as evidenced in the
current S&L and Westinghouse master lists. Twenty-three of the
supports / restraints in the primary sample had open ECNs that had not
yet been incorporated onto the drawing. There were no discrepancies
noted by the NRC CAT inspectors that would indicate inadequacies in
implementation of the design change process with respect to
supports / restraints.
Discussions were held with responsible engineers relating to
seismic interaction programs, design and inspection of Class D
support / restraints and the piping thermal expansion test and
inspection programs. No concerns were identified.
c. Conclusions
"
Pipe supports / restraints were found in general to be in conformance
with drawing, design change and procedural requirements. Site
engineering, construction and inspection personnel were knowledge-
able of procedures, requirements and responsibilities.
3. Concrete Expansion Anchors
a. Inspection' Scope
One hundred and six concrete expansion anchor bolts on 23 pipe
supports /retraints were examined for proper length, marking,
embedment depth, spacing, residual torque (an indication of anchor
preload), damage and bolt hole to plate edge distance. Various
systems, sizes and locations were included in the anchor sample.
Table III-6 provides a listing of the anchors inspected. Anchors
were torqued to the 15 day-3 month test torque specified in site
procedures. This represented approximately 50-60 percent of
installation torques.
Acceptance criteria for these field inspections were contained in
the following documents:
- Form BY/CEA, " Standard Specification for Concrete Expansion Anchor
Work," Rev. 22.
Hunter Corp. SIP 20.513, " Installation of Concrete Expansion-
Anchors," Rev. 16. ,
Detail drawings for pipe supports / restraints,
b. Inspection Findings
Only three of the 106 anchor bolts required rotation to reach the
-test torque. Only one of these three required significant rotation
to reach the full installation torqu.e (2 turns). Even considering
III-6
. _ ._ . _.
that the test torques were relatively low, no significant installa-
tion deficiency is indicated.
All other characteristics examined were either within tolerance or
had been previously identified and evaluated.
c. Coralusions
The concrete expansion anchors installed in pipe supports / restraints
were installed in accordance with design and procedural require-
ments.
4. Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC)
a. Inspection Scope
Twelve safety-related seismic HVAC duct supports and two fan sup-
ports were inspected for configuration, dimensions, location,
damage, weld size and member size. Due to the application of
fire protection coating many of the auxiliary steel connections in
the sample was not readily accessible for clip angle and weld size
inspection. However, as a result of welding discrepancies noted on
the accessable joints in this sample, the auxiliary steel connection
details for an additional eight duct supports were examined for the
specified weld size.2' Approximately 15 duct segments were also
inspected for size, stiffener and support location, fasteners and
joint makeup, damage and weld size. Five fire dampers were
inspected for fusible links, specified location and type per drawing
and damper list, sleeve to damper welding and damage or corrosion to
blade operating mechanisms. The inspection of HVAC equipment is
discussed in section III.B.5 of this report. See Table III-7 for
observations and listing of supports and fire dampers inspected.
The following documents provided the acceptance criteria for HVAC
hardware installations:
S&L Drawing M-1261, " Safety-Related HVAC Haager Details."
S&L Safety-Related HVAC Hanger Lists.
l Reliable Sheet Metal (RSM) Works, Inc. Procedure 23, "Installa-
l tion Verification," Rev. 2.
t
RSM Procedure 30A, " Bolted Connections," Rev. 4.
!-
i
RSM SWI 2, " Inspection and Acceptance Criteria for Fire Damper
Assemblies (FDA)," Rev. 1.
S&L Specification F-2782.
S&L Fire Damper List. .
15ee Section IV-8.6 for further details. . .
..
III-7 .,
.
RSM Duct Construction Manual and Construction Details.
HVAC duct design location drawings. .
b. Inspection Findings
Several minor dimensional, orientation and drawing discrepancies
were noted during the duct and fan support inspections. None of
these were considered significant. Several undersize welds were
identified on clip angle to tube steel and clip angle to in place
steel welds for three duct supports. As a result of these observa-
tions, the connection joints for eight additional duct supports were
inspected. Five of these were also found to be undersize. Some of
these welds were shop welds made off-site and may not have been
inspected by site personnel; some were field welds that had been
inspected by site personnel. Typically, welds specified to be
1/4 or 5/16 inch fillets were 1/16 to 1/8 undersize for one or more
of the eight welds on each auxiliary steel installation. As a
result of these findings nonconformance report NCR-118 was issued.2
From an overall standpoint the discrepancies noted were not
considered to be major structural concerns. However, the number of
discrepancies noted in QC accepted hardware, most of which have
already been through a complete reinspection program, is a concern.
This indicates a need for additional management review and attention
to detail by QC inspectors.
The inspection of fire dampers identified one damper that was
installed with a standard fusible link instead of the electro-
thermal link required by the specification damper list. Licensee
personnel indicated that the electro-thermal link was not yet
installed by the electrical contractor but was scheduled to be. A
check of the companion Unit 1 damper revealed that the electro-
thermal link there had been installed. Other damper features
conformed to design requirements.
With regard to duct inspections, one 73 inch long duct segment did
not have stiffeners installed as required by the Duct Brochure and
Specification. Other attributes examined on duct work conformed to
design requirements,
c. Conclusions
The QC program failed to identify support auxiliary steel connection
welds that did not meet design size requirements on eight of 20
supports inspected by the NRC CAT.2
zSee Section IV-B.6 for a list of specific findings and disposition
of NCR-118.
III-8
L
i
5. Mechanical Equipment
a. Inspection Sccpe
Seventeen pieces of equipment located in seven systems were
inspected for ASME class, capacity, temperature, pressure rating and
for compliance with foundation details such as bolting arrangement,
number and size of bolts. Installation documentation was checked
for compliance with Quality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC)
requirements. The inspection sample included pumps, tanks, heat
exchangers and HVAC cubicle coolers that were reported to be
completely installed and QC accepted. Table III-8 provides a
listing of inspected items.
Listed below are the major documents that provided the acceptance
criteria for inspection.
Applicable vendor drawings and foundation details
Vendor manuals
Hunter Corp., SIP-4.000, " Control of Construction Processes,"
Rev. 14.
Hunter Corp., SIP-4.001, " Bolted Connections," Rev. 2.
Hunter Corp., SIP-4.201, " Installation Verification," Rev. 11.
Heater Corp. , SIP-6.001, " Visual Examination & Verification,"
Rev. 4.
b. Inspection Findings
Generally, the mechanical equipment inspected by the NRC CAT was
procured and installed in accordance with vendor and design require-
ments. However, a discrepancy was identified with four heat
exchangers supplied by Westinghouse. It was observed that the
installation procedures used by the installation contractor for
tightening foundation bolts at the sliding end of these four heat
exchangers was not in agreement with the Westinghouse equipment
manual. The Westinghouse manual states that these specific bolts
should be backed off to allow for expansion, but the installation
contractor's procedure states they are to be snug tight.
To investigate this concern the licensee performed torque checks on
the equipment foundation bolts and found some of the bolts to have
been tightened to 250 to 280 ft-lbs; values considerably in excess
of the 100 ft-lbs assumed for a snugtight installation. The
licensee subsequently issued ECN 27982 to eliminate bolt torquing
requirements on specified sliding connections. Westinghouse
correspondence (CAW-9141) states that these bolts should be backed
off on Unit 2 shortly and on Unit I during the first refueling.
Westinghouse has evaluated the present condition on Unit 1 and
determined that it is acceptable to wait until fuel loading for
corrective action.
III-9
_ _ _ . _ ____-_ -______________ -
-
c .- Conclusion -
Mechanical equipment installations, except certain heat exchanger
sliding connections, generally conformed to design and installation
requirements. Installation documentation reviewed was in accordance
with requirments.
.
.
!
'
4
!
i
j. III-10
._ _
,
TABLE III-1
PIPING INSPECTION SAMPLE
Pipe
DrawinD Class' Diameter
. Number Revision (ASME) (Inches) Notes Observation
large Bore:
CC-52- 4H 2 3 1 1%" as-built dim
measures 4%"
CC-57 4G 3 3 1
CC-61 4G 2 3 1, 2
CV-19 7N 2 4, 3 1
CV-20 6C 2 4, 3 Scaffolding supported
by operator for Valve
2CV8106
FW-70 8G 2 6,4,3
FW-72 4D 2 3
Small Bore:
S-CC-001-243 6 3 2, 3/4 3000# socket elbow
specified is 6000#
S-CC-001-253 1B 3 2
S-CV-001-212 2B 1, 2 3/4
S-CV-001-233 1B 2 2
S-CV-001-292 1C 7 2
S-MS-001-224 78 2 1/2
S-RC-001-221 2C 1 2
S-RC-001-234 3A 1 3/4
NOTES:
1. Design changes specified by Engineering Change Notices and/or Field
Change Requests identified at the revision block of this drawing were
reviewed. The changes were compared to field data compiled during the
NRC CAT inspection.
2. Piping located inside the heat exchanger cavity was not inspected by the
NRC CAT.
III-11
l
TABLE III-2
HYDROSTATIC / PNEUMATIC TEST PACKAGE SAMPLE
lest Package ID System
SG-21 Retest Main Steam - Feedwater
CS-37 Containment Spray
BR-6 Boron Therm.-Gen.
SX-102 Retest Essential Service Water
PS-8 Process Sampling
SI-26 Safety Injection
CS-38 Containment Spray
NT-3 Nitrogen
D0-93 Diesel Oil
IA-4 Instrument Air
0G-11 Off-Gas
RY-17 Reactor Coolant Pressurizer
WM-4 Makeup Demin.
.
III-12
.
TABLE III-3
PIPE WALL THICKNESS MEASUREMENTS
Nominal /
Minimal Wall
1 Manufacturer / Pipe Size / ASME Thickness 2 Measured Wall
(Heat No.) Schedule Class (Inches) Thickness (Inches)
SW (MRR 10264) 29" 1 2.425/2.330 2.5
Sandvik (750557) 2"/160 1 .344/.301 .35
B&W (M1629) 8"/160 1 .906/.792 .91
.
B&W (M1656) 8"/160 1 .906/.792 .99
CE (BZE260) 3" 1 .438/.383 .43
C-W (3109-8-2) 10"/140 1 1.00/.875 1.03
C-W (3109-8-2) 10"/140 1 1.00/.875 1.01
C-W (3109-12-2) 6"/160 1 .719/.629 .74
B&W (M-2417) 6"/160 1 .719/.629 .74
Cameron (L4328) 12"/140 3 .1.125/.984 1.14
C-E (5835) 3"/160 1 .438/.383 .45
T-T (94584) 6" 2 3 1.59
T-F (EICL) 28" 2 1 3/16 1.30
USS (N15150) 8"/160 1 .906/.792 .94
USS (N15150) 8"/160 2 .906/.792 .91
USS (L45353) 16"/120 2 1.219/1.066 1.24
USS (L62803) 6"/120 2 .562/.491 .56
C-W (2799-4-2) 12"/40 2 .375/.328 .43
C-W (1210-3-2) 12"/40 2 .375/.328 .48
SWEPC0 (8034857) 8"/40 2 .322/.281 .35
Armco (781055) 24"/40 2 .687/.601 .77
- Armco (61266) 16"/STD.WT. 2 .375/.328 .43
,
,.
III-13
. - - . . __ , ._- -.. - .. -
TABLE III-3 (Continued)
PIPE WALL THICKNESS MEASUREMENTS
Nominal /
Minimal Wall
1 Manufacturer / Pipe Size / ASME Thickness 2 Measured Wall
(Heat No.) Schedule Class (Inches) Thickness (Inches)
ASP (83540) 2"/160 1 .344/.301 .35
Elbow
T-F (7297) 8"/160 1 .906/.792 1.03
Elbow
T-F (ERPC) 12"/140 1 1.125/.984 1.27
Elbow
T-F (JHZH) 12"/40 2 .375/.328 .40
Elbow
T-F (JIFM) 8"/40 2 .322/.281 .35
Elbow
T-T (713894) 24"/40 2 .687/.601 .88
Elbow
G-W (624063) 16"/STD.WT. 2 .375/.328 .42
Elbow
NOTES:
1 B&W - Babcock & Wilcox Tubular Products Division
C-W - Curtis-Wright Corp.
C-E - Combustion Engineering
T-T - Tube Turns
T-F - Taylor Forge
USS - United States Steel
SW - Southwest
ASP - Alloy Stainless Products
2 Thickness measurements were made by Krautkramer UT Instrument, Model USK6
SR. No. 27593-3926 using 3/8" and 1/2" diameter transducers. Couplant:
Ultrajel; Operator: Ebasco level II.
3 Nonstandard part - bought to specified dimensions
.
III-14
- . . . . . . .
TABLE III-4
PIPE SUPPORT / RESTRAINT INSPECTION SAMPLE
Pipe Size
S/R Number Tyge Class (Inches) location
2SIO1004X Box 1 10 Reactor
2SIl0003S Snubber 1 2 Reactor
2SIO4035X Strut 2 8 Reactor
2RY20011X U-bolt 2 3 Reactor
2RH02006X Strut 1 12 Reactor
2RC10008X Strut 1 3 Reactor
2SIO3025V Spring 2 8 Reactor
2SIO4019X Strut 2 10 Reactor
2RH06004V Spring 2 3 Aux.
2RH098005A Anchor 2 2 Aux.
2RH04010X Strut 2 8 Aux.
2RH098012X U-bolt 2 2 Aux.
2SIO5035X Box 2 4 Aux.
2RY09089S Snubber D 6 Reactor
2RY20013X Box D 3 Reactor
2RY09020C Spring D 12 Reactor
2RY09013S Snubber D 6 Reactor
'
2RY08034X Strut U 4 Reactor
2RY08011X Strut 0 4 Reactor
2RY08008X Strut D 4 Reactor
2CC22004X Strut 3 6 Reactor
2CC22009X Strut 3 6 Reactor
( 2RH07019V Spring 2 8 Aux.
2AP238013X U-bolt D 3 Aux,
i
[
III-15
. _ _ . - _ _ - _ . _ . _ _ . _ . . _ _.._. _ .. - _ . _
. . - ._. _ . _ _ - -
TABLE III-4 (Centinu:d)
' PIPE SUPPORT / RESTRAINT INSPECTION SAMPLE
Pipe Size
S/R Number h Class (Inches) Location
2SIO6239V Spring 2 24 Aux.
2RH07013S Snubber 2 8 Aux.
,
2RC11009X Strut 1 3 Reactor
2CC23015X Strut 3 4 Reactor
2RC10009X Strut l' 3 Reactor
2RC10016X Strut 1 3 Reactor
2RC10020X Strut 1 2 Reactor
2RC11010X Strut 1 3 Reactor
2CC10001R Rod 3 8 Aux.
Reactor - Reactor Building
"
Aux. - Auxiliary Building
I
f
i
1
85
J
III-16
- . . . . . . . .- ..- -. .- . . . - ... .-.
_
i
TABLE III-5
PIPE SUPPORT / RESTRAINT INSPECTION OBSERVATIONS
.
, Support / Restraint Observations
,
Primary Sample
2SIl0003X Weld length of rear bracket
- to embed was 4 5/8 inches long ,
vs. 5 1/2 specified
'
2RY08011X Loose strut locknut
t
,
2RC11009X Unspread cotter pins
2RC23015X Loose locknut
i 2RC10016X Loose locknut
2RC20020X Piece 2 oriented 90 degrees
from specified position
.
- 2RC11010X Backed off locknut
f Adjacent Sample
f'
2CV65015, 2CV66017, Loose locknuts
2CC28010X, 2CV63019
,
2RC11011X, 2CCV15011 Unspread/ missing cotter pins
-
2FW1900312, 2FW19009R Gaps between lubrite plate and
1- restraining bars not per design
- tolerance +
i
N
}
l
i
i
.
,
1
i
i
i I
i
i
III-17
- .
i
4
_ . _ _ _ _ _
. . - . . - - - - . _ .. . . . .- - . . - _ . .-. - ...
-TABLE III-6
CONCRETE EXPANSION ANCHOR INSPECTION SAMPLE
.
Support / Number-Diameter (Inches)
i Restraint of Anchors Inspected Observations
2RH02007X 12-3/4 One turned at 6 ft-lbs.
2FW93E010X 4-5/8
2MS918008A 4-1/2
2SI30A002X 12-3/8
2CV15013S 4-3/4
2CV15041S 4-1/2
2RC23034X 4-1/2
2RC90B024X 4-1/2 One turned at 35 ft-lbs
2CV13034S 4-3/4
2CV09025X 4-1
2RC29002X 4-1/2
2MS948001 4-3/4
21YO94H4G20933 2-1/2
21YO94H4G20911 2-1/4 One turned at 30 ft-lbs
2SI938024 4-3/4
2 WOO 9A033X 4-1/2
2CS03B77X 4-3/4
2SIO6223 4-1
2SX50009X 4-1
25I06259 4-1 One turned at 180 ft-lbs
2AB62005R 4-3/4
2SIO6263X 8-5/8
l 2CS06010X 4-3/4
y
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III-18
f
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TABLE III-7
HVAC INSPECTION SAMPLES.AND OBSERVATIONS
Item Inspected Observations
Duct Supports:
H3856 Undersize auxiliary steel welds.
H3837
H3854 Duct spacer to horizontal member
missing one of two welds.
H3855
H3853
H922
d2174
H3749 Undersize auxiliary steel welds.
H3822
H3652 Undersize auxiliary stecl welds.
H1395 Discrepancy as to hanger type
affecting horizontal member attachment.
H8624 Minor dimensional / tolerance discrepancy.
1
Fan Supports:
2VD03CA Incorrect brace orientation. '
2VD01CA Missing washers on foundation bolts and
foundation bolt spacing not per vendor
drawing.
Fire Dampers:
2VX03Y
2VD17YB
2VD17YA
. 2VD63Y
2VD53Y
1See Section IV-B.6 for additional supports inspected
III-19
TABLE III-7 (Continu:d)
HVAC INSPECTION SAMPLES AND OBSERVATIONS
Item Inspected Observations
Duct Segments:
Fifteen segments shown on Segment M-1283-2-18 does not
portions of drawings M-1281 have required stiffener.
and M-1283.
.
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III-20
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TABLE III-8
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT SAMPLE
Boric Acid Transfer Pump 2AB03P
Boric Acid Tank 2AB03T
Diesel Generator Oil Transfer Pump 20001PA
Diesel Generator Day Tank 20002TA
Residual Heat Exchanger 2RH02AA
Residual Heat Removal Pump 2RH01PA
Letdown Reheat Heat Exchanger 2BR03A
Letdown Heat Exchanger 2CV05A
Volume Control Tank 2CV01T
Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger 2CV01AA
Seal Water Heat Exchanger 2CV02A
Containment Spray Additive Tank 2CS0lT
Safety Injection Pump 2SIO1PA
Safety Injection Pump Room Cubicle Cooler 2VA04SA
Centrifugal Charging Pump 28 Cubicle Cooler 2VA06SB
'
Safety Injection Pump Room Cubicle Cooler 2VA04SA
Centrifugal Charging Pump 2A Cubicle Cooler 2VA06SA
III-21
IV. WELDING AND N0NDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION
A. Objective
The objective of the appraisal of welding and nondestructive examination
(NDE) was to determine if Quality Control accepted work related to
welding and NDE activities was controlled and performed in accordance
with design requirements, Safety Analysis Report commitments, and
applicable codes and specifications.
An additional objective was to determine if personnel involved in
welding and NDE activities were trained and qualified in accordance
with established performance standards and applicable code requirements.
B. Discussion
To accomplish the above objectives, welds and welding details for
piping; pipe supports / restraints; field and shop fabricated tanks;
structural steel installations; heating, ventilating, and air condi-
tioning (HVAC) installations; electrical supports; and instrumentation
and control tubing and supports were inspected. The inspected welds
were selected to provide a representative sample of the licensee's
contractor welding activities in terms of welding processes used,
materials welded and existing weld-joint configurations. Considera-
tions such as physical location, difficulty of welding and limited
accessibility were also used in the sample selection. Design changes
related to welding such as increase or decrease of weld sizes and
changes in the welding process or procedure were also reviewed for
technical adequacy.
NDE activities were appraised through the review of radiographs for
both field and vendor fabricated welds, the review of NDE procedures
and personnel qualifications, the inspection of the calibration status
of NDE equipment and the witnessing of in-process NDE activities. The
NRC Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) inspectors reviewed a sample of
radiographic film in final storage in the vault of the licensee's
facility. In addition, a sample of film for Westinghouse supplied
components was requested for review which were stored in the
Westinghouse storage facility.
During the inspection of structural welds in the pipe whip restraint,
structural and HVAC areas, the NRC CAT inspectors identified welds
which did not meet some of the requirements specified by the AE
Sargent 8 Lundy Engineers (S&L). S&L has evaluated most of these
welds and determined that the welds are adequate for their intended
application. Undersized weld reinforcements were also found in nozzle
to shell joints (ASME Code Category 0 Joints) on tanks and heat
exchangers. A detailed discussion concerning these welds is included
later in this section.
In the area of NDE, the NRC CAT inspectors requested to review a sample
of radiographs which were stored at the Westinghouse storage facility.
Two items were requested for review. Initially, the radiographs for
the Boric Acid Transfer Pump (2AB03P) and the Let Down Chiller Heat
Exchanger (2BR03A) were requested. Westinghouse, however, provided
.
IV-1
_
. radiographs for the Let Down Heat Exchanger and the Moderating Heat
Exchanger which were fabricated by Atlas Industrial Manufacturing.
A further review of the items requested established tnat the Boric Acid
Transfer Pump and the let Down Chiller were exempt from radiography
because their wall thickness was less than the thickness requiring
radiographic examination under the rules of the ASME Code for Class 3
components. As a result of this, the NRC CAT requested the radiographs
for the Component Cooling Surge Tank (2CC01T) and Volume Control Tank
(2CV01T). The film for the Component Surge Tank and Volume Control Tank
were not received during the NRC CAT inspection period. The licensee
stated that radiographs for these Westinghouse supplied components
would be reviewed and further reviews performed to ensure that code
requirements were met.
The NRC CAT inspectors also identified some radiographs which showed
that some welds did not have the required weld quality or the film or
other documentation did not accurately identify the proper hardware.
A detailed discussion concerning the welds and their associated
deficiencies are provided later in this section.
The welding and NDE activities were examined in order to ascertain
compliance with the governing construction codes and specifications.
This effort involved the review and inspection of the following
contractors:
Field Activities
1. Sargent & Lundy Engineers: Architect-Engineer.
2. Hunter Corporation: piping installation and piping
supports / restraints, fire protection fabrication and installation.
3. Chicago Bridge and Iron Company (CB&I): containment liner and
containment penetration fabrication and installation, pipe whip
restraints.
4. Pittsburgh Des Moines Corporation (PDM): reactor pool fabrication
and installation.
5. Reliable Sheet Metal (RSM): heating, ventilating and air
conditioning.
6. Nuclear Installation Service Co. (NISCo): reactor internals
modification and installation.
7. Powers-Azco-Pope (PAP): instrumentation installation and
instrumentation supports.
8. Hatfield Electric Company (HECo): electrical installation and
supports.
9. BlountBrothers(BBC): structural steel modification and erection.
10. Ebasco Services Inc.: preservice inspection and examination.
IV-2
_ . - . . _ _ _ - _. _ _ ._
Shop Fabrication
1. Southwest Fabricating & Welding Company, Inc.: shop fabricated
piping spools.
- 2. Harnischfeger Corporation
- crane manufacturer.
3. Westinghouse: nuclear steam supply system.
4. Anchor / Darling Valve Company: valve manufacturer.
5. Teledyne Brown: NSSS supports fabricator.
6. Carrier Corporation: chillers and coolers manufacturer.
7. Phillips Steel Company: liquid radwaste evaporators supplier.
8. Graver Corporation: tank fabricator.
9. Jamesbury Corporation: valve body supplier.
10. Dresser Industries: valve manufacturer.
11. G8W Energy Product Corporation: spray eductors supplier.
12. TRW Mission Manufacturing Co.: containment spray system supplier.
13. Farr Company: reaction chamber filter supplier.
14. Continental Boiler: return air riser supplier.
15. Yuba Heat Transfer Corporation: high pressure heater manufacturer.
16. McQuay Perfex Inc.: condenser shell and hot well tank shell
supplier.
17. Pall Trinity Micro Corporation: cartridge filters supplier.
18. ACF Industries: valve body supplier.
19. Cleaver Brooks: steam boilers fabricator.
20. Mannings Lewis: miscellaneous heat exchangers shell supplier.
21. Cooper-Bessemer: air receiver tanks supplier.
22. Greer Hydraulics: pulsation damper suppliers.
23. ITT Grinnell: snubber support assembly fabricator.
24. Rockwell International: hydrogen recombiner manufacturer.
25. Atlas Industrial Manufacturing: heat exchanger manufacturer.
IV-3
-
o
26. W. J. Wooley Company: containment vessel hatches fabricator and
supplier.
27. Bingham-Willamette: pump manufacturer.
28. Plant Management Corp.: surface condenser tanks supplier
29. Borg Warner: valve manufacturer
30. Aerojet Energy: expansion joints supplier
The results of the inspection activities involving each of these areas
and contractors are documented as follows:
1. Pipe and Pipe Support Fabrication
a. Inspection Scope
(1) Welding Activities
The NRC CAT inspectors reviewed activities relating to fabri-
cation in the areas of piping system welds, support / restraint
welds, welding procedures, welder qualifications, NDE proce-
dures, personnel qualifications, and the review of radiographic
film for shop and field fabricated welds. Field welding
involving pipe fabrication was performed by Hunter. Southwest
Fabricating and Welding supplied the shop fabricated piping
spools.
The NRC CAT inspected 47 pipe supports / restraints involving
approximately 450 welds in order to verify conformance of
welding to drawing requirements and confirm the visual
acceptability of the welds. See Table IV-1 for a listing of
supports subjected to detailed inspection. Additionally,
another 22 supports / restraints involving 600 we ds were
visually inspected to verify the quality of the completed
welds (See Table IV-2). The NRC CAT inspectors also inspected
the welds on the lateral supports for Steam Generator #7.
The NRC CAT inspection of piping welds consisted of visual
inspection during walkdown of piping systems and inspection of
pipe welds located near the supports / restraints being inspec-
ted. Approximately 51 piping spools involving 1700 ASME Class
I, 2 and 3 welds were inspected. Twenty-four of those piping
spools were subjected to detailed inspection which included the
review of pertinent QC documentation while the remaining 27
spools were only visually inspected. Both field and shop
welds were inspected in order to assure compliance with the
requirements of the ASME Code. See Tables IV-3 and IV-4 for
listings of piping spools inspected. In addition, 50 welding
filler metal test reports, 45 welder qualification test records
and 4 welding procedures were reviewed for compliance with
applicable specifications, procedures and the ASME Code
requirements.
IV-4
(2) Nondestructive Examination Activities
The NRC CAT inspection of NDE activities for the pipe fabri-
cation area included the review of 89 shop and 63 field
fabricated welds which involved 1953 film. Field NDE activi-
ties are performed by an independent third party, Pittsburgh
Testing Laboratory. In addition, 5 NDE procedures and 6 NDE
personnel qualification records were reviewed in order to
verify compliance with the governing codes and specifications.
Four NDE technicians were observed while performing in-process
inspections and were evaluated for their ability to follow the
applicable inspection procedures. Fifteen pieces of NDE
equipment were inspected for calibration and one quality
assurance NDE procedure was reviewed for adequacy.
b. Inspection Findings
(1) Welding Activities
In general, the ir.spected pipe and pipe supports / restraints
welding activities were found to comply with the governing
codes and specifications. However, minor discrepancies were
identified involving undersized welds in pipe whip restraints.
Twenty-nine of 1050 structural welds inspected, involving 69
pipe supports / restraints, were found to be deficient with
respect to the specified acceptance criteria. Tn.enty-six of
the inspected welds were undersized, two welds were short in
length and one pipe did not have full contact with the
contoured tube steel saddle. As a result of this finding the
applicant issued Nonconformance Reports (NCRs) and the welds
were subsequently determined to be adequate for the intended
application. See Table IV-1 for details. The inspection of
the Steam Generator lateral support welds showed areas which
were overground by 1/16 to 1/8 inch. Discrepancy Report
QA-MISC-083 was written to document this condition.
No deficient pipe welds were identified during this inspection.
However, during the review of piping documentation, it was
observed that the actual width of weld buildup on the inside
surface of MS-56A, field weld 334, had not been documented
adequately to confirm that all buildup was actually included in
the radiograph of the adjacent butt weld. The review of the
radiographs revealed an acceptable weld buildup condition.
During the review of 50 Material Test Reports for welding
filler metal, it was observed that the purchasing specifica-
tions did not specifically address the requirements of ASME
Section III pertaining to heat treated tensile strength and
the minimum required impact test values. As a result, the
test reports had not been reviewed against the applicable
code requirements. Discrepancy Report QA-Misc-081 was issued
and the welding filler metal test reports were reviewed against
the applicable Code requirements. Subsequent reviews by
Hunter and the NRC CAT inspectors did not reveal any
unacceptable material.
IV-5
(2) Nondestructive Examination Activities
e In general, the inspected NDE activities were found to comply
with the applicable codes and specifications. However, during
the review of the radiographic film some minor irregularities
were identified which involved the following five welds:
Three Field Welds, P-1A-275FW14, CU-28FW2846 and 0G-60-1
FW563 had one set of film and each film had artifacts in
the area of interest. These conditions were not identified
on the reader sheet by the interpreter or the S&L reviewer.
The welds were re-radiographed and the weld quality was
determined to be acceptable.
Field Weld RH-13FW135 station 30 had a linear indication.
This was not recorded on the reader sheet. The weld was
re-radiographed and the indication was determined to be an
acceptable root surface condition.
Shop Weld SI-43-2 Weld 4, contained some views which were
identified as being Weld 6. In other cases Weld 6 was
crossed out and Weld 4 written instead. The dates on the
weld 6 views did not correspond with the reader sheet dates
and there was no explanation on the reader sheet to identify
the correct status of the weld. After careful comparison
of indications and film marks on a film-by-film basis, it
was determined that the correct weld was radiographed in
its entirety and there were no rejectable indications in the
area of interest.
One ultrasonic (UT) procedure QC-UT-1 did not state how the
inspector was to perform UT thickness calibrations.Section V
of the ASME Code paragraph T-561 states that "The instrument
shall be calibrated on a block of the same material and product
form as the material to be measured." The procedure did not
incorporate this Code requirement. However, the NDE manager
stated that they do verify the calibration using the same
material and product form as the material to be measured. The
manager also stated that the procedure will be revised to
incorporate this requirement.
c. Conclusions
(1) Welding Activities
In general, the inspected welding activities were found to
comply with the requirements of the applicable codes and
specifications. However, the NRC CAT found structural welds
on pipe supports and pipe whip restraints which did not meet
the weld specifications. The conditions were evaluated by
S&L and determined to be adequate for the intended appli-
cation.
IV-6
(2) Nondestructive Examination
In general, the inspected NDE activities were found to comply
with the requirements of the governing codes and specifica-
tions. However, the NRC CAT inspectors found some film (1
weld) which was misidentified. Other film (3 welds) had
artifacts in the area of interest and the readers sheets did
not record these conditions. One weld has a linear indication
not noted on the reader sheet.
2. Reactor Internals Modification and Installation
a. Inspection Scope
Approximately 25 welds on the improved rod cluster control guide
tubes were visually inspected. The welds and documentation
packages for the lower internals storage rack modifications were
also reviewed. In addition, one welding procedure and the
qualification test records for two welders were also reviewed for
adequacy. The modification work was performed by NISCo.
b. Inspection Findings and Conclusions
No problems were identified in the area of inspected welding
activities. Activities were found to meet the specified acceptance
criteria.
3. Preservice Inspection (PSI)
a. Inspection Scope
Approximately 20 welds requiring preservice and inservice inspec-
tions were visually inspected (VT) in order to verify compliance
with the requirements of Section XI of the ASME Code. Four of those
welds were also ultrasonically (UT) and liquid penetrant (LP)
examined using the applicable project NDE procedures. Two closure
plates and 2 welds were LP and VT examined in accordance with the
original preservice requirements. In addition, the qualification
test records for four NDE technicians were reviewed and 4 techni-
cians were observed while performing UT and PT inspections. Three
NDE procedures and 15 equipment calibration records were reviewed
for adequacy. The NRC CAT inspectors also examined 30 thickness
check reports and witnessed the performance of thickness measure-
ments. The calibration of UT equipment for thickness measurements
was also reviewed and witnessed. The preservice inspections were
performed by Ebasco.
! b. Inspection Findings
!
During the review of the Ebasco's UT thickness verification proce-
dure, it was noted that the equipment is calibrated using a IIW
Block. The IIW block (standard industry block) did not have any
identification, therefore, it was not possible to determine the
material and product form of the block.Section V of the ASME
,
Code requirement T-561 states that: "The instrument shall be
l
l IV-7
_
calibrated on a block of the same material and product form as the
material to be measured." As a result of this finding Ebasco
inspected the block by applying a magnet and determined that the
block is made from an austenetic stainless steel material.
I Twenty ~(20) thickness reports were also reviewed. The review
revealed that the tested pipes had 20 to 30 percent thicker pipe
wall thickness that the minimum required design thickness. The
thickness examinations are not an ASME Section XI requirement and
the project performs these thickness checks as an additional
verification of the minimum design thickness.
'
c. Conclusions
No problems were identified in the inspected preservice inspection
'
activities. Activities were found to comply with the requirements
of the governing codes and specifications.
4. Electrical Installation and Electrical Supports
'
a. Inspection Scope
The NRC CAT inspectors reviewed approximately 180 field and 50 shop
welds in the area of electrical installation. Three welding pro-
cedures and the qualification test records for seven welders were
reviewed. In addition, the personnel qualification test records for
four welding inspectors were also reviewed and two inspectors were
, observed and evaluated for their ability to follow the visual
!
inspection procedures. The welding activities in the electrical
l area were performed by Hatfield Electric Company,
b. Inspection Findings
During the inspection of hanger H543 no weld detail drawing was
found for the installed type of weld attachment. In addition, the
weld joining the angle iron to the Tee shape section was found to
have lack of fusion and insufficient throat. As a result of this
'
acceptable.
The review of radiographic film for welder qualification testing
revealed that the film for welder stamp #LG did not meet the
requirements of the AWS 01.1, Structural Welding Code. Further
examination of QC records established that this welder has welded a
total of 18 hangers. The NRC CAT inspectors reinspected seven of
these hangers and the licensee reinspected all 18 hangers. The ,
'
inspected welds were found to be of acceptable quality.
c. Conclusions
With the exception of the minor discrepancies of one hanger and
one welder qualification radiograph the inspected activities
l were found to comply with the applicable construction codes and
'
specifications.
,
IV-8
l
L
5. Instrumentation Tubing Installation and Instrumentation Supports
a. Inspection Scope
Approximately 120 welds involving 18 instrumentation supports, 2
panels, and 30 tubing welds were visually inspected to ascertain
compliance with the specified acceptance criteria. Seven welding
procedures and qualification test records for seven welders were
reviewed. NDE procedures and qualification records for five NDE
inspectors were also reviewed. Two visual welding inspectors and
one liquid penetrant inspector were observed and evaluated for
their ability to follow the applicable inspection procedures.
The welding in the instrumentation area was performed by
Powers-Azco-Pope (PAP).
b. Inspection Findings and Conclusions
No deficiencies were identified in the area of instrumentation
welding and NDE activities. Activities were found to comply with
the applicable construction codes and specifications.
6. Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning
Installation and Supports
a. Inspection Scope
Approximately 140 welds involving 16 supports were inspected for
compliance with the specified acceptance criteria. Three welding
procedures and the qualification test records for six welders were
reviewed. In addition, four personnel qualification test records
were also reviewed and two welding inspectors were observed and
evaluated for their ability to follow the visual inspection proce-
dures. The welds on eight duct pieces, two air blowers, one air
filter and four dampers were also included in this inspection.
The welding in the HVAC area was performed by Reliable Sheet Metal
(RSM).
b. Inspection Findings
During the inspection of duct piece M1285-4-44 a burn-through the
duct was observed near the welded joint between the duct and the
duct companion flange. As a result of this finding, RSM issued
Discrepancy Report (DR) #M1285-4-7689 and the duct was repaired. On
duct piece M1287-4-C-10 a three sided stiffener was found to be
installed with staggered stitch welds 1 inch long on 11 inch centers
instead of the required 1 inch long on 9 inch centers as specified
on design drawings. As a result, DR #M1287-4-T690 was written and
a four sided stiffener was added to correct the deficiency. It
should be noted that both of these items had not been subjected
to the Type 2 inspection which is performed by RSM after the first
line QC inspection is completed.
The NRC CAT inspectors identified auxiliary tube steel welded
connections on eight hangers to be deficient with respect to the
IV-9
specified acceptance criteria. The eight hangers and their
associated welding deficiencies are listed below:
- Hanger H3824 - Undersized weld was found on the section end
of the east clip to the tube steel connection.
Hanger H3827 - Clip to tube steel weld was found to be undersized.
- Hanger H3749 - The return welds were found to be undersized.
found to be undersized.
Hanger H3856 - East side of the auxiliary steel to clip weld
was found to be undersized.
- Hanger H3652 - Top weld on east end clip to tube steel and the
top return weld on the north clip were found to
be undersized.
Hanger H3754 - Vertical weld and top and bottom welds on tube
steel were found to be undersized.
l
Hanger H3753 - Clip to tube steel welds and north auxiliary steel
return were found to be undersized.
As a result of these findings, RSM issued NCR 118. The deficiencies
were reviewed by S&L and found to be adequate for the intended
application. See Section III of this report for additional details,
c. Conclusions
With the exception of the findings (burn-through duct in one
! isolated case, deficient stitch welds and undersized welds in
auxiliarysteelconnections)theinspectedweldingactivities
were found to comply with the applicable codes and specifications.
The undersized welds on auxiliary steel has been reviewed and
been found acceptable by S&L.
7. Structural Steel Fabrication, Erection and Modification
a. Inspection Scope
!
Approximately 120 welds comprising 70 field and 50 shop welds
involving 21 structural beams were visually inspected in order to
'
ascertain compliance with the specified acceptance criteria.
Five welding procedures and the qualification test records for six
1
welders were reviewed. Visual inspection procedures and the
qualification test records for four inspectors were also reviewed.
,
Two welding inspectors were observed and evaluated for their ability
! to follow the visual inspection procedures. The structural steel
field welding was performed by Blount Brothers. American Bridge and
Inland Steel Company supplied the structural steel to the project.
l
l
!
! IV-10
b. Inspection Findings
No problems were identified in the area of inspected welding activi-
ties involving the modification of structural steel. However,
several original welds involving clip to beam web connection welds
were found to be deficient. Specifically, the design drawings
required fillet welds all around, while the connection was seal
welded on the top and bottom of the clip angle due to coping of the
beam web. The deficient connections are identified as follows:
North end of beam A45788; West end of beam A45785; South end of beam
, 49982; and West end of Beam B482. The connection on the left end of
beam 43501 was found to be undersized with respect to the specified
sizes on the design drawings. These welds were completed by
American Bridge.
'
As a result of these findings Discrepancy Reports Q3-946 and Q3-947
were issued. The deficiencies were reviewed by S&L and determined
to be adequate for the intended application.
c. Conclusions
With the exception of the undersized clip angle to web welds the
inspected welding activities were found to comply with the speci-
fled requirements. The undersized welds were reviewed by S&L and
determined to be adequate for the intended application.
8. Refueling Cavity Liner Fabrication
a. Inspection Scope
f
The NRC CAT inspectors visually inspected approximately 60 feet of
welded seam and 12 slot welds on the Reactor Pool Liner. The
attachment welds for six brackets and the welds on the reactor
vessel head guide pin rack drive shaft tool brackets were also
inspected in order to ascertain compliance with the specified
acceptance criteria. Two welding procedures and 3 welder qualiff-
cation test records were reviewed for adequacy. In the area of NDE
i
the NRC CAT reviewed the radiographs for 27 spot welds involving 54
film. The Refueling Cavity Liner fabrication was completed by
PittsburghDesMoinesCorporation(PDM).
b. Inspection Findings and Conclusions
No discrepancies were identified in the areas of inspected welding
and NDE activities. Activities were found to comply with the
applicable construction codes and specifications.
9. Fire Protection System Fabrication and Installation
a. Inspection Scope
Approximately 60 welds involving 10 pipe supports and 15 pipe welds
involving 2 pipe spools were visually inspected. One welding
IV-11
E
l-
l
l
l
procedure and the qualification test records for two welders were
also reviewed for adequacy. One Engineering Change Notice (ECN
247916) was reviewed for adequacy. This ECN pertained to increase
of weld sizes on support 2FP2045X. The fire protection installation
l was completed by Hunter.
b. Inspection Findings and Conclusions
No deficiencies were identified in the area of inspected welding and
NDE activities. Activities were found to comply with the governing
construction codes and specifications.
10. Containment Liner and Containment Penetration Installation
a. Inspection Scope
The NRC CAT inspectors visually inspected approximately 40 feet of
liner seam, welds on two pad plates, the attachment welds for one
EmergencyAiqLock,theweldsonanconstructionopening,andthe
attachment welds for two mechanical and two electrical penetrations.
Two welding procedures and the qualification test records for two
welders were also reviewed. In the area of NDE, the NRC CAT
reviewed the radiographs for 197 feet of welded seam which involved
349 film. One radiographic examination procedure was also reviewed
as a part of this inspection. The containment liner and penetra-
tions were installed by Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I).
b. Inspection Findings
No problems were identified in the area of inspected welding
activities. However, during the review of radiographs the NRC CAT
inspectors identified welds which did not meet the required
weld quality. The welds and their associated deficiencies are
listed as follows:
Weld (92-A)-(92-1)hadacrackattheendoftheweldnear
station 0. This was not noted on the reader sheet.
Weld 46-4-11 to 46-12-1 had a rejectable linear indication.
The indication appeared on film RS3 and was not recorded
on the reader sheet. The reader sheet recorded RS2 as being the
final repair shot for the weld,
c. Conclusions
In general, the inspected welding and NDE activities were found to
comply with the governing codes and specifications. However, two
welds were found to contain unacceptable indications. As a result
of this finding, the applicant has committed to review and
evaluate this item.
IV-12
~ . - . -- .- .- _-- . _
11. Vendors and Shop Fabricators Other Than Those Previously Addressed
a. Inspection Scope
The NRC CAT inspectors visually inspected six vendor supplied tanks
i and heat exchangers (See Table IV-5). In addition to the welds
inspected and listed in Table IV-5, the NRC CAT inspectors reviewed
, radiographs related to work performed by 28 vendors which have
! supplied various equipment and hardware to the Byron Power
Station project. A total of 350 feet of welded seam involving
889 radiographs and 28 welds involving 245 film were reviewed.
The radiographs for 19 valves and pumps involving 304 film, and
the radiographs for 60 spot welds involving 93 film were also
reviewed for compliance with the governing codes and specifica-
tions (See Table IV-6).
b. Inspection Findings
During the inspection of tanks and heat exchangers supplied by the
vendors listed in Table IV-5, the NRC CAT inspectors found that the
size of the nozzle and manway weld reinforcement did not meet the
l requirements stated in the vendor drawings. In addition, the welds
I
'
on some of the inspected supports were also found to be undersized.
A total of six tanks and heat exchangers were found to deviate from
the required drawing sizes. See Table IV-5 for details. The NRC
has issued Information Notice 85-33 on the subject of undersized
weld reinforcement in ASME Code nozzle to shell joints. As a result
l of the Information Notice, the licensee had inspected the nozzle
l welds on ten pressure vessels and tanks prior to this inspection.
Undersized weld reinforcement on the nozzle to shell welds were
'
iden*.Ified on the ten tanks. The licensee issued NCRs on this
,
issue. It was identified that some of these welds violate ASME Code t
l requirements for minimum size of welds.
In the area of NDE, the NRC CAT inspectors identified deficiencies
,
relating to NDE documentation and radiographs supplied by vendors.
! Specifically, unacceptable indications were found in radiographs
supplied by ITT Grinnell (one weld), Graver (one weld), Phillips
l
Steel (two welds), and Teledyne Brown (one weld). Irregularities
l with the NDE documentation were noted in the documentation
! supplied by G&W Energy, Continental Boiler, Cleaver Brooks and
l Harnischfeger Corporation. See Table IV-6 for details. In
l addition, the film for the Component Cooling Surge Tank (2CC01T) ,
j and the Volume Control tank (2CV01T) which were stored by
l Westinghouse were not available to the NRC CAT inspectors for review
during the inspection period. This indicates a lack of retriev-
'
ability for ASME documentation,
c. Conclusions
t
In general, the inspected welding and NDE activities were found to
l comply with the requirements of the governing codes and specifica- i
tions. However, six tanks and heat exchangers were found to deviate
from the requirements stated in the applicable drawings and specifi-
cations. In addition, the radiographs and NDE documentation
IV-13
I
l
B
l'
I' supplied by vendors weie found to be deficient with respect to
l the required quality. The film for two components supplied by
Westinghouse were not provided during the inspection period.
t
!
'
l
.
O
!
!
IV-14
TABLE IV-1
LIST OF SUPPORTS WHICH WERE INSPECTED AGAINST DRAWING REQUIREMENTS
2SIO3001X 2SI13020X 2CC22004X
2SI42001X 2SI23003X 2RH02073X
2CC19018X 2CV03009S 2SIO3025V
2RYO6015S 2SIO9006X 2RH02050X (6)
2SIO3041X 2CC23009X 2RH02069X
2SI26010X 2CC19013X (1) 2W002014X
2FWO5018X 2RYO9086S 2FWO3012S
2SI16020X 2FWO3008X 2RH02027X
'
2 WOO 3003X 2MS03079S 2SX08037X
2SIO6261X 2SIO6258X 2CS06033A
2SIO6263X 2SIO6262X 2CS03A099X ,
,- 2CS104014A 2SIO6238X 2CS08020X
2SIO6241X 2SIO6236X 2CS01200X
2CV47044A 2CV74004X 2SIO3011X (6)
2SI9R5558 (2) (a) MS-P16(a) RC-4-4(3)(a)
s RY-7(4)(a) 2SI13R-6558(5)(a)
NOTES:
(1) Two fillet welds 1/2" short on length along web of W-section.
Discrepancy Report DR-QC-2CC19003. See Section II of this report for
> P# additional discussion.
(2) Ten welds undersized by more then 1/8". Whip restraint deleted prior
to CAT inspection by Westinghouse.
(3) Four welds 1/16" undersized one leg. NCR 1131.
(4) Three 3/8" fillet welds undersized by 1/16" and short 3/8" on length.
NCR 1133.
(5) Nine welds undersized on one leg by as much as 3/8". NCR 1132.
(6) Pipe not in full contact with contoured tube steel saddle.
(a) Pipe Whip Restraints - shop welds only.
IV-15
TABLE IV-2
SUPPORTS WHICH WERE VISUALLY INSPECTED
2CV74005 2CV7400X 2CV16034V
CV28003X CV16033S 2SI30A029X
2SI30A003X 2FP02055X FW93E010A
2SIO3042X 2CV47079R 2RH20011X
2RH20010X 2RH10000G 2FWO8022X
2MS01079S 2MS01074S 2MS01205X
2MS01206X 2MS05002C 2MS05001X
2MS05006R
IV-16
TABLE IV-3
LIST OF PIPING WHICH WAS VISUALLY INSPECTED
ITEM DESCRIPTION PIPE SIZE (IN.) MATERIAL
2CV-44-2 Chemical Volume Control 3 Stainless Steel
2RC-16-2 Reactor Coolant 3 Stainless Steel
2FC-24-2 Fuel Pool Cooling 4 Stainless Steel
2RC-19-2 Reactor Coolant 4 Stainless Steel
2RC-0010231-1A Reactor Coolant 2 Stainless Steel
2RC-51-1 Reactor Coolant 3 Stainless Steel
2SI-37-3 Safety Injection 18, 24 Stainless Steel
2RH-9-4 Residual Heat Removal 14 Stainless Steel
2CS-18-3 Containment Spray 12, 16 Stainless Steel
2CS-17-2 Containment Spray 18 Stainless Steel
2CS-17-4 Containment Spray 14, 16, 18 Stainless Steel
2RH-14-4 Residual Heat Removal 8 Stainless Steel
2CV-17-4 Chemical Volume Control 8 Stainless Steel
S-CV-100-241 Chemical Volume Control 2 Stainless Steel
S-CV-100-242 Chemical Volume Control 2 Stainless Steel
S-CV-100-243 Chemical Volume Control 2 Stainless Steel
2SX-20-5 Essential Service Water 6 Carbon Steel
2SI-56-4 Safety Injection 3 Stainless Steel
2SI-37-2 Safety Injection 24 Stainless Steel
2SI-40-1 Safety Injection 8 Stainless Steel
2RC-13-3 Reactor Coolant 4 Stainless Steel
2FC-21-2 Fuel Pool Cooling 4 Stainless Steel
2RE-13-7 Containment Equipment Drain 4 Stainless Steel
2SI-32-3 Safety Injection 12 Stainless Steel
2RH-10-8 Residual Heat Removal 4 Stainless Steel
2RH-10-7 Residual Heat Removal 8 Stainless Steel
2RH-10-5 Residual Heat Removal 8 Stainless Steel
l
IV-17
.
TABLE IV-4
PORTIONS OF PIPING SYSTEMS VISUALLY EXAMINED AND
FOR WHICH DOCUMENTATION WAS REVIEWED
ITEM DESCRIPTION PIPE SIZE (IN.) MATERIAL
2MS-60-1 Main Steam 30 Carbon Steel
2MS-60-2 Main Steam 30 Carbon Steel
2MS-60-3 Main Steam 30 Carbon Steel
2MS-60-4 Main Steam 30 Carbon Steel
2MS-60-5 Main Steam 30, 12, 4 Carbon Steel
2MS-60-6 Main Steam 28 Carbon Steel
2MS-60-7 Main Steam 28, 6 Carbon Steel
2MS-60-8 Main Steam 8 Carbon Steel
'2MS-60-9 Main Steam 8 Carbon Steel
2PC-78 Main Steam Penetration 30, 42 Carbon Steel
2FW-25-7 Feedwater 16 Carbon Steel
2FW-25-6 Feedwater 16 Carbon Steel
2FW-25-5 Feedwater 16 Carbon Steel
2FW-25-4 Feedwater 16 Carbon Steel
2CS-17-1 Containment Spray 16 Stainless Steel
2CS-17-2 Containment Spray 16 Stainless Steel
2CS-17-3 Containment Spray 16 Stainless Steel
2CS-17-4 Containment Spray 6, 14, 16 Stainless Steel
2CS-17-5 Containment Spray 14 Stainless Steel
2CS-16-1 Containment Spray 10, 8 Stainless Steel
2CS-16-2 Containment Spray 10 Stainless Stool
2CS-16-3 Containment Spray 10 Stainless Steel
2CS-16-4 Containment Spray 10 Stainless Steel
2CS-16-5 Containment Spray 10 Stainless Steel
,
IV-18
_
TABLE IV-5
TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS WHICH WERE VISUALLY INSPECTED
ITEM MANUFACTURER
Accumulator Tank 2SIO4TA (1) Southwest Fabricating and Welding
Letdown Heat Exchanger 2CV01AA (2) Atlas Industrial Manufacturing
Volume Control Tank 2CV01T (3) Lamco Industries, Inc.
ComponentCoolingSurgeTank2CC01T(4) Westinghouse Corporation
Spray Additive Tank 2CS01T (5) Graver Tank Company
Fuel Oil Day Storage Tank 20001TA (6) Chicago Bridge and Iron Company
(1) Bolting ring fillet weld 1/16" undersized on one leg. NCR-1148
(2) One nozzle reinforcing fillet weld 1/8" undersized. NCR-1148
(3) One nozzle reinforcing fillet weld size 1/16", 1/4" required. NCR-994.
(4) Manway fillet welds undersized, nozzle welds undersized, saddle and
stiffening ring fillet welds undersized. NCR-994.
(5) Support leg fillet welds undersized. NCR-996.
(6) Bolting ring to tank fillet weld 1/16" undersized, stiffener fillets
intermittently undersized, and two nozzle reinforcing fillets
undersized. NCP-1148
IV-19
F-
!
!
l
l
TABLE IV-6
VENDOR RADIOGRAPHS REVIEWED
Valve Spot Feet of
Contractor Welds Pumps Welds Welds Film Notes
G8W Energy 5 56 (1)
Products
'
TRW Mission 8 48
Manufacturing
Anchor Darling 2 55
Far r Company 7 94
Continental Boiler 8 8 (2)
McQual Perfex 5 12
i Pall Trinity 2 28
ACF Industries 1 20
Jamesbury Corp. 2 19
Cleaver Brooks 42 36 (3)
Graver Corp. 75 180 (4)
Yuba 59 120
Harnischfeger 19 63 (5)
Dresser Industries 11 44
Bingham Willamette 1 62
Manning Lewis 1 1
Cooper-Bessemer 4 4
Carrier Corp. 9 9
Greer liydraulics 8 32
ITT Grinnell 5 8 (6)
W. J. Wooley 13 48
Atlas Industrial 28 108
Plant Mangement Corp. 5 5
IV-20
. ._. _ _ _ _ _
l'
l
TABLE IV-6 - (Continued)
l VENDOR RADIOGRAPHS REVIEWED
i
l
Valve Spot Feet of
Contractor Welds Pumps Welds Welds Film Notes
Phillips Steel 27 54 (7)
l Borg Warner 5 100
Teledyne Brown 96 204 (8)
'
Rockwell Inter- 5 71
national
i
' Aerojet Energy 3 42
NOTES:
(1) The flim packet for one of the welds which should have contained film
for five intervals, contained film for only two intervals. The missing
flim for the other three intervals was later found and was reviewed with
no problems identified.
(2) The reader sheets with the film indicated that this film was for
Braidwood components. Further investigation of documentation indicated
that the items had originally been scheduled for Braidwood but had later
been transferred to Byron.
(3) Reader sheets for weld WT 8549-64 were not in that packet but were found
in flim packet for weld WT 2158-64.
(4) Circumferential seam 1Al-6 showed added weld metal on interval A-B dated
June 20, 1977, however the added metal does not show in interval M-A
dated June 23, 1977. CECO reviewed the film and returned it supposedly
in proper order. However due to two different identifications on the
film, it was impossible to tell whether one or two welds were represented
by these film. Subsequently, Ceco determined that the film actually were
from only one weld, and that further repair in the M-A interval accounted
for the difference in appearance of the two weld intervals.
On weld 1Al-1 (Job 2) interval 11-12 a linear indication, possibly a
crack, was noted. CECO then did an ultrasonic examination of the area.
However, the performed examination was a longitudinal examination and is
not acceptable for this type and location of indication. An NCR is being
written. ThisindicationisinvesselIC80!T(Byron 1).
In vessel H1 tank 2 weld 3Al-1 interval F-G at the end of the seam in the
transverse weld, an indication was noted. However, when the film of the
transverse weld were located they showed no indication of a problem in
the area mentioned.
IV-21
E
i
!
TABLE IV-6 - (Continued)
VENDOR RADIOGRAPHS REVIEWED
,
NOTES:
l (5) When the film was submitted, the reader sheets were so faint that it was
l impossible to read them. Subsequently, the original sheets in the QA file ,
'
were produced and the film was read. No problems were noted.
(6) A 3/8 inch slag line was noted in the 2-3 interval. After reviewing the
receiving and issuing documents, it was determined that the item had
never been issued to the job for installation.
(7) Area 3255-A OWX10D had a linear indication on each of the junction welds.
Area 3244-A-2V2 OWX07 TV2 had the penetrameter shim into the area of
interest.
,
(8) 4901-9, weld 147 A-B, had an unacceptable slag line at station A and the
l belt numbers appears to be inside the area of interest. Six welds did
not have full coverage. The welds were identified as: 4901-9, - weld
103 G-H, weld 116 A-B, weld 160 G-H; 4901-10 - welds 147 A-B and 160 G-H;
and 4902, weld 75 B-C. Item 4901-1D, weld 103 G-H, also did not have
full coverage and there was a linear indication extending into the
uncovered area,
l
l
!
!
!
l
IV-22
<
I
V. CIVIL AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRUCTION
A. Objective
The objective of the appraisal of civil and structural construction was
to determine by evaluation and review of Quality Control (QC) accepted
work and documentation whether civil and structural construction areas
were completed in accordance with regulatory requirements, Safety
Analysis Report commitments, and project specifications, drawings and
procedures.
B. Discussion
The specific areas of civil and structural construction evaluated were
structural steel installation, high strength bolting for structural
steel connections and Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) support con-
nections, general concrete surfa.e quality, cadwelds, concrete
placements, concrete expansion anchor (CEA) qualification report,
masonry and containment prestressed, post-tensioned tendons.
A physical or hardware inspection and a review of QC documentation and
field procedures were conducted for the following activities:
structural steel installation, high strength bolting for structural
steel connections and NSSS support connections, general concrete surface
quality, masonry and containment prestressed post-tensioned tendons.
For concrete expansion anchors, cadwelds, and concrete placement, this
portion of the NRC Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) review was limited
to a review of QC documentation and field procedures. The qualification
report for CEAs was also reviewed. The installation of concrete
expansion anchors was also reviewed in the mechanical and electrical
construction areas (see Sections II and III).
1. Structural Steel Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
Installed and QC accepted structural steel were inspected by the
NRC CAT. Attributes inspected were member size, configuration,
and bolted connections. For bolted connections, both
friction and sliding connections were tested by using a calibrated
torque wrench to determine whether the bolts had proper pretension.
The sample used in the structural steel verification for correct
member size and configuration is described in Table V-1. A total
of 85 structural steel members and 38 connections were inspected.
High strength bolting for structural steel connections and NSSS
support connections which were checked for pretension are shown in
Tables V-2 and V-3a, respectively. A total of 699 high strength
bolts were tested for proper pretension. These included 7/8 inch
diameter A325 and 1 inch and 1 1/8 inch diameter A490 bolts. As a
result of NRC CAT inspection findings, the licensee inspected
additional A490 bolts for structural steel connections and NSSS
support connections (See Table V-3b). The A325 bolts were sampled
from structural steel connections. Test torque values were obtained
V-1
by using a Skidmore Wilhelm tension tester to establish the proper
torque-tension relationship. In addition, a total of 62 bolts
sampled from 17 sliding connections were checked for installation
The requirements and acceptance criteria for structural steel
installation are included in the drawings listed in Table V-4 and
in the following specifications and procedures:
Blount Brothers QA/QC Work Procedures #21, " Structural Steel
Fabrication, Repair, Modification and Erection," Rev. 16,
May 8, 1984.
Powers-Azco-Pope Procedure No. FP-21, " Bolted Connections,"
Rev. 2, June 17, 1983.
Hunter Corporation Site Implementation Procedure #4.001,
" Bolted Connections," Rev. #2, May 26, 1983.
Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory Procedure No. QC-SR-1,
' Structural Steel Inspection," Rev. #2, July 24, 1984.
b. Inspection Findings
For the 85 structural steel members and 38 connections, no signifi-
cant hardware deficiencies were identified. There were seven minor
design drawing or hardware discrepancies. However, none of these
resulted in a significant hardware deficiency and were evaluated
to be acceptable in the installed condition. These findings are
described below.
The seven minor design drawing or hardware discrepancies were:
1. Design drawing (S-1015, Rev. AJ) showed a W14x90 was to be used
for the radial beam (Modification No.94204) at radial line R42
of the Containment Unit 2 Building. However, a W14x78 was
actually installed. Apparently, the original design drawing
specified a W14x78 which was not available at the time of
installation. Field Change Request (FCR) 696 was issued to
allow the use of a W14x90 (which was readily available) instead
of the W14x78 originally specified. A change to the design
drawing to reflect the FCR was done. Following this, a W14x78
became available and was subsequently installed as originally
intended. FCR 696 was voided, but followup was not done to
revise the design drawing to show the installed W14x78. There
was no hardware deficiency.
2. Design drawings incorrectly showed the left connection of Beam
No. 94203 as Detail 2329-17 only. Based on comments from the
NRC CAT inspectors, FCR 44354 was issued to correctly describe
the actual connection as Detail 3 and Detail X on Drawing
S-2228 and Detail 2329-17. There was no hardware deficiency.
V-2
3. Beam No. 3.6AB1012N-2 had four abandoned flame-cut holes in
the bottom flange at about mid-span. These four holes had not
been identified previously. Deviation Report (DR) 949 was
issued to correct this deficiency. The resolution was to
plug weld the holes.
4. The top connection of the double angle brace to Beam No.
5AB1026N was to be a 10 bolt connection, but only 8 bolts were
installed. The missing two bolts had not been identified
previously. DR #Q3-951 was subsequently issued. Sargent and
Lundy Engineers (S&L) evaluated the existing condition to be
acceptable as-is; however, the 2 bolts missing would be
installed.
5. The brace to column connection directly below Beam 8.6AB235 at
elevation 467 was installed with four bolts in a six bolt
connection and welded where the bolts had not been installed.
Previously, FCR F-41049 had identified the as-built condition
and was acceptable as-is. However, the FCR was not clearly
incorporated onto the design drawing. The as-built condition
(correctly shown on the FCR) was welded across the top 1 inch
on both corners of the plate. However, on the design drawing
it appears that the weld is to be across the entire top side
of the plate.
6. The right end connection of Beam 8.6A8218R had been welded in
lieu of bolted. However, the design drawings showed the
connection as bolted. This condition was not identified
previously. FCR F-44359 was issued to document the as-built
condition on the design drawing. There was no hardware
deficiency.
7. Beam 3.6AB1102N had a cope in the bottom side of the flange
which did not meet the American Institute of Steel Construction
(AISC) requirements for minimum 1/2 inch radius. Deviation
Report for Correctable Items (DRC) No. 2C-374-23 was then
issued to repair this condition to meet the AISC requirements.
It was noted that the licensee had previously identified similar
deficiencies as described above in the Quality Control Structural
Steel Review (QCSSR) Program and in the resolution of NCR F-743
(reportable deficiency 82-08).
For the installed torque inspection of 7/8 inch diameter A325 bolts,
294 and 185 bolts were sampled from the Containment Unit 2 and
Auxiliary Building, respectively. Of these, 15 had been installed
at torques significantly below the inspection torque values. Six
(5-Containment and 1-Auxiliary Building) were installed with zero
torque. In addition, two 7/8 inch diameter A307 bolts were used in
a connection which should have been A325 bolts. See Table V-2.
For the inspection of 1 1/8 inch diameter A490 bolts. 112 bolts
in the Containment Unit 2 were inspected. Of these, 36 (approxi-
mately 32%) were determined to be at torque levels significantly
below the inspection torque value. It was determined by S&L that
V-3
there are 29 connections requiring tension in the bolts to transfer
axial loads. The licensee field tested the bolts on 25 of the 29
connections. The remaining four connections were determined to be
inaccessible. It was determined that 95 out of 228 (approximately
42%) bolts tested were significantly below the inspection torque.
The lowest average torque value in a connection was 67% less than
the average inspection torque. See Table V-2.
For the 1 inch diameter A490 bolt inspection, 208 bolts were sampled
from NSSS support connections. Of these, 49 (approximately 23%)
were at torque levels significantly below the inspection tcrque
value. The licensee field tested 56 additional bolts of the NSSS
support connections. It was determined that 20 (approximately 36%)
were at torque levels significantly below the inspection torque.
See Table V-3a, b.
S&L design drawings allow the substitution of M4x13 structural
steel sections for W4x13 structural steel sections for pipe sup-
ports. The resulting vertical weld configuration shown on the
design documents for the M section is shorter than that for the
original W section. The licensee indicated that a review would be
conducted to show that this substitution would not cause an over-
stress condition.
The sliding connections were generally found to be acceptable. A few
bolts were found to be installed at torque values below 50 ft-lbs.
Installation requirements at the time of inspection specified the
bolts be installed between 50 and 100 ft-lbs.
c. Conclusion
In general, structural steel installation was found acceptable.
Although several design drawing and hardware discrepancies were
identified, they were considered isolated cases and did not signi-
ficantly affect the installed hardware. A significant number of
bolted connections were found by the NRC CAT inspectors to be below
inspection torque levels indicating less tension in the bolts than
specified by the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC).
The sliding connections were found to be acceptable.
l
2. Reinforced Concrete Construction
a. Inspection Scope
Reinforced concrete construction areas inspected were general
surface quality, cadweld documentation, concrete pour packages
and the qualification report for the wedge type concrete expansion
anchors (CEAs). General concrete quality was examined from
surrounding areas of completed concreto construction for
conformance to site specifications.
Cadweld documentation covering the initial site cadweld splicing
production performed by Delta-Delta Midstates were reviewed.
Cadweld documentation was also Feviewed for the period covering June
V-4
m
, -
- .. .. - - - . - .- - - _ .
4
11,,1980 thru July 31, 1980, performed by Blount Brothers Corpora-
' tion.
, The qualification records for eight cadwelders of Delta-Delta
Midstates were. reviewed. The records showed proper qualification of
.
cadwelders by visual and tensiT,e testing in each position and bar
i size.
-The following cadweld records or QC' documentation were reviewed:
" Sample Selection Log"
,
" Requests for Sister Splices T-Vertical"
" Tensile and Visual Reports for Samples U-I"
'
"Cadweld History T-Horizontal," thru December 31, 1977.
"Cadwelding Cadweld History."
Nine concrete pour packages were reviewed. A list of those
reviewed is provided in Table V-5. Records reviewed and associated
with the concrete placements were field concrete control log sheets,
.
Econcrete placement checkout sheets, quality control report pre-
placement checklists, quality control report surveillance of con-
crete placement and compression tests of 6x12 inch concrete
cylinders. The records were checked for adequate completion by the ,
QC inspectors, the existence of senior QC inspectors' signature for-
evaluation of completed forms, and acceptable coverage of attributes
,
by the documentation.
s' The following qualification test report for the wedge type CEAs was
reviewed:
Summary Report-Static, Dynamic and Relaxation Testing of
Expansion Anchors in Response to Bulletin 79-02, July 20, 1981.
The requirements and acceptance criteria for reinforced concrete
construction are contained in the following drawing, specifications,
and procedures:
- ~ Drawing S-693, Rev. AF, " Auxiliary Building Floor Framing
,
Plan E1. 383 ft-0 inches Area 6."
BY/BR/MCS, " Specification for Making and Inspecting Mechanical
- (Cadweld) Splices," Rev. 7, July 5, 1978."
4
y
BY/BR/CEA, "BY/BR Standard Specification for Concrete Expansion
Anchor Work Byron Units.1 and 2 and Braidwood Units 1 and 2."
CECO Specification F/L-2722, " General Structures Work," Rev. 41,
- June 21, 1985.
L
!-
f
V-5
i
_ - - _ . _ - - , - - . - . - - ~ . . -.
_ . , , . _ - - _ - - - . - . - - - , , - _ , -
b. Inspection Findings
General concrete surface quality was found to be acceptable.
Concrete openings were being recorded on a Miscellaneous Opening
Identification Walkdown computer log. No concrete opening or chip
out was identified by the NRC CAT that was not either recorded on
the miscellaneous opening computer log or field repaired with backup
engineering evaluation by S&L.
QC documentation kept for cadweld splicing production by Delta-Delta
Midstates did not clearly show that Part B.2.3.4 of the FSAR was
met for tensile testing frequency. As a result, the licensee
committed to reconstruct the tensile testing sequence of each
cadweld operator to verify that the FSAR commitments were met.
Cadweld records provided for cadweld splices perfonned by Blount
Brothers Corporation from June 11, 1980 to July 31, 1980 indicated
that the tensile testing requirements were met.
The concrete pour packages reviewed were found to meet FSAR, speci-
fication and procedure requirements. Proper QC inspection attri-
butes were listed in the documentation.
The NRC CAT identified that in some cases for oversized holes in
pipe support base plates, washers were not required by procedures
to be welded to the base plate. These support assemblies rely on
the induced friction between the mounted plates and concrete surface
to prevent lateral movement of the pipe support. Tensile preload in
the CEAs is critical for these supports. Neither the CEA qualifi-
cation test report nor other documents provided by S&L provided a
correlation between tensile preload in the CEAs and installed torque
or the amount of residual tension in the CEA with time.
The torque to preload relationship was determined using the Marks
Engineering Handbook formula using a coefficient of friction of 0.3
and a correlation was made with test results from another site.
However, this does not adequately demonstrate that the residual
tension in the CEAs installed at Byron is sufficient to prevent
excessive pipe support movement. Using the formulas in the Marks
Engineering Handbook with a low coefficient of friction will yield
results that may not be conservative. The coefficient of friction
for steel on steel can be as high as 0.8. The preloads calculated
using this coefficient would not be conservative.
In the CEA qualifications test report the embedment depth of the
concrete expansion bolts was measured from the bottom of the wedge
to the face of the concrete. Site QC inspectors, however, measure
the embedment depth from the bottom of the anchor to the face of
the concrete. The difference between these measurements is approxi-
mately one anchor bolt diameter. As a result, for all size CEAs
except the 1/4 inch diameter ones, the embedmant depth could be
seven diameters instead of the eight diameters required by the
qualification report. For the 1/4 inch diameter CEAs the embedment
depth could be 2.25 diameters instead of the six diameters required
V-6
. . _ _
by the qualification report. It appears that design requirements
were not properly translated into installation and inspection
procedures.
c. Conclusions
General concrete surface quality and concrete pour packages were
found to be acceptable. The licensee has committed to reconstruct
the cadweld records to verify conformance to FSAR, specification and
procedure requirements for those performed by Delta-Delta Midstates.
The licensee has not demonstrated that the installation torque for
CEAs will produce adequate preload in the bolt when installed in
materials similar to those used on site.
It appears that the CEA embedment depth was not measured conserva-
tively especially with the smaller anchors (i.e., 1/4 inch dia-
meter). An evaluation of site practice and inspection methods
should be made to ensure that the embedment depths are consistent
with the qualification report.
3. Masonry Wall Construction
a. Inspection Scope
Masonry wall construction activities reviewed included controlling
procedures, specifications, and inspection of installed masonry
walls. For the installed masonry walls, the inspection concentrated
on exterior column modifications. The masonry work reviewed was in
the Auxiliary Building and included 4 column modifications and the
inspection records for 3 masonry walls.
The requirements and acceptance criteria for masonry construction
- and inspection are listed in Table V-6 and the following
specification:
J CECO Specification F/L-2722 " General Structures Work,"
Rev. 41, June 21, 1985.
b. Inspection Findings and Conclusions
,
Examination of inspection records and completed work showed that
masonry wall installations generally conformed with design drawings
and specifications.
c. Conclusions
In general, masonry walls inspected were found to be acceptable.
4. Prestressed Tendon Installation
a. Inspection Scope
The installation records of 15 prestressed tendons of the Contain-
ment Unit 2 were reviewed for conformance to the project specifica-
V-7
_
-- - .
_ - - - -
--.
_ - _- - . __
l
l
tion. The tendons reviewed were five vertical, five horizontal and
l five dome. The vertical, dome and three of the six horizontal
tendon galleries were inspected for evidence of leaking grease..
I The requirements and acceptance criteria used for inspection of
l prestressed, post-tensioned tendon installation were included in
the following specification:
'
! CECO Specification F/L-2722 " General Structures Work,"
Rev. 41, June 21, 1985.
I b. Inspection Findings
One horizontal grease cap was found to be leaking grease. The
grease was collected, measured and found to be one-tenth of a
gallon. This is within specification limits. In order to more
accurately monitor the grease loss in any tendon, the licensee
plans to revise procedures and keep a running log of grease loss
in each tendon.
c. Conclusions
In general, the prestressed, post-tensioned system was found to be
acceptable.
!
(
V-8
_ --
._. _ . . _ _ _ _ _
-
-. .. . . - - .. - _. .. . - - _ - - - _ - - . _ ,
TABLE V-1 '
STRUCTURAL STEEL INSTALLATION SAMPLE
i
Approximate
Elevation
Building and Area Beam Brace Column Connection *
Containment Elev. 450 ft. 26 -
3 14
Unit 2 Area 5 and 8
Auxiliary Elev. 374 ft. 15 -
1 8
to 376 ft.
Area 7
Elev. 383 ft. 11 3 3 8
to 401 ft. -
Area 7
f
Elev. 451 ft. 5 2 4 3
to 459 ft.
Area 7
Elev. 467 ft. 6 - -
3
Area 7
Elev. 477 ft. 4 1 1 2
Area 7
<
'
TOTALS 67 6 12 38
.
l
- This sample is separate from the high strength bolt torque sample.
.
t
4
.
.
V-9
-, . .- .-- .-._. - - ,- - - - - , . _ . - ... - - , .. - , . . . _ - _ - . - - - . - . - , . . --
TABLE V-2
HIGH STRENGTH BOLTING 0F STRUCTURAL STEEL CONNECTIONS
7/8 inch diameter A325 bolts 1;
No. of Bolts Number of Bolts
Building Elevation Checked Found Unacceptable Comments
Containment 401 ft. 52 None Sample taken from
Unit 2 connections along
radial lines R29,
R31, R38 and R40.
407 ft. 24 6 - 1 each @ 0,250, Sample taken along
350 and 400 lines R39 and R40.
ft-lbs; 2 @
300 ft-lbs.
412 ft. 99 3 - 1 each @ 250 Sample taken along
and 300 ft-lbs; lines R22, R38, R39
1 @ 400 ft-lbs. and R40.
426 ft. 119 4 - All four @ 0 Sample taken along
ft-lbs. radial lines R22 thru
R26 and R32 thru R34.
Auxiliary 451 ft. 73 None Sample taken from
column lines U21, V21
523 to S25.
459 ft. 85 1 - One @ 175 ft-lbs Sample taken from
column lines U21, V21
and S7-23.
two 7/8 inch
dia. A307 bolts were
installed where A325
bolts should have been.
461 ft. 27 1 - One 0 0 ft-lbs Sample taken from
column lines U21
and V21.
TOTAL 479 15 3% found
unacceptable
V-10
- = - - .- - . . - = - - _ _ _ . . . - - . . - _ ,
TABLE V-2- (Continued)
l HIGH STRENGTH BOLTING OF STRUCTURAL STEEL CONNECTIONS
' 1 1/8 inch diameter A490 bolts 2;
No. of Bolts Number of Bolts
Building Elevation Checked Found Unacceptable Comments
Containment 401 ft. 66 25 - One each @ 200, 38% found
- Unit 2 425, 550, 600, unacceptable.
625, 700, 825, Sample taken
850, 900, 1025, from connections
i 1050, 1125, along radial lines
1150 ft-lbs. R23, R25, R29, R31,
Two each @ 300, R38 and R40.
525, 800 ft-lbs.
i
Three @ 500 and
1200 ft-lbs.
407 ft. 14 8 - One each @ 250, 57% found
300, 600, 800, unacceptable.
1150 and 1200 Sample taken
along radial
'
ft-lbs. Two @
i 1175 ft-lbs. lines R23, R25,
4
R31, R38 and
>
R40.
412 ft. 32 3 - One @ 600 ft-lbs. Sample taken
, Two @ 750 ft-lbs. along radial
i lines R23, R25,
R33, R38 and
R40.
TOTAL 112 36 32% found
unacceptable.
NOTE:
1. Inspection torque value used was 425 ft-lbs.
2. Inspection torque value used was 1250 ft-lbs.
,
!
,
5
I
i
.
V-11
!
. _ . _ , _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ . . _ - . _. , _ _____ ____ ._ . ._ __ _,- _
- . _ _ _ . .. . _ .
.
TABLE V-3a
HIGH STRENGTH BOLT INSTALLED TORQUE INSPECTION
FOR CONNECTIONS OF NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM SUPPORTS
1 inch diameter A490 bolts:1
No. of Number Found
Building Location Bolts Checked Unacceptable Comments
Containment Steam 24 12 - 200 to 600
Unit 2 Generator ft-lbs.
No. 5 Lower
Lateral
Support
Steam 32 10 - 300 to 600
Generator ft-lbs.
No. 6 Lower
Lateral
Support
Steam 24 24 - 100 to 700
Generator ft-lbs.
No. 8 Lower
Lateral
Support
Tower 28 2 - One each @
Restraint 650 and 700
ft-lbs.
TOTAL 108 48 44% found
unacceptable.
NOTE:
1. Inspection torque value used was 750 ft-lbs.
.
V-12
_- -
l TABLE V-3b
LICENSEE'S RESULTS OF INDEPENDENT INSPECTION OF HIGH
STRENGTH BOLTS OF NSSS SUPPORT CONNECTIONS i
(
)
Number of Bolts
Not Accepted -
Torque Value
Bolt Size Number of Bolts Range for Bolts
Location and Type Inspected Not Accepted 1 Comments
l
Containment:
Pressurizer 1 1/4 inch 8 4 - 1050 to 1300
Column diameter ft-lbs.
Support A490
No. 1
Pressurizer 1 1/4 inch 8 2 - 800 and 1200
Column diameter ft-lbs.
l Support A490
No. 2
Pressurizer 1 1/4 inch 8 3 - 1400 to 1425
l Column- diameter ft-lbs.
Support A490
No. 3
Pressurizer 1 1/4 inch 8 1 - 800 ft-lbs
Column diameter
Support A490
No. 4
Pressurizer 1 1/2 inch 4 0 - Not Appli- Hydraulic torque
Column diameter cable. wrench utilized.
Support A490
No. 1
. Pressurizer 1 1/2 inch 4 1 - 2353 ft-lbs. Hydraulic torque
I Column diameter wrench utilized.
Support A490
No. 2
!
Pressurizer 1 1/2 inch 4 0 - Not Appli- Hydraulic torque
Column diameter cable. wrench utilized.
Support A490
No. 3
Pressurizer 1 1/2 inch 4 1 - 2157 ft-lbs. Hydraulic torque
Column diameter wrench utilized.
Support A490
No. 4
V-13
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.. . _ - . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . ._ _ _ . .. ___ _ . .
TABLE V-3b - (Continued)
i
'
LICENSEE'S RESULTS OF INDEPENDENT INSPECTION OF HIGH
STRENGTH BOLTS OF NSSS SUPPORT CONNECTIONS
'.
Number of Bolts
[l
Not Accepted - ,
.
_
Torque Value
Bolt Size Number of Bolts Range for Bolty
] Lecation and Type Inspected Not Accepted Comments
l
Reactor 2 1/2 inch 8 8 - 3937 to 5118 Hydraulic torque
Coolant diameter ft-lbs. wrench utilized.
Pump A490
Loop No. 7
, TOTAL 56- 20 36% found
.
unacceptable. ,
4
. NOTE:
1 Inspection torque values used were for 1-1/4, 1-1/2 and 2-1/2 inch diameter
balts 1450, 4745 and 5570 ft-lbs, respectively.
E
^
t
!
4
, r
s
'
i
i
4
V-14
.
v-e .,c. . . , , , , , - , _ . _ _ , - . . . _ - < - . , _ . , ,-.,_m-# , _ , , - , - ._-_-._,p.. y.-,,,--,___, -,_,,,_wy ,..,--_,mmm, -- ,-,y. , , --
-
TABLE V-4
DRAWINGS USED FOR STRUCTURAL STEEL INSPECTION
American Bridge
Drawing No. Rev. Order No.
A251 B K6776
A252 D K6776
A281 D K6776
A410 A K6777
A419 A K6777
A423 A K6777
A424 A K6777
A528 0 K67777-X14
E216 D K6776
FWA503 C K6777-X14
585 E K6777
586 A K6777
588 0 K6777
589 A K6777
593 A K6777
1002 A K6777
1004 0 K6777
l
l
.
o
i.
V-15
l-
[
r-
TABLE V-4 - (Continued)
DRAWINGS USED FOR STRUCTURAL STEEL INSPECTION
Sargent and Lundy Engineers
Drawing No. Rev. Title
M-913 Sheet 35 Containment Building Pressure Sensor Galleries '
S-482 E Auxiliary Building Standard Connection Details
Sheet 2
S-686 AG Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan E1.
374'-0" Area 7
S-687 W Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan El.
374'-0" Area 5 and 7
S-701 BT Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan El.
401'-0" Area 7
S-719 T Auxiliary Building Anchor Plate Schedule
and Details
S-764 R Auxiliary Building Foundation Sections and Details
S-798 M Auxiliary Building Steel Column Schedule
S-1015 AJ Containment Building Plan El. 461'-10"
Areas 5 & 8
S-1322 AH Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan E1.
467'-0" Area 7
S-1330 Y Auxiliary Building Roof Framing Plan Area 7
S-1344 W Auxiliary Building Sections and Details
S-1645 H Auxiliary Building Sections and Details
S-2135 AF Typical Modification Details
S-2138 S Typical Modification Details
S-2143 W Typical Modification Details
S-2146-BY R Auxiliary Building Framing Modification Plan
El. 374'-0" Area 7
S-2147-BY Y ' Auxiliary Building Framing Modification Plan
El. 374'-0"
V-16
. -
TABLE V-4 - (Continued)
DRAWINGS USED FOR STRUCTURAL STEEL INSPECTION
Sargent and Lundy Engineers
Drawing No. Rev. Title
S-2152 AJ Auxiliary Building Framing Modification
Schedule for El. 374'
S-2160 AC Auxiliary Building Framing Modification
Schedule for E1. 374'
S-2161 U Auxiliary Building Framing Modification
Schedule El. 374'-0"
S-2171 Y Auxiliary Typical Modification Details
S-2173-BY AC Auxiliary Building Framing Cover Plate Schedule
S-2175-BY AC Auxiliary Building Framing Cover Plate Schedule
S-2180 AW Auxiliary Building Framing Modification
Schedule for E1. 375'-6"; 376'-0"; 391'-6";
392'-0"; 394'-6"; 401'-0"; 409'-6"; 414'-0";
415'-0"; 417'-0"
S-2190 M Framing Modification Sections and Details
S-2228 Z Containment Building Framing Modification
Schedule for E1. 461'-10"
S-2305 C Framing Modification Sections and Details
S-2311 C Framing Modification Sections and Details
S-2316 E Framing Modification Sections and Details
S-2321 D Framing Modification Sections and Details
S-2329 E Framing Modification Sections and Details
S-2343 D Framing Modification Sections and Details
,
l S-2346 C Framing Modification Sections and Details
l
l S-2348 E Framing Modification Sections and Details
,
S-2359 C Framing Modification Sections and Details
S-2396 B Framing Modification Sections and Details
.
S-2397 D Framing Modification Sections and Details
l
V-17
!
, _ , . ,. _
_ _ _ . - , _ . . . .. ._.. .- ,,. - -.. . - - , - _ , . . - .-~. - _ . . ,-
TABLE V-5
CONCRETE POUR PACKAGES REVIEWED
Document Record No. Pour No. Description of Pour
5.02.01.01 2-A-353'-9"-7-F-1 1/3 Tendon Tunnel Slab
5.02.01.02 2-A-353'-9"-6-F-4 1/3 Tendon Tunnel Slab
5.02.01.03 2-A-353'-9"-5-F-4 1/3 Tendon Tunnel Slab
5.03.01.02 1-C-329'-4"-3-F-12 2/3 Auxiliary Building
1-C-329'-4"-2-F-11 Slab and Sumps @ 330 ft. elev.
1-C-324'-5"-4-F-22
1-C-324'-5"-3-F-22
5.04.01.04 1-D-401-0-1-F Part of Fuel Handling Building
2-0-401-0-2-F Foundation
V-18
TABLE V-6
DRAWINGS USED FOR MASONRY WALL INSPECTION
Dwg No. Rev./Date Titic
A220 BJ Auxiliary Building Upper Basement Floor Plan El.
8/4/85 364'-0" Area 3
A223 BE Auxiliary Building Upper Basement Floor Plan El.
5/10/85 364'-0" Area 6
A224 K Auxiliary Building Upper Basement Floor Plan El.
3/1/79 364'-0" Area 7
S680 BF Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan E1. 364'-0"
. 8/9/85 Area 3
5682 BH Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan El. 364'-0"
6/21/85 Area 6
5683 AU Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan El. 364'-0"
8/9/85 Area 7
S1141 AH Column Bracing Rows 6" and 30"
8/7/85
S1727 AD Auxiliary Building Block Wall Steel Column Sections
1/19/84 and Details
S1728 AG Auxiliary Building Block Wall Steel Column Sections
11/8/84 and Details
S1730 AV Auxiliary Building Block Wall Steel Column Schedule
5/31/85
S1738 G Auxiliary Building Block Wall Steel Column Sections
4/26/85 and Details
V-19
VI. MATERIAL TRACEABILITY AND CONTROL
A. Objective
The objective of this portion of the NRC Construction Appraisal Team
(CAT) inspection was to examine traceability and control of material
and equipment, and to determine the adequacy of the licensee's program
relative to these activities.
B. Discussion
The method utilized to perform the inspection included selecting samples
of various types of material and equipment for examination. Most of
the samples were selected and identification markings were noted from
installations in the plant. Some samples of installed material, such as
cadweld sleeves, that were not accessible were selected from records.
Also, some samples of delivered material, such as protective coating
materials, not yet installed, were inspected in warehouses or shops.
A total of 271 samples were examined to varying extents. Table VI-1,
" Summary of Samples," indicates the major contractors involved and the
types of samples examined.
Selected procedures from on-site organizations were reviewed, including
the following:
Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)
BSI-101, Purchase Request, Rev. 4.
BSI-102, Material and Equipment Receiving, Receiving Inspection,
Storage and Removal from Storage, Rev. 7.
BSI-102a, Supplement A - Hatfield Receiving & Inspection of Site
Requisitioned Material, Rev. 2.
- BSI-113, Storage Requirements and Surveillance Plan, Rev. O.
Hatfield Electric Company (HECo)
Procedure No. 5, Class I Material and Equipment and Receiving
and Inspection, Rev. 14.
Procedure No. 14, Handling and Storage of Safety Related Material
and Equipment, Rev. 8.
Hunter Corporation (Hunter)
- SIP 3.102, Material and Services Procurement, Rev. 2.
- SIP 3.602, Material Receiving Inspection, Rev. 3.
SIP 3.801, Storage of Mechanical Components and Materials, Rev. 5.
- SIP 3.802, Material Requisitions, Rev. 2.
.
VI-1
.
SIP 4.000, Control of Construction Processes, Rev. 14.
Powers-Azco-Pope (PAP)
FP-2, Control of Procurement and Requisition of Materials and
Services, Rev. 4.
FP-3, Material Receiving Inspection Control, Rev. 13.
FP-4, Material Storage, Rev. 9.
FP-16, Identification and Marking of Pipe and Components, Rev.12.
Reliable Sheet Metal (RSM)
Procedure No. 4, Field Material Receiving and Inspection, Rev. 7.
Procedure No. 8, Storage of Components and Materials, Rev. 7.
Procedure No. 30, Control of Construction Processes, Rev. 1.
Midway Industrial (MIC)
QCP-4, Container Marking and Material Control, Rev. 4.
Blount Brothers Company (BBC)
Procedure No. 2, Procurement Control, Rev. 7.
Procedure No.10, " Receiving, Storage and Handling, Rev. 9.
A total of 271 samples were selected to verify traceability to: (1)
the design drawings and specifications, and (2) the supply source.
Verification was performed by review of drawings and procurement
specifications, and by matching material and equipment markings with
vendor certifications, other documentation and heat numbers. Table
VI-2, " Sample Breakdown by Contractors," indicates the types and
quantities of samples applicable to each contractor. Table VI-3,
" Weld Filler Material Compliance," contains a list of weld filler
material samples.
The following sections describe the inspection results.
1. Material Traceability and Control
a. Inspection Scope
In addition to review of in-place procedures, the 271 samples of
material and equipment were examined for traceability to drawings,
,
specifications, procurement records, Certified Material Test
'
Reports (CMTRs), Certificates of Conformance (C of Cs), heat
l numbers or other required documentation. Samples included
equipment (electrical, mechanical and instruments), pipe,
structural steel, weld joints, electrical cables, fasteners,
and other materials as indicated in Table VI-2.
VI-2
b. Inspection Findings
In general, it was found that satisfactory procedures were in place
for material traceability and for control of material at the site.
Except for the lack of traceability for certain fastener materials,
the material treceability program was found to be generally
acceptable. The following observations were made by the NRC
CAT inspector:
(1) Sixteen samples of weld filler material listed in Table VI-3
were examined for traceability and compliance with specifica-
tions and codes, and were found to be acceptable. Also, 11
weld filler material holding ovens in 8 issue stations were -
examined and found to meet requirements for temperature control
and thermometer calibration records. In addition, 8 portable
ovens were examined and found to be operating satisfactorily.
(2) Some deficiencies were found regarding the traceability and
control of equipment mounting bolts for large vendor-supplied
ASME pump-motor assemblies, various electrical equipment, and
HVAC equipment as follows: '
(a) Equipment assembly / mounting bolts for each of the 10
large vendor supplied pump-motor installations examined
were found to have unmarked bolts or bolts with markings
indicating incorrect or indeterminate materials. The
discrepancies are as follows:
Chemical Volume Positive Displacement Pump (2CV02P) -
Motor mounting bolts required to be A325;
no markings found.
Chemical Volume Centifugal Charging Pump (2CV01PA) -
Motor mounting bolts required to be SAE Grade 5;
SAE Grade 8 found.
Chemical Volume Centifugal Charging Pump (2CV01PB) -
Motor mounting bolts required to be SAE Grade 5;
unmarked bolts found.
Residual Heat Removal Pumps (2RH01PA & PB) -
Pump casing studs required to be SA 453, Grade
660; untraceable marking "TP" found.
Pump casing stud nuts required to be SA 194,
Grade B6X; untraceable markings "78" and "MR 5178"
found.
Motor base to motor casing bolts required to be A449,
Grade 5; A325 bolts found.
Containment Spray Pumps (2CS01PA & PB) -
Casing stud nuts required to be SA 194, Grade 2H,
Trace N-20; untraceable markings found.
VI-3
Motor mounting bolts to attachment required to be SA
193, Grade B7; markings found indicate A325 or SA 325.
Bolts from motor attachment to adaptor required to be
SA 193, Grade B7; found A307 markings.
Anchor bolts, per seismic report, should be A325;
records indicate A36 installed. Records included a
prior Sargent & Lundy analysis indicating that A36
is acceptable, but no design change was made.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2AF01PB) (diesel motor) -
Bolts from gear box to skid required to be SAE Grade 5;
markings found for A325. Requirement for anchor bolts
not known; no markings found, records indicate A36
installed.
Safety Injection Pumps (2SIO1PA & PB) -
Pump mounting bolts indicated by Westinghouse Pump and
Valve Engineering (memorandum revised 9/12/85) required
to be SA 307; markings found indicated SAE Grade 5
installed.
As a result of these CAT findings, the licensee issued
Nonconformance Report (NCR) No. F-1014 to initiate further
examination of the discrepancies and corrective action.
The numerous discrepancies between drawings, manuals,
seismic qualification reports and markings on installed
fasteners indicate a generic lack of attention to fastener
details by the licensee and vendors. This matter requires
management attention.
(b) Equipment assembly / mounting bolts for certain electrical
equipment were found to have unmarked bolts indicating
indeterminate materials. The cor.ditions are as follows:
Battery rack assembly bolts in battery rooms 211 and
212 were inspected. It was found that of 460 bolts
inspected, 69 were marked to indicate SAE Grade 5
material, and the rest were unmarked and thus were
of indetert!nate material. The licensee indicated
that ASTM A307 bolts were required, although docu-
mentation specifying the material required was not
provided.
Interconnection bolts for 4KV Switchgear cabinets
(2AP06E) were inspected and some bolts were found
marked to indicate A307 material, but others were
unmarked and thus of indeterminate material.
Assembly bolts for Fire Hazards Panel (2PL10J) were
inspected and five were found to be properly marked
for A307 material, but five of the ten bolts were
unmarked and thus of indeterminate material.
VI-4
i
.
As a result of these CAT findings, the licensee issued
NRC No. F-1012 to initiate further review of the trace-
ability of fasteners of various vendor supplied equip-
ment and to provide for corrective action.
It was noted that the licensee recently issued NCR No.
F-1001 (August 16, 1985) to initiate review of site
procured and contractor installed bolts which do not
conform to ASTM A307 requirements and to initiate
corrective action.
(c) Nuts for studs in the trapeze assembly portion of pipe
hanger 2RY05009 were specified to be of SA194, Grade 2H
material. Markings found by the NRC CAT inspectors were
not traceable. Records indicated that A307 nuts were
installed. Four additional hangers: 2RY28002, 2RY28003,
2CV25021 and 2CV15016 were found to have nuts installed
with proper 2H markings. The incorrect nuts on hanger
2RY050G9 is considered an isolated case.
As a result of this CAT finding, the contractor (Hunter)
issued NCR No. 1141 to initiate corrective action to
replace the nuts on hanger 2RY05009.
(d) Bolts for attaching HVAC Diesel Generator Service Room
Vent Fans 2VD02CA & B to adjacent duct sections were
inspected. It was found that A307 bolts were required,
but approximately 50% of the bolts were unmarked and
thus material was indeterminate. The licensee stated
that NCR No. F-1001 mentioned under VI.B.1.b(2)(b) above
was also applicable to this finding.
b. Conclusions
In general, except for certain fastener hardware, the material
traceability and control program was considered to be satisfactory.
Significant lack of traceability was found for fastener materials,
including assembly and mounting bolts for large vendor supplied
pumps with motors mounted on skids; bolts for battery racks,
switchgear cabinets and other electrical equipment; and bolts for
HVAC equipment as noted above.
,
l
l VI-5
i
_ _ _
_ __. , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , ,
_ _ __ __
TABLE VI-1
SUMMARY OF SAMPLES
Contractors Activities No. of Samples
Hatfield(HECo) Electrical 37
Hunter (Hunter) Piping / Mechanical 136
Powers-Azco-Pope (PAP) Instrumentation 43
Reliable Sheet Metal (RSM) HVAC 14
BlountBrothers(BBC) Structural 22
ChicagoBridge& Iron (CB&I) Containment Liner 8
Midway Industrial (MIC) Coatings 11
TOTAL 271
i
VI-6
.-
TABLE VI-2
SAMPLE BREAKOOWN BY CONTRACTORS
ITEM HECo HC* PAP RSM BBC CB&I MIC TOTAL
Equipment 14 19 10 3 - - -
46
Pipe -
21 8 - - - -
29(L)**
Tubing - - 4 - - - -
4(L)
Steel-Structural - - - 2 2 - -
4(L) i
Steel-Rebar - - - - 5 - -
5(L)
Steel-Plate - - - -
2 3 -
5(L)
Steel-Tube - 5 - -
1 - -
6(L)
Hangers / Supports - 4 -
2 - - -
6
Embedments - - - - 3 - -
3
Weld Filler Material 2 9 2 - -
3 -
16(L)
Weld Joints -
31 19 4 - 2 - 56
ElectricalCables(Reels) 5 - - - - - - 5
Fasteners (SetsInstalled) 6 44 - 3 - - - 53
Fasteners (LotsinStorage) - 3 - - 5 - -
8(L)
Cadweld Sleeves - - - - 4 - -
4(L)
Coatings - - - - - -
11 11(L)
Conduit 5 - - - - - -
5(L)
Cable Raceway 5 - - - - - -
5(L)
TOTALS 37 Tf6 TJ T4 T T TF F
- Hunter Corp.
- (L) = Lots
l
l
i
.
VI-7
-
TABLE VI-3
WELD FILLER MATERIAL COMPLIANCE
Material Heat No./ Compliance
Designation & Size Material ID Comments
E308-16 3/32" 74882 Acceptable
E308-16 3/32" 11343 Acceptable
E308-16 1/8" J1711 Acceptable
E308L-16 5/32" 64901 Acceptable
E309-16 3/32" 10440 Acceptable
E309-16 3/32" Lot 90075-3 Acceptable
E309-16 1/8" Lot 90069-1 Acceptable
E502-16 3/32" 431C4621 Acceptable
E502-16 1/8" 01P124 Acceptable
E6010 3/16" 645S481 Acceptable
E6010 5/32" LO2103 Acceptable
E6010 5/32" 11270 Acceptable
E7018 3/32" 34422 Acceptable
E7018 1/8" 33641 Acceptable
E7018 1/8" 40157441 Acceptable
i E7018 5/32" 402X9551 Acceptable
,
i
VI-8
VII. DESIGN CHANGE CONTROL
A. Objective
The primary objective of the appraisal of design change control was
to determine whether design change activities were conducted in com-
pliance with regulatory requirements, Safety Analysis Report (SAR)
commitments and approved licensee, architect-engineer and constructor
procedures. An additional objective was to determine that hardware
modifications described in a sample of design change documents were
properly implemented in the field.
B. Discussion
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III " Design Control" and Criterion
VI " Document Control" establish the overall regulatory requirements
for design change control. These requirements are elaborated in
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.64, Rev. 2, June 1976, " Quality Assurance
Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants" which endorses
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N45.2.11-1974
" Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants."
The licensee's commitment to comply with RG 1.64 is stated in Appendix
A of the Byron /Braidwood Stations Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
The areas of design change control evaluated by the NRC Construction
Appraisal Team (CAT) inspectors were control of changes to design
documents and control of design changes. In each of these areas,
interviews were conducted with personnel responsible for the control
of activities, procedures were reviewed, and a sample of the controlled
documents was reviewed. In addition, a sample of the design changes
which had been inspected and accepted by onsite contractor quality
control personnel was verified in the field by the NRC CAT inspectors.
1. Control of Design Documents
The specific aspects of the control of design documents inspected
were the availability to the users of the latest approved design
documents and design change documents and the methods of assuring
that approved changes not yet incorporated into design documents
are provided to the users prior to work being performed.
a. Inspection Scope
(1) The following procedures related to distribution and control
of design documents and design change documents were reviewed:
- Commonwealth Edison Company (Ceco) Quality Requirement
(QR) 3.0 " Design Control," Rev. 15, August 15, 1984.
- Ceco QR 6.0, " Document Control," Rev. 9, August 15, 1984.
- Ceco Quality Procedure (QP) 6-1, " Distribution of Design
Documents," Rev. 7, October 10, 1983.
VII-1
- Ceco QP 6-2, " Procedure for Station Construction Department
Design Document Control," Rev. 3, May 12, 1983.
CECO Braidwood Nuclear Station Project Procedure PCD-03,
" Field Change Request," Rev. O, June 15, 1984.
- Sargent & Lundy Engineers (S&L) General Quality Assurance
Procedure (GQ) 3.07, "Sargent & Lundy Drawings," Rev. 6,
October 21, 1981.
- S&L GQ-3.13, " Engineering Change Notices," Rev. 6,
October 21, 1981.
- S&L GQ-6.01, " Project Distribution List and Project File
Indexes," Rev. 5, October 21, 1981.
- S&L Project Instruction for Byron /Braidwood (PI-BB) 29,
" Distribution and Control of Design Documents for S&L
Field Personnel at the Byron /Braidwood Stations," Rev. 2,
August 2, 1985.
- Hatfield Electric Company (HECo) Procedure No. 4, " Drawing
Control," Rev. 13, April 10, 1985.
Reliable Sheet Metal Works, Inc. (RSM) Procedure No. 7A,
" Document Control," Rev. 1, March 20, 1984.
- RSM Procedure No. 7, " Design Drawing and Design Change
Control," Rev. 7, March 20, 1984.
Powers-Azco-Pope (PAP) Field Operating Procedure FP-1,
" Document and Drawing Control," Rev. 6, August 29, 1984.
- Hunter Corporation Site Implementation Procedure 2.101,
" Document Control," Rev. 5, December 12, 1984.
(2) Ceco and contractor Quality Assurance (QA) audit and sur-
veillance reports concerning design document control were
reviewed for findings, trends and corrective actions.
(3) CECO, S&L and contractor document control, engineering,
construction and QA personnel were interviewed concerning
distribution, control and use of design documents and design
change documents,
b. Inspection Findings
S&L design documents and Engineering Change Notices (ECNs) are
distributed by S&L to CECO, contractor and S&L organizations and
personnel in accordance with PI-BB-29 and the S&L distribution
lists. Field Change Requests (FCRs), which are Ceco design change
documents, are distributed by the CECO Project Construction
l Department (PCD) to S&L, contractor and CECO organizations and
personnel.
l
VII-2
Ceco, S&L and the contractors each control the redistribution and
use of design documents and design change documents within their
organizations in accordance with their separate and individual
document control procedures. In general, receipt of design docu-
ments is recorded on control cards or log sheets, the latest
revisions of design documents and design change documents are issued
to the (satellite) document control stations and the superseded
revisions destroyed or stamped. All four contractors' (HEco, RSM,
PAP and Hunter) document control systems reviewed by the NRC CAT
inspectors control the use of approved, unincorporated design change
documents by annotating the design change identification numbers on
the controlled copies of the affected design documents.
The CECO PCD document control station is the " master" against which
other document control station records were evaluated. Typically,
possible contractor discrepancies concerning the latest approved and
issued revision of a design document and the correct annotated
design change documents are resolved by comparison to the design
documents and document receipt logs in the CECO PCD Document Control
Station. The document control list (s), ECN status list and FCR
status list are updated every 30 days in accordance with procedures;
however, the PCD document control clerk maintains a more current
master list by manually entering new issuances as they occur.
(1) The NRC CAT inspectors reviewed approximately 200 S&L drawings
at the CECO PCD document control station for legibility and
correct indication of controlled status (no stamping). Sixty
drawings were reviewed for correct revision and correct
annotation of FCRs/ECNs against the S&L status list of
'
drawings.
Noincorrectdesigndocumentrevisionswereidlntified.
However, a large number of FCRs and ECNs were listed on
controlled drawings. The NRC CAT inspectors selected 6
structural drawings which had 39 FCRs listed as open. Review
of the FCR master log indicated that 35 of the 39 FCRs had
been incorporated . As a result,,the inspectors identified a
,'
concern that PCD was not deleting FCRs/ECNs from construction
drawings in a timely manner after the FCR or ECN was
'
incorporated into the drawing. Further review indicated that
QA Surveillance Report No.' 5872.~had previously identified a
similar concern. Ceco QA had commited to reauditing PCD's
document control program during QA Audit No. 6-84-212. ,
However, a review of this audit by the NRC CAT inspectors
indicated that the concern of not deleting FCRs/ECNs from
construction drawings in a timely manner had not been
addressed. Ceco QA conducted audit No. 6-85-204 during the
inspection period to address this concern. This audit revealed
that over 60 percent of the FCRs and ECNs listed on the
drawings had already been incorporated. PCD has committed to
remove all closed design changes posted on drawings by November
1, 1985.
VII-3
L_
(2) The NRC CAT inspectors reviewed about 75 S&L design documents
at five Hatfield Electric Company (HECo) document control
stations in the Auxiliary Building, Containment Building and QC
trailer for legibility and appropriate stamping (i.e. ,
" controlled"). The revision numbers and FCRs/ECNs annotated
were recorded for about 20 design documents and checked against
the HECo master files. No incorrect design documents were
identified, although several cases were identified where field
personnel had not deleted FCRs or ECNs, from their controlled
drawings. Inspection and installation records were reviewed by
HECo and no outdated FCRs or ECNs were recorded as having been
used in construction or inspection activities.
The NRC CAT inspectors also reviewed document control audit
and surveillances for procedure requirements and adequate
corrective actions. The following deficiences were noted:
-
HEco Procedure No. 4 drawing " Drawing Control", states
"Hatfield QA will perform a monthly surveillance of this
procedure using Form HP-47". The surveillance reports
for April and May 1985 could not be located. HECo
performed three surveillances during the month of
September to verify adequate document control.
-
HECo special surveillance dated July 26, 1985, identified
that HECo was not maintaining current mechanical drawings.
Installation reports had not been reviewed to assure that
installation was in accordance with the current drawings.
HEco performed this review during the inspection period
and determined that installations had been completed in
accordance with current design documents.
(3) The NRC CAT inspectors reviewed about 50 S&L design drawings
!
at three Powers-Azco-Pope (PAP) document control stations,
l
for legibility and correct stamping (i.e., " controlled"). The
i
revision numbers and FCRs/ECNs annotated were recorded for
- about 15 design documents and checked against the PAP master
l files.
l
l No incorrect design document revisions were identified. During
i the inspection a controlled copy of S&L Drawing No.
l GE-2-3543604, Rev. C had been mairitained on the engineering
l stick file, however, the drafting controlled copy could not be
l located. Further review by PAP indicated that this drawing was
l voided. PAP stated that S&L electrical drawings were used for
i reference purposes and had not affected installation. PAP was
subsequently removed from distribution of S&L electrical
drawings.
c. Conclusion
For the sample inspected, the control of design documents is
considered adequate.
VII-4
--
N
,
2. Control of Design Change
'
The specific aspects of the control of changes to design inspected
by the NRC CAT were the change control systems for ECNc'and FCRs,
and the implementation and verification of the changes.
.s
a. Inspection Scope
(1) The following proceldures relating to the control of design
changes were reviewed:
CECO QR 3.0, " Design Control," Rev. 15, August 15, 1984.
- CECO QP 3-1, " Design Control," Rev. 5, October 5, 1984.
- CECO QP 3-2, " Design Change Control," Rev. 13, October 5,
1984.
'
CECO PCD-02, " Engineering Change Notices," Rev. O, May 24,
1984.
- Ceco PCD-03, " Field Change Request," Rev. O, June 15, 1984.
- S&L GQ 3.07, "Sargent & Lundy Drawings," Rev. 6,
October 21, 1981.
S&L GQ 3.08, " Design Calculations," Rev. 5, January 31,
1985.
S&L GQ 3.13, " Engineering Change Notices," Rev. 6,
October 21, 1981.
S&L PI-BB-13, " Procedure for Processing Commonwealth
Edison Company Fiel'd Change Requests (FCRs)," Rev. 12,
September 27, 1984.
S&L PI-BB-18, " Procedure for Handling Commonwealth
Edison Company Field Change Requests Transmitting
'As-Built' Information," Rev. 1, May 7, 1984.
- S&L PI-BB-23, " Byron /Braidwood Electrical Field Personnel,"
Rev. 7, October.25, 1983.
- S&L PI-BB-25, " Activities of the On-Site Structural Design
Group," Rev. O, August 29, 1983.
- S&L PI-BB-28, " Activities of the Byron /Braidwood Station
Mechanical Engineering, Piping Design, Support Design and
Analysis Field Personnel," Rev. 3, August 4, 1983.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation (W) Instruction
PED-B-1.2, " Byron Unit 1 and Unit 2 Engineering Change
Notices," Rev. O, April 1, 1985.
VII-5
-
-
- W Instruction PED-B-1.3, " Byron Unit 1 and Unit 2 Field
Change Requests," Rev. O, April 1, 1985.
- Nuclear Power Services, Inc. (NPS) Procedure 3.0.5,
" Design Control - Revisions and Holds," Rev. D, July 23,
1985.
- HECo Procedure #29, " Field Initiated Requests for Design
Changes," Rev. 8, January 30, 1985.
RSM Procedure No. 7, " Design Drawing and Design Change
Control," Rev. 7, March 20, 1984.
PA.P Field Operating Procedure FP-9, " Design Change / Field
Routing Control," Rev. 10, April 17, 1984.
Hunter Site Implementation Procedure 2.201, " Design Control,"
Rev. 13, June 11, 1984.
(2) CECO and contractor QA audit and surveillance reports con-
cerning design change were reviewed for findings, trends and
corrective actions.
(3) Interviews were conducted with personnel from CECO, S&L,
W, NPS, HECo, RSM, PAP and Hunter concerning initiation
(origination), review, approval and implementation of
design changes.
b. Inspection Findings
S&L has approximately 166 people in their Byron site organization,
of whom about 145 are assigned in engineering and design groups.
The majority of the engineering and design personnel are engaged
in resolving field problems by clarifying design documents and
making design changes.
The contractors perform no engineering or design function; however,
RSM, PAP and Hunter prepare supplementary drawings / sketches from
S&L approved design drawings for use as aids in fabrication and
construction. Generally, such aids are prepared by the contractor
field engineers and both contractor engineering and QC personnel
review them for conformance with the S&L approved drawings.
Design changes are accomplished through design change documents
such as FCRs, ECNs, Field Change Notices (FCNs) and through
revision of design documents without an intermediate design
change document. FCRs are a CECO design change document generally
originated in the field by Ceco or contractor personnel and
approved by both CECO and S&L. ECNs are an S&L design change
document originated in the field or S&L's Chicago office and
approved by S&L. FCNs are a Westinghouse Electric Corporation
(the nuclear steam supply system vendor) change document originated
and approved by offsite Westinghouse personnel. Roughly 42,000
VII-6
m
,-
FCRs/ECNs have been issued for both units. Presently, an average
of about 100 FCRs and 50 ECNs are being issued each month and the
trend is decreasing.
Problems, conflicts and items requiring clarification of the
approved design documents identified by the contractors are
forwarded to S&L for resolution. HECo uses Field Problem Sheets,
RSM uses Ventilation Field Problem Sheets, PAP uses Field Work
Requests, and Hunter uses Piping and Support Field Problem Fonns.
These contractor documents are generally not controlled or
considered QA documents. When resolution requires a design change,
a FCR, ECN, or drawing revision is prepared and issued to the
contractor.
(1) Approximately 46 ECNs and FCRs were selected and reviewed
for procedural compliance, adequacy of problem description
and resolution. These ECNs and FCRs are listed in Table VII-1.
One minor procedural deficiency was identified. The " Request
Class" blocks for " Limited Construction" or " Plant Modifica-
tion" and " Major" or " Minor" changes were not checked on a
number of FCRs. Examples are:
FCR-70113, January 22, 1985
FCR-35607, April 30, 1985
FCR-35608, April 30, 1985
This appears to be inconsistent with the requirements of
Attachment B to CECO QR 3-2.
(2) Six FCRs/ECNs for which the work had been completed and
accepted by contractor QC were selected for verification.
Prior to inspection of physical changes, the base design
drawings, applicable change notices and backup calculations and
QC inspection reports were reviewed by the NRC CAT inspectors.
The physical changes were then inspected in the field to verify
that the changes were implemented as described. Each design
change was found to have been properly completed.
- FCR-35607 and 35608, April 30,1985 - The change
required additional mounting holes to support
instrumentation.
-
FCR 21637, August 11, 1983 - The change required the
addition of a shuttle pan to support cables.
- ECN 22400, July 25, 1984 - The change required the
addition of a flex hose to the Component Cooling System
piping. Snubbers were eliminated and piping was rerouted.
- FCR 33510, September 20, 1984 - That change required
screen stiffeners to be cut to facilitate installation
of security bars.
VII-7
-
-
FCR-25855, March 18, 1985 - The change provided
location and mounting of isolation transformers.
(3) The calculations for about 28 ECNs/FCRs were reviewed for
conformance with applicable requirements. These ECNs and FCRs
are denoted in Table VII-1 by an asterisk.
All the calculations were changes to previously approved
designs, and thus were in effect partial revisions to previous
calculations. They consisted of both hand and computer
calculations, involving mostly structural attachments, core
drilling and pipe supports / restraints. Examples are:
FCR 35607, April 30, 1985
ECN 22400, July 25, 1984
FCR 33510, September 20, 1984
The calculations were reviewed for technical adequacy,
compliance with regulations and commitments and meeting
procedure requirements. The calculations in the sample
inspected were found to be prepared, checked and reviewed
in conformance with procedural requirements. They had been
reviewed and approved prior to the approval date on the
ECNs/FCRs. No calculation errors were observed in the
sample inspected.
(4) In addition, the NRC CAT inspectors in the technical discipline
areas reviewed approximately 50 design change documents
(ECNs/FCRs). The design changes verified were selected after
work had been completed and accepted by contractor QC. Each
design change was reviewed for technical adequacy and the
installation was verified in the field.
c. Conclusions
For the sample inspected, the control of the design change process
is adequate.
VII-8
,
TABLE VII-1
Design Change Document Da+e Issued Responsible Contractor
- ECN 22400 07/25/84 Hunter
- ECN 244686 10/14/84 Hunter
- ECN 245144 12/13/84 Hunter
FCR 21637 08/11/82 HECo
FCR 22915 06/07/83 HECo
FCR 24976 06/11/84 HECo
FCR 24979 06/12/84 HECo
- FCR 25115 07/13/84 HECo
- FCR 25761 01/03/84 HECo
FCR 25762 01/03/84 HEco
FCR 25855 03/18/85 HECo
- FCR 25949 02/11/85 HECo
- FCR 25993 03/07/85 HEco
FCR 26081 03/25/85 HECo
FCR 30546 01/05/84 Hunter
FCR 31994 04/20/84 Hunter
- FCR 33137 10/09/84 PAP
- FCR 33510 09/20/84 RSM
FCR 33706 09/20/84 RSM
FCR 33771 10/25/84 RSM
- FCR 34005 10/11/84 PAP
FCR 34712 02/11/85 RSM
FCR 34986 06/10/85 Hunter
- FCR 35081 02/21/85 RSM
FCR 35377 04/05/85 RSM
- FCR 35378 04/29/85 RSM
FCR 35383 04/09/85 RSM
- FCR 35601 04/29/85 PAP
- FCR 35602 04/29/85 PAP
- FCR 35607 04/30/85 PAP
- FCR 35608 04/30/85 PAP
- FCR 35706 05/23/85 RSM
- FCR 35732 06/26/85 RSM
- FCR 35827 05/17/85 PAP
- FCR 35833 05/29/85 PAP
- FCR 35834 05/29/85 PAP
- FCR 35835 05/31/85 PAP
- FCR 35914 07/30/85 RSM
- FCR 35935 08/13/85 RSM
- FCR 35970 06/12/85 PAP
- FCR 36017 08/12/85 PAP
- FCR 36018 08/12/85 PAP
FCR 70111 01/21/85 Hunter
- FCR 70113 01/22/85 Hunter
FCR 70114 01/23/85 Hunter
FCR 70123 02/21/85 Hunter
NOTES:
Hunter - Hunter Corporation
HECO - Hatfield Electric Company
PAP - Powers-Azco-Pope
RSM - Reliable Sheet Metal Works, Inc.
- Indicates that calculations were reviewed.
VII-9
- - - . . _ . _ _
-
VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEMS
A. Objective
The objective of this portion of the NRC CAT inspection was to verify,
through selected samples, whether measures were established and
implemented to assure that nonconformances and other conditions adverse
to quality were promptly identified and corrected.
B. Discussion
An examination was made of the licensee's program for identification
and control of nonconformances and corrective actions, including review
of documents and inspection of some material / equipment for verification <
of actual corrective actions in the plant. Items such as the following
were reviewed:
Procedures and organizational interfaces
Trend analyses
Audit and surveillance reports
Nonconformance reports
Deviation reports
Inspection reports
Control of actual material and equipment corrections in the plant
Control of open nonconformances at turnover for testing or operation
Table VIII-1, " Corrective Action Samples," contains a list of samples
that were randomly selected.
The following procedures of on-site _ organizations were found in place, .
and applicable portions pertaining to corrective action were reviewed:
"
. Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)
- SQI-6, On Site Contractor Nonconformance Reports, Rev. O.
- SQI-7, QA Handling of CECO Nonconformance Reports, Rev.1.
l * S01-12, Byron Site QA Audits, Rev. 2.
!
i * SQI-31, Byron QA Training Program, Rev. 1.
!
- SQI-38, Performance and Reporting of Deficiency Trending Analysis
by Site QA, Rev. 1.
Sargent and Lundy (S&L)
[
- GQ-16.01, Corrective Action Reports, Rev. 6.
l
! VIII-1 l
,
1 --. i - , . , . - - - - -- ,. .- , _ , - . , , , _ , _ , . _ . . _ , _ . - - - _ - . _ - - - , - . - -
,_ . - - .-.,_ ,._,.---.--., - , n,-- - , - , _ , ,
y
- MAS-30, Technical Monitoring of Quality Related Design Activities,
Rev. A.
Hatfield Electric Company (HECo)
- Quality Assurance Manual, Rev.16.
- Procedure No. 1, Method of Preparing Procedures, Rev. 13.
- Procedure No. 6. Reporting Damaged or Nonconforming Material or
Equipment, Rev. 14.
- Procedure No. 8, Audits, Rev. 5.
- Procedure No. 12 Installation of Class IE Equipment, Rev. 8.
Hunter Corporation (Hunter)
- Quality Assurance Manual, Rev. 7.
- SIP-3.801, Storage of Mechanical Components and Materials, Rev. 5.
SIP-4.201, Installation Verification, Rev.11.
SIP-11.101, Nonconformance Processing, Rev. 4.
_P_owers-Azco-Pope (PAP)
- Quality Assurance Manual, Rev. 3.
- QC-4, Nonconformance Control, Rev. 11.
QC-5, Site Audit, Rev. 11.
R_eliable Sheet Metal (RSM)
- Quality Assurance Manual, Rev. O.
Procedure No. 5, Site Quality Assurance Audits, Rev. 5.
- Procedure No. 10, Nonconformance and Corrective Action, Rev. 4.
- Procedure No. 23 Installation Verification, Rev. 2.
Blount Brothers Company (BBC)
- Quality Assurance Manual, Rev. 1.
Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories (PTL)
- QC-1A-1, Internal Audits, Rev. 8.
- QC-CRN-1, Control and Reporting of Nonconformances, Rev. 2.
VIII-2
1. Corrective Action
a. Inspection Scope
A review was performed of applicable portions of project
procedures. In addition to QA manuals and procedures, a total
of 218 samples of corrective action documents were reviewed, and
six material / equipment samples were inspected for verification
of corrective actions in the plant. Table VIII-1, " Corrective
Action Samples," contains a list of documents and material / equip-
ment samples that were randomly selected and inspected.
b. Inspection Findings
In general, it was found that satisfactory procedures were in
place for corrective action systems to identify and control the
correction of conditions adverse to quality at the site. Except
for concerns discussed below, the corrective action systems and
implementing measures were found to be acceptable. The six
material / equipment samples requiring rework in the plant were
inspected, and corrective action control was verified.
(1) Numerous problems with fastener material discrepancies on
large vendor-supplied ASME pump / motor assemblies and other
vendor equipment were found by the NRC CAT for which
effective corrective actions were not performed. See
Section VI.B.1.b(2) for details. These problems indicate
a lack of effective quality control at vendors' plants,
and also a lack of vendor surveillance with attention to
verification of proper fasteners prior to shipment.
(2) Radiographs for certain ASME equipment were not provided by
the vendor, Westinghouse Electric Company. Radiographs
requested by NRC CAT inspectors had not been located during
the inspection period. See Section IV.B.11.b for details.
A review of audits performed by both Commonwealth Edison
Company and Westinghouse Electric Company indicated that
the retrievability of radiograph records had not been
addressed during the audits.
(3) A review of four Preoperational Test Release (turnover)
packages revealed that the turnover procedure and release
forms did not include a record of preventive maintenance
status or any related deficiencies. In a limited review
of the licensee's preventive maintenance program, it was
found that the preventive maintenance program was fragmented
among CECO and contractor organizations, and that effective
coordinated control was lacking.
The preventive maintenance program for mechanical equipment
was discussed with Hunter Quality Assurance (QA) personnel
and CECO project construction, startup and operations personnel.
VIII-3
Shaft rotation records for the following five pumps were
reviewed: 2CC01PA, 2CC01PB, 2CS01PA, 2CS01PB, 2AF01PA.
Hunter Procedure SIP-3.801, Storage of Mechanical Components
and Materials, addresses maintenance of mechanical equipment
prior to establishment of the full surveillance program at
turnover to CECO operations. This procedure does not clearly
define programmatic requirements or responsibilities during
periods in which equipment is undergoing flushing or testing
by the CECO staff. Although the equipment has not yet been
' formally turned over to CECO at these stages, there is some
confusion as to maintenance responsibility during this time
frame. For example, Hunter apparently terminates periodic
pump / motor shaft rotations at the time of final coupling and
alignment of pumps to motors. Normally this equipment would
then be flushed by CECO startup personnel and then turned
over to CECO startup/ testing personnel. During these periods,
regular pump operations and monitoring of basic parameters
is conducted by test personnel.
The NRC CAT inspectors identified that for the Containment
Spray Pumps (2CS01PA and 2CS01PB) the scheduled shaft
rotation stopped in March and April of 1985, and due to
flushing delays these pumps had not yet been flushed, run
or otherwise monitored as of September 20, 1985. The
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2AF01PA) was coupled and last
rotated by Hunter in January 1985 and was flushed in May
1985 but has not been turned over to startup or run since
then. The potential long term effects of this lack of
maintenance has not been addressed, and it does not appear
that measures were in place to provide for an evaluation
of this condition.
The overall requirements and responsibilities of the
preventive maintenance program need to be better defined
for the interface period between construction and operation.
c. Conclusions
The licensee's corrective action program was found to be generally
acceptable, except for the following concerns:
,
a. Failure to assure that fasteners of required materials were
! furnished with vendor supplied equipment. ,
b. Failure to assure that radiographs for certain vendor supplied
equipment were properly stored and retrievable as required.
c. Failure to provide for effective specification and performance
of preventive maintenance, particularly from the time of
turnover for testing until turnover for operation.
VIII-4
__
TABLE VIII-1
CORRECTIVE ACTION SAMPLES
ITEMS QUANTITY EXAMINED
CECO S&L W HEC 0 HC PAP RSM BBC PTL TOTAL
Trend Reports 3 - -
1 3 3 3 2 1 16 j
Audit Reports 18 2 16 3 7 7 5 7 1 66
Nonconformance Reports 10 - -
16 10 12 9 10 10 77
Deviation Reports . - - -
10 10 - - 1 -
21
Inspection Reports - - -
10 3 -
4 5 -
22
Surveillance Reports - - - - -
10 - - -
10
Samples for Field - - -
2 2 -
1 1 -
6
Verification of
Corrective Action ,
Turnover Packages 4 - - - - - - - - 4
Unit Concept Report - - - - - - - -
1 1
l Over Inspection - - - - - - - -
1 1
Report
TOTAL 35 2 16 42 35 32 22 26 14 218
CECO = Commonwealth Edison Comapny
l
l S&L = Sargent and Lundy
W = Westinghouse Electric Company
l
'
HECo = Hatfield Electric Company
HC = Hunter Corporation
PAP = Pope-Azco-Pope
RSM = Reliable Sheet Metal
BBC = Blount Brothers Corporation
PTL = Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories
VIII-5
,
L
_ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . __ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _
_
ATTACHMENT A
A. Persons Contacted
The following list identifies licensee discipline coordinators and key
individuals contacted during the inspection for each area.
1. Licensee Coordinators and Contacts
Area Names
Team Leader K. Ainger
D. Tuetken
Electrical and J. Binder
Instrumentation S. Vovos
L. Stern
Mechanical B. Moravec, J. Porter,
B. Somsag, R. Irish
D. Geddings
Welding and NDE D. McCarty, E. Wolber
J. Porter
Civil and Structural J. Mihovilovich, R. Guse
R. Hardison
Material Traceability B. Klinger
E. Briette
Corrective Action Systems E. Martin
D. Felz
Design Change Controls B. Klinger, P. Donavin
B. Byrne
'
In addition to the above personnel, numerous other inspectors, engineers
and supervisors were also contacted.
B. Documents Reviewed
The types of documents listed below were reviewed by the NRC CAT members
to the extent necessary to satisfy the inspection objectives stated in
Section I of this report. There are additional references within the
body of the report to specific procedures, instructions, specifications
and drawings.
1. Final Safety Analysis Report
2. Quality assurance manual
3. Quality assurance procedures and instructions
AA-1
_ _ . . _ _ .- . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - -__ - - . - - ._- . _ .__ ._ __
,
!
- 4. Quality control procedures
5. Administrative procedures
6. General electrical installation procedures and specifications
7. General instrumentation installation procedures
8. General piping and pipe support installation procedures and
specifications
9. General mechanical equipment installation procedures and
specifications
10. General concrete specifications
11. As-built drawings
12. Welding and NDE procedures
13. Personnel qualification records
14. Material traceability procedeires
15. Procedures for processing design changes
i 16. Procedures for document control
1
17. Procedures for controlling as-built drawings
18. Procedures for processing nonconformances,, l
l
l
i
l
l t
I
!
,
i
f
i
'
AA-2
1
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ATTACHMENT B
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
AISC - American Institute of Steel Construction :
ANSI - American National Standards Institute
ASME - American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASTM - American Society for Testing and Materials
AWS - American Welding Society
ATWS - Anticipated Transient Without Scram '
- BBC - Blount Brothers Company
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BY/BR - Byron /Braidwood ,
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CAT - Construction Appraisal Team (NRC)
CB&I - Chicago Bridge and Iron Company
C of C - Certificate of Conformance
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CEA - Concrete Expansion Anchor
CECO - Commonwealth Edison Company ,
CMTR - Certified Material Test Report
l CSCV - Cable Separation Criteria Violation
- CSNF - Conduct Separation Notification Report
l DIT - Design Information Transmittal ,
l DR - Deviation Report
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DRC - Deviation Report for Correctable Items
ECN - Engineering Change Notice
l FCN - Field Change Notice
l FCR - Field Change Request
r GQ - General Quality
! HECo - Hatfield Electric Co.
Hunter - Hunter Corp. ,
HVAC - Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning
( IE -OfficeofInspectionandEnforcement(NRC)
i IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
l IPCEA - Insulated Power Cable Engineers Association i
IRR - Interface Review Report '
LP - Liquid Penetrant Inspection !
LOCA - Loss-of-Coolant Accident
MIC - Midway Industrial Company
M0V - Motor Operated Valve :
- NCR - Nonconformance Report
l NDE - Nondestructive Examination
NISCo - Nuclear Installation Service Co.
NPS - Nuclear Power Service, Inc.
NRR -OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation(NRC)
- NRC - U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission
l NSSS - Nuclear Steam System Supplier
l OAD - Operations Analysis Department
! PAP - Powers-Azco-Pope
PCD - Project Construction Department
PDM - Pittsburgh Des Moines Corp. t
PI-BB - Project Instruction - Byron /Braidwood
PSAR - Preliminary Safety Evaluation Report
PSI - Preservice Inspection i
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PTL - Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories
QA - Quality Assurance
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QAM - Quality Assurance Manual
l QC - Quality Control
QCSSR - Quality Control Structural Steel Review
l QP - Quality Procedure
- Quality Requirement
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QR
RG - Re
RSM -Rd'ulatoryGuide(NRC)
iable Sheet Metal Works, Inc.
SAR - iafety Analysis Report
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SIP - Si*.e Implementation Procedure
, S&L - Saigent and Lundy Engineers
l SWI - Site Work Instruction
l UT - Ultrasonic Inspection
l V - Volt
VT - Visual Inspection
W - Westinghouse Electric Corp.
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