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Rev 2 of Cook Nuclear Plant Restart Plan.
	ML17334A730
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Site:	Cook
Issue date:	05/06/1998
From:	SAMPSON J R; INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
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ML17334A731	List: ML17334A730; ML17334A736;
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ATTACHMENTTOAEP:NRC:1303RESTARTPLAN-REVISION29806f00446980506PDRADOCK05000315PPDR

'I CookNuclearPlantRestartPlanJ.RSampsonSiteVicePresidentRevision2

IntroductionandOverview1.1Purpose1.2Background1.3RolesandResponsibilities1.4CookNuclearPlantRestartProcessOverview2.RestartWorkScopeDetermination2.1RestartWorkScopeDeterminationProcess2.2PlantSystemReviews2.3RedefinedRestartWorkScope3..RestartWorkScopePerformance3.1WorkScopePerformance4.RestartReadinessAssessment4.14.24.34.4SystemReadinessFunctionalAreaReadinessPrograinmaticReadinessContainmentReadiness5.RestartAuthorization5.1RestartOversightCommittee(ROC)ReviewandApproval5.2SeniorManagerReviewTeam(SMRT)ReviewandApproval5.3ExecutiveVicePresidentRestartAuthorization6.StartupandPowerAscension6.1ManagementOversightandOrganizationalSupport6.2OperatingProficiencyandExperienceReviewAttachments:Asystemengineerreviewboard(SERB)charterBrestartoversightcommittee(ROC)charterCcriteriaforworkincludedinrestartscopeDplantsystemstobereviewedbyROCErestartprocessmapFplantperformanceassuranceoversightofrestartRevisionBlock 1.0IntroductionandOverview1.1PurposeTheCookNuclearPlantRestartPlandescribestheactivitiesandcontrolsthatwillbeimplementedtoensurethefacilityisreadytosafelystartupandoperateinanevent&eemanner.Toprovideuswiththeassurancethatthiscanbeaccomplishedwemustdeterminethatourpeople,plantandprogramsarereadytomeetthischallenge.Theplanwillassesstheseareasandidentifyanyneededactiontoensurewecansafelystartupandoperatereliablyinanevent&eemanner.Theplanwillassessthefollowing:~PeopleHaveweadequatelypreparedourpeoplesuchthattheyaretrainedonthechangesinourprogramsandproceduresandunderstandtheissuesinvolvedinrestartingandoperatingtheplant?Arethefunctionalareasstaffed,organizedandfunctioningataleveltosupportsafestartupandreliableoperationinanevent&eemanner?~'rogramsHaveourprogramsandproceduresbeenadjustedtoincludethelessonslearned?Aretheyadequatetoallowustoreturntooperationandpreventfuturenonconformingconditions?oPlantAreourmaterielcondition,configurations,restart.readinessofsystemsandabilitytomeetdesignfunctionwhilecomplyingwithapplicableregulationsadequatetoallowustoreturntoservice?Thisplanprovidesamaptoconducttheassessmentsneededtoassureourselvesthatwearereadytorestart.Theactionsandactivitiesneededtodothisandanycorrectiveactionswillbeperformedinaccordancewithapprovedprocedures.1.2BackgroundDuringtheJuly-September,1997,time&arne,theNRCconductedanarchitectengineeringinspectionatCookNuclearPlant.TheAEinspectionfocusedprimarilyontwosafetysystems,ECCSandCCW.SixweeksintotheAEinspection,aquestionsurfacedregardingourabilitytosustainlong-termcoolingofthecoreduringadesignbasisaccident.Asaconservativemeasure,bothunitswereshutdownonSeptember9andcooledtocoldshutdownuntilthisquestioncouldbeproperlyanswered.

OnSeptember12,theNRCconcludedtheAEinspectionwithapublicexit.meeting.Followingthismeeting,CookNuclearPlantcommittedtoaddressingandresolvingseven(7)specificissuesidentifiedduringtheinspectionpriortorestartoftheunits.Itwasbelievedthatthesesevenissuescouldberesolvedwithinafewweeks.SubsequenttoourlettertotheNRCcommittingtotheseactions,theNRCissuedaconfirmatoryactionletter(CAL)identifyingtheirapprovalwouldberequiredpriortorestartingtheunits.TheNRCCALalsoidentifiedtwoadditionalactionstobetakenasaconditionforrestartingtheunits.Theunit2reactorwasscheduledforarefuelingtobegininlateSeptember,1997.Theunit2corewaswithintwoweeksofnormalburnupwindowatthetimeoftheunscheduledshutdown.OurobjectivewastoresolvetheCALitems,andrestartunit2fortheremainingtwoweeksoffuelburnup,thencommencetherefuelingoutage.Overthenextseveralweeks,itbecameapparentthatarestartwouldnotbeachievableinthenearterm,andadecisionwasmadetobegintheunit2refuelingoutageanditsscheduledworkonOctober20,1997.Inparallelwiththeoutagework,ourorganizationworkedthroughthemanyAEinspection/CALissues.ItappearedthataJanuary1998restartofbothunitswouldbefeasible.DuringthetimeperiodofJanuary-February1998,theCookNuclearPlantseniormanagementteamhadseveralmeetingswiththeNRC,andtheCALissueswerenearingresolution.Itwasduringthistimeperiodthatseveralnewissuesarose,concerningorrelatingtoourcontainmentsystemsthatwouldrequiresignificantresourcesandfocustoreconcile.Giventhesignificantperiodthatbothunitshadbeenshutdownuptothispoint,andtheuncertaintyforanear-termstartupdate,itwasdecidedthatthescopeofbothunits'utagesneededtobere-evaluated,andamorerigorousassessmentofplantreadinesswasrequiredpriortoanyrestart.ThesestepsarenecessaryinordertoachievetheobjectivesdescribedinSection1.1.Thekeyfactorsthatledtothisdecisionare:Designbasisconcernsandequipmentperformanceandtestingissueswhichhavecometolightinrecentmonthsraisedtheconcernthatadditionalhardwareandnon-hardwareactivitiesmayneedtobecompletedduringthisextendedshutdown.Confirmationisrequiredthatprocedureinadequaciesorequipmentdeficienciesthatmaychallengeplantoperatorsduringnormal,abnormal,oremergencyconditionshavebeenadequatelyidentifiedandaddressed.Lessonslearned&omothernuclearutilitiesintheimplementationofanintegratedassessmentofreadinesstorestartfollowinganextendedshutdown periodarebeingadoptedandappliedtoCookNuclearPlantonapilotbasisduringthisoutage.1.3RolesandResponsibilitiesRolesandresponsibilitiesfortheexecutionofthisplanareasfollows:1.3.1AllNuclearGenerationEmployeesResponsibleforsupportingtherestartactivitiesbyfocusingonsafeoperationsandcontinuousimprovement.Allemployeesareobligatedtoraiseanyandallqualityconcernstomanagement'sactionthroughthecorrectiveactionprogram.1.3.2SystemEngineersResponsibleforsuccessfulcompletionofrestartworkonselectedsystems,performinganassessmentofsystemreadinesstosupportunityrestartand,safe,reliablepoweroperations,implementingnecessarycorrectiveactionsandprovidingaffirmationofreadiness.1.3.3SystemEngineeringReviewBoard(SERB)BoardinternaltotheengineeringorganizationresponsibleforassessingthereadinessofplantsystemsandprovidingrecommendationsforadditionalrestartscopetotheROC.TheSERBcharterisprovidedinattachmentA.1.3.4RestartOversightCommittee(ROC)Responsiblefordeterminingtherestartscopeofworkusingconsistentstandardsandcriteriaapprovedbytheseniormanagementreviewteam(SMRT)andassessingthereadinessofCookNuclearPlanttorestartandresumepoweroperations,usingtheprocessapprovedbytheSMRTinthisprocedure.TheROCcharterisprovidedinattachmentB.1.3.5SeniorManagementReviewTeam(SMRT)Members:SiteVicePresident(Chairman)VicePresidentNuclearEngineeringDirectorPerformanceAssuranceDirectorRegulatoryAffairs*IndependentSafetyReviewCommitteeMember-*Thismemberwillactivelyparticipateasavailable,andwillperformacontinuousoversightrole.Routinecommunicationwiththismembermay beaccomplishedthroughreviewofmeetingminutes,phoneconferencingandfollowupinterviewswiththeSMRTmembers.TheSMRTisresponsibleforgenerationandapprovalsof:(a)criteriaforscreeningworkitemsrequiredforcompletionofrestart;and,monitoringandoversightoftheprocessforaffirmationandapprovalofplantandstaffreadinessforrestart.1.3.6PlantManager,EngineeringManagersandDepartmentSuperintendentsResponsibilityforsuccessfulcompletionoftherestartwork,performinganassessmentoffunctionalareareadinesstosupportunitrestartandsafe,reliablepoweroperations,implementingnecessarycorrectiveactionsandprovidingaffirmationofreadinesstotheROC.1.3.7RestartManagerResponsibilityforthemanagementandcontrolofrestartworkactivitiesincludingtheschedulingofactivitiesandcoordinationofresources.1.3.8SiteVicePresidentOverallresponsibilityforthemanagementandimplementationoftherestartplantoachievethepurposedescribedinsection1.1.Servesaschairmanofthe(SMRT).1.3.9ExecutiveVicePresidentNuclearGenerationResponsibleforauthorizingstartupandpowerascension,andprovidingseniormanagementoversightoftherestartprocess.1.3.10PlantPerformanceAssuranceResponsibletodischargeperformanceassuranceresponsibilitiesunder10CFR50,AppendixB,toprovideassurancethatactivitiesaffectingqualityaresatisfactorilyaccomplished.SeeAttachmentFforfurtherdetails.1.4CookNuclearPlantRestartProcessOverviewTherestartplanconsistsofthefollowingmajoractivities:(1)scopedetermination(2)workperformance(3)readinessassessment

(4)startupauthorization(5)startupandpowerascensionFollowingisaprocessmapandsummaryoftheactivitieswithmoredetailedinformationpresentedinlatersectionsofthisdocument.

f CookPlantRestartPlanOverviewL1srvBgheenPerformSystemReadinessReviews15sERSRexxnmedRestartWorkScopesaRocAppmveRestartWorkScope2.1ReawQeneoerPerformRestartWorkMPerformRnatReviewRacerrvnendStartup41srNTReconvnendRestart$.1opearoeRestartAndPowerOperation12IleagerPerformFnctionalAreaReadeessReviewsFinalReview12nanoyooPerformProgranmaticRearfeessReviews1AovRers~PerformContainmentReadinessReview 1.1SysEngineersPerformSystem'eadinessReviewsThe'objectiveoftherestartreadinessassessmentistoensurethattheintegratedsetofplantequipment,humanresourcesandworkprogramsarecapableofsupportingsafeandreliablepoweroperations.Therestartreadinessassessmentwillbeinitiatedinparallelwiththeexecutionandcompletionofrestartwork.Therestartreadinessassessmentwillfocusonthefollowing1.2~ManagersPerformFunctionalAreaReadinessReviews~plantsystemreadiness~functionalareareadiness~programmaticreadiness~containmentreadiness1.3.ManagersPerformProgrammaticReadinessReviews1.4DirPlantEngineeringPerformContainmentReadinessReviews1.5SERBRecommendRestartWorkScopeTherestartworkscopemaybeincreasedasaresultoftheplantsystemassessmentsorotherongoingwork.ThesystemengineerswillrecommendtherestartworkscopetotheSystemEngineerReviewBoard(SERB).

1.6'OC'pproveRestartWorkScopeAllrestartscopeadditionswillbeapprovedbytheRestartOversightCommittee(ROC).2.1RestartManagerPerformRestartWorkFollowingdeterminationoftherestartworkscopebytheROC,therestartmanagerisresponsibleforcoordinatingtheplanning,schedulingandcompletionofthework.3.1ROC,PNSRCPerformFinalReviewRecommendStartupResultsoftherestartassessmentwillbepresentedtotheRestartOversight.Committee(ROC)withanaf5rmationbytheresponsiblesystemengineerorengineeringmanager,andthefunctionalareasuperintendentofthereadinessofthesystem'rorganizationtosupportplantstartupandsafe,reliablepoweroperations.4.1SMRTRecommendRestartFollowingpresentationandacceptanceoftheassessmentresultsbytheROC,theSiteVicePresidentwillconvenetheSMRTtoperformanintegratedreviewoftheaffirmations,verifycompliancewithregulatorycommitmentsandanyotherspecialcriteriathatmayimpacttheinitiationofstartupactivities.4.2ExecVicePresAuthorizeRestartBasedontheresultsofthisreview,theExecutiveVicePresidentNuclearGenerationwillauthorizestartupandpowerascension.5.1OPSStartupandPowerAscensionStartupandpowerascensionfollowingthecompletionofstartupworkwillfollowadeliberateandcontrolledapproachthatensuresoperationalandpersonnelsafety.ThenormalstartupprocessdefinedinCookNuclearPlantprocedureswillbesupplementedwithappropriatemanagementoversightandsupport&omengineeringandmaintenanceorganizationsuchthatissuesorconcernsarepromptlyaddressedandthestartupcanbeaccomplishedinasafe,controlledmanner.

0 2.0RestartWorkScopeDetermination2.1RestartWorkScopeDeterminationProcessTherestartworkscopeisbeingdefinedthroughadeterminationprocessdrivenbytheROCconsistentwiththeircharter.Outstandingworkitemsandselectedprogranunaticissuesarereviewedagainstdefinedcriteriatodeterminewhichitemsshouldbeincludedintherestartscope.Systemengineershavethelargestroleinthisprocess,butthereisalsoconsiderableinvolvementfromotherorganizationsincludingoperations,designengineering,andmaintenance.TherestartworkscopedeterminationprocessisoutlinedinattachmentE..2.2PlantSystemReviewPlantsystemsarereviewedbythesystemengineerusingtheplantsystemreviewinstructionswithresultsandrecommendationspresentedtotheROC.Theplantsystemreviewprocessconsistsoffourprimlyelementsasdescribedbelow.2.2,1SelectionofPlantSystemsPlantsystemshavebeenselectedforadetailedreviewandaffirmationbasedonthehistoricalperformanceandrisksignificanceofthesystem.Thisreviewwillbeperformedinaccordancewiththeplantsystemreadinessreviewinstructions.ResultsoftheassessmentofselectedsystemswillbepresentedfirsttotheSERBand,uponapproval,totheROCwithappropriaterecommendationsforadditionalactions'obeperformedafterrestart.ThesystemsarelistedinattachmentD.TheremainingsystemswillbeassessedandevaluatedaspartofthelineresponsibilityoftheengineeringorganizationthroughtheuseoftheSERB.IssuesthataffectrestartscopeonthesesystemswillbepresentedtotheROConacasebasis.2.2.2RestartWorkScopeAdditionsTherestartworkscopeadditionforplantsystemsisfocusedonthoseitemsnotalreadyincludedintherestartworkscope.ItemsalreadyscheduledforcompletionpriortorestartarenotevaluatedagainstthecriteriaprovidedinattachmentCunlessthereisaproposaltodeletethem.Thegoalofthesystemreviewandworkscopeadditionprocessistodefine'theworknecessaryforcompletionpriortorestartsuchthatthesystemiscapableofsupportingsafeandreliablepoweroperation.Thisreviewwillincludethefollowing:10 (a)(c)themagnitude,significanceandriskofitemswhichwillberesolvedaAerrestartshouldbedefinedandevaluated;assurancethatrecurringproblemsonthesystemthatcouldaffectsafeandreliableoperationsarebeingfixed;assurancethatanydesignbasisandlicensingissuesonthesystemarebeingaddressedwithinatimeframethatisappropriatefortheissue;andassurancethatoperatorswillnotbeunnecessarilychallengedintheoperationofthesystemduringnormal,abnormal,oremergencyconditions.BasedonthereviewofopenworkitemsagainstthecriteriapresentedinattachmentC,thesystemengineeristoproviderecommendationsfortherestartscopechangesfortheselectedsystemsinattachmentDtotheSERBanduponapprovaltotheROC.ItemsrecommendedforadditiontotherestartscopeforremainingplantsystemswillbehandledonanitemspecificbasisbytheROCfollowinganinitialreviewbylinemanagement.Itshouldbenotedthat.itwasnottheintentofthisprogramtoresolvealldesignbasisissues.Wearecommittedtoalongrangeprogramtoaccomplishthisresolution.2.2.3MonitoringRestartWork,AddressingEmergentIssuesandPerformingaMoreDetailedAssessmentofSystemReadinessSystemengineeringistomonitortheprogressofworkonassignedsystemandaddressemergentissuesasrequired.AnymajorrestartscopeimpactsdefinedbyemergentissuesshouldbebroughttotheROCfollowinglinemanagementreview.Allotheremergentissuesareassesseddailybytheengineeringmanagers.Also,thesystemengineeristousethisperiodtocompletetheassessmentandevaluationofsystemreadinessinpreparationforthefinalsystemreadinessreviewandaffirmationofreadinessforrestart.2.2.4FinalSystemReadinessReviewandAffirmationThisaspectofthesystemreadinessreviewprocessissummarizedinsection4.1.Althoughitisnotexpectedthatanysignificantrestartworkscopeissueswillbeidentifiedduringthisfinalreview,ifanyareidentified,theyaretobebroughttotheimmediateattentionoftheROC(followinglinemanagementreview).11

2.3RedefinedRestartWorkScopeTherestartworkscopemayberedefinedbasedontheevaluationprocessdescribedabove.Decisionsmadeby,theROCregardingtherestartworkscopearedocumentedinmeetingminutesandworkitemstatusistracked.3.0RestartWorkScopePerformance3.1WorkScopePerformanceFollowingdeterminationoftherestartworkscopebytheROC,therestartmanagerisresponsibleforcoordinatingtheplanning,schedulingandcompletionofthework,includingtheimplementationofprograinmaticchanges.TherestartworkscopeperformanceprocessisoutlinedinattachmentE.4.0RestartReadinessAssessment'herestartieadinessassessmentisanintegratedlinemanagementassessmentthatassistsstationmanagementindeterminingthereadinesstoinitiatestartupandachievesafe,reliablepoweroperationthroughthenextoperatingcycle.TherestartreadinessassessmentprocessisoutlinedinattachmentE,Thisformofassessmentisoneelementofacomprehensiveplantassessmentprogramthatisthefoundationofourcontinuousimprovementphilosophy.Implementationofthisactionisconsistentwiththeexperienceandlessonslearnedofothernuclearutilities.TherestartreadinessassessmentisbeingimplementedatCookNuclearPlantbasedonlessonslearnedandwillbecapturedsuchthatthisprocesscanbeimplementedonaroutinebasisinthefuture.Therestartreadinessassessmentforrestartwillverifythecompletionofalldefinedrestartworkandtheaffirmationofsystem,departmentandrestartreadinessforstartupandpoweroperations.ResultsoftheassessmentandafBrmationofreadinesswillbepresentedtotheROCbytheresponsiblesystemengineer,functionalareamanagerandoperationsshiftsupervisor.-FollowingacceptancebytheROC,thesitevicepresidentwillconveneanSMRTmeetingtoreviewtheseaffirmationsandverifycompliancewithregulatorycommitmentsandanyotherapplicablecriteria.Thesitevicepresidentwillrecommendstartupoftheunitsbasedonthisreview,andassuranceregardingthereadinessofthestationtoinitiatestartupandsafely,reliablyoperatethroughthenextoperatingcycle.Followingisasummaryofthekeyelementsoftheprogram.4.1SystemReadinessSystemreadinessaffirmationsbythesystemengineeraretoconfirmthatplantsystemsmeetfunctionaldesignrequirements,havebeensuitablytestedandarereadytosupportsafeandreliablestartupandoperationthroughthenextcycle.ThisafIirmationisbasedontheworkcompletedasdescribedinsection2.2,andisto12

includeacoordinatedsystemwalkdownofthesystemwithoperationsandmaintenancepersonnelonsystemsdefinedbytheplantengineeringmanager.Wherenecessary,compensatoryactionsforrescheduledworkorotherareasofperformanceriskaretobedefinedandaddressed.SystemreadinessaffirmationsaretobepresentedbythesystemengineertotheSERBanduponitsapprovaltotheROCforthesystemsidentifiedinattachmentD.Affirmationofsystemreadinessisdocumentedwiththesignatureofthesystemengineerandmanager.Affirmationofindividualsystemreadinessfortheremainingplantsystemswillbeaddressedaspartofthesystemengineeringlinemanagementresponsibilityandwillbeoneelementofthefunctionalareareadinessevaluation.4.2FunctionalAreaReadinessrFunctionalareareadinessbyselectedfunctionalareasisanaffirmationthatthedepartmentisinanappropriatestateofreadinesstosupportstartupandsafeandreliablepoweroperationthroughthenextcycle.Functionalareareadinesswillincludeitemssuchas:(a)(c)(d)adequacyofstaffinglevels,personnelexperienceandqualificationstodemonstratecompliancewithregulatoryrequirementsandcommitments;completionofpersonneltrainingonnormalstartupevaluations,powerascensionrequirements,industryoperatingexperienceincludingextendedshutdownandunusualeventsatsimilarplants,emergencypreparedness,changesinplantconfiguration,changesinplantoperatingandemergencyprocedures,andchangesinkeyadininistrativeproceduresandprocesses;resolutionofsignificantperformancedeficienciesandreductionofbacklogs(correctiveaction,correctivemaintenanceetc.)tomanageablelevels;andestablishmentofgoalsandprioritiesforthecontinuedimprovementofthedepartmentincludinguseofcriticalassessmentmethods.FunctionalAreareadinesswillbeaffirmedtotheROCbythefollowingfunctional~operationsoutagemanagement~maintenancelicensingplantengineeringfuelsdesignengineering~plantprotection~productionengineeringinformationmanagementchemistryplantperformanceassuranceradiationprotectionAffirmationoffunctionalareareadinessisdocumentedwiththesignatureofthefunctionalareamanager.13

4.3ProgrammaticReadinessProgrammaticreadinessreviewwillconfirmthatprogramsareinplacetosupportidentificationandcorrectionofproblems.Programmaticissuesidentifiedduringtheunitshutdownhavebeenevaluatedandnecessarycorrectiveorpreventiveactionshavebeencompleted.Programsinplaceatthetimeofunitstart-upwillensurethattheplantwillbeoperatedinconformancewithitsdesignbasesandinaccordancewiththeAEPqualityassuranceprogram.A/Eprogrammaticissuespotentialbypassof50.59safetyevaluations50.59safetyevaluationqualitycorrectiveactionprogramimprovementssurveillanceprogramassessment4.4ContainmentReadinessThecontainmentreadinessreviewwillfocusontheabilityofthecontainmentsystemtomeettheintendedfunctionaldesignrequirements.Thecriticalpointsofthereviewwillfocusonthesystemmaterielcondition,adequatesurveillancetesting,andthesystemconfigurationcontrol,5.0RestartAuthorizationTherestartauthorizationprocessisoutlinedinattachmentE.5.1RestartOversightCommittee(ROC)ReviewandApprovalTheROCwillreviewandaccepttheassessmentaffirmationsin4.1,4.2,4.3and4.4.ArestartrecommendationwillbemadetotheSMRTbasedontheresultsofthefunctionalareaassessments.5.2SeniorManagerReviewTeam(SMRT)ReviewandApprovalUponreviewandacceptanceoftheassessmentaffirmationsin4.1,4.2,4.3and4.4bytheROC,thesitevicepresidentwillconveneanSMRTmeetingtoperformanintegratedreviewandapproval.5.3ExecutiveVicePresidentRestartAuthorizationBasedonthisreviewtheexecutivevicepresidentnucleargenerationwillprovide-theauthorizationforrestartandpowerascension.14

6.0StartupandPowerAscensionStartupandpowerascension,followingthecompletionoftherestartworkwillfollowadeliberateandcontrolledapproachthatensuresoperationalandpersonnelsafety.Thenormalstartupmanagementteamwillbeaugmentedwithashiftplantmanagerandshiftengineeringmanagersuchthatissuesorconcernsarepromptlyaddressedandthestatuscanbeaccomplishedinasafe,controlledmanner.Thestartupandpowerascensionactionssummarizedinthissectiondonotchangeoralteranyrequirementsofthestartupproceduresdefinedabove.6.1ManagementOversightandOrganizationalSupportTheCookNuclearPlantmanagementstructurewillbesupplementedwithashiftplantmanagerandshiftengineeringmanagertocomplimenttheshiftmaintenancemanagerduringthestartupandpowerascensionphase.Theresponsibilitiesofthesepositionsareasfollows:6.1.1ShiftPlantManagerTheshiftplantmanagerprovideson-shift(24-hour)presenceasadirectrepresentativeoftheplantmanagerandisresponsibleformaintaininganoverallperspectiveofthestartupprocess.Ifnecessary,theshiftplantmanagerisauthorizedtorequestoperationstodelaythestartup,reducepower,orshutdowntomakenecessaryrepairs.6.1.2ShiftEngineeringManagerTheshiftengineeringmanagerprovideson-shift(24-hour)presenceasadirectrepresentativeoftheplantengineeringmanagerandisresponsibleformaintaininganoverallperspectiveofengineeringsupportofthestartupprocess.Theshiftengineeringmanagerwillcontrolon-shiftengineeringresourcesasnecessarytosupportscheduledstartuptestingactivities,resolveemergentoperabilityissues,supportmaintenanceandmanagenecessaryreactorengineeringtestactivities.6.1.3ShiftMaintenanceManagerTheshiftmaintenancemanagerprovideson-shift(24-hour)presenceasadirectrepresentativeofthemaintenancemanagerandisresponsibleformaintaininganoverallperspectiveofmaintenancesupportofthestartupprocess.Theshiftmaintenancemanagerwillcontrolon-shiftmaintenanceresourcesasnecessarytosupportscheduledstartuptestingactivities,resolveemergentequipmentissues,andsupportoperations.15 0

Thisorganizationwillbeimplementedasdirectedbytheplantmanageratcriticalevolutionsduringstartupsuchaschangetomode4,initialcriticality,turbineroll,andparalleltogrid.Theorganizationwillbedisbandedasdirectedbytheplantmanagerbutnotbeforemode4to30%power.6.2OperatingProficiencyandExperienceReviewTominimizethepotentialforperformanceerrorsduringtheplantstartup,thefollowingactionswillbetaken:~operationspersonnelwillutilizethesimulatortopracticethestartupevolutionandensureunderstandingandproficiencywithapplicablestartupproceduresandspecialrequirements;areviewofpastCookNuclearPlantstartupissuesrelevantindustryoperatingexperiencewillbeperformedduringthefunctionalareareviewstoensureunderstandingofpastexperienceandlessonslearned;departmentcommunicationmeetingswillbeconductedwitheachplantdepartmenttodiscussmanagementexpectationsregardingthestartupandpowerascensionprocesses,schedule,andresponsibilities.These~meetingswillbecompletedpriortoinitiatingthestartupevolution.16 ATTACHMENTAPURPOSE:Performasystem-based,multi-disciplinarytechnicalreviewofpotentialrestartissuesassociatedwithrisksignificantplantequipment.ThisboardwillensureconsistentapplicationoftherestartcriteriacontainedinAttachmentCoftheCookNuclearPlantRestartPlanamongsystemengineers,andensurethatrestartdecisionsreflectthesharedconcernsofOperations,MaintenanceandEngineering.Theresultofthisreviewwillbetodefinetheequipmentrelatedworkwhichisneededtoensureasafeandeventfreestartupandachieveareliablepoststartupoperatingcycle.MEMBERS:DirectorPlantEngineering(Chair)MechanicalComponentManagerElectricalSystemManager.SafetyandAnalysisManagerI&CManagerPerformanceTestingManagerPreventiveMaintenanceManagerBoardSecretaryNon-Member:AdditionalattendancebymembersofRestartOversightCommitteeisexpectedtoreinforceexpectationsandprovideoversightfortherestartIssuereviewprocess.Alternatechair:SiteEngineeringManagersAlternatesafetyandanalysismanager:EngineersintheSafetyandAnalysisSection,subjecttoacceptanceoftheSERBchairoralternatechair.QUORUM:Chair(oralternate),twoOnsiteManagers,SafetyandAnalysisManager(oralternate),andSecretary.17 0

ACTIONS:3.5.6.ReviewallpotentialrestartitemsidentifiedbySystemEngineersbasedoncriteriadefinedintherestartplan;theSystemEngineerwillpresenttheproposedrestartitemsfordiscussion.ArepresentativeofOperationsandMaintenanceknowledgeableofthesystem'srestartissueswillsupportthesystemengineerandensuretheperspectiveoftheotherproductiongroupsisconsidered.TheOperationsrepresentativewillnormallybeanSSoraUSoftheOperationscrewresponsibleforthesystem,butcanbeanSSassignedtothe%orkControlCenter.DesignatesystemsthatarerequiredtobepresentedtotheSERBbysystemengineer,MaintenanceandOperations.TheSERBwillreviewallitemsidentifiedaspotentialrestartissuesbythesystemengineersystemreadinessreview.Thesystemengineer,OperationsorMaintenancerepresentativeswillalsoidentifyotherissueswhicharenotidentifiedaspotentialrestMtissuesbutmaybequestioned.AcompletelistofopenissuesoneachsystemwillbeavailableduringSERBmeetings.TheSERBwillreviewandquestionadditionalitemsasdesiredtodetermineiftheyshouldberestartissues.EnsurearecordofalldecisionsandconcernsraisedbytheSERBreviewisdocumentedforfuttuereview.Asaiesultofthereview,recommendspecificpotentialrestartitemsforapprovalbytheROC.Reviewandapprovethecharterandanyrevisionsneededtosupporttherestartplan.DisbandthisboardafterstartupwhendirectedbytheSiteVicePresident.D.R.HaferDirectorofPlantHnginccting18

ATTACHMENTBPURPOSE:Exercisemanagementoversightandapprovalofphysicalandprogrammaticworkscopenecessarytoensureasafeanduneventfulunitstartup,andachieveareliableoperatingcycle.PositionPlantManager,ChairOperationsSuperintendentViceChairProductionEngineeringDirectorPlantEngineeringDirectorMaintenanceSuperintendentLicensingManagerChemistrySuperintendentRadiationProtectionSuperintendentTrainingSuperintendentRestartManagerRestartPlanProjectManager*Secretary*DougCooperBobGillespieKenBakerDonHaferJohnBoeschMarkAckermanDaveMoreyDougNobleDennisLoopeJohnStubblefieldPhilGoraBettyClarkAlternateBobGillespieGuyTollasAlbertoVerteramoMikeFinissiMarkStarkGordonArentBobClaesPaulHollandDennisWilleminDickStrasserSandyMcClintock*Indicatesnon-votingmembersQUORUM:Chairpersonorvicechairperson,andthree(3)additionalvotingmembers,twoofwhichmustbeprimarymembers.Attendance&omPerformanceAssuranceandBusinessPerformanceisstronglyencouragedtoperformanactiveoversightrole.ACTIONS:2.Setandcommunicateexpectationsfortheorganizationtoevaluateworkitemsagainsttherestartscopecriteria.Ensurescreeningcriteriaareconsistentlyappliedviatherestartoversightcommitteereview,meetingandapprovalprocess.19 4I Someitemsthatmeetoneormoreofthecriteriamaybedeferreduntilafterrestartifthereisspecialconsiderationthatprovidesthebasisforthisdecision.Examplesmayincludeitemsthatareonlyaconcernduringcertainseasons,reducedriskofperformingtheworkduringasystemoutage,orimplementationofadequatecompensatoryactionsuntilalong-termsolutionisdefined.Aclearbasisfordeferraloftheseitemsistobeprovided.3.Reviewandapprove:A.Restartactionitemstobecompletedpriortostar{up.B.Stationreadinesstoinitiateuntilstartupandpowerascensionasdeterminedbytheresultsoftheassessmentofreadinesstostartup,4.Maintainarecotdofpresentations,discussions,deliberationsandbasisfordecisionsandrecommendations.5,Reviewcharterasnecessarytoaccommodatechangingconditions.Conveneasnecessarytoaccomplishthischarterpriortoandduringstarship.Disbandafterunitstartupwhendirectedbythesitevicepresident..SiteVicedentDate20 ATTACHMENTC.Tobeincludedintheplantrestartworkscope,itemsmustmeetthefollowingcriteria:1.Level1ScreeningResolvesanimmediateindustrialornuclearsafety,operabilityorregulatoryissue.Theseissueswillbemandatoryrestartitems.1.NecessaiytoaddressthevoluntaryshutdownfortheA/Einspectionandrelatedprogrammaticissues.I2.Necessarytoaddresstheconfirmatoryactionletter.3.RequiredtoreturnanINOPERABLEsystem,subsystemorcomponenttoOPERABLEstatus.4.Requiredtoresolveanimmediateindustrialornuclearsafetyconcern.5.Necessarytoaddressregulatorycommitments.2.Level2ScreeningNotanimmediateindustrialornuclearsafety,operabilityorregulatoryissue.Theseissueswillbeconsideredforadditiontotherestartitemlistbasedonthereviewandrecommendationsofplantengineering,operations,andmaintenanceiftheaction:1~Eliminatesanexistingcomponentfailure,deficiency,orconditionthatcouldresultinoperationin,orentryto,anLCOactionstatement.'2.Resolvesexistingdeficienciesorconditionsthat:a.wouldresultinfailureorinabilitytoperformarequiredsurveillancetestduringthecurrentoutageorthefollowingoperatingcycleinaccordancewiththeplanttechnicalspecifications;b.wouldincreasetherisktooperationforsafetyassociatedwithperformingasurveillance;orc.wouldresultinthefailuretomeetalicenserequirementorarestartcommitmenttoanoutsideagency.21

3.Restoresdegradedcriticalcomponentsorconditionsthatcouldresultinaplanttransient,powerreductionorshutdown.4.Resolvesconditionsthathaveresultedinrepetitivesafetysystemorequipmentfailures.5.Restoreshcensingbasisdeficienciestoconformingconditions(extendedprogrammaticreviewsandscheduledcoirectiveactionsmaybecompletedpost-restartwiththeproperjustificationofnosafetyimpact,asatisfactoryOPERABILITYdetermination,andappropriateregulatorycommunication).6.Correctsequipmentwithdesignbasisdeficiencies;i.L,deficienciesinsafety-relatedortechnicalspecificationequipmentnotinconformancewithdesignbasisdocumentssuchastheFSAR(extendedprogrammaticreviewsandscheduledcomctiveactionsmaybecompletedpost-restartwithjustificationofnosafetyimpact,asatisfactoryOPERABILITYdeterminationandappropriateregulatorycommunication).7.Correctsdeficienciesinconfigurationmanagementprograms,processes,engineeringanalysiscodes,oroperating,maintenance,ortestproceduresthathaveareasonableprobabilityofaffectingequipmentOPERABILITY(documentationdeficiencies,whichhavenosafetyimpact,maybecompletedpost-restart).8,Eliminatesconditionsthatcreateapotentialforpeieonnelradiationexposure,radioactivityrelease,orefHuentdischargeinexcessoflimits.9.Reducesaunulativedeficiencies,backlogsorconditionsthat,intheaggri~te,areevaluatedtohavesignificantnegativeimpactonsafety,operabilityorreliableplantoperation.(Notapplicabletoindividualworkitems).Appaved:Siteident22 23 ATTACHhgNTD.120Vac/CRIDInvertersAirRecirculation/HydrogenSkimmerAuxiliaryFeedwater250VdcStationBatteriesComponentCoolingWaterContainmentContainmentSprayControlAirECCSAccumulatorsECCSChargingModes1,2,3/CVCSHigh-headInjectionECCSRHRECCSSIElectricalSafetyBusses(4000V/600V)EmergencyDieselGeneratorsEssentialServiceWaterIceCondenserMainSteamNon-essentialServiceWaterPlantAirCompressorsReactorCoolantSystem/RCSPressureReliefReactorProtectionSystem/Solid-stateProtection/ESFAS24

ATTACHMENTERestartProcessMap(1)RestartWorkScopeDetermination1.1BeniEngheenrcSelectPlantSystemsForReviewApprovePlantSystemForReview1.3SYSENO~OPS,MrPerformSystemReviewsAddithnalWorkScoRequired?PerformReadinessAssessment)sadnessAssessmara11.2ROCValidateExistingRestaWorkScopeYES1.5SERBSERBReviewAndApprovalApproveRestartWorkScopeAdditionsApprovedRestartScopeAdditions1.7SYSENGRMonitorWork,AddressEmergentIssuesPerformWorkScopApprovedRestartWorkScope(2)RestartWorkScopePerformance2.1Mr,ISPlanRestartWorkScheduleRestartWo2.3AlOqyConductRestartWorkPerformReadinessAssessmentI3IeennessAssessnenl3.125

ATTACHMENTERestartProcessMap(3)ReadinessAssessment3.1SyeEny'neerAffirmPlantSystemReadinesssaSERBSERBConfirmsReadinessPlantSystemReady?SERBnoRestartWorkScopeDetermination3AMenegeaAffirmFunctionalAreaReadinessFunctionalAreasReady1oeienlIoeen1AYesYesS.euORBSAffirmProgrammaticReadinessProgramsReady?noRestartWorkScopeDetermination1oeienneieeen1AYesS.laMenderCompliieAndPresentResultsRestartAuthorization4eeienALerertzeiionAAnoRestartWorkScopeDetermination1oeienTwLteen1AYesAffirmContainmentReadinessContainmentReady?26noRestartWorkScopeDeterminationOe~1A

ATTACHMENTERestartProcessMapATTACHMENTERestartProcessMap{4)RestartAuthorization{5)PowerOperation4.1ROCPerformFinalReadinesReview42ROC,PNSRCPerformFinalReviewRecommendStartupRecommendRestart4AExecVlccPresa%AuthorizeRestart5.1OexeSNNStartupandPowerAscension27 V.~

ATTACHMENTFPerfoanceAssuranceOversightofRestartPerformanceAssuranceOversightofRestartThepurposeofthisoversighteffortistodischargePerformanceAssuranceresponsibilities,under10CFR50,AppendixB,toprovideassurancethatactivitiesafffectingqualityaresatisfactorilyaccomplished.Thisoversightwillincludeprovidingindependentfeedbacktolinemanagementconcerningtheadequacyoftherestartplanandhoweffectivetheplanisbeingimplemented.Toenhanceindependence,personnelconductingthisoversightwillincludethosewhohavenotbeeninvolvedwiththeevolutionofpracticesandlessonslearnedastheRestartPlanhasbeenimplemented.Criticalactivitieswereidentified&omtherestartplan.Criticalattributesoftheseactivitieswereidentifiedandscheduledforoversightasfollows:ListofCriticalActivitiesSystemReadinessReviewsFunctionalAreaReviewsProgrammaticReviewsContainmentReadinessReviewsDeterminationofRestartWorkScopeRestartWorkSERBROCIntegrationofReviewsStartupandPowerAscensionCriticalAttributesofCriticalActivitiesSystemReadinessReviewsAretherightsystemsbeingreviewed?Aretherightmethodsbeingusedtoconductthereviews?Arethereviewseffective?FunctionalAreaReviewsAretherightareasbeingreviewed?Aretherightmethodsbeingusedtoconductthereviews?Arethereviewseffectlve2ProgrammaticReviewsAretherightprogramsbeingreviewed?Aretherightmethodsbeingusedtoconductthereviews?Arethereviewseffective2ContainmentReadinessReviewsIstherightscopebeingreviewed2Aretherightmethodsbeingusedtoconductthereviews?Arethereviewseffective2DeterminationofRestartWorkScopeIstherightcriteriabeingusedtodeterminerestartworkscope?Arethereanyhiddeninventoriesofitemsthatarenotbeingconsidered?Reviewworknotincludedinrestart?AdherencetoCriteriaExpertJudgement28

ATTACHMZYI'PerfceAssuranceOversightofRestartRestartWorkIsrestartworkbeingperformedtoproperstandards?EngineeringMaintenanceOperationsOtherSERBIsthecharteradequate?IstheSERBeffectivelycarryingoutthecharter2ROCIsthecharteradequate?IstheROCeffectivelycarryingoutthecharter2IntegrationofReviewsIsthemethodofintegratingreviewsadequate?PlantEquipmentHumanResourcesWorkProgramsStartupandPowerAscensionIsitadequatelyPlanned2IsitadequatelyScheduled?IsisadequatelyPerformed(OnshiftObservations)?29 RevisionBlockRestartPlanRevisionsRevisionNumberDescriptionPage26:Newpage.AddedRevisionBlockPage8"AuthorizeRestart":DeletedExecutiveVicePresidentNuclearEngineering.AddedExecutiveVicePresidentNuclearGeneration.Pages20and21:Addedreferencenumberstorestartcriteria.Sect1.3.5:AddedDirectorRegulatoryAffairstoSMRTAttachmentA:AddedPreventiveMaintenanceManagertoSERBcharterSect1.3.10:AddedPlantPerformanceAssuranceresponsibilitiesAddedAttachmentF,PerformanceAssuranceOversightOfRestartIndex:AddedAttachmentFAttachmentC:Added"operabilityorregulatory"tolevel1screening.Added5.Necessarytoaddressregulatorycommitments.Added"regulatory"tolevel2screening.Date4/7/9830 e.

ML17334A730

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