ML20151Q269
| ML20151Q269 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1988 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151Q258 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 8808110092 | |
| Download: ML20151Q269 (48) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. .. .. . . . _ _ . . . . _ .- -- . .. . - . . .-_ ._ _ _ i s i FINAL REPORT ON -
'USNRC I.E. BULLETIN 79-14 FOR THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY , SEQUOYAll NUCLEAR PLANT '
I l UNIT 1 AND COMMON PIPING . 1 d 4 j ' l i 8808110092 880804 ! l PDR ADOCK 05000327 1 O PDC ' 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988 -
SEQUOYAII NUCLEAR PLANT I.E. BULLETIN 79-14 FINAL REPORT UNIT 1 AND COMMON EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This is the final report in response to USNRC I.E. Bulletin 79-14 for Tennessee
, . . Valley Authority's (TVA) Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Unit 1 ed Common safety related piping. This report summarizes the commitments, ,
implementation, and results of the TVA program to reconcile the ,selsmic analyses of piping and pipe supports with the as-built condi!!ons. The !.E. Bulletin.79-14 (IEB 79-14) Program for Sequoyah Unit 1 and Common consisted of a series of Inspections and subsequent evaluations culminating with the Scauoyah Unit i restart program. This report discusses the followin'g three distinct scopes of piping / supports and the approaches used to close IEB 79-14 for each scope. -
- 1. Unit 1 Rigorously Analyzed Piping / Supports This se' ope is associated with the rigorously analyzed piping and supports not included in the Unit 2 Pipe Support Calculation R' generation e
Program (CRP). This scope includes 162 rigorous piping analyses and approximately 2900 supports. . As-Built walkdown data packages were developed and input to the IEB 79-14 closure process and the review of associated pipe support calculations. Discrepancies between as-built and as-designed data were evaluated, reconciled and documented. This support calculation review resulted in a
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total of 373 modifications. Pipe support modifications were prioritized 1 1 as restart or post restart in accordance with TVA Civ!! Engineering l Branch instruction CEB C121.89. The prioritization process resulted in l the installation of 179 modifications. The remaining modifications wl.ll l be installed by the end of the Unit 1 Cycle Four Outage, j l i 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988
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- 2. Common Area Rigorously Analyzed Piping / Supports This scope is associated with rigorously analyzed piping and supports in common areas of the plant. IEB 79-14 closure was accomplished by use of previously completed inspection programs, reconcillation of resulting discrepancies and performance of additional activities 'as part of the Unit 2 CRP.
Functional verification walkdowns_ in accordance with Civil Engineering . . Isranch instruction CEB CI 21.83 were conducted as part of the, Unit 2 CRP. Anomalies resulting from this functional verification were resolve'd as part of the Unit 2 CRP process. Restart and post restart support
-modifications in ecmmon areas were prioritized using CEB C121.89. All required restart modifications were installed prior to Unit 2 restart. The remaining modifications will be installed by the end of the Unit 2 Cycle Four Outage. -
- 3. Unit 1 and Common Alternately Analyzed Piping / Supports
, This seope is associated with alternately analyzed piping and supports in Unit 1 and common areas of the plant. This alternately analyzed piping was originally inspected per TVA site maintenance procedure M1-6.17C and the discrepancies resulting from this inspection have been resolved.
Additionally, the SQN restart program included the Alternate ' Analysis . Review Program (AARP) to address specific design criteria issues. Phase 1 of the AARP addressed critical piping attributes and was commited for completion prior to Unit i restart. Phase 1 and the modifications resulting from this program are complete. 11 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988
4 l l Completion of Phase 11 of the AARP and incorporation of any ) modifications by the end of the cycle four outage will result in closure of IEB 79-14 for alternately analyzed piping. In additon to inspection and resolution of existing conditions, IEB 79-14 requires the seismic design be kept current with the as-bulit condition of the plant. The Sequoyah design control process will assure that future
.~ modifications are properly accounted for in the seismic design. The USNRC have reviewed and approved the Sequoyah design control process, as recorded , ,
in Volume 2, Section 2.1 of NUREG-1232 Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah Nuclear Performance Plan. , The Sequoyah IEB 79-14 commitments have been addressed for Unit 1 and Common and will be maintained throughout the future operation of the plant. l l l l 1 l 1 I l 1 111 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988
e SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1.E. BULLETIN 79-14 FINAL REPORT FOR UNIT 1 AND COMMON TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITL,E PAGE EXECUT;VE
SUMMARY
l TABLE OF CONTENTS iv 1.0 PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND 1-1 - . 1.1 Purpose 1.2 Background - 1.3 Sequoyah IEB 79-14 Program Commitments 1.4 AdditionalInspections Prior to the Restart Program 2.0 UNIT 1 RIGOROUSLY ANALYZED PIPINO!CUPPORTS 2-1 3.0 COMMON AREA RIGOROUSLY ANALYZED PIPING / SUPPORTS - 3-1 4.0 UNIT 1 AND COMMON ALTERNATELY ANALYZED PIPING / SUPPORTS 4-1 5.0 DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS , 5-1 6.0 CONCLUb!ONS 6-1 ATTACHMENTS Attachment A: L.M. Mills, June 27,1980, letter to James P. O'Reilly Attachment B: Unit 1 Rigorously Analyzed Piping Problem List Attachment C: IED 79-14 Attributes Verified by SMI-0-317-69 Attachment D: Common Area Rigorously Analyzed Piping Problem List Attachment E: 79-14 Attributes Verified for Common Area Rigorously Analyzed Piping Attachment F:. L.lst of Inaccessible Supports l IV l l 1
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l 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988 ! 1
1.0. PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND 1.1 Purpose The purpose of this report is to document compliance with the commitments of the United States Nucle.ar Regulatory Commission (USNRC) I.E. Bull.etin 79-14 (IEB 79-14) for Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
, - - (SQN) Unit 1 and Common safety related piping. The report summarizes the commitments, implementation, and results of the TVA program to reconcile ~ ~
the seismic analyses of piping and pipe supports with the as-built condition. This report discusses the previous IEB 79-14 activities as well as current activities performed as part of the SQN ru. art program. These current activities include the Unit 1 Rigorous Analysis Program, the Unit 2 Calculation Regeneration Program, (CRP) and the Alternate Analysis Review Program (AARP). Additionally, this report discusses the enhanced design control procedures implemented to assure that the seismic design is kept current with the as-built cond!'tlon.
1.2 Background
On July 2,1979, the USNRC issued IEB 79-14, "Seismic Analyses for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems," requiring action by all power reactor facility licenaces and construction permit holders. Revision 1, dated July 18, l'979, and supplements dated August 15, 1979, and September 7, 1979, provided clarification and guidance on the intent of the bulletin. , IED 79-14 addecsses a USNRC concern that the as-built configuration of safety-related piping systems may not conform to design documents used to obtain input information for seismic analyses. Potentially, this nonconformance cculd affect the v slidity of the analyses. 1-1 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988
4 IEB 79-14 required the !!censee to verify, unless verified to an equivalent degree within the preceding 12 months, that the seismic analysis applies to the actual configuration of safety-related piping systems. This requirement applies to all safety-related piping ?- 1/2" in diameter and greater and to seismic Category 1 piping, regardless of size, which was dynamically analyzed by computer.
, - - Tne specific requirements are as follows:
- 1. Identify inspection elements to be used in verifying that the seismic analysis input information conforms to the actual configuration of safety-related systems.
- 2. Inspect all safety-related systems and include in the inspection pipe run geometry; support and restraint design, location, function, and clearance (including floor and wall penetrations); embedments (excluding those
, covered by I.E. Bulletin 79-02); pipe attac'hments; and valve and valve operator locations and weights (excluding those covered in IE Bulletin 79-04).
- 3. If nonconformances are identified:
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- a. Evaluate the effect of the nonconformance upon system operability under specified carthquake loadings.
- b. Submit an evaluation of identified nonconformances on the validity of piping and support analyses. Where you determine that reanalysis is necessary, submit your schedule for: (1) completing the ' reanalysis, (2) comparisons of the cesults to FSAR or other NRC approved acceptance criteria, and (3) submitting descriptions of the results of reanalysis.
1-2 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988
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- c. In lieu of b., submit a schedule for correcting nonconforming systems so that they conform to the design documents. Also submit a description of the work required to establish conformance.
- d. Revise documents to reflect the as-built conditions in the plant, and -
describe measures which are in effect which provide assurance that future modifications of piping systems, including their supports, will be reflected in a' timely manner in design documents and the seismic analysis. . Supplement 2 of the bulletin allows an alternate approach to performing the inspections using the specific revision of drawings which were used as input to the seismic analyses. The alternate approach allows inspection of the es-built configuration of the systems to the latest design drawings, marking the drawings accordingly, and returning the ' marked-up design drawings to the seismic analyst for comparison to the seismic analysis input. This alternate approach was used at Sequoyah. Upon receipt of the bulletin, the TVA Office of Engineering Design and Constructio.n (OEDC) initiated a review of written procedures and documentation for SQN Unit 1 and Common piping to verify that as-built safety related piping systems were consistent with the configura'tlon used in the seismic analysis. This review concluded that TVA's procedural and ' documentation program satisfied the requirements of IEB 79-14. A description - of TVA's procedural and documentation program was submitted to the USNRC for review in September 7,1979, letter to James P. O',Reilly from L.M. Mills (RIMS A27 790907 010). The response w~as reviewed by the USNRC and was determined to comply with the requirements of the bulletin (Ref: M.A. McBurnett to D.L. Lambert, 10/16/79; RIMS A27 791026 012), in November 1979, the USNRC conducted an audit of the OEDC procedural and documentation program and found it satisfactory. 1-3 . 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988
i: As a follow-up to the audit of the program, the USNRC performed a field , inspection in Aprl! 1980 (Ref C. E. Murphy to H.G. Parris, May 27, 1980; RIMS A02 800523 010). This inspection identified the 'following types of support discrepancies:
- 1. Damaged support
- 2. Excessive gap ,
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- 3. Incorrect support location'
- 4. Missing support member . .
- 5. Additional support installed. .
Consequently, the USNRC issued a Confirmation of Action (Ref: James P. O'Reilly to H.G.'Parris, dated April 29,1980; RIMS A02 800430 008), requiring , certain actions to demonstrate compliance with the bulletin prior to initial criticality. The specific actions required b'y the confirmation of Action Letter (CAL) were
- 1. Determine t'he cause of the problem in implementing TVA's piping and support program, including the reasons for the failure of TVA's quality
- assuranc.e program to identify the problem.
- 2. Inspect a representative sample of pipe supports on each sa'fety-related system inside containment to verify proper installation. The perce,ntage to be inspected will be based on the findings from the determinations in -
parage::ph I above and following discussions with the USNRC.
- 3. Select at least one isometric drawing from each of eight safety-related systems inside containment and verify that all requirements of IEB 79-14 ,
are met. .
- 4. Upon completion of the above, provide the USNRC with TVA's inspection .
findings, schedule for completion of the inspection of the remainder of the safety-related supports outside containment, and proposed corrective actions. , 1-4 4 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988
l 1.3 Sequoyah IEB 79-14 Program Commitments TVA initiated a sampling inspection program to verify USNRC findings and to scope any additional actions necessary to assure compliance with IEB 79-14 to resolve the USNRC CAL. The sampling inspection program, as agreed to by the USNRC, included the following:
1. A detailed inspection of'all supports on one isometric for each of eight systems inside containment. .
- 2. A detailed inspection of all supports on one isometric for each .of eight systems outside containment.
- 3. A detailed inspectio~n of 20 supports per system for the four remaining systems inside containment and the five remaining systems outside containment. '
- 4. A detailed piping configuration inspection of the same isometries noted in item 2 above.
The plant was considered to be an operating plant and technical specifications were applicable in accordance with IEB 79-14 requirements. For this reason, the detailed inspections were performed using Sequoyah Nuclea,r Plant maintenance Instruction MI-6.17. In addition, TVA elected to perform walkdowns for 80 Isometrics of 12 safety-related systems inside containment to ensure that potential problem supports inside containment were discovered and corrected. These inspections were not
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conducted per MI-6.17; however an inspection summary sheet with two-party sign-off by construction and operations inspectors was used. These inspections are referred to as the 80 isometric walkdowns. b d 1-5 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988
l Upon completion of the sampling program, TVA responded to the CAL in a letter to the USNRC from L.M. Mills to J.P. O'Reilly dated June 27,1980 (See Attachment A). This letter describes the scope and type of inspections performed and summarizes the results and conclusions and represents Sequoyah's IEB 79-14 commitments. Three primary conclusions were drawn in the letter as a result of the sampling program inspections: 1) the Quality Assurance Program was essentially sound since discrepancies were randomly distrJbuted; 2) the nature of discrepaneles , found does not prohlblt low power operation of the plant; and 3) additional inspections were required to provide further assurance that the plant could be operated safely at full power. TVA committed to and performed additional inspections to provide further assurance that the plant could be operated safely at full power. These Inspection programs consisted of the following SQN_ maintenance Instructions:
- 1. Mi-6.17A for rigorously analyzed piping
- 2. Mi-6.18 for review of walkdown discrepar^1cs
- 3. Mi-6.17C for alternately analyzed piping The scope of Mi-6.17A was to inspect all accessible computer analy' zed, safety-related piping which had not been previously inspected. ,
The purpose of Mi-6.18 was to provide a procedure for proper documentation of the data obtained from these inspections, the resolution of discrepancies, ! and follow through with technical specification action statements, if , appropriate, within the requir:d time period (48 hours). l The scope of MI-6.17C was to visually inspect safety-related piping 2-1/2 l Inches and larger in diameter that was analyzed using the alternate analysis i method. The following systems, inside and outside of containment, were to be inspected per MI-6.17C: 1 1-6 j 1 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988
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- 1. Essential Raw Cooling Water
- 2. Component Cooling Water
- 3. Waste Disposal
- 4. Chemical and Volume Control
- 5. Spent Fuel Pit Cooling
- 6. Fire Protection.
**"* The requirements for resolution of discrepancies and invoking technical specifications action statements for Mi-6.17 C were included in the procedure. ,
1.4 AddittoaalInspections Prior To The Restart Programs . In De'cember 1985 and February 1986, the Quality Assurance staff performed a survey a. Sequoyah to determine if the original IEB 79-14 Program had been conduc.ed adequately and if corrective act'lons were completed satisfactorily. The .iurvey was in response to IEB 79-14 concerns raised at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. As a result of the survey, tw'o Corrective Action Reports (CARS) were issued; SQNCAR8602009 and SQNCAR8606034. The CARS identified weaknesses in portions of the original IEB 79-14 programs. The CARS concluded that the 80 Isometric walkdown inspections had inadequate procedural control of the walkdowns and documentation of discrepancy resolution and also concluded that the number of supports declared inaccessible during the walkdowns was too large and that these supports should be inspected. In response to the CARS, Special Maintenance Instruction SMI-1-317-24 (SMI- ,
- 24) was developed. SMI-24 required new walkdowns of all the 80 Isometric )
Inspection scope to a detailed inspection criteria and required inspection of j supports previously declared inaccessible in other inspections. The SMI-24 I l Inspections rese.lted in identification of over 3000 potential discrepancies i requiring evaluation. 1-7 ,
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During the same timeframa as the SMI-24 inspections, the Sequoyah units were voluntarily shut down due to questions about environmental qualification of electrical equipment. TVA committed to a series of evaluations and program reviews prior to restarting the units. The major restart issue relating to pipe supports was missing calculations. In response to this issue, TVA committed to a pipe support calculation review and regeneration program to assure that all pipe support calculations were available and consistent with design basis
.-- criteria.
The IED 79-14 Program for Sequoyah Unit 1 and Common piping has consisted of a series of Inspections and subsequent evaluations. These fall into one of three general categories: the Unit 1 Rigorously Analyzed Piping; Common Area Rigorously Analyzed Piping and Unit 1 and Common Alternately Analyzed Piping. The IEB 79-14 activities addressed by each of these categories are summarized in the following sections of this report. 4 8 e e O I l l 4 1-8 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988
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l 2.0 UNIT 1 RIGOROUSLY ANALYZED PIPING / SUPPORTS Unit I computer (rigorously) analyzed piping was evaluated by a comprehensive program including the review and reconcillation of piping and pipe support related as-built data which has achieved compliance with IEB 79-14 requirements. The scope of this program was r!guously analyzed piping in Unit I and Common excluding the piping and supports rcquired for restart of Unit 2 (which were handled under the Unit 2 CPR). The Unit 1 Rigorous Analysis Program included 162 piping analyses and approximately 2900 associated pipe supports. A listing of the pipir g analysis problem numbers within this program is provided as Attachment B. The purpose of tile program was to evaluate open items against piping analyses and support designs including nonconformances, open Engineering Change Notices (PCNs), design baseline punchlist items, discrepancies identified in the previous SMI-24 walkdowns, and other as-built discrepancies, in addition, pipe support calculations were upgraded to the latest requirements established in design criteria SQN-DC-V-24.2. Special Maintenance Instruction SMI-0-317-69 (SMI-69) was developed to control the c'ollection of additional as-built dato in accordance with IEB 79-14 for use in the Unit 1 Rigorous Analysis Program. Under the requirements of SMI-69, previous Quality Control (QC) verified inspection data from procedures MI-6.17, MI-6.17A and SMI-1-317-24 could be used. The SMI-69 inspections would obtain the required data to provide a complete piping and support as-
. built package for use in the evaluation. Attachment C lists the piping and support attributes requiring as-built documentation per 5iMI-69. Approximately one-third of the supports in the program scope had full SMI-69 inspections performed, and all but six piping isometries had complete SMI-69 Inspections.
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t The percentage of isometrics requiring new inspections was high since the original walkdowns were visual inspections and not all dimen; ions were recorded. The six isometrics which did not require new inspections had full dimensioning from previous walkdowns. Under SMI-69, all piping dimensions were measured. In addition, all supports were required to have field walkdowns for functional verifications even if the original IEB 79-14 data was complete. This provided additional assurance that as-built data was current and accurate. As Indicated previously, the Unit 1. Rigorous Analysis Program was a , 4 comprehensive program structured to meet restart requirements as well as to reconcile as-built data. Open items for the analysis were collected. prior to evaluating the analysis. This included the latest valve data, the SMI-69 as-built package, and open discrepancies from previous walkdowns. A piping analyst then reviewed the information and provided a documented disposition of the open issues or discrepaneles in the analys'is package. The as-built data-and other concerns such as nonconformance reports and significant condition reports were evaluated cumulatively against t'he stress analysis. As-built discrepancies we're resolved in one of three ways; 1) the discrepancy ..as , restored to the design condition by issuing a work request (WR); 2) the discrepancy .was determined to be acceptable-as-is and changes in pipe stress or support loads were documented in the calculation; 3) the effects were indeterminate, therefore, a reanalysis was performed and a new record analysis package was created. Of the 162 analysis packages reviewed, only three were determined to require complete reanalysis. The discrepancies in the remainder - could be resolved using hand calculations or localized computer models. In all cases, evaluations were documented and entered in Retrieval and Information
. Management System (RIMS).
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Once the piping analysis evaluation was complete, support loads were tabulated and provided to the support design group for evaluation. As with the piping analyses, open items regarding supports were dispositioned cumulatively along with the as-built data. Discrepancies between the support design calculation and the as-built condition were reconciled by; 1) requesting the support be restored to the as-designed drawing requirements through a WR; 2) documenting in the support calculation the discrepant condition was ; i
<"- acceptableas-is; 3) modifying the original design through an Engineering Change Notico (ECN)/ Design Change Nqtice (DCN). ,
All pipe support evaluations were performed using design criteria SQN-DC-V-24.2. This new criteria is different from the design criteria used in the original design and includes the latest design baseline requirements approved by the USNRC for the restart program (Volume 2 Section 2.3.2 of NUREG-1232 SER on TVA, Sequoyah Nuclear Performance Pla'n). Modifications and WRs which were identitled by the evaluation were prioritized for restart or post restart implementation in accordance with CEB-Cl-21.89. The USNRC approved this criteria fo use on the restart of Sequoyah (Volume 2 S.ection 2.3.2 of NUREG-1232 SER on TVA, Sequoyah Nuclear Performcnce Plan). The criteria was applied to all 373 modifications resulting from the Unit 1 Rigorous Analysis Program. All 179 modifications' categorized as pre-restart will be installed prior to plant restart. Post , restart modifications are scheduled to be completed by the end of Unit 1 fuel cycle four refueling outage. l < 1 'T I 3-3 87-085-SQt..i August 1,1988
t 3.0 COMMON AREA RIGOROUSLY ANALYZED PIPING / SUPPORTS f r\ l The seismic design of Rigorously Analyzed Piping in common plant areas has been reconciled with the as-built condition of the plant in compliance with the IED 79-14 commitments as stated in the L.M. Mills June 27, 1980 letter. This i scope of piping and supports includes computer (rigorously) analyzed p! ping I which was not included in the Unit 1 Rigorous Analysis Program, and was not v"' included in the Unit 2 scope of piping for which IEB 79-14 has been closed. A list of piping analysis probleras in this scope is provided as Attachment D. Compliance was achieved through the original inspection programs, additional inspections per SMI-24 and was independently verified by the Unit 2 Calculation Regeneration Program (CRP) functional verification inspecticas. As stated in Section 1.0, rigorously analyzed piping in common areas was originally inspected as part of the outside ' containment inspections performed in accordance with Mi-6.17 and MI-6.17A. Discrepancies were processed in accordance with MI-6.18 and technical speelfication action statements were invoked, if necessary. The discrepancies were evaluated and modifications were installed as required to reconcile the seismic design with the as-built condition. The discrepaneles identified by SMI-24 have been evaluated and modifications issued where necessary. An independent verification of the Mi-6.17 and Mi-6.17A inspections on common area rigorous supports was completed as a part of the Unit 2 CRP and no adverse trending was identified. As part of the Unit 2 CRP, each support received a functional verification inspection per CED CI 21.83. This inspection reconfirmed the adequacy of the existing support configuration for IED 79-14 attributes such as location, type, and direction of restraint. Discrepancies identified as part of the functional walkdown were documented and reconciled with the piping analysis and support design calculation. This provides additional assurance that the original inspection programs identified and resolved the critical IED 79-14 related support concerns. 3-1 87-085 QNil August 1,1988
4 Piping attributes were not reinspected by CEB-CI-21.83. Reinspections on piping were not necessary since no adverse trend in piping attributes has been identlfled on Sequoyah. The Unit 1 Rigorous Analysis Program provides further confirmation that piping attributes are not a concern. The Unit I rigorously analyzed piping was reinspected by measurement and no significant piping discrepaneles were Identifled. Attachment E is a summary of tho'IEB 79-14 attributes checked in the common 4 area inspections. The attachment notes if the attribute was visually checked , or measured. The attachment demonstrates compilance with t.he commitments in the L.M. Mills letter. . The piping stress analysis and support designs for common areas have been reconclied with the as-built data in accordance with of TVA IEB 79-14 commitments . Discrepaneles identifled from the CEB-CI-21.83 walkdowns for the Unit 2 CRP and previous TVA walkdowns have been evaluated and design modifications for supports identified, as necess'ary. The modifications were prioritized for installation pre or post restart in accordance with CEB CI 21.89. i 1 { f 3-2 , 87-Ls5-SQNII August 1,1988
l 4.0 UNIT 1 AND COMMON ALTERNATELY ANALYZED PIPING SUPPORTS Selsmically designed safety related piping in Unit 1 and Common which was not originally quallfled by computer analysis is defined as alternately analyzed piping. Alternately analyzed piping represents approximately 10% of the total Unit 1 and Common IEB 79-14 program scope. The IEB 79-l4 requirements for alternately analyzed piping apply to 2-1/2 inches and larger piping only. The initial response for IEB 79-14 qompliance for alternate piping was , , performed per procedure M1-6.17C. The 2-1/2 inch and larger piping and supports in the six systems committed to be reviewed in L.M. Mills' letter were visually inspected. In 1982, alternately analyzed piping became a generic lesue 'within TVA. As a result, NCRs SQNSQP8215 and SQNSWP8222 were . written to identify technical and documentation deficiencies. SQNSQP8215 potentially identified some incomplete 'or improper documentation .and inadequate compliance with the alternate analysis criteria. SQNSWP8222 Identified the possibility of non conservative bouridary conditions. To resolve these analysis conconformances, a two phased program called the Alternate Analysis Review Program (AARP) has been developed for restart of Sequoyah. Phase I of the AARP has been completed for restart and addressed four attributes potentially present in alternately analyzed piping.' Phase II of the program addresses the resolution of all remaining program deficiencies. The scope of Phase I was limited to those systems or portions of sy::tems required to mitigate FSAR Chapter 15 events and piping which might adversely affect equipment requ! red for unit restart. Interim allowables greater than the design basis allowables were permitted to be used for support design during Phase I by the USNRC.
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The four attributes addressed in Phase I were as follows:
- 1. Flexibility at branch /run interfaces.
- 2. Thermal expansion flex!bility for piping with operating temperatures greater than 200 degrees F.
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.. -085-SQNil August 1,1988 )
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- 3. Support of pneumatic and motor operated valves.
- 4. Interface with deadwelght supported piping for pipe sizes greater than 2".
Phase 11 includes resolution of the following items in addition to the Phase I attributes listed earlier.
- 1. Thermal expansion flexibility for piping operating temperatures greater ,
than 120 degrees F.
- 2. Support of long axla! runs and large concentrated weights. - -
- 3. Interface with deadweight supported piping P.s it an or equal to 2" diameter.
- 4. 'Ger.eral technical and documentation deficiencies, in addition, the following issues are to be evaluated during Phase 11:
- 1. Verify friction loads on supports due to thermal growth of piping at Sequoyah are not significant. -
- 2. Justify the pipe support deflection criterla used to verify rigidity.
- 3. Review the results of the Employee Concern Program and the Category I (L) Piping Program to assess any potential impact on the Alternate '
Analysis Program. All attributes are to be resolved to the design basis requirements. Unit 1 Phase i 11 scope of the AARP is committed to be completed by the end of Unit 1 cycle l four outage. Unit 2 Phase 11 scope is committed to be completed by the end of ! the Unit 2 cycle four outage and includes alternately analyzed piping in common areas. l l l 4 I I 4-2 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988
4 Alternately analyzed piping in the IEB 79-14 scope will have field inspections as necessary to verify compilance to the alternate analysis criteria as part of the AARP Phase II. Any identified discrepancies will be evaluated against the design criteria and will be resolved in one of three ways: 1) being reworked via a WR to be restored to the original design requirements, or 2) documenting the
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discrepancy is acceptable as-is or 3) modified to an acceptable condition via a plant modification packaga or a design change notice. Completion of the existing committed Alternate Analysis Review Program Phase II will result in closure of IEB 79-14 for alternately analysed piping. . i l 4-3 l 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988
4 5.0 DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS The seismic analysis of the plant must be updated for each modification to the plant to insure the seismic design remains current. The control of modifications and design changes is called design control. The USNRC identified several concerns with Sequoyah's past design control program. These concerns have resulted in changes which have significantly enhanced the
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process. This enhanced design' control program is discussed in detail in Volume 2 Section 111.5 of TVA's Nuclear Performance Plan. The USNRC has evaluated . the program enhancements and concluded the design control program is acceptable. This evaluation is documented in Volume 2 Section 2.1 of NUREG-1232 Safety Evaluation Report on Tennessee Valley Authority, Sequoyah Nucle'ar Performance Plan. This enhanced design control program is bei'ng implemented in two phases. . The first phase was implemented before the restart of Sequoyah Unit 2 and includes a change control board and a transitional design control system. The second phase establishes a permanent design control system based on the plant modification package concept. The enhanced program ensures that design documents are revised in a timely manner to reflect the as-built condition in the plant and any effects on the seismic analysis are evaluated. l 5-1 87-085-SQNii August 1,1988
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6.0 CONCLUSION
S Rigorously analyzed piping and pipe supports in Sequoyah Unit 1 and Common are in compliance with TVA IEB 79-14 commitments as a result of the inspections performed and the subsequent resolution of discrepancies between the as-constructed and as-analyzed condition. Corrective actions have been identified and have been prioritized consistent with Sequoyah restart criteria. Additional walkdowns are to be performed on alternately analyzed piping post restart as part of Phase 11 of the Alternate Analysis Review Program. Resolution of any further discrepancies identified in these walkdowns and all corrective actions for Unit I and Common IEB 79-14 scope piping will be completed by the end of the cycle four refueling outages. In the course of performing the various walkdowns,130 supports were declared to be inaccessible. Attachment F is a listing of these inaccessible supports.
. The reason the supports were declared inaccessible vary' from support to support and are summarized as follows:
- 1. The support is located in a high radiation zone where high exposures would occur even during cold shutdown.
- 2. The support is located in a sleeve, or a guard pipe or a pipe whip restraint structure and there is no physical access.
- 3. The support is covered with fire barrier material and removing the material would breech the fire barrier.
The design control process requires the seismic design be kept current with the as-built conditon of the plant. This will assure modifications after completion of the restart programs are properly accounted for in the seismic design. The USNRC has reviewed and approved the Sequoyah design control process as recorded in Volume 2 Section 2.1 of NUREG-1232 Safety Evaluation Report on Tennessee Valley Authority, Sequoyah Nuclear Performance Plan. 6-1 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988 '
. - . - -.. - - _-_ : 2 - _ . - --.-. .
s As the result of original inspections, additional activities performed as part of TVA's restart plan, combined with the commitment for completion of the Alternate Analysis Review Program Phase II, the requirements of 128 79-14 have been satisfied. An enhanced design control program has been implemented to assure that modifications to piping and pipe support designs will be evaluated and documented in a timely manner. 1 6-2 l I 87-085-SQNil . August 1,1988 l _ _ . _ . _ . _ - . , _ . - ~ . _ . __ ._.
k u
~
__ _ n= = - w.x - . - _- - N' * ' '
.s ATTACilMENT A .
.v. .' 300627 00S' V
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. ,- +;: ~ . , ,.. . w.-~ w ~ ~~ =~ m m N
y Aug CLestaut Street Tower II T-June 27,1%0 W ite. James F. U' ta. illy. Director uf fica of Ins tion and Inforcement 800708E0127 g
'. U.S. Atur. lear ulatory Coczussion .....
..s Eh-;.
" " , ' - ' , magion II - Sule. 31VO .
F
= ..._ c ._ .. . N e a'80 0.7.
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Dear ttr. O'Railly ,
y SEquotAh 5t,CLIAS. PLA.:."T UNIT 1 - ERC-UI.L El% ION II LETTI3111:1h' 'l-
- 30-327/60 "~
.; V- .' -
. 't,-y UJkACTIUJ . *IKSPLCTIUM EI.POkT - ADDITIUKAL* DJGUd.ATION OW
' ..2 .
p
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- 3:.. . . : ::. . .r.. *
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' ~~ ?~'." .3' The vuoject lectur dated March 2.1,'1980, cited WA vita one inf raction ..
h
.' T in accordance vita 10 CTE 2.201. A respecsa to that inf raction was ' - , ; ,-
subctitted on June 12,1!/eu. Inclosed is a re[ ort on the inspection
. pro ;ran initiated as a result of that inf raction.
n y - . . 7
.~ 2 ~,,' . ",9 ", WA 'is confident in.it the inspection prok,ran specified in the enclosuro gj pA 7 3
- .l"7
, .._~~" in adesustu to ensure systeu performance vill not be degraded. 7hs con- , g' -
I servatisa used in d= sign, coucined with the formal contruls used in
.. ; -.i -
'~
constructico and operatico, are sufficient to prevent even randoa . c .1'
- . . f allurea of individual couH>nenta f rou 4egradiu, overall system per ,,b . . . . .
A. .M' ---- -" r . - 2.., . ;; , ,
'E
,..-.=,
" ."~~ . f o r a ne w unde r vo rm t ca se condition s._.'.* ; ,
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,- =:;,:
.4 . , . . . . . .-. . - ~ -.. :. r:. . . - = -- ~
.. ~ * . . . . . .
' TVA te.l.ieves the inspectico and analyses perf ormed so f ar are ruf ficient. , ; .. . . ... .
to de=4aatrate that the piping and pipin;; support systens on Sequoyah - T ;.r - i unic 1 are fundamentally sound and that low, over operat.ica of the unit vould *oe uasif octad by even tha rest severe diserepancies that could be f o u.wi . If.
.5 },.,- ou have any quescions concerning this t.atter, please &ct in touch -
vit O. L. Lanbert at I D 857-2531. .
. e. . .
c;. J .i .n0 c Very truly yours, l j:.;s .._u..._ j Toutssar vit.ux Aurooun
;..-. . . . ,_ _.?
~
7-e {'-~- . . ._ L. M. Mills, l'.anac.r
.',.y.
- p. -
1 N clear Eaculation and safety
-{ .
f . . v i.':MAH:ATX ' '
- y ' ,p ~ ~~-'d _ _ G ; 1,.sur a I - - - ' , ' - cc: lit, i
.. ~Z.~~ .E, . . '.~ l Of fice oi InsW Lion sW Inf orcamantVic t o r S tallo , J r. , Dir ec to r (rn
' U.s. duc14Ar Lagu14 tory coa =1aalo%
I' 1 uasnington, oc N335
,d ce: S.e4 pass 2 " '
as -
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l ATTACHMENT A (Continued)
?
'[*. - ,,
A 27 80'0627 005
.:v.: . w..t. -,... . .m e .,
l 2 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director June 27,1980 l ,:. r ... . . . . . .
- .._ ;;.: . .a. /.~... . . . . -
cc (laciosure): AXMS, 640 CST 2-C * ' * '~
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.:: .::: :.. ... ......: :. . .. J. 1. Calboua, 1750 CST 2-C :" * '1'
- 7.i'=w' r -~ ~ :'n: v. .:r
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...y. T. Co t tle Sequoyah-hkC -
. :.m.: ,.. 2.r;.:
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. t 2: - ' . A. W. .Cr eva s s e , 401 U3b C . " ::..
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. L S. Sanger, Jr. , L11233 C-K ~ *
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2"'"::.,P : . ~. r~". - l - 2. c. c. staek, sequoy.a :: . . . .:. . .:. Ig .,,. . F.' A. s czepanski, 417 Usb.C - "
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- m. : cc (Tn~1neare)c.r::. : .. ::: 2.::..?
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_..... R. O. Barr.ett V 4 C-K M.~=,"..-
.. R. W. Cantrell. 204 GB.K (2) .
4- " ~- i .."_:'". .?.;. 3 =. . . .~.:. . . :. .". . ._:-
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. C. A. Chnoley, WlCD224 C-K 1u.7/3-" l" - ' E ."
C. A.
- Hyers..W9C135 C-K " ~ '
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.: J. L. Parris, W11C126 C.K
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L L Spratae, W11A9 C.K *..
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i"+ . HI3:CO - 7/2/80
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CC' Pm*1 n 31 re : ' * * - - - J. P. Inig:t, W12330' C.K
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..' ATTACHMENT A (Continued) s , . ' ,b)
, g.geg,m.g g.. .
. - . + : s+ : + - . . = -n - **" W-I
,.jse t SEC')0) AH NUCLL*.R Pt.wT t;MIT 1 IhTRACTION 3M/80-15 INSPECTICN TINDIS,;3 I. Introduction .
. .:.~. .: - .a'.'-" nspectica was conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory cercsission en
~ '
?$~~"".".;,[5*
*- Adil{23-25',1980, , . ..
- ~.'.'
~
. ; :G': GM- to deter:nine
'~" Seqcoyah Nuclear' Plant unit '.1, compliance '***...
e .'g.: ;. . K. .. : ... . ...:.::.
' :G. . .;'. .r:.:. . -
with.IE Bull.e. tin 79-14, "Seismic Analyses
....t....-' .
'. for As * -
'y Piping Systems.* . . -
7 ne results of this inspectica indicated to the. inspector
+-"*
that TVA's progran of verifying the proper it.stallation of piping supports; r:-' '
. r
..s had:2~n'ot been properly inp'le: ented in the syste .s inspected. ;..;;. ..: ..::. :::... L
., .i..?. :.
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i ** Q.f* .*~il- j.ll. *'.' I A Confir=.stion of Action letter was issued to TVA on April 29 by '."' u Ja:es
.-' ; .; . P. O'Reilly, .:' ' Director of of fice of Ins;ecticn at.d Enforcerent fer I ,#.1 .
-= RegicA II. ~'ne letter listed the following spe:ific require::e .ts.'
, .::=::..
l ., Detert:ine t.he cause of the proble:2 ir.1 :ple:ent.ing your piping
' ' " " -- ;; ;;.;~; ...;. :. .. :.. .:-. .7.. . . . . - -
.:T.:.=... . .. .. . .
. . ~.2.; E i "Ja!.~E; and support progra.n, - -
4.?*.h -
' M. " T::. "~"
' .f?; ;:-4'? L . ~
' -
- includir.g the ea cr.s f or the f ailure' of ' .,;....- ' . . . < .
~ ~ - '
y . your quality assurance pregra:n ,o ider.tify tha proble.. ".<.-"..'.:.-.* ^- >
- 7. .) . . . l '~;; - ..
- 2. - yl ; - :- ,
Inspe:t a representative sa ple of pipe supports on each safety- ' L related systen incide contair.mcr.: to verify prope.r installatien. L L, no percentage :. - to be inspe:ted will be based on the findings . k
, t, frc:s ,the deterninc tict.s in paragra .
i above ar.d folievir.g . ( discussiens with this c!! :e; * >,
?
3,. Salect at least one isc:.etri: dra : r.; f::.. caer. Of eig'. . I. gafety. { y related sys: ems inside : r.tain..ent ,
.r and vertly t. hat all requirc.,ents I
1 i
.. of IE Bulle tin 79-14 at e ret.
f
^i
; g 9
- e 4
9
- i 4
- 5 h
N.- 5 A-3 . 5 4 I' ' t ; s
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my M45 i n.N > Msh.%"- 6.
- ^- -
, ,. - - - - * ' " " * ~ _
wq $ " y%)GLRh . , h_h_,w_Ji%5Krmmwn _ m ' -
- , . unmiis w .
ATTACHMENT A (Continued) s . ,. . . a ': v..c **:. w.. wv.- .m.smve
- 4. Upon ce.9pletion of the atnve, ' provide us 'with your insp.ection x '
findines, schedule for completien of the ins;ection of the remainder of the safety-relatad supports outside contaistm.ent,,
~
.s' . . .. . .c.:: . . - . .
and proposed corrective actions. b7. .. d?.1.: A f elicwup lettei" to Mr. O',Reilly f rors L.L.M. Mills en May 6,1580, requested ,.g.,
..T2:i.~. ~..-E.9. ' .. .. . . .'lks . : =:
. .3i ..~.-fi#.' .:.9.:: . . . . . .
;r- -
...T. ' O'. ' . tha t 'it e m 3 h e" r evis ed 'a s f ol1ow s . ". s..f."..~..
- 3. . :.. . .. ,
. . . - - :-- = :. ' ;;. ~ . . . . .
- nu;: ... . 'f. -
. ~
9;.. Select at least one iser.ctric draging fro. each of eight safety- ;-
- 2. . - :
2.~ related systems inside contain.m.ent and verify preper insta.11alion of . .. .Y-s -
., - pipe supperts. Select at least one iscretri: ' drawing from each'of .
'.1.:f' "
. eight sbety-: elated syste.,s outside'contair. ent and verify that all . -h.-
? :-
..,,, the ..ptre.ments of IE Bulletin 79-14 arc =st.....
'I'hese eight systens u". .
r '.~ shall include the residual heat rer. oval (F.9) , auxiliary feedvater .
; .dr. .
. Q.3 . . .
. c.T.. .' '.."
- ( ATU) , safety injection (SI), and upper-head injection (CHI) sy ster s.'
{.
. , . . .w '.
- The folleving re;;rts the results of the inspection prcgram, established by
.J,m...
- ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. su:- . -- . --
'. c ..
-- r..r .: . _.: .- . :- .
?.'.A
.:..... to ce: ply:.w. ith the requirer.er.ts cf..t.he Ccnfir:ation of Action letter,. .. : a:--.
. , _ . . . . ~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. _ . ,,_ ... *. 3..;
and is intended'as the final'*respo.se to that letter. 7<*A pt pc s c s furthe r "7Ei.
- li.*
. , r"* -
t .. .. - M-! . . .. i..spect'icns t"o" be perferred, ar.d a dAa'l rce:.c..se' to II Iulletin 79-14
..- will be issuad upon completien of the su.=3cet in s pe = t ier.s .
-l:. . .
... f."
.: :- .- :: ? II. Instertie. Findines *
- .u: . "-
A. Oescri.0:ica cf Ir.specticn Tregr.w ' 4
^
A.n inspection pregias was established which exceeded the ree.uirc:,ents
,q Q . .
- specified in the' Confirnation of Action letter.
- The prograc was Inter.ded to ensure that any significar.t prcbler.s on saf ety syste.:.s 9 .
l A-4 i&m
- g. . =a- , . . -- - - , .
i
'* ? ,q ' ' ~ ' W g.y :- L%%M&%QX '
- ' ^^
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- n. 1
_. m . _._ -- M-- __ _ r=. w ' A4*WG. - -- - RWO *v.- Shi [
, , ATTACHMENT A (Continued)
. .. .~._ _ . _
l 2:. .
@ inside centair..,cnt were fcur.d a .d corrected. All sig .ifi:a..:
u physical discrepancies identified by the pretran will be corrected . before initial criticality.
' ~'~'
1 -' Maihtenance Instruction 6.17 "Instructions for the I:::pler entatic.. oi' j i:Fu: CI Sulletin 79-14," previded the origir.a1 prefra.= for inspection . 1 [ ) and review of supports and c:nfiguration. In addition, r vaih'through l j i S, .. inspection of the safety-related supports inside cer.tair.cett was i[ perfo:ted. Division of Nuclear Power (i.';0 PP.) certified inspectors ""~( . y . pe: f or.m.ed the inspectiens required by :'.I-6.17. S Civisica of' Const: : tion
'.- (CC::5-) certified inspecters and Divisicn of Envir.eerir.g < sign .
(EN OIE) engineers assisted in perfer sing verifications o.n iter.s , [ where cues-icas arose.
;- ' q.". . . - -
~. l L
?
The 1.Lpectien progra censi.ted ef that holeein9 1. Ir.specticn of S.;;perts e . ref uty-F elt.ted ystems .. side Centair.=en . 3 N -j . . - - A de t ailed inspe: tie.. 's.ir. Fe r n t .4 2r. sp, r .s ir.st e y 2: p e r t ::.- i c f t. .;: .t :. r c i : :"po r t :; .r.r.c. 1cl it.?ti- c ..t t c ..t . s sh . er. the n.;er ist.5stric? f c ^ - - -' ' -
?!-- r r e i .': ed. .:.i e
. W it.spectica i.. 1uded: )
I, ,
~
% l
.. df a.
J. All supports en one istr.atric analysis drawir9 for the
'e. !
\
s, .;
. following systersi N*1 .
4 A-5
.biPJ.
~
..e
.,l wa .;,
s m mm- . --
s .
. .. ATTACHMENT A (Continued)
, a . . . ,.
' . ~ . . - :, . : s> : n. w. . ,,.-+,. .. . ~.n e (1) Reactor coolant V
, (2) Fecidual hest reroval ,
_!l W ,, (3) Safety injection .,,., ..,,,, l4 (4) Che=tical and volune centrol
~~ '~~
. $$.)
- .d, .'
, ,.; .u -
-: (5) Auxiliary feedvater .
i,,- c;= . .. .: p, . .~, . :.:.. - ..--
,. "- t,:,:, - . - .
' ~~ '
. . ,z . - .:c.
.. .:1 .-(6) Ha1.n steam ~
- u .1T**
- -Tryz.* :.: '-
,,-.-,,,. - -- - ; .. ~
- - r - . .
y G ,
.'~
g ;' -
' .;. (7) Component cooling .
.:..- ,- :.;;g *:.. . .
. (8) Main feedvater -
..~.' .
4
- l u .... \
T. %..- ' 1 . . :.:. .... -..
.. ,,,, Also included in this portien of the i .spection were checks to 5.h,li,,-Q-
. ,-.. ; . .; 7. . ;
- see that supports that had been voided had in fact been ret oved. ;-~P' 7 ,
1 [ , [*^ '
., , ( b . On 4 additional syste:.s. at least 20 hangers fox each .
a syste= were randen.ly selected f rem the appropriate isoir.etrie 2 .- .... .
......- .. -..,7_;._,.;_
. = . . . = . .: . . : ;-.. .=: ; . .,
- M.U. * - . .:.! -
.2 . ....u- .- .. .'. r
.+- .
..-T . . . . . . .
r"
~
(1) Upper-head ir.jectica k - (2) Centain cat spray l (3) S' team generator hicwdown
, (4) E:7.argency tav cecli..; water
- c. In esses here pipir.; f rc . o..o cf .;.e sys ra s tei .S insucted passed threugh a support that also it.cluded piping other than those included la the identified isc .etrics, the g
f . entire ' gang hanger" was inspected for all syste: s af f ected. - A-6 m IS
, --m .=w -
, m .
,i d' W
i
, s' i I ATTACHMENT A (Continued)
, .. . . . - ,s , ? s e
. 4' *: . .w v *-****h' N*
d 2. Isor.etric Walkdown Inspection :sside Cor.tair.:wnt
! ~--
l In order to ensure that potential prcble supports inside - . J.$. ... 3' k, contain: ment were. discovered and corre:ted, valkdown inspecticas 9
- , _ _ . .... ... .- . .:mv. : ..
- ---.--..,,. ~-
.n: .- .... l: .-L' ..&"??5.6-
* :~ ;. L ,;.. "T]"~7,7,4f
..:.-. %jor.; isor.etries on the 12 safity-relased ayste s irtsida ' W.f.'~;[.]. "
[ .. i"',,1, 'l.~;f.. ,.- !~ contain: ment were perfor: sed.
,_ t . ,3
.--,y. hese inspections consisted of c'.f :dE i :._m -
" nspecEing the piping configuraties ar.d approxir. ate" sup; ort -
~
location against the latest revisien of the analysis isooetrie. ' 4 '- J
~
a r --
.n .
.y .
- .. .-....c. Specific , . .:
checks ' vere made .to ensure'that (1) piping and valve . .ffff,# .
~.? - - , , . . ,::2, ; ;,.;, 1 =,. I
,,' configuration was as shown, (2) supper.s were installed in the i.' M-.".
proper location and were functional, ar.d (3) to identify niss'in['. . . . . . . 1 i . or additional sup;cres. In general, d!.ransier.a1 checks were not
, ' ~hade unless a discrepancy was suspected; and then a'here det ailed t
7, ,
. . . . - . . inspection was perfor:.ed.
t . . : ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~*
.y ::. ? ..:*
g .
- y;, : :: : *.: .'***.
= *
.. ,y==.;. .,
., , , _ ..;., G.-
3 Walkdcr.n inspectic .s were e.sf e by tsL s of :TJO FR ar.d CO:S7
.;.c.
certified inspectors, sup. cort ed by D: 53 ar.alysis e..gir.e ers t and results were. reviewed by CC::ST er.gineers ar.d C' ::ES aAalysis engineers. a
; 3. Ce tailed Hanger Inspec tion C atside O..tatt. .t .t e
?
. Cutside contain. ant, the see 12 syste:s pi;: the f.el p,41 l
~
\
b1 cooling system were 1.nspected to the sand level of detail as
; v 1 those inside contair...cnt. Again, at least ene isc etr'ic was 1 selected for each syste's and all s;;;e ts shc..n s er e a.:.bj ected -
to a'datailed configuratica ins;4ctien. P, i x
< A-7 ee==.~-- -
& ? d l5 & @ &.,, w , w y $ $ $ $ N W .MWMEh5
4 *
~
, 4. Piping Configuration In:pectOns inY1YhYNIN't[ieii"6dDIib'~**" l con tair.=en t 4 ,
f.- ,
.. l. ,
ne same portions, of piping syste .s outside containtnent that 1 L
. . :- 4 received detailed hanger inspectico were inspected to the full . .
I
~
,fr : ~*
* * . ' . . ., . "- ,j
.. . ..Li~L' . .=....::--.. w =h- -- -
, . ""extent of ?r. aulletin 79-14, including pipe run"gec'e .etrys'iupport .-
. ".. i. ~
~
'aAd restraint design, locaticas, fer.ctica, and clearance ~ . ,
n
's a e r2>e d:ent s : pipe attach:nents: and valve and valve operator L -
locatica snd veights. : :..
.. ~.; , i \
9 ~~ ~*'
..- . . . : ;. :.L =.. .:.: ?:. .. .
^ *' ;. , ".* :[ . ... .- .iU.
B. , Description of Review of Data Cbtained - - - l 1 Each. 1.ndividual data package, including r.arked up copies of drawp.gs l 4 showing the condition as found by inspectors, was reviewed in detail
.1 . ,i.: .-.. . .. , . ... . J i ..
.i
"/ . ..
. "n ,;, by a s erie s of engineers. An initial screening was done by a site . * i
- d.- ; ~;.:: . : =. : :. u . ..::.
-- .: =
j
~
engineer to ensure that approp:iate data was properly recorded and -- l
~. -
. any cbvicus discrepancies were flagged. All data' packages were then .
d
, given to a team of design engineers, onsite specifically for this t.
review. te design engineers analyzed as necessary to deter.dne whether the support was acceptable. Prchlens that could r.ct be handled casite were sent to I.N OEI in Y Crville f'ar further c' vale.. tion. Probicn hangers were evalu.sted in light ci Te:hnical Specif t:atie..s
, j and appropriate action state.unts were invoked where applicable.
. . l
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1 Y .
. . . . A-8 I
~- xl.
l
. g g. ~ 'w . ' # ' "
e j .___2 &M K., g- __ w e _ =cra r e w h r. m .ra 7 .
'
- ATTACHMENT A (Continued) ,
l
.. . /+ ,>.x-n.y .v. . ~ ~~~m or's r
An additional review was perforsed on all data packages for the detail hanger ins;iection inside centain=.e..t. A teao of engineers, IEE:'
~. -' ' ene each f ree DI D' ES, CCrtST, and I?JC PR, reviewed in carefu.1 detail *
- 1
~~
, ...r.. ... . . .
all discrepancies to detemine th.e spoeific type of prcblem and the . . .~~~-i:E-- .
.u.....-- -
-- . . , . . . . . .". --- t c caus.e for,that prcblem. .
~-h .*: .03..;..
- o. .*, , .:. ;
.. 'i! .. ne inforsation obtalned frets this re.viev ,, 1;3.:;. ".- <
m ' ?':. --- -
. . ~ ... ..n . s.. .- -
7,. ; .. ;- ;;-. - . . . s . ~./ . . : 4 f ,, ..\.. ',' was used to detsrnine what further checks, if any, vere required to . . . . / ,.
. -~
- - = - 1
, a i+ :...
'.;.S . . .....;
ensure' all potential problerr.s could be identified and correctbd. ".*_ 'd . ' This provided the basis for performing the additional walkdowns . . ;.. p inside contain=.ent using 1:sr ctric analys'8 -s drawings and is also the - ".. g.- ;. 1 '~ s
--; ~ :-
.~ . [ . . *. .
- .J
. hasis for deter:sining further inspectier. require:nents.
;; ; ~. '
~
. ,n ;c/f 3 n.r
+.4 yW *. .
Criteria 6 sed for determining thc acceptaM11ty of a deficiency were
'.e - ~~ .
extre.aly conservative. . 1 9 Ir. general, discrep ancies were analyzed ca o
, f. . .
an individual basis within the bounds of existing analysis.
~
.-:*i . ... ..r.;--.-.- A total e.'
5 , .. ~ '
~-;. }. :
, reanalysis of the entire iser.etYic pretien was net deoe to deter .ine i
acceptability, n erefore,
~
?
as-fcur ! cendi ict.s that' r.ight be slightly
.7 out of toicrance were freque .tly determir.ed te be unt.:ceptable, even '.
though a esore detalied analysis ef the apparent discrepar.eies may l ~ { r T. snow r.any discrepanciec to be inconset.;uential. ' P 2.s C. Discussion of pit. dings - > P he results of the inspectiot. pregra:n descri':ed revealed t'.at the . 9 Cuolity As surance Progra:s is essentially sou.d.
- Cis:repancie s fou .d e were randenly distributed through several phases cf t.'.e design ,
cCastractiCA, and operatics prC<6ss, hr.d did not f all into any oht I p l%Y 1
. - ^~9 L..M.m
.g * '
Y a.
' ATTACHMENT A (Continued) l . . . . . ,~...,>.~w.r~-~*~**'**^*"'
category to a degree necessary to be ' identified as a trend or to Iq indicate a breakdown in the progra:s. The' progran as it presently 9 ..... .
. . . . . exists
. :. :.has
. . ... evolved over the past six years, and controls were not :
m .- ." e 1 always as for=al as they are now.
.. .: . . h: .
- The inspection program being
; [.'^@::. :.>= .' . :... .
N.': .:: '.h h. F.-H :*-:d' performed was designed to uncovercted :thetotypes.' of pro
.~J'_. .'l a.: '. .d.;.' .~t: .
1.'..: -
. . ;* ., ~;; . . . .E !..
e...*.. . 9,. :;. r e s ult f rca the evolu tion ary p roce s s
+='*' . .. -
W $.Q '.
~. , and examination of' inspection -; -.
I
- . -."e-
. .; .. .~~ findings .w-has verified that those types of 3roblems are bein,g found .. . . .
; ^-
1 j .
. x ,.
' , =
S.., .
..: :::.. . u ..Areas whera .:: : . - -.. problems were identified on Sequoyah unit 1 c 1 be su 1
G =-
......r. .g a
- e.arized )
~ . - * . .'
a need..for8
": . 1.. =r
, 1.
f x - I=provement of ccecunicaticos between the design engineer and
-- j ; . . ;;
.W s . . . . .
- .- . . constructor with regard to acceptance criteria, especiAlly as
(
- h. ..;.,. '...... _ _ . .
related to clearances. g . . 4,. t
.r .. .2:2.:
.w..- -- -
,(... . . . . .-~.2.
- =;
. Increased fornalitation of design. interface controls, especially- . .
- y. .. . *-9.=
T* - -~"
~. with regard to the link, between field r.:.difications and subsequen " " '
reanalysis. _
- 3. ,
Txpanding the inspection presras to cover overall system
'l
? .. configuration, as well as the ,
e I full details of discrete pieces,
? ,
a s is pre sently done. {' h E3 / e
' A d, . .
T*.'A is confident that the 1.spc: len crqr*:m specified her3in }' ' [ J is k
)v I
fully adequate to ensure overall syste:n performance will4 rot h . l 5 degraded. 1 e
'a
) The conservatius use-d in design, cce.bined with the for-:.41 t 3
l -0 ,1 centrols used in constr*.:cticn and cperatien, are sufficient to p V4, s
', revent i even randers f ailures of 1.ndividual ecepenents frcra degradirg . .,
a e ve } l systern perfor ance under worso case conditions.
- }
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2*iT _n-- nu f ATTACllMENT A (Continued)
-.- . **, ? se .g +** . . o - v .- . ~
4,-, awa.sw.4.
. FA 111. Schedule for Completion of Insocetien and corrective Action
, ,T/A believes the inspection and analyses perforud so f ar are sufficient - -
~
o . to demonstrate that the piping and piping support systens on Sequoyah
$ *.i .. . .. .. . :.... .. . . . .
. . :. . . . . .: : .~ .
'7. ,
...),'.E "unit 1 are fundar.entA11y sound, and that lovlp ever operation of the unit
- 5, s . ..:.
. ' would be unaffected by even the rsost severe discrepancies that could be . ' ,
,','~
, found. ,
Y $: h f- 8 . T/A believes that additional inspections are necessary to provide further
^ :5 : - , .: -
. .. - ~ a. . -"'-
' .*l. ,
- p-assurance that the plant can be operated safely at full power... The inspection *'
.p. . .
pregrain will consist of t.he following. y . . .
.,,.~ , A. Perforn iscsotric valWn inspections associated with the remainin-9 ... safety-related systens inside contain:w.nt. I
$. .' . 5.'1- . . ..: .', . h?. ' :.REI. :.%: -
g.. . . < .
.g - 1 7.. . _
.z~~" :.. . . .. - : .:= -
Y .. B. 1 4:.! . .: Perform -rn isecetric' valkdevn inspections associated with the safety
,_, sys te:r.s outside contair. ment.
t C.
.:.n . -
Inspect three supports on each side of rotsti .g eqviptant for prcper . clearanee.
, D. Perform a valkdown inspection cf cupports en pipi..g :-1/; 1,,-3,5 or larger that were, analy:ed with the alternate criteria rethod on the TJCd, cccpenent cooling, vaste dispcsal, CYCS, fuel pool cooling, and' fire protection systems in clas s I structures. Systers not j !
included are ice condenser glycol, auxiliary toiler, pr!r.ary vater, ,b,Nj and roof drais, systems, since they perfors no :afety function, Q : v d se j_: . . i A-11 s.: .
~
, 3 '- -
[ l ATTACHMENT A (Continued) . l
, .: -y :. r. .. .s. e .- .. . -n ow d .
. E. Perfor:n valve and rsaterial verifications en the eight isometrics l
? h inspected outside containment.
... . _ _r-.
L '.. F. . Perform valve and material 1.nput infor;ution verifications on
.i: :. ..
~ ,
-. m-
- i ,f' ., ' rigorously analyzed systans on a sample basis to consist of three
$.t ' .
Galves "for each isocetric~and material verification at three welds 5or
,' each isometric. i 2 '
s ;, . ?.5 .. ' f.:.;-,. C. Formal procedures will be written to ensure that discrepancies found m , [*
} are appropriately reviewed and technical speAification' action statemenes.~
, invoked, if appropriate, within 48 hours from ~th'e time the design \
l
.r engineer performing the reviev !s notified of the discrepancy. 'his y ',' ,
, a, . .
is in accord.cce with It Bulletin 79-14. ~ ' i . . . -
-l .- - -
e 4 + ll. .. : . s. .
-- = -
.7. -. , of the inspections specified, til but ites D will be ec=plet .d bef ore j ,, 30 effective full-power days fuel burnup on unit 1. Ites D vill be
. co.:rlaced before restart f rom the first refueling'autete. This'is justified based on the inherent conservatisu of tne siternate'eriteria
.,.. nethod. ':hirty effective f ull po.er days is a power history
- at which a N
very Icv fissica product inventcry is acc.: ulated, and decay heat levels l present in the core vill be lev. l
~
J -
!.Qi ~'
a
- 1 All discrepancies that have a definite potential for causing a loss of
- l
\
pressure boundary during a seismic eve 5: and those inaccessible sup;cres ' f .. classified as having a minimum potential for causing a loss of pressure boundary vill be repsued before in'itial criticality. ' , .w - 1 t' A-12 b "
%&BR @E @ M BEM Bbu m eem atm
1 t
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\
Q * *. . , ,= - : n :v g e. w.. n -v. w . a m e L f 9 TVA believes that the program described above is fully adequate to
. : ~yi p l' ensure safe operation of Sequoyah unit 1. , ,
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e 44
1 ATTACHMENT B UNIT ONE RIGOROUSLY ANALYZED PIPING PROBLEMS Problem No. Waste Disposal System N2-77-01 A N2-77-01R N2-77-02 A ' N2-77-02R , Control Air System N2-32-01 A N2-32-01 R N2-32-02 A 1 N2-32-02 R N2-32-03 A N2-32-03R Reactor Coolant Auxiliary (Misc. Piqing} N2-13-05 R, 06 R Rea-tor Coolant System N2-68-01 A N2-68-03R N2-68-10,12,13,14 R N2-68-11R N2-68-9R N2-68-17 R N2-68-18R N2-68-19 R : 0600104-13-01 j 0600104-13-02 1 0600104-13-03 1 0600104-13-04 0600104-13-05 0600104-13-06 0600104-13-07 0600104-13-09 0600104-13-10 0600104-13-11 0600104-13-12 , 1 D-1 l
~
l 1 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988
ATTACHMENT B (cont'd) UNIT ONE RIGOROUSLY ANALYZED PIPING PROBLEMS Main Steam System N2-01-01 A N2-01-02 A N2-01-03 A N2-01-04 A N2-01-7R ' N2-01-09A N2-01-10 A - - N2-01-11 A ' N2-01-12 A 0600104-06-01 0600104-06-02 0600104-06-03 0600104-06-04 Main & Auxiliary Feedwater System N2-03-3 A,-4 A,-5 A N2-03-06 A,-7 A N2-03-14A N2-03-15 A 0600104-05-01 0600104-05-02 0600104-02-01 . 0600104-02-02 0600104-02-03 0600104-02-04 - Air Conditioning (Cooling / Heating) System N 2-31-01 A N2-31-01 R N 2-31-02 A N2-31-02R N2-31-03 A N2-31-03R N2-31-04 A N2-31-04 R . B-2 87-085-SQNil August 1,1988
ATTACHMENT B (cont'd) UNIT ONE RIGOROUSLY ANALYZED PIPING PROBLEMS Spent Fuel Pit Cooling System N2-78-01R N2-78-02R N2-78-05A N2-78-06 A Service Air System N2-33-01 A N2-33-01R N2-33-02 A Condensate Demineralizer System N2-14-01R N2-14-02 R Samoling & Water Quality System N2-43-01 A N2-43-02A Residual Heat Removal System N2-74-1 A,-2A,-3 A,-0 4 A' N2-74-04R 0600104-03-01 . Station Drainage System
' ,1 N2-40-O s A N2-40-01R N2-40-02A ,
l l 6 B-3 l l l l 37-085-SQNii ugust 1,1988
{ ATTACHMENT B (cont'd) UNIT ONE RIGOROUSLY ANALYZED PIPING PROBLEMS Safety Infection System N2-63-01 A-Oi A N2-63-03 A-04 A N2-63-05A N2-63-06A N2-63-07 R,-08 R N2-63,72,74-1 A,-2 A 0600104-09-01 0G00104-09-02 ~ 0600104-09-03 0600104-09-04 0600104-09-05 0600104-09-06 0600104-09-07 - 0600104-09-08 0600104-09-09 0600104-09-10 0600104-09-11 Chemical & Volume Control System N2-62-01 A,-02 A N2-62-1 R,-2 R,-3 R,-4 R N2-62-03 A,-04 A,-05 A N2-62-0 6 A,-07 A,-08 A , N2-62-09R N2-62-15 A N2-62-22A - N2-62-23 A
- N2-62-25A 0600104-08-01 0600104-08-02 0600104-08-04 l 0600104-08-05 ,
l 0600104-08-06 0600104-08-08 0600104-08-09 1 0600104-08-15 ^ l 0600104-08-16 ' 1 0600104-08-10 ' 0600104-08-11 0600104-08-12 0600104-08-03 0600104-08-07 0600104-08-13 ~ l 0600104-08-14 0600104-08-17 - 0600104-08-18 ' l B-4 87-085 SQNil Amy2st1,1988 l
,y-..,-ww-.- - -- ,
7
l ATTACHMENT B (cont'd) l 1 UNIT ONE RIGOROUSLY ANALYZED PIPING PRODLEMS Containr.nent Soray System N2-72-01 A,-02 A N2-72-03A N2-72-04A N2-72-05 A 0600104-01-0'. ' 0600104-01-02 0600104-01-03 - 0600104-01-04 Blowdown System
~
0600104-07-01 0600104-07-02 0600104-07-03 0600104-07-05 0600104-07-04 Demineralized Water and Cask Decontamination System N2-59-1 A N2-59-1R J B-6 ,
. \
87-085-SQNil August 1,1988 !
I ATTACHMENT B (cont'd) UNIT ONE RIGOROUSLY ANALYZED PIPING PROBLEMS Ice Condenser Containment System N2-64-01 A , N2-64-03R l N2-64-02R Incore Monitoring System , 0600104-10-01 - l 0600104-10-02 - l 0600104-10-03 l l High Pressure Fire Protection System l N2-26-01,02 N2-26-01 R N2-26-05A N2-26-06 A N2-26-07 A N2-26-11 A Component Cooling Water System 0600104-04-06 0600104-04-07 0600104-04-09 Upper Head inicetion System 0600104-15-01 0600104-15-02 0600104-15 0600104-15-04 0600104-15-05 Upper Head inlection System N2-87-01 A Radiation Monitoring System
. N2-90-3 A N2-90-05A N2-90-05R B-5 87-085-SQNil Aug5t 1,1988
~
. l ATTACHMENT C SQN UNIT 1 RIGOROUSLY ANALYZED PIPING PROGRAM IEB 79-14 ATTRIBUTES VERIFIED BY SMI-0-317-69 IEB 79-14 Attribute Verified by
-' A. Piping Configuration -
- 1. Piping geometry check ,
A L Interferences with other components A
- 3. Other equipment supported off the pipe A
- 4. Additional mass such as flanges, strainers, A etc.
- 5. Insulation type and thickness A
- 6. Pipe attachments -
A -- - B. Pipe Properties
- 1. Pipe size A
- 2. Pipe material V C. Valves
- 1. Valve type A
- 2. Location A
- 3. Extended operator orientation A
- 4. Weight design verified E. Additional or missing valves A D. Supports Functional Evaluation
- 1. Location A
- 2. Restraint directio. A
- 3. Type / Function (spring, snubber, rod, A structural frame)
- 4. Clearance between pipe and structural. A frame type support E. Support Structural Evaluation
- 1. Configuration A
- 2. Missing members A ,
- 3. Missing welds A -
- 4. Missing anchor bolts A
- 5. Damaged supports A
- 6. Additional or missing supports A F. Embedment A*
G. Floor and Wall Penetration
- 1. Fixed or free at penetration A
- 2. Clearance if free A A = actural measurement '
V = visual to determine if carbon steel, stainless steel or aluminum A* = confirmed anchor bolt location, diameter and type l l l 1 I 1 C-1 87-085-SQNil , August 1,1988
= _ _ _-
. l ATTACHMENT D i
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLAMT COMMON AREA RIGOROUSLY ANALYZED PIPING PROBLEM LIST Problem No. Problem No. Auxiliary Feedwater Essential Raw Cooling Water (cont'd) N2-03-01 A,02 A N 2-67-18 R N2-03-13 A ' N2-67-19 R N2-67-22R Auxiliary Boller N2-67-23 R - N2-67-24 R - N2-12-01 A N2-67-25R N2-12-06 A Component Cooling High Pressure Fl.e Protection N2-70-26 A N2-26-01 A,02 A,03 A,04 A N 2-70-44 A N2-70-45 A Chemical & Volume Control N2-70-14A thru 25A 0600104-04-01 N2-62-17A 0600104-04-02 0600104-04-03 Essential Raw Cooling Water 0600104-04-04 0600104-04-05
- N2-67-01R 0600104-04-08 N2-67-02R 0600104-04-10 N2-67-03Al 0600104-04-11 N2-67-03A3 N2-67-03R Standby Diesel Generator .
N2-67-04 A N2-67-04R N2-82-01 A N2-67-05R N2-82-02 A N2-67-06R N2-82-03A N2-67-07 R N2-67-08R l N2-67-09A l N2-67-10 A N2-67-11 A ' N2-67-12 A N2-67-13 A ' N2-67-14 A - N2-67-15 A N 2 16 A N2-67-16 R N2-67-17R l D-1 l 87-085-SQNil . August 1,1988
b ATTACHMENT E SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT IEB 79-14 ATTRIBUTES VERIFIED FOR COMMON AREA RIGOROUSLY ANALYZED PIPING (PIPING) Attribute Program
~
6.17 6.17 A Piping geometry
- a. Routing DI V/M
- b. Interferences Potential DI DI -
Interference
- c. Piping attachments DI V/M
- d. Piping material IJ! NI
- e. Pipe wall thickness DI LDI
- f. Insulation PV PV Valves
- a. Location DI V/M
- b. Operator / orientation DR V/M
- c. Weight DR LDI Definitions: LDI - Detailed inspection - limited to three locations V/M - Visual / measurement if in doubt PV - Provisions verification by review of as-built drawings not inspected NI - Not inspected DR - Design review DI - Detailed inspection l
E-1 87-085-SQNil . August 1,1988
e
~.
ATTACHMENT E (Centinued) SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT IEB 79-14 ATTRIBUTES VERIFIED FOR COMMON AREA RIGOROUSLY ANALYZED PIPING (SUPPORTS) Functional
- Verification Summary Attribute SMI-I CEB-DI of MI 6.17 (1) MI 6.17AGl 317-24 21.83 Inspections Supports Functional Evaluation .
- 1. Location X X(3) X -
X
- 2. Restraint direction X X X X' X
- 3. Type / Function (spring, snubber, rod, structural frame) X X X X X
, 4. Clearance between pipe and i structural frame type support X X(4) X X X Support Structural E'v aluation
- 1. Configuration X X X X X
- 2. Missing members X X X X X
- 3. Missing welds X X X X X
- 4. Missing anchor bolts X X X X X
- 5. Damaged supports X X X X X
- 6. Additional or missing supports X X -
X X Embedment X X X X X Floor and Wall Penetration
- 1. Fixed or free at penetration X X - -
X
- 2. Clearance if free X X - -
X i NOTES: (1) Limited Sample (8 Isos)/ Detailed Inspection , (2) Significant Sample / Limited Inspection (3) Visual
- (4) Limited To Three Locations t
E
- h ATTACHMENT F LISTING OF INACCESSIBLE SUPPORTS Support Number Support Number Support Number 1-CVCH-802 1-CCH-135 47A050-2-40A 1-CVCH-803 1-CCH-141 47A050-2-40B 1-CVCH-804 1-CCH-319 A 47A050-2-40C 1-CVCH-321 1-C Cil-79 47A050-2-40D 1-CVCH-330 1-CCH-85 47A450-5-1 1-CVCH-801 1-CCII-129 47 A454-1-32 1-CVCH-805 1-CCH-825 A- 47A454-1-33 -
1-CVCH-806 1-CCH-833 47A454-3-16 . 1-CVCH-807 1-CCH-868 47A454-1-8 1-CVCH-808 1-CCH-869 47A454-1-9 1-CVCH-809 1-CCH-874 47A454-1-11 1-CVCH-810 1-CCH-876 47A464-4-102 1-CVCH-826 1-CCH-883 47A491-1-1 48N1704 1-CCH-890 47A491-1-5 48N1704 1-CCH-891 47 A49.1 6 1-UIIIH-153 1-SGBH-261 47A491-1-7 48N1704 1-SGBH-263 47 A491-6-26 A 48N1"04 1-SGBH-276 47 A491-6-26B 1-CVCH-610 1-SGBH-283 47A491-7-10 1-CVCH-442 1-RCH-158 47A491-8-78 1-CVCH-504 1-ERCWH-24 47 A491-9-15 1-BlH-415 1-ERCWH-180 47 A491-34-1 1-BIH-425 ' 1-ERCWH-199 47 A491-34-14 1-CVCH-435 1-ERCWH-202 47 A555-12-10 47A033-456 1-ERCWH-351 47 AS SS-12-11 47A053-514 1-ERCWH-354 47A555-12-12 . 47 A431-34-1 1-FPCH-493 47A555-12-13 47A431-13-30 1-FPCH-494 47A555-12-22 47A431-13-31 1-PPCII-495 47 A555-12-24 47A431-13-32 1-FPCII-511 47A555-12-25 47 A431-13-34 1-FPCH-516 47 A555-18-1 47 A431-13-3 5 1CCH-760 47 A555-18-2 47 A431-13-36 1-CCil-762 47A555-18 47 A431-13-37 1-CCH-809 47A555-18-7
' 47A431-13-38 1-CCH-809A 47 AS G 5-18-8 47A431-13-39 1-CCH-1117 47 A560-3-21 47A431-13-40 1-CCH-1129 47A560-3-22 47 A431-13-41 1-CVCH-551 47 A560-3-25 1-CVCH-409' 1-CVCH-572 2-CVCH-504 1-CVCH-427 2-CVCH-447 47 A56 C-3-13 1-CVCH-606 2-CVCH-485 47A560-3-14 1-CVCH-607 2-CVCH-469 47A560-4-26 1-CVCil-608 2-CVCH-471 1-CVCH-588 -
2-CVCH-503 e d 6 _,. - - ._.}}