ML20210T157

Summary of 751002 Meeting W/Util,Ebasco & C-E in Bethesda,Md Re Outstanding Items in NRC Review of CP Application.List of Attendees Encl

ML20210T157
Person / Time
Site:	Satsop
Issue date:	11/07/1975
From:	Oreilly P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-WNP-1668 NUDOCS 8605290769
Download: ML20210T157 (8)

Text

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3 liOV 7 M DOC 1'J:T, HOS. STN 50-50C and STN 50-509 APPLICAhT WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYST124 (WPPSS)

FACILITY: WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECTS NO. 3 AND NO. 5

SUMMARY

OF OCTOBER 2,1975 MEETING REGARDING OUTSTANDING REVIEW MATTERS on October 2,1975, representatives of WPPSS. Ebasco, and Combustion Engineering met with the NRC staff in Bethesda, Maryland. The purpose of the meeting was to discuso outstanding items in the staff's review of the LTPSS Nuclear Projects No. 3 and No. 5 construction permit application. A list of attendees is attached.

The following outstanding items identified in the draf t Safety Evalu-ation Report were discussed.

1. Electrical Itons A. Balance-of- Plant Scope (1) Auxiliary Fe.xiwater System - Compatibility of Figures 7.4-2 ard 10.4-7 in the PSAR.

Figures 7.4-2 shows the auxiliary feedwater systen logic.

Figure 10.4-2 does not facilitate following the functional operation of the system. WPPSS stated that the incon-oistency would be clarified in the next amendment.

(2) IEET Standard 323-1974--Conformance to the aging and/or on c iing qualification requirements.

We informed LTPSS that the information submitted in the latest P3AR amendments was still under review. To date no problems have been identified.

(3) Possible exceptions to Regulatory Guide 1.47 -

WPPSS agreed to revise the PSAR to clarify their intent regarding Regulatory Guide 1.47.

(4) Periodic response time testing - PSAR does not include programs for periodic testing of protection system response times.

We informed WPPSS that the information submitted in the

'most recent amendments was still under review. No, problems 66 =vs smru Ausu6A .Auu Lv uaLC.

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i NCV 7 1975 (5) Battery installation - two batteries per room (Category I) with a barrier between the batteries.

We informed kTPSS that the information supplied in the s>ost recent amendments clarifying that there are indeed separate rooms for each battery has resolved this matter.

II. CESSAR Interfaces B. Electrical Items (1) Flow to the core attained within a maximum of 30 seconds after loss of offsite power.

LTPSS claimed that the proposed design meets the interface requirement. Uc requested that WPPSS confirm this conformance.

(2) ECCS flow re-established in 13 seconds and auxiliary feodwater flov established within 15 seconds following a loss-of-off site power af ter a loss-of-coolant accident.

UPPSS stated that the PSAR will be revised to provide the necessary clarification.

(3) Regulation of the voltage on the plant vital instrument buses shall be within i 1%.

UPPSS stated that the PSAR will be revised to provide the necessary clarification.

(4) Throttling of flow during the recirculation mode to match the available NPS!!.

We inforned WPPSS that the most recent amendments revised this nsterial in an acceptable manner.

(5) An energency generator shall be used to supply power to certain equipment following failure of the normal power supply.

Ve informed WPPSS that the recently-supplied list iden-tified those portions of the QVCS to be connected to the dnsite diesel generators was acceptable.

(6) !!o main stean isolation signal will be provided to close the turbine stop valvec for a raain steam line break accident.

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, We informed WPPSS thst our requirements in this regard l were being revised, and we would notify them about the

! spproach to be used within a few weeks.

l l (7) The main steam isolation valves shall be fail-close

valves. In the event of loss of ponr to the valve l controllers or a loss in air supply to the valves (if l air operated) the main steem isolation valves shall automatically close.

! Combustion Engineering stated that CESSAR Amendment No.

l 38 deleted this interface requirement.

i l (8) Requireme..e that the consequences of a steam line break together with a failure of an stemspheric dump valve be demonstrated to be acceptable by either analysis or suit-l able equipment modifications.

WPPSS stated that additional information would be provided in the PSAR regarding this matter.

(9) No main steam isolation signal will be provided for the main steam isolation valve bypass valves since they will normally be de-energized.

WPPSS stated that additional information concerninS this matter will be provided in the PSAR.

(10) Verification that valves of one train will not be powered from the same load center within that train to prevent a single failure from causing possible radiological conse-quences in excess of the dose guideline values in 10 CFR Part 100.

We 'provided clarification about this matter. WPPSS stated that our concern would be taken into consideration and a response provided at a later dats.

III. Reactor Systmas Itmas - Balance-of-Plant (1) Overpressure Protection Design - We informed WFPSS that the information provided in A==ad===t No. 23 is acceptable at the " construction permit stage of review.

(2) NPSIl Requirements for Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps -

We informed WPPSS that the response provided in Amendment P , 22 :s n :14.2 1. -e.r L1=. %= = i = L =d i I -i -= 10 o==> . . _

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h3'l 1 ~r require an evaluation for the LPSI pumps like that provided in Section 6.3.2.14 of the PSAR for the other pumps taking suction from the sump. CE informed es that Ameude.ent 39 of the CESSAR rasnoved the requiremest for use of the LPSI pumpe in the recirculation mode.

I (3) Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.79 - Wa inforned WPPSS that the exception taken concerning the pre-operational testing of the LPSI pumps taking sycSion from the contain-ment sump was not acceptable. WPFS3 replied that the CESSAR no longer requires use of the LPSI pumps during  :

the recirculation mode. It was also pointed out that Regulatory Guide 1.79 does not addresa use cf the high pressure safety injection pumps to take suction froo the '

sump. We stated that we would take this natter under ,

consideration.

(4) Steam Line Break Analysis - We informed hTPSS th:it any ,

valves in the main steam and feedwater systews that vill remain open to contribute to blowdown of the intact occam generator assuming a stem line break coinc$ dent with a e single failure must be identified. The existing steam line breal, analysis must be justified or a new analysis including maximum blowodm conditions provided.

IV. Compliance with CESSAR Interface Requiresnents (1) Shutdown Cooliac Requirements - We informed WPPSS that it is not apparent that the reduced flow rate proposed for i the shutdown cooling heat c.chcr. Arn vill prsvide the ,nr-formance capability of the system as presen:.ad in the CESSAR. WPPSS should either meet the CESSAR interfrice requirassents or demonstrate that all of the perforrmspce requiremients for the shutdown cooling system are satisfied with reduced flow capability. This mesna that the system should cool the primary systass from 3500 F to 2123F in about 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> assuming a single failure. WPPSS replied l that this matter is surrently seder discussion with CE.

(2) Post-LOCA Cooling Requiresents - We informed hTPSS that we will require a creakdown of the shutdown cooling heat exchanger duty requirements under post LOCA conditions with comparisons to CESSAR to arplain and justify the '

reduced cooling water flow requirements.

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NOV 7 1975 (3) Ramaoval of Power from Atmospheric Dump Valves - We informed UPPSS that the proposal to reunove power to these valves to ,

preclude a spurious failure is currently under review.

(4) Rsmoval of Power from Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Valves - We informed WPPSS that this proposal is currently under review.

(5) Protection of Safety Injection Tanks from Pipe Whip - We stated that we would require identification of those potential pipe ruptures for which the safety injection tan 1vi vill not be afforded protection from consequential effecto. Ebasco informed us that the SI tanka would not be protected from the effects of a main steam line break since the SI tanks are not required to nitigate the consequences of this accident.

V. Site-Related Items A. Elope Stability .

(1) Itm 323.16 in the staff's request for additional information war discussed.

Woodward-Clyde stated that the response to this question would discuss I the conditions asuciated with profiles 4 thru 7, and would show ths.t i the conditions conducivo to landslide formation are not present.

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Voadvard-Clyde stated that, in the case of profile 4, (1) the absence of contimous sihstone beds, (2) the absence of undercutting in the direction of thee olope aM (3) the fact that the badding angle dips

! hack into tt: slope 6.reculde slide formation. We questioned reason

! (1), stating that the absence of continuous siltstone beds is not a l Very strong argumsnt against slide formation.

l Wadward-Clyde stated that, with regard to profile 5, (1) there is an absence of continuous siltstone beds, (2) it is horizontally bedded,

• sM (3) only weathering is present. Therefore, Woodward-Clyde has con-l cluded that slide formation on profile 5 in precluded. We comumented

that there are problees with the identification of residual soile l Versus rock etrata in the PSAR.

l In a discussion of profile 7, the profile of most concern from a l safety standpoint, Woodward-Clyde stated that, because of the absence l of utalercutting and the lack of siltatone beds, slide formation in precluded along profile 7.

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NOV y g5 WPPSS informed us that the PSAR rarportse to itsu 323.16 will upe the above reasoning to show that a beddies plana failure along slopes 4, 5 or 7 is precludet.

Itsus 323.17 was then discussed. Ebsaro stated that several alternatives reopenses to this question had been considered.

The first method consisted of drilling in each slide and testing the raeidual soil Ehssco identified the followieg probless with this method of determining, soil strengths' (1) If undisturbeJ soil in tested - questionable if data are applicable since this soil did not fail.

(2) If disturbed soil is tested - will obtain remolded shear strength, not shear strargth at the time the slope failed.

For these reasons, the shear strengths thus obtained may not be represent-stive of shear strengths of the soils at the site.

In the second raethod, 'from the geometry of the slide, a back calculation would be perforned of residual soil properties at the time that the slide occurred. From this information, the cause of the slide would then be eatinated. Ebasco expressed concern about the reliability of this nethod.

L*e replied that we were concerned about the reliability of the first niet hod. Of the two methods, we expressed our preference for the second, ackrowledging that conservative assumptions based on sound principles must be made.

(1) Assume static failure caused slide - can't demonstrate slids was caused by a seismic event.

('2) It must be recognised that this method yields relatively low shear strengths.

,Ubasco supunarimod the possible courses of action that could be taken relative to the staff's concerns about slope stability.

(1) Remove all residual soil.

(2) Assume the presentation given at this meeting is acceptable to the staff, open up the slopes in question, and use state-Cf CI.. ii icuhuhus a iv yvaluais ihris Ia11uzu puimaa61m1, opress > ,,,,,,,, ,,,,,_ - - , -

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NOV 7 10. 7 5 (3) Evaluate the progressive slide mechanism (creeping slopes).

(4) Use residual strength properties of the soil at the site to d monstrate that no slide could come down rapidly into the site area.

(5) Use an enticaly new approach in conjunction with observational techniques.

After a brief discussion of ites (5)e Ebasco indicated that this would be the approach used to address the staff's concerns. Details of this method will be presented at a future meeting.

Original Signed by Patrick D. O'Reilfy Patrich D. O'Reilly Light Water Reactors Project Eranch 1-3 Division if Reactor Licensing Enclosere:

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. NOV 7 M ATTDDANCE LIST ITETING WITH WP-3 & WPN-5_

OCTOBER 2. 1975 WFFSS D. B. Whitford C. C. Sorensen ERASCO P. J. Hannaway H. Oslick A. Wern W. D. Rosak J. H. Barnes J. L. Ehass R. T. Vickers COMBUSTION _ ENGINEERING C. Brinkman WOODWARD-CLYDE A. Patwardhan l

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! D. L. Tibbitta P. D. O'Reilly

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