ML20215G142

Insp Repts 50-440/87-10 & 50-441/87-02 on 870512-14.No Violations,Deficiencies or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise Involving Observations of Key Functions & Locations During Exercise

ML20215G142
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	06/02/1987
From:	Foster J, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215G124	List: ML20215G123 ML20215G142
References
50-440-87-10, 50-441-87-02, 50-441-87-2, NUDOCS 8706230137
Download: ML20215G142 (20)

See also: IR 05000440/1987010

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No.- 50-440/87010(DRSS); 50-441/87002(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 Licenses No. NPF-45; CPPR-149

Licensee: Cleveland Electric Illuminating

Company

Post Office Box 5000

Cleveland, OH 44101

Facility Name: Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

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Inspection At: Perry Site, Perry, OH

Inspection Conducted: May 12-14, 1987

Inspector: J. Fo F N 6/2/37 t

Team Leader Date

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Approved By: W. Sn' ell, hief 6/L/37

Emergency Preparedness Date

Section

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Inspection Summary

Inspection on May 12-14, 1987 (Reports No. 50-440/87010(DRSS);

No. 50-441/87002(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Perry Power Plant

emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by four NRC

representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise. The

inspection was conducted by two NRC inspectors and two consultants.

Results: No violations deficiencies or deviations were identified.

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8706230137 870603

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DETAILS

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'1. Personnel Contacted-

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• J. Foster,-Control Room (simulator), Technical Support Center (TSC),

Operations Support Center (OSC), Emergency Operations Facility

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• E. Hickey, Emergency 0perations' Facility (E0F)

• T. Col'aurn, Control Room (simulator), Operations Support Center (OSC),

Medical / Fire Scenario-

• J. Will, Control Room.(simulator),

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company

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• D. Hulbert,-Supervisor, Emergency Planning Unit-

• T.' Corbett, Emergency. Plan Responsible Instructor

• S. Reilly, Specialist, Nutech

• S. Danielson, Specialist, Nutech

• D Rossetti, ALARA Coordinator

• P. Moskowitz, Supervisor, Health Physics

• W. Burkhart, Supervisor, Radwaste

• R. Tadych, GS, Perry Training

• W. Coleman, GSE, Community Relations

• K..Novak, Supervisor, Site Protection

• F. Stead, Manager, NED

• J. Braun, Offsite Radiation Advisor

• A. Slezak, Security Coordinator

• G. Gerber, Administrative Assistant

• R.-Stratman, Operations Advisor

• R. Newkirk, Plant Technical Engineer

• F. Witaker, Radiation Protection Coordinator

J. Grim, Radiation Protection Assistant

G. Van Weg, Radiation Protection Assistant

T. Boyer, Plant Operations Advisor

J. Webb, Environmental Liaison

V. Higaki, Information Liaison

J. Goecker, OSC Coordinator

D. Cobb, Shift Supervisor

J. Hanley, Unit Supervisor

B. Triplett, Supervising Operator

T. Terbizan, Control Room Communicator

• Denotes personnel _ listed above who attended the exit meeting on

May 14, 1987. j

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2. ' Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items

(Closed) Open Item No. 50-440/86019-01: The licensee was requested to

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perform a review of their Emergency Action Level (EAL) scheme, and make

adjustments as required. Emergency Preparedness personnel provided

documentation of the-review, and discussed proposed changes to the EAL

scheme. This item is closed.

(Closed) Open Item No. 50-440/86019-02: The licensee's procedures lacked

a section requiring semi-annual shift augmentation (call-in) drills. The

licensee has incorporated this requirement in Revision 6 of procedures

OM15A:EP, EPI-C1, and PTI-GEN.P0003. This item is closed.

(Closed) Open Items (50-440/860009-01; 50-441/860003-01): In the previous

Exercise, one of the notifications for the declaration of an Alert to

State and local agencies was not made within fifteen minutes. During

this exercise, notifications were observed to be made within the required

timeframes. This item is closed.

(Closed) Open Items (50-440/860009-02; 50-441/860003-02): During the  ;

previous Exercise, the inplant team responding to the simulated '

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injured / contaminated man did not provide complete information to the

Control Room regarding the accident site situation. During this

exercise, communications with inplant teams were acceptable. This item

is closed.

(Closed) Open Items (50-440/860009-03; 50-441/860003-03): During the

previous Exercise, procedural criteria for downgrading an Emergency

Action Level (EAL) to a lesser level were not considered in downgrading

-the Action Level, and an unapproved form was utilized in recovery

planning. During this exercise, procedures for downgrading were properly

utilized, and the form used in recovery planning had been reviewed,

improved upon, and proceduralized. This item is closed.

3. General

An exercise of the' Perry Power. Plant Emergency Plan was conducted at the-

Perry Station on May 13, 1987. The exercise tested the licensee's

emergency support organizations' capabilities to respond to a simulated

accident scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive effluent.

Attachment 1 to this report describes the Scope and Objectives of the

exercise and Attachment 2 describes the exercise scenario.

4. General Observations

a. Procedures

This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix E requirements, using the Perry Power Station Emergency

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Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

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b'. ' Coordination

The licensee's' response was coordinated, orderly and timely. If

the. scenario events had been real, the actions taken by the

. licensee would have been sufficient'to permit the State and local

authorities to take appropriate actions.to protect the public's

. health and safety.. There was very limited participation by State

and local agencies'during this exercise.

c. Observers.

The licensee's observers monitored and critiqued'this exercise

along with four NRC observers.

d. Exercise Critiques-

Licensee personnel conducted facility and overall Exercise critiques.

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A critique was held with the licensee and NRC representatives on

May 14, 1987, the day after the exercise. The NRC discussed the

observed strengths and weaknesses during the exit interview.

Attending personnel are listed in Section 1.

5. Specific Observations

a. Control Room-

The Control room operators worked together as a coordinated team

with everyone contributing imaginative recommendations to- the team

effort. The~ shift Supervisor displayed strong leadership of this

team and the Shift Technical Advisor showed initiative in his

support.of the Shift Supervisor.

Proper classifications of the simulated emergency conditions were

made, based on the appropriate Emergency Action Level (EAL) for

each event. Operators showed coordination, determination, and ,

perseverance in their efforts to mitigate the effects of the

simulated accident.

Control Room Operators appeared to be well trained, were knowledgeable

.of their procedures, used them properly, and responded appropriately

to operational and safety systems failures. Operators quickly and

efficiently reviewed their EALS, which minimized the time necessary

to make classifications.

Initial notifications and follow-up messages were accurate and

completed expeditiously.

Good communications were maintained with other Emergency Response

Facilities throughout the exercise. Communications procedures on

telephones, Public Address systems and radios were uniform, precise,

and consistently included the caveot "This is a drill" at the

beginning and end of all transmissions.

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The Control Nom and' Secondary Alarm Station lo;!s were excellent,

and actions taken during the accident could have been reconstructed- ] !

in detail. The thoroughness of the control Room 1og-permitted the i

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, , Shift Supervisor to create an excellent _ list of system problems and '

abnormalities midway through the' exercise. This list was then ,!

i: passed on'to the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations-  !

Facility. I

The Secondary Alarm Station personnel did an excellent job in

supporting the Control Room, particularly.during the simulated fire

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and contaminated' injury events.

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i .It was noted that the Operators 'sometimes. tended to rely too heavily

on memory, e.g. procedures were not always consulted to insure steps

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were not missed; schematic drawings were not always examined when

recalling system configurations, t

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It: was also observed that the communicator- reading the notifications

forms would not always read the heading for an item contained on the

form, but would read'only the heading letter. While this did not

cause any confusion during this exercise, a more reliable method

would be to read the heading letter and subject for each item on the .

notification form.

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Based on the above findings,.this portion of the licensee's program

was adequate.

b. Technical Support Center (TSC)

The Technical Support Center (TSC) was activated within 20 minutes

of-the announcement to-activate the facility.

TSC personnel demonstrated excellent player attitude, good teamwork

and good communication among groups. After initial initiation,

noise levels were low.

Status boards were very well used and are well laid out. Good

human factors engineering is evident in the TSC. An Area Radiation

Monitor was observed to be in operation, and habitability studies

and dosimeter checks were performed at regular intervals.

Procedures,-logs, and checklists were well utilized. Press releases

were discussed with the Operations Manager, and approved prior to

issuance. The plant parameters status boards were updated each

15 minute? during the entire exercise. There were frequent and.

regular br;.fings of the TSC staff on plant conditions / actions in

progress.

There was good comu nicetion with the Control Room and the E0F.

Notifications were msde as required, and within the required

timeframe.

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The Operations Manager (Emergency Coordinator) was clearly in control. i

There was good direction of mitigation and recovery efforts, and I

discussion of priorities related to the most likely recovery paths.  !

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i The TSC declared a Site Area Emergency approximately 30 minutes prior I

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to the time postulated for such a declaration in the exercise scenario, l,

and this appeared to be a proper interpretation of the Emergency Action

Levels (EALs).

A General Emergency was declared at approximately 0917 hours0.0106 days <br />0.255 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.489185e-4 months <br />, one hour

and 40 minutes prior to the time postulated in the exercise scenario.

Again, this appeared to be a proper and conservative decision, based

on the EAL scheme contained in the Emergency Plan, j

Accountability took 28 minutes to conduct, and concluded with

20 individuals missing. These individuals were accounted for within

another 27 minutes. It appeared that the initial number of individuals

unaccounted for was partially due to the security procedures utilized

to activate the Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center.

Essentially, these activation procedures allow individuals to report

to these facilities without signing in during the initial stages of j

facility activation. Discussion with licensee personnel indicated that  ;

these procedures had been enacted following experimentation to find

the best procedure which would allow rapid facility activation and

minimize personnel unaccounted for during accountability.

Communicators were located in the room adjacent to the main TSC, and

appeared to be performing their function well. The licensee had

provided for an individual to simulate the NRC Headquarters Duty

Officer, and this individual properly asked one communicator to leave

the line to the NRC open. As the communicator does not have imn.ediate

access to plant operational parameters, it was not apparent that the

timely availability of information to the NRC would be adequate in a

real event.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program

was adequate, however, the following item should be considered for

improvement:

• The adequacy of procedures utilized for communicating with

the NRC should be evaluated.

c. Operational Support Center (OSC)

In general, the OSC appeared to be capable of providing operational

support to the emergency response effort.

The facility had an excellent pool of support personnel and was able

to field 22 teams during the exercise, often with four to five teams

activated at one time.

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Teams'wsre observed to be well equipped- and briefings of OSC

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personnel were very good, especially on the Health Physics aspects

g of their tasks. There wasLvery good direction as to the location

of. radiation areas, and instructions to wait or pause in low

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radiation areas. Teams were also advised of increasing. radiation

levels when elevated levels were expected in.their work area..

However, when an area ~which-had been marked as a high radiation

area.had a decrease in radiation level,'it remained a high

radiation area.

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. Resources were well utilized, and plant prints / diagrams were

consulted for system information and best access routes.

The use' of tape markers (as time allowed) to track individuals (by

name) was considered worthwhile.

Some minor communications problems were noted, such as confusion

J over whether a valve had been shut manually, or had shut by itself

, automatically.

, Early in the-exercise,;with four teams, dispatched into the plant,

the supply'of. hand-held two-way radios ran out, and it appeared

that additional. radios are needed.

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Based on the above' findings, this portion of the licensee's program

was adequate.

- d. Medical / Fire' Scenario-

The injured person simulation was considered excellent.

The licensee demonstrated a competent medical response to a

contaminated injured man. Personnel trained in first aid (Security)

and health physics promptly responded to the report of an injured man.

Responding personnel concentrated on the wound and did not over-react

to the potential for minor radiological contamination.

One individual at the medical drill was observed to lack protective

gloves, which could help.contain any potential radioactive

contamination. It was not clear whether the gloves were not worn

by choice (for dexterity in treating the wound) or if.the supply of

gloves was depleted. It was noted that all involved individuals

demonstrated proper health physics practices, and " frisked"

themselves appropriately. ,

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Fire brigade personnel were knowledgeable of their equipment, and

carefully avoided kinking of the fire hose when " stringing" the

hose out.

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The personnel responding to a simulated fire were well equipped and j

appeared to be well trained. However, one individual stayed to j

direct Perry Fire Department personnel when they were called to

respond to the " injured person". This effectively decreased the

size of the fire brigade, and after the injured per. ton (also a

fire brigade member) was removed, only one fire-fighter remained,

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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program

was adequate.

e. Post Accident Sample (PAS)

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Post Accident Sampling teams were not observed during this exercisc.

f. Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)

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The EOF was activated in a timely and efficient manner. The General i

Emergency was declared prior to E0F activation and the decision was j

made to continue to perform notifications and other EOF functions in

the TSC until an appropriate time'for turnover.

Excellent briefings were made periodically by the Emergency

Coordinator.

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Status boards were well maintained and updated periodically (15 minute '

intervals). Health Physics personnel circulated at intervals, .I

performing radiation surveys, verifying radiation monitor readings, l

and reminding personnel to check their dosimeters. Management control j

by all supervisors was apparent.

Communication and coordination with the TSC was excellent.

Dose assessment was performed in a timely and efficient manner.

Discussions on source term and anticipatory future events allowed

conservative Protective Action Recommendations to be made in

anticipation of a release. Dose projection personnel provided good

analysis and discussion of the doses generated by the MIDAS dose

assessment system.  !

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The Radiation Monitoring Teams (RMTs) were well coordinated and did  !

an excellent job of tracking the plume. RMT readings were also

compared with dose projections as an additional verification of

dose projections. Periodic updates of the teams on plant status {

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were made. Doses to RMT team members were adequately tracked. 1

Excellent discussions were held on reentry and recovery.

The EOF was uncomfortably hot and the Dose Assessment Room was even i

worse. Licensee personnel indicated that the air conditioning i

system was serviced during the exercise, with recharging of the i

systems' freon supply subsequently reducing temperatures in the EOF. l

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Ho' wever,'it was also -indicated that the overall evaluation of the

Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system for the

EOF.had not been completed (flow adjustment, etc). This will be

tracked as an'Open Items No. 50-440/87010-01; 50-441/87002-01.

Based on the above findings, with the exception of the Open Item,

.cbove, this-portion of the licensee's program was adequate.

n g.: Offsite Radiological Monitoring Teams

Offsite radiological monitoring teams were not observed during this

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6. . Exercise Scenario and Control

The exercise scenario was considered challenging and ' difficult, and

. adequately. tested all aspects of the Emergency Plan. ' The scenario was  !

innovative in th&t'the plant condition apparently stabilized early on, .

and later deteriorated. The rapidity of the scenario led to the TSC l

escalating to a General-Emergency classification, and the injured /

contaminated man scenario carne late, rathat than early in' the overall

exercise, a refreshing change.

Minor problems were'noted in the overall exercise. The fire scenario was

temporarily' suspended due to.an actual fire alarm. The licensee smoothly

stopped the fire scenario, and later re-started the scenario without

problems.

4 A minor " exercise artifact" was observed in that the MIDAS dose assessment

system does not show release flowrates when in the " exercise mode".

Control Room Communicators at times appeared unfamiliar with the telephone

system in the simulator Control Room. Discussion indicated that the

communications equipment in the simulator control Room does not fully

duplicate the equipment in the actual Control Room, which has a unique

telephone system.

It was noted that the task of dose assessment would have been more

challenging if a wind direction shift during the time of radioactive

release had been added tn the scenario.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was

adequate.

7. Exit Interview

K The inspectors held an exit interview the day after the exercise on May 14,

1987, with the representatives denoted in Section 1. The NRC Team Leader

discussed the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee was also

asked if any of the information discussed during the exit was proprietary. l

The licensee responded that none of the information was proprietary. l

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Attachments:

Attachment'1: Perry 1987 Exercise Scope and Objectives

Attachment 2: Perry 1987 Exercise Scenario Outline

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() 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

1.1 Scope

The 1987 Emergency Preparedness Exercise, to be conducted on

May 13, 1987, will simulate accident events culminating in a

radiological accident with resultant off-site releases from Perry

Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP), located in North Perry Village, Lake

County, Ohio. The exercise will involve events that test the

effectiveness of the PNPP Emergency Preparedness Program only.

Successful demonstration of the emergency response capabilities of

the State of Ohio, and the Counties of Lake, Ashtabula, and Geauga

was accomplished in the April 15, 1986 Emergency Preparedness

Exercise and will not be demonstrated in this exercise.

1.2 Objectives

ITEM

NO. OBJECTIVE

1 Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate

facilities promptly.

2 Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and to

maintain staffing around the clock.

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V LIMITING CONDITION:

The ability to maintain around the clock

staffing of the Technical Support Center (TSC),

Operations Support Center (OSC) and Emergency

Operations Facility (EOF) will be demonstrated

by means o,f staffing / shift rosters..

3 Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to

coordinate emergency activities.

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4 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to

support emergency operations. )

5 Demonstrate ability to communicate with all j

appropriate locations, organizations, and field j

personnel.

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6 Damonstrate ability to mobilize and deploy field I

monitoring teams in e timely fashion. 1

7 Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for  ;

determining ambient radiation levels.

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8 Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for

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measurement of airborne radiciodine concentrations as

( low as 1.0E-7 uCi/cc in the presence of noble gases. l

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ITEM

< NO. OBJECTIVE

9 Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public

via plume exposure, based on plant and field data,

and to determine appropriate protective measures,

based on PAGs, available shelter, evacuation time

estimates and all other appropriate factors.

10 Demonstrate ability to notify off-site officials and

agencies within 15 minutes of an emergency.

11. -Demonstrate ability to periodically update off-site

officials and.ogencies of the' status of the emergency

based on data available at the PNPP.

12 Demonstrate ability to notify emergency support pools

'(i.e., INPO, ANI, etc.).

13 Demonstrate ability to notify on-site personnel using

plant alarm /PA system.

14 Demonstrate ability to effectively assess incident

Londitions and classify the incident correctly.

15 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources

necessary to manage an accountability of all or part. ll

of site personnel.

LIMITING CONDITION:

Personnel accountability will only be

demonstrated in the Unit 1 Protected Area and

EOF portio ~n of the Training Building,

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16 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources

necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or

part of site personnel.

.4 . LIMITING CCNDITION:

Protected Area persennel will be evacuated to

the adjacent parking areas during the

performance of personnel accountability.

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's / NO. OBJECTIVE

17 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources

necessary to control access to the site.

LIMITING CONDITION:

PNPP Security personnel will establish traffic

control points at key intersections on-site.

PNPP will also simulate requesting traffic

control assistance from the Lake County Sheriff

Department.

18 Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and

control emergency worker exposure.

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LIMITING CONDITION:

This objective will be demonstrated for all

emergency teams dispatched at or from the PNPP

and personnel within the PNPP emergency

facilities.

19 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based {

on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to 1

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emergency workers and/or direct the use of protective

clothing.  ;

LIMITING CONDITION:

This objective will be demonstrated for all

emergency teams dispatched at or from the PNPP

and personhel within the PNPP emergency

facilitier.

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20 Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, )

once the decision har been made to do so.

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LIMITING CONDITION:

Demonstrate the availability of KI in the event

it is needed.

21 Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear,

accurate and timely manner.

22 Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination

of information released.

23 Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor

control in a coordinated fashion.

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ITEM 1

NO. OBJECTIVE

24 Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for

decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and

vehicles.

25 Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance facilities and

procedures for handling contaminated individuals.

26 Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and

procedo res for handling contaminated individuals.

27 Demonstrate adequacy of on-site first aid

facilities / equipment and procedures for handling

contaminated individuals.

28 Demonstrate adequacy of in plant post accident

sampling techniques and analysis.

29 Demonstrate ability to determine and implement

appropriate measures for controlled recovery and

re-entry.

LIMITING CONDITION:

This objective will only cover establishment of

a Recovery Organization and the development of

re-entry / recovery goals.

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(T 7.2 Sequence of Events

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0700 Initial Conditions

Unit One of the Perry Power Plant is operating at 100% power,

and has been continuously operating the equivalent of 14 full

power months. The next refueling outage is scheduled to begin

June 6.

Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator 00S (during performance

of SVI-R43-T1317, it was determined that it took 11.2 seconds

for the engine to reach a speed of 441 rpm. Division 1 Diesel

Generator was declared inoperable at 0519, 5/13/87.)

Tornado watch in effect

RCS DEI: 0.17 uCi/gm

RCS Leakage: 1.5 gpm unidentified

TIP "D" is inoperable, and scheduled for replacement at 1000

today

MSIV Leakage Control Blower E32-C001 was declared inoperable at

0317 this morning due to the failure of SVI-E32-T1201

/" 0705 Tornadcs sighted in the area. National Weather Service

(~,T/ upgrades the tornado watch to a tornado warning.

0715 Tornado touches down in the northwest corner of the site near

the switchyard, taking down the Perry-Eastlake tie line.

Control Room indications and notifications from SOC confirm the

loss of the power line. A security guard will also report the

, sighting of the funnel cloud on-site. Shift Supervisor

declares an Unusual Event based on the tornado touching down on

site.

0800 Turbine trip due to high vibration; reactor scram, increased

RCS leakage (approx. 75 gpm). (The leakage is from a ruptured

3/4" instrument line in the containment. As the leakage

continues, and, later, when the SRVs begin to relieve to the

suppression pool, the pressure in the containment will be

partially diverted back to the drywell by way of the vacuum

breaker. There is no leak in the drywell, even though the

drywell pressure will increase due to the backflow through this

vacuum breaker.) When the turbine bypass valves cycle as a 3

result of the turbine trip, the sparger/downcomer fails, )

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falling into the condenser tube nest, and damaging several

tubes. Condenser vacuum begins to gradually decrease. The

Reactor Recire. Pumps will fail to transfer to slow speed when l

the scram occurs; this unanalyzed transient will worsen the

existing cladding leakage, and cause additional gap activity to

r~ be released to the coolant. When the Control Room Operators l

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take action to manually shift the pumps, the action will be

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0805 High Conductivity Alarm: Hotwell-(due to tube failures). j

0810 The Emergency Coordinator declares an Alert based on RCS

leakage in excess of 50 gpm. The TSC and OSC are activated. j

0815 Operators start RCIC manually to assist in level restoration, )

and RHR "A" is placed in Suppression Pool Cooling.

0820 MSIVs and turbine bypass valves isolate on low vacuum.

0825 2 SRVs open to relieve pressure and stick in a partially open

position. (Approx. 600,000 lbm/hr. total flow).

0830 HPCS started manually to assist in level restoration.

0835 HPCS trips and remains 00S for the duration of the exercise.

0845 RCIC HELB. 1E51-F063 fails to shut automatically, but

operators are successful in manual isolation from the Control

Room. There are now no high pressure injection systems

available.

0915 RPV water level below TAF (0"). Emergency Coordinator declares

a Site Area Emergency. The EOF and JPIC are activated. During

the next hour, while the core remains uncovered, some

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additional cladding damage will occur.

1015 Pressure decreases below LPCS/LPCI shutoff head. RPV reflooded

to approx. 200". Operators begin preparations to initiate

shutdown cooling.

1045 Shutdown cooling line up complete and flow initiated. Small

leak develops in the shutdown cooling suction line, in the

"B" RHR room.

1055 Double-ended rupture of the shutdown cooling suction line. RPV

is being drained into the "B" RHR room. Water flashes as it

drains from the ruptured pipe, and entrained noble gases from

the coolant are released to the RHR room environment.

1100 Unit i Vent Monitor indicates a significant increase in the

release rate to the environment. Emergency Coordinator should

declare a General Emergency based on the loss of all three

fission product barriers.

1115 Operators have lined up for alternate shutdown cooling. t

(Coolant is dumped to the suppression pool by way of the failed

open SRVs, and the decay heat is dissipated by the RHR. System,

whichislinedupforSuppressionPoolCooling)

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[] 1215 Release of radioactive gases to the RHR room is reduced

U significantly when ths Reactor Coolant System is cooled below

212 degrees, and d2 pressurized.

The participants will be allowed to isolate the rupture any

time after this point.

1230 Release to the environment is essentially terminated when the

remaining noble gases in the RHR room are exhausted by the

ventilation system.

1245 SAS receives a sprinkler system flow initiation alarm

indicating a potential fire in the loading area on the 620'

elevation of the Radwaste Building.

1250 SAS/ Control Room receive verification of a working fire at the

above location. The PNPP Fire Brigade is toned out to respond.

1300 Fire Brigade Leader reports that a PNPP fire fighter has been

injured, and requests assistance from the Perry Township Fire

Department, in transporting the injured person for off-site

medical treatment.

1400 RMTs return to the EOF: one RMT member is found to be

contaminated. Decontamination efforts proceed at the EOF.

Fire is extinguished. When the Emergency Coordinator receives

3 adequate information re the status of the injured fire fighter

(V at the hospital, he may consider termination of the emergency

and initiation of recovery discussions. ,

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1500 Exercise terminated at the discretion of the Lead Exercise

Controller, after receiving confirmation that all exercise

objectives have been satisfactorily demonstrated.

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(A _,) 7.3 NARRATIVE SUMMARY

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Plant conditions postulated to exist at the onset of the 1987 Emergency f

Preparedness Exercise include the following: Unit 1 is near the end of

core life, after continuously operating the equivalent of 14 full power j

months. The next refueling outage is scheduled to begin June 6. The '

Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator was declared inoperable this

morning due to a failure to reach operating rpm within the specified

amount of time. There is currently 1.5 gpm unidentified leakage from the

Reactor Coolant System, and the National Weather Service has issued a

Tornado Watch for the area surrounding the Perry Plant. Other

miscellaneous items of equipment (not significant to the sequence of

events) are out of service, as specified in Section 7.2 of this manual.

Immediately after the exercise is initiated, the Tornado Watch is

upgraded to a Tornado Warning due to numerous sightings of funnel clouds

in the area. Fifteen minutes after initiation of the exercise (0715), a

tornado will be observed on-site, and take down the Perry-Eastlake

transmission line. Upon receipt of the information regarding the tornado

on-site, the Shift Supervisor should declare an UNUSUAL EVENT, implement

the appropriate cuergency plan implementing instructions, and initiate

notifications to off-site agencies and CEI management. Investigations

for additional damage caused by the tornado will continue.

At 0755, the Control Room will receive indications of increasing

,. vibration on the Main Turbine. In accordance with applicable procedures,

! the operators will attempt to reduce turbine load / speed to correct the

problem, but at 0800, it will trip on high vibration. The turbine trip

results in a reactor scram, and when the turbine bypass valves cycle open

to relieve excess pressure to the condenser, the tailpipe /downcomer on i

one of the valves will fall into the condenser tube nest, causing damage '

to several tubes, and leakage of some Cire. Water into the condenser.

The scram transient also causes the, leakage from the RCS to increase to l

about 75 gpm. This leakage is postulated to be from a 3/4" i strument ,

sensing line in the containment, and will be identified to the Control I

Room by two annunciators: one in the Control Room, and one in the Rad  ;

Waste Control Room. As this leakage is identified and quantified, the

Emergency Coordinator will declare an ALERT, initiate appropriate

notifications, and activate the TSC and OSC.

Following the scram / turbine trip transient, the Reactor Feed Pumps will i

trip as condenser vacuum decreases, and the Motor Feed Pump fails to

start. In an attempt to maintain RPV water level, the operators will l

start the RCIC pump. After the MSIVs and bypass valves isolate on low

condenser vacuum, the RPV pressure will increase until the first two SRVs

lift. Both these SRVs will fail in a partially open position; operators

will be unable to shut either of them. j

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Over the next several minutes, both divisions of SRV solenoids will be

Icst; the operators will be unable to operate the valves electrically.

Approximately five minutes after the HPCS Pump is started to

restore / maintain water level, it will trip, and repair activities will

not be successful in returning it to service before the fuel is

uncovered. Shortly thereafter, the RCIC turbine will isolate when the

steam supply line ruptures. One of the isolation valves (F063) will fail

to completely close, but operators will be able to close it from the

switch in the Control Room when they attempt to do so.

All high-pressure injection systems have been disabled, and since the

SRVs are not electrically operable, the operators cannot depressurize to

enable any low pressure systems. RPV water level will decrease due, to

the leakage out the stuck-open SRVs and the smaller leak out the

instrument line in the containment. Approximately thirty minutes later,

level will reach 0" (Top of Active Fuel), and the Emergency Coordinator

will declare a Site Area Emergency. The EOF and JPIC will be activated

at this time, if they haven't already been activated. (Note that, even

though there is not a leak in the drywell, drywell pressure has

increased, due to flow through the containment-to-drywell vacuum breaker,

as containment pressure increases from the leaks). During the next hour,

while the fuel remains uncovered, it is postulated that inadequate

cooling results in additional cladding damage, and the release of some

gap activity (1 to 5%) to the coolant.

By 1015, RPV pressure has decreased below LPCS/LPCI shutoff head, and the

RPV is quickly reflooded to 200". The reflooding will depressurize the

RPV and operators should begin preparations in initiate Shutdown Cooling.

As Shutdown Cooling flow is initiated, a rupture occurs in the

20" suction line, and the RPV begins draining to the "B" RHR room. The

Unit i Vent monitor will reflect a significant release of radioactivity

to the environment, as the gases released in the RHR Room are exhausted

by the ventilation system. The Emergency Coordinator will declare a

GENERAL EMERGENCY based on the loss of all three fission product

barriers.

Concurrent with the initial declaration of the General Emergency, EOF

participants will provide the automatic (default) protective action

recommendation: Shelter within a two-mile radius of the plant, and in

Sectors J, K, and L five miles downwind. Between 11:15 and 11:30, the

Unit One Vent will reflect a sharp increase in the release rate, and new

dose projections will result in an upgraded protective action

recommendation: evacuate within a two-mile radius of the plant and

continue sheltering out to five miles in Sectors J, K, and L.

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By 1215 in the afternoon, the RPV has been. cooled.below 212 degrees, and 'l

the release of gases to the "B" RHR Room will be essentially terminated.

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The release of radioactivity to the environment will continue until'all j

the gases have been exhausted from the Aux. Bldg., approximately fifteen- l

minutes later. . Efforts to repair and close one of the failed - open i

isolation valves (F008 and F009) will be allowed to be successful anytime

after this.

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At approximately 1245, SAS will receive a flow' initiation alarm on the

sprinkler system in the loading area of the 620' elevation of the Rad ,

Waste Bldg. An electrical short in a cable run has started some l

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protective clothing and low level waste on fire. Once the fire has been

verified, the Fire. Brigade will be toned out to fight the fire; one of

the PNPP firefighters will be injured as he approaches the scene of the

fire, and will require transportation to a local hospital (Lake County

East) for treatment. Due to minor levels of airborne radioactivity at

the scene of the fire, he will be found to be contaminated, but the

severity of his injuries will dictate that he be transported before j

decontamination efforts can be completed. J

After arrival of the Perry Township Fire Department, the fire will be

-brought under control and put out. Shortly thereafter, after the  ;

radiation levels in the EPZ have returned to. background, and the RMTs  ;

have been recalled to the EGF, one of the Team members and his vehicle

will be found to be contaminated, and will be decontaminated in

accordance the appropriate procedures.

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By this time (approximately 1400), reentry and recovery discussions

should be in progress.

The exercise will be terminated by the Lead Exercise Controller after he

has received confirmation from his Controller organization that all

objectives have been satisfactorily demonstrated (approx. 1500).

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