ML20215G142
| ML20215G142 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1987 |
| From: | Foster J, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215G124 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-440-87-10, 50-441-87-02, 50-441-87-2, NUDOCS 8706230137 | |
| Download: ML20215G142 (20) | |
See also: IR 05000440/1987010
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No.- 50-440/87010(DRSS); 50-441/87002(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441
Licenses No. NPF-45; CPPR-149
Licensee: Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Company
Post Office Box 5000
Cleveland, OH 44101
Facility Name:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
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Inspection At:
Perry Site, Perry, OH
Inspection Conducted:
May 12-14, 1987
6/2/37
Inspector:
J. Fo
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Team Leader
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Approved By:
W. Sn' ell,
hief
6/L/37
Date
Section
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Inspection Summary
Inspection on May 12-14, 1987 (Reports No. 50-440/87010(DRSS);
No. 50-441/87002(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the Perry Power Plant
emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by four NRC
representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise.
The
inspection was conducted by two NRC inspectors and two consultants.
Results:
No violations deficiencies or deviations were identified.
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8706230137 870603
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ADOCK 05000440
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DETAILS
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Personnel Contacted-
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NRC Observers and Areas Observed
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- J. Foster,-Control Room (simulator), Technical Support Center (TSC),
Operations Support Center (OSC), Emergency Operations Facility
~(EOF)
- E. Hickey, Emergency 0perations' Facility (E0F)
- T. Col'aurn, Control Room (simulator), Operations Support Center (OSC),
Medical / Fire Scenario-
- J. Will, Control Room.(simulator),
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company
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- D. Hulbert,-Supervisor, Emergency Planning Unit-
- T.' Corbett, Emergency. Plan Responsible Instructor
- S. Reilly, Specialist, Nutech
- S. Danielson, Specialist, Nutech
- D
Rossetti, ALARA Coordinator
- P. Moskowitz, Supervisor, Health Physics
- W. Burkhart, Supervisor, Radwaste
- R. Tadych, GS, Perry Training
- W. Coleman, GSE, Community Relations
- K..Novak, Supervisor, Site Protection
- F.
Stead, Manager, NED
- J. Braun, Offsite Radiation Advisor
- A. Slezak, Security Coordinator
- G. Gerber, Administrative Assistant
- R.-Stratman, Operations Advisor
- R. Newkirk, Plant Technical Engineer
- F. Witaker, Radiation Protection Coordinator
J. Grim, Radiation Protection Assistant
G. Van Weg, Radiation Protection Assistant
T. Boyer, Plant Operations Advisor
J. Webb, Environmental Liaison
V. Higaki, Information Liaison
J. Goecker, OSC Coordinator
D. Cobb, Shift Supervisor
J. Hanley, Unit Supervisor
B. Triplett, Supervising Operator
T. Terbizan, Control Room Communicator
- Denotes personnel _ listed above who attended the exit meeting on
May 14, 1987.
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2.
' Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items
(Closed) Open Item No. 50-440/86019-01:
The licensee was requested to
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perform a review of their Emergency Action Level (EAL) scheme, and make
adjustments as required.
Emergency Preparedness personnel provided
documentation of the-review, and discussed proposed changes to the EAL
scheme.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Open Item No. 50-440/86019-02:
The licensee's procedures lacked
a section requiring semi-annual shift augmentation (call-in) drills.
The
licensee has incorporated this requirement in Revision 6 of procedures
OM15A:EP, EPI-C1, and PTI-GEN.P0003.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Open Items (50-440/860009-01; 50-441/860003-01):
In the previous
Exercise, one of the notifications for the declaration of an Alert to
State and local agencies was not made within fifteen minutes.
During
this exercise, notifications were observed to be made within the required
timeframes.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Open Items (50-440/860009-02; 50-441/860003-02):
During the
previous Exercise, the inplant team responding to the simulated
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injured / contaminated man did not provide complete information to the
Control Room regarding the accident site situation.
During this
exercise, communications with inplant teams were acceptable.
This item
is closed.
(Closed) Open Items (50-440/860009-03; 50-441/860003-03):
During the
previous Exercise, procedural criteria for downgrading an Emergency
Action Level (EAL) to a lesser level were not considered in downgrading
-the Action Level, and an unapproved form was utilized in recovery
planning.
During this exercise, procedures for downgrading were properly
utilized, and the form used in recovery planning had been reviewed,
improved upon, and proceduralized.
This item is closed.
3.
General
An exercise of the' Perry Power. Plant Emergency Plan was conducted at the-
Perry Station on May 13, 1987.
The exercise tested the licensee's
emergency support organizations' capabilities to respond to a simulated
accident scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive effluent.
Attachment 1 to this report describes the Scope and Objectives of the
exercise and Attachment 2 describes the exercise scenario.
4.
General Observations
a.
Procedures
This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix E requirements, using the Perry Power Station Emergency
Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
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' Coordination
The licensee's' response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If
the. scenario events had been real, the actions taken by the
. licensee would have been sufficient'to permit the State and local
authorities to take appropriate actions.to protect the public's
. health and safety.. There was very limited participation by State
and local agencies'during this exercise.
c.
Observers.
The licensee's observers monitored and critiqued'this exercise
along with four NRC observers.
d.
Exercise Critiques-
Licensee personnel conducted facility and overall Exercise critiques.
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A critique was held with the licensee and NRC representatives on
May 14, 1987, the day after the exercise.
The NRC discussed the
observed strengths and weaknesses during the exit interview.
Attending personnel are listed in Section 1.
5.
Specific Observations
a.
Control Room-
The Control room operators worked together as a coordinated team
with everyone contributing imaginative recommendations to- the team
effort.
The~ shift Supervisor displayed strong leadership of this
team and the Shift Technical Advisor showed initiative in his
support.of the Shift Supervisor.
Proper classifications of the simulated emergency conditions were
made, based on the appropriate Emergency Action Level (EAL) for
each event.
Operators showed coordination, determination, and
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perseverance in their efforts to mitigate the effects of the
simulated accident.
Control Room Operators appeared to be well trained, were knowledgeable
.of their procedures, used them properly, and responded appropriately
to operational and safety systems failures.
Operators quickly and
efficiently reviewed their EALS, which minimized the time necessary
to make classifications.
Initial notifications and follow-up messages were accurate and
completed expeditiously.
Good communications were maintained with other Emergency Response
Facilities throughout the exercise.
Communications procedures on
telephones, Public Address systems and radios were uniform, precise,
and consistently included the caveot "This is a drill" at the
beginning and end of all transmissions.
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The Control Nom and' Secondary Alarm Station lo;!s were excellent,
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and actions taken during the accident could have been reconstructed-
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in detail.
The thoroughness of the control Room 1og-permitted the
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Shift Supervisor to create an excellent _ list of system problems and
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abnormalities midway through the' exercise.
This list was then
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passed on'to the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations-
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Facility.
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The Secondary Alarm Station personnel did an excellent job in
supporting the Control Room, particularly.during the simulated fire
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and contaminated' injury events.
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.It was noted that the Operators 'sometimes. tended to rely too heavily
on memory, e.g. procedures were not always consulted to insure steps
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were not missed; schematic drawings were not always examined when
recalling system configurations,
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It: was also observed that the communicator- reading the notifications
forms would not always read the heading for an item contained on the
form, but would read'only the heading letter.
While this did not
cause any confusion during this exercise, a more reliable method
would be to read the heading letter and subject for each item on the
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notification form.
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Based on the above findings,.this portion of the licensee's program
was adequate.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The Technical Support Center (TSC) was activated within 20 minutes
of-the announcement to-activate the facility.
TSC personnel demonstrated excellent player attitude, good teamwork
and good communication among groups.
After initial initiation,
noise levels were low.
Status boards were very well used and are well laid out.
Good
human factors engineering is evident in the TSC.
An Area Radiation
Monitor was observed to be in operation, and habitability studies
and dosimeter checks were performed at regular intervals.
Procedures,-logs, and checklists were well utilized.
Press releases
were discussed with the Operations Manager, and approved prior to
issuance.
The plant parameters status boards were updated each
15 minute? during the entire exercise.
There were frequent and.
regular br;.fings of the TSC staff on plant conditions / actions in
progress.
There was good comu nicetion with the Control Room and the E0F.
Notifications were msde as required, and within the required
timeframe.
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The Operations Manager (Emergency Coordinator) was clearly in control.
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There was good direction of mitigation and recovery efforts, and
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discussion of priorities related to the most likely recovery paths.
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The TSC declared a Site Area Emergency approximately 30 minutes prior
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to the time postulated for such a declaration in the exercise scenario,
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and this appeared to be a proper interpretation of the Emergency Action
Levels (EALs).
A General Emergency was declared at approximately 0917 hours0.0106 days <br />0.255 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.489185e-4 months <br />, one hour
and 40 minutes prior to the time postulated in the exercise scenario.
Again, this appeared to be a proper and conservative decision, based
on the EAL scheme contained in the Emergency Plan,
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Accountability took 28 minutes to conduct, and concluded with
20 individuals missing.
These individuals were accounted for within
another 27 minutes.
It appeared that the initial number of individuals
unaccounted for was partially due to the security procedures utilized
to activate the Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center.
Essentially, these activation procedures allow individuals to report
to these facilities without signing in during the initial stages of
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facility activation.
Discussion with licensee personnel indicated that
these procedures had been enacted following experimentation to find
the best procedure which would allow rapid facility activation and
minimize personnel unaccounted for during accountability.
Communicators were located in the room adjacent to the main TSC, and
appeared to be performing their function well.
The licensee had
provided for an individual to simulate the NRC Headquarters Duty
Officer, and this individual properly asked one communicator to leave
the line to the NRC open.
As the communicator does not have imn.ediate
access to plant operational parameters, it was not apparent that the
timely availability of information to the NRC would be adequate in a
real event.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program
was adequate, however, the following item should be considered for
improvement:
The adequacy of procedures utilized for communicating with
the NRC should be evaluated.
c.
Operational Support Center (OSC)
In general, the OSC appeared to be capable of providing operational
support to the emergency response effort.
The facility had an excellent pool of support personnel and was able
to field 22 teams during the exercise, often with four to five teams
activated at one time.
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Teams'wsre observed to be well equipped- and briefings of OSC
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personnel were very good, especially on the Health Physics aspects
of their tasks. There wasLvery good direction as to the location
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of. radiation areas, and instructions to wait or pause in low
radiation areas.
Teams were also advised of increasing. radiation
levels when elevated levels were expected in.their work area..
However, when an area ~which-had been marked as a high radiation
area.had a decrease in radiation level,'it remained a high
radiation area.
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consulted for system information and best access routes.
The use' of tape markers (as time allowed) to track individuals (by
name) was considered worthwhile.
Some minor communications problems were noted, such as confusion
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over whether a valve had been shut manually, or had shut by itself
automatically.
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Early in the-exercise,;with four teams, dispatched into the plant,
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the supply'of. hand-held two-way radios ran out, and it appeared
that additional. radios are needed.
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Based on the above' findings, this portion of the licensee's program
was adequate.
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Medical / Fire' Scenario-
The injured person simulation was considered excellent.
The licensee demonstrated a competent medical response to a
contaminated injured man.
Personnel trained in first aid (Security)
and health physics promptly responded to the report of an injured man.
Responding personnel concentrated on the wound and did not over-react
to the potential for minor radiological contamination.
One individual at the medical drill was observed to lack protective
gloves, which could help.contain any potential radioactive
contamination.
It was not clear whether the gloves were not worn
by choice (for dexterity in treating the wound) or if.the supply of
gloves was depleted.
It was noted that all involved individuals
demonstrated proper health physics practices, and " frisked"
themselves appropriately.
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Fire brigade personnel were knowledgeable of their equipment, and
carefully avoided kinking of the fire hose when " stringing" the
hose out.
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The personnel responding to a simulated fire were well equipped and
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appeared to be well trained.
However, one individual stayed to
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direct Perry Fire Department personnel when they were called to
respond to the " injured person".
This effectively decreased the
size of the fire brigade, and after the injured per. ton (also a
fire brigade member) was removed, only one fire-fighter remained,
and he had to call for assistance.
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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program
was adequate.
e.
Post Accident Sample (PAS)
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Post Accident Sampling teams were not observed during this exercisc.
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Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
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The EOF was activated in a timely and efficient manner.
The General
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Emergency was declared prior to E0F activation and the decision was
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made to continue to perform notifications and other EOF functions in
the TSC until an appropriate time'for turnover.
Excellent briefings were made periodically by the Emergency
Coordinator.
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Status boards were well maintained and updated periodically (15 minute
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intervals).
Health Physics personnel circulated at intervals,
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performing radiation surveys, verifying radiation monitor readings,
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and reminding personnel to check their dosimeters.
Management control
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by all supervisors was apparent.
Communication and coordination with the TSC was excellent.
Dose assessment was performed in a timely and efficient manner.
Discussions on source term and anticipatory future events allowed
conservative Protective Action Recommendations to be made in
anticipation of a release.
Dose projection personnel provided good
analysis and discussion of the doses generated by the MIDAS dose
assessment system.
The Radiation Monitoring Teams (RMTs) were well coordinated and did
an excellent job of tracking the plume.
RMT readings were also
compared with dose projections as an additional verification of
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dose projections. Periodic updates of the teams on plant status
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were made.
Doses to RMT team members were adequately tracked.
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Excellent discussions were held on reentry and recovery.
The EOF was uncomfortably hot and the Dose Assessment Room was even
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worse.
Licensee personnel indicated that the air conditioning
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system was serviced during the exercise, with recharging of the
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systems' freon supply subsequently reducing temperatures in the EOF.
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Ho' wever,'it was also -indicated that the overall evaluation of the
Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system for the
EOF.had not been completed (flow adjustment, etc). This will be
tracked as an'Open Items No. 50-440/87010-01; 50-441/87002-01.
Based on the above findings, with the exception of the Open Item,
.cbove, this-portion of the licensee's program was adequate.
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Offsite Radiological Monitoring Teams
Offsite radiological monitoring teams were not observed during this
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. Exercise Scenario and Control
The exercise scenario was considered challenging and ' difficult, and
. adequately. tested all aspects of the Emergency Plan. ' The scenario was
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innovative in th&t'the plant condition apparently stabilized early on,
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and later deteriorated.
The rapidity of the scenario led to the TSC
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escalating to a General-Emergency classification, and the injured /
contaminated man scenario carne late, rathat than early in' the overall
exercise, a refreshing change.
Minor problems were'noted in the overall exercise.
The fire scenario was
temporarily' suspended due to.an actual fire alarm.
The licensee smoothly
stopped the fire scenario, and later re-started the scenario without
problems.
A minor " exercise artifact" was observed in that the MIDAS dose assessment
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system does not show release flowrates when in the " exercise mode".
Control Room Communicators at times appeared unfamiliar with the telephone
system in the simulator Control Room.
Discussion indicated that the
communications equipment in the simulator control Room does not fully
duplicate the equipment in the actual Control Room, which has a unique
telephone system.
It was noted that the task of dose assessment would have been more
challenging if a wind direction shift during the time of radioactive
release had been added tn the scenario.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was
adequate.
7.
Exit Interview
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The inspectors held an exit interview the day after the exercise on May 14,
1987, with the representatives denoted in Section 1.
The NRC Team Leader
discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee was also
asked if any of the information discussed during the exit was proprietary.
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The licensee responded that none of the information was proprietary.
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Attachments:
Attachment'1:
Perry 1987 Exercise Scope and Objectives
Attachment 2:
Perry 1987 Exercise Scenario Outline
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1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
1.1
Scope
The 1987 Emergency Preparedness Exercise, to be conducted on
May 13, 1987, will simulate accident events culminating in a
radiological accident with resultant off-site releases from Perry
Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP), located in North Perry Village, Lake
County, Ohio. The exercise will involve events that test the
effectiveness of the PNPP Emergency Preparedness Program only.
Successful demonstration of the emergency response capabilities of
the State of Ohio, and the Counties of Lake, Ashtabula, and Geauga
was accomplished in the April 15, 1986 Emergency Preparedness
Exercise and will not be demonstrated in this exercise.
1.2 Objectives
ITEM
NO.
OBJECTIVE
1
Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate
facilities promptly.
2
Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and to
maintain staffing around the clock.
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LIMITING CONDITION:
The ability to maintain around the clock
staffing of the Technical Support Center (TSC),
Operations Support Center (OSC) and Emergency
Operations Facility (EOF) will be demonstrated
by means o,f staffing / shift rosters..
3
Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to
coordinate emergency activities.
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4
Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to
support emergency operations.
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Demonstrate ability to communicate with all
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appropriate locations, organizations, and field
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personnel.
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Damonstrate ability to mobilize and deploy field
monitoring teams in e timely fashion.
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Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for
determining ambient radiation levels.
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Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for
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measurement of airborne radiciodine concentrations as
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low as 1.0E-7 uCi/cc in the presence of noble gases.
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NO.
OBJECTIVE
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Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public
via plume exposure, based on plant and field data,
and to determine appropriate protective measures,
based on PAGs, available shelter, evacuation time
estimates and all other appropriate factors.
10
Demonstrate ability to notify off-site officials and
agencies within 15 minutes of an emergency.
11.
-Demonstrate ability to periodically update off-site
officials and.ogencies of the' status of the emergency
based on data available at the PNPP.
12
Demonstrate ability to notify emergency support pools
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13
Demonstrate ability to notify on-site personnel using
plant alarm /PA system.
14
Demonstrate ability to effectively assess incident
Londitions and classify the incident correctly.
15
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources
necessary to manage an accountability of all or part.
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of site personnel.
LIMITING CONDITION:
Personnel accountability will only be
demonstrated in the Unit 1 Protected Area and
EOF portio ~n of the Training Building,
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16
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources
necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or
part of site personnel.
LIMITING CCNDITION:
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Protected Area persennel will be evacuated to
the adjacent parking areas during the
performance of personnel accountability.
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ITEM
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NO.
OBJECTIVE
17
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources
necessary to control access to the site.
LIMITING CONDITION:
PNPP Security personnel will establish traffic
control points at key intersections on-site.
PNPP will also simulate requesting traffic
control assistance from the Lake County Sheriff
Department.
18
Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and
control emergency worker exposure.
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LIMITING CONDITION:
This objective will be demonstrated for all
emergency teams dispatched at or from the PNPP
and personnel within the PNPP emergency
facilities.
19
Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based
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on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to
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emergency workers and/or direct the use of protective
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clothing.
LIMITING CONDITION:
This objective will be demonstrated for all
emergency teams dispatched at or from the PNPP
and personhel within the PNPP emergency
facilitier.
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20
Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI,
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once the decision har been made to do so.
LIMITING CONDITION:
Demonstrate the availability of KI in the event
it is needed.
21
Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear,
accurate and timely manner.
22
Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination
of information released.
23
Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor
control in a coordinated fashion.
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ITEM
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NO.
OBJECTIVE
24
Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for
decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and
vehicles.
25
Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance facilities and
procedures for handling contaminated individuals.
26
Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and
procedo res for handling contaminated individuals.
27
Demonstrate adequacy of on-site first aid
facilities / equipment and procedures for handling
contaminated individuals.
28
Demonstrate adequacy of in plant post accident
sampling techniques and analysis.
29
Demonstrate ability to determine and implement
appropriate measures for controlled recovery and
re-entry.
LIMITING CONDITION:
This objective will only cover establishment of
a Recovery Organization and the development of
re-entry / recovery goals.
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7.2 Sequence of Events
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0700 Initial Conditions
Unit One of the Perry Power Plant is operating at 100% power,
and has been continuously operating the equivalent of 14 full
power months. The next refueling outage is scheduled to begin
June 6.
Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator 00S (during performance
of SVI-R43-T1317, it was determined that it took 11.2 seconds
for the engine to reach a speed of 441 rpm.
Division 1 Diesel
Generator was declared inoperable at 0519, 5/13/87.)
Tornado watch in effect
RCS DEI:
0.17 uCi/gm
RCS Leakage:
1.5 gpm unidentified
TIP "D" is inoperable, and scheduled for replacement at 1000
today
MSIV Leakage Control Blower E32-C001 was declared inoperable at
0317 this morning due to the failure of SVI-E32-T1201
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0705 Tornadcs sighted in the area. National Weather Service
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upgrades the tornado watch to a tornado warning.
0715 Tornado touches down in the northwest corner of the site near
the switchyard, taking down the Perry-Eastlake tie line.
Control Room indications and notifications from SOC confirm the
loss of the power line. A security guard will also report the
sighting of the funnel cloud on-site.
Shift Supervisor
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declares an Unusual Event based on the tornado touching down on
site.
0800 Turbine trip due to high vibration; reactor scram, increased
RCS leakage (approx. 75 gpm).
(The leakage is from a ruptured
3/4" instrument line in the containment. As the leakage
continues, and, later, when the SRVs begin to relieve to the
suppression pool, the pressure in the containment will be
partially diverted back to the drywell by way of the vacuum
breaker. There is no leak in the drywell, even though the
drywell pressure will increase due to the backflow through this
vacuum breaker.) When the turbine bypass valves cycle as a
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result of the turbine trip, the sparger/downcomer fails,
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falling into the condenser tube nest, and damaging several
tubes. Condenser vacuum begins to gradually decrease. The
Reactor Recire. Pumps will fail to transfer to slow speed when
the scram occurs; this unanalyzed transient will worsen the
existing cladding leakage, and cause additional gap activity to
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be released to the coolant. When the Control Room Operators
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take action to manually shift the pumps, the action will be
successful'.
0805 High Conductivity Alarm: Hotwell-(due to tube failures).
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0810 The Emergency Coordinator declares an Alert based on RCS
leakage in excess of 50 gpm. The TSC and OSC are activated.
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0815 Operators start RCIC manually to assist in level restoration,
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and RHR "A" is placed in Suppression Pool Cooling.
0820 MSIVs and turbine bypass valves isolate on low vacuum.
0825 2 SRVs open to relieve pressure and stick in a partially open
position.
(Approx. 600,000 lbm/hr. total flow).
0830 HPCS started manually to assist in level restoration.
0835 HPCS trips and remains 00S for the duration of the exercise.
1E51-F063 fails to shut automatically, but
operators are successful in manual isolation from the Control
Room. There are now no high pressure injection systems
available.
0915 RPV water level below TAF (0").
Emergency Coordinator declares
a Site Area Emergency. The EOF and JPIC are activated. During
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the next hour, while the core remains uncovered, some
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additional cladding damage will occur.
1015 Pressure decreases below LPCS/LPCI shutoff head. RPV reflooded
to approx. 200".
Operators begin preparations to initiate
1045 Shutdown cooling line up complete and flow initiated.
Small
leak develops in the shutdown cooling suction line, in the
"B" RHR room.
1055 Double-ended rupture of the shutdown cooling suction line. RPV
is being drained into the "B" RHR room. Water flashes as it
drains from the ruptured pipe, and entrained noble gases from
the coolant are released to the RHR room environment.
1100 Unit i Vent Monitor indicates a significant increase in the
release rate to the environment. Emergency Coordinator should
declare a General Emergency based on the loss of all three
fission product barriers.
1115 Operators have lined up for alternate shutdown cooling.
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(Coolant is dumped to the suppression pool by way of the failed
open SRVs, and the decay heat is dissipated by the RHR. System,
whichislinedupforSuppressionPoolCooling)
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1215 Release of radioactive gases to the RHR room is reduced
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significantly when ths Reactor Coolant System is cooled below
212 degrees, and d2 pressurized.
The participants will be allowed to isolate the rupture any
time after this point.
1230 Release to the environment is essentially terminated when the
remaining noble gases in the RHR room are exhausted by the
ventilation system.
1245 SAS receives a sprinkler system flow initiation alarm
indicating a potential fire in the loading area on the 620'
elevation of the Radwaste Building.
1250 SAS/ Control Room receive verification of a working fire at the
above location. The PNPP Fire Brigade is toned out to respond.
1300 Fire Brigade Leader reports that a PNPP fire fighter has been
injured, and requests assistance from the Perry Township Fire
Department, in transporting the injured person for off-site
medical treatment.
1400 RMTs return to the EOF: one RMT member is found to be
contaminated. Decontamination efforts proceed at the EOF.
Fire is extinguished. When the Emergency Coordinator receives
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adequate information re the status of the injured fire fighter
at the hospital, he may consider termination of the emergency
and initiation of recovery discussions.
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1500 Exercise terminated at the discretion of the Lead Exercise
Controller, after receiving confirmation that all exercise
objectives have been satisfactorily demonstrated.
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7.3 NARRATIVE SUMMARY
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Plant conditions postulated to exist at the onset of the 1987 Emergency
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Preparedness Exercise include the following: Unit 1 is near the end of
core life, after continuously operating the equivalent of 14 full power
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months. The next refueling outage is scheduled to begin June 6.
The
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Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator was declared inoperable this
morning due to a failure to reach operating rpm within the specified
amount of time. There is currently 1.5 gpm unidentified leakage from the
Reactor Coolant System, and the National Weather Service has issued a
Tornado Watch for the area surrounding the Perry Plant.
Other
miscellaneous items of equipment (not significant to the sequence of
events) are out of service, as specified in Section 7.2 of this manual.
Immediately after the exercise is initiated, the Tornado Watch is
upgraded to a Tornado Warning due to numerous sightings of funnel clouds
in the area. Fifteen minutes after initiation of the exercise (0715), a
tornado will be observed on-site, and take down the Perry-Eastlake
transmission line. Upon receipt of the information regarding the tornado
on-site, the Shift Supervisor should declare an UNUSUAL EVENT, implement
the appropriate cuergency plan implementing instructions, and initiate
notifications to off-site agencies and CEI management.
Investigations
for additional damage caused by the tornado will continue.
At 0755, the Control Room will receive indications of increasing
vibration on the Main Turbine.
In accordance with applicable procedures,
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the operators will attempt to reduce turbine load / speed to correct the
problem, but at 0800, it will trip on high vibration. The turbine trip
results in a reactor scram, and when the turbine bypass valves cycle open
to relieve excess pressure to the condenser, the tailpipe /downcomer on
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one of the valves will fall into the condenser tube nest, causing damage
to several tubes, and leakage of some Cire. Water into the condenser.
The scram transient also causes the, leakage from the RCS to increase to
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about 75 gpm.
This leakage is postulated to be from a 3/4" i strument
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sensing line in the containment, and will be identified to the Control
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Room by two annunciators: one in the Control Room, and one in the Rad
Waste Control Room. As this leakage is identified and quantified, the
Emergency Coordinator will declare an ALERT, initiate appropriate
notifications, and activate the TSC and OSC.
Following the scram / turbine trip transient, the Reactor Feed Pumps will
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trip as condenser vacuum decreases, and the Motor Feed Pump fails to
start.
In an attempt to maintain RPV water level, the operators will
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start the RCIC pump.
After the MSIVs and bypass valves isolate on low
condenser vacuum, the RPV pressure will increase until the first two SRVs
lift.
Both these SRVs will fail in a partially open position; operators
will be unable to shut either of them.
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Over the next several minutes, both divisions of SRV solenoids will be
Icst; the operators will be unable to operate the valves electrically.
Approximately five minutes after the HPCS Pump is started to
restore / maintain water level, it will trip, and repair activities will
not be successful in returning it to service before the fuel is
uncovered.
Shortly thereafter, the RCIC turbine will isolate when the
steam supply line ruptures.
One of the isolation valves (F063) will fail
to completely close, but operators will be able to close it from the
switch in the Control Room when they attempt to do so.
All high-pressure injection systems have been disabled, and since the
SRVs are not electrically operable, the operators cannot depressurize to
enable any low pressure systems.
RPV water level will decrease due, to
the leakage out the stuck-open SRVs and the smaller leak out the
instrument line in the containment. Approximately thirty minutes later,
level will reach 0" (Top of Active Fuel), and the Emergency Coordinator
will declare a Site Area Emergency. The EOF and JPIC will be activated
at this time, if they haven't already been activated.
(Note that, even
though there is not a leak in the drywell, drywell pressure has
increased, due to flow through the containment-to-drywell vacuum breaker,
as containment pressure increases from the leaks). During the next hour,
while the fuel remains uncovered, it is postulated that inadequate
cooling results in additional cladding damage, and the release of some
gap activity (1 to 5%) to the coolant.
By 1015, RPV pressure has decreased below LPCS/LPCI shutoff head, and the
RPV is quickly reflooded to 200".
The reflooding will depressurize the
RPV and operators should begin preparations in initiate Shutdown Cooling.
As Shutdown Cooling flow is initiated, a rupture occurs in the
20" suction line, and the RPV begins draining to the "B" RHR room. The
Unit i Vent monitor will reflect a significant release of radioactivity
to the environment, as the gases released in the RHR Room are exhausted
by the ventilation system. The Emergency Coordinator will declare a
GENERAL EMERGENCY based on the loss of all three fission product
barriers.
Concurrent with the initial declaration of the General Emergency, EOF
participants will provide the automatic (default) protective action
recommendation:
Shelter within a two-mile radius of the plant, and in
Sectors J, K, and L five miles downwind. Between 11:15 and 11:30, the
Unit One Vent will reflect a sharp increase in the release rate, and new
dose projections will result in an upgraded protective action
recommendation:
evacuate within a two-mile radius of the plant and
continue sheltering out to five miles in Sectors J, K, and L.
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By 1215 in the afternoon, the RPV has been. cooled.below 212 degrees, and
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the release of gases to the "B" RHR Room will be essentially terminated.
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The release of radioactivity to the environment will continue until'all
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the gases have been exhausted from the Aux. Bldg., approximately fifteen-
minutes later. . Efforts to repair and close one of the failed - open
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isolation valves (F008 and F009) will be allowed to be successful anytime
after this.
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At approximately 1245, SAS will receive a flow' initiation alarm on the
sprinkler system in the loading area of the 620' elevation of the Rad
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Waste Bldg. An electrical short in a cable run has started some
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protective clothing and low level waste on fire. Once the fire has been
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verified, the Fire. Brigade will be toned out to fight the fire; one of
the PNPP firefighters will be injured as he approaches the scene of the
fire, and will require transportation to a local hospital (Lake County
East) for treatment. Due to minor levels of airborne radioactivity at
the scene of the fire, he will be found to be contaminated, but the
severity of his injuries will dictate that he be transported before
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decontamination efforts can be completed.
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After arrival of the Perry Township Fire Department, the fire will be
-brought under control and put out.
Shortly thereafter, after the
radiation levels in the EPZ have returned to. background, and the RMTs
have been recalled to the EGF, one of the Team members and his vehicle
will be found to be contaminated, and will be decontaminated in
accordance the appropriate procedures.
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By this time (approximately 1400), reentry and recovery discussions
should be in progress.
The exercise will be terminated by the Lead Exercise Controller after he
has received confirmation from his Controller organization that all
objectives have been satisfactorily demonstrated (approx. 1500).
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