Text

Responds to 870901 Ltr Re EIS for Meltdown of Large Reactors & NRC Compliance W/Nepa.As Result of TMI-2 Accident on 790329,NRC Included Class 9 Accidents in Assessments in Fes Re Licensing of Plants.Related Info Encl
	ML20235R852
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island, Seabrook, 05000000
Issue date:	09/30/1987
From:	Murley T; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Piercebjorklun; AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
Shared Package
ML20235R855	List: ML20235R852; ML20235R856; ML20235T734;
References
	NUDOCS 8710080207
	Download: ML20235R852 (42)
	v • d • e

- _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - . .

( '

/

? SEP 3 01987 t'

Ms. Patricia Pierce-Bjorklund 15 Spring Street Essex, Massachusetts 01929 4

Dear Ms. Pierce-Bjorklund:

I have been asked to respond to your letter of September 1,1987 to , ,

Chairman Zech,.in which you raised a number of qQestions regarding an i

" environmental impact statement for meltdown of large reactors" and NRC compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA1 In keeping with the NEPA, the NRC issued Title 10 of the CNe of Federal /

Regulations Part 51, which defines the environmental protection requirements /

applicable to NRC's domestic licensing and related regulatory functions. This J regulation, which implements section 102(2) of the NEPA of 1969, as amended, requires the NRC to write environmental impact statements for the construction and operation of commercial nuclear reactors. ,

1 From the time the NRC implemented the NEPA until 1980, in preparing the Final Environmental Statement (FES) issued in connection,vith the licensing of a commercial nuclear power plant, the NRC staff considered various classes of accidents (from trivial incidents commonly referbed to45 Class 1 accidents to the design-basis accident referred to as a Class 8 accident). The March 29, 1979 accident at Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear plant emphasized the need for changes in NRC policies regarding the consideration given to more severe kinds of low probability accidents in the environmental impact assessments .'

required by the NEPA (refer to enclosed 45 FR 40101 published 6/13/80). These accidents, which involve substantial physical deterioration of the fuel in the reactor core (including overheating to the point of melting) and deterioration i of the capability of the containment structure to perform its intended function 1 of limiting'the release of radioactive materials to the environment, are commonly referred to as Class 9 accidents (these are more severe than the Class 8 design-basis accident).

Therefore, as a result of TMI, beginning in 1980, the'NRC staff included the Class 9 accidents in its assessments in the FESS reltted to the licensing of commercial nuclear power plants. For your information because you have previously expressed an interest in the Seabrook plant, I have enclosed a copy of those pages in the Seabrook FES that deal with the Class 9 accidsnts.

, b 9

ef y /'

0$0N SE88@da 3 o

fy g~ jw v3vY

C ~t , ,% A s

'4 h ,f S.,. '8 .

4 j{ j *)

h if .. ).,

. .~f1 ,

N> f 5 2

- d qq ,y 4<

g ;d e:Qf ;

,i 3 .d"n t/Thi FES for a nuclea6 power plant is avcilable in the NRC Public Document R

,' 1717 H Street, NW, W6shington, D.C. 20555 and at the local Public Document Room near'the plant site. The FES for the Seabrook plant was issued'in December.1982, and the Exeter Public Library (its Local Public Document Room), 47 Front Street, l'Aeter,MH sh6ald.have a copy available.

3, . ..

W ' g j- '"s.

S

^; a Sincerely,

~

o 1

/; f a.

Thomas E. Murley, Dir .ctor i

Office of Nuclear j, -

actor Regulation i

A

, i Distribution:

i See next page ai l . *See previous conc rrence l 9 j 10FC :ACTD :AD/DRP* :D/DRP :ADP :DDONRR :DDONRR

!.....:. .p.IR.r---:------------:-----------:----------:------------:-----------:-----------

PDI-3*ARP/ PPM 9*-

lNAME: (lm .: Tech Ed :BBrtjer :SV ga :FMiraglia. :JSniezek :TMurley

)....:..........:............:............:.

LOATE :09///JP7 09/.,/87 ,:09/ /87 : ../ /87 :04/ /87 :09/ /87 :09/ /87 1 : OFFICIAL RECORD COPT

l; M ~

p i sl O n i f

B o c,-

l' h /

, f

___.____.___.___..l...--

C j- j, d.

Lc. -

. Ms. Patricia PierceJBjorklund

' l 5 Spring Street-ssex, Massachusetts 01929

Dear s. Pierce.Bjorklund:

1.have en asked to respond to your letter of September 1,1987 to Chairman Zech, in hich you raised a number of questions regarding an " environmental impact sta ment for meltdown of large reactors" and NRC compliance with the National Env ronmental Policy Act (NEPA).

-InkeepingwiththeNEPN,theNRCissued Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 1, which defines the environmental protection requirements.

applicable to NRC' domestic licensing and related regulatory functions. This regulation, which im lements section 102(2) of the NEPA of 1969, as amended, requires the.NRC to w te environmental impact statements for the constructiam and operation of comer ial nuclear reactors. The Final Environmental Statements ,

(FES) for each reactor a available in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20555 nd. at the Local-Public Document Room near the plant site. In the past you have own interest in the Seabrook and Pilgrim.

plants. The FES for the Seab ok plant was issued in December 1982, and the Exeter Public Library (its Loca Public Document Room), 47 Front Street,-Exeter NH should have a copy available. For Pilgrim, the FES was issued in May 1972, and the Plymouth Public Library (i local Public Document Room), 11 North j i

Street, Plymouth, MA should have a c y available.

incerely, i

Steve A. Varga, Director i Divisio of Reactor Projects I/II I

' Office o Nuclear Reactor Regulation Distribution:

See next page OFC :ACT IR/PDI-3: ARM /PPMB :D :A :D/DRP : : :

. __.: .,.......:.....__.g..:.... ... ...: ...___:......__ ...:............:....____...

NAME ses:Im :TechEd) :STurk oger :SVarga : :

DATE:09/W/87- :09/21/87

/8

09 :09/p87 :09/ /87 : :

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

s ,

'}l: '

s t Patricia Pierce-B. Yklund e r a

.4-The FES for a nuclear power plant is available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, W, Washington, D.C. 20555.and at the Local Public Document Room near the plant site. The FES for the Seabrook plant was issued in December 1982, and the Exeter Public Library (its Local Public Docum m t Room), 47 Front Street, Exeter, NH should have a copy available.

Sincerely, Original signed S Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

s 45FR40101 DISTRIBUU ON:

{DocketMUe NRC PDR Local PDR ED0 #003162 EDO R/F TMurley/JSneizek FMiraglia PDI-3 R/F SVarga (2)

BBoger VNerses MFairtile OGC-Bethesda GPA/CA-(3)

SECY (3)

RStarostecki JFunches JBlaha DMossburg

See previous concurrence i J OFC .:ACTDIR

,(c......:....../PDI-3*

> ARM /PPMB^

AD/ORP^ :D/DRP

ADP \ :DDONR :DDON

..}..... . . ..., __ _ _ ...

...!.$[.'!! .. _f.! $

DATE 09/ /87 __!!$$........!.$.9$$......:..........!....f

$09/ /87 $09/ /87 : 9/J.3/87 9/i.3/8 096b/l7 $09M/s7 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY V

/ /

.a:

i_._i_._..___- 2 - -

k l

Federal Register / Vol. 45 No.116 / Friday June 13, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 40101 1

8. Section 113.93 is amended by analysis of results of titrations of the sequences that can result in inadequate revising paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) to challenge material. The vaccinates and cooling of reactor fuel and to melting of 4 reed: controls shall be observed for 3 days the reactor core. In this regard, attention postchellenge and all deaths recorded. shall be given both to the probability of

*

occurrence of such releases and to the

,I,,g, 113.93 Clostrid6um Novyt Bactorin. *

i (21 U.S.C.151 and 154: 37 FR 2844,24646; 38 environmental txmsequences of such Ill19141) releases. his statement of interim ICI , , , Done at Washington. D.C., this eth day of policy is taken in coordination with (1) Each of at least 8 but not more lune 19eo. ok ongoW utelskd acdvihe than 10 guinea pigs. each welphing 300 R. P. Jones, that are directly related to accident to 500 grams, shall be injecte Act/ng Deputy Admin /stmror, veterinary considerations in the areas of plant i subcutaneously with a guinea ig dose. Serv /ces. design, operational safety, siting policy. -

A r,econd guinea is dose shal be p mrru.a n.me4sno and emergency planning. The suasoco e34w a+= Commisalon intends to continue the dose i es ph one- rulemaking on this matter when new fifth of the bse recomm! ended on these shal siting requirements and other safety label for a calf. NUCLEAR REGULATORY relsted requirements incorporating (2) Clostrid/um novy / challenge COMMtSSION accident considerations are in place, material, available upon request from Veterinary Services, shall be used for 10 CFR Parts 50 and 51 OATrs:His statement of interim policy challenge 14 to ts days following the is effective June 13.1980 Comment last infection of the product.Each of Nuclear Power Plant Accident period expires September 11,1980. '

eight vaccinates and each of five Conalderations Under the National additional nonveccinated guines pigs for Environmental Polley Act of 1969 Aponessts:Re Commission intends controls shall be injected the interim policy guidance contained Aceaecr. U.S Nuclear Regulatory herein to be immediately effective. /

intramuscularly with approximately 100 Commission

% of challenge material.This dose However, all interested persons who AcTtosc Statement of Interim Policy, desire to submit written comments or shall be determined by statistical analysis of results of titrations of the suussARY:The Nuclear Regulatory suggestions for cons!deration in challenge material. The vaccinates and Commission (NRC) is revising its policy connection with this statement should i ,

i controls shall be observed for 3 days for considering the more severe kinds of send them to the Secretary of the postchallenge and all deaths recorded. very low probability accidents that are Commission. U.S. Nudear Regulatory physically possible in environmental Commission. Washington, D.C. 20555. ..

9. Section 113.94 is amended by impact assessments required by the Attention: Docketing and Service revising the introduc'ory portion of National Environmental Polley Act Branch. :

paragraph (c) and paragraphs (c)(1) and (NEPA). Such accidents are commonly con runTwen mponesarsoes coerrAcT:

(c)(2) to read: referred to as Class 9 accidents, R. Wayne Houston, Chief. Accident foll wing an accident classification Evaluation Branch Office of Nuclear g i13.94 clostrwm sordenn sectertn. scheme proposed by the Atomic Energy Reactor Regulation. U.S. Nudear Commission (predecessor to NRC)in Regulatory Commission Washington.

1971 for purposes of implementing D.C. 20555. Telephone: (301) 492.-7323.

(c) Potency test. Bulk or final NEPA.'The March 28,1979 accident at container samples of completed product Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island nuclear smassman massamme from cach serial shallbe tested for plant has emphasized the need for %ddent Conaldaretions in Past NEPA potency by one of the followin8 changes in NRC policies regarding the A .iews methods: A host animal test wrf tten into considerations to be given to serious the filed Outline of Production, or the De DmPosed Annex b Apy ndix D ; l accidents from an environmental as well two-stage test provided in thJs as a safety point of view. of10 CFR Part 50(hereafter the I paragraph. This statement ofinterim policy Annex") was published for comment on December 1,1971 by the (former)

(1) Each of at least 8 but not more announces the withdrawalof the Atomic Energy Commisalon. It proposed than 10 guines pigs. each weighing 300 proposed Annex to Appendix D of to to 500 grams, shall be injected CFR Part 50 and the suspension of the to specify a set of standardized accident subcutaneously with a guines pig dose. rulemaking proceeding that began with assumptions 6 be used in A second guines pig dose shall be the publication of that proposed Annex Environmental Reports submitted by injected 21 to 23 days after the first on December 1,1971.1t is the applicants for construction permits or dose. Each guines pig dose shall be one. Commission's position that its operating licenses for nuclear power Environmentallmpact Statements shall reactors. it also included a system for fifth of the dose recommended on the label for a calf. dessifying accidents accerding to a ;

indude considerations of the site.

(2) Clostridium sordelli / challenge specific environmentalimpaets graded scale of severity and probability l material, evallable upon request from attributable to accident sequences that of occunence. Nine desses of accidents Veterinary Services, chall be used for were defined, ranging from trivial to i lead to releases of radiation and/or challenge 14 to 15 days following the radioactive materials, including very serious. It directed that "for each second injectbn of the product. Each of dass, exoopt datoes 1 and 9, the eight vaccinates and each of five irmpo 4 .a Ann.: me cm Pari sa environmental consequences shall be additional nonvaccinated guinea pige for Appendia n as m assat.m comu inianWEPA. evaluated as indicated." Qass 1 events -

l 6"P l a'antsas resations ** **t=ewatfr gr were not to be canaldered because of controls shall be in}ected intramuscularly with approximately 100 'j[%"DZ[.,P*"Q' their trivial consequences, whereas in regard to Cass e events, the Annex W of challenge material,his dose Ame i..un under son we uas *

as m shall be determined by statistical ases. stated as follows:

- _ - l

40102 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No.116 / Friday, June 13, 1980 / Rules and Regulations within a 50-mile radius of the plant, and body on which the plant floats. Here the Tha occurrences in Class 9 involve staff emphasized its focus on risk to the sequsnece of postulated successive failures some differences between boiling water more severe than those postulated for the reactors (BWR) and pressurized water environment but did not find that the d and reactors (PWR). Beyond these few probability of a core melt event

, j',$'y,','gC.'$1r specifics, the discussions have occurring in the first place was consequinoes could be sevm. However, the reiterated the guldance of the Annex essentially any different than for land-probability of their occurrence is so smalt and have relled upon the Annex's based plant. In its Memorandum and that their environmental risk is extremely Order in the Matter of Offshore Power low. Defante in depth (multiple physical conclusion that the probability of Systems.* the Commission concurred in berrists). quality assurance for design, occurrence of a Class 9 event is too low the staff's judgment.Thus, the Reactor manufseture, and operation, continued to warrant consideration, a conclusion based upon generally stated safety Safety Study and NRC experience with survettlance and testing, and conservative dulgn are att applied to provide and these cases has served to refocus considerations. attention on the need to reemphasize maintain the required high degree of With the publication of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). in draft that environmental risk entails both el as are a t re ein s f iny mote form in August 1974 and final form in probabilities and consequences, a point in probability that the environmental risk to that was made in the publication of the October 1975, the accident discussions extremely low. For these reasons. it is not Annex, but was not given adequate nscessary to discusa such events in in EnvironmentalImpact Statements applicants' Environmental Reports. beEan to refer to this first detailed study emphasis. in July 1977 the NRC commissioned a of the risks ossociated with nuclear Risk Assessment Review Group "to A footnote to the Annex stated: power plant accidents, particularly Although this annex refers to applicant's events wh!ch can lead to the melting of clarify the achievements and limitations of the Reactor Safety Study." One of the a su ptIons an o h r provis e creof are the fuelinside a reactor.' The references conclusions of this study, published in to this study were in keeping with the September 1978, as NUREC/CR 0400, applicable.except as the content may intent and spirit of NEPA "to disclose" otherwise require, to AEC draft and final " Risk Assessment Review Group Report Detalled Statements.

relevant information. but it is obvious to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory that WASH-1400 did not form the basie Commission." was that "The Review During the public comment period that for the conclusion expressed in the followed publication of the Annex a Annex in 1971 that the probability of Group was unable to determine whether the absolute probabilities of accident number of criticisms of the Anner were occurrence of Class 9 events was too eiv d. Principal among these were sequences in WASH-1400 are high or low to warrant their (site. specific) low, but believes that the error bounds consideration under NEPA. on those estimates are in general, (1)The phiiosophy of prescribing The Commission's staff has, however, tons oes not lead to objective greatly understated." This and other a identified in certain cases unique findings of the Review Group have also (2)lt biled to treat the probabilitiesmore of circumstances which it felt subsequently been referred to in warranted extensive and detailed Environmental Impact Statements, along accidents in any but the most general consideration of Class 9 events.One of with a reference to the Commission's these was the proposed Clinch River policy statement on the Reactor Safety w,h ( No supporting analysis was given Breeder Reactor Plant (CRBRP), a liquid to show that Class 9 accfdents are Study inlight of the Risk Assessment metal cooled fast breeder reactor very Review Group Report, published o,n sufficiently low in probability that their different from the more conventional January 18,1979.The Commission s consequences in terms of environmental light water reactor plants for which the statement accepted the fir. dings of the risks need not be discussed safety experience base is much broader. Review Group, both as to the Reactor (4) No guidance was iven as to how In the Final Environmental Statement S d s achievements and as to cecident and normal refeases of for the CRBRP.: the staff included a IQt b '

radioactive effluents during plant discussion of the consideration it had A few Draft En'vironmental operation should be factored into the given to Class 9 events. Statements have been published cost benefit analysis. in the early site review for the (5) The accident assumptions are not subsequent to the Three Mile Island Perryman site, the staff performed an accident. These were for conventional sinerally applicable to gas cooled or Informal assessment of the relative land-based light wster reactor plants hquid metal cooled reactors.

differences in Class 9 accident and continued to reflect the past (e) Safety and environmental risks are consequences among the alternative practice with respect to accidents at not essentially different considerations.

Neither the Atomic Energy s!tes. (SECY-%137) such plants, but noted that the Commission not the NRC took any in the case of the app!! cation by experience gained from the Three Mile further action on this rulemaking except Offshore Power Systems to manufacture Island accident was not factored into floating nuclear power plants. the staff the discussion '

in 1974 when to CFR Part 51 was promulgated. Over the intervening years judged that the environmental risks of Our experience with past NEPA some Class 9 events warranted special reviews of accidents and the TMI the accident considerations discussed in consideration.The special Environmental Impact Statements for accident clearly leads us to believe that circumstances were the potentially a change is needed.

proposed nuclear power plants reflected serious consequences associated with Accordingly, the proposed Annex to the guidance of the Annex with few exceptions. Typically, the discussions of water (liquid) pathways leading to Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 50, published radiological exposures if a molten on December 1.1971. is hereby accident consequences through Class a (d: sign basis accidents) for each case reactor core were to fallinto the water withdrawn and shall not hereafter be have reflected specific site used by appilcants nor by the staff.The

'It lohnwet that the Ructm Sa'ety Study reasons for the withdrawal are as characteristics associated with meteorology (the dispenlon on nicases follows:

J cf radioactive material (ato the

['j'E..i,*",,"*.,*.',ii

.w .t .e, .oaant,M,"3'$'jy"'.,

e NtMC-ah February ton. 'Dode% Sp.m Sepember MsS atmosphere), the actual population

M -- --

\

Federal. Register / Vol. 45 No.116 / Friday, June 13, 1980 / Rules and Regulations # 183

%e environmental consequences of issued Statements, nor, absent a

1. The Annex proscribes consideration of the kinds of accidents releases whose probability of occurence showing of similar special circumstances, as a basis for opening, (Class 9) that, azording to the Reactor has been estimated shall also be discussed in probabilistic terms. Such reopening or expanding any predous or Safety Study, dominate the accident consequences shall be characterized in ongoing promeding.'

risk. However,it is also the Intent of the

2. De definition of Class 9 accidents terms of potential radiological in the Annex is not sufficiently precise exposures to individuals, to population Commission that the staff take steps to to warrant its further use in Commission groups, and, where applicable, to biota. identify additional cases that might pohey, rules, and regulations, nor as a Health and safety risks that may be warrant early consideration of either decision criterion in agency practice. associated with exposures to people additional features or other actions

3. The Annex a prescription of sh611 be discussed in a manner that which would prevent or mitigate the assumptions to be used in the analysis fairly reflects the current state of consequences of serious sa:fdents.

of the environmental consequences of knowledge regarding such risks. Cases for such consideration are those accidents does not contribute to Socioeconomic impacts that might be for which a Final Environmental objective consideration. associated with emergency measures Statement has already been issued at

4. The Annex does not ve adequate during or following an accident should the Construction Permit stage but for consideration to the detal ed treatment also be discussed.The environmental which the Operating unse review of rnessures taken to prevent and to stage has not yet been reached. In l risk of accidents should also be '

mitigate the consequences of accidents compared to and contrasted with carrying out this directive, the staff in the safety review of each application. radiological risks associated with should consider relevant site features.

ne classification of accidents normal and anticipated operational including pulation denalty, associated onger relesses. with acci nt risk in comparison to such

(,P,, f*ph x(h in pr mulgating this interim guidance, features at presently operating plants. l interim idance is given for the the Commission is aware that there are Staff should also consider the likelihood treatmen of accident risk and willlikely remain for some time to that substantive changes in plant design considerations in NEpA reviews. come many uncertainties in the features which may manmate further application of risk assessment methods, for adverse site features may be more Accident Considerations in Future easily incorporated in plants when NEPA Reviews and it expects that its Environmental impact Statements will identify major construction has not yet progressed very it is the position of the Commission uncertainties in its probabuistic far.

that its EnvironmentalImpact Environmental Reporta submitted by I estimates. On the other hand the Statements, pursuant to Section 102(c)(1) Commission believes that the state of applicants for construction permits and of the National Environmental Policy the art is sufficiently advanced that a for operating licenses on or after fufy 1.

Act of1960, shallinclude a reasoned 1980 should include a discussion of the beginning should now be made in the consideration of the environmental risks use of these methodologies in the environmental risks associated with (impacta) attributable to accidents at the regulatory process, and that such use accidents thatt follows the guidance 3 particular facility or facilities widdn the will represent a constructive and rational given herein.

scope of each such statement. In the forward step in the discharge ofits analysis and discussion of such risks, Related Policy Matters Under 4 responsibilities. Cualdh approximately equal attention shall be !

it is the intent of the Commission in in addition to its responsibilities given to the probability of occurrence of issuing this Statement of Interim Policy releases and to the probability of that the staff willinitiate treatments of under NEPA. the NRC also bears occurrence of the environmental accident considerations, in accordance responsibility under the Atomic Energy consequences of those releases, Act for the protection of the public with the foregoing guidance,in its Releases refer to radiation and/or health and safety from the hazards radioactive materials entering ongoing NEpA reviews, i.e., for any I proceeding at a licensing stage where a associated with the use of nuclear environmental exposure pathways, energy. Pursu nt to this responsibility Final Environmental Impact Statement including air, water, and ground water. the Commission notes that there are Events or accident sequences that has not yet been issued. These new treatments, whicHawill take into account currently a number of ongoing activities lead to releases shallinclude but not be being considered by the Commission limited to those that can reasonably be significant site and plantapecific and its staff which intimately relate to expected to occur. In. plant accident features, will result in more detailed the " Class 9 accident" question and sequences that can lend to a spectrum of discussions of accident risks than in which are either the subject of current releases shall be discussed and shall previous envirortmental statements, rulemaking or are candidate subjects for include sequences that can result in particularly for those related to rulemaking.

inadequate cooling of reactor fuel and to conventionallight water plants at land. On December 19,1979 the melting of the reactor core.The extent to based sites. It is expected that these Commission issued for public comment

which events arising from causes revised treatments willlead to external to the plant which are conclusions regarding the environmental a proposed rule which would significantly revise its requirements in

) considered possible contril,ators to the riske of accidents similar to those that to CFR Part 50 for emergency planning risk associated with the particular plant would be reached by a continuation of current practices, particularly for cases for nuclear power planta. One of the g shall also be discussed. Detailed considerations in this rulemaking was quantitative considerations that form involving special circumstances where the basis of probabilistic estimates of Class 9 risks heve been considered by acomno non r.cinnaky and nattard di y the staff, as described above.'Ihus, this 9

releases need not be incorporated in the Environmentallmpact Statements but change in policy is not to be construed g g , gaff g*g as any lack of confidence ir. conclusions ,%,,4,4 ,,,,,%,,,,,

shall be referenced therein. Such po.iuo cs s-u-s references shallinclude, ea spplicable, regardir4 the enviromnental risks of r accidents expressed in any previously *es m mer.

reports on safety evaluations,

40104 Federal Register / Vol. 45 No.116 / Friday, June 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. resellers and reseller retailers of the potential consequences of Class 9 gasoline. Generally, the new rules eccidrnte in a generic sense.' Samuel l. Ch!Ik.

Secirrary of the Comminion.

permit resellers and reseller-retailers to in August 3979, pursuant to the compute maximum lawful selling prices Commission's request, a Siting Policy in on.so inu nw ti-an ses.mi based on the acquisition cost of the type Task Force made recommendations with suaso caos ruo.u-as or grade of gasoline, plus a fixed cents respect to possible changes in NRC per gallon markup depending on the reactor siting policy and criteria,a e of sale, plus tax conts.'The new currently sei forth in to CFR Part 100. As DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY tqu r es an simuar to the ntauer price stated therein. its recommendations Economic Regulatory Administration rules adopted in July tir79.

were made to accomplish (among Under the new rules, acquisition cost gog g.~

10 CFR Ports 210,212 is' defined as the last purchase price for o ke into con d rat on ln siting the risk seUen w gasobe sab of 5 InMon associatzd with accidents beyond the design (Docket No. ERA-R-79-32El gallons or less in calendar year 1979. For basis (Cl:ss 9) by establishing population sellers with sales of more than 5 million denstiy an i distribution criten*- Rosellers' and Receher-Retailers' Price one of ga o in da r "this matter is currently before the Rules for GasoHne , I' n de Commission- Acesscr. Economic Regulatory cost of product in inventory computed This and other recommendations that Administration. Department of Energy, pursuant to the seller's historical have been made as a result of the acy,oec Final rule. accounting practices consistently invsstig2tions into the Three Mile Island applied.'

tecident are currently being brought sUMMAnt.The Department of Energy Generally, the retailer price rules tog 2ther by the Commission's staff in (DOE) hereby adopts three amendments adopted in July 1979 permit retailers to the form of proposed Action Plans.' to its reseller and reseller-retaller price alter their normal business practices Among other matters, these incorporate rules. First, small resellers and reseller- with respect to sales of gasoline.The recommendations for rulemaking related retailers (sales in calendar year 1979 of new resener retailer rules do not contain to degraded core cooling and core melt 5 million gallons of gasoline or less) are a almilar provision. However, in most eccidents. The Commission expects to permitted the option of computing other respects the July 1979 price rules

" acquisition cost" using the firm's for independent retailers and the new issue decisions on these Action Plans in reseller retailer price rules are similar.

the naar future. it is the Commission's historical accounting practices policy and intent to devote NRC's major consistently appliad. Second, the normal ofincreased Finally, the restriction on the amount business practices rule is amended to commissions that may be resources to matters which the passed through in price increases by Commission believes will make existing treat reseller-retailers conalstently with independent retailers with respect to refiners was removed. In doing so, end future nuclear power plants safer, retall gasoline sales. Third, the however, the provision that permitted end to prevent a recurrence of the kind refiners an exception to the equal ciaccident that occurred at Three Mile exception to the refiner equal Island. In the interim. however, and application rule regarding retail sales by application rule to reflect increased consignee agents is reinstated. commissions in the retail selling price pending completion of rulemaking charged by comtnission agents was cetivities in the areas of emergency Dart: Effective May 1,1980.

deleted.

pl:nning. siti criteria, and design and pon PunTNem twPonMAtlOM C0ff7ACP.

" II. Amendments Robert C. Gillette (&aring Procedures),

erations of e ous ent Economic Regulatory Administration, Comments received by DOE since the potential, the Commission finds it Room 2214,2000 M Street. NWa issuance of the rule indicate that a few essIntial to improve its procedures for Washington. D.C. 20481 (202) 653-3757 small sellers would prefer to use the d: scribing and disclosing to the public William I. Webb (Office of Public cost of product in inventory rather than the basis for arriving at conclusions Information). Economic Regulatory the last purchase price to determine regarding the environmental risks due to Administration, Room 110-B 2000 M acquisition cost. Generally these sellers eccidrnts at nuclear power plants. On Street. NW., Washington, D.C. 20481 purchase product from more than one completion of the rulemaking activities supplier at widely varying prices.

in these areas, and based also upon the egulations and Chu e experience gained with this statement of Emergency Planning) Economic ,with rupset to niabhshina the maximum interim policy and guidance, the Regulatory Administration, Room t.wfui .eutns price for sesohol. which is the subleet Commission intends to pursue possible 7204,2000 M Street, NW., Washington. of a Notice of Proposed Rulemakins (45 FR HM&

changIs or additions to 10 CFR Part 51 M*y s2. tesok notwnhatandins sawenu m se D.C. 20461 (202) 653-3202 mainry in Sauulemaktna. the new price rules for to codify its position on the role of William Punk or William MaIo fee Bem *D" nunen and mienm pcma accid:nt risks under NEPA. (Office of GeneralCounsel). ""nce ee s*i blend suohot w natunh a maximum lewful untna price for suchot in a manner Nt Detal at Washington. D.C., this eth day of Department of Energy, Room 6A-127, 1000 Independence Avenue.SW., tm88 **s

ha' ad *1c*h*l * *P*"'** 'I june 19ea sesohol as separete products under the price rules.

Washington. D.C. 20585 (202) 252-6736 Accordingly, the acquistbon cost of nch is a eCf. NUREG est "Plannins Suu for the or 252-6754 component of the blende's maximum iswful sellina Dewispment of State and tocal Govemment pMee for geschol.

Radlolostcal Emergency Response Plans in Support SUPPLEMEDfT ARY INPonMAT10sc s!! a firm has consteteady and historically ned of LJght Wate Nuclear Power Plants." Novembet more than ode accounting precoce for determining I. Background !

1s'1L N cost of product in inwntory (ao one for DOre eNUREG-osta. " Report of the 86 ting Pohey task II. Amendments '

III. Procedural Requirements Erice rules and one for income tan purpowsk the Peros,* August str's. nre may choose et3her of these accounting ,

s Dreh WREG.cesa

Action Plans for procuces to determine b east of product la l implementing Recommendauens of the Presidenre

!. Background inventory under the new, f!aed marsin meeDer and Commtu6cn and Other Stu,d.iet of the ThG-2 On April 26,1980 (45 FR 29546. May 2. renner retene rule. m nim. of couru. mui ,

Accident." Decemba 1a 1 e 1980) DOE issued new price rulee for canaisiency apply that preettas under the new rule.

.e'

?. ,'

y . .

(' % "'s. -

Table 5.8 Approximate 2-hour radiation doses from design-basis accidents at exclusion area boundary Dose (rems) at 914 m*,

Events whole body

'refP Infrequent Accidents k Waste gas tank failure 0.1

i. Small-break LOCA** 0.04 1 Steam generator, tube 72)912 3g pi rupture *** 0.03

., y1 Limiting Faults

,a Main steamline break 0.0005 Control rod ejection 0.004 Large-break LOCA 1.04

Plant Exclusion Area Boundary Distance.

N **LOCA-Loss of Coolant Accident; the TMI-2 accident

,;.nfs was one kind of a small-break LOCA.

_ NA ***See NUREG-0651 for descriptions of three steam SM- generator tube rupture accidents that have

[.

2: . . ,

occurred in the United States.

3 g;,in10CFR100.11(a). The results of these calculations show that for these W . events the exposures are not expected to exceed 16 rems to the whole body and

[ $127 rems to the thyroid of any individual at the exclusion area boundary over a For calculation of the thyroid dose, it was assumed that an b,,%q.,periodof2 ycE hours. individual would be located at a point on the exclusion area boundar

! M'H!iradioiodine concentration in the plume has its highest value and inhaled at a M?M breathing rate characteristic of a person jogging, for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

" .The health risk to an individual receiving such a dose to the thyroid is the t .-

K+ . :.. potential appearance of benign or malignant thyroid nodules in about 6 out of U 100 cases, and the development of a fatal thyroid cancer in about 2 out of 1000 g Cases.

i f

f f g None of the calculations of the impacts of design-basis accidents described in

. dix. - this section takes into consideration possible reductions in individual or popu- !

?

M g "lation exposures as a result of any protective actions. j

~' I w^7" (2 ) Probabilistic Assessment of Severe Accidents Qig'"? -

lIn this and the following three sections, there is a discussion,of the prob-

' abilities and consequences of accidents of greater severity than the design-L - . basis accidents discussed in the previous section. As a class, they are con-y L' 'sidered less likely to occur, but their consequences could be more severe, both 1, .- for the plant itself and for the environment. These severe accidents, hereto- !

m,.

~

wye' frequently called Class 9 accidents, can be distinguished from design-

[,g basis accidents in two primary respects: they involve substantial physical k -I

'p.SeabrookFES 5-47 i G .. M , g

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____..._..________U

r j'

deterioration of the fuel in the reactor core, including overheating to the (

point of melting, and they involve deterioration of the capability of the con-tainment structure to perform its intended function of limiting the release of '

I radioactive materials to the environment. 4 l !

The assessment methodology employed is that described in the Reactor Safety :

Study (RSS), which was published in 1975 (NUREG-75/0M). Because this report "

has been subject to considerable controversy, a dis ussion of the uncertainties surrounding it is provided in Section 5.9.4.5(7). However, the sets of accident sequences that were found in the RSS to be the dominant contributors to the L risk in the prototype PWR (Westinghouse-designed Surry Unit 1) have recently been updated ("rebaselined") (NUREG-0715). The rebaselining has been done r largely to incorporate peer group comments (NUREG/CR-0400) and better data and j analytical techniques resulting from research and development af ter the publica- ~

tion of the RSS. Entailed in the rebaselining effort was the evaluation of the 'ti individual dominant accident sequences--as they are understood to evolve. The earlier technique of grouping a number of accident sequences into the encom- t passing " Release Categories" as was done in the RSS has been largely (but not i completely) eliminated.

i The Seabrook plants are Westinghouse-designed PWRs having similar design and operating characteristics to the RSS prototype PWR. Therefore, the present assessment for Seabrook has used as its starting point the rebaselined accident sequences and release categories referred to above, and more fully described in Appendix E. Characteristics of the sequences and release categories utied (all of which involve partial to complete melting of the reactor core) are shown in Table 5.9. Sequences initiated by natural phenomena such as tornadoes, floods, or seismic events and those that could be initiated by deliberate acts of sabo-tage are not included in these event sequences. It is the staff's judgment that the radiological consequences of such events would not be different in, kind from ,

those which have been treated. Moreover, there are design requirements in !

10 CFR 50, Appendix A, relating to effects of natural phenomena, and safeguards I requirements in 10 CFR 73, ensuring that these potential initiators are in large <i measure taken into account in the design and operation of the plant. The data base for assessing the probabilities of events more severe than the design bases j for natural phenomena or sabotage events is beyond the state-of-the-art of pro- '

babilistic risk assessment. In addition, the staff judges that the additional risk from severe accidents initiated by natural events or sabotage is within l the uncertainty of risks presented for the sequences considered here.

The calculated probability per reactor year associated with each accident sequence or release category used is shown in the second column in Table 5.9.

As in the RSS there are substantial uncertainties in these probabilities. This is due, in part, to difficulties associated with the quantification of human error and to inadequacies in the data base on failure rates of individual plant components that were used to calculate the probabilities (ibid). The probabil-ity of accident sequences from the Surry plant was used to give a perspective of the societal risk at Seabrook because, although the probabilities of particu-lar accident sequences may be different and even improved for Seabrook, the overall effect of all sequences taken together is likely to be within the ,

uncertainties (see Section 5.9.4.5(7) for discussion of uncertainties in risk ;-

estimates).

ji Seabrook FES 5-48 i k!

m

< $b_

0 0. 0. 2 8 .

- 0 0 0 8 1 4

4 1 3 -

1

0 0 0 x .

u . . . .

H s

R 0 0 0 1 S e d A t t

n e

s W a m

e a 8 , i d e - I t i l 0 I s c e r 4 1 V e c r S 4 2 c y

- 1 0 0 x x . k a . . . i s s i r B 0 0 0 1 d e i c o n i r c t e r i n p o n t e 5 p g i e v - A e h n 0 t s t i b 1 n a e o S 1 5 i C i p e - 4 1 3 x t y r e . . . d e n h o T 0 0 0 2 e s i c -

t a a n -

n e t i _ f e l r

) o s s e e sd - e R c ee 'n 0 r n sn o b .

1 p d u ai i R 2 9 n el t - 8 3 2 x s a f l e c s ' . . . i o es a C 0 0 0 1 s ra r s e n b F m c o ce s n i i r 5 i e s r( - n u s e 0 a q m. u hR pW 1 h e C c 4 1 c s s

. sP 6 3 2 x e , i o '

. . . m t m d ea l 0 0 0 2 n A

. t e e a s,

cni s d ,

a i u r f 3 e c P o os

n. rn yce r

0 1

- l e a r

c e N p

)

7 f

ae n u K 0 0 8 x d h (

u - . . n t ,

5 s q e 1 1 0. 6 a d .

- ue X f N 4 Ss s p

o .

9 u n r .

9 r o o P 5

. y r i .

5 - g t c ,

n yr p T e o e t o 6 6 6 5 e i C i l it - - - - p r ,

t b l c 0 0 0 0 o c o ,

c

+

a i a 1 1 1 1 t s H b e T b e o e N S

.ar x x x x s d ,

, b i o ,

o or 0 0 0 0 r C r t re . . . . e o Z P p 2 3 3 4 h f ,

r t h ,

e E R a f

n L e p

o x ,

r i u ,

u d d R Y e .

o n n s rr u e s s a og o p e e e r p d d l t ee g A u u P

. ncc V k l l enn c e c c d ee t a e n In Q! T iuu cqq n

e

'B L

3 R

7 R

B S I

t t e

cee A ss E v M T

W P

N o

au

+- f;y oR ym -

TS p _

t

V 1 l

The magnitudes (curies) of radioactivity release for each accident sequence or release category are obtained by multiplying the release fractions shown in Table 5.9 by the amounts that would be present in the core at the time of the .

hypothetical accident. These are shown in Table 5.7 for a Seabrook plant at a core thermal power level of 3425 MWt, the power level used in the safety evaluation.

The potential radiological consequences of these releases have been calculated .

]

by the consequence model used in the RSS (NUREG-0340) adapted and modified as 1 described below to apply to a specific site. The essential elements are shown in schematic form in Figure 5.3. Environmental parameters specific to the site of the Seabrook facility have been used and include the following:

meteorological data for the site representing a full year of consecutive hourly measurements and seasonal variations projected population for the year 2000 extending throughout regions of 80-km (50-mi) and 563-km (350-mi) radius from the site (Tha weighted aver-age transient population extended to a 16-km (10-mi) radius from the site.)

the habitable land fraction within the 563-km (350-mi) radius land-use statistics, on a statewide basis, including farm land values, farm product values including dairy production, and growing season infor-mation, for the State of New Hampshire and each surrounding state within a the 563-km (350-mi) region land-use statistics including farmland values, farm product values includ-ing dairy production and growing season information for the adjoining regions of Canada within the 563-km (350-mi) radius, based on comparison with the values for the nearby states of the U.S. -

To obtain a probability distribution of consequences, the calculations are per-formed assuming'the occurrence of each accident-release sequence at each of 91 different " start" times throughout a 1 year period. Each calculation utilizes (1) the site-specific hourly meteorological data, (2) the population projec-tions for the year 2000 out to a distance of 800 km (500 miles) around Seabrook --

site, including weighted average transient population (in particular seasonal beach visitors), and (3) seasonal information for the time period following -

each " start" time. The consequence model also contains provisions for incor-porating the consequence-reduction benefits of evacuation, relocation, and other protective actions. Early evacuation and relocation of people would con-siderably reduce the exposure from the radioactive cloud and the contaminated ground in the wake of the cloud passage. The evacuation model used (see Appendix F) has been revised from that used in the RSS for better site-specific application. The quantitative characteristics of the evacuation model used for the Seabrook site are estimates made by the staff and are based upon evacuation time estimates prepared by the applicant. There normally would be some facili-ties near 3 plant, such as schools or he r t als, where special equ'ipment or -

personnel may be required to effect evact nion and some people near a site who may choose not to evacuate. Several such f milities have been identified near .

the Seabrook site, such as the Exeter Hospital, the Winnacunnet Cooperative High School and the Hampton and Seabrook beaches. Therefore, actual evacuation Seabrook FES 5-50

- --L

l-

f. -

' Ek ,,, e i

T'i' , weather Data

+

v-y ,. .

4 Release Categories Atmospheric gDispersion

~ Cosintry -

Health Effects Cloud Depletion Property Damage

] Population _

,. o l I Ground I Contamination

.g 7

Evacuation 1

)

A Y

t-p Figure 5.3 Schematic outline of atmospheric pathway consequence model

$'1 7

9 1

7

i .

7 4

2

~

i r0

$ Seabrook FES 5-51 q.

~

i %

=,.

I.

, effectiveness could be greater or less than that characterized but would not be .

expected to be very much less. These facilities will be given specific consid-eration in the development of the evacuation plans for the Seabrook vicinity. -

Full power operation of the Seabrook plant will not be permitted until evacua-tion plans have been approved by the NRC.

The other protective actions include: (1) either complete denial of use (inter- l diction), or permitting use only at a sufficiently later time after appropriate }

decontamination of food stuffs such as crops and milk, (2) decontamination of l' severely contaminated environment (land and property) when it is considered to be economically feasible to lower the levels of contamination to protective 7 action guide (PAG) levels, and (3) denial of use (interdiction) of severely i contaminated land and property for varying periods of time until the contamina- I tion levels reduce to such values by radioactive decay and weathering so that .

land and property can be economically decontaminated as in (2) above. These I actions would reduce the radiological exposure to the people from immediate and/or subsequent use of or living in the contaminated environment. {

Early evacuation within and early relocation of people from outside the plume ;

exposure pathway EPZ (see Appendix F) and other protective actions as mentioned i above are considered as essential sequels to serious nuclear reactor accidents j involving significant release of radioactivity to the atmosphere. Therefore, J the results shown for Seabrook include the benefits of these protective actions. 1 There are also uncertainties in each facet of the estimates of consequences and I the error bounds may be as la ge as they are for the probabilities (see Figure 5.3). l.

The results of the calculations using this consequence model are radiological I doses to individuals and to populations, health effects that might result from these exposures, costs of implementing protective actions, and costs associated with property damage by radioactive contamination.

(3) Dose and Health Impacts of Atmospheric Releases ,

The results of the calculations of dose and health impacts performed for the Seabrook facility and site are presented in the form of probability distribu-tions in Figures 5.4 through 5.7 and are included in the impact summary table, Table 5.10. All of the accident sequences and release categories shown in Table 5.9 contribute to the results, the consequences from each being weighted y!

by its associated probability. f Figure 5.4 shows the probability distribution for the number of persons who 1 might receive whole-body ooses equal to or greater than 200 rems and 25 rems, [

and thyroid doses equal to or greater than 300 rems from early exposure,* all t on a per-reactor year basis. The 200-rem whole-body dose figure corresponds (i approximately to a threshold value for which hospitalization would be indicated 4 for the treatment of radiation injury. The 25-rem whole-body dose (which has j ;

Early exposure to an individual includes external doses from the radioactive cloud and the contaminated ground, and the dose from internally deposited i '

radionuclides from inhalation of contaminated air during the cloud passage.

Other pathways of exposure are excluded.

Seabrook FES 5-52 4

w

s; Patricia Pierce-Bjork 1'und '

at The FES for a nuclear power plant is available_in the NRC Public Document Room, <

1717 H Street,.NW, Washington, D.C. 20555 and at the Local Public Document Room near the plant site. The FES for the Seabrook plant was issued in December 1982, and the Exeter Public Library (its Local Public Document Room), 47 Front Street, Exeter, NH should have a copy available.

Sincerely, Original signed b)

Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation-

Enclosure:

45FR40101 DISTRIBllTION:

. Docket File NRC PDR -

%ocaD PDRM E00 #003162 ED0 R/F TMurley/JSneizek FMiraglia PDI-3 R/F SVarga (2)

BBoger

.VNerses MFairtile OGC-Bethesda GPA/CA (3)

SECY (3)

RStarostecki JFunches JBlaha DMossburg

See previous concurrence 1

.._!b. . . ~. h. ... .....!h ......__! _ . ....! _ ..\.___!. .____! . . ___

.f . .

~

. .. . $. I.*I I. . $. . . . . . . . . . _0.0$. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ _ _ ! . . _ _ . , _. _$

DATE 09/ /87 $09/ /87 $09/ /87 : 9/23/87 $ M.3/3 f $0968/l7 $09hM/S7 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY V

/ / ]

SEP 3 o jgg7 I

Ms. Patricia Pierce-Bjorklund 15 Spring Street Essex, Massachusetts 01929 l

Dear Ms. Pierce-Bjorklund:

I have been asked to respond to your letter of September 1, 1987 to Chairman Zech, in which you raised a number of questions regarding an

" environmental impact statement for meltdown of large reactors" and NRC

. compliance with the Natienal Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).

In keeping with the NEPA, the NRC issued Title 10 of the Code of Federal j Regulations Part 51, which defines the environmental protection requirements

~

applicable to NRC's domestic licensing and related regulatory functions. This regulation, which implements section 102(2) of the NEPA of 1969, as amended, requires the NRC to write environmental impact statements for the construction and operation of commercial nuclear reactors.

From the time the NRC implemented the NEPA until 1980, in preparing the Final Environmental Statement (FES) issued in connection with the licensing of a commercial nuclear power plant, the NRC staff considered various classes of accidents (from trivial incidents commonly referred to as Class 1 accidents to the design-basis accident referred to as a Class 8 accident). The March 29, 1979 accident at Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear plant emphasized the need for changes in NRC policies regarding the consideration given to more severa kinds of low probability accidents in the environmental impact assessments required by the NEPA (refer to enclosed 45 FR 40101 published 6/13/80). These accidents, which involve substantial physical deterioration of the fuel in the reactor core (including overheating to the point of melting) and deterioration of the capability of the containment structure to perform its intended function of limiting'the release of radioactive materials to the environment, are commonly referred to as Class 9 accidents (these are more severe than the Class 8 design-basis accident).

Therefore, as a result of TMI, beginning in 1980, the NRC staff included the Class 9 accidents in its assessments in the FESS related to the licensing of commercial nuclear power plants. For your information because you have previously I expressed an interest in the Seabrook plant, I have enclosed a copy of those pages j in the Seabrook FES that deal with the Class 9 accidents. j l

1 l

l l

1

i s

_2..

a. .The FES for a nuclear power plant is available in' the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20555 and at the. Local Public Document Room.

near the' plant site. The.FES for the Seabrook plant was issued in; December 1982, and the Exeter Public Library (its Local Public Document Room), 47. Front Street',

l Exeter, NH should'have a copy available.

Sincerely, Thomas E. Murley, Dir ctor Office of Nuclear ~ actor Regulation-Distribution:

'See next page

See previous conc rrence 1

0FC -:ACT I DI-3* ARM /PPMB* :AD/DRP* :D/DRP :ADP :DDONRR :DDONRR

. .....: . .y...:........___.:............:.... .....__: ..__.......:............:__........_

LNAME : m : Tech Ed :BBoger :SV ga :FMiraglia :JSnfezek :TMurley

' DATE :09/ d 87 :09/ /87 :09/ /87 : ./ /87 :09/ /87 :09/ /87 :09/ /87 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY g

i-

, Ms. Patricia Pierce Bjorklund 5 Spring. Street-sex, Massachusetts 01929

Dear s. Pierce-Bjorklund:

I have en asked to respond to your letter of September 1,1987 to Chairman Zech, in hich you raised a number of questions regarding an " environmental-impact sta ment for meltdown of large reactors" and NRC compliance with the National Env ronmental Policy Act (NEPA).

In keeping with he NEPA, the NRC issued -Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 1, which defines the environmental protection requirements applicable to NRC' domestic licensing and related regulatory functions. This regulation, which im lements-section 102(2) of the NEPA of 1969, as amended, requires the NRC to w te environmental impact statements for the construction and operation of commer ial nuclear reactors. The Final Environmental Statements (FESI for each reactor a available in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20555 nd at the Local Public Document Room near the plant site. In the past you have own interest in the Seabrook and Pilgrim.

plants. The FES for the Seab ok plant was issued in December 1982, and the Exeter Public Library (its Loca Public Document Room), 47 Front Street, Exeter NH should have a copy available. For Pilgrim, the FES was issued in May 1972, and the Plynouth Public Library (i Local Public Document Room), 11 North Street, Plymouth, MA should have a c y available.

incerely, Steve A. Varga, Director Divisio of Reactor Projects I/II Office o Nuclear Reactor Regulation Distribution:

See next page

\

OFC :ACT IR/PDI.3: ARM /PPMB :D :A :D/DRP : : :

.....: ,.......:....__ .S6._:.... __. ...: ......:___.........:............:..___......

NAME ses:lm :TechEdj :STurk oger :SVarga : :

DATE :09/f}'/87 :09/22/87 :09 /8 :09/g$(87 :09/ /87 : : ,

1 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY l

1 l l l

l !

l \

l l L 1

r e

Federal Register / Vol. 45. No.116 / Friday, June 13, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 40101

8. Section 113.93 is amended by analysis of results of titrations of the sequences that can result in inadequate revising paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) to challenge material.The vaccinates and cooling of reactor fuel and to melting of .

read: controls shall be observed for 3 days the reactor core. In this regard. attention postchellenge and all deaths recorded. shall be given both to the probability of i 113.93 Clostridium Novyt Bactorin. * * * *

occurrence of such releases and to the ,

g environmental consequences of such i f 21 U.S.C.151 and 154 37 FR 28477,28840; 38 FR 191411 releases.nis statement ofinterim ICI , , , Done at Washington, D.C., this 6th day of policy is taken in coordination with (1) Each of at least 8 but not more June 19eo. other ongoing safety-related activities than 10 guinea p s, each weighing 300 R. P. lones, that are directly related to accident to 500 grams, sha 1 be injected Actins Deputy Administrator. Veterinary considerations in the areas of plant subcutaneously with a guinea pig dose. Services. design. operational safety, siting policy, ,

A second guines ig dose shall be p % ,, m u eu.e and emergency planning.ne ausso coce me. mas Commission intends to continue the hn cted ,p, 2 ito es p ose ha! b one- rulemaking on this matter when new fifth of the bae recommended on the siting requirements and other safety '

label for a calf. NUCl. EAR REGULATORY related requirements incorporating -

(2) Clostridium novy / challenge COMMISSION accident considerations are in place, material, available upon request from Veterinary Services. shall be used for 10 CFR Parts 50 and 51 DAfts: This statement of interim policy challenge 14 to ts days following the is effective June 13.1980 Comment last injection of the product. Each of Nuclear Power Plant Accident period expires September 11.1980. '

eight vaccinates and each of five Conalderations Under the National ,

additional nonveccinated guinea pigs for Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ADDRESSES: ne Commission intends l controls shall be injected the interim policy guidance contained Aotwcy:U.S Nuclear Regulatory herein to be immediately effective. >

intramuscularly with approximately 100 Commission i.Ib of challenge material.This dose However, allinterested persons who ACTioM: Statement of Interim Policy. desire to submit written comments or shall be determined by statistical analysis of results of titrations of the sutsesARY:The Nuclear Regulatory suggestions for consideration in connection with this statement shoeld ;

challenge material. ne vaccinates and Commission (NRC) is revising its policy controls shall be observed for 3 days for considering the more severe kinds of send them to the Secsetary of the postchellenge and all deaths recorded. very low probability accidents that are Commission. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory physically possible in environmental Commission. Washington, D.C. 20555,

9. Section 113.94 is amended by impact assessments required by the Attention: Docketing and Service nvising the introductory portion of National Environmental Policy Act Branch.

paragraph (c) and paragraphs (c)(1) and (NEpA). Such accidents are commonly con rustTwen sosponsaATsose costrAct:

(c)(2) to read: referred to as Class 9 accidents. R. Wayne Houston. Chief. Accident following an accident classification Evaluation Branch Office of Nuclear g 113,s4 Clostridium sordetin sectorin. scheme proposed by the Atornie Energy Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear tosold' Commission (predecessor to NRC)in Regulatory Commission. Washington, 1971 for purposes ofimplementin8 D.C. 20555, Telephone: (301) 492-7323.

(c) Potency fest. Bulk or final NEpA.'ne March 28,1979 accident at container samples of completed product Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island nuclear SmsnmAnwonnaATmse from each serial shall be tested for plant has emphasized the need for Accident Considerations in Past NEPA potency by one of the followin8 changes in NRC policies regarding the Reviews methods: A host acimal test written into considerations to be given to serious ne pmp sed Annex to App ndix D the filed Outline of Production, or the accidents from an environmental as well two-stage test provided in this as a safety point of view. of to CFR Part 50(hereafter the ,

Paragraph. nfs atatement ofinterim polley " Annex ') was published for comment t on December 1,1971 by the (former)

(1) Each of at least 8 but not more announces the withdrawal of the Atomic Energy Commission. It proposed than 10 guinea pigs, each weighing 300 proposed Annex to Appendix D of10 to 500 grams, shall be injected CFR Part 50 and the suspension of the to specify a set of standardized ea:ident assumptions to be used in subcutaneously with a guinea pig dose, rulemaking proceeding that began with A second guines pig dose shall be Environmental Reports submitted by the publication of that proposed Annex injected 21 to 23 days after the first on Decamber 1,1971. It is the applicants for construction permits or dose. Each guinea pig dose shall be one- Commission's position that its operating limnees for nuclear power Environmental impact Statements shall reactors. it also included a system for fifth of the dose recommended on the include considerations of the site, classifying accidents acmeding to a label for a calf.

(2) Clostridium sordellii challenge specific environmentalimpacts graded scale of severity and probability material, available upon request from attributable to accident sequences that of occurrence. Nine classes of accidents votvinary Services, shall be used for were defined, ranging from trMal to lead to nlesses of radiation and/or chalkr.ge to to ts days following the radioactive materials, including very serious. It directed that "for each second injection of the product. Each of clana, except cleases 1 and 9, the eight vaccinates and each of five s propo.ed as an Annen to to cyn part sa environmental consequences shall be .

Q additional nonveccinated guinea pigs for App oca D. as rn assst. TWhoe's NEPA. evaluated as indjCated." Class 1 events controls shall be injected "r***s'*euhuan**wmb=e=ntirp were not to be conaldered because of intramuscularly with approximately 100 ggg*L'***'j@gy their trivial consequenosa, whereas in regard to Claes e eventa, the Annex 1.Ib of challenge material.%!s dose A n.:is enn waar connuorenom * * ** m rm ehall be determined by statistical seem stated o follows: .

l 1

i 4

)

r -- -- - - - - - - - -

+

40102 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No.116 / Friday June 13, 1980 / Rules and Regulations within a 50-mile rad!us of the plant, and body on which the plant floats. Here the

%e . .. ss in Class 9 involve staff emphasized its focus on risk to the sequences of postulated sucensive feilures some differences between bolling water more severe than those postuisted for the reactors (BWR) and pressurized water environment but did not find that the

" reactors (PWR). Beyond these few probability of a core melt event

-e eer t estur l tr specifics, the discussions have occurring in the first place was consequences could be severeJfowever,the reiterated the guidance of the Annex essentially any different than forland-probability of their occurrence is so small based plant. In its Memorandum and .

that their environmental risk is extremely and have relied upon the Annex's low. Defense in depth (multiple physical conclusion that the probability of Order in the Matter of Offshore Power occurrence of a Class 9 event is too low Systems.* the Commission concurred in barriers). qtiality assurance for design.

manufacture, and operstion, continued to warrant consideration, a conclusion the staff's judgment.nus, the Reactor surveillance and testing and conservative based upon generally stated safety Safety Study and NRC experience with design are all applied to provide and considerations. these cases has served to refocus maintain the required high degree of With the publication of the Reactor attention on the need to reemphasize that environmental risk entails both la ere, a t re ein, fhfent y r mote Safety Study [ WASH-1400). in draft probabilities and consequences, a point form in August 1974 and final form in

- in probability that the environmental risk is October 1975, the accident discussions that was made in the publication of the -

extremely low. For these reasons. it is not Annex, but was not given adequate necessary to discusa such events in in Environmentallmpact Statements applicants' Environmental Reports. began to refer to this first detailed study emphasis.

in July 1977 the NRC commissioned a of the risks associated with nuclear Risk Assessment Review Group "to A footnote to the Annex stated: power plant accidents, particularly Although this annex refers to arplicant's events which can lead to the melting of clarify the achievements and limitations the fuel inside a reactor.: De references of the Reactor Safety Study."One of the e ptIons and o7h r provfse ereof are conclusions of this study, published in to this study were in keeping with the applicable, except as the content ma intent and spirit of NEpA "to disclose" September 1978, as NUREG/CR.0600.

otherwise require, to AEC draft and i nel " Risk Anessment Review Group Report Detailed Statements.

relevant information, but it is obvious to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory '

Duri th I p' d ' that WASH-1400 did not form the basis for the conclusion expressed in the Commission," was that "he Review followe pub tl n & ne a Annex in 1971 that the probability of Grou was unable to determine whether number of criticisms of the Anney were the a solute probabilities of accident ,

ccurrence of Cices 9 events was too sequencee in WASH-1400 are high or !

(ved. Pri I I th" low to warrant their (site-specific) Iow, but believes that the error bounds follow consideration under NEPA.

n h cribi The Commission's staff has, however, on those estimates are in general, j ass pt ons does not le o obj tive identified in certain cases unique eatly understated. n!s and other ,

ry,j {mdings of the Review Group have also l circumstances which it felt warranted subsequently been referred to in (2)It fled to treat the probabilities of more extensive and detailed accidents in any but the most general Environmental hr. pact Statements, along consideration of Class 9 events. One of with a reference to the Commission's w,f)' these was the proposed Clinch River

( No supporting analy:Is was given Breeder Reactor Plant (CRBRP), a liquid policy statement on the Reactor Safety to show that Class 9 accidents are Studyinlight of the Risk Assessment -

metal cooled fast breeder reactor very sufDetently low in probability that their Review Group Report, published o,n different from the more conventional January 18,1979. The Commission s j consequences in terms of environmental !fght water reactor plants for which the statement accepted the findings of the ;

risks need not be discussed (4) No guidance was ven as to how safety experience base is much broader, Review Group, both as to the Reactor In the Final Environmental Statement accident and normal te ases of

- radioactive effluents during plant for the CRBRP,s the staffincluded a gQS dy's achievements and as to operation should be factored into the discussion of the consideration it had A few Draft En'vironmental cost benefit analysis. given to Class 9 events. Statements have been published (5)he accident assumptions are not in the early site review for the subsequent to the Three Mile Island Perryman site, the staff performed an accident. These were for conventional '

generally applicable to gas cooled or liquid metal cooled reactors, informal assessment of the relative land-based 11 ht water reactor plants (6) Safety and environmental risks are differences in Class 9 accident and continue to reflect the past not essentially different considerations. consequences among the alternative practice with respect to accidents at Neither the Atomic Energy sites. (SECY-78-137) g. plants but noted that the Commission nor the NRC took any In the case of the application by sined from the nree Mile further action on this rulemaking except Offshore Power Systems to manufacture experiencefent Island acci was not factored into in 1974 when to CFR Part 51 was floating nuclear power plants, the staff the discussion promulgated. Over the intervening years ludged that the environmental risks of Our experience with past NEpA the accident considersticos discussed in some Class 9 events warranted special reviews of accidents and the TM1 EnvironmentalImpact Statements for consideration.The special accident clearly leads.us to believe that proposed nuclear power plants reflected circumstances were the potentially a change is needed, the guidance of the Annex with few serious consequences associated with Accordingly, the proposed Annex to exceptions. Typically,the discussions of water (llquid) pathways leading to Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 50. published accident consequences through Class 8 radiological exposures if a molten on December 1,1971,is hereby (design basis accidents) for each case reactor core were to fallinto the water withdrawn and shall not hereafter be have reflected speelfic site used by applicants nor by the staff. The

'It b of inkruuhe &e Ruckr Befey Study reasons for the withdrawal are as characteristics assoCisted with *' "'

meteorology (the dispersion ci rklesses I'((,"*' g",*,"[,[" ,

[o[]ow,:

of radioactive materialinto the ,qwveano a core in it socident.

atmosphere), the actualpopulation 'NtmEG-otas. Febniary ten.

Docke No. BW so e, Sepuniber n te't

I usur-_ _ __

- J l

Fedeen! Register / Vol. 45. No.118 / Friday June 13. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 48103 The environmental consequences of issued Statements. nor, absent a

1. The Annez proscribes releues whose probability of occurence showing of sim!!ar consideration of the kinds of accidents circumstances, as a is for opening.

(Class 9) that, acconitrig to the Reactor has been estimated shall also be discussed in probabilistic terms. Such reopening. or expanding any previous or Safety Study. dominate the accident consequences shall be characterized in ongoing proceeding.'

risk.

2. The definition of Class 9 accidents . terms of potential radiological However.It is also the intent of the i exposuree to individuals, to population Commission that the staff take steps to j in the Annex is not sufficiently precise to warrant its further use in Commission groups, and, where applicable. to blota, identify additional cases that might l' Policy. rules, and regulations, nor as a }icolth and safety risks that may be warrant early consideration of either decision criterion in agency practice, sesociated with exposures to people additional features or other actions

3. De Annex's prescription of shall be. discussed in a manner that which would prevent or mitigate the assumptions to be used in the analysis fairly reflects the current state of consequences of serious accidenta.

of the environmentalconsequences of knowledge regarding such risks. Cases for such musideration are those accidente does not contribute to Socioeconomic impacts that might be for which a Final Environmental objective considetetion. associated with emergency measures Statement has aheady been issued at .

4. ne Annex does not give adequate during or following an accident should the Construction Permit stage but for consideration to the detaued treatment also be discussed. The environmental which the Operating IJoense review of measures taken to prevent and to risk of accidents should also be stage has not yet been ruched. in i mitigate the consequences of accidents compared to and contrasted with carrying out this directive, the staff l

)

In the safety review of each application. radiologist risks associsted with should consider relevant alte features.

" "" ' "" I pu on s e i t ex e all olonger [,' h*th , in groeu os in its place the folio in promulgating this interim guidance, e sul ance a gNen or e features Staff shoulatfresently also consideroperating planta.

the likelihood the Commission is aware that there are and willlikely remain for some time to that substantive changes in plant design ne de t a reviews. come many uncertainties in the features which may compensate further <

application of risk assessment methods, for adverse site features may be more Accident Considerations in Future easily incorporated in plants when NEPA Reviewe and it expects that its Environmental impact Statements willidentify major construction has not yet progressed very It is the position of the Commission uncertainties in its probabilistic far.

that its EnvironmentalImpact Environmental Reports submitted by (

estimates.On the other hand the Statements, pursuant to Section 102(c)(1) Commission believes that the state of applicants for construction permits and of the National Environmental Policy the art is sufficiently advanced that a for operating licenses on or after fufy 1.

Act of1909, shallinclude a reasoned 1980 should include a discussion of the consideration of the environmental risks beginning should now be made in the environmental risks associated with use of these methodologies in the (impacts) attributable to accidents at the regulatory procen, and that such use accidents that follows the guidance 0 particular facility or facilities within the will represent a constructive and rational given herein, scope of each such statement.In the forward step in the discharge of its analysis and discussion of such risks. Related Policy Matters Under approximately equal attention shallbe teponsibilities. gg It is the intent of the Commisalon i ven to the probability of occurrence of issulng this Statement of Interim Policy in in addition to its responsibilities i N

releases and tr, the probability of that the staff wulinitiate treatments of under NEPA. the NRC also bears occurrence of the environmental accident considera tions, in accordance responsibility under the Atomic Energy consequences of those releases, Act for the protection of the public with the foregoing guldence. In its Releases refer to radiation and/or health and safety from the hazards radioactive materials entering ongoing NEpA reviews, i.e., for any proceeding a t a licensing stage where a associated with the use of nuclear environmental exposure pathways, energy. Pursu.nt to this responsibility including air, water, and ground water. Final Environmental Impact Statement has not yet been issued. These new the Commisalon notes that there are Events or accident sequences that treatments, whicifwlli take into account currently a number of ongoing activities lead to releases shallinclude but not be being considered by the Commission limited to those that can reasonably be significant site- and plant. specific and its staff which intimately relate to expected to occur. In plant accident features will result in more detailed the " Class 9 accident question and sequences thet can lead to a spectrum of discussions of accident risks than in which are either the subject of current releases shall be discussed and shall previous environmental statements, rulemaking or are candidate subjects for include seguences that t.an result in particularly for those related to fulernaking.

inadequate cooling of reactor fuel and to conventionallight water plants et land. On December 19.1979 the melting of the reactor core.The extent to based sites. It is expected that these Commission issued for public comment

which events arising from causes revised treatments willlead to external to the plant which are conclusions regarding the environmental a proposed rule which would

) risks of accidents simuar to those that significant}y revise its requirements in considered possible contributors to the to CFR Part 50 for emergency planning risk sesociated with the particular plant would be reached by a continuation of current practices, particularly for cases for nuclear power plants. One of the g shall also be discussed. Detailed considerations in this rulemaking was quantitative considerations that form involving special circumstances where the basis of probabilistic estimates of Class 9 risks have been considered by releases need not be incorporated in the the staff, as described above. Thus, this *commi ia re cain.ky s.d nr.dford di or )

0 Environmentallmpact Statements but change in policy is not to be construed gu4pgd*y g g as any lack of confidence in conclusions ,, ,,,,w ,,,,,,,w g g, ,,,,,,,,

j 1

shall be reforenced therein. Such references shallinclude, as applicable, regarding the environmental risks of .,,n p.eu cs s. a a !

accidents expressed in any previously *se re mer.

reports on safety evaluations.

i l

w 40104 Federal Register / Vol. 45 No.116 / Friday, June 13, 1980 / Rules and Regulations For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. resellers and reseller-retailers of the potential consequences of Class 9 gasoline. Generally, the new rules accidents in a generic sense.' Samuel l. Chtlk, Secretary of the Commission.

permit resellers and reseller-retallers to In August 1979, pursuant to the a p s Commission's request, a Siting Policy its ow. eSpeu nW s-um s4s eel {ompd e I

Tsak Force made recommendations with ausso coot mo ew or grade of gasoline, plus a fixed cents respect to possIble changes in NRC per gallon markup depending on the reactor siting policy and criteria.' type of sale, plus tax costs.8 he new l currently set forth in to CFR Part 100. As DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY rules are similar to the retaller price j stated therein, its recommendations rules adopted in July 1979. I Economic Regulatory Administration were made to accomplish (among Under the new rules, acquisition cost g,g ; is' defined as the last purchase price for 10 CFR Ports 210,212 oa into n d ret on in alting the risk seDen gasdne salu of 5 mWon nuiciated with accidents beyond the design [Docaet No. ERA-R-7M2El gallons or less in calendar year 1979. For basis (Ctess s) by estabHsMng population density an i distribution criterts- Rosellers' and Reseher-Retallers' Pric, sellers with sales of more than 5 million one of gas t' dar e his matter is currently before the Rules for Qaeoline g,u 'idden s l Comml'.slon- Aeawcy: Economic Regulatory cost of product in inventory computed This and other recommendations that Administration. Department of Energy. pursuant to the seller's historical have been made as a result of the Actioet Final rule. accounting practices consistently ,

I investigations into the Three Mile Island app!!ed.'

accident are currently being brought suussARY:The Department of Energy Generally, the retailer price rules l together by the Commission's staff in (DOE) hereby adopts three amendments adopted in July 1979 permit retallers to i the form of proposed Action Plans.' to its reseller and reseller retailer price alter their normal business practices i Among other matters, these incorporate rules. First, small resellers and reseller- with respect to sales of gasoline.The i recommendations for rulemaking related retallers (sales in calendar year 1979 of new reseller retailer rules do not contain to degraded core cooling and core melt 5 million gallons of gasoline or less) are a similar provision. However,in most accidents. The Commission expects to permitted the option of computing other respects the July 1979 price rules issue decisions on these Action Plans in " acquisition cost" using the firm's for independent retailers and the new the near future. it is the Commission's historical accounting practices reseller-retailer price rules are similar.

policy and intent to devote NRC's major consistently applied. Second, the normal Finally, the restriction on the amount '

resources to matters which the business practices rule is amended to ofincreased commissions that may be Commission believes will make existing treet reseller. retailers consistently with passed through in price increases by and future nuclear power plants safer, independent retailers with respect to refiners was removed. In doing so, and to prevent a recurrence of the kind retail gasoline sales. Third, the however, the provision that permitted exception to the refiner equal refiners an exception to the equal ,

of act:ident that occurred at Three Mile '

Island. In the interim, however, and application rule regarding retail eales by application rule to reflect increased pending completion of rulemaking consignee-agents is reinstated. commissions in the retail selling price activities in the areas oT emergency cart: Effective May 1,1980. charged by commission agents was planning, siting criteria, and design and deleted.

FOR PURTHaR INFORMADON CONTACT:

' II. Amendments Robert C. Gillette (Hearing Procedures).

co eratlone o se o s e ent Economic Regulatory Administration. Comments received by DOE since the potential, the Commission finds it Room 2214. 2000 M Street. NW.,

essential to improve its procedures for issuance of the rule indicate that a few Washington, D.C. 20401 (202) 653-3757 small sellers would prefer to use the describing and disclosing to the public William L Webb (Office of Public cost of product in inventory rather than the basis for arriving at conclusions ini rmation). Economic Regulatory the last purt.hase price to determine regarding the environmental risks due to Administration. Room 11thB. 2000 M acquisition cost. Generally these sellers accidents at nuclear power plants. On Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20461 purchase product from more than one completion of the rulemaking activities in these areas, and based also upon the " " "' # **

Chu Be egulations and experience gained with this statement of Emergency Planning). Economic 'with enpect to nubtahtns h mutmum interim policy and guidarce, the Reguletory Administradon Rcom tewfut unins pace for suohot which a snow Commission intends to pursue p esible 7204,2000 M Street. NW., Weshington, of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaktna les F1L s4Ms.

changes or additions to to CFR Part 51 my n 124 prwiestmens suwmuu 2 **

D.C 20461 (202) 651-3202 **ki"8 "h* "'" F'** '"I '"'

to codify its position on the role of wgggi,'m Funk or Wi!!!am Mayo I,ee **"'um.'"

rue n *u*n'e.mtsines, 'and rotatics permit accident risks under NEPA. (Office of General Counsel). um si blad suohol to utabush a mutmum Deted at Washington D.C.,this 9th day of Department of Energy, Room 6A-127 lawful nilins price for suohot in a mannu that insa me aucun and aladol compuents of June teso. 10001 independence Avenue.SW., gasohol se separete peuducts under the price rulu.

Washington. D.C. 205&5 (202) 252-6736 Accarensty. % apon oost of each to e

' Cf. NUREG-atsa. " Planning Besla for the or 252-6754 component of the blender's maximum Lawful settins Development of State and Local Government price for gasobot.

Radiological Emergency Response Plans tn Support gyppgggggggyggy gwpogggyggge

'If a firm has consisteo0y and histortcany used of t#nt weter Nuclear Power Pla:. ' Novembe 1.Bacspound more than one scoounting practics for determining tr'sL the cost of product in invutory 1 4 one for DOE's eNUREG. oats." Report of the Siting Polley Task [1. Amendinents Feros." August is"s- III. Procedural Reqprements price rules and one for income tax purposee), the nre may choose eyher of these accounting eproft NUREC osso, " Action Plans for

1. Background procuces to determine b east of product in implementing Recommendations of b President's inventory under the new. Exod marytn reseDer and Comunteston and O$er Brodin of the Tho-Accidut." December la Is*g On April & M M R Wo. Mey 2. ,esatier retatter rule Tse it,s. of cour.o. must 1980) DOE issued new price rules for comisantly apply et preenes unde the == rule

~~~

y Table 5.8 Approximate 2-hour radiation doses

N j from design-basis accidents at exclusion area boundary Dose (rems) at 914 m*,

f Events whole body

, se l v 6#? Infrequent Accidents E- Waste gas tank failure 0.1 Small-break LOCA** 0.04

': 'W Steam generator, tube N. rupture *** 0.03

ng .

EM Limiting Faults

[' Main steamline break 0.0005 Control rod ejection 0.004 Large-break LOCA 1.04

Plant Exclusion Area Boundary Distance.

'eI **LOCA-Loss of Coolant Accident; the TMI-2 accident was one kind of a small-break LOCA.

Ms ***See NUREG-0651 for descriptions of three steam I.YdI' d ~ 4 generator tube rupture accidents that have hk 4 occurred in the United States.

?

$ events

^' in 10 CFR 100.11(a). areThe the exposures results of these calculations show that for these not expected to exceed 16 rems to the whole body and q f127remstothethyroidofanyindividualattheexclusionareaboundaryovera For calculation of the thyroid dose, it was assumed that an V.-,M. " - ,, period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . individual would be located at a point on the exclusion area bounda

', NM" radioiodine concentration in the plume has its highest value and inhaled at a kW brecthing rate characteristic of a person jogging, for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

.;- U The health risk to an individual receiving such a dose to the thyroid is the V.. potential appearance of benign or malignant thyroid nodules in about 6 out of

-e 100 cases, and the development of a f atal thyroid cancer in about 2 out of 1000

, e cases.

ghNoneofthecalculationsoftheimpactsofdesign-basisaccidentsdescribedin rig. this section takes into consideration possible reductions in individual or popu-c iMgy,lationexposuresasaresultofanyprotectiveactions.

i. "

(2) Probabilistic Assessment of Severe Accidents

. ,.% - i

' ~

In this and the following three sections, there is a discussion of the prob- l

. abilities and consequences of accidents of greater severity than the design-t .

basis accidents discussed in the previous section. As a class, they are con-l /-

sidered less likely to occur, but their consequences could be more severe, both for the plant itself and for the environment. These severe accidents, hereto- i l

Ve' frequently called Class 9 accidents, can be distinguished from design-

basis accidents in two primary respects: they involve substantial physical 5 h)\. i; i pyp..SeabrookFES 5-47

-o

e

! s deterioration of the fuel in the reactor core, including overheating to the y point of melting, and they involve deterioration of the capability of the con- '

tainment structure to perform its intended function of limiting the release of t radioactive materials to the environment. l The assessment methodology employed is that described in the Reactor Safety Study (RSS), which was published in 1975 (NUREG-75/014). Because this report has been subject to considerable controversy, a discussion of the uncertainties surrounding it is provided in Section 5.9.4.5(7). However, the sets of accident ,

sequences that were found in the RSS to be the dominant contributors to the risk in the prototype PWR (Westinghouse-designed Surry Unit 1) have recently been updated ("rebaselined") (NUREG-0715). The rebaselining has been done largely to incorporate peer group comments (NUREG/CR-0400) and better data and analytical techniques resulting from research and development af ter the publica-tion of the RSS. Entailed in the rebaselining effort was the evaluation of Thethe individual dominant accident sequences--as they are understood to evolve.

earlier technique of grouping a number of accident sequences into the encom-passing " Release Categories" as was done in the RSS has been largely (but not completely) eliminated.

The Seabrook plants are Westinghouse-designed PWRs having similar design and operating characteristics to the RSS prototype PWR. Therefore, the present assessment for Seabrook has used as its starting point the rebaselined accident sequences and release categories referred to above, and more fully described in Appendix E. Characteristics of the sequences and release categories used (all of which involve partial to complete melting of the reactor core) are shown in Table'5.9. Sequences initiated by natural phenomena such as tornadoes, floods, or seismic events and those that could be initiated by deliberate acts of sabo-tage are not included in these event sequences. It is the staff's judgment that the radiological consequences of such events would not be different in kind from those which have been treated. Moreover, there are design requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, relating to effects of natural phenomena, and safeguards requirements in 10 CFR 73, ensuring that these potential initiators are in large measure taken into account in the design and operation of the plant. The data base for assessing the probabilities of events more severe than the design bases for natural phenomena or sabotage events is beyond the state-of-the-art of pro-babilistic risk assessment. In addition, the staff judges that the additional risk from severe accidents initiated by natural events or sabotage is within the uncertainty of risks presented for the sequences considered here.

The calculated probability per reactor year associated with each accident sequence or release category used is shown in the second column in Table 5.9. l As in the RSS there are substantial uncertainties in these probabilities. This i

is due, in part, to difficulties associated with the quantification of human error and to inadequacies in the data base on failure rates of individual plant components that were used to calculate the probabilities (ibid). The probabil-i l

ity of accident sequences from the Surry plant was used to give a perspective of the societal risk at Seabrook because, although the probabilities of particu- ,

lar accident sequences may be different and even improved for Seabrook, the overall effect of all sequences taken together is likely to be within the uncertainties (see Section 5.9.4.5(7) for discussion of uncertainties in risk l estimates).

a h

Seabrook FES 5-48 a 1

~_-__

'0 0 0 2 6 .

- 0 0 0

[ *

4

=

8 1 3 1 4 1

0 0 0 x s u . . H

R 0 0 0 1 S e d , .

A t t e s

W a m

n e a 6 , i d e - I t s

i l -

0 I c e r 4 1 V e c r S 4 2 e - 1 0 0 x x , k y a . . . i s s

.l r B 0 0 0 l d e i a o '

n i r c t e r i n p o n

.t e 5 p g i e v - A e h n 0 . t s t i b ~

1 n a e o S 1 5 i C i p e - 4 1 3 x t y r e . ; . d e n h o T 0 0 0 2 e s i c .

t a a n n e t i f e l r

) o 5 s e e c

sd - e R te n 0 r n sn o b 1 p d u ai i R 2 9 n

el t - 8 3 2 x s a f l e c s . i o es a C 0 0 0 1 s ra r .

s e n b F m c o

'c e i r 5 s n i e i

s r( - n u . s e- 0 a q m u hR 1 h e C c pW 4 1 c s s sP 6 3 2 x e , i o . . m t m d

. t ma I 0 0 0. 2 e e n A a

ani s d a i u r

w, f 3 e c P o os - l c f

~. e 0 e a ,

yc 1 r p )

n rn r e N 7 ae K 0 0 8 x d h (

mu mq

.- . . . n t ,

5 e 1 1 0 6 a d .

ue X f N 4 Ss s p

o .

9 u n r .

9 r o o P 5

. y r i .

5 - g t c ,

n yr p T e o e t o 6 6 6 5 e i C i l it - - - - p r , t t b l c 0 0 0 0 o c o ,

c

- e i a 1 1 1 1 t s M b e T b e o e N S ar x x x x s d ,

b i o ,

o or 0 0 0 0 r C r t re . . . . e o Z P p 2 3 3 4 h f , r t h ,

e E R a f

n L e

o x , r p i u ,

u d d R Y e .

o n n s rr u e s s a

~ og o p e e e r p d d l t ee g A u u P 2 ncc V k l l

? enn c e c c ftt; .

d ee t a e n n :

i uu n 'B 3 7 B S I I e cqq e L R R * *

t t cee E

v M W P

W P

N o

Ass T s.

4 t-o p!;g? gv y'$-

t '

c

l

. I The magnitudes (curies) of radioactivity release for each accident sequence or i release category are obtained by multiplying the release fractions shown in l Table 5.9 by the amounts that would be present in the core at the time of the hypothetical accident. These are shown in Table 5.7 for a Seabrook plant at a core thermal power level of 3425 MWt, the power level used in the safety evaluation.

The potential radiological consequences of these releases have been calculated by the consequence model used in the RSS (NUREG-0340) adapted and modified as described below to apply to a specific site. The essential elements are shown in schematic form in Figure 5.3. Environmental parameters specific to the site of the Seabrook facility have been used and include the following:

meteorological data for the site representing a full year of consecutive hourly measurements and seasonal variations projected population for the year 2000 extending throughout regions of 80-km (50-mi) and 563-km (350-mi) radius from the site (The weighted aver-age transient population extended to a 16-km (10-mi) radius from the site.)

the habitable land fraction within the 563-km (350-mi) radius land use statistics, on a statewide basis, including farm land values, farm product values including dairy production, and growing season infor-mation, for the State of New Hampshire and each surrounding state within _

the 563-km (350-mi) region land-use statistics including farmland values, farm product values includ-ing dairy production and growing season information for the adjoining regions of Canada within the 563-km (350-mi) radius, based on comparison with the values for the nearby states of the U.S.

To obtain a probability distribution of consequences, the calculations are per- '

formed assuming 'the occurrence of each accident-release sequence at each of 91 -

different " start" times throughout a 1 year period. Each calculation utilizes (1) the site-specific hourly meteorological data, (2) the population projec-tions for the year 2000 out to a distance of 800 km (500 miles) around Seabrook -

site, including weighted average transient population (in particular seasonal 5 beach visitors), and (3) seasonal information for the time period following each " start" time. The consequence model also contains provisions for incor-porating the consequence reduction benefits of evacuation, relocation, and other protective actions. Early evacuation and relocation of people would con-siderably reduce the exposure from the radioactive cloud and the contaminated ground in the wake of the cloud passage. The evacuation model used (see Appendix F) has been revised from that used in the RSS for better site-specific application. The quantitative characteristics of the evacuation model used for the Seabrook site are estimates made by the staff and are based upon evacuation time estimates prepared by the applicant. There normally would be some facili-ties near a plant, such as schools or hospitals, where special equipment or personnel may be required to effect evacuation and some people near a site who may choose not to evacuate. Several such facilities have been identified near the Seabrook site, such as the Exeter Hospital, the Winnacunnet Cooperative High School and the Hampton and Seabrook beaches. Therefore, actual evacuation Seabrook FES 5-50 x--__________ -- '

l 1 e l'

WP

t ,. . #?

q ..

f-I

,r, ' .

'l , weather Data

?

v .

Release Categories Atmospheric l Dispersion

- 005i"'t"Y "_ Health Effects i

e Cloud Depletion _

Property Damage j Population _

o I a

A~ Ground *

Contamination

.g Evacuation d

i t-j~ ~ Figure 5.3 Schematic outline of atmospheric pathway consequence model it i

3 i

f.

i Seabrook FES 5-51

{

r l

, effectiveness could be greater er less than that characterized but would not be expected to be very much less. These facilities will be given specific consid-eration in the development of the evacuation plans for the Seabrook vicinity. ,

l Full power operation of the Seabrook plant will not be permitted until evacua-tion plans have been approved by the NRC.

The other protective actions include: (1) either complete denial of use (inter-diction), or permitting use only at a sufficiently later time after appropriate decontamination of food stuffs such as crops and milk, (2) decontamination of severely contaminated environment (land and property) when it is considered to be economically feasible to lower the levels of contamination to protective 7 action guide (PAG) levels, and (3) denial of use (interdiction) of severely j contaminated land and property for varying periods of time until the contamina- ;

tion levels reduce to such values by radioactive decay and weathering so that ;E land and property can be economically decontaminated as in (2) above. These actions would reduce the radiological exposure to the people from immediate and/or subsequent use of or living in the contaminated environment. 1 Early evacuation within and early relocation of people from outside the plume exposure pathway EPZ (see Appendix F) and other protective actions as mentioned above are considered as essential sequels to serious nuclear reactor accidents involving significant release of radioactivity to the atmosphere. Therefore, the results shown for Seabrook include the benefits of these protective actions.

There are also uncertainties in each facet of the estimates of consequences and the error bounds may be as large as they are for the probabilities (see Figure 5.3).

i The results of the calculations using this consequence model are radiological I doses to individuals and to populations, health effects that might result from d these exposures, costs of implementing protective actions, and costs associated with property damage by radioactive contamination. ,

(3) Dose and Health Impacts cf Atmospheric Releases The results of the calculations of dose and health impacts performed for the Seabrook facility and site are presented in the form of probability distribu-tions in Figures 5.4 through 5.7 and are included in the impact summary table, Table 5.10. All of the accident sequences and release categories shown in g i Table 5.9 contribute to the results, the consequences from each being weighted J j by its associated probability. hf J V l Figure 5.4 shows the probability distribution f'r the o number of persons who i might receive whole-body doses equal to or greater than 200 rems and 25 rems, and thyroid doses equal to or greater than 300 rems from early exposure,* all I

on a per-reactor year basis. The 200-rem whole-body dose figure corresponds Q approximately to a threshold value for which hospitalization would be indicated 4 for the treatment of radiation injury. The 25-rem whole-body dose (which has j ,

j I

Early exposure to an individual includes external doses from the radioactive cloud and the contaminated ground, and the dose from internally deposited $

radionuclides from inhalation of contaminated air during the cloud passage.

Other pathways of exposure are excluded.

l Seabrook FES 5-52

' u i

y:,

M G L' f 37 .v

(

Patricia Pierce-Bjorklund '

The FES for a nuclear power plant is available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street,- NW,. Washington, D.C. 20555 and at the Local Public Document Room 0 near the plant site. The FES for the Seabrook plant was issued in December 1982, 9 fp

'and-the Exeter Public Library (its Local Public Document Room), 47 Front Street, o Exeter, NH should have a copy available. ,

Sincerely, .

o Original Signed b'y Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

45FR40101

' DISTRIBU' TION:

' Docket File i 4.NR0iPD# 3 '

. Local PDR ED0 #003162 E00 R/F TMurley/JSneizek FMiraglia PDI-3 R/F SVarga (2)

BBoger VNerses MFairtile OGC-Bethesda GPA/CA (3)

SECY (3)

RStarostecki '

JFunches ,

JBlaha DMossburg

See previous concurrence 1 3

0FC :ACIDIR/PDI-3* ARM /PPMB* :AD/DRP^ : D/ DTTP :ADP \ :0DONR

...............................:............. .. .. ....; ....]..... . . ..., :DDChIf.-...

.o7

. ..! $..$.' ..!$..........!.S!!.......:..........!...... '. . .. .f . .! . $ ..

DATE$09/ /87 $09/ /87 $09/ /87 : 69/13/87 . $ p3/e3/3 $ 096 8/l 7 $094%/.7 v '

0FFICIAL RECORD COYY / ~/

g.

t L g g..

y

.. # ' 6EP 3 01987 4

1

yyy Ms.fPatricia Pierc)y

5. e-Bjorklund I 151SprJng,$treet ,

f Edgex, -Hardschusetts 01929

fy

'in / dear Ms. Pierce-Bjorklund:

1 VQM ,

E l

/ ~ :I have been asked to respond'to your letter of September 1, 1987 to Jgy ' Chairman Zechgin which you raised a number. of questions regarding an 4'i).genviVonmentalLimpactstatementformeltdownoflargereactors"andNRC

~ W compTjance with'the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).

In keeping with thd'NEPA; the NRC issued Title 10 of the Code of Federal l Regulations Part 51, which defines the environmental protection requirements

applicable .to NRC's domestic licensing and reisted regulatory functions. This l' regulation, which implements sectioF102(2) of the NEPA of 1969, as amended, requires the NRC to write environmental impact statements for.the construction.

s' and operation,of commercial nuclear reactors.

From the time'y;the NRC implemented the NEPA until 1980, in preparing the Final Environmentalfstatement(FES)issuedinconnectionwiththelicensingofa N ' commercial.nuclest power plant, the NRC staff considered various classes of accidents _(from trivial incidents commonly referred to as Class 1 accidents to the design-basis accident referred to as a Class 8 accident). The March 29, 1979 accident at Unit 2 of the.Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear plant emphasized.

the need for changes in NRC policies regarding the consideration given to more severe kinds of low probability accidents in the environmental impact assessments required by the NEPA (refer to enclosed 45 FR 40101 published 6/13/80). These f

accidents, which involve substantial physical deterioration of the fuel in the d rea.ctor core-(including overheating to the point of melting) and deterioration

, 'Lof the capability of the containment structure to perform its intended function

(

of limiting the release of radioactive materials to the environment, are commonly

~L referred to as Class 9 acpfdents (these are more severe than the Class 8 design-basis accident).

Therefore, as a result of TMI, beginning in 1980, the NRC staff included the

. Class 9 accidents in'its assessments in the FESS related to the licensing of t

commercial nuclear power plants. For your information because you have previously expressed an interest in the Seabrook plant, I have enclosed a copy of those pages in the Seabrook FES that deal with the Class 9 accidents.

l/

l i

/

f.

r>

t

. 2 w

The FES for a nuclear power plant is available in the NRC Public Document Rocm, 1717.H Street : NW, Washington, D.C. 20555 and at the ' Local Public Document 1com L '. - near the plant site. . The FES for the Seabrook plant was issued in December 1982, and;.the Exeter Public Library (its local Public Document Room), 47. Front Street, Exeter, NH should have a copy available. g Sincerely, J p!

n Thomas E. Murley, Dir ctor Office of Nuclear actor Regulation g

Distribution:

See,next page- y

>p

'l

i a>

. *See previous contgrrence ;

OFC :ACT I DI-3* ARM / PPMB* :AD/DRP* :D/DRP :ADP :DDONRR :DDDNRR NAME : m : Tech Ed :BBoger :SV ga :FMiraglia :JSniezek :TMurley ,1 DATE:09/1887 :09/ /87 :09/ /87 : ./ /87 :09/ /87 :09/ /87 :09/ /87

.0FFICIAL RECORD COPY

n. <. P l

I k

l.

l

[

n c j 11 i

m1. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __m. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

${;

=

a i , Ms. Retricia Pierce-Bjorklund 5 Spring Street sex.,. Massachusetts 01929

Dear s. Pierce.Bjorklund:

I have. 2en ' asked to respond to your letter of September 1,1987 to Chairman Zech,'in hich you raised a-number'of questions regarding an " environmental

~1mpact's?.e ment for meltdown of large reactors" and NRC compliance with the National Eny' ronmental Policy Act (NEPA).

t:

In keep'ih9 "with the NEPA, the NRC issued Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 1, which defines the environmental protection requirements applicable- t'o NRC' domestic licensing and related regulatory functions. This reculation, which im lements section 102(2) of the NEPA of 1969, as amended,

-requires the NRC to write environmental impact statements for the construction and operation of comerbial nuclear reactors. The Final Environmental Statements (FES1 fwr eqch reactor a available in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, E NW,~Washingtbn D.C. 20555 nd at the Local Public Document Room near the plant

-site. In the pas' you have own ir,terest in the Seabrook and Pilgrim plants. The FES for the Seab ok plant was issued in December 1982, and the Exeter Public' Library (its loca Public Document Room), 47 Front Street, Exeter NH should have a copy available. For Pilgrim, the FES was issued in May 1972, and the Plymouth Public Library (i Local Public Document Room), 11 North Street, Plymouth, MA should have a c y available, incerely, Steve A. Varga, Director s Divisio of Reactor Projects I/II y Office o Nuclear Reactor Regulation Distribution: l See next page OFC :ACT IR/PDI-3: ARM /PPMB :D :A" :D/DRP : : :

.....: ,.......:....... 94.:.... ... ___: .. ...:............:.___........:__......... ;

NAME ses:lm : Tech Ed ) :STurk - oger :SVarga : :

.....:............:............:....f. ... :............:..........._:............:..___......

DATE :09/fV/17 :09/22/87 :097 /8 :09/71/87 1 :09/ /87 : :

-OFFICIAL RECORD COPY y

3 ,f

,Y i

- _ _ _ _ - _'A

Federal Register / Vol 45, No.116 / Friday. June 13. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 40181 1

8. Sectka 113.03 is amended by annlysis of results of titrations of the sequences that can result in inadequate revising paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) to challenge material.The vaccinates und cooling of reactor fuel and to melting of .

read: controls shall be observed for 3 days the reactor core. In this regard, attention Postchellenge and all deaths recorded. shall be given both to the probab!!ity of f I t13.e3 Clostrldtum Novyt Bactorin. * * * *

occurrence of such releases and to the ,

g,g, environmental consequences of such )

(21 U.S.C 151 and 154: 37 FR :o4n, tshe:3e Mt 1M41) releases.%is statement ofinterim ICI , , , Done at Washington. D.C this eth day of pol!cy !s taken in coordination with (1) Each of at least 8 but not more lune m o. oths ongoing safety related activities than 10 guinea pigs. each weighing 300 R. P. Jones, that are directly related to amident to 500 grams, shall be injected Acting Deputy Adm/nistmror. veterinary considerations in the areas of plant subcutaneously with a guines pig dose. Serr/ces. design, operational safety, siting policy. '

A second guinea pig dose shall be p imo ru.nia-aa so ..i and emergency planning. The i e pYg dos hal b one- sam eme anm Commission intends to continue the d e Es rulemaking on this matter when new fifth of the dose recommended on the siting requirements and other safety II. bel for a calf. NUCLEAR REOULATORY related requirements incorporating (2) Clostridium novy / challenge COMMISSIOd accident considerations are in place.

material, available upon request from Veterinary Services, shall be used for 10 CFR Parta 50 and $1 cafts This statement ofinterim pohey challenge 14 to 15 days following the is effective lune 13,1980 Comment last injection of the product. Et.ch of Nuclear Power Plant Accident period expires September 11.1980. f eight vaccinates and each of five Conalderations Under the National cdditional nonveccinated guinea pigs for Environmental Policy Act of 1969 Apontssts:We Commission intends controls shall be injected the interim policy guidance contained AceNev:U.S Nuclear Regulatory herein to be immediately effective.

intramuscularly with approximately 100 Commission l

% of challenge material. This dose However, all interested persons who AcTioec Statement of Interim Policy. desire to submit written mmments or shall be determined by statistical Enzlysis of results of titrations of the sowuARY:The Nuclear Regulatory suggestions for consideration in f challenge material.%e vaccinates and Comm!ssion (NRC) is revising its policy connection with this statement should '

controls shall be observed for 3 days for considering the more severe kinds of send them to the Secretary of the l postchallenge and all deaths recorded- very low probability accidents that are Commission. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l physically possible in environmental Commission. Washington. D.C. 20555, j

9. Section 113.94 is amended by impact assessments required by the Attention: Docketing and Servim J Branch. ;

revising the introductory portion of National Environmental Policy Act paragraph (c) and paragraphs (c)(1) and (NEPA). Such accidents are commonly PoM FUUtTHE11 tesFOMatATION C0erTACT:

(c)(2) to read: referred to as Class 9 accidents, R. Wayne Houston, Chief, Accident f Ilowing an accident classification Evaluation Branch Office of Nuclear j i 113.e4 Csostrimum sordemi sectorin. scheme proposed by the Atomic Energy Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear 1 gg;

, , , , Commission (predecessor to NRC)!n Regulatory Commission. Washington, I 1971 for purposes ofimplementing D.C. 20555 Telephone: (301) 492-7323.

(c) Potency test. Bulk or final NEPA.'The March 28.1979 accident at container samples of completed product " A " " 0"* * **

Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island nuclear from each serial shall be tested for plant has emphasized the need for Accident Considerations in Past NEPA potency by one of the following changes in NRC policies regarding the Reviews methods: A host animal test written into considerations to be given to serious the filed Outline of Production, or the The propoud Annex to Apy ndix D accidents from an environmental as well two stage test provided in this as a safety point of view, of to Cm Part @emaher the ,

pnagtsph. nie statement of interim policy " Annex") was publinbed for comment t on December 1.1971 by the (former)

(1) Each of at least 8 but not mon announces the withdrawal of the than 10 guinea pigs. each weighing 300 proposed Annex to Appendix D of to Atomic Energy Commisalon. It proposed to 500 grams, shall be inlected CFR Part 50 and the suspension of the to specify a set of standardized soddent subcutaneously with a guinea pig dose, ralemaking proceeding that began with assumptions to be used in A second guines pig dose shall be the publication of that proposed Annex Environmental Reports submitted by injected 21 to 23 deys after the first on December 1,1971. It is the applicants for construction permits or de:e. Each guinea pig dose shall be one- Commission's position that its operating licenses for nuclear power fifth of the dose recommended on the Environmentallmpact Statements shall reactors. It also included a system for label for a calf. include considerations of the site, classifying accidents acmrding to a (2) Clostridium sordelliichallenge specifle environmentalimpacts graded scale of severity and probability l

I meterial, available upon request from attributable to accident sequences that of occurrence. Nine cleases of accidents l Veterinary Services, shall be used for lead to releases of radiation and/or were defined. ranging from trivial to challenge 14 to ts days following the radioactive materials, including very serious. It directed that "for each second injection of the product. Each of cleas, exmpt clac4es 1 and 9, the cight vaccinates and each of five 'Propo d .. .a An= to to cra Part sa environmental conwquences shall be i cdditional nonveccinated guinea pigs for Appendt D. se rn unat ne comnwon . NurA. evaluated as indicated." Class 1 events I controla shall be injected empheaanns '*eut*8an* *** 8.b-rmur gy were not to be considered because of ;

Intramuscularly with approximately 100 g1Q7jg,*l,ggy their trivial consequences, whereas in S 3

% of challenge material.nie dose A,,,,, u een una., ower. con *

as m regard to Clase 9 events. the Annex shall be determined by statisti;al amt : stated as followa:

l I ;

40102 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No.116 / Friday, June 13, 1980 / Rules and Regulations within a so.tnlle radius of the ' plant, and body on which the plant floats. Here the ne occurrences in case e involve staff emphasized its focus on risk to the aquences of postulated succesetve letture some differences between bol!!ng water

. more sev:re than those postulated for the reactors IBWR) and pmssurized water environment but did not find that the ns d probability of a core melt event

,, *),[, , ,,? $'ir reactors (FWR). Beyond these few specifica, the discussions have occurring in the first place was conwquenoes could be severe. However, the retterated the guidance of the Annex essentially any different than for land-probaMilty of their occurrenes is so small and have telled upon the Annex's based plant.Inits Memorandum and .

that their environmental risk is extremely Order in the Metter of Offshore Power .

low. Defense in depth (multiple physical conclusion that the p?obability of occurrence of a Clast 9 event is too low Systems

the Commission concurred in barrier:1. quality assurance for design. the staff's judgment. Dus, the Reactor minuf:cture andoperation,et,ntinued to warrant consideration, a conclusion '

surv:itlince and testing, and conservative based upon generally stated safety Safety Study and NRC experience with desta ere all applisd to provide and considerations. these cases has served to refocus attention on the need to reemphasize With the publication of the Reactor es : ce a po n i occi ts in this Safety Study (WASH-1400),in draft that environmental risk entalls both ,

- ci:ss are, and will remain. sufficiently remote form in August 1974 and final form in probabilities and consequences, a point ,!

in probability that the environmental risk la October 1975, the accident discussions that was made in the publication of the extrem31y low. For these reasons. It is not in Environmentallmpact Statements Annex,but was not given adequate nec:ss:ry to discuss such events in tpplicents' Environmental Reports. began to refer to this first detailed study emphasis.

in July 1977 the NRC commissioned a of the risks associated with nuclear Risk Assessment Review Group"to A footnote to the Annex stated: power plant accidents. particularly Although this annex refers to applicant's events which can lead to the melting of clarify the achievements and lim!tations Environmental Reports. the current of the Reactor Safety Study." One of the

' the fuelinside a reactor.' he references conclusions of this study, published in to this study were in keeping with the p le xcep as e conten may September 1978, as NUREG/CR.0400, intent and spirit of NEpA "to disclose" Risk Assessment Review Group Report j stherwise require, to AEC draft and final relevant information, but it is obvious '

Dat211:d Staternents. to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory that WASH-1400 did not form the basis Commission." was that "We Review Durin en riod that gg 'J , co 1 fer the conclusion expressed in the Annex in1971 that the probability of Grou was unable to detennine whether number of criticisms of the Anney Were the a solute probabilities of accident occurrence of Class 9 events was too sequences in WASii-1400 are hl6h or

" si d Prt cipaIamongthne wen low to warrant their (site specific) Iow, but bellsves that the error bounds j th' f Y consideration under NEPA. at e g neral Th hk h bl staffha however, a sejt ,d d t si t one does n t le to obi tive id bmissio findings of the Review Group have also j (2)It biled to treat the probabilities of circumstances which it felt warranted subsequently been referred to in

)

more extensive and detailed Environmental Impact Statements, along accidents in any but the most general consideration of Class 9 events. One of I fuld p cy a a m nt n the e or af y to a o that I s 9a id nt are ed r I e et r P a C 1 ) 3 2"#" NATA 0E"'

W= s':PeM2 2' tad#"'ms"!!n'C'I' risks need not be discuned light water reactor plants for which the January 18,1979.De Commlulon s statement accepted the findings of the (4) No guidance was ven as to how safety experience base is much broader, Review Group, both as to the Reactor in the Final Environmental Statement cccident and normal re esses of gj[Sjdy's achievements and as to lant for the CRBRP.' the staffincluded a '

radio 2ctive effluents duringfinto the operation should be factore discussion of the conalderationit had A few D Environmental given to Class 9 events. Statements have been published '

I cost-benefit analysis. In the early site revfew for the (5)ne accident assumptions are not subsequent to the Three Mile Island Perryman site, the staff performed an accident.These were for conventional g:nzrally applicable to ges cooled or Informal assessment of the relative land. based light water reactor plants liquid metal cooled reactors. '

(6) S:fety and environmental risks ar, differences in Class 9 accident and continued to reflect the past consequences among the alternative practice with respect to accidents at n2t essentially different considerations.

NJither the Atomic Energy sites. (SECY-76-137) such plants. but noted that the Commission not the NRC took any in the case of the application by experience gained from the Three Mile further action on this rulemaking except Offshore Power Systems to manufacture Island accident was not factored into 1 flosting nuclear power plants, the staff the discussion.

in 1974 when to CFR Part 51 was promulgated. Over the intervening yeare judged that the environmental risks of Our experience with past NEpA I the accident considerations discussed in some Class 9 events warranted special reviews of accidents and the TM1 consideration. no special accident clearly leads us to believe that l Environmental!mpact Statements for ! I proposed nuclear power plants reflected circumstances were the potentially a change is needed. ~ i serious consequences associated with I Accordingly, the proposed Annex to the guidance of the Annex with few I exceptions. Typically, the discussions of water (liquid) pathways leading to Appendix D of to CFR Part 50, published l

radiological exposures if a molten on December 1.1971,is hereby '

cccidInt consequences through Class a (d: sign basis accidents) for each case reactor core were to fall into the water withdrawn and shall not hereafter be '

have reflected specific site used by applicants not by the etoff.The

'lue of inw.et est 6e Reactor Safety Study l reasons for the withdrawal are as j characteristics assoCitled With meteorology (the dispersion et :alesses 7'N,j,",[",'fg' id i. 3','h','N'"' follows:

cf radioactive materialinto the .q.1, . ca,. .e . . Docket No, ltrN so.437. 5epteenber te. ts"a ctmosphers), the ectualpopulation swunsc.cs s.r.bmary wr,

)

I 1

1 i

48183 Federal Register / Vol. 45 No.116 / Priday June 13, 1980 / Rules and Regulations

= issued Statementa, nor, absent a The environmental consequences of

1. The Annex proscribes k releases whose pmbebility of occurence showing of similar special p con fderationcithe kinds of accidents

- (Cisse 9) that, according to the Reactor has been estimated shall also be circumstances, as a basis for opening.

discussed in probabilistic terma. Solb reopening, or expanding any previous or Safety Study, dominate the accident ongoing proceeding.*

. consequences shall be characterized in ri6k. terms of potential radiological However, itis also the intent of the )

g. %e definition of Class 9 accidents Commission that the staff take steps to 4

in the Annex is not sufficiently precise exposures to individuals, to population Identify additional cases that might to warrant its further use in Commission groups, and, when applicable, to blota. warrant early consideration of either Health and safety risks that may be policy, rules, and regulations, nor as a additional features or other actions Acision criterion in agency practice. associated with exposures to people which would prevent or mitigate the

3. The Annex's prescription of shallbe discussed in a manner that fairly reflects the current state of consequences of serious acx:identa.

assumptions to be used in the analye:s of the environmentalconsequences of knowledge regarding such Heks. Cases for such consideration are those Socioeconomic impacts that might be for which e Final Environmental accidents does not contribute to Statement has already been tasued at objective consideration. awociated with emergency measures )

during or following an accident should the Construction Permit stage but for

4. 'Ite Annex does not ve adequate also be discussed.The environmental which the Operating Ucense review l' consideration to the deta ed treatment stage has not yet been reached.In of measures taken to prevent and to risk of accidents should also be compared to and contrasted with carrying out this directive, the rtaff mitigate the consequences of accidents in the safety review of each application. radiological risks associated with should consider relevant site features.

%e classification of accidents normal and anticipated operational includingdpulation density, associated g ,eci posedin that Annex shallnolonger ,,i,,,,,,

used. In its place the following in promulgating this interim guidance, features atfresently operating planta interim guidance is given for the the Commission is aware that there are that substantive changes in plant design and willlikely remain for some time to reviews. features which may compenaste farther ne de stio i come many uncertainties in the for adverse site features may be more application of risk assessment methods, Accident Considerations in Future and it expects that its Environmental easily incorporated in plants when NEPA Reviews construction has not yet progressed very impact Statements willidentify major it is the position of the Commission uncertainties in its probabilistic far.

that its EnvironmentalImpact Environmental Reports submitted by estimates.On the other hand the Statements, pursuant to Section 102(c)(1) Commission believes that the state of applicants for construction permits and of the NationalEnvironmentalPolicy the art is sufficiently advanced that a for operating licenses on or after July 1, Act of 1909, shallinclude a reasoned beginning should now be made in the 1980 should include a discussion of the consideration of the environmental risks use of these methodologies in the environmental risks associated with accidents that follows the guidance (impacts) attributable to accidents at the regulatory process, and that such use 0 particular facility or facilities within the will represent a contractive and rational given herein.

scope of each such statement In the forward step in the discharge ofits Related Policy Mattwo Undse analysis and discussion of such risks, approximately equal attention shall be responsibilities. CalMe it is the intent of the Commission in In addition to its responsibilities given to the probability of occurrence of issuing this Statement ofInterim Policy under NEPA, the NRC also bears releases and to the probability of that the staff will initiate treatments of responsibility under the Atomic Energy occuwence of the environmental accident ccesiderations, in accordance 1

consequences of those releases. Act for the protection of the public with the foregoing guidance,in its health and safety from the hazards I Releases refer to radiation and/or ongoing NEPA reviews,i.e., for any j radioactive materiale entering associated with the use of nuclear envimnmental exposure pathways, proceeding at a licensing stage where a energy. Purso.nl to this responsibility !

Final Environmental Impact Statement including air, water, and g?cund water. the Commission notes that there are Events or accident segaces that has not yet bten issued.These new trestments, whiclewill take into account currently a number of ongoing activities lead to releases shallinclude but not be being considered by the Commission ,

limited to those that can reasonably be significant site and plant specific and its staff which intimately relate to l features, will result in more detailed the " Class 9 accident" question and i expected to occur. In plant accident sequences that canlead to a spectrum of discussions of accident risks than inwhich are either the subject of current previous environmental statements, rulemaking or are candidate subjects for releases shellbe discussed and shall particularly for those related to include sequences that can result in rulemaking.

inadequate cooling of reactor fuel and to conventionallight water plants at land. On December 19.19'/9 the melting of the reactor core.The extent to based sites. it is expected that these Commission issued for public comment

which events arising from causes revised trestments willlead to conclusions regarding the environmental a proposed rule which would external to the plant whleh are slgnificantly revise its requirements in 1 considered possible contributors to the risks of accidents similar to those that to CIT Part 50 for emergency planning i

would be reached by a continuation of risk associated with the particular plant for nuclear power planta. One of the current practices, particularly for cases considerations in this rulemaking was shall also be discussed. Detailed involving special circumstances where 4 quantitative considerations that form Class 9 risks have been considered by the basis of probabillstle estimates of 'Commoe.ionen Cata kr end nr.dford e y releases need not be incorporated in the the staff, as described above.Thus, this ** ** Mdaa of *e s****'s ** *a='s "'"*

Environmentallmpact Statements but change in policy is not to be construed '

as any lack of confidence in conclusions 7/,,'1, *,*1d E** * .

shall be referenced therein. Such regarding the environmental risks of .,, , io cs s .m.s references shall include, as appilcable, a +e ru msr.

accidents expressed in any previously reports on safety evaluations, l

l

, 40104 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No.116 / Friday, June 13, 1980 / Rules and Regulations For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. resellers and reseller-retailers of the potential consequences of Class 9 gasoline. Generally, the new rules accidents in a generic sense.? Samuel J. Chilk.

Secretary of the Comm/ssion permit resellen and reseller-retailers to In August 1979, pursuant to the compute maximum lawful selling prices Commisston's request a Siting Policy gra om awsu nw sas-am sis ..i based on the acquisition cost of the type Task Force made recommendations with auseo caos raso.es es or grade of gasoline, plus a fixed cents respect to possible changes in NRC per gallon markup depending on the reactor siting policy and criteria,e type of sale, plus tax costs.8 %e new currently set forth in to CFR Part 100. As DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY rules are similar to the retaller price ,

stated therein. its recommendations Economic Regulatory Administration rules adopted in July 1979.

were made to accomplish (among Under the new rules, acqafsition cost g,g; i 10 CFR Parts 210,212 is' defined as the last purchese price for o ake into con d ret on in siting the risk en gasob sales d 5 mMon suociated with accidents beyond the design (Docket No. ERA-A-79-32El gallons or less in calendar yeer 1979. For basis IClass s) by establishing population sellers with sales of more that. 5 million

<tensley an t distribution criterta- Rosellers' and Raseller Retailers' Price ne of a o in I V

%ls matter is currently before the Rules for Gasoftne d I

Acewev: Economic Regulatory cost of product in inventory cominuted l Commbalon.

pursuant to the seller's historical l This and other recommendations that Administration. Department of Energy.

accounting practices consistently I have been made as a result of the Acnose Final rule, investigations into the Three Mile Island applied.8 accident are cunently being brought sUweaARY:De Department of Energy Generally, the reta!!er price rules together by the Commission's staff in (DOE) hereby adopts three amendments adopted in July 1979 permit retailers to the form of proposed Action Plans.' to its reseller and reseller-retailer price alter their norrnal business practices Among other matters. these incorporate rules. First, small resellers and reseller- with respect to sales of gasoline. The recommendations for rulemaking related retallers (sales in calender year 1979 of new reseller retailer rules do not contain l

to degraded core cooling and core melt 5 million gallons of gasoline or less) are a similar provMon. However, in most accidents.The Commission expects to pennitted the option of computing other respects the July 1979 price rules

" acquisition cost" using the firm's for independent retailers and the new issue decisions on these Action Plans in reseller-retailer price rules are similar.

the near future. !t is the Ccmmission's historical accounting practices consistently applied. Second, the normal Finally, the restriction on the amount policy and intent to devote NRC's major ofincreased commissions that may be resources to matters which the business practices rule is amended to Commission believes will make existing treet reseller-retallers consistently with passed through in price increases by independent retailers with respect to refiners was removed. In doing so, and future nuclear power plants safer, retail gasoline sales. Third, the however, the provision that permitted and to prevent a recurrence of the kind exception to the refiner equal refiners an exception to the equal of accident that occurred at Three Mile Island. In the interim. however, and application rule regarding retail sales by application rule to reflect increased consignee agents is reinstated. commissions in the setall selling price pending completion of rulemaking activities in the areas o*f emergency DATE: Effective May 1,1980. charged by commission agents was planning, sitin criteria, and design and deleted.

rom FURTHeR INFOntaADON CONTACT Robert C. Gillette (&aring Procedures). fl. Amendments co a erations of e ou ent Economic Regulatory Administration. Comments received by DOE since the potential, the Commission finds it Room 2214. 2000 M Street NW.- Issuance of the rule indicate that a few essential to improve its procedures for Washington. D.C. 20461 (202) 653-3757 small sellers would prefer to use the describing and disclosing to the public William L. Webb (Office of Public cost of product in inventory rather than the basis for arriving at conclusions Inf rmation). Economic Regulatory the last purchase price to determine regarding the environmental risks due to Administration, Room 110-B. 2000 M requisition cost. Generally these sellers accidents at nuclear power plants. On Street NW., Washington. D.C. 20461 purchase product from more than one completion of the rulemaking activities supplier at widely varying prices.

in these areas, and based also upon the egulat ons and Chu k Bot experience gained with this statement of Emergency Manning), Economic i with nopect to utabbehtne the mutmum interim policy and guidance, the Regulatory Administradon. Room lawM wilins price for sesohol. which is the subloct Commission intends to pursue p ssible 7204. 2000 M Street. NW., Washington, of a Notice of Proposed Rulemakins (43 ITl 5464a.

changes or additions to 10 CFR Part 51 May 12. seen urwtastandins statownte to **

D.C. 20481 (202) 653-3202 contrary in Set rulemaktns. the new pnce rules for to codify its positfon on the role of William Funk or William Mayo Iee re.dem rudo rotaneuw retence pcmn accident riske under NEPA. (Office of General Counsel). eene,e hi blud enohol to miablish a mutmum Deted at Washington D.C., thle 9th day of Department of Energy. Room 6A-127, lewfut utlins price for suoholin a mannu ht to th' enene ud alcohol compents of June 1981 1000 independence Avenue.SW.. t'"ohot as separete products under h price rules es We shington. D.C. 20585 (202) 252-4736 Accordinsty. the ooguistuon cost of each is a

'Cf. NUREG.me6. "Plannins Basis for h compoaent of the blender's maximum tewful allins Development of Biate end local Govemment or 252-6754 '

pdc' I*' 888*h*I-Radiolog6 cal Emersency Response Plans tn Support SUPPttestNTARY INp0RatAT10ec 'If a firm has constetently and historically used of t4ht weta Nuclest Pown Plants." November 1. Background more ha one accounung practice for detumaning Itt b cost of product in innetory (e4, one for DOE'e a NUREG o628. " Report of the Satins Pelley Task II. Amendments III. Procedural Requirements price rulee and one for inconw tu purposes). the Faros." Aueust te*9 nrm may choose et$ hor of these accountins e Draft NUREG.cesa

Action Plans for precuces to determine N onet of product in implementing Recommendations of the Proeidenrs I. Background inventory under h hew. fixed marytn eneDer and Conuntest.on and Other Stud,6es of b Tho-a On April 26.1980 (45 FR 29548. May 2. renun rotann rule ne firm. of courw. must ge4,,i o, 6, sa se s consistency oppty ht precues unde the new rule-1980) DOE issued new price rules for 3

0' i:.

C, .

s Table 5.8 Approximate 2-hour radiation doses from design-basis accidents at exclusion area boundary l

Dose (rems) at 914 m*,

J- Events whole body

@,u,1y fh F Infrequent Accidents

+g ,

"f. Waste gas tank failure 0.1 Small-break LOCA** 0.04 i $tk Steam generator, tube b: rupture *** 0.03 mg.

JM.t Limiting Faults b~ Main steamline break 0.0005 Control rod ejection 0.004 Large-break LOCA 1.04

Plant Exclusion Area Boundary Distance.

U2 **LOCA-Loss of Coolant Accident; the TMI-2 accident

. i.nfi - was one kind of a small-break LOCA.

JE4 ***See NUREG-0651 for descriptions of three steam d.$ 7 generator tube rupture accidents that have g' occurred in the United States, eygg:-

,in 10 CFR 100.11(a). The results of these calculations show that for these at' events the exposures are not expected to exceed 16 rems to the whole body and

[ q f'127remstothethyroidofanyindividualattheexclusionareaboundaryovera d

For calculation of the thyroid dose, it was assumed that an J v.d7 ,">, period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . individual would be located at a point on the exclusion area boundar

$ 5 D iradioiodine concentration in the plume has its highest value and inhaled at a

D M breathing rate characteristic of a person jogging, for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

GU The health risk to an individual receiving such a dose to the thyroid is the i w.m potential appearance of benign or malignant thyroid nodules in about 6 out of 0 100 cases, and the development of a fatal thyroid cancer in about 2 out of 1000 n e cases.

g g None of the calculations of the impacts of design-basis accidents described in

, b. this section takes into consideration possible reductions in individual or popu-F TIg{1ationexposuresasaresultofanyprotectiveactions.

N (2) Probabilistic Assessment of Severe Accidents Q~~ [~ ,In this and the following three sections, there is a discussion of the prob-abilities and consequences of accidents of greater severity than the design-

' . basis accidents discussed in the previous section. As a class, they are con-

;'*a 'sidered less likely to occur, but their consequences could be more severe, both for the plant itself and for the environment. These severe accidents, hereto-Ve' frequently called Class 9 accidents, can be distinguished from design-g c1 basis accidents in two primary respects: they involve substantial physical t ,fg$%

f/j S 5-47 pgteabrookFES y._%

w s

I b l

[

' deterioration of the fuel in the reactor core, including overheating to the l

point of melting, and they involve deterioration of the capability of the con-l tainment structure to perform its intended function of limiting the release of

! radioactive materials to the environment.

The assessment methodology employed is that described in the Reactor Safety Study (RSS), which was published in 1975 (NUREG-75/014). Because this report g has been subject to considerable controversy, a discussion of the uncertainties : :

surrounding it is provided in Section 5.9.4.5(7). However, the sets of accident : (

sequences that were found in the RSS to be the dominant contributors to the risk in the prototype PWR (Westinghouse-designed Surry Unit 1) have recently been updated ("rebaselined") (NUREG-0715). The rebaselining has been done largely to incorporate peer group comments (NUREG/CR-0400) and better data and i analytical techniques resulting from research and development after the publica-tion of the RSS. Entailed in the rebaselining effort was the evaluation of the ;

individual dominant accident sequences--as . hey are understood to evolve. The i earlier technique of grouping a number of accident sequences into the encom-passing " Release Categories" as was done in the RSS has been largely (but not completely) eliminated. l The Seabrook plants are Westinghouse-designed PWRs having similar design and operating characteristics to the RSS prototype PWR. Therefore, the present assessment for Seabrook has used as its starting point the rebaselined accident sequences and release categories referred to above, and more fully described in Appendix E. Characteristics of the sequences and release categories used (all of which involve partial to complete melting of the reactor core) are shown in Table ~5.9. Sequences initiated by natural phenomena such as tornadoes, floods, or seismic events and these that could be initiated by deliberate acts of sabo-tage are not included in these event sequences. It is the staff's judgment that the radiological consequences of such events would not be different in kind from those which have been treated. Moreover, there are design requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, relating to effects of natural phenomena, and safeguards requirements in 10 CFR 73, ensuring that these potential initiators are in large 3 measure taken into account in the design and operation of the plant. The data ;

base for assessing the probabilities of events more severe than the design bases j for natural phenomena or sabotage events is beyond the state-of-the-art of pro- j babilistic risk assessment. In addition, the staff judges that the additional l risk from severe accidents initiated by natural events or sabotage is within .

{

the uncertainty of risks presented for the sequences considered here. l The calculated probability per reactor year associated with each accident sequence or release category used is shown in the second column in Table 5.9.

As in the RSS there are substantial uncertainties in these probabilities. This !

is due, in part, to difficulties associated with the quantification of human {

error and to inadequacies in the data base on failure rates of individual plant )

components that were used to calculate the probabilities (ibid). The probabil-ity of accident sequences from the Surry plant was used to give a perspective of the societal risk at Seabrook because, although the probabilities of particu- '

lar accident sequences may be different and even improved for Seabrook, the overall effect of all sequences taken together is likely to be within the ,

uncertainties (see Section 5.9.4.5(7) for discussion of uncertainties in risk y l

estimates).

, i l l

Seabrook FES 5-48 i L l 9, : i

, t l

0 0 0 2 6 .

- 0 0 0

8 1 4

4 1 3 1

0 0 0 x .

u . . H s

R 0 0 0 1 S e d A t t e s

W a m

n e a 8 , i d e - I t s

i l 0 I c e r 4 1 V e c r S 4 2 c - 1 0 0 x x . k y a . . . i s s l r B 0 0 0 1 d e i a o -

n i r c t e r i n p o n t e 5 p g i e v - A e h n 0 t s t i b 1 n a e o S 1 5 i C i p e - 4 1 3 x t y r e . . d e n h o T 0. 0 0 2 e s i c .

t a a n n e t i f e l r

) o 5 s e e

~ sd - e R c t e n 0 r n sn o b 1 p d u ii i R 2 9 n el t - 8 3 2 x s a f l e c s . . . i o es a C 0 0 0 1 s rs r s e n b F m s n c o ce i s

i r 5 i e r( - n u . s e 0 a q m u hR 1 h e C c pW 4 1 c s s sP 6 3 2 x e , i o . . . m t m d t

ua I 0 0 0 2 e e n A a

c.v cn i s d a i u r

e c o

. fo'sc 3 0

- l e a c

P f

~ yc r p )

1 rn r e N 7 ae K 0 0 8 x d h (

mu mq

- . n t a

5 e 1 1 0 6 d .

ue X f N 4 Ss s p

o .

9 u n r .

9 r o o P 5 y r i .

5 y r- g t c ,

n p T e o e t o 8 8 8 5 e i p r ,C i t

l i t - - - -

b l c 0 0 0 0 o c o ,

c 4

c ia 1 1 1 1 t s M b e T b e o e N S ar x x x x s d ,

b i o ,

o or 0 0 0 0 r C r t re . . . . e o Z P p 2 3 3 4 h f ,

r t h ,

e E R a f

n L e p

o x , r i u ,

u d d R Y e .

o n n s rr u e s s a og o p e e e r p d d l t ee g A u u P

. ncc V k l l enn c e c c (y Iti d ee t a e n n :

iuu cqq n 'B 3 7 B S I I e e L R R * *

t t y

cee A ss E v M T

W P

N o

u e

o y4 o? ?w .

y$

w ,

t

1 1

The magnitudes (curies) of radioactivity release for each accident sequence or ;

release category are obtained by multiplying the release fractions shown in Table 5.9 by the amounts that would be present in the core at the time of the I hypothetical accident. These are shown in Table 5.7 for a Seabrook plant at a i core thermal power level of 3425 MWt, the power level used in the safety evaluation.

The potential radiological consequences of these releases have been calculated i by the consequence model used in the RSS (NUREG-0340) adapted and modified as described below to apply to a specific site. The essential elements are shown in schematic form in Figure 5.3. Environmental parameters specific to the site of the Seabrook facility have been used and include the following:

meteorological data for the site representing a full year of consecutive hourly measurements and seasonal variations projected population for the year 2000 extending throughout regions of 80-km (50-mi) and 563-km (350-mi) radius from the site (The weighted aver-age transient population extended to a 16-km (10-mi) radius from the site.)

the habitable land fraction within the 563-km (350-mi) radius land-use statistics, on a statewide basis, including farm land values, farm product values including dairy production, and growing season infor- -

mation, for the State of New Hampshire and each surrounding state within 2 the 563-km (350-mi) region land-use statistics including farmland values, farm product values includ-ing dairy production and growing season information for the adjoining regions of Canada within the 563-km (350-mi) radius, based on comparison with the values for the nearby states of the U.S To obtain a probability distribution of consequences, the calculations are per-formed assuming 'the occurrence of each accident-release sequence at each of 91 !

different " start" times throughout a 1 year period. Each calculation utilizes (1) the site-specific hourly meteorological data, (2) the population projec-tions for the year 2000 out to a distance of 800 km (500 miles) around Seabrook '

site, including weighted average transient population (in particular seasonal beach visitors), and (3) seasonal information for the time period following each " start" time. The consequence model also contains provisions for incor-porating the consequence reduction benefits of evacuation, relocation, and other protective actions. Early evacuation and relocation of people would con-siderably reduce the exposure from the radioactive cloud and the contaminated ground in the wake of the cloud passage. The evacuation model used (see Appendix F) has been revised from that used in the RSS for better site-specific application. The quantitative characteristics of the evacuation model used for the Seabrook site are estimates made by the staff and are based upon evacuation time estimates prepared by the applicant. There normally would be some facili-ties near a plant, such as schools or hospitals, where special eqijipment or personnel may be required to effect evacuation and some people near a site who may choose not to evacuate. Several such facilities have been identified near the Seabrook site, such as the Exeter Hospital, the Winnacunnet Cooperative High School and the Hampton and Seabrook beaches. Therefore, actual evacuation Seabrook FES 5-50

__ . _1

~

?. e' m.

f', ,

' i. ; n <

t'l , Weather Data Y.

.. , 'l Release Categories ] Atmospheric l Dispersion

. Oosimetry - Health Effects i

Cloud Oepletion Property Damage

] Population _

o I a Ground

f Contamination t'

~

Evacuation 4

i t-Figure 5.3 Schematic outline of atmospheric pathway consequence model

}

M l

f N l l

f.

i i db 4

Seabrook FES 5-51 q.

L' i

I

', effectiveness could be greater or less than that characterized but would not be l

expected to be very much less. These facilities will be given specific consid-i eration in the development of the evacuation plans for the Seabrook vicinity.

} Full power operation of the Seabrook plant will not be permitted until evacua-t tion plans have been approved by the NRC.

The other protective actions include: (1) either complete denial of use (inter- f diction), or permitting use only at a sufficiently later time after appropriate decontamination of food stuffs such as crops and milk, (2) decontamination of ]-

severely contaminated environment (land and property) when it is considered to be economically feasible to lower the levels of contamination to protective ,

action guide (PAG) levels, and (3) denial of use (interdiction) of severely l contaminated land and property for varying periods of time until the contamina- i; tion levels reduce to such values by radioactive decay and weathering so that ;

land and property can be economically decontaminated as in (2) above. These 1 actions would reduce the radiological exposure to the people from immediate and/or subsequent use of or living in the contaminated environment. f[

Early evacuation within and early relocation of people from outside the plume exposure pathway EPZ (see Appendix F) and other protective actions as mentioned above are considered as essential sequels to serious nuclear reactor accidents involving significant release of radioactivity to the atmosphere. Therefore, the results shown for Seabrook include the benefits of these protective actions.

There are also uncertainties in each facet of the estimates of consequences and the error bounds may be as large as they are for the probabilities (see :

Figure 5.3). j j

The results of the calculations using this consequence model are radiological -

doses to individuals and to populations, health effects that might result from '

these exposures, costs of implementing protective actions, and costs associated with property damage by radioactive contamination.

(3) Dose and Health Impacts of Atmospheric Releases The results of the calculations of dose and health impacts performed for the Seabrook facility and site are presented in the form of probability distribu-tions in Figures 5.4 through 5.7 and are included in the impact summary table, jd Table 5.10. All of the accident sequences and release categories shown in Table 5.9 contribute to the results, the consequences from each being weighted by its associated probability. di y

Figure 5.4 shows the probability distribution for the number of persons who

~

might receive whole-body doses equal to or greater than 200 rems and 25 rems, {e and thyroid doses equal to or greater than 300 rems from early exposure,* all t on a per-reactor year basis. The 20.0-cem whole-body dose figure corresponds -

approximately to a threshold value for which hospitalization would be indicated for the treatment of radiation injury. The 25-rem whole-body dose (which has ;p 5

I

Early exposure to an individual includes external doses from the radioactive cloud and the contaminated ground, and the dose from internally deposited 5 ,

radionuclides from inhalation of contaminated air during the cloud passage. l Other pathways of exposure are excluded.

Seabrook FES 5-52 ,

l

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

ML20235R852

Contents

Text

Dear Ms. Pierce-Bjorklund:

Dear s. Pierce.Bjorklund:

Enclosure:

Enclosure:

Dear Ms. Pierce-Bjorklund:

Dear s. Pierce-Bjorklund:

Enclosure:

Dear s. Pierce.Bjorklund:

Navigation menu

ML20235R852

Text

Dear Ms. Pierce-Bjorklund:

Dear s. Pierce.Bjorklund:

Enclosure:

Enclosure:

Dear Ms. Pierce-Bjorklund:

Dear s. Pierce-Bjorklund:

Enclosure:

Dear s. Pierce.Bjorklund:

Navigation menu

Search